

The Right Hon.ble WILLIAM PITT, Esq.r

LETTERS

ON

THE LATE WAR

BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN:

TOGETHER WITH

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS,

ON

THE SAME SUBJECT.

BY WILLIAM COBBETT, ESQ.

NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY J. BELDEN AND CO.

Van Winkle & Wiley, Printers.

1815.

DISTRICT OF NEW-YORK, ss.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the twenty-seventh day of November, in the fortieth year of the Independence of the United States of America, J. Belden & Co. of the said district, have deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof they claim as proprietors, in the words following, to wit:

"Letters on the late War between the United States and Great Britain: together with other Miscellaneous Writings, on the same Subject. By William Cobbett, Esq."

In conformity to the act of Congress of the United States, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;" and also to an act, entitled, "An act, supplementary to an act, entitled an act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints."

THERON RUDD,
Clerk of the Southern District of New-York.

PREFACE.

A PREFACE, in many instances, may be said to be an apology to the public for the entertainment which the author or publisher is about to set before his readers; and, conscious of the inferiority of the viands, of the defect in cookery, or the misarrangement of the table, he is induced to make known his disappointment at what he intended should be a treat, and to ask the pardon of his guests.

Considering a preface in this light, we should not pretend to offer one to our readers. We have no apology to make for the contents of this volume: it contains the writings of a man, on the concerns of America, whose energetic pen has been, for twenty years, employed in political discussions, and who, from the boldness and originality of his style, as well as from his perspicuity of expression, has received the current approbation of the generality of English readers, and even silenced the pen of invidious criticism.

We are aware that all we could say, either in favour of, or against these letters, would not add an atom to their merit, or detract from the prejudice which many may feel towards them; but we consider it a duty that we owe to the public, to state our opinion of the writer, and our inducements to their publication.

William Cobbett, during his residence in the United States, appeared among us as the foe to civil liberty, and the most virulent opposer of republics. It will be recollected, however, by our readers, that this was in an epoch of the French revolution, and in a day, too, when its horrors were at their height; which were, in some instances, sufficient to disgust the most strenuous advocates of liberty and the RIGHTS OF MAN. Instead of liberty, it carried with it the stamp of licentiousness; and under the toga of Roman eloquence, breathing virtue and self devotion, was a dagger concealed, yet warm with blood, and thirsting for further victims. At an era like this, many men who, before and since, have been the steadiest and most zealous friends of republicanism, were even staggered in their faith, and revolted at the bloody calendar which the times displayed.

We do not by this intend to become the apologists of William Cobbett, or of his writings at that day, under the title of Porcupine; they were too slanderous, too anti-republican, and too hostile to the interests of this nation, for any American pen to vindicate: if any defence can be made, it is that he was devoted to the cause of his own avowed country, England; and that, feeling too strongly the enormities of France during the throes of her revolution, he carried America and all republican systems into the vortex of his enmity.

The continued devotion of his talents to politics, from that day until the present, and the prodigies which have eventuated within this period, have

operated to cause a revolution in his sentiments, as regards states, kingdoms, and councils, almost as wonderful as the changes, chances, and disasters, which have astonished and distracted the world, by turns, for the last quarter century. From the friend of monarchy, the supporter of crowned heads, of legitimate sovereignty, of titles, clergy, and tythes, William Cobbett has become the champion of civil liberty, the defender of the rights of man, the opponent of clerical intolerance, and the advocate of the independence and integrity of nations: from the Porcupine, armed with his venomous quills to assail the republic of America and her institutions, he has become her friend and advocate, even amongst her enemies; and in as much as he once attempted to wound her, has he endeavoured at reparation of injury by doing her service. Some of our readers may say all this has been produced by self interest; that he was the *hireling* writer of England while in America; the hireling writer of the ministry on his return; and that he now is the hireling writer of the opposition. Allowing all this to be true, of which we know nothing, are we to reject the writings of any one, because he was once employed to do us an injury, but who is now engaged in a better cause, and feels desirous to do us a service?

We believe that William Cobbett did receive remuneration for his writings while in America; but we also believe him now to be independent, and so much so, that he is placed far above receiving a stipend or salary from either one party or the other; and that

he now is endeavouring to hold, at least, for the remainder of his life, a steady, unbiassed, and independent pen, fearless of frowns, and heedless of favours. His writings certainly bear no more analogy to the speeches of the members of the opposition, than to those of the ministerial bench, excepting that of the thorough contempt which he now bears for those privileged orders he once extolled, and those licentious exactions he once called necessary. The opposition never uttered, nor dared to utter, such sentiments as are expressed by Cobbett in these letters. They are completely *unique*, to come from the pen of an Englishman, and are as bold as *unique*, possessing within themselves a property, *sui generis*, which neither king, lords, nor commons could imitate, for they speak a language they are not wont to hear—the language of truth, exhibiting *their errors, their injustice, and folly.*

Instead of adverting to what William Cobbett has been, we therefore prefer to do justice to what he now is, and, presenting these letters as *his index*, we leave him to the better judgment of our readers.

*** *It is not the novelty of these letters which induces our publication, but in order to preserve them for the American reader. Many of them have been published in our daily papers; but the ephemeral fate of a newspaper is such as would not warrant its being made a chronicle of reference; besides, we are convinced that no one paper contains all these letters, and, in those that contain the most of them, they are so heterogeneously*

mixed, that the reader is in pain while he resorts to them. With regard to our chronological arrangement of dates, &c. the reader must make an excuse for us in his own mind, by considering the detached and uncertain manner in which they reached us. We have, in some instances, preferred following the order of the subject than the date, for which, we should presume, he would feel rather pleased than angry. Conscious that we have exerted ourselves to gratify our patrons, we shall feel proud of their pleasure, and shall continue our compilations of William Cobbett's writings on America, should these be received with the public's approbation.

New-York, November, 1815.

LETTERS

OF

WILLIAM COBBETT, ESQ.

LETTER I.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

Sir,

FEELING, as the people of this kingdom do so severely, smarting, writhing, as we are, under the effects of the war with France, and considering how easily this war might, in 1793, have been avoided without either danger or dishonour to England; thus feeling, and thus reflecting, it is natural for us, when threatened with a new war, to inquire, betimes, what are the grounds of such war; whether it would be *just;* if just, whether it would be *necessary;* and, be the cause what it may, whether the *consequences* are likely to be good or evil.

If, sir, the counsels of Mr. Fox had been listened to, in the years 1792 and 1793, the state of England, of Europe, and of the world, would have been very different indeed from what it now is. A war against opinions and principles would not have been waged; England, instead of becoming a party in that fatal and disgraceful war, would have been a mediatress between the conflicting parties, if, indeed, she had not wholly prevented the conflict. So many governments would not have been overthrown; such rivers of human blood would not have been shed; *reformation* might and would have been produced, because the state of things, and the temper of men's minds, demanded it; but no where need there have been destruction; all the states of Europe might have remained on their old foundations, and the Bourbons might at this day have been upon the thrones of France and Spain. This kingdom, too, might, and must have shared in the *reformation;* but such reformation would have made no inroads upon rank or property; and the nation would have avoided all those measures of coercion, all those before-unheard-of laws to which the contest gave rise;

and those enormous expenses, which, first producing debt and tenfold taxation, led by degrees to that *pauperism* and *paper money*, which now form the two great and hideous features in the state of our internal affairs, and which no man who really loves the country can contemplate without the most serious apprehensions.

Such being the consequences of that war, or, rather a part of these consequences, the far greater proportion of them being, in all probability, yet to come, it behooves those who have power to act *to consider well* before they launch the country into a new war; and it is the right of every man to express, in the way which he may think most likely to be efficient, his opinions upon the subject. This right I am now about to exercise, and if I have chosen, as the vehicle, an address to your Royal Highness, it is because that respect, which inclination as well as duty dictate upon such an occasion, will not fail to make me dismiss from my mind all partiality and prejudice, and to offer nothing unsupported by fair reasoning and undeniable facts.

As to the *grounds of the present dispute* with the American States, they are some of them of very long standing. The conduct of this government relative to the war against those States was extremely unwise; but its conduct since the war is, I am convinced, unparalleled in the annals of diplomatic folly. The moment that war was at an end, the *people* of the two countries, attached to each other by all the ties which imperious nature has provided, were ready to rush into a mutual embrace, and like children of the same common parent, whose harmony had been disturbed by a transient quarrel, to become even more affectionate towards each other than they had been before. Not so the *governments*. With them ambition and resentment had something to say. But, the American Government being, from the nature of its constitution, a thing of such transient possession, it would have been impossible for any set of men long to remain in power if they had been discovered to entertain a vindictive disposition towards England; that is to say, if the government of England had discovered no such disposition towards America. Unhappily such a disposition was but too plainly seen in the whole of the conduct of our government; and hence we have witnessed, from the end of the American war to this day, a dispute, and an angry dispute too, upon some ground or other, constantly existing and in agitation between the two countries, to the great injury of them both, to the great injury of the cause of freedom, and to the great advantage of France as a nation, and to the cause of despotic sway all over the world. The *war* was at an end, but the *quarrel* seemed only to have begun: a seven years war, and an already eight-and-twenty years of quarrel!

It was full ten years before we condescended to send a Minister to reside in America, and when we did it, the object seemed to be only to recall, or to render more active, ancient animosities. A miserable dispute about old claims for debts due to English subjects on one side, and about negroes carried off at the peace on the other side, clouded and made gloomy the dawn of this new diplomatic intercourse. This dispute was kept alive until new claims for vessels unlawfully confiscated arose on the part of the American government. The treaty of 1794, which provided for Commissioners to settle these claims would, it was hoped, produce harmony; but it is well known that it only widened the breach. At last, however, we patched up this matter: we yielded, but it was without magnanimity—we gave our money; the nation was taxed to make up for the blunders of the cabinet; but we gave without the credit of generosity. In the meanwhile, the English creditors have remained, many of them until this day, unsatisfied, while a Board of Commissioners, who have been sitting either here or in America ever since the year 1794, or, at least, have been paid all that time, have swallowed up in expenses to the nation, a great part of what would have sufficed to satisfy our own claimants without any application for money for that purpose to the American States. In the course of this part of the dispute there was much unfairness on the part of the American Government; and we might have been fully justified, strictly speaking, in coming to a rupture upon that ground. But, we came to neither a rupture nor a reconciliation: we asserted our claims, and then gave them up; but we took care to choose that manner of doing it, which effectually took all merit from the thing.

This point was hardly patched up, when another subject of dispute arose; to that another, and another, and another, have succeeded, the long-contested question relative *to the impressment of American seamen* running through the whole. So that, at last, there has grown together a mass of disputes and of ill-blood, which threaten us with a new war, and which war threatens us with new burdens, and, still worse, which threatens the world with the extinguishment of some part, at least, of its remaining liberties. The points, however, more immediately at issue, are those relating to the present *non-importation law* and the *affair between the American Frigate President, and our sloop of war, the Little Belt.* As to the former points in dispute, the Americans were the complainants: they called for satisfaction, and, whether they ought to have obtained it or not, it is certain that they have not yet obtained it. Upon these two recent points, therefore, as being thought likely to lead to war, and as being so represented by those public prints which are known to be under the influence of persons in power,

I shall now proceed most respectfully to offer to your Royal Highness such remarks as the occasion appears to me to demand.

The *Non-Importation Act*, that is to say, the law which has been passed in America to prohibit the importation of any thing being the growth or manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland, and which law is now in force in America, must doubtless be regarded as a measure of a hostile, though not of a warlike nature, because the same law does not apply to the enemy with whom we are at war; and, beside this commercial prohibition, our ships of war are shut out from the harbours, rivers, and waters of the United States, while our enemy's ships of war are permitted freely to enter and abide in them. These are distinctions of an unfriendly nature: they are, indeed, measures of hostility; but, then, I beg your Royal Highness to bear in mind, that they are acts of a much lower degree of hostility than were the acts of your Royal Father's ministers against France in the Year 1792, though they, to this hour, contend, that that war was a war of *aggression* on the part of France; and, of course, their own doctrine, if now cited against this country, would be quite sufficient on the part of America. But the fact is, that the non-importation act, and the exclusion of British ships from the waters of America, while importation is permitted from France, and while French ships have free entrance and abidance in the waters of the United States, are acts of a hostile nature, and would, if unjustified by provocation, fully authorize, on our part, acts of reprisal and of war.

But, sir, these measures, on the part of America, have not been adopted without alleged provocation, and without loud and reiterated remonstrances. They have, in fact, arisen out of certain measures adopted by us, and which measures are alleged to be in violation of the rights of America as a neutral nation; and, therefore, before we can justify a war in consequence of the hostile measures of America, we must ascertain whether her allegations against us be true; for, if they be, we may find, perhaps, that she is not only not blamable for what she has now done, but is entitled to praise for her forbearance and moderation.

That we have violated the rights of America as a neutral state, there can be no doubt. The fact is not denied; nor is it pretended, that the violation would not, in itself, be sufficient to justify any degree of hostility on the part of the offended state. Indeed, to dispute these facts, would be to show a total disregard of truth; for, we have published, and, as far as in us lies, we have carried, and still carry into execution, *an interdict against all trade on the part of America, except such as we choose to license.* We have said to her, that she shall not carry the produce of her soil and exchange it for the produce

of the soil of France, Italy, or Holland. If we meet with one of her ships laden with the flour of Pennsylvania, and owned by a Pennsylvanian merchant, bound to any port of the French empire, we compel such ship to come into some one of our ports, and there to unlade and dispose of her cargo, or else to *pay duty upon it*, before we permit her to proceed on her voyage. In short, we have issued and acted upon such edicts as establish an absolute control and sovereignty over the ships of America, and all that part of the population and property of America that are employed in maritime commerce.

That the rights of America are herein openly violated, all the world knows. Your Royal Highness need not be reminded of the dispute, so long continued, relative to the *right of search*; that is to say, a right, on the part of a belligerent, to search merchant neutral ships at sea, in order to ascertain whether they had on board *contraband goods of war*, or *goods belonging to an enemy*. It was contended by those who denied the right of search, that no belligerent had a right to search a neutral at sea, in any case; and that, if this point was given up, the *goods* of an enemy, in a neutral ship, ought not to be seized, for that the neutrality of the ship protected the goods. To this doctrine English writers and statesmen have never subscribed; they insisted, that we had a right to search neutral ships upon the high seas, and if we found contraband articles, or enemy's goods on board of them, to seize them, and, in some cases, to make ship, as well as cargo, lawful prize. But, no statesman, no lawyer, no writer, ever pretended, that we had a right to seize in a *neutral ship* the *goods of a neutral party*. No one ever dreamt of setting up a right like this, which, in fact, is neither more nor less than making war upon the neutrals; because we do to them the very worst that we can do, short of wanton cruelty, of which the laws and usages of *war* do not allow.

In justification of the adoption of these our measures towards America, our government asserted, that France had *begun* the violation of the neutral rights of America, and that our measures were in the way of *retaliation*, and that the laws of war allowed of retaliation. It is a singular species of *law*, which, because a weak nation has been injured by one powerful nation, subjects it to be injured by another. If Belcher were to beat Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool in the street, Crib would not, for that reason, be justified in beating them too: this would, I presume, be deemed a new and most outrageous species of retaliation; and there is little doubt that the belligerent pugilists would soon be sent to a place where they would have leisure to study the laws of war. But it is alleged by our government, that the Americans *submitted* to the Decrees of Napoleon; that they

acquiesced in his violation of their rights; and that it was just in us to treat them in the same manner that he had treated them, because they had so submitted and acquiesced. The same reason would apply equally well in justification of the above supposed retaliatory measures of Crib, who also might, with just as much truth, accuse Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool of submission and acquiescence with regard to Belcher; for they could not avoid submission and acquiescence to superior force; they might *cry out*, indeed, and they would cry out; and so did the Americans, who, from the first day to the last of the existence of the French Decrees, ceased not to remonstrate against them, and that, too, in the strongest terms; and, therefore, there appears not to have been the slightest ground whereon to build a justification of our measures as measures of *retaliation*.

But, sir, if our measures were not justifiable upon the supposition that this violation of neutral rights was *begun* by the enemy, surely they must be declared to be wholly without justification, if it appear that *we ourselves were the beginners* in this career of violation of the rights of America as a neutral state; and that this is the fact is clearly proved by the documents which have long ago been laid before the public, but which I beg leave to call to the recollection of your Royal Highness.

This rivalship in the violation of neutral rights began in a declaration, on our part, made to America through her Minister here, that she was to consider the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave, as in a state of rigorous blockade, though it was notoriously impossible for us to maintain such blockade by actual forces. The grounds for this measure were stated to be, that *the King of Prussia* (and not France) had forcibly and hostilely taken possession of various parts of *the Electorate of Hanover* and other dominions belonging to his majesty, and had shut English ships out of the Prussian ports. This might be a very good reason for shutting the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave, against *Prussian* ships; but, surely it gave us no right to shut them against the ships of America, whose government had had nothing to do with the King of Prussia's hostile seizure upon the Electorate of Hanover; who had neither aided him, abetted him, nor encouraged him in any manner whatever; and, it was very hard that the people of America should be made to suffer from the result of a dispute, be it what it might, between the King of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover. The King of Prussia is closely connected by marriage with your Royal Highness's illustrious family: it is not, therefore, for me to dare to presume that he should have been capable of any thing unbecoming his high

rank; but this I may venture to say, that, whatever his conduct might be, there could be no justice in making the people, or any portion of the people, of America suffer for that conduct. Indeed, sir, it appears to me, that to involve, in any way whatever, England in this dispute about Hanover, was not very closely conformable to that great constitutional Act by which your Royal Highness's family was raised to the throne of this kingdom, and which Act expressly declares, that in case of the family of Brunswick succeeding to the Throne, no war shall be undertaken by England for their German dominions, *unless by consent of Parliament.* If the measure of blockade above mentioned had produced war on the part of America, that war would have been made without consent of Parliament; and, though a measure fall short of producing war, it may be equally a violation of the Act of Settlement, if its natural tendency be to produce war, or to cause England to support warlike expenses, which this measure manifestly has done, and has, at last, led to something very nearly approaching to open war with America, though, in the mean while, Hanover itself has been wrested from the King of Prussia, and formed into a member of another kingdom.

Thus, then, at any rate, this attack upon the rights of neutrals did not *begin* with France. If it was not begun by us, it was begun by the King of Prussia, though it is not very easy to perceive how he could violate the maritime rights of America by any act of his in the heart of Germany. The Decrees of France have grown out of our measures. They carry in themselves the proof of this. The first (for there are but two) issued from Berlin, was expressly grounded upon our Orders issued in consequence of the conduct of the King of Prussia in Hanover; and thus the Emperor Napoleon became, towards us, the avenger, as far as he was able, of that very King of Prussia, whom he had just driven from his dominions! Alas, sir, what a scene was here exhibited to the people of Europe! First the King of Prussia, closely related to the family of the King of England, seizes upon the German dominions of the latter: the latter protests against this, and, by his Secretary of State, declares that he never will make peace without obtaining the restoration of these dominions: while this quarrel is going on, Napoleon marches against the king of Prussia, defeats him, drives him from his dominions, takes Hanover, the object in dispute, and bestows it on a third party; and, from the capital of the king of Prussia's dominions, issues a decree against England, avenging the cause of the king of Prussia!

Napoleon, in this his first Decree, *declares England* (who had, by this time, extended her blockade from the Elbe to the Port of Brest) *in a state of blockade*, and prohibits all trade and all

commercial communication with England. But, this Decree, which was little less practicable in all cases than our blockade, was declared to be *retaliatory*, and was to be repealed whenever England repealed her Orders in Council which had then been issued. Certainly this was not the *beginning*. We had begun, and that, too, under the administration of those who have since so loudly censured the Orders in Council; and, which must, I presume, be a subject of regret with your Royal Highness, the state paper in which this beginning was announced to the American government, came from the pen of Mr. Fox, who appears to have yielded implicitly to the principles of his new associates in politics. At any rate, this Decree of the Emperor Napoleon was not the beginning of the open attacks upon neutral rights; and, what is of still more importance, it was *not Napoleon*, but it was *the king of Prussia*, who committed those acts of aggression in Hanover which produced our first of that series of measures, called the Orders in Council, and which measures have finally led to the exclusion of our goods and our ships from the American ports. This is a fact of great importance in the dispute, and especially if that dispute should end in war. It will be right, in that case, for us to bear in mind the *real* grounds of the war; the *true* origin of it. And, endeavour to cast the blame where we will, it will, at last, be found in *the aggression of the king of Prussia upon Hanover*.

The Berlin Decree brought forth new Orders in Council from us; and these brought from the Emperor Napoleon the Decree issued at Milan, in December, 1807. This ended the series of invasions of neutral rights; for, indeed, nothing more was now left to invade. Both parties called their measures *retaliatory*. Crib having taken a blow upon a third party in the way of retaliation on Belcher, Belcher takes another blow upon the same party in the way of retaliation on Crib. Both parties declared, that they were perfectly ready to *repeal* their Decrees; that they *regretted* exceedingly the necessity of adopting them; each explicitly promised, that, whenever the other gave up the new restrictions, he would also give them up too. Napoleon said his measures had been forced upon him by us: we said our measures had been forced upon us by him. The Americans, who complained of both, were told by us, that we should always be ready to revoke our Orders if the enemy would revoke his Decrees. This was saying very little, seeing that his Decrees had been issued *in consequence of our Orders*, and, of course, he was not to be expected to revoke first, especially as the Decrees themselves declare that their object is to cause our Orders to be revoked.

The American government, having remonstrated so long in vain, and seeing no likelihood of obtaining redress by the

means of diplomatic entreaties, and yet not wishing to plunge the country into a war, resort to the measure of *exclusion from their ports*, giving to both parties an opportunity of preventing the execution even of this measure of demi-hostility. During the session of Congress in 1809-10, a law was passed providing, that if both France and England continued in their violation of the rights of America until and after the 1st day of November, 1810, the ships and goods of both should be prohibited from entering the ports and waters of the American States; that if they both repealed their obnoxious Decrees and Orders, then the ships and goods of both were to have free admission; that if one party repealed and the other did not, then the ships and goods of the repealing party were to be admitted, and the ships and goods of the non-repealing party were to be excluded. Napoleon, the Americans say, has repealed; we have not, and, accordingly, our ships and goods are excluded, while those of France are admitted into the waters and ports of the United States.

This is one source of the present ill blood against America, who is accused of *partiality to France;* but before this charge can be established, we must show that the measures she has adopted are not the natural and necessary result of an impartial measure; a measure in execution of an impartial law. If a pardon were tendered to Belcher and Crib upon condition that they ceased to beat the parties as above supposed, and if Belcher persisted while his enemy did not, the injured parties could not fairly be accused of *partiality* in pardoning Crib while they punished Belcher. The American government and people may, however, without any crime, or, at least, without giving us any just cause of complaint against them, like, and show that they like, Napoleon better than Messrs. Perceval and Rose, and Lords Liverpool and Wellesley. It may be bad taste in the American government and people to entertain such a liking; it may be great stupidity, and almost wilful blindness, that prevents them from perceiving how much more the latter are the friends of freedom than the former. But, so long as the American government does no act of partiality affecting us, we have no reason to complain: so that justice is done to a man in court, he has no reason to complain of the personal likings or dislikings of the judge or the jury. The people in America look at France, and at the state of Europe in general, with minds pretty free from prejudice. They are in no fear of the power of Napoleon. They have amongst them no persons whose interests are served by inflaming the hatred of the people against him. They reckon dynasties as nothing. They coolly compare the present with the former state of Europe; and if they give the preference to the present state of things, it must be be-

cause they think there has been a change for the better. They may be deceived; but it can be the interest of nobody to deceive them. Those who have the management of their public affairs may have a wrong bias; but they cannot communicate it to the people; for they have no public money to expend upon a hireling press. The government and people may all be deceived; but the deception cannot be the effect of any cheat practised upon either; it cannot be the work of bribery and corruption. If, therefore, the government and people of America do really entertain a partiality for Napoleon, we have, on that account, good ground for regret, but certainly none for complaint or reproach. They have a right to like and to dislike whom they please. We, for instance, have a great attachment to the court and government of Sicily, and also to the courts and ancient governments of Spain and Portugal. We should not permit the American government or people to interfere with these attachments of ours; and, I presume, it will, therefore, not be thought reasonable that we should arrogate to ourselves the right of judging whom the American people and government are to like.

When we are told of the "partiality for France," which is a charge continually preferred against the American government, we should ask what *acts* of partiality they have been guilty of, and that is the test by which we ought to try their conduct in the present instance. They have put their law in force; they have shut out our goods and our ships, while they freely admit those of France; and this is called *partiality*, and is made the grounds of one of those charges, by the means of which, it appears to me, that the venal press in England is endeavouring to prepare the minds of the people for a war with the American States. But, to make out this charge, it must be shown, that the French have done nothing that we have not done in the way of repealing the injurious Decrees. Indeed, this is what is asserted; and, though a regular communication has been made to the American government by the French government, that the Berlin and Milan Decrees *are revoked*; though they are by the American Minister here asserted to be revoked, and no longer in operation; still it is asserted by some here, that they are not revoked. The American government, however, is satisfied that they are revoked, and it has, accordingly, put its exclusion law in force against us.

To settle this point of fact the Americans have not been told what sort of *evidence* we shall require. They present us the letter of the French minister for foreign affairs to the American minister at Paris, telling him that the Decrees *are revoked*, and that the revocation is to *go into effect* on the 1st of November, 1810. This we say is nothing at all, because it is clogged

with this remark, "*it being clearly understood that the English Orders in Council are to be revoked at the same time.*" Certainly. This was to be naturally expected; and England had promised that it should be so. The Decrees *have* actually been revoked, without this condition being complied with on our part; but, if they had not, it was to be expected that the American government would put their exclusion law in force against us at the time appointed; because we ought to have declared our *intention* at the same time, and in the same manner that the French declared their intention. It was in the month of August, 1810, that Mr. Pinckney, the American minister in London, communicated to our Foreign Secretary, Lord Wellesley, that the French decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to take effect from the 1st day of the then ensuing November. The answer which Mr. Pinckney expected, was, that the English Orders in Council were also revoked, and that the revocation would take effect from the 1st of November. That he had a right to expect this will clearly appear from the communications made to the American government by our ministers in that country, who, in answer to the complaints of America upon this score, always declared that the king, their master, was exceedingly grieved to be compelled to have recourse to such measures; that nothing could be further from his heart, or more repugnant to his feelings, than a wish to injure or harass the commerce of neutrals; that he had taken these odious measures in pure self defence; that it was his "*earnest desire*" (I quote one of these declarations) "to see the commerce of the world restored to that *freedom* which is necessary for its prosperity, and his *readiness* to abandon the system, which had been *forced* upon him, whenever the enemy *should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary.*" When, therefore, Mr. Pinckney, who had this declaration before him, communicated to Lord Wellesley the fact that the French Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to go into effect on the 1st of November, he had a full right to expect an immediate revocation of our Orders in Council, and an assurance that such revocation should go into effect on the same day when the French revocation was to go into effect. But, instead of this, he received for answer, that we would revoke our Orders when the revocation of the French Decrees should have *actually taken place.* But there was another condition, "that whenever the repeal of the French Decrees shall have *actually taken place*, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have been *restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of these Decrees,*" then the King will relinquish his present system. Here is a *second* condition. We do not here content ourselves with the revocation of the Decrees; no, nor even with that revocation

having actually gone into effect. We call for something more, and that something greater too than the thing for which we before contended. We here say, that, before we revoke our Orders, we will have the neutral commerce restored to its old footing; that is, that we will have the "Continental System" abandoned by France, with which system the Americans have nothing to do, and with regard to which they can have no right to say a word, it being a series of measures of internal regulation, not trenching upon nor touching their maritime commerce. It is a matter wholly distinct from the other; it relates to the reception or exclusion of English goods in France and her dependencies; and, if we are to make America answerable for the conduct of France in that respect, it would follow that France would have a right to make her answerable for our conduct in excluding the goods of France from the ports of England.

We had, it appears to me, no right to require any thing of America, previously to our revocation of the obnoxious Orders, than an official and authenticated declaration that the French Decrees were revoked. And what more could we ask for than was tendered to us, I am at a loss to conjecture. The French government officially informed the American government that the Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to have effect on the 1st of November. This was officially communicated to us by the American government through their accredited minister. We were, therefore, to give credit to the fact. But no: we stop to see the 1st of November arrive. This was not the way to convince America of our *readiness*, our *earnest desire*, to see neutral commerce restored to freedom. The course to pursue, in order to give proof of such a disposition, was to revoke our Orders in Council, and to declare that the revocation would begin to be acted upon on the 1st of November. This would have been *keeping pace* with the French; and, if we had found that the revocation did not go into operation in France on the 1st of November, we should have lost nothing by our revocation; for we might immediately have renewed our Orders in Council, and we should then have continued them in force, having clearly thrown all the blame upon the enemy.

This line of conduct would, too, have been perfectly consonant with our professions to the American government, to whom, in 1808, our minister had declared, that, in order to evince the sincerity of our desire to remove the impediments to neutral commerce, we were willing to *follow the example* of France in the way of revocation, or, to proceed step for step with her in the way of relaxation. Our minister, upon the occasion here alluded to, in communicating the several Orders in Council to the American government, declared that "the king felt great *regret* at the *necessity imposed upon him* for such an interfe-

rence with neutral commerce, and he assured the American government, that his Majesty would *readily follow the example*, in case the Berlin Decree should be rescinded; or, would proceed, *pari passu* with France, in relaxing the rigour of their measures." Agreeably to this declaration, we should, it clearly appears to me, have done exactly *what France did* in August, 1810, and not evaded it by saying that we *would* revoke after her revocation should have been actually put into operation; that is to say, that we would condescend to *begin* after France had *ended*.

This is the view, may it please your Royal Highness, which clear and unclouded reason takes of this matter. This is the light in which it has been seen by the American government, and by the people of that country, who, though they do not wish for war, will assuredly not censure those who manage their affairs for acting as they have done upon this occasion. The measure of exclusion adopted against us by America is too advantageous to France for the latter not to *act* upon the revocation of her Decrees; and, indeed, there appears now not to be the smallest doubt, that, as far as relates to America, (and she is in reality the only neutral,) the Decrees are, in deed as well as in word, revoked. It is notorious that our Orders are not revoked; and, for my part, I am wholly at a loss to form an idea of the grounds upon which any complaint against America can be founded, as far as relates to this part of the dispute.

In a future Letter I shall submit to your Royal Highness some remarks relating to the affair of the *Little Belt*, and shall endeavour to lay before you the real state of that case, and the consequences which would naturally arise from a rupture with America, or from a prolongation of the present quarrel.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday, 29th August, 1811.

LETTER II.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

INTELLIGENCE, received since the date of the former Letter which I did myself the honour to address to your Royal Highness, makes it more imperious upon us to examine well the grounds upon which we are proceeding with regard to the American States. The President has called the Congress together; and there can be little doubt of his object being to pro-

pose to them, for their approbation, some measure more of a warlike character than any which he has hitherto adopted; nor can we it seems to me, be at all surprised at this, if, as is rumoured, it be true that Mr. Foster, our new minister in America, has made a communication to the American government, making the revocation of our Orders in Council depend upon the conduct of Napoleon as to the Continental System.

The rise and progress of the Orders in Council and of the French Decrees have already been noticed, and sufficiently dwelt upon; it has been shown, that the grounds of the present dispute, namely, the flagrant violation of neutral rights, did not originate with France, but with England, or, if not with England, with Prussia: it has been shown, and no one will attempt to deny the fact, that the French Decrees were passed *after* the issuing of our Orders in Council; that they were passed expressly in the way of retaliation; that they were to be revoked when we revoked our Orders. It has been shown that we professed to be animated with a sincere and most earnest desire to revoke our Orders, and, indeed, that we expressly declared that we would revoke them whenever the French would revoke their Decrees. It has been shown that the French officially informed the American government that the Decrees were revoked, and that, thereupon, the American government called upon us to fulfil our promises in revoking our Orders; but that we did not do this; that we evaded the fulfilment of these promises, and, in short, that we have not revoked, or softened the rigour of any part of our Orders. It has, in a word, been shown, that while the French have revoked their Decrees, while they, in consequence of the remonstrances of America, have ceased to violate her neutral rights, we persevere in such violation.

The pretext for this was, at first, that the Emperor Napoleon, though he *said* he had revoked his Decrees, had *not* done it, and meant not to do it. This, may it please your Royal Highness, was, it appears to me, a very strange kind of language to use towards other powers. It was treating the American government as a sort of political ideot. It was telling it that it did not understand the interests of America, and that it was unworthy to be entrusted with power. And, it was saying to the Emperor of France, that he was to be regarded as shut out of the pale of sovereigns; that he was on no account to be believed; that no faith was to be given to the official communications of his ministers, or of any persons treating in his name. Thus, then, the door against peace, against exchange of prisoners, against a softening of the rigours of war in any way, or in any degree, was forever barred; and the termination of war was, in fact, made to depend upon the death of Napoleon.

But this pretext could not last long; for the Decrees were

actually revoked; the revocation went into effect; and those Decrees are now wholly dead as to any violation of the neutral rights of America. It was, therefore, necessary to urge some new objection to the revocation of our Orders in Council; and it is now said, that Mr. Foster has demanded that, as a condition of the revocation of our Orders in Council, the French shall revoke all the commercial regulations which they have adopted since the Orders in Council were issued; that is to say, that Napoleon shall give up what he calls the Continental System, and *admit English goods into the Continent of Europe.*

I do not say, may it please your Royal Highness, that Mr. Foster has been instructed to make such a demand: I state the proposition as I find it described in our own public prints; but this I can have no hesitation in saying, that a proposition so replete with proof of having flowed from impudence and ignorance the most consummate, is not to be found in the history of the diplomacy of the universe. The government of America can have no right whatever to interfere with the internal regulations of the French empire, or any other country; and the Continental System, as it is called, consists merely of internal regulations. These regulations have nothing at all to do with the *rights of neutrals;* they do not violate, in any degree, any of those rights; and, therefore, America cannot, without setting even common sense at defiance, be called upon to demand an abandonment of that system.

But, sir, permit me to stop here, and to examine a little into what that system really is. It forbids the importation into the empire of Napoleon, and the states of his allies, of any article being the manufacture or produce of England or her colonies. This, in a few words, is the Continental System. And your Royal Highness certainly need not be reminded, that it is a system which has been very exactly copied from the commercial code of England herself. Your Royal Highness's ministers, and many members of Parliament, have spoken of this system as the effect of vindictiveness on the part of Napoleon; as the effect of a mad despotism which threatens Europe with a return of the barbarous ages; but I see nothing in this system that has not long made part of our own system. It is notorious, that the goods manufactured in France are prohibited in England; it is notorious that French wine and brandy are forbidden to be brought hither; in short, it is notorious that no article being the manufacture or produce of France is permitted to be brought into England; and that seizure, confiscation, fine, imprisonment, and ruin attend all those who act in infraction of this our commercial code.

This being the case, it does seem to require an uncommon portion of impudence or of self conceit for us to demand of the

Americans to cause the Continental System to be abandoned as condition upon which we are willing to *cease to violate their rights*. But it has been said, that Napoleon enforces his system with so much rigour and barbarity. This does not at all alter the state of the case between us and America, who has no *power*, and, if she had the power, who has no *right*, to interfere with his internal regulations. Yet, sir, it is not amiss to inquire a little into the fact of this alleged *barbarity* of Napoleon. All rulers are content with accomplishing their object; and, in this case, it would not be his interest to inflict greater penalties than the accomplishing of his object required. Our own laws against smuggling are not the mildest in the world; and we have seen them hardened, by degrees, till they answered the purpose that the government had in view. We have been told, indeed, that Napoleon punishes offences against his commercial code with enormous fines, with imprisonment, and we have heard of instances where he has resorted to the punishment of death. These severities have been made the subject of most grievous complaints against him here; they have brought down upon him reproaches the most bitter: they have been cited as proofs indubitable of the intolerable despotism under which his people groan. But, sir, I have confidence enough in your justice and magnanimity to remind you, that there is nothing which his commercial code inflicts; that there is nothing in any of the punishments that even rumour has conveyed to our ears; no, nothing in any of these surpassing in severity; nay, nothing in any of them equalling in severity, the punishments provided for in the commercial code of England, having for their object, towards France, precisely that in view which the Continental System has in view towards England, namely, her embarrassment, and, finally, her overthrow.

In support of this assertion I could cite many of the acts in our statute book; but I allude particularly to that which was passed in the month of May, 1793, at the breaking out of the war against the republicans of France. That act, which appears to have been drawn up by the present Lord Chancellor, makes it high treason, and punishes with death, and also with forfeiture of estates, all those persons, residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand whatever, either directly or indirectly, in selling any goods (mentioned in the said act) to the French government, or to any body residing in French territories. This act punishes, in the same awful manner, any one who shall send a bank note to any one residing in the French territory, or shall have any hand, in the most distant manner, in causing such notes to be sent. It punishes in the same manner any person, residing or being in Great Britain, who shall have any hand in purchasing any real property in any country under

the dominion of France; and it extends its vengeance to all those, who, in the most distant manner, shall have any hand in such transaction. This act is the 27th chap. of the 33d year of the reign of George the Third; and I have never seen and never heard of any act or edict that dealt out death and destruction with so liberal a hand.

It was said at the time, by the present Lord Chancellor, and by the greater part of those men who compose your Royal Highness's ministry, that this act, terrible as it was, was demanded by the safety of the nation. This Mr. Fox denied, and he strenuously laboured to prevent the passing of an act so severe. I shall offer no opinion upon this matter; but it is certain that the code of Napoleon is not, because it cannot be, more terribly severe than this act; and this being the case, common decency ought to restrain those who justified this act from uttering reproaches against the author of the continental code. Our government then said, that the act of 1793 was necessary, in order to crush the revolution that had reared its head in France, and that was extending its principles over Europe. They justified the act upon the ground of its necessity. So does Napoleon his code. He says, that that code is necessary to protect the continent against the maritime despotism and the intrigues of England. His accusations against us may be false, but he is only retorting upon us our accusations against France; and between two such powers, there is nobody to judge. In truth, our government passed its act of 1793, because it had the will and the power to pass and to enforce it; and Napoleon has established his continental system, because he also has the will and the power. It is to the judgment of the world that the matter must be left, and I beseech your Royal Highness to consider, that the world will judge of our conduct according to the evidence which it has to judge from, and that that judgment will leave wholly out of view our interests and our humours.

To return, and apply what has here been said to the case on which I have the honour to address your Royal Highness, what answer would have been given to America, if she, in the year 1793, had demanded of our government the rescinding of the act of which I have just given a faint description? In supposing, even by the way of argument, America to have taken such a liberty, I do a violence to common sense, and commit an outrage upon diplomatic decorum; and it is quite impossible to put into words an expression of that indignation which her conduct would have excited. And yet, sir, there appears to me to be no reason whatever for our expecting America to be permitted to interfere with Napoleon's continental system, unless we admit that she had a right to interfere with our act of 1793.

The dispute between us and America relates to the acknowledged *rights of neutral nations*. These rights of America we avow that we violate. We have hitherto said, that we were ready to cease such violation as soon as the French did the same; but now, if we are to believe the intelligence from America, and the corresponding statements of our public prints, we have shifted our ground, and demand of America that she shall cause the continental system to be done away, or, at least, we tell her that it shall be done away, or we will not cease to violate her rights.

The language of those who appear to be ready to justify a refusal, upon the ground above stated, to revoke our Orders in Council, is this: that it was *natural* to expect that the revocation would be made to depend upon a *real* and *effectual* abolition of the French Decrees; that the revocation is merely nominal unless all the regulations of Napoleon, made since 1806, are also repealed; that, when these latter are repealed, it will be right for America to call upon us for a repeal of our Orders in Council, and not before; and, it is added, that the American President will not have the support of the people, if he attempt to act upon any other principles than these. So that, as your Royal Highness will clearly perceive, these persons imagine, or, at least, they would persuade the people of England, that unless the President insist upon the admission of *English* manufactures and produce into the dominions of *France*, he will not be supported by the people of America, in a demand of England, to cease to violate the known and acknowledged rights of America. The President is not asking for any indulgence at our hands: he is merely asking for what is due to his country; he is merely insisting upon our ceasing to violate the rights of America; and, if what the public prints tell us be true, we say in answer: "We will cease to violate your rights; we will cease to do you wrong; we will cease to confiscate your vessels in the teeth of the law of nations; but not unless Napoleon will suffer the continent of Europe to purchase our manufactures and commerce." If my neighbour complain of me for a grievous injury and outrageous insult committed against him, am I to answer him by saying, that I will cease to injure and insult him, when another neighbour with whom I am at variance will purchase his clothing and cutlery from me? The party whom I injure and insult will naturally say, that he has nothing to do with my quarrel with a third party. We should disdain the idea of appealing to America as a mediatress, and, indeed, if she were to attempt to put herself forward in that capacity, indignation and vengeance would ring from one end of the kingdom to the other. Yet we are, it seems, to look to her to cause

the French to do away regulations injurious to us, but with which America has nothing at all to do.

As to the disposition of the *people* of America, your Royal Highness should receive with great distrust whatever is said, come from what quarter it may, respecting the popular feeling being against the President and his measures. The same round of deception will, doubtless, be used here as in all other cases where a country is at war with us. It is now nearly twenty years since we drew the sword against revolutionary France; and if your Royal Highness look back, you will find, that, during the whole of that period, the people of France have been, by those who have had the power of the press in their hands in this country, represented as hostile to their government, under all its various forms, and as wishing most earnestly for the success of its enemies. The result, however, has been, that the people have never, in any one instance, aided those enemies; but have made all sorts of sacrifices for the purpose of frustrating their designs. On the contrary, the people in all the countries allied with us in the war, have been invariably represented as attached to their government, and they have, when the hour of trial came, as invariably turned from that government, and received the French with open arms. After these twenty years of such terrible experience, it is not for me to presume, that your Royal Highness can suffer yourself to be deceived with regard to the disposition of the American people, who clearly understand all the grounds of the present dispute, and of whom, your Royal Highness may be assured, Mr. Madison, in his demands of justice at our hands, is but the echo. The Americans do not wish for war: war is a state which they dread: there is no class amongst them who can profit from war: they have none of that description of people to whom war is a harvest: there are none of those whom to support out of the public wealth the pretext of war is necessary: they dread a standing army: they have witnessed the effects of such establishments in other parts of the world: they have seen how such establishments and loss of freedom go hand in hand. But these considerations will not, I am persuaded, deter them from going far enough into hostile measures to do great injury to us, unless we shall, by our acts, prove to them that such measures are unnecessary.

The public are told, and the same may reach the ear of your Royal Highness, (for courts are not the places into which truth first makes its way,) that the American President is *unpopular;* that the people are on *our side* in the dispute. Guard your ear, I beseech you, sir, against such reports, which are wholly false, and which have their rise partly in the ignorance, and partly in the venality of those by whom they are propa-

gated. It is a fact, on which your Royal Highness may rely, that at the *last election* (in the autumn of 1810) the popular party had a majority far greater than at any former period; and it is hardly necessary for me to say how that party stands with regard to England; for, from some cause or other, it does so happen, that in every country where there is a description of persons professing a strong and enthusiastic attachment to public liberty, they are sure to regard England as their enemy. We are told that these are all sham patriots; that they are demagogues, jacobins, levellers, and men who delight in confusion and bloodshed. But, sir, the misfortune is, that these persons, in all the countries that we meddle with, do invariably succeed in the end. Their side proves, at last, to be the strongest. They do, in fact, finally prove to form almost the whole of the people; and, when we discover this, we generally quit their country in disgust, and, since they "will not be *true to themselves*," we even leave them to be punished by their revolutions and reforms. In America, however, it will, I think, be very difficult for any one to persuade your Royal Highness that those who are opposed to us are sham patriots, and men who wish for confusion. Every man in that country has enough to eat; every man has something to call his own. There are no baits for sham patriots; no fat places to scramble for; no sinecures where a single lazy possessor snorts away in the course of the year the fruit of the labour of hundreds of toiling and starving wretches; none of those things, in short, for the sake of gaining which it is worth while to make hypocritical professions of patriotism. As an instance of the sentiments of the people of America with regard to political parties, I beg leave to point out to your Royal Highness the circumstance of *Mr. Pickering* (who is held forth as the great champion of our cause in America) having, at the last election, been put out of the *Senate* of the United States, of which he had long been a member, being one of the Senators for Massachusetts, his native state. The people of the state, first elect the two Houses and the Governor of the state, and these elect the persons to serve them in the Senate of the union. Thus Mr. Pickering was, then, rejected, not merely by the people; not merely at a popular election; but by the deliberate voice of the whole legislature of the state. And this, too, in that part of the union called New-England; in the state of Massachusetts too, which state, it is well known, takes the lead in the northern part of the country, and which state has always been represented as disposed to divide from the states of the south. If we had friends any where in America, it was in this state; and yet, even in this state, we see the most unequivocal proof of disaffection to our cause.

It is useless, sir, for us to reproach the people of America with this disaffection. They must be left to follow their own taste. In common life, if we find any one that does not like us, we generally endeavour, if we wish to gain his liking, to win him to it by kindness and by benefits of some sort or other. We go thus to work with animals of every description. In cases where we have the power, we but too often make use of that to subdue the disinclined party to our will. But, where we have not the power, we are seldom so very foolish as to deal out reproaches against those whose good will we do not take the pains to gain. It is, therefore, the height of folly in us to *complain* that the Americans do not like our government, and prefer to it that of Napoleon. The friends of England accuse them of giving support to a *despot*. They do not love despots, sir, you may be assured; and, if they like Napoleon better than they do our government, it is because *they* think him less inimical to their freedom and their property. This is the ground of their judgment. They are not carried away by words: they look at the acts that affect them; and, upon such grounds, they might, under some circumstances, justly prefer the Dey of Algiers to the ruler of any other state.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday, 5th September, 1811.

LETTER III.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

Sir,

BEFORE I enter upon the affair of the American frigate and the Little Belt, permit me to call your Royal Highness's attention, for a moment, to the servility of the English Press, and to offer you some remarks thereon.

Towards the end of last week, a Council having been held, and an Order relative to American commerce having been agreed upon, it was, by those who merely knew that some order of this kind was about to come forth, taken for granted, that it contained a prohibition against future imports from the American States into this country, by way of retaliation for the American non-importation act. There needed no more. The busy slaves of the press, who endeavour even to anticipate the acts of government, be they what they may, with their approbation, lost not a moment. This "measure of *retaliation*," as they called it, was then an instance of perfect

wisdom in your Royal Highness's ministers: it was a measure become absolutely necessary to our safety as well as our honour; and, indeed, if it had *not* been adopted, we are told, that the ministers would have been *highly criminal.* Alas! it was all a mistake: there was no such measure adopted: and, oh! most scandalous to relate! these same writers discovered, all in a moment, that it would have been *premature* to adopt such a measure at present!

I have mentioned this fact with a view of putting your Royal Highness upon your guard against the parasites of the press, who (though it may be a bold assertion to make) are the worst of parasites, even in England. "Hang them scurvy jades, they would have done no less if Cæsar had murdered their mothers," said Casca of the strumpets of Rome, who affected to weep when Cæsar fainted, and who shouted when he came to again. And be your Royal Highness well assured, that these same writers would have applauded your ministers, if, instead of an Order in Council to prohibit the importation of American produce, they had issued an order to strip the skin over the ears of the Roman Catholics, or to do any other thing, however tyrannical, however monstrous, it might have been.

Suffer yourself not, then, sir, to be persuaded to act, in any case, from what is presented to you in the writings of these parasites. Reflect, sir, upon the past. During the whole of the last twenty years, these same writers have praised *all* the measures of the government. *All* these measures were, according to them, the fruit of consummate wisdom. Yet these measures have, at last, produced a state of things exactly the contrary of what was wished for and expected. All the measures which have led to the victories and conquests of France, that have led to her exaltation, that have produced all that we now behold in our own situation, the paper money not excepted; *all* these measures have received, in their turn, the unqualified approbation of the parasites of the press. To know and bear in mind this fact will be, I am certain, sufficient to guard your Royal Highness against forming your opinion of measures from what may be said of them by this tribe of time-serving writers, who have been one of the principal causes of that state of things in Europe, which is, even with themselves, the burden of incessant and unavailing lamentation. Buonaparte! "The Corsican Tyrant!" The "towering despot." Buonaparte! Alas! sir, the fault is none of his, and all the abuse bestowed upon him should go in another direction. The fault is in those who contrived and who encouraged the war against the republicans of France; and amongst them, there are in all the world none to equal the parasites of the English press.

In returning, now, to the affair of the American frigate and

the Little Belt, the first thing would be, to ascertain *which vessel fired the first shot.* The commanders on both sides deny having fired first; and, if their *words* are thus at variance, the decisions of courts of inquiry will do little in the way of settling the point. This fact, therefore, appears to me not *capable* of being decided. There is no court wherein to try it. We do not acknowledge a court in America, and the Americans do not acknowledge a court here. Each government believes its own officer, or its own courts of inquiry; and, if the belief of the American government is opposed to what ours believe, there is no decision but by an appeal to arms. But there is a much better way of settling the matter; and that is, *to say no more about it,* which may be done without any stain upon the honour of either party. And this is the most desirable, if the supposed attack upon the Little Belt can possibly be made, in some general settlement of disputes, to form a set-off against the affair of the Chesapeake.

Yet, may it please your Royal Highness, there is a view of this matter which it is very necessary for you to take, and which will never be taken by any of the political parasites in this country. We are accustomed to speak of this supposed attack upon the Little Belt, as if it had taken place *out at sea,* and as if there had been *no alleged provocation* ever given to the American ships of war. But, sir, the Americans allege, that the Little Belt was found *in their waters*; that she was one of a squadron that formed a sort of blockade of their coast; that this squadron stopped, rummaged, and insulted their merchantmen; and that, in many cases, it seized and carried away their own people out of their own ships within sight of their own shores. The way for us to judge of the feelings that such acts were calculated to inspire in the bosoms of the Americans, is, to make the cause our own for a moment; to suppose an American squadron off our coast, stopping, rummaging, and insulting our colliers, and, in many cases, taking away their sailors to serve them; to be exposed to the loss of life in that service; and, at the very least, to be taken from their calling and their families and friends.

Your Royal Highness would, I trust, risk even your life rather than suffer this with impunity; and you would, I am sure, look upon your people as unworthy of existence, if they were not ready to bleed in such a cause. Your Royal Highness sees, I am fully persuaded, but one side of the question, with regard to America. The venal prints present you with publications made by the enemies of the men at present in power in America; that is to say, by the *opposition* of that country. But the fact is, that *all* parties agree in their complaints against our seizure of their seamen, with instances of which their public prints abound.

This is a thing so completely without a parallel, that one can hardly bring one's self to look upon it as a reality. For an American vessel to meet a packet between Cork and Bristol, and take out some of her sailors, and carry them away to the East or West Indies to die or be killed, is something so monstrous, that one cannot bring one's self to feel as if it were real. Yet, this is no more than what the Americans complain of; and if there be good ground, or only slight ground; if there be any ground at all, for such complaint, the affair between the American frigate and the Little Belt is by no means a matter to be wondered at. I beg your Royal Highness to consider how many families in the American states have been made unhappy by the impressment of American seamen; how many parents have been thus deprived of their sons, wives of their husbands, and children of their fathers; and, when you have so considered, you will not, I am sure, be surprised at the exultation that appears to have been felt in America at the result of the affair with the Little Belt.

As a specimen of the complaints of individuals upon this score, I here insert a letter from an unfortunate impressed American, which letter I take from the New-York Public Advertiser of the 31st July: "*Port Royal, Jamaica, 30th June*, 1811. Mr. Snowden, I hope you will be so good as to publish these few lines. I, Edwin Bouldin, was impressed out of the barque Columbus, of Elizabeth City, Captain Traftor, and carried on board his Britannic Majesty's brig Rhodian, in Montego Bay, commanded by Captain Mobary. He told me my protection was of no consequence, he would have me whether or not. I was born in Baltimore, and served my time with Messrs. Smith and Buchanan. I hope my friends will do something for me to get my clearance, for I do not like to serve any other country but my own, which I am willing to serve. I am now captain of the forecastle, and stationed captain of a gun in the waist. I am treated very ill because I will not enter. They request of me to go on board my country's ships to list men, which I refused to do, and was threatened to be punished for it.——I remain a true citizen of the United States of America, EDWIN BOULDIN." ——This, may it please your Royal Highness, is merely a specimen. The public prints in America abound with documents of a similar description; and thus the resentment of the whole nation is kept alive, and wound up to a pitch hardly to be described.

Astonishment is expressed by some persons in this country that the Americans appear to like the Emperor Napoleon better than our government: but if it be considered that the Emperor Napoleon does not give rise to complaints such as those just quoted, this astonishment will cease. Men dislike those

who do them injury, and they dislike those most who do them most injury. In settling the point, which is most the friend of *real freedom*, Napoleon or our government, there might, however, be some difference of opinion in America, where the people are free to speak and write as well as to think, and where there are no persons whose trade it is to publish falsehoods. But, whatever error any persons might be led into upon this subject, the consequence to us would be trifling, were it not for the real solid grounds of complaints that are incessantly staring the American people in the face. There may be a very harsh despotism in France, for any thing that they know to the contrary; though they are not a people to be carried away by mere *names*. They are a people likely to sit down coolly, and compare the present state of France with its state under the Bourbons; likely to compare the present situation of the great mass of the people with their former situation; and extremely likely not to think any the worse of Napoleon for his having sprung from parents as humble as those of their Jefferson or Madison. But, if they should make up their minds to a settled conviction of there being a military despotism in France, they will, though they regret its existence, dislike it less than they will any other system, from which they receive more annoyance; and in this they do no more than follow the dictates of human nature, which, in spite of all the wishes of man, will still continue the same.

The disposition of the American people towards England and towards France is a matter of the greatest importance, and should, therefore, be rightly understood by your Royal Highness, who has it in your power to restore between America and England that harmony, which has so long been disturbed, and which is so necessary to save the remains of freedom in the world. I here present to you, sir, some remarks of a recent date, (25th July,) published in an American print, called the "BALTIMORE AMERICAN." You will see, sir, that the writer deprecates a war with England; he does not deceive himself or his readers as to its dangers; he makes a just estimate of the relative means of the two nations; and I think your Royal Highness will allow, that he is not ignorant of *the real situation of England*. I cannot help being earnest in my wishes that your Royal Highness would be pleased to bestow some attention upon these remarks. They are, as a composition, not unworthy of the honour; but, what renders them valuable is, that they do really express the sentiments of all the moderate part of the people in America; they express the sentiments which predominate in the community, and upon which, your Royal Highness may be assured, the American government will act.

"God forbid that we should have war with England, or any

other nation, if we can avoid it. For I am not of the temper of that furious federalist, who would have unfurled the American colours long ago against a less offender. I had rather see her starry flag floating in the serenity of a calm atmosphere, than agitated and obscured in the clouds, the smoke, and flashes of war. But if Britain's unchangeable jealousy of the prosperity of others, her obdurate pride and enmity to us, should proceed upon pretence of retaliating upon what she has forced, to more violent and avowed attacks, I trust that your older and younger Americans will meet her with equal spirit, and give her blow for blow. I have never expected her to abstain from injury while our merchants had a ship, or our country a seaman, upon the ocean, by any sense of justice—but have trusted only to the adverse circumstances of her state, to restrain her violence and continue our peace. Heaven grant that it may be preserved, and, if possible, without the distress of her own partly innocent people. But if her crimes will not allow it, if, urged by the malignant passions she has long indulged, and now heightened by revenge, she throws off all restraint, and loosens war in all its rage upon us, then, as she has shed blood like water, give her blood to drink in righteous judgment. I know too well that we must suffer with her. Dreadful necessity only justifies the contest. I call you not, young Americans, to false glory, to spoil and triumph. You must lay down your lives, endure defeat, loss, and captivity, as the varying fate of war ordains. But this must not appal you. Prepare for it with unsubmitting spirit; renew the combat till your great enemy, like the whale of the deep, weakened with many wounds, yields himself up a prey to smaller foes, on his own element. This, by the order of Providence, has been the case before. When they possessed the sea in full security, our sailors issued out in a few small barks, mounted with the pieces dug from the rubbish of years, and scanty stores of ammunition, seized their trade, and baffled their power. From such beginnings grew a numerous shipping that fearlessly braved them on their own coasts, and on every sea; that brought plenty into the land, and at once armed and enriched it. What shall prevent this again? Have our enemies grown stronger, or we become weaker? Or has Heaven dropped its sceptre, and rules no more by justice and mercy? We are now three times as many as in 1775, when we engaged them before. Our territory is greatly enlarged, and teems with new and useful products. Cotton, formerly known only to the domestic uses of a part of the people in two or three states, is now in sufficiency to supply clothing to all America, and from its lightness can be easi ly conveyed by land to every quarter. Wool, flax, and hemp, are furnished in increasing quantities every day. Machines for every work, manufactories for every

useful article, are invented and establishing continually. Large supplies of salt, sugar, and spirits are provided for in the western countries, and can never be wanting on the sea coast. Lead, iron, powder, and arms, we have in abundance—parks of artillery for the field and fortifications—magazines and arsenals ready formed and increasing—a sufficient force of disciplined troops and instructed officers to become the basis of larger armies—a number of ships of war, with men and officers trained and prepared for naval enterprise—a people ready, in the spirit of independence, to rush against the enemy that wrongs and challenges them—a government formed, established, operating all round, with every material for intelligence, direction and power—revenues, credit, confidence—good will at home and abroad—justice and necessity obliging, and Heaven, I hope, approving. It is a common opinion that our enemies are stronger; but this appears an illusion from the fleets of other nations having been vanquished one by one, and left the ocean. Her strength has not increased in proportion. She indeed possesses a thousand ships of war, but no increase of people. Her commerce is distressed, her manufactures pining, her finances sinking under irrecoverable debts, her gold and silver gone, her paper depreciating, her credit failing; depending upon other countries for food, for materials of manufacture, for supplies for her navy; her wants increasing; her means lessening. Every island and port she takes demands more from her, divides her force, increases her expense, adds to her cares, and multiplies her dangers. Her government is embarrassed, her people distracted, her seamen unhappy, and ready to leave her every moment. The American commerce has been a staff of support, but will now become a sword to wound her. Instead of supplying, we shall take her colonies. Her West India possessions will be able to contribute nothing; their labours turned to raise bread. Their trade stopped as it passes our coast; obliged to make a further division of her forces, her European enemies will seize the opportunity to break upon her there. Ireland is in a ferment, and must be watched. The East Indies bode a hurricane. She is exposed to injury in a thousand places, and has no strength equal to the extension. She may inflict some wounds on us, but they cannot go deep; while every blow she receives in such a crisis may go to her vitals. She will encounter us in despair; we shall meet her with hope and alacrity. The first occasion that has presented, proved this fact; though the sottishness of her Federal Republican attempted to prevent the volunteer offering of our seamen to Decatur, as a proof of our inability to procure men. Had we impressed, as England does all her crews, what would it have proved by the same logic?

"An Old American."

Such, sir, are the sentiments of the people of America. Great pains are taken by our venal writers to cause it to be believed, that the people are *divided*, and that Mr. Madison is in great disrepute. This, as I had the honour to observe to you before, is no more than a continuation of the series of deceptions practised upon this nation for the last twenty years with such complete and such fatal success. If, indeed, the Americans were to say as much of Ireland, there might be some justification for the assertion; but there is no fact to justify the assertion as applied to America, in the whole extent of which we hear not of a single instance of any person acting in defiance of the law; no proclamations to prevent the people from meeting; no calling out of troops to disperse the people; no barracks built in any part of the country; no force to protect the government but simply that of the law, and none to defend the country but a population of proprietors voluntarily bearing arms. There *can* be no division in America for any length of time; for, the moment there is a serious division, *the government must give way*; those who rule, rule solely by the will of the people: they have no power which they do not derive immediately from that source; and, therefore, when the government of that country declares against us, the people declare against us in the same voice.

The infinite pains which have been taken, in this country, to create a belief, that the American President has been rendered unpopular by the publications of Mr. Smith, whom he had displaced, can hardly have failed to produce some effect upon the mind of your Royal Highness, especially as it is to be presumed, that the same movers have been at work in all the ways at their command. I subjoin, for the perusal of your Royal Highness, an address to this Mr. Smith; and, from it, you will perceive, that, by some of his countrymen at least, he is held in that contempt which his meanness and his impotent malice so richly merit. And, sir, I am persuaded, that his perfidy will meet with commendation in no country upon earth but this, and in this only amongst those who have always been ready to receive, with open arms, any one guilty of treason against his *country*, be his character or conduct, in other respects, what it might. This person appears to have received no injury but what arose from the loss of a place which he was found unfit to fill, and from which he seems to have been removed in the gentlest possible manner. Yet, in revenge for this, he assaults the character of the President, he discloses every thing upon which he can force a misconstruction; and, after all, after having said all he is able to say of the conduct of the President, whose confidence he seems to have possessed for nearly eight years, he brings forth nothing worthy of blame, except it be the indiscre-

tion in reposing that very confidence. The publication of Mr. Smith is calculated to raise Mr. Madison and the American government in the eyes of the world; for, how pure, how free from all fault must the government be, if a Secretary of State, who thus throws open an eight years' history of the cabinet, can tell nothing more than this man, animated by malice exceeding that of a cast-off coquet, has been able to tell!

The praises which have, in our public prints, been bestowed upon the attempted mischief of this Mr. Smith, are by no means calculated to promote harmony with America, where both the government and the people will judge of our wishes by these praises. This man is notoriously the enemy of the American government, and, *therefore*, he is praised here. This is not the way to prove to the American government that we are its *friends*, and that it does wrong to prefer Napoleon to us. That we ought to prefer the safety and honour of England to all other things is certain; and, if the American government aimed any blow at these, it would become our duty to destroy that government if we could. But, sir, I suspect that there are some persons in this country who hate the American government, because it suffers America to be the habitation of freedom. For this cause, I am satisfied, they would gladly, if they could, annihilate both government and people; and, in my mind there is not the smallest doubt, that they hate Napoleon beyond all description less than they hate Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison. This description of persons are hostile to the existence of liberty anywhere, and that, too, for reasons which every one clearly understands. While any part of the earth remains untrodden by slaves, they are not at heart's ease. They hate the Emperor Napoleon because they *fear* him; but, they hate him still more because they see in his conquests a tendency to a reforming result. They are the mortal enemies of freedom, in whatever part of the globe she may unfurl her banners. No matter what the people are who shout for freedom; no matter of what nation or climate; no matter what language they speak; and, on the other hand, the enemy of freedom is invariably, by these persons, hailed as a friend. Such persons are naturally averse from any measures that tend to restore harmony between this country and America, which they look upon as a rebel against their principles. What such persons would wish, is, that America should exclude not only from her ships, but also from her soil, all British subjects without distinction. This would exactly suit their tyrannical wishes. This would answer one of their great purposes. But this they never will see. No government in America would dare to attempt it. The very proposition would, as it ought to do, bring universal execration down upon the head of the proposer.

The charge against the Americans of entertaining a *partiality* for the emperor of France is one well worthy of attention; because, if it were true, it would naturally have much weight with your Royal Highness. But, from the address to Mr. Smith, which I subjoin, you will perceive, that the same men in America, who complain the most loudly of Great Britain, condemn, in unqualified terms, the system of government existing in France. And, which is of much more interest, Mr. Jefferson himself (supposed to be the great founder and encourager of the partiality for France) expresses the same sentiments, as appears from a letter of his, which I also subjoin.

With these papers before you, sir, it will, I think, be impossible for you to form a wrong judgment as to the real sentiments of the American government and people; and I am persuaded that you will perceive, that every measure, tending to widen the breach between the two countries, can answer no purpose but that of favouring the views of France. Even the Order in Council, issued on the 7th instant, will, I fear, have this tendency, while it cannot possibly do ourselves any good. The impossibility of supplying the West India Islands with lumber and provisions from our own North American provinces is notorious. The Order, therefore, will merely impose a tax upon the consumer, without shifting, in any degree worth notice, the source of the supply. And, indeed, the measure will serve to show *what we would do if we could.*

There is one point, relative to the intercourse between America and England, of which I am the more desirous to speak, because I have heretofore myself entertained and promulgated erroneous notions respecting it: I allude to the necessity of the former being supplied with woollens by the latter. Whence this error arose, how it has been removed from my mind, and what is the real state of the fact, your Royal Highness will gather from the preface (hereunto subjoined) to an American work on sheep and wool, which I, some time ago, republished, as the most likely means of effectually eradicating an error which I had contributed to render popular, and the duration of which might have been injurious to the country. This work, if I could hope that your Royal Highness would condescend to peruse it, would leave no doubt in your mind, that America no longer stands in absolute need of English wool or woollens; that, if another pound of wool, in any form, were never to be imported by her, it would be greatly to her advantage; and, in short, that it comports with the plans of her most enlightened statesmen, not less than with her interests and the interests of humanity, that she should no longer be an importer of this formerly necessary of life. This, sir, is not one of the most trifling of the many recent revolutions in the affairs of the world;

and it is one which, though wholly overlooked by such statesmen as Lord Sheffield, is well worthy of the serious consideration of your Royal Highness.

There is no way in which America is now dependent upon us, or upon any other country. She has every thing within herself that she need to have. Her soil produces all sorts of corn in abundance, and, of some sorts, two crops in the year upon the same ground. Wool and flax she produces with as much facility as we do. She supplies us with cotton. She has wine of her own production; and it will not be long before she will have the oil of the olive. To attempt to bind such a country in the degrading bonds of the custom house is folly, and almost an outrage upon nature. In looking round the world; in viewing its slavish state; in looking at the miserable victims of European oppression, who does not exclaim: "Thank God, she cannot so be bound!" A policy, on our part, that would have prolonged her dependence would have been, doubtless, more agreeable to her people, who, like all other people, love their ease, and prefer the comfort of the present day to the happiness of posterity. We might easily have caused America to be more commercial; but of this our policy was afraid; and our jealousy has rendered her an infinite service. By those measures of ours, which produced the former non-importation act, we taught her to have recourse to her own soil and her own hands for the supplying of her own wants; and then, as now, we favoured the policy of Mr. Jefferson, whose views have been adopted and adhered to by his successor in the presidential chair.

The relative situation of the two countries is now wholly changed. America no longer stands in absolute need of our manufactures. We are become a debtor rather than a creditor with her; and, if the present non-importation act continue in force another year, the ties of commerce will be so completely cut asunder as never more to have much effect. In any case, they never can be any thing resembling what they formerly were; and, if we are wise, our views and measures will change with the change in the state of things. We shall endeavour, by all honourable means, to keep well with America, and to attach her to us by new ties, the ties of common interest and unclashing pursuits. We shall anticipate those events which nature points out—the absolute independence of Mexico, and, perhaps, of most of the West India islands. We shall there invite her population to hoist the banners of freedom; and, by that means, form a counterpoise to the power of the emperor of France. This, at which I take but a mere glance, would be a work worthy of your Royal Highness, and would render your name great while you live, and dear to after ages. The times demand a great and far-seeing

policy. This little island, cut off as she will be from all the world, cannot, I am persuaded, retain her independence, unless she now exert her energies in something other than expeditions to the continent of Europe, where every creature seems to be arrayed in hostility against her. The mere *colonial* system is no longer suited to her state, nor to the state of Europe. A system that would combine the powers of England with those of America, and that would thus set liberty to wage war with despotism, dropping the custom house and all its pitiful regulations as out of date, would give new life to an enslaved world, and would ensure the independence of England for a time beyond calculation. But, sir, even to deliberate upon a system of policy like this, requires no common portion of energy. There are such stubborn prejudices, and more stubborn private interests, to encounter and overcome, that I should despair of success without a previous and radical change of system at home; but, satisfied I am, that, to produce that change, which would infallibly be the groundwork of all the rest, there needs nothing but the determination, firmly adhered to, of your Royal Highness.

To tell your Royal Highness what I *expect* to see take place would be useless: whether we are to hail *a change of system*, or are to lose all hope of it, cannot be long in ascertaining. If the former, a short delay will be amply compensated by the event; and, if the latter, the fact will always be ascertained too soon.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday, 12th September, 1811.

LETTER IV.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

IN looking back to the real causes of the miseries which afflict this country, and of the greater miseries with which it appears to be threatened, your Royal Highness will, I am persuaded, find, that one of the most efficient has been the *prostitution of the Press.* It is, on all hands, acknowledged, that the press is the most powerful engine that can be brought to operate upon public opinion, and upon the direction of public affairs; and, therefore, when used to a bad end, the mischief it produces must necessarily be great. If left *free,* it is impossible that it can, upon the whole, produce harm; because, from a free press free discussion will flow; and where discussion is free, *truth*

will always prevail; but where the press is in that state in which a man dares not *freely* publish his thoughts, respecting public men and public affairs, if those thoughts be hostile to men in power, the press must of necessity be an evil; because, while it is thus restrained on that side, there will never be wanting slaves to use it in behalf of those who have the distribution of the public money. Thus the public mind receives a wrong bias, and measures are approved of, which, in the end, prove destructive, and which would never have met with approbation had *every* man been free to communicate his thoughts to the public.

Where there is *no Press at all*, or, which is the same thing as to politics, where there is a *Licenser*, or person appointed by the government to sanction writings previous to their publication, the press does no good, to be sure, but neither does it any harm; for the public, well-knowing the source of what they read, (and very little they will read,) suffer it to have no effect upon their minds. They read a licensed newspaper as they would hear the charge of an accuser, who should tell them beforehand that the accused party was not to be suffered to make any defence. But where the press is called *free*, and yet where he who writes with effect against men in power, or against public measures, is liable to be punished with greater severity than the major part of felons, the press must be an engine of incalculable mischief; because the notion of *freedom of the Press* is still entertained by the greater part of readers, while there exists this terrific restraint on him who would write strongly, and, perhaps, effectually, against public men and public measures, if it were not for the fear of almost certain ruin.

Thus the press becomes a *deceiver* of the people; it becomes prostituted to the most pernicious purposes. Few men of real talent will condescend to write with a bridle in their mouths; the periodical press falls, for the far greater part, into the hands of needy adventurers, who are ever ready to sell their columns to the highest bidder; Falsehood stalks forth and ranges uncontrolled, while Truth dares not show her face; and, if she appear at all, it is under so thick a covering, in so crawling an attitude, and with so many apologies to power, that she always disgraces her character, and not unfrequently injures her cause.

Hence we may trace all the severe blows which our country has suffered, and which have, at last, reduced us to a state which every man contemplates with a greater or less degree of apprehension. At the outset of the American war, Mr. Horne Tooke, who wrote against the project of taxing America by force of arms, while she was unrepresented in Parliament, was harassed with state prosecutions, and was pent up in

a jail, while Dr. Johnson who wrote in defence of the project, and in whom venality and pride contended for the predominance, was caressed and pensioned. The nation, by the means of a press thus managed, were made to approve of the measures against America; they were made to expect the contest to be of short duration, and the success to be complete. They were induced to give their approbation to the sending of German troops, Brunswickers and Hessian mercenaries, to make war upon the fellow-subjects, the brethren of Englishmen. If we look back to that day, we shall see the periodical press urging the nation on to the war, and promising a speedy and successful termination of it. The Americans were represented as a poor, contemptible enemy; as ragamuffins, without arms and without commanders; "destitute," as one writer asserted, "of money, of arms, of ammunition, of commanders, and, if they had all these, they had not courage to apply them to their defence." Thus were the people of England induced to give their approbation to the measures of the ministry at the outset; and, by similar means, were they inveigled into a continuation of that approbation from one campaign to another, and were only to be undeceived by the capture of whole armies of English troops by those whom they had been taught to despise.

To the same cause may, in great part, be attributed the war against the republicans of France, a war which has laid low so many sovereign princes, rooted out so many dynasties, and which, however it may terminate, has already occasioned more misery in England than she ever before experienced. If there had been *no Press* in England at the commencement of the French revolution, the people of England would have formed their judgment upon what they *saw*, and what they *felt*; or, if men had been, on both sides of the question, free to publish their thoughts, the people, hearing *all* that could be said *for*, as well as *against*, the cause of France, would have come to a decision warranted by truth and reason. But while those who wrote against the republicans of France, and urged the nation on to a war against them, were at perfect liberty to make use of what statements or arguments they chose for that purpose, those who wrote on the other side were compelled to smother the best part of what they might have urged, that is to say, they could not write with *effect*; or, if they did, they exposed themselves to ruin, and, perhaps, to premature death; for there are not many bodies able to endure sentences of long imprisonment, without receiving injuries that are seldom overcome. Mr. Gilbert Wakefield lived out his two years in Dorchester jail; but he did not for many months survive the effects of his imprisonment, leaving a wife and family to starve, had not his virtues bequeathed them friends. Mr. Wakefield's crime

was the answering the triumphant answering of *a Bishop*, who had written against the republicans of France, and the tendency of whose publication was to encourage the people of England to go on with the war then begun. After the example made of Mr. Wakefield, after such a *reply* to his pamphlet, the war would, of course, meet with few literary opponents, or, if any, so shy and so timid as to produce little or no effect; while, on the other side, the advocates of the war, with nothing to fear, and every thing to hope in the way of personal advantage, could not fail to succeed in persuading the people, that to push on the war was just and necessary. The delusion was kept up through the same means. In spite of discomfiture and disgrace; in spite of facts that might have been supposed almost sufficient to enlighten a born idiot, they were made to hope on from campaign to campaign; and, though they saw league after league dissolved, they were still induced to give their approbation to new leagues. Without a press, such as I have described, this would have been impossible. A total destruction of the press, or the establishment of a *licenser*, would have prevented the possibility of such delusion; because, then, the people would have judged from what they *saw* and what they *felt*; they would have judged from the actual events of the war, and from the effects which the war, as it proceeded, produced upon themselves. But by the means of the press, such as I have described it, by the means of a succession of falsehoods, coming upon the heels of one another so quick as to leave little time for reflection, the people were hurried on from one stage to another of the war, till, at last, they saw no way of retreating; and thousands, when they saw, in the end, the fatal consequences of the measures they had been so zealous in supporting, continued, rather than acknowledge themselves dupes, the partisans of those by whom they had been deceived; and so they continue to this day.

But, sir, amongst all the instances in which this prostituted press has abused the public ear, I know of no one where it has worked with more zeal, or more apparent effect, than with regard to the present *dispute with the American States*. The *grounds* of complaint on the part of America have been sedulously kept out of sight; her remonstrances, against what no one can deny to be a violation of *her rights*, have been constantly represented as *demands* made upon us to give up some of *our rights*; her people have been represented as being on our side, and against their government; and, last of all, when this prostituted press can no longer disguise the fact that the Americans are preparing for war against us, it represents the American legislature as well as the President as acting under the influence of France; as being instruments in the hands of

Buonaparte. And by these means it has drawn the public along, from stage to stage, in an approbation of the measures, which have now brought us to the eve of a new war, in addition to that which we find sufficiently burdensome and calamitous, and to which there is no man who pretends to see the prospect of a termination.

I have before taken the liberty to address your Royal Highness upon this subject; and if I now repeat, in part, what I have already said, my excuse must be, that the state of things is now more likely, in my opinion, to excite attention to my observations. Under this persuasion, and in the hope of being yet able to contribute something towards the prevention of a war with the American States, I shall here again take a view of the whole of the question, and shall then offer to your Royal Highness such observations upon the subject as appear to me not to be unworthy of your attention.

There are two great points upon which we are at issue with America: *The Orders in Council*, and the *Impressment of American Seamen*. The dispute with that country has lately turned chiefly upon the former; but it should be made known to your Royal Highness, that the latter, as I once before had the honour to observe to you, is the grievance that clings most closely to the hearts of the people, so many of whom have to weep the loss of a husband, a brother, or a son, of whom they have been bereft by our impressments.

In proceeding to discuss the first of these points, I will first state to your Royal Highness how the Americans are affected by our Orders in Council. An American ship, though navigated by American citizens, and laden with Indian corn, or any other produce of America, bound to any part of France, or her dominions, is, if she chance to be seen by one of our ships of war or privateers, brought into any one of our ports, and there she is condemned, ship and cargo, and the master and seamen are sent adrift, to get back to America as they can, or to starve in our streets. The same takes place with regard to an American vessel bound from France, or her dominions, to America. These captures take place on any part of the ocean, and they have often taken place at the very mouth of the American ports and rivers; and, as great part of the crews of vessels so captured are taken out by the captors to prevent a rescue, the sailors so taken out are frequently kept at sea for a long while, and, in many cases, they have lost their lives during such, their detention, which to them must necessarily be, in all cases, a most irksome and horrible captivity.

That this is a great injury to America nobody can deny, and, therefore, the next point to consider is, whether we have any right to inflict it upon her; whether we have a right thus to

seize the property of her merchants, and to expose to hardship, peril, and death, the persons of her sailors. And here, sir, I have no hesitation in saying, that our conduct is wholly unjustifiable, according to all the hitherto known and settled rules of the neutral law of nations, even as recognised by ourselves. For never until since the year 1806, that is to say, till since the issuing of the Orders in Council, did England pretend to have a right to make prize of a neutral ship, even carrying *enemy's* goods to or from an enemy's port, contenting herself with seizing the *cargo* and suffering the *ship* to go free. And, as to the seizure of the goods of a neutral, on board a neutral ship, the very attempt to set up the pretension of a right to do that would have marked out the author as a madman. Indeed, such a pretension puts an end to all idea of *neutrality;* it at once involves every maritime nation in every war that shall exist between any other maritime nations; and is, therefore, a pretension so tyrannical in its principle, and so desolating in its consequences, as to be abhorred by all but those who delight in the troubles and miseries of mankind, and the waste of human life.

Conscious that general usage and reason are against us, we ground our justification upon a rule of war, which says that one belligerent may *retaliate* upon another. It is not, for instance, held to be right, to kill prisoners made in war; but, if our enemy kill the prisoners he takes from us, we may, according to this rule, kill the prisoners we take from him; though, even in that case, not exceeding the number that he has killed belonging to us. No rule of *retaliation* could apply to the case before us. We were not at war with America. She had seized no ships belonging to England. She had not been guilty, and she was not charged with being guilty, of any breach of the laws of neutrality. But, if *she* had been guilty of no offence, *France* had, and the retaliation was to fall upon America.

This leads me to solicit the patient attention of your Royal Highness to the *History of the Orders in Council*, which Orders we have always called *retaliatory* measures. The Emperor Napoleon issued two Decrees, the first from *Berlin*, and the second from *Milan*. These Decrees were levelled against the trade carried on between neutrals and England, or, rather, between America and England, America being, in fact, the only neutral then left. The Decrees were a gross violation of the neutral rights of America. Napoleon had not, indeed, the power of enforcing them; but he would have done it if he could; and the very attempt, the very existence of the Decrees, was a violation of the heretofore acknowledged rights of neutrals. Such was the conduct of Napoleon. We issued what we called Orders in Council, the nature and effect of

which I have above described. We have contended, that these Orders were in the way of *retaliation* for the French Decrees. This the Americans have always treated as an outrage on every principle of justice. They have, as well they might, denied that we have a right to act with injustice towards them, upon the pretence, true or false, that another power has acted with injustice towards them. They have scoffed at such a principle of action; but they have, at the same time, observed, that, even if this monstrous principle were admitted, we should find in it no justification of our Orders, the commencement of which they trace to a date *prior to that of the first of Napoleon's Decrees.*

The *first* of this series of measures, of which America complains, was adopted by our government, and that, too, under the administration of those who are now OUT. It was a blockade of the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave, in consequence of *the king of Prussia* having taken possession of various parts of the *Electorate of Hanover*, and having, as was asserted in Mr. Fox's letter, done other things injurious to English commerce. Thus this dispute with America grew, in part at least, out of the connexion with *Hanover*. This regulation, against which the Americans immediately protested as being a gross violation of their neutral rights, was dated on the 8th of April, 1806. Before the month of November in that year, Napoleon had put an end to all disputes between us and the king of Prussia, by attacking, defeating, and overthrowing the king of Prussia, and taking possession of Prussia itself as well as Hanover. Being at Berlin, he, on the 21st of November, 1806, issued that Decree before spoken of, called the *Berlin Decree*. This measure he called a measure of *retaliation* for our regulations against neutrals. We followed him with more restrictions upon neutrals, or, rather, upon America, under the form of Orders in Council, and these we declared to be measures of *retaliation* for the Berlin Decree. Then came Napoleon with his Decree from Milan, as a *retaliation* for these Orders. And we have followed him with Order upon Order since that time, calling them measures of *retaliation.*

America complained of both the belligerents, and was told by each that he had been compelled to deviate from the law of nations in his own defence, and that he only wished to reduce his adversary to the necessity of returning to an observance of the rules of that law. We, more especially, expressed our *sorrow* at being *obliged* to give annoyance to neutral commerce; and we said, we were so anxious to see this obligation at an end, that we would waive the point of *priority* of violation, and would repeal our Orders, *step by step*, with the repeal of the French De-

crees; that is to say, that whenever Napoleon was ready to *begin* the work of repealing, we would begin too, and keep pace with him, until the whole mass of obnoxious Decrees and Orders were removed.

As neither did begin, however, America fell upon a mode of inducing one or the other, or both, to do it by a temptation to their interests. She passed an act, in May, 1810, which provided that, if neither of the belligerents had repealed before the 1st of November, in that year, the ships and goods of both should be excluded from her ports and harbours; that if both repealed, the ships and goods of both should continue to be admitted; that if one repealed, and the other did not, the ships and goods of the non-repealing nation should be excluded.

Napoleon, in the month of July, 1810, signified to the American minister at Paris, that his Decrees *were repealed*, and that the repeal would be acted upon on the appointed 1st of November. Whereupon the President, as the act required, declared the fact of the repeal, and declared, at the same time, that unless England had repealed her Orders before the 1st of February, 1811, her ships and goods would from that day be excluded. England did not repeal, and her ships and goods have been excluded accordingly, to the woful experience of our wool-growers and manufacturers, and to the infinite satisfaction, doubtless, of the emperor of France.

The reasons we have given for not repealing, are, *first*, that Napoleon *has not repealed;* and, *second*, that if he had, he has erected the continental system in the stead of his Decrees. As to the first of these reasons, it is telling the American government that it utters wilful falsehoods, or that it is so blind and foolish as not to be able to ascertain a fact of such importance to the interests of the nation. And, as to the latter reason, it is, in fact, calling upon America to compel Napoleon to alter his internal laws in favour of English goods; or, it is telling her, that we will continue to punish her if she does not do that, or join us in the war. America is satisfied that Napoleon has repealed his decrees; she has declared it through her minister here, and through her President in his proclamations and his messages to the Congress; and still we *deny the fact*. This is a ground of action that no nation will endure, unless it be wholly destitute of spirit, or of the means of obtaining redress or revenge.

The matter is now taken up by the Congress, to whose proceedings therein I will speak, when I have submitted to your Royal Highness a statement of the nature of the other great point in dispute; namely, *the impressment of seamen out of American ships by our ships of war.*

Our ships of war, when they meet an American vessel at sea,

board her, and take out of her, by force, any seamen whom our officers assert to be *British subjects.* There is no *rule* by which they are bound. They act at discretion; and the consequence is, that great numbers of native Americans have been thus impressed, and great numbers of them are now in our navy. The total number so held at any one time cannot, perhaps, be ascertained; but, from a statement published in America, it appears, that Mr. Lyman, the late Consul here, stated the number, about two years ago, at *fourteen thousand.* That many of these men have died on board of our ships, that many have been wounded, that many have been killed in action, and that many have been worn out in the service, there can be no doubt. Some obtain their release through the application of the American consul here, and of these the sufferings have, in many instances, been very great. There have been instances where men have thus got free after having been flogged through the fleet for desertion.

But it has been asked, whether we are not to take our sailors where we find them. To which America answers, yes, but take only your own; "take," said Mr. Lyman, "your whole pound of flesh, but take not a drop of blood." She says, that she wishes not to have in her ships any British sailors; and she is willing to give them up, wherever the fact of their being British sailors can be proved. Let them, she says, be brought before any magistrate, or any public civil authority, in any of your own ports, at home or abroad, and she is willing to abide by the decision. But let not men be seized in her ships upon the high seas, (and sometimes at the mouth of her own rivers,) where there is nobody to judge between the parties, and where the British officer going on board is at once accuser, witness, judge, and captor. Let not your officer, who cannot know the men, except by mere accident, be taken to be a better judge of the fact than the commander of the ship in which they sail. Let it not be admitted, that he is never to be believed, and that even the protections given by the American authorities are to be received as falsehoods, and disregarded accordingly.

We have hitherto refused to alter our practice. The grievance has been growing greater and greater, as it necessarily must with the continuance of the war, until, at last, the number of persons impressed, the number of sufferers, and the corresponding number of complaining parents, wives, and children, in America, are become so great, that the whole country cries out War! War! or an end to impressment!

I beg your Royal Highness to consider what must be the feelings of a people at the existence of a grievance like this; and, if you do seriously consider it, I am sure you will see cause to despise those parasites of the press in England, who

are using their utmost endeavours to persuade the public, that the American Congress are, in their resentful language against England, "stimulated by the *intrigues* of Buonaparte." As if the intrigues of Buonaparte were necessary to make an assembly of *real* representatives of the American people feel for the ruin of so many hundreds of their merchants, and for the greater sufferings of so many thousands of their seamen and of the relations of those seamen! As if the intrigues of Buonaparte were necessary to make such an assembly feel at seeing their country, whose independence was purchased with the blood of their fathers, treated, at sea, as if it were still no more than a colony! As if to feel acutely, and to express themselves strongly upon such an occasion, it were necessary for them to be instigated by the intrigues of a foreign power!

Having now, with as much clearness as I have been able to combine with brevity, submitted to your Royal Highness the nature and extent of the complaints which America prefers against England, I next proceed to state to you what has been done by the Congress, in the way of obtaining redress for those grievances; after which will naturally come such observations as I think not unworthy of your serious attention, relative to the consequences of a war with a country which, *until this moment*, the prostituted press of this country has studiously treated with *contempt*.

It is necessary to begin here by observing on the means which this press has, on this subject, made use of to deceive the public. The writers to whose labours I allude, were employed during the last spring and summer in representing Mr. Madison as a falling character: they told us that Mr. Smith's disclosures had ruined the reputation of the former; they expressed their opinion that he would never more show his face in the Congress; and the *people* of America they represented as being decidedly against a war with England. So that the public here were led to believe, that, let our ministers do what they might with regard to America, there was no danger to be apprehended. I took the liberty, many months ago, to endeavour to guard your Royal Highness against the adoption of opinions founded upon such statements; and I then expressed to you my firm conviction, that an *immediate* change of conduct on our part, towards America, was necessary to prevent a war with that country. When the President's speech reached us, breathing a spirit of resentment, and suggesting the propriety of arming, these yelpers of the venal press, as if all set on by one and the same halloo, and as if forgetting their predictions about his fall, flew at him in a strain of abuse such as I have seldom witnessed, except when I myself have had the honour to be thought by their setters on an object worthy of their

mercenary malice. They likened the style of his speech to that of the Wabash and Shawanese Savages; they called him a tool of Buonaparte; they represented him as a mean, low-minded, ignorant man; and I have never heard that any one of them has been called to account for this conduct. They soon found, however, what every man of sense anticipated, that the sentiments of the President's speech were but a faint sketch of the picture to be finished by the Congress, who, therefore, next became an object of attack. But, by degrees, as the accounts of the proceedings of the Congress have reached us, these deceivers of the English people have grown more measured in their abuse. At the arrival of every new menace from the city of Washington, they have, as is in the nature of the true-bred bully, become more and more gentle; till, at last, they have softened down into a tone of civility. They do not "*now* make a mockery" of war with America; they even hope that it may be prevented; and they "trust empty punctilio will not stand in the way of reconciliation;" that very reconciliation which they had done all in their power to prevent.

But, still sticking to their character of deceivers, they are now employed in garbling the debates in the Congress. They are employed in suppressing the sentiments of those members who are advocates for a resistance of England, and in puffing forth the speeches of those who are on the opposite side. The speech of one gentleman in particular, Mr. Randolph, they praise beyond bounds, for which, however, they have one reason, which they do not avow; and, which, as it is somewhat curious, I will, even at the expense of a digression, make a subject of remark.

In reading the speech of this gentleman, as copied into some of our newspapers, I could not help wondering that a thing so incoherent and so weak should have called forth the praises even of these prints. I wondered that even they should describe such at once wild and vapid matter as "full of *acuteness* and *sarcasm*." I had, indeed, frequently heard them bestow encomiums on the speeches of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Perceval; but any thing so inappropriate as this I had never heard them hazard before. When, however, I came to see the speech itself, in the American newspapers, and found that *I myself* had been an object of Mr. Randolph's attack, the wonder ceased. It was no longer a matter of surprise, that the mercenary tribe had discovered in the speech of Mr. Randolph every thing characteristic of acuteness, and profundity, and public spirit. But, really, it was dealing very unfairly with their readers not to let at them to a participation in the enjoyment of these sarcastic passages, especially when they would not thereby have diminished their own; and it is not a little surprising, that they

should, in copying the speech of their champion, have taken the pains to exclude precisely these passages. Since, however, they have done it, I will fill up the gap.

Mr. RANDOLPH had, it seems, been accused of not being a *republican*, and of being devoted to England; in the way of answer to which he makes the following personal remarks and allusions. "I do not like this republicanism which is supported by *Mr. Adams* on this side the Atlantic, and by *Cobbet* on the other, who, if he could *break jail*, would assist in revolutionizing New-England. Republicanism of John Adams, and William Cobbett, *par nobile fratrum*, united now as in 1798. Formerly, Mr. Adams and Porcupine would have called me a *Frenchman;* now, if worthy of notice, both would call mean *Englishman* .....From whom," says he, in another part of his speech, "come these charges? From men *escaping from jails* in Europe, and here teaching our fathers and sons their political duties." Now, in the first place, I have great satisfaction in learning from such unquestionable authority that I agree in political opinions with Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams was one of those who, at the earliest date, made a conspicuous figure in the cause of no taxation without representation; he was American minister at the Hague, afterwards at Paris, afterwards in England; he was Vice President of the United States all the time that General Washington was President; he was afterwards himself President of the United States: and having been, at the next election, supplanted by Mr. Jefferson, he has, since his retirement, had the rare virtue to acknowledge, upon further reflection, that the system of his successor was the most advantageous to his country; and, upon that ground, to give that system all the support in his power. He lives now in the simplest style, at the age of about seventy-five, in his native state of Massachusetts, beloved and venerated by all around him, and without having, or being suspected of having, added to his own private means a single dollar of the public money. Such is the man whose opinions I am now charged with holding, and in company with whom I am said to have changed my former opinions as to American politics; upon which I can only say that no effort of mine shall be wanting to render myself worthy of such an honour. As to what Mr. Randolph says about my being *in jail*, that is a mode of *answering* which he must have learnt from our mercenary prints. That is the way that they answer my arguments. But this gentleman's general accusation against those *who have been in jails in Europe;* his objection to *their* teaching politics to the people of America; these are worthy of some attention. For the present, laying my own case out of the question, I would, if I were within his hearing, ask this gentleman how long it is since the bare cir-

cumstance of having been imprisoned in a jail has been looked upon as sufficient to disqualify a man for teaching *political duties.* It seems to me, on the contrary, that the circumstance ought, if such man has suffered on account of his politics, to be considered as one qualification at least, seeing that it must necessarily have impressed strongly upon his mind the nature and effect of the political institution under which he has suffered. But, surely, Mr. Randolph cannot have been serious; for he boasts of being descended from the country of *Hampden* and *Sidney*, and of having imbibed his political principles from them. Indeed! Why then he should have recollected, that the former, if he had not, in a glorious fight for the liberties of England, died in the field, would have perished on the scaffold; and, that the latter, after having, for a long while, *inhabited a jail*, did actually lose his life under the hands of the executioner. And if the brave Sidney, who was found guilty by a packed jury, and who, when condemned by a corrupt judge, stretched out his arm to him and bade him feel his pulse to see if he trembled; if this undaunted advocate of freedom had escaped before the day of execution, and arrived in America, would Mr. Randolph, had he been then living, have objected to *him* as a teacher of political duties merely on the ground of his having escaped from a jail? And *Prynn*, who was persecuted by the then attorney general of England, and who, by the tyrannical judges of that day, those base instruments of a corrupted court; if he, who was imprisoned, and fined, and pilloried, and mutilated, almost beyond mortal endurance, and who, after all, lived to bring one of his judges to the block; if Prynn, who was thus punished on a charge of seditious libel, had "broke jail," *this very jail of Newgate*, where he was at first confined; if he had "broke jail," and gone to America, would Mr. Randolph's forefathers, of whom he boasts, have objected to such a teacher of political duties? Why, though, perhaps, Mr. Randolph does not know it, William Penn was prosecuted for seditious libel, and was confined in *this very jail of Newgate* too, though his time here was rendered short by a jury who had the sense to know their duty, and the courage to resist the browbeating of a corrupt political judge; and was William Penn thought an unfit teacher of political duties? I am pleading here, not my own cause, but that of many others, who are now in America, and who have been in jails in Europe. This, however, is unnecessary; for it is a fact, and a fact, too, which your Royal Highness should know, that these gentlemen have been received there, not as Mr. Randolph seems to have wished, but with kindness, respect, and honour. Mr. *Emmet* and Mr. *Sampson* are amongst the first advocates at the bar in New-York, and their associate, Dr. *M'Neven*, is at the head, or

nearly so, of the physicians. The instance of Mr. *Duane* is worthy of particular notice. He was a printer at Calcutta, where his types and property were destroyed, himself thrown into a guard house, and soon afterwards shipped off to Europe. He found his way to America, and to his pen England owes no inconsiderable portion of the hostility that has since existed against her in that country. I can remember the time when he, and he alone, as far as the power of the press went, kept alive the opposition to the English interest. All the other writers seemed to be weary of the strife; but his inextinguishable remembrance of the past sustained him under all difficulties, and he finally saw that cause triumph, of which, at one time, every body else seemed to despair. He, above all others, has been a teacher of "political duties," as Mr. Randolph calls them; and, assuredly, if success be a proof of merit, few men ever had so much. If Mr. Finnerty were to exchange a solitary cell in Lincoln jail, to which he has been consigned, at a distance from his friends, and from his means of obtaining a livelihood; if he were to change that situation for the free air of America, leaving his present dreary abode to the occupancy of the next man, if another such man should be found, to comment on the character of Castlereagh; if Mr. Finnerty were to make this exchange, does Mr. Randolph imagine, that the people of America would regard him, who has given such proofs of his talents and integrity, as a very unfit teacher of political duties? And now, as to myself, it appears to me, that Mr. Randolph would have better consulted the dignity of his situation as a legislator, if he had *answered* my *arguments* rather than made an allusion to the situation in which he knew me to be. I had not given him any offence; I had not even named him in any of my articles on American affairs. I had used the best of my humble endeavours to prevent the necessity of, and to remove all pretence for those warlike measures, of which he appears to have been so determined an opponent; and, surely, if I did happen to differ from him in opinion, the circumstance of my being in a jail was not to deprive me of all right to exercise my judgment, and to put the result upon paper. Such a deprivation made no part of my sentence. Judges Grose and Ellenborough, and Bailey and Le Blanc did, indeed, sentence me to be imprisoned for *two years in Newgate*, where Prynn had been before me; but they did not sentence me to be *blindfolded* and have *my hands tied* all the time; they did, indeed, further adjudge that *a thousand pounds* should be taken from me, and *paid to the king*, but they did not condemn me to be *bereft of my reason!* they did, indeed, sentence me to give bail for my good behaviour for the further term of *seven years*, making altogether much more than the average calculation of the duration of man's

life, but they passed no sentence of imprisonment on my *thoughts*. Nor did they, in their sentence, include a prohibition against my thoughts finding their way to America; no, nor against their producing an impression there proportioned to their correctness and to the force with which they might be expressed. Therefore, I presume, it will be thought that Mr. Randolph censured me without cause, though, I must confess, that his censure is more than compensated for by the information that he has given me and the world, that my efforts, as to America, coincide with those of Mr. Adams; and, in return, I will inform him, that he has the honour to agree, not only in sentiments, but also in expressions, with every literary slave in the British dominions, with every one whose hand is like the beggar's dish, and whose columns have a price as regular, though not, perhaps, so moderate, as stalls at a market, or beds at an inn.

From this digression I should now return to the Proceedings in the American Congress, a regular account of which I should lay before your Royal Highness; but the performance of this duty must, for want of time, be deferred till my next.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, 30th January, 1812.

LETTER V.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

I NOW proceed to place before your Royal Highness an account of the measures proposed by the American Congress to be adopted, in consequence of the refusal of our government to comply with the demands of the American President, relative to the Orders in Council and the Impressment of American Seamen.

The lower house of Congress began by receiving and approving of a Report of their committee of foreign relations, which report I subjoin to this letter. That report can be regarded in no other light than as a *manifesto* against England. It sets forth the grounds of complaint; and it then recommends preparations for war.

This recommendation has been acted upon, and preparations for war are actually going on. An act was brought forward immediately for raising a body of regular troops; and, after much deliberation, this act appears to have been passed,

the number of troops amounting to 25,000 men. And, here, let me beg your Royal Highness to observe, that these troops are to have a bounty in *lands*, of which every man is to receive 160 acres. These men will have the *soil* to fight for; their motive of action will not be of that vague and indefinite kind which is held forth by Colonel Dillon, in his work addressed, as he says, by permission, to you. That these troops are not intended for purposes of mere *defence* will be obvious to your Royal Highness; but of the way in which they will probably be employed I shall speak by and by.

Beside these, the President is to be enabled to employ fifty thousand volunteers, whose services may, at any time, be extended beyond the limits of the United States, if the parties volunteering choose to be so employed.

The Militia, consisting of all the able men in the country, without any exception as to rank or degree, the President may call out in such numbers as may be found necessary.

Some national ships are to be built; those that they now have are to be repaired and armed; gunboats are to be fitted out; and the *merchant ships* are to be permitted *to arm* and to defend themselves at sea. But the greatest of the maritime measures is, a high reward to be offered to any Americans on board British ships, and to *the associates of such Americans*, in case of their *bringing in to an American port* any British ship of war. This is, in fact, a reward offered to the crews of British ships to desert to the enemy, and to carry their ship with them, upon the same principle, I presume, that our consul at Valencia, and our commandant at Gibraltar are, in our public prints, said to have offered so much a man to each soldier of the French army that should desert to them, and so much in addition provided the deserter brought *his horse*. Whether this be consistent with morality, I shall not, at present inquire; but of this I am very sure, that the measure adopted, or proposed to be adopted, by the Congress, is of a very dangerous tendency, especially when we consider how large a portion of Americans and other foreigners we have on board of our ships.

These measures are not, sir, to be considered as the measures of a faction, whose object, in getting the nation into a war, is to create the means of fattening themselves, and their families, and dependants, and supporters; they are the measures of *the people* of America, speaking through the lips of their real representatives, unbribed themselves, and chosen without the aid of bribery; and they arise out of the grounds of complaint against us, which I before had the honour to lay before your Royal Highness. The prostituted press of London has, for many months past, been endeavouring

to make its deluded readers believe, that the partisans of England, in America, were the most numerous; and that, if the government engaged in war against us, the people would turn against it, and that a separation of the States would take place. I endeavoured to guard the public, and your Royal Highness, against these delusive statements; and we now see that, though there are two parties in America, both parties have united against us, with as much cordiality as the two parties in our House of Commons united against Mr. Madock's motion of the 11th of May, 1809, for an inquiry into the sale of seats in that honourable house, and, surely, an union more cordial than that has seldom been heard of between opponents of any description. Those members of the congress who have voted against the war with England are so few, and those who have spoken against it, are, for the most part, so notoriously contemptible, that the measure may be regarded as having been adopted without opposition. The Congress has not been long elected; they have just received the instructions of their constituents; and it will not be long before those constituents will again have an opportunity of deciding upon their merits or demerits. None of those members hold officer of any sort; none of them have pensions or sinecures, and none of them can touch, in any way, a farthing of the money which may be expended in consequence of their votes for the creation of any office. This being the case, the voice of the Congress must be the *voice of the nation;* and it would be delusion unexampled to believe that the people of America are not entering heartily into this war.

Our prostituted press, unable any longer to keep up the delusion of the disinclination of the American nation to resist by force of arms, now tell the public, that the war will not be of *long duration;* and this prediction they found chiefly upon the supposition, that America has not the *pecuniary means* sufficient for the carrying on of war.

The *collection of taxes* is, indeed, what the Americans do not like; but, it does not follow, that, for a great purpose, they would not submit to a trifling tax; and a very trifling tax indeed would suffice. It is true that they now pay but little. In America the taxes do not amount to *a dollar* a head, taking the people one with another; here, if we exclude the army, the navy, the paupers, and the prisoners, the taxes amount to *fifty dollars* a head. By putting on a second dollar, the government would double its means; and, surely, an American can pay two dollars as well as an Englishman can pay fifty. One of your Royal Highness's servants, that stirring old gentleman, Mr. George Rose, assures us, that our population *increases* in war, and that the longer the war continues the faster we increase in

numbers. He says nothing of the increase of *paupers;* but, upon his principle, American population cannot be checked by war; for he will hardly contend that this quality of fecundity appertains exclusively to us. Another of your servants, Lord Harrowby, has lately asserted, that the *prosperity* of this country is now greater than it ever was. Your Royal Highness will not, therefore, believe, that America is to be beggared and ruined by a war, which, in all probability, will last only a few years.

Besides, the resources of America, in her *lands,* are very great. She has, owing to her peculiar situation, a species of fund to draw upon which no other nation has. She is now about to raise an army with a bounty, in money, of 16 dollars a man. The rest of his bounty is to consist of *lands,* which, of course, cost the people nothing; and, in this same way, a large portion of the demands of a war may and will be met.

Much has been said about the *natural ties* between the two countries. This, considered as an impediment to war, is the grossest of all the delusions, and never could have been practised upon any nation but this. All that remains of a recollection of the former connexion is calculated to produce hostility. It is fine enough to flourish away upon the subject of the Americans being of the *same family* with us; but there are many, and many hundreds and thousands of men in America, who recollect that their fathers were killed by those Brunswickers and Hessians, and other German mercenaries, whom England hired to send against them, because they insisted upon the principle of *no taxation without representation.* These ideas of kindred might do very well in a poem; but they are despicable in political reflections, and only discover the folly, or the wickedness, of those who obtrude them upon the public.

There appears, then, no good reason to suppose that the Americans will not enter upon the war, and that they will not persevere in it, till they obtain its object, or, at least, till they have fairly tried their strength. As to the *consequences* of such war to us, some of them I should regard as ultimately beneficial. The *loss* of Canada I should deem a gain, though it is worth to us a thousand empires in the east; that is to say, it is not a thousandth part so mischievous to us.

Another loss would be deeply felt, I mean the loss, *for ever,* of America as a market for our goods. Lord Sheffield has lately said, that what America does not take *this* year, she must take *next* year; that, pass what acts she will, she must, in the end, be clothed by us. His Lordship's mind does not keep pace with the events of the world. The Morning Post and Courier are, I suspect, his chief instructors as to what has been passing for the last ten years; or he would have known that

manufactures have arrived at great perfection in America; that she is able to supply herself; and that she already *exports* cotton and wool in a partly manufactured state. A war of a few years' continuance would sever the two countries for ever as to manufactures; and this is one reason why the government of America, which wishes to cut off the connexion with England, is disposed for war. This, however, is not, in *my opinion*, an evil. A temporary one it is: but, I can see no good that can arise to England from being the workshop for America, while we do not raise corn enough to feed ourselves.

But, sir, there are consequences, which may be produced by a war with America, well calculated to make one think seriously on the event. Mr. Joel Barlow, who, in the year 1792, went as a deputy from a society of men in England to present a congratulatory address to the National Convention of France, and who was, at that time, hunted down and proscribed like Paine and many others, is now American ambassador at the court of Napoleon, where he has to negotiate with Count Daru, who, in that same year, 1792, was in England, and was chased out of England along with Mr. Chauvelin. These two men, who are old acquaintances, will not be long in coming to a clear understanding. They have both now an opportunity of repaying the kindness they received from England, and there can be little doubt of their having the disposition to do it.

By a hearty co-operation between America and France, fleets, and formidable fleets too, may be sent to sea, much sooner than our overweening confidence will, perhaps, permit us to believe; and, if a force of forty ships of the line, with a suitable number of frigates, can be sent out from the ports of France and Holland in the course of a year, there is no telling what may be the consequence to this kingdom. America has *more than a hundred thousand seamen;* she has facilities of all sorts for building ships; and, with the aid of France, would soon become truly formidable; because we should not dare to send a merchant ship to any part of the world without a convoy. Americans would enter in the French naval service; those who are now captains of merchantmen would be tempted with the honour of commanding ships of war; they have, for the greater part, some particular cause of hatred against England, and would be animated by the double motive of ambition and revenge.

No man at all acquainted with American seamen will ever speak of them with contempt. They are universally allowed to be excellent seamen; active and daring, but not more so than they are skilful and cool. These are precisely the ingredients that the Emperor Napoleon stands in need of; and what then, sir, shall be said of those English ministers who shall force them into his hands!

A war with America would hasten the work of revolution in Mexico, and it would have the further effect of making that country, in its state of independence, start in hostility to us; because, between North and South America there would inevitably be a close connexion. Indeed, sir, this appears to me to be one of the great objects which America has, in now going to war. She sees that a revolution is taking place in South America; she sees that, if that revolution be crushed, England, under the character of *Protector of Spain*, will, in fact, govern South America, if for no other purpose, for that of keeping the mines out of the hands of France. That England should govern South America is what North America can never permit; therefore, the latter must, by some means or other, assist the South Americans to secure their independence; and this assistance North America cannot give with effect, *unless she be at war with England;* for, as she has seen in the case of the *Floridas*, the moment she makes a move towards the Spanish territory, England steps forward, as the protector of Ferdinand, and complains of her conduct.

If, therefore, the President of the United States has resolved upon doing all that he is able to promote and secure the independence of South America, he must also have resolved upon a war with England, which, in that case, is not to be avoided by a repeal of the Orders in Council and an abandonment of our practice of impressing American seamen, unless we have the wisdom to declare beforehand that we shall leave the South Americans wholly to themselves. This is the golden opportunity for the South Americans to assert their rights and to become free. Our war against Napoleon, on the land, disables us (if we were inclined to do it) from sending soldiers to support the old system; and our fleets are exceedingly well employed in preventing Napoleon from sending soldiers for that purpose; the government of Old Spain has neither troops, nor ships; there are no Brunswickers, or Hessians, or Waldeckers, or Anspachers to be hired by the government of Old Spain, as in the case of the war for independence in North America; and thus are the South Americans left to settle the dispute with their own colonial governments.

To this state of things the American President, as appears from his speech at the opening of the session, has not been inattentive; and, it appears to me very clear, that we have here the real foundation of the sudden change of the tone of the American government towards us. It may be asked, how these views of the United States comport with those of the emperor of France, and whether he will approve of a separation of South America from Old Spain, of which he, with but too good reason, expects to be the master? In the first place, he has seen the

result of a war against independence in North America, and the love of dominion must have bereft him of reason, if he fail to profit from so memorable a lesson. In the next place, he must see that, unless New Spain become independent, it will become dependant upon England, he not having sufficient maritime force to keep it in colonial subjection to himself against the will of England. And even if he were to receive it in its colonial state, at a peace, he would only be entailing upon himself and his heirs the possession of a vulnerable point, exposed to the attack of England. These reasons are quite sufficient to induce him not to oppose any project for separating New from Old Spain, which, notwithstanding the independence of the countries containing the mines, would still be a great receptacle of the treasures thence derived.

But, when to these reasons are added the many weighty reasons for seeing America engaged in a war with England, there can be no doubt as to what will be his decision. Such a war would favour his views against us in so many ways that the bare enumeration would be tedious. It would lock up the troops that we have now in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, and would demand new levies of militia and fencibles in those provinces; it would compel us to send a larger naval force to North America and the West Indies than is now there; it would compel us to send convoys with every fleet of merchant vessels to the end of their voyage; it would, of course, divide our fleets, and thereby weaken our strength in the European seas; it would (as far as that is an evil) make it much more expensive and difficult to maintain our armies in Spain and Portugal; it would greatly augment our expenses, and, at the same time, our danger.

If I were asked what ought to be done to prevent war with America, I should say, certainly, first repeal the Orders in Council; but I am far from supposing that that measure alone would be sufficient. Indeed, it seems to me, that the impressment of American seamen must be abandoned; and to this I would add, a declaration that England would not interfere in the affairs of Spanish South America. There would then be an end of the causes of ill blood; we should then have in America, not a *faction* for us, but we should have the whole nation for our friends. We should also have a friend in South America; and to these countries we might look with confidence for the means of forming a combination against the overwhelming power of France.

I am well aware, sir, of the great obstacles to such an arrangement; but these obstacles it is in the power of your Royal Highness to remove. This country, which has so long been suffering, now looks *to you* for some mitigation, at least, of its

sufferings; and I, therefore, trust, that the dawn of your authority will not be clouded with an additional war; a war that will complete the round of English hostility to nations looked upon as free. It was a fatal day which saw the sword of England drawn against the republicans of France. What a lesson do the effects of that war hold out to your Royal Highness! There is no man, be he who he may, who does not now dread the ultimate consequences. That that war might have been prevented all the world is now convinced; and, if war should take place with America, the same opinion with respect to it will hereafter prevail, but it will prevail, perhaps, when it will be useless. Princes, more than other men, are liable to be deceived, and it is too often a matter of great difficulty to undeceive them; yet, of what vast importance it is, that they should know the truth! And how urgent a duty it is to convey it to their ear if one has the power! The lives of thousands, and the happiness of millions, depend upon the decision which your Royal Highness shall make with regard to this question of war or peace with America; and, therefore, that you should weigh it well before you decide must be the anxious hope of every man who has a sincere regard for the fame and the safety of the country.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, 13th February, 1812.

LETTER VI.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

Since I was imprisoned in this jail for writing and publishing an article on the *flogging of English local militiamen*, at the town of Ely, and on the employing of *German troops* upon that occasion, I have presumed to do myself the honour to address five letters to your Royal Highness, relative to the dispute between this country and the United States of America. In the first three of these letters, which were published in August and September last, I exerted my humble endeavours to draw the attention of your Royal Highness to the nature of that dispute; to caution you against the danger of suffering your ministers to urge us on to a war with America; to give you a true account of the feelings of the people of America upon the subject; and to prevail on you to cause the *Orders in Council to be rescinded.* I had, nine months before the date of these letters, exhorted your ministers to adopt this measure, giving

them what I deemed sufficient reasons for believing, that they would be *compelled* to adopt it at last; or, that they would have to justify themselves for plunging the country into a war with America.

What has now taken place in the House of Commons, in that same house which has, for so long a time, supported the ministers in their adherence to the Orders in Council, can hardly fail to have awakened in the mind of your Royal Highness a recollection of these my efforts, which, to the misfortune of the country, appear to have been despised by your late minister and his colleagues. Now, however, those great teachers, Experience and Adversity, seem to have commanded attention; and, in consequence of a motion of Mr. Brougham, at the close of an investigation brought forward by that gentleman, and conducted by him to the close, with spirit, perseverance, and ability which do him infinite honour, and which have received, as they merit, that highest of honours, the thanks and applause of all the sensible and public-spirited part of the nation; in consequence of this motion, made on the 16th instant, the ministry appear to have yielded rather than put the question to the vote, and to have agreed that the Orders in Council, as far as objected to by America, should be annulled.

Here, then, sir, is an occasion for you to pause and to reflect. And, the first thing to ask is, what *new* grounds present themselves for the annulling of these orders. There are none. They stand upon precisely the same footing that they have stood on ever since the month of November, 1810, when your ministers were, by the American government, called upon to annul them in imitation of the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan. I backed the application of the American minister; I told your ministers that the *sooner* they repealed the orders the better; I foresaw that war must, at last, be the consequence of their persisting in a refusal; I urged them to do what they ought to do of their own accord, and not to wait till they should be compelled to do it. But, sir, your minister, that minister for whose *public services* we the people of England, are now to pay 50,000*l.* down, and 3,000*l.* per annum; that minister, to whose memory we are *now to erect a monument*; that minister persisted in his refusal, and tauntingly set America at defiance; the best, and, indeed, the only excuse, for which, is, to suppose him profoundly ignorant of the temper and the means of America, and of the interests of England in respect to her transatlantic connexions.

America, whose government is very properly obliged to consult the wishes of the people at large, was slow in her movements towards measures of hostility. Like a truly wise man, the President not only used all the means in his power to

avoid the extremity of war; but he also took care to prove to the world that he had done so. At last, however, the Congress began to make preparations for war, beginning with fully explaining to the people the grounds of their so doing. From one step they proceeded to another, and, at every step, their proceedings became more and more a subject of *mockery* with all those who, in England, take to themselves the exclusive appellation of *loyal men* and *friends of government.*

It was in this stage of the occurrences, on the 1st of February last, just after the arrival of the report of the committee of Foreign Relations to the lower house of Congress, that I thought it my duty to address a *fourth* letter to your Royal Highness, the chief object of which was to exhort you not to believe the representations of the hired press, which was hard at work to inculcate a belief, that the report in question, and all the warlike steps taken by the Congress, were mere empty noise; mere boasting and bullying; that all would end in smoke, and that our ministers might adhere to their Orders in Council with perfect safety. I occupied no less than four pages in my earnest endeavours to impress upon the mind of your Royal Highness a distrust of this hired, this base, this prostituted press, which, while it was vilifying the President and the Congress, while it was calling them tools in the hands of France, was telling the people of England, that a war with America would be felt by them no more "than a war with the rocks of Scilly." Many were the prints that laboured to these ends; but the print pre-eminent in this, as in almost every other imposition on the public, was the TIMES, the prostituted columns of which has, within these two years, done England more mischief than those of all the other prints put together.

What will be said by these prints, now that they see the Orders in Council annulled even before America has struck a blow, is more a matter of curiosity than of concern; but it must, with your Royal Highness, be a subject of deep sorrow and mortification to see your ministers now lowering their tone, taking a cowering attitude, without any new reason being afforded in the conduct of either France or America, and before the ink is hardly dry of that DECLARATION, wherein you were advised to proclaim to the whole world, that you would *not annul* the Orders in Council, till France had, by a distinct and solemn act, made an *unqualified revocation* of her decrees. France, so far from doing this, has, in the most distinct manner, proclaimed the contrary; and yet, our Orders are, or are to be, annulled! After all the bold talk of your ministers; after all the pledges of perseverance that they have put in your mouth; after all their contemptuous defiance of America, here we are doing the very act which we might have done nearly two years

ago, and might thereby have prevented much of the misery, and all the melancholy consequences of that misery, in the central counties of England!

That we should be forced to adopt this measure, or to sustain a war with America, might have been foreseen, and ought to have been foreseen, by your ministers from the beginning. I am warranted in asserting this, because I foresaw and foretold it; but, so long ago as the month of January last, it became so evident to me, that I could not refrain from reiterating a positive assurance that it would and must be the case. At the time to which I here refer, your minister, that minister to whose memory we are now to erect *a monument*, told the House of Commons, that America would be totally *ruined* if she persisted in her measures against England, and he, with a sort of supercilious benignity, observed, that he did not wish to see her "*destroyed.*" I saw her affairs in a very different light, and, at that very moment, told the public, that what is now come to pass would come to pass. My words of the 18th of January were these: "The Americans said, that the Orders *ought* to be repealed, and we refused to repeal them; and they now say that we *shall* repeal them, or that we shall have them amongst our enemies. Now, then, shall we repeal them, or shall we not? Shall we, after all, give way? Shall we, after all our vaunts and all our threats, yield at the name of war? Shall we, who can conquer thirty millions of people in five days, retract our determinations at the menace of eight millions? And, shall we do it, too, in consequence of a Manifesto, in which, according to the interpretation of the Times newspaper, our court is called a *corrupted court?* Shall we yield, at last, upon terms like these? My opinion is, *that we shall.* Aye, hard as the thing may be to get down, my opinion is, that we shall swallow it. . . . . The wiseacres of the hired press say, that the Orders will be repealed, when Napoleon revokes the Decrees "*with the same formality that he employed in promulgating them.*" Here they foolishly make new disgrace for themselves: for he will, I dare say, do no such thing. The Americans say, that he has revoked them to their satisfaction. They will not call upon him to issue any proclamations or edicts. *They* are perfectly satisfied with what he has done; and, therefore, this new pretension is a very foolish thing; it is keeping just the *ends of the horns projecting.* When the wise men were at it, they would have done well to draw them in out of sight. *For draw them in they must, or there is a war with America.*" . . . . . By and by I shall offer an observation or two upon the *reasons the Americans have for going to war,* and upon the *probable consequences of such war,* if it

should take place. At present I shall, as to this point, only repeat my opinion, that it will take place unless the Orders in Council be repealed; and also, my opinion, *that these Orders will be repealed;* and that, too, without any of the *saving conditions*, of which the half-horned Courier is so silly as to talk. *It will mortify some people, but it will be done.* It will make those Jacobins and Levellers in America laugh, and Mr. Madison more, perhaps, than any body else; *but I say it will be done.* Bonaparte will laugh too; *but it will be done;* and, perhaps, the least mortifying circumstance will not be, that *it is what I recommended fifteen months ago.* How much better would it have been, IF IT HAD BEEN DONE *THEN.* How much better in every respect; and especially how much *better for our character!* However, better late than never; only, when it is done, I hope it will be done with *as good a grace as possible*, and that after that, the venal prints in London will never more *foretell the downfal of Mr. Madison*, and will see the folly of venting their spleen, in words, against those who are beyond our reach; of showing the teeth where one cannot bite."

These passages, sir, were published *on the 18th of January last;* so that it would seem, that though shut up in one of "His Majesty's Jails," I knew what was doing in the world better than "His Majesty's Ministers" did. "How much better would it have been, if it had been done *then.*" These were my words five months ago, sir; and, therefore, they apply with the more force now. "How much better would it have been, if it had been done *then!*" How much better would it have been, if *my* opinion had been acted upon; if my advice, so urgently and so respectfully tendered to your Royal Highness, had been followed! What national shame, what humiliation, what misery, what melancholy scenes, would have been avoided! There can, I think, be no doubt in the mind of your Royal Highness, that the troubles which we have witnessed in the manufacturing counties have arisen chiefly from the want of employment amongst the manufacturers, which, lowering the wages at the same time that corn was rising in price, has, in the end, produced all the scenes of misery, all the acts of violence, and the melancholy fate of so many of our countrymen. There can, I think, be no doubt, that the perseverance in the Orders in Council, and certain other parts of our maritime system connected with them, have been the chief cause of all these calamities; and, when we behold the sufferings of the people, as proved before the House of Commons; when we see the soldiers stationed to protect the judges in the courts of justice; when we see the soldiers employed (as is stated in the public prints) *to guard the sheriff and his officers*

in the performance of their awful duty of executing the men at Chester; when we are now told of thirty-eight men being just committed in a body to Lancaster jail, out of which, eight persons have just been taken to be hanged, amongst which eight, one is stated to have been a woman, "Hannah Smith, for committing a *highway robbery*, by STEALING POTATOES at Bank Top, in the town of Manchester:" when we behold all these things, sir, and scores of others that might be added to the list, and when we reflect, that they might *all have been prevented if my advice had been followed a year and a half ago;* when we thus reflect, and when we see that we have to pay 50,000*l.* down, and 3,000*l.* to the family, and have further to be taxed to pay for *a monument* in honour of the minister who rejected this advice, what must be the feelings of the people?

Even in December last, when the corporation of the city of London, upon the motion of Mr. ALDERMAN WOOD, prayed your Royal Highness to take measures for "*re-opening the usual channels of intercourse with neutral nations;*" if, even then, the Orders in Council had been annulled, the greatest part of the calamities above mentioned might have been prevented. But your ministers, with the late Mr. Perceval at their head, advised your Royal Highness to reject this part of the prayer of the city of London, and to tell them, that "nothing should be wanting on your part to contribute towards the restoration of commercial intercourse between this country and other nations to *the footing on which it had been usually conducted, even in the midst of war.*" This, sir, was only repeating what your ministers had before said; but, sir, you have not been able to do this. You have not been able to make the emperor of France relax in the smallest degree. His *continental system* remains in full vigour; and so it will remain, even after our Orders shall have been completely done away. What, then, sir, are we to think of the minister who advised you to give such an answer to the city of London? What are we to think of *a monument* to the memory of that minister?

There is yet one point, and it is a point of great interest, upon which I am anxious to address your Royal Highness; and that is, the *effect* which the annulling of our Orders will produce in America. It has been said by the hired writers; (who detest the Americans only because they are free;) it has been said by these prostituted personages and their like elsewhere, that America will now demand other points to be conceded to her. I had the honour to state to your Royal Highness, in my *Fourth* Letter, that America had TWO subjects of complaint against us, upon both of which she must be satisfied, if we meant to have peace with her: namely, *The Orders in Council*, and *the Impressment of American seamen.* The nature,

the extent, and the grounds of the latter complaint, was, in the letter here referred to, fully stated; and I then took occasion to endeavour to convince your Royal Highness, that this was what stuck closest to the hearts of the people of America; and in America, sir, the feelings of *the people* are consulted, as they ought to be, upon all occasions.

If we look back to the report of the committee of Congress, of November last, we shall find, that the heaviest of its denunciations is levelled against our impressment of their seamen. After stating their grievances as growing out of the Orders in Council, they proceed to the subject of impressment, and say, "Your committee are not, however, of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating avarice. And while we are laying before you the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, we cannot refrain from presenting to the justice and humanity of our country *the unhappy case of our impressed seamen.* Although the groans of these *victims of barbarity* for the loss of (what should be dearer to the Americans than life) THEIR LIBERTY; although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents have, of late, been drowned in the louder clamours at the loss of property, yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigour and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of this country by protecting the property of the merchants, then, indeed, *by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen,* whose hard and honest services are employed, equally with those of the merchants, in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country." These were the sentiments, expressed in that report, which determined on war; and your Royal Highness may be assured, that up to these sentiments they are prepared to act. It was from this conviction, that, in the Fifth Letter addressed to your Royal Highness, I said: "If I were asked what ought to be done to prevent war with America, I should say, certainly first repeal the Orders in Council; but I am far from supposing that that measure alone would be sufficient. Indeed, it seems to me, *that the impressment of American seamen must be abandoned;* and to this I would add a declaration, that England would not interfere in the affairs of Spanish South America." I now, sir, most earnestly repeat this advice. I implore you to resist the advice of those who would fain make you believe that we ought to persist in these impressments. I implore your Royal Highness to reflect on the manifold miseries that may arise from this cause; and

to be pleased to bear in mind, that to yield hereafter, to yield upon force or menace, will be disgrace; whereas, to yield now would indicate a sentiment of justice. How many nations have, from the indulgence of the pride and obstinacy of their rulers, been at last humbled in the dust! But this will never, I trust, be the lot of England under the sway of your Royal Highness. That nothing may be wanting on my part to prevent your Royal Highness from being deceived into the adoption of injurious measures with regard to the question of impressment, I will, in my next, endeavour to lay before you a true and clear statement of the case, and will humbly offer you my opinion as to what ought to be done by our government with respect to it. And I remain in the meanwhile, &c. &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Thursday, 18th June, 1812.

AMERICAN STATES.

A SECOND American war seemed to be all that was wanting to complete the round of adventures in this jubilee reign; and this, it seems, we have now got. It was very hard to persuade people that America would declare war. I begged of the Regent not to listen to those who affected to laugh at American hostility. I told him, in so many words, that we should have war, unless we redressed the grievances that America complained of. Scarcely any body could be prevailed upon to believe this; but it is come true, it seems, after all. The anti-jacobins will not believe me; they despise my warnings; and they pay for it in the end. Not only the public, but the government, in England, wholly disbelieved that the Americans would go to war. The truth is, that there are so many newspapers in England whose sole purpose is to deceive the public, that the wonder is that any truth at all ever gains general belief. There has, however, been an extraordinary degree of obstinacy as to the real intention of America with regard to war. Nothing could induce people to believe that she would go to war. I asserted and proved, as I thought, that it was naturally to be expected that she would go to war, unless we did away the orders in council, and also the impressment of American seamen; but scarcely a soul would believe. Perhaps it may be good for the cause of freedom that I was not believed! But let us now quit the past, and look a little to the future. What will take place now? The letter, or pretended letter, from Liverpool, under the date of the 18th instant, would make this cheated nation believe, that the moment the news arrives of the

repeal of the orders in council, the quarrel with America will be at an end. It will be best, however, to let the letter speak for itself: "I have to advise you, that a pilot boat is arrived here to-day from New-York, which she left on the 23d ult., bringing an account that the senate, after deliberating seven days, had come to the resolution of declaring war against Great Britain, 19 to 13. An express had arrived at New-York to major Bloomfield, which he read at the head of his army, formally announcing that the United States had declared war against Great Britain. I think it proper to add, however, that the houses in New-York which despatched the pilot boat with this information, for the purpose of making speculations in produce, expressly ordered, that should the orders in council be revoked, their friends here were on no account to make any purchases for them. This is a convincing proof that this declaration of war will be short-lived, and on the arrival of the Gazette, containing the revocation of the orders in council, all matters in dispute between the two countries will be amicably settled. The Mackerel schooner had been despatched from New-York by Mr. Foster, direct to Falmouth, the day before the pilot boat sailed. When the senate came to the resolution of declaring war, the account of Mr. Perceval's death had not reached Washington, but was known at New-York." Thus a new falsehood is to be set on foot. We are now to believe that the declaration of war is to have no effect. Till now it has been asserted, distinctly asserted, that the senate had rejected the proposition for war. This, as the reader well knows, has been stated most distinctly, with all the circumstances attending the fact. It was not only asserted that the senate had rejected the proposition, but the number of the majority against the motion was given to this deceived, this cheated, this insulted nation. In the Courier newspaper of the 17th inst. was published the following paragraph:

"We stop the press to state, that we have just learned, that on a motion made in the house of representatives for declaring war against Great Britain, the question was carried by a large majority; but, on being brought up to the senate, it was rejected by a majority of two." This was published on the 19th of July, and on the 20th the above letter from Liverpool. Now, upon what authority was the first statement made? Clearly upon no authority at all. It was a falsehood; a falsehood intended to deceive the people of England; a falsehood intended to answer most base, and yet most foolish purposes; for, on the 20th, out comes the truth by sheer force. I have heard a gentleman say that he verily believed, that if the French were at Dover, half a million strong, these same newspapers would represent Napoleon as at the last gasp. I hardly believe that; for, by

the time he was safely landed, they would be considering of the means of going over to his side, and would, in their own minds, be settling as to their price. But, short of a crisis like that, there is nothing that will induce them to desist from persevering in falsehood to the very moment of detection: to the very moment! They know well, that a few weeks, days, or hours, must expose their falsehoods to the public; but they know, also, that for those weeks, days, or hours, the falsehoods answer their purposes. And when one falsehood is worn out, they have another. Thus it is that this nation is deceived; it is thus that it is more deceived than any other nation upon earth; and that, at last, when a calamity comes upon it, it seems to be thunderstruck at what all the rest of the world clearly foresaw. It is thus, too, more than by any other means, that the country has been brought into its present humbled and distressed state. The people have always been believing pretty nearly the contrary of the truth while the event was coming. The result has, in almost every case, been precisely the opposite of what was expected; and the world have thought the people of England mad for their silly expectations; but if the world knew the means that are used to make the people of England believe falsehoods instead of truth; if the world knew that the people of England, during the progress of any expedition, or other warlike undertaking, for instance, hear nothing but falsehoods respecting it, the world would not be surprised at the disappointment of the people of England at the result. These observations apply with peculiar force to the dispute with America, who has been represented to the people of England as being, even now, wholly incapable of going to war, and whose government has been represented as acting contrary to the sense of the people in all its acts of resistance against England. Now, however, we are at war, if the above news be true; and even now new falsehoods are attempted to be palmed upon us. But does the reader not perceive, that if America has declared war, she is at war? And that if she is at war, there must be a treaty before there can be a peace? To make a treaty of peace will require some months, at any rate; and does the reader suppose that the Americans, after the expense of arming has been encountered, will disarm till she has obtained satisfaction upon all the points at issue? The acts of aggression (as she considers them) on our part are many; and does the reader suppose that the mere news of the repeal of the orders in council will satisfy her? Besides, if there were no cause of disagreement but that of the orders in council, does not the reader perceive that the repeal has not been full, and complete, and unqualified; and that if it were so, America cannot be expected to disarm without some sort of compensa-

tion? What! is our government to commit upon the Americans whatever acts of aggression it pleases; and, after that, when America arms, and declares war, are we to suppose, that to effect an instant peace, we have nothing to do but to put a stop to our aggressions? I do not take upon me to assert that they are aggressions; but supposing them to be such, as I really think they are, does the reader suppose that our government possesses a license to commit acts of aggression, and to put forward its mere cessation of them as a ground for peace with the offended party? This is not the way with our government, either abroad or at home.

It is always talking of "indemnity for the past, and security for the future;" and why are we to suppose that the American government will not talk in the same way? If a man offend our government, does it say "cease to offend us, and there is an end of the matter!" No: this is not the language it is now making use of to the people in the Luddite counties. It punishes them, when it can catch them: and shall it lay down as a maxim, that it is never to be made responsible for what it does! The reader may be assured that the Americans do not consider it as exempted from the usual laws and principles by which nations regulate their conduct towards each other: and he may be further assured, that the inquiries relative to the state of our manufacturers will not, when read in America, tend to lower her tone. She is now armed; she has got over her great reluctance to enlist soldiers and to fit out armed vessels; and she will never lay down her arms, that is to say, she will never make peace with us, until we agree to make her ample compensation for her losses and injuries under the orders in council, and also agree to desist from impressing any persons on board her ships at sea. Are we prepared for this? Are the associates of Perceval ready to give up these points? Are they ready to pay for what has been captured under regulations which the Americans regard as a violation of their rights; and are they ready to make it a crime in any English officer to seize seamen on board American ships at sea? If they are, we shall certainly soon be at peace with America; if they are not, my opinion is, we shall have war with her till these points are given up. The close of the pretended letter from Liverpool is curious. It observes, that "when the senate came to a resolution of declaring war, the account of Mr. Perceval's death had not reached Washington." As much as to say, if the news of his death had reached Washington, war might not have been declared! And this is the way in which the friends of the little dead lawyer speak of him, is it! They leave us clearly to infer, that the news of his death, the bare news of his death, might have prevented a war with America! And yet have these same writers the impudence to call the people of

Nottingham and other places, monsters, because they expressed their joy upon receiving the same news! In conclusion. I beg the reader to bear in mind that I have been nearly two years endeavouring to prevent a war with America; that very soon after I was sentenced to be imprisoned two years in Newgate, and to pay a thousand pounds to the king, for writing about the flogging of English local militia men at the town of Ely, and about the employing of German troops upon that occasion; I beg the reader to bear in mind, that, very soon after that imprisonment commenced, I began my most earnest endeavours to prevent this war, the most fatal I fear of all the many wars in which we have been engaged, since the present king mounted the throne. I was enabled to tell pretty exactly what would come to pass, unless we redressed the grievances of America without delay. I had letters from America, written by persons of a little more understanding than appears to be possessed by those from whom our lawyers get their information. I did not know to what extent the merchants of America might submit to have their property seized; but I was well assured, that the American people would no longer suffer their seamen to be impressed upon the open sea. This I was positively told nearly two years ago; and I am now particularly anxious to impress it upon the minds of the ministers; for they may be assured, that the American government, if it has actually declared war, will never make peace till that point is settled to the satisfaction of the American people; till, in short, we agree to desist wholly from taking any person whatever out of an American ship at sea. I am aware how stinging it will be to some persons in England to yield one jot to America. I am aware how much more they hate her government than they hate that of France. I am aware how glad they would be to hear of the United States being swallowed up by an earthquake. Not so, however, the people of England generally, who do not grudge any thing that is yielded to America so much as they do what is yielded to other powers. They do not, besides, see very clearly the advantage they are to derive from the keeping down of the Americans by the means of the English navy. They do not see the benefit that is likely to accrue to them from any thing, the tendency of which is to press upon a free people in another country. Nothing, I am convinced, will ever make an American war popular in England.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, July 23d, 1812.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

If I have now to refer to the proofs of the correctness of those opinions which I addressed to your Royal Highness many months past, upon the subject of the dispute with America, I beg you to be assured, that I do it not in the way of triumph, but in the hope, that even yet my advice, most respectfully offered to your Royal Highness, may have some weight with you, and may, in some small degree, tend to avert that last of national evils, a war with America, a war against the children of Englishmen, a war against the seat of political and religious freedom.

In my former letters I took great pains to endeavour to induce your Royal Highness to distrust the statements in our public prints as to the power of the English party in the American states. I assured you, that the venal press in England was engaged in promulgating a series of deceptions with regard to the opinions of the people of America. I took the liberty to point out to your Royal Highness the mischiefs which must result from listening to the advice of those whose language might correspond with that of this press; and, in short, I showed, that if the endeavours of that pernicious, partial, and corrupt press had their intended effect, war with America must be the consequence. By this press (the vilest instrument of the vilest corruption that ever existed in the whole world) the people of England were induced to approve of the measures which have now produced a war with America; or, at least, they were induced to wink at them. They were made to believe, that our measures of hostility against America were useful to us, and that the American government had not the power to resent them by war. The same, I doubt not, was told to your Royal Highness verbally; but how wretchedly have the nation and you been deceived!

The state of affairs between the two countries now stands thus: There exists a dispute on the subject of our *Orders in Council*, on that of the *Impressment of American seamen*, and on the *possession of the Floridas*. There are some other matters of inferior importance, but they would admit of easy arrangement. With regard to the Orders in Council, your Royal Highness was advised to issue, on the 21st of April last, a declaration, stating that you would not repeal the Orders in Council until France, officially and unconditionally, by some public promulgation, repealed her Berlin and Milan Decrees. France, so far from doing this, has, in the most public

and solemn manner, declared, that she will never do what your declaration required, though, at the same time, she has repeated (and she has done no more) what she had said to the American government in 1810, and what was then communicated to our government by the American minister in London. Nevertheless, you were afterwards advised to repeal the Orders in Council, though the conditions of the declaration before issued were not at all satisfied, but were, in fact, set at open defiance.

This repeal, which took place on the 23d of June last, was, however, too late in its adoption to prevent war. The American government, who had been making their preparations for many months, and which preparations had been the subject of mockery with the venal press in England, declared war on the 18th of June last. The intelligence of this having been received in England, your Royal Highness was advised to issue, on the 31st of July, an Order in Council for an embargo on all American vessels in our ports, and also for capturing and detaining all American vessels at sea.

This is the state of affairs between the two countries; and the main question now appears to be, whether, when the American government hears of our repeal of the Orders in Council, they will revoke their declaration of war. This is a question of great interest at this moment; and I shall, therefore, proceed to lay before your Royal Highness my sentiments with respect to it.

The same sort of infatuation that has prevailed here, with regard to American affairs, for many months past, appears still to prevail. Indeed, sir, I can call it no other than *insolence;* an insolent contempt of the Americans, taught by those who hate them, and who would if they could, kill them to the last man, in revenge for their having established a free government, where there are neither sinecures, jobs, or selling of seats. This insolence has induced people to talk of America as a country incapable of resenting any thing that we might do to her; as being a wretched state, unsupported by any thing like vigour in government; as a sort of horde of half savages, with whom we might do what we pleased; and, to the very last minute, the great mass of the people here, ninety-nine out of every hundred, firmly believed, *that America would never go to war with us.* They left *provocation* quite out of the question. They appeared to have got into their heads a conclusion, that let us do what we would to America, *she would not go to war with us.*

This way of thinking has pervaded the whole of the writings upon the subject of the dispute with America. At every stage in the progress towards war, the corrupt press has asserted, that America *knew better* than to go to war with us. When

she went so far as to pass acts for raising an army and equipping a fleet, and that, too, with the avowed intention of making war against us; still the hirelings told the people, that she dared not go to war, and that she only meant to *bully*. I could fill a large volume with assertions from the Times newspaper alone that *we should not yield a tittle*, and that *America would not dare to go to war*. But the fact is too notorious to dwell upon. There is no man, and especially your Royal Highness, who can have failed to observe the constant repetition of these assertions.

At last, however, America *has dared to go to war*, even against that great warrior George the Third, nearly three-fifths of whose reign has been occupied in wars, exclusive of the wars in India. He has been not only the greatest warrior, but the greatest *conqueror*, of any European prince that ever lived. Napoleon is nothing to him as a conqueror; and yet the Americans have dared to declare war against him. But, even now, now that she has actually declared war, and that, too, by an act of congress, by a law passed by *real* representatives of the people; by men elected by the free voice of the nation; by an unbribed, unbought, unsold, unenslaved assembly, not by a set of corrupt knaves whom the president can at any time twist about by means of the people's money; even now, when she has declared war in this solemn manner, the hireling newspapers in London would fain make us believe, that the whole thing is a mere make-belief, that it is a mere feint, and "will end in smoke." At the least, they tell us, that when the news of the repeal of our Orders in Council reaches America, there must be *a revocation of the declaration of war*. They seem to forget, that the declaration of war in America is *an act of congress*, and to do away the effect of that act, another act must pass. They seem to forget that it is *the people* who have declared war, and that the people must be consulted before that declaration can be annulled or revoked. But, sir, the fact is, that these writers talk miserable nonsense. We are *at war* with America; and, before we can have peace with her again, we must have *a treaty of peace*.

But the main question for rational men to discuss is: "will the repeal of our Orders in Council be sufficient to induce America to make peace with us, without including the redress of her other grievances?" This is the question that we have to discuss; it is a question in which hundreds of thousands are immediately interested; and it is a question which I think may be answered in the *negative;* that is to say, sir, I give it as my opinion, that the repeal of our Orders in Council will not be sufficient to restore us to a state of peace with America; and I now proceed respectfully to submit to your Royal Highness the reasons upon which this opinion is founded.

In my last letter I had the honour to state to your Royal

Highness, that there was another great point with America; namely, the *Impressment of American seamen*, which must be adjusted before harmony could be restored between the two countries; and, as you must have perceived, this subject of complaint stands at the head of Mr. Madison's statement of the grounds of war; it stands at the head of his manifesto against our government. His own words will best speak this meaning:

"Without going beyond the renewal, in 1803, of the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaired wrongs of inferior magnitude, the conduct of her government presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation. British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels in a situation where no laws can operate but the law of nations, and the laws of the country to which the vessels belong; and a self-redress is assumed, which if the British subjects were wrongfully detained, and alone concerned, is that substitution of force for a resort to the responsible sovereign, which falls within the definition of war. Could the seizure of British subjects, in such cases, be regarded as within the exercise of a belligerent right, the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article of captured property to be adjudged without a regular investigation before a competent tribunal, would imperiously demand the fairest trial, where the sacred rights of persons were at issue. In place of such trial, these rights are subjected to the will of every petty commander. The practice, hence, is so far from affecting British subjects alone, that, under the pretext of searching for these, thousands of American citizens under the safeguard of public laws, and of their national flag, have been torn from their country, and from every thing dear to them—have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation, and exposed under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren. Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge if committed against herself, the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations: and that no proof might be wanting of their conciliatory dispositions, and no pretext left for a continuance of the practice, the British government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements, such as could not be rejected,

if the recovery of the British subjects were the real and the sole object. The communication passed without effect."

The grievance here complained of is certainly very great, and cannot be expected to be borne by any nation capable of resistance. If England were at peace, and America at war, and the latter were to assume the right of stopping our merchant vessels at sea, and taking out of them, by force, any men whom her officers might choose to consider as Americans, what should *we* say to the assumption? And would not your Royal Highness be ashamed to exercise the royal authority without the power instantly to punish such an affront to the dignity of the crown and the honour of the country? But *degrading* as this impressment is to the national character of the Americans, it cuts them still deeper by the real sufferings that it inflicts; by the ruin which it occasions to thousands of families; and by the deaths which it produces in the course of every year. I have before stated that the number of impressed American seamen is very great, or at least has so been stated in America, amounting to many thousands, constantly in a state of the most terrible bondage to them; and, as some are daily dropping off, while others are impressed, the extent to which the evil has been felt in America must have been very great indeed, during so long a war.

Our corrupt newspapers, with the Times at their head, are endeavouring to misrepresent the nature of the complaint of America, and thereby to provide the ministers beforehand with a justification for war rather than afford her redress. Upon the part of the President's manifesto above quoted, the Times makes these observations:

"She first complains of our impressing *British* seamen when found on board American vessels; but this is a right which we now exercise under peculiar modifications and restrictions. We do not attempt to search *ships of war*, however inferior their force to ours: and as to searching merchantmen, we do not even do this, vaguely or indiscriminately; but upon *positive and accurate information*. And practically, we apprehend, that the *criminal concealment* on the part of America, is a much greater nuisance to us, than a wanton search on our part is to her. Let her, however, propose 'such arrangements' on this head as are calculated to effect the recovery of British subjects, and she will find Great Britain far from averse to listen to her."

This, sir, is a tissue of falsehoods and misrepresentations. The President does not complain that we impress *British seamen*; he complains that, under pretence of taking British seamen, we take *American seamen*. This is what he complains of, which is precisely the contrary of what is here stated. As

to not taking men out of American ships of war, our government knows well, that America has no ships of war worth speaking of, and that she has thousands of merchant ships. It is said here, we do not search American merchantmen "vaguely and indiscriminately; but upon *positive* and *accurate information.*" One would suppose it impossible for any man, capable of writing a paragraph, to sit down coolly and state so perfect a falsehood as this. But herein we have an instance of the length to which the hirelings of the English press will go in supporting any thing which they are called on to support. It is a fact, and this writer knew it to be a fact, that any commander of any ship in our navy, when he meets an American merchantman at sea, does, or may, go or send on board of her, and he does, or may, take out of her any persons, who, IN HIS OPINION, are British subjects. That this is a fact no one can deny: where then is the "positive and accurate information?" It is also a fact, that the Americans have frequently asserted, that our officers have thus taken out of their ships at sea many thousands of American citizens, under the pretence of their being British subjects. It is also a fact, which is proved by the books at our own admiralty, that the American government, through its consul in London, has *obtained the release* from our fleet, of a great number of American citizens thus impressed, seized, and carried off upon the high seas. It is also a fact, proved by the same authority, that many of the Americans, thus taken, have lost their limbs in the compulsory service of England, a service which they abhorred. It is a fact that I take upon me to vouch for, that amongst the American citizens thus captured and carried off, and forced into our service of late years, were *two grand nephews of General Washington,** and that one of the two was released from our service by the Lords of the Admiralty, in consequence of an application from the American consul, while I was in prison for writing about the flogging of the local militia in the town of Ely, and about the employment of German troops upon the occasion.

And yet, sir, in the face of all these facts, has the hired writer the audacity, the cool impudence, to assert, that we never search American vessels for seamen, "but upon *positive* and *accurate* information." With this instance of falsehood—of wilful, shameless falsehood, before them, one would imagine, that the public would never after be in danger of being deceived by the same writer; but, alas! sir, the cunning slave, who sells his pen for this purpose, knows well that the public,

* John and Charles Lewis: John was discharged in February, 1812, after three applications; was very badly used during detention; deserted twice, and flogged twice. Charles was also applied for three times, and was discharged in December, 1811. It was alleged in the first case that he was a native of Quebec, and in the other that he had voluntarily entered.

or, at least, that that part of the public whom he wishes to deceive, will never, till it be too late, be able to detect him; he knows that his falsehood goes where the exposure seldom comes, and if it come at all, he knows that its arrival will be too late to prevent the effect to produce which is his object.

He next calls upon America *to propose her arrangement* upon this subject; though in the very manifesto, upon which he is commenting, the president declares that an offer had been made to our government to enter into an arrangement, but that "the communication passed without effect." It is going very far on the part of America to offer to enter into any arrangement upon the subject; for why should not she say, as we certainly should say; "Take care of your own seamen; keep them from us in any way that you please; but you shall, on the seas, take nobody out of our vessels." Nevertheless, she has offered to enter into arrangements, "such," she says, "as could not be rejected, if the "recovery of *British* seamen was the *sole* object;" and yet this writer accuses her of the *criminal concealment* of our seamen! We have rejected this offer of an arrangement for the prevention of British seamen from taking shelter in American ships; and yet this writer accuses America of a desire to injure us by making her ships an asylum for British deserters!

Our government say, that if we do not exercise our power of searching American ships, and taking out our own seamen, our sea service will be ruined by the desertions to those American ships. For instance, a British ship of war is lying at Plymouth, and there are three or four American vessels in the same port. Numbers of the seamen get on board the American ships; they get out to sea; and, if they cannot be seized there, they go off safely to America, or to any other part of the world, and are thus lost to our navy. There is no doubt, sir, but this might become a very serious evil, if not counteracted. But are the Americans to suffer because (for whatever reason) our sailors desert? And, above all, are real American citizens to be exposed to impressment, to be sent to be shot at, to be conveyed to the West or East Indies, to be made to end their days under the discipline of an English man of war—are real American citizens to be exposed to all this because British seamen desert, and because that desertion (a very serious crime) may become extremely dangerous to us? I am sure your Royal Highness is too just to answer this question in the affirmative.

The case must be new, because the relative situation of the two countries is a novelty in the history of nations; but while we have an undoubted right to recover our own seamen, if we can do it without violating the rights of other nations, we can have no right, in any case, to seize American citizens. Ameri-

ca says, "I do not want your seamen—I would rather not have them. Keep them by what means you please. Take them wherever you can find them in my ships: but, before you do it, produce *proof of their being yours*, and that, too, before a *competent tribunal*." Nothing can be fairer than this; but this necessarily sets aside all impressments at *sea*, where there can be no proof given, because there can be no tribunal, or umpire, to decide upon the proofs, and we contend, that, without the power of impressing *at sea*, our navy would be greatly injured by desertion, and our strength thereby materially weakened.

This is the point upon which we are at issue with America—supposing the Orders in Council to remain repealed, and the dispute as to that matter to be settled—this is the point upon which, if not settled amicably, we shall have war with the American States. It is the point upon which the people of America, who are *something*, are more sore; and I am convinced that it is a point which they will not give up. They say, and they truly say, that it is a mockery for them to talk of their freedom and their independence, if the very bodies of their citizens are liable to be taken upon the high seas and forced into the service of a foreign sovereign, there to be treated according to the rules and regulations of that sovereign. A people submitting to this cannot be called free, and their country cannot be called independent. Therefore, when the time comes for entering on a treaty of peace with America, I hope your Royal Highness will resist all advice tending to a pertinacious adherence to the exercise of the power of impressment; for while that power is exercised we shall, in my opinion, never have real peace with America.

The other point in dispute, namely, the *possession of the Floridas*, or, at least, that part of them which belongs to Spain, is of inferior importance; but I am of opinion, that that point will not be easily overcome, unless we are prepared to give it up. America sees the possibility of Old Spain becoming a mere puppet in the hands of England, and she sees the almost *certainty* of its becoming a dependant upon either England or France: and she wants neither France nor England for *so near a neighbour*. She has, in the adventures of *Captain Henry*, seen the danger of having a neighbour on her northern flank; and the Floridas are not divided by immense deserts and lakes as Canada is. While the Floridas were held by the sleepy old government of Spain, America saw little danger; but she will not, I am convinced, suffer either England or France to be mistress of those provinces.

This is a point, therefore, which, in my opinion, we should be forward in giving up, and not get into a war with America *for the sake of Ferdinand*, as we are continuing the war with France

for his sake. The revolutions going on in South America it is the interest of the United States to encourage and assist to the utmost of their power; and I should advise your Royal Highness to show an earnest desire to avoid interference therein; for if, upon the ground of supporting the authority of Ferdinand, or upon any other ground, you show a disposition to take part against the republicans of South America, that alone will be sufficient greatly to retard, if not wholly defeat, all attempts at an accommodation with America. Nay, sir, to speak freely my sentiments, I do not expect peace with America while we have an army in Spain, or, at least, while there is the smallest chance of our obtaining a settled ascendency in that kingdom; and I really think that every mile of progress that we are making there puts peace with America at a greater distance. We, in this country, or the greater part of us, see no danger in the increase of any power, except the power of Napoleon, whose territories half envelop our coast, and whose armies are but at the distance of a few hours sail. Not so the Americans. They see danger in the increase of our power, ours being that sort of power by which they are most annoyed. If they had their choice between us and France, for a neighbour in South America, they would not hesitate a moment in preferring France—because her power is not of that sort which would be formidable to America. What she would wish, however, is to see South America independent of Old Spain, and, of course, of the masters of Old Spain; and she is not so blind as not to perceive, that the contest in Old Spain now is, who shall have it under her control, England or France.

For these reasons every victory that we gain in Spain will be an additional obstacle to peace with America, unless we set out by a frank and clear declaration, leaving South America to itself, and the Floridas to the United States.

Before I conclude, I beg leave to notice that part of the speech, recently delivered by your Royal Highness's order to the two houses of parliament, wherein mention is made of the dispute with America. The part I allude to is this: "His Royal Highness has commanded us to assure you, that he views with most sincere regret the hostile measures which have been recently adopted by the government of the United States of America towards this country. His Royal Highness is nevertheless willing to hope, that the accustomed relations of peace and amity may yet be restored; but if his expectations in this respect should be disappointed, by the conduct of the government of the United States, or by their *perseverance in any unwarrantable pretensions*, he will most fully rely on the support of every class of his majesty's subjects, in a contest in which the *honour of his majesty's crown*, and the *best interests of his dominions*, must be involved."

This part of the speech has been thought, with reason, to augur war—for I am not aware of "*any pretensions*" of America that she will not "*persevere*" in. If pretensions to be put forward, to be now originated, had been spoken of, there might have been more room for doubt; but in speaking of pretensions to be persevered in, the speech necessarily refers to pretensions *already put forward*; and I repeat, sir, that I do not know of any pretensions that America has put forward, in which I do not believe she will persevere, to do which the conduct of your Royal Highness's ministers is eminently calculated to give her encouragement.

As to support from *the people* of England, in a war against America, your Royal Highness will certainly have it, if the grounds of the war be *clearly just*; but it would be very difficult for your ministers to make the people perceive, or believe, that the impressment of American seamen, any where, and especially in the very ships of America, was necessary "to the honour of his majesty's crown, and involved the best interests of his dominions." The people have now seen all the predictions of the hireling prints, with regard to America, falsified; they have been told that America could not support herself for a year without England, and they have seen her do it for a year and a half, and at the end of that time declare war. They are not now to be persuaded that this government can do what it pleases with America.

It has been stated, with an air of triumph, by the partisans of your ministers, that the *opposition* are pledged to support a war against America, unless she is satisfied with the repeal of the Orders in Council. But *the people*, sir, have given no such pledge; the manufacturers have given no such pledge; and the war will not be a jot the more popular on account of its having the support of that set of men who are called the *opposition*, and for whom the people have no respect, any more than they have for their opponents. The Orders in Council were a grievance to America, but not a greater grievance than to see her citizens dragged by force into a service which they abhor, on so many accounts, however pleasant and honourable it may be to our own countrymen. This grievance was known to exist; and, therefore, if the opposition have given a pledge to support a war against America, unless she be satisfied with the repeal of the Orders in Council alone, they have given a pledge to do that in which they will not have the support of the people.

I am one of those, sir, who do not regard a great extension of trade as a benefit; but those who do must lay their account with seeing much of our trade destroyed *for ever* by a war with America. Three or four years of war would compel her to become a manufacturing country to such an extent as never more to stand

in need of English goods; so that, if your Royal Highness's ministers do insist upon exercising the power of seizing people on board of American ships at sea, those persons who manufacture goods for America must seek another market, for that is closed against them for ever.

For many years, sir, there has existed in this country, a faction perfectly desperate in their HATRED OF FREEDOM. They not only hate all free nations, but they hate the very sound of the word freedom. I am well satisfied that persons of this description would gladly hear of the murder of every soul in America. There is nothing that they hate so much as a man who is not a slave, and who lives out of the reach of arbitrary power. These persons will be sorely grieved to see peace preserved between the two countries on terms honourable to America; but I am, for my part, ready to confess, that with me it will be a subject of joy; I am ready to declare, that I see less reason than ever for an Englishman's wishing to see the people of America humbled or borne down; and that it will grieve me exceedingly to reflect that England is taxed, and that English blood is shed, for the purpose of enforcing the power to impress American seamen; but this mortification I shall, I trust, be spared, by the humanity and wisdom of your Royal Highness.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

DURING the time that I was imprisoned for two years in Newgate, for writing about the flogging of the local militia in the town of Ely, and about the employment of German troops upon that occasion, I addressed to your Royal Highness several letters, the object of which was to prevent this country from being plunged into war with America. I took great pleasure in offering to you advice, which I thought would be beneficial to my country; and, of course, I have experienced great sorrow at seeing that that advice has not been followed, and that, in consequence of its rejection, we are now actually in a state of war with our brethren across the Atlantic.

Those corruptors and blinders of the people, the hired writers, do not attempt to make their readers believe that we are not at war with the republic of America. They it is who have hastened, if not actually produced, this war; for they it was who reviled the American president, and who caused it to be belived here that he and the congress dared not go to war. What pains, alas! have I taken to convince your Royal Highness of the folly and falsehood of these opinions! Though my mind was bruised with

the means of raising the thousand pounds fine to pay to the king, (and which you have received from me in his behalf,) I let slip no occasion to caution you against these representations. I told you (and you might as well have believed me) that the American people were something; that they had a say in the measures of government; that they would not suffer themselves to be plunged into war for the gain of a set of lazy and rapacious fellows; but that, if their country's good demanded it, they would go to war; and that such war would, in all probability, be very calamitous to England.

While I was telling you this, your late minister, Perceval, was laughing at the idea of America going to war; and his opinion was upheld by all the venal scribes in the kingdom; that is to say, by nineteen-twentieths, perhaps, of all those who write in newspapers, and other political works. That we really are at war with America, however, the following document clearly proves. The American congress declared war in due form; they passed an act making war against your royal sire and his people; their government issued letters of marque and reprisal; but, still our hirelings said that there was no war. The following proclamation, however, issued by an American general from his head quarters in Canada, which province he has invaded, puts the fact of war beyond all doubt.

[The proclamation of Brigadier General Hull, above alluded to, was inserted in the Statesman of the 11th instant, to which paper we refer our readers.]

He, sir, who will not believe in this, would not believe though one were to rise from the dead. This is an animating address; and it is, at least, possible, that it may prove the forerunner of the fall of Canada, which, when once gone, will never, I believe, return to the English crown.

The fact of war being now ascertained beyond all doubt, the next thing for us to think of is, the means by which we are to obtain peace with this new and most formidable enemy. The hired writers, unable any longer to keep from their readers the fact that war has taken place, are now affecting to treat the matter lightly: to make the people of England believe, that the Americans will be driven out of Canada; that the people of America hate the war—and that, at any rate, the congress will be obliged to put an end to the war, when the intelligence of the repeal of our Orders in Council shall arrive at the seat of the American government.

These being the assertions now most in vogue, and most generally listened to, I will give your Royal Highness my reason for disbelieving them.

First, as to the probability of the Americans being baffled in their designs upon Canada: if the contest was a contest of man to man, upon ground wholly neutral, I should say, that the advantage

might be on our side; but I am not sure that it would; for the Americans have given repeated proofs of their courage. They are, indeed, known to be as brave as any people in the world. They are, too, volunteers, real volunteers, in the service they are now upon. The American army does not consist of a set of poor creatures, whom misery and vice have made soldiers; it does not consist of the offcasts and outcasts of the country. It consists of a band of freemen, who understand things, and who are ready to fight for what they understand; and not of a set of half cripples, of creatures that require to be trussed up in order to prevent them from falling to pieces. It is the youth; the strong, the active, the hardy, the sound youth of America, whom our army in Canada have to face; and though I do not say that the latter will be unable to resist them, yet I must say, that I fear they will not, when I consider that the Americans can with ease pour in a force of forty or fifty thousand men, and when I hear it stated, that we have not above fourteen or fifteen thousand men in Canada, exclusive of the militia, upon whom I do not know what degree of reliance is to be placed. After all, however, the question of success in the invasion of Canada will, as in the cases of France and Holland, depend wholly upon the people of Canada. If they have reason to fight for their present government; if they be convinced that a change of government would make their lot worse, they will, of course, rise and fight against the invaders, and then our commander may safely set General Hull at defiance; but if the people of Canada should have been inveigled to believe that a change of government would be for their benefit, I must confess that I should greatly doubt our power of resistance. It will be quite useless for us to reproach the people of Canada with their want of zeal in defence of their country. We have reproached the Dutch and the Italians, and the Hanoverians, for the like; but, sir, it answers no purpose. Such reproaches do not tend to drive out the invaders; nor do they tend to deter other nations from following the example of the invaded party. What a whole nation wills, must, sooner or later, take place.

As to the second assertion, that the people of America hate the war, I must say that I have seen no proof of such hatred. The Americans, being a reflecting people, and a people resolutely bent upon preserving their freedom, have a general hatred to war, as being, generally speaking, hostile to that freedom. But in the choice of evils, if war should appear the least evil, they will not fail to take it—and, indeed, they have taken it—for, in America, it is really the people who declare war—the congress is the real representative of the people—there are no sham elections—no buying and selling of votes and of false oaths—but the members are the unbought, uncorrupted, unenslaved agents of the people, and if they cease to speak the sentiments of the people who elect them,

they are put out of the congress at the end of a very few months. It is, therefore, not only false, but stupid, to affect to believe the war is unpopular, and the government is odious in the eyes of the people. All its members are chosen by them—and if it ceased to please them, it would soon cease to exist. Nothing, therefore, can be so absurd as to suppose that a measure so important as that of war has been adopted against the will of the people.

This opinion has been attempted to be sustained upon the evidence of a riot at Baltimore, the object of which was the silencing of a newspaper, and the end of which was bloodshed on both sides. But, from this fact, the exactly contrary conclusion ought to be drawn. The newspaper in question was, as it appears, hostile to the war—and, therefore, a riot, in order to silence such paper, cannot be considered as a proof of unpopularity attached to the war. Though this species of attack upon the liberty of the press is far less injurious to that liberty of the press than the base attacks dictated by despotism, and masked under the visor of forms dearest to freedom—still it is an attack—it is answering statement and argument by violence—by something other than statement and argument. Therefore, I disapprove of the attack—but I cannot consider it as a mark of the unpopularity of the war, of the precise contrary of which it is, indeed, a very bad proof.

Much having, in our hired newspapers, been said of this riot; it having been represented as a proof of bad government in America, and (which is more to my present purpose) as a sign of approaching anarchy, tending to the overthrow of that government which has declared war against us, I must trespass a little further upon this head, to beg your Royal Highness to believe nothing that the hired men say upon the subject. When the war with France began, in 1794; that war, which appears not to promise any end; when that war began, many riots took place in England, against those who were opposed to the war; many houses were destroyed—many printing offices demolished—many booksellers put to flight—many men were totally ruined—and that, too, by mobs marching and killing under banners on which were inscribed "*Church and King.*" Now, as there was a general anarchy to follow these things in England, I beg your Royal Highness not to be persuaded to believe that anarchy will follow the demolishing of a printing office in the United States of America, where there are more newspapers than there are in all Europe, this country included. Once more, however, I express my disapprobation, and even my abhorrence, of that demolition: which was the less excusable, as the assailants had freedom, real freedom of the press, to answer any thing which the bribed printer might publish, and even to publish an account of his bribery. Such, however, appears to have been the popular feeling in favour of the war, that

no consideration was of sufficient weight to restrain the resentment of the people against a man who was daily declaiming against that measure.

If we consider, as I think we must, that the people of America were in favour of the war at the time it was declared, the next thing to be considered is, what effect the intelligence of the repeal of the Orders in Council will have in America. The question is, in short, whether that intelligence will make such a change in the sentiments of the people of America, as to produce peace. I think it will not. There are some persons in England who seem to believe, that the receipt of that intelligence will at once put an end to the war; for they do not appear to consider any treaty necessary to the restoration of peace with America.

Not only must there be a negociation, and a treaty of convention, before there can be peace, or even a suspension of arms; but I am of opinion, that no such treaty or convention can be made without more being done by us than merely the repealing of our Orders in Council, which removes but a part, and not, by any means, the greatest part of the grievances of which the Americans complain. So long ago as the month of February last, as will be seen by my motto, I expressed to your Royal Highness my opinion, that the mere repeal of the Orders in Council would not satisfy the people of America. It was, therefore, with no small degree of surprise, that I saw (from the reports in the newspapers) that Mr. Brougham had pledged himself to support the ministers in a war with America, if she should not be satisfied with their measure of repeal. I was surprised at this, because Mr. Brougham must have seen that she complained of the impressment of her seamen, and of divers other things which she deemed to be injuries. Besides, did Mr. Brougham imagine that our two years nearly of refusal to repeal were to go off without any thing being done by us in the way of compensation. The history of the transaction is this: The American President announces, in 1810, that unless we repeal our Orders by a certain day, in the same way that France had done, a certain law shall go into force against us. We do not comply; we continue in what he calls a violation of his country's rights for a year and a half after the time appointed for repealing; at the end of that time an inquiry takes place in parliament, and two volumes are published containing evidence of the ruinous effects, to us, of the measure which America has adopted. Thereupon, we repeal. But, sir, Mr. Brougham can hardly want to be told, that America has made no promise to be satisfied with any repeal which should take place after her act should go into effect. Indeed, she has never made any such promise; nor was it to be supposed that, when she saw her measure of exclusion was ruining us, she would be content with our merely doing that which was calculated to save ourselves. This, in fact, is our language to her; we refused to re-

peal our Orders till we found that the not repealing them was injurious to ourselves, and, therefore, we now repeal them, and, in consequence, call upon you to act as if we had never refused.

This, sir, is what no nation can be supposed to listen to. We do what America deems an injury; we do what she says is sufficient to justify her in declaring war against us. And, after a while, we desist; but notoriously because proof has been produced that perseverance is injurious to ourselves. In the meanwhile she declares war, to compel us to do that which we have done before we hear of her declaration. And, under these circumstances, can we expect her to disarm until she has obtained something like indemnification for the injuries which she alleges she has sustained? If there were in existence no ground of dispute other than that of the Orders in Council, it appears to me that America could (especially with our parliamentary evidence before her) never think of peace without a compensation for the vessels seized illegally, as she says, under the Orders in Council. Otherwise, she tells the world that she may be always injured with impunity; because the utmost that any nation has to apprehend from her hostility is to be compelled to cease to violate her rights. Upon this principle she may be exposed to a like attack the next day after she has made peace. Either, therefore, she complains without cause, or the mere repeal of our Orders in Council ought not to satisfy her.

Besides, sir, it appears to me, that even supposing that there were no other ground for the war, on her part, than the existence of our Orders in Council, she is bound, in fairness towards the emperor Napoleon, to obtain some kind of compensation for what she has suffered from the execution of our Orders in Council after the time that he repealed his Decrees. If she make peace with us, and place us upon the same footing with France, without obtaining such compensation, he will assuredly allege partiality against her, since she will have suffered us to continue to do with impunity, for a year and a half, that which she has made him cease to do. It was, therefore, I repeat it, matter of great surprise with me, that Mr. Brougham should have given the pledge above mentioned; though I hope your Royal Highness will be advised better than to pursue measures that shall put them to the test.

Compensation for the property seized under the Orders in Council will, I think, be denied—and if the Orders be recognised as a violation of the rights of America, I do not see upon what ground such compensation could be objected to; but, sir, as far as relates to ourselves, I trust, that the means of making such compensation would not be demanded of the people, but would be taken from those who have received the amount of the property seized. With this, however, America has nothing to do—she can only demand compensation; but she may extend that demand to the amount of her fitting out ships of war, and in sending forth an

army. "Indemnity for the past and security for the future" is, sir, a phrase not unknown to those who adorn, and have adorned your royal sire's court; and I do not know of any maxim in public law, or in diplomacy, that forbids a republic any more than a monarchy to make such a demand. If we do allow that America has just cause of complaint, we do wrong, we act a base and cowardly part, if we desist not from doing that which she complains of.

Upon what ground it is, then, that Mr. Brougham expects an immediate cessation of hostilities on the part of America, I am at a loss to discover. I am at a loss to discover upon what ground it is that he has made his pledge, or at least the pledge which has been attributed to him. Either he must look upon the Orders in Council as the sole ground of the American declaration of war, or he must suppose there to be other grounds. If he looks upon them as the sole ground, he must, I think, suppose that America will lay down her arms without obtaining indemnity for such heavy losses as those Orders have occasioned her; and if he looks upon the declaration as having been partly produced by other subjects of complaint, he must reasonably suppose, that an adjustment, as to those grounds of complaint, must precede a cessation of hostilities.

Whatever pledges may have been given by any persons, it is for your Royal Highness to lend an ear to the voice of reason; and I am greatly deceived, if that voice will not recommend to you an expression, as speedily as possible, of your readiness to cause the officers of the fleet to cease to impress any person out of American ships. This, as I have before had the honour to assure your Royal Highness, is the complaint which has, at last, in reality, produced the war between us and our American brethren. There have been many subjects of difference, many grounds of quarrel, but this is what finds its way to the heart of the American people. They would, I verily believe, have endured all but this: this, however, I knew they would not endure, and I told your ministers and the public so long ago. If I am asked whether I think that the ceasing to impress people on board of American ships would cause many of our sailors to desert, I answer, that I do not know—but that I do not see why it should; I do not see why Englishmen should like the American service better than our own. And, really, I must say, sir, that I think, that to entertain any such apprehension squares not well with the tenor of our national songs, about the valour and patriotism of our "tars." I think it exceedingly humiliating to us to suffer it to be said, or to act as if we said, that we must retain the power of impressment, or personal seizure, on board American ships out at sea, for fear the giving up of that power should cause our fleet to be deserted. Sir, I am one of those who love to believe that English seamen do not want force to induce them to fight for their country. It

is, in my eyes, a most mortifying thing to proclaim to the world, that we are likely to have a war with America, and that we appear to prefer war with America to the giving up of the means of detecting and seizing English sailors, deserters from the king's service. This so badly comports with all our assertions respecting the freedom we enjoy, and also respecting our devotion to our king and our glorious constitution: for it appears to me, that if the world believed in the necessity of this power of impressment, it must think either that our boastings of our blessed state are untrue, or that our sailors are not the most wise or the most loyal set of men. I am for wiping off the stigma; and without crying or fainting away, as Sir Vicary Gibbs is reported to have done at Horsemonger lane, I am for showing the Yankees, and the whole world, that we want no terror to keep our seamen to their duty; that we are not afraid of their skulking from our fleet to take refuge in American ships; that we entertain not the disgraceful apprehension, that those who have once had the honour to sail under the Royal flag of the house of Hanover, will ever prefer that of the American, or any other republic.

Honour, sir, as well as policy, seem to me to dictate the giving up of this power; and, as the giving of it up might, and, as I think, would, cause the restoration of peace between England and America, I will not be persuaded that such a measure does not accord with the wishes of your Royal Highness.

As to "the exhausting the resources of America," which now begins to be talked of by that most corrupt of newspapers, the Times, I do most earnestly beseech your Royal Highness to bear in mind how long the late Pitt promised this deluded nation that he would exhaust the resources of republican France! Sir, Mr. Madison, though a very plain-dressed, sleek headed man; though he wears neither tails, nor bags, nor big wigs, nor robes; though he dresses in a pepper-and-salt coat, and a nice dimity waistcoat, knows a great deal more of our real situation than I believe many of your ministers know of it; and I should not wonder if he knew almost as much of it as your Royal Highness's self does. He is a man, sir, who is not to be led by our hireling prints; he sees our gold at above five pounds an ounce; he has seen acts passed, which, in effect, force the circulation of our bank notes; and, seeing this, he does not want any body to tell him what is coming; seeing this, he will laugh at the idea of our exhausting the resources of America, the capital of whose whole debt does not amount to a tenth part of one half year's interest upon our debt. This ground of hope is, sir, more visionary than any other. Indeed, they are all equally visionary. There is no hope of any thing but loss and injury to us by a war with America.

I have now done all that I am able to prevent this calamity. If the war proceeds, I shall say as little about it as circumstances

will permit. I have lost no occasion of endeavouring to put aside this evil; and when the result of the contest shall be lamented—when those who now rejoice at the idea of doing mischief to freemen shall be weeping over their folly, I trust that your Royal Highness will have the justice to remember that this war had a decided opponent in your faithful servant,

WM. COBBETT.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

WHEN I closed my last letter to your Royal Highness upon this subject, it was my intention to forbear any further remonstrance with you thereon, and to leave *time* to be the teacher. But the intelligence, arrived from America since the date of that letter, has made me depart from that intention, and has induced me to make one more effort to convince you, that without further measures in the way of conciliation, peace with America is not likely to be restored.

The very day on which my last letter was printing, (Friday last,) was marked by the promulgation of tidings from America, that the congress had *revoked the declaration of war*, and that the American general in Canada had *entered into an armistice* for thirty days; and that both these had taken place in consequence of the revocation of our Orders in Council. A few hours were sufficient to dissipate these falsehoods; fabricated, no doubt, for the purpose of deceiving the people of this "most thinking" country. The deception would last, in all human probability, for only a few days; but, at the end of those days, a new falsehood would be invented, and the old one lost in that. This falsehood, however, does not appear to have lived even forty-eight hours; for the very next day after its promulgation brought forth the contradiction; brought forth the complete proof of a fabrication. Surely, sir, the people of America must despise us! They must despise, or, at least, pity, a nation who are made the sport of such vile literary impostors; base hirelings, who prostitute the press to all the purposes hostile to truth and freedom.

The authentic intelligence received from America appears to be, in substance, this: That the American government has received intelligence of the repeal of our Orders in Council, but that it is by no means satisfied therewith, and means to demand a redress of all its alleged grievances before it lays down its arms. In confirmation of this, the following paragraph has been quoted from a paper deemed the demi-official paper of the American government:

"The Orders in Council of the British government are *now no longer a question* with the United States. The question of peace now requires only a proper and a vigorous use of the ample means which the government is possessed of, to render it speedy, decisive, and glorious. Peace, when it comes, must bring with it *more than the confession* of British outrage by the retraction of its avowed tyranny. It is not *a mere cessation to do wrong* that can now produce a peace; wrongs done must be *redressed;* and a *guarantee must be given, in the face of the world*, for the restoration of our enslaved citizens, and the respect due to our flag, which, like the soil we inherit, must in future secure all that sails under it. The rights of neutrals must be recognised; and the British, like the first tyrants of the Swiss, must no longer expect a free people to bow down and worship the symbols of British usurpation."

Did I not tell you so, sir, in my very last letter? Did I not say, that America would now demand "*indemnity for the past, and security for the future?*" I wished to guard your Royal Highness against deception, and I, for that purpose, entered into an argument to show that we ought not to expect America to make peace with us upon our having barely *ceased to commit* what she asserted to be a violation of her rights. I told your Royal Highness, that she, for more than one reason, must demand something more than a mere *cessation* to do what she declared to be a wrong. In short, if I had been informed, when I wrote my last letter, of what I now *know*, I could not have written otherwise than I then did.

I, therefore, have, I think, some claim to attention from your Royal Highness, especially as I have all along told you, that the repeal of our Orders would not, *alone*, be sufficient. When the repeal took place, upon the death of Mr. Perceval, and when Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Brougham were reported to be making pledges to support a war against America, if that repeal did not satisfy her—at *that time*—at that important moment, when conciliation might have been rendered complete; even then, without a moment's delay, I told your Royal Highness, that the repeal of the Orders would not, of itself, be enough, and, as will be seen by the passage taken for my motto, I most earnestly besought you to put a stop, of your own accord, to the impressment of persons on board of American ships. If *this* had been done, sir; if this measure, so strongly recommended by me, had been adopted *then*, we should now have seen our ports crowded with American ships to take away our manufactures, instead of hearing of hundreds of American privateers cruising against our commerce.

The Courier and Times, newspapers, two of the most corrupt in England, make certain remarks upon the paragraph which I have quoted from the American demi-official print; and as these remarks embrace assertions and notions that are false, it is neces-

sary, or, at least, it may be useful to put the matters of which they treat in a fair light.

The Courier has this paragraph:—"Here, then, is an open avowal, that nothing will satisfy the American government but the *abandonment of the right of search*, and the acknowledgment of the principle, that free ships make free goods. *Perish the idea of peace, if it is only to be made on such terms.* Yet this the American government calls an anxious desire to accommodate all differences upon the most reasonable conditions ! !!"

The Times says:—"In this philippic, *redress* is not only claimed for the supposed wrongs inflicted by this country, but it is declared that the 'American flag must *in future secure all that sails under it.*' This is adopting, in its fullest extent, the language of Buonaparte, that 'free ships make free goods.' If that principle be maintained by the American government, and supported by the American legislature, we see not the slightest prospect of a speedy termination of hostilities."

Thus, then, these good hirelings are for war, rather than give up what they call the "*right of search.*" They are hardly so stupid as not to know that the Americans do not contend for our abandonment of the *right of search*, in the usual sense of those words; they must know that, as far as to search ships at sea (or rather to *visit* them) has been sanctioned by the usage of nations, the Americans are ready to submit to it; but, sir, this right of search is very different indeed from that of which these good hired writers are speaking.

There is a right of search, or of visit, acknowledged by all the nations of Europe. When a nation is at war, she claims the right of visiting all neutral merchant ships at sea, in order to see that they do not visit her enemy by carrying warlike stores or troops for him; and if she find them thus taking part with her enemy; if she find them thus transgressing the general usage of nations, she seizes them, as, indeed, she has just cause for doing, seeing that they are, in fact, engaged in the war against her. And the right of visiting them, to see whether they be thus transgressing, has been, by us, called *the right of search.* We have contended for, and have, for some time past, been able to maintain, an extension of this right to the *goods of an enemy* found in a neutral ship; though it is to be observed, that our ally, Russia, and our ally, Sweden, as well as Denmark and Holland, in all times, have contended against this right. But what have these to do with the searching of which Americans complain? They complain, not that we seize contraband of war on board their vessels; not that we confiscate ships or cargoes where there are enemy's troops or enemy's goods; but that we stop their vessels upon the high seas, and that there WE TAKE OUT OF THEM WHATEVER PERSONS WE PLEASE. This is what they complain of; and the fact is perfect-

ly notorious, that we have, in this way, taken many thousands of persons out of American ships, carrying on their trade quietly from one part of the world to another. It is notorious, that many of the persons thus seized were citizens and native Americans; that they have been taken on board of our ships of war; that they have been kept there for years; that they have been taken to all parts of the world; that many of them have been wounded, many have lost their limbs, and many killed, in a service which they abhorred, being compelled to fight against those with whom they had no quarrel.

There is no man of any consideration, who will attempt to say that this is right. It must of necessity, have created a deep-rooted ill will against us in America, where the seafaring people are not a class of individuals who have neither house nor home, and whose state is desperate. A vessel, in America, is often manned by people all living in the same village; and the impressment, the banishment, the destruction of one, must be felt by the whole, and by the whole of the neighbourhood also. Hence the heart burnings in America against England. The confiscation of ships and cargoes, under the Orders in Council, together with the dreadful distress to the captains and crews, produced great effect against us; but, great as it was, it fell short of the effect produced by the impressment of American seamen.

It has been said that, if we give up the exercise of this power of impressment, our sailors will desert to the American ships. But suppose the fact to be so: what is that to America? It is not her fault. She does not force them out of our service. She does not compel them to desert. If they really do like her service better than ours, she cannot help that. We may as well complain of her for having such a country as our artisans and manufacturers prefer to their own, and, upon that ground, go and search her country for our deserted artisans and manufacturers, who emigrate to her shores in defiance of our laws. Really, sir, I can see no just cause of complaint against her because our men desert to her ships. It is for us to keep our men, if we wish them not to go into her service; and not to complain of her for receiving them.

It is a practice wholly unknown in the world before. We have never, that I have heard of, attempted to exercise such a power against any nation but America. It is true, that all our officers who may visit her ships may not conduct themselves in a manner such as she has complained of; but it is not less true, that they are *left entirely to their own discretion.* They are, it is true, not authorized to take *Americans* out of American ships; but, then, it is left to them, and must be wholly left to them, to decide *who are and who are not, Americans.* This being the case, it is clear that every American ship's crew, who meet an English ship of war at sea, are *at the mercy* of the commander of that ship of war!

No more need be said; for no man likes to be at the mercy of another. The English captain has, in this case, the power of seizure, of imprisonment, of banishment, and, indeed, what power has he not over the American crew? They may produce proof of being natives of America, and then he is not authorized to seize them. Aye! but he, alas! is the sole and absolute *judge of that proof*, which he may think *bad*, and then it may as well not be produced.

This is the view to take of the matter, sir. The corrupt press of London may, and will, bewilder the minds of the people, by talking about the right of search and the like; but the plain fact is this: that in consequence of this authority given to our ships of war, to take persons out of American ships at sea, the crew of every American merchant ship that went to sea, or even from one port to another in America, were at the absolute mercy of the commander of the first English ship of war that happened to meet them. Suppose the case, sir, of an American captain sailing out of the Delaware for the East Indies with his complement of men, being twenty, all his neighbours, met by an English sloop of war; suppose him to have six of his men taken, in spite of all his assurances of their being native Americans; suppose him to pursue his voyage with only fourteen hands; suppose the six seized men be taken off to the West Indies; suppose two or three die of the yellow fever; another to be killed; another lose an arm, and the sixth released by the intervention of the American consul at London. Suppose this case, sir, and you will suppose *what may have happened*. It was possible for such cases to happen, and that was enough; but it was a thing which admitted of being rendered impossible. It is sufficient to say, that in consequence of this power, no American could, in a merchant ship, sail the sea in safety. He never was, for one single hour, secure against captivity and banishment. To a people so situated, war must be a *relief*. The American seamen will prefer war, because, if captured in war, the laws of war protect him and feed him as a *prisoner*—whereas he was before liable, not only to be seized and carried from his calling and country, but, at the same time, compelled to act as a seaman on board of our ships; compelled to labour and to risk his life in our service, where it might be his lot to assist in serving others of his own countrymen as he himself had been served.

Sir, when you take a dispassionate view of this matter, I am quite sure, that the justice of your mind will decide you in favour of an abandonment, a frank abandonment, of the exercise of this power, which is, I am satisfied, without a precedent in the usage of nations, and which, under the present circumstances, can do nothing towards the safety of the country.

If this point were once settled, it appears to me that much diffi-

culty would not remain. But, as I had the honour to state to your Royal Highness, it is not to be supposed, that war is to *cease* the moment we *cease to do wrong* to America. I have not taken upon me to say, whether our Orders in Council were a wrong or not; but, by the repeal, we seem to have acknowledged that they were. If, then, they were a wrong, the cessation of them cannot be considered as sufficient to induce America to put up the sword at once, and without further ceremony. When I published what was called a libel, in the year 1812, that is to say, when I published an expression of my feelings at what had then been described as having taken place at the town of Ely, (where the bank has since broken,) with respect to the local militia and the German legion; when I made that publication, I *ceased*—I made only one of that sort; yet, sir, was I, at the distance of a year after the publication, sentenced to be imprisoned for two years, and to pay a thousand pounds fine to your royal sire, and which thousand pounds I have paid to you in his behalf. So you see, sir, that after one has done a thing, or has been doing a thing, it is not always sufficient *to cease* to do it; the ceasing to do that which is deemed wrong is not always regarded as sufficient to appease, or disarm the offended party. The last part of my punishment, the payment of the fine to you, in behalf of your royal sire, was inflicted at more than three years' distance from the time of my writing about the local militia and the German legion. There may, perhaps, in the law of nations, be an exception from the general principles, in cases where a kingly government commits an offence, or alleged offence, against a republic; but, in my small reading, I have, I must confess, never met with any such exception.

Therefore, I, for my part, was not at all surprised to see the American demi-official print announce, that *compensation for the past*, and *security for the future*, would be required. "It is not," says the writer, "a mere *cessation to do wrong* that can now produce a peace; wrong done must be *redressed*, and a *guarantee* must be given in the face of the world." Yes, sir, just as in my case, who, after imprisonment and fine, was compelled, before I was released, *to enter into bonds*, to give a *guarantee*, as the republican writer calls it. Indeed, sir, the history of the world is full of cases in support of this doctrine of the Americans. When your royal brother invaded Holland, it was not sufficient that he *ceased* to penetrate into the country; for when he got back to *the Helder*, though he had then entirely *ceased* to be an invader, and appears to have very properly confined his wishes to the safe bringing-off of his army, the republican generals *Brune* (the "printer's boy of Limosin") and *Daendals*, insisted upon the surrender, to France and Holland, of *eight thousand* of their seamen, who were then prisoners of war in England; this they insisted upon "as the price of permission to the British troops, with whom the

duke of York had invaded Holland, to re-embark on board their transports *without molestation.*"

This was a compensation for injury, not *done*, but *attempted.* If the royal commander had said, "I have *stopped;* I have *ceased;* I am going away; *what more do you want?*"—If he had thus addressed the republican generals, they would have thought him cracked in the brain. His Royal Highness knew a great deal better. He took the effectual way of giving his opponents satisfaction, and thus he was enabled to bring off his army without molestation.

Here, then, sir, are two instances of the soundness of the American doctrine; that a mere cessation of an offensive act is not, as a matter of course, deemed a satisfaction to the party offended. Nay, in my case, that was single; it was committed in a moment; it at once ceased; there was no remonstrance; no expostulation; the single act was seized hold of, and my printer and publisher, and one of the newsmen, though they did not attempt to defend *their* conduct, but confessed their crime, declared on oath that they were wholly unconscious that they were publishing a libel, and humbly sued for mercy; though they did all this, *yet they were all imprisoned.*

Upon what principle, then, I ask, can these corrupt writers imagine, that America is to be satisfied with the mere repeal of our Orders in Council; that is to say, with the mere cessation of the acts offensive to her? Upon what ground is it that the country, in which the proceedings against me took place, can expect this at her hands? I do not say that we were doing her wrong; I do not take upon me to decide that question. If we were not doing her wrong, however, why did we repeal? If we were not doing her wrong, why did we yield at her menaces? If we were not doing her wrong, we should not have given way; and if we were doing her wrong, we should have gone further; for, upon the principles on which I was punished, and on which the sansculotte generals insisted upon your royal brother's giving up 8000 prisoners of war then in England; upon those principles, a *mere cessation* to do what gives offence is not considered as a sufficient atonement to the offended party.

The President of the United States has seen himself ridiculed, and most grossly abused in our venal newspapers, who, amongst other qualities not more to be admired, have ascribed to him that of *cowardice.* Such language does not tend to harmony; and though (thank God!) Mr. Madison cannot, by his obstinacy, or to indulge any old grudge, plunge his country into a war; yet he certainly has the power to render the way to peace more difficult. I must, however, do him the justice to say, that I do not believe him capable of imitating, for one single moment, those detestable miscreants, whom history has but too frequently exhibited in the act

of rendering millions miserable for the purpose of gratifying some stupid, some idiot-like, some hog-like passion. But, without being under any such influence, and without supposing any very strong prejudice against England in the minds of the people of America, there are, I fear, reasons enough to induce Mr. Madison to be in no haste to listen to terms of peace.

America has long felt the power of England; she has long been compelled to endure that which she detested; she is covered with scars of our inflicting; and she will not forget all this now that she has arms in her hands. I have before pointed out to your Royal Highness of what importance it is to her that we should have nothing to do in the affairs of Spain. The war in Spain is, in fact, more fearful to America when it is most promising in appearance to us. She will never rest contented while there is a chance of our having any influence in Spanish South America. Of Napoleon she is not afraid in that quarter. He has no fleet to endanger her commerce; and, besides, her present exertions against us may, perhaps, secure her his assent to her wishes on that flank of her territories.

As to our internal situation, she is well aware of it. The army in Canada is not better known to her than the army in the "*disturbed counties.*" Mr. Madison is very well acquainted with the causes of our disturbances; he has read before now all the evidence taken at the bar of parliament; he has seen it *proved* that the people of England are suffering greatly from the non-importation of their goods into America; he is well aware of the wants of our army in Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean; and he knows that a war with his country must soon plunge us into the greatest distress.

It is with a knowledge of all these that Mr. Madison enters on the war; and under such circumstances, it appears to me impossible that he should listen to any terms of peace not including ample indemnity for the past. The American prints seem to insist upon a guarantee for the release of the American seamen whom we have impressed. This, I should hope, there would be no objection to; and, indeed, I hope that your Royal Highness's ministers will *now*, at the eleventh hour, do every thing in their power to procure us the restoration of *honourable* peace; I hope that England is not doomed to wage war against every man in the world who is in the enjoyment of real liberty. I know, sir, that there are, in England, men who abhor the American government and people, and who would, if they had the power, exterminate them both, merely because the one guarantees, and the other enjoys freedom. Such men will never be happy while they see a freeman in the world: but their malice will not be gratified; they will, though it blast their eye-sight, still see the Americans free. Such men always speak of America with disdain; they affect to consider her as nothing; they seem to think that no ceremony is ne-

cessary with her; that even when she has declared war, and has actually begun war, she is bound to leave off merely upon our ceasing to do her wrong, if wrong it be. Such men would, of course, think it a mortification *to send over to her pacific overtures*, which one of them already calls *suing for peace*. Far from your Royal Highness be counsels like these! This was the language with regard to the republicans of France; but the haughty Pitt was glad, at last, to be permitted to send overtures of peace to those republicans. I hope, therefore, that we shall, in this case, be wise in the outset, which is far better than *wisdom at the close*.

The whole case is now before you, sir; war or peace is in your power. That you may choose the latter is the earnest wish of your Royal Highness's faithful servant,

WM. COBBETT.

AMERICAN WAR.

THIS war, as appears by advices from America, has been further marked by our success by land, and our failure by sea. I will not call it disgrace, or defeat; but an American sloop of war has now defeated an English sloop of war for the second time. So that, owing to some cause or other, the American navy, upon equal terms, really seems to have gained the superiority. In the meanwhile, however, it is stated, that through the means of the *mediation of Russia*, an opening for a negotiation for peace is likely to take place. But from the language of our vile newspaper editors, who appear to hate the Americans for no other cause than that they are not slaves, little hope seems to exist of a happy result. The article to which I allude, was in the following words:

"Captain Bedford, as we stated yesterday, has brought the official notification of an offer on the part of Russia to mediate between this country and America. *We hope it will be refused;* indeed, we are sure it will. We have the highest respect for the Russian government, the warmest admiration of its prowess, but we have a love for our naval pre-eminence that cannot bear to have it even touched by a foreign hand. Russia, too, can hardly be supposed to be very adverse to the principles of the armed neutrality, and that idea alone would be sufficient to make us decline the offer. But without discussing that point, we must make our stand upon this—*never to commit our naval rights to the mediation of any power.* This is the flag we must nail to the national mast, and go down rather than strike it. Before the war commenced concessions might have been proper; we always

thought it unwise. But *the hour of concession and compromise is passed:* America has rushed unnecessarily and unnaturally into war, and she must be *made to feel the effects of her folly and injustice.* Peace must be the consequence of *punishment*, and retraction of her insolent demands must *precede* negotiation. The thunder of our cannon must first strike terror into the American shores, and Great Britain must be seen and felt, in all the majesty of her might, from Boston to Savannah, from the lakes of Canada to the mouths of the Mississippi. And before this article goes forth to the world, her cannon have been heard, and her power felt. The clamorous demagogues of America, the turbulent democrats, the noisy advocates for war with us, the pretended patriots of America, and the real *partisans of France,* assume now another tone. Their papers no longer speak the language of boast and menace. *Fear* pervades their towns on the seacoast—*Alarm* prevails in all quarters. They are more intent upon moving their property than in making head against the danger; and though they boasted that they would support government with all their means and resources, with their treasures and their blood, the government cannot, in the first year of the war, raise a loan of four millions sterling! These are the immediate consequences of a war entered into to gratify the passions of hatred and envy of England, and to propitiate France."

And this is the language of *peace,* is it? It would seem, that writers like this feared nothing so much as an end to that war, which has already brought more disgrace upon the British navy than all the wars in which we were ever before engaged. It would really seem that these men were paid to endeavour to cause an American navy to be created. What other object they can have in view, in thus goading the Americans on to hostility and hatred, I cannot conceive; I am sure that the *Times* newspaper, by its senseless abuse of Mr. Madison and the congress, and its insolent and contemptuous language towards the American people, did much in producing this fatal war. Paine has said that it is the *last feather* that breaks the horse's back; and would it be any wonder, if this base print, by that insolence, those taunting menaces, in which it dealt a few months before the war was declared, was the *last feather* upon the occasion? It spoke of the Americans and their navy in a strain of contempt not to be endured. It told them that their boasted *navy* should be towed into Halifax in a month from the date of their declaration of war. It said that it hated *other* enemies of England; but that Mr. Madison and his nation were unworthy of any thing but contempt. It was impossible for any nation to put up with this. Libels the most atrocious were published against Mr. Madison and all his brother officers in the government. The naval officers of America were spoken of as if they were dogs. In that country *the people* have some-

thing to say as to public affairs; and is it any wonder that such publications should produce an effect amongst them, who read every thing, and who well understand what they read? The President, we find, has instantly, and with great avidity, accepted the mediation of Russia. He is a very plain man. Wears, or used to wear, a grey coat, and his no powdered hair very smooth. He had no big wig, nor any gowns, or any other fine thing upon him. But he seems to know very well what he is about. Indeed, all he has to know, is, what *the people wish*, and that he knows by their votes. He knows that they hate war, as the great and fruitful parent of taxation and arbitrary power; and to please them, he must avail himself of every thing that offers, even a chance of putting an end to the war on just and honourable terms.

But, as you see, our hirelings exclaim against the acceptance of any mediation; even the mediation of Russia, who has committed her fleets to our hands. For once let us hope that these men do not speak the language of the government. If we refuse the mediation of our own ally in the war: if we refuse the mediation of that power, who, we say, is about to deliver Europe, and us, from the fears of Buonaparte, what will that power—what will the world say of our cause? We are not, it seems, "to commit our *naval rights* to the mediation of any power." But this is not proposed. The Americans do not dispute any thing heretofore acknowledged by them, or contended for by us, as *a right*. The thing we contend for is, the practice of *impressing persons* on board neutral ships on the *high seas*. This the Americans deny to be a right. They say that it never was before practised, or contended for, or claimed, by any belligerent nation; they say, that by no writer on public law; by no principle ever laid down by such writer; by no practice; by no recognition of any power; by no assertion of ours, is this act justified. In short, they say that it has neither law, precedent, nor reason for its basis. If they assert, in this respect, what is not true, why not *prove* it? Why not cite us the book, the treaty, the public document, the principle, the precedent, upon which we ground this practice? No one attempts to do this; and until it be done, what impudence is it to say that we possess such a right!

Agreeably to all the principles of jurisprudence, when a man claims a right to do that which is, on the face of the thing, a trespass upon another man, he must first *prove* his right. There may be in John a right to pass across the field of James; but having now, for the first time, begun to exercise this right, it is incumbent upon him to *prove* it in the way of defence against an action of trespass; and, if he cannot prove it; if he can show neither written deeds, nor bring evidence of precedent or custom, he suffers as a trespasser. Apply this to the case before us, and will any one say, that, in order to justify a war for such a practice, we ought not to

produce something in *proof* of our right? I am for giving up no naval *right* of England; and if any one will show me any *treaty*, any *declaration* of any power, any *recognition*, any *maxim* of any writer upon the public law, or any *custom* or *precedent of any power in the whole world*, to justify our impressment of persons on board of neutral ships on the high seas, I will say, that our last shot ought to be fired, rather than cease our practice of impressment. Can I say more? Can I go further? Will justice or reason allow me to go further than this? The Americans will say, that I go much too far; but I am quite Englishman enough to go this length. Further, however, I will not go, call me what the hirelings will.

Is it not a little too much in this writer to talk about *concessions*, as demanded by America? She asks (I repeat it for about the hundredth time) for *no concessions*. She says we are trespassing upon her, and we, without any attempt to *prove* that we are not trespassing, accuse her of demanding concessions, because she asks us to *cease what she deems a trespass*. I really, upon no point, ever observed these prints more base and impudent than they are upon this. It is so plain a case. America complains of a most injurious trespass; we call it the exercise of a *right;* she replies, *prove* your right; and we rejoin by accusing her of *demanding concessions*. However, she is now, it seems, to be *punished*. That word will go backwards down the throats of those who have made use of it. "*Punishment*" is to *precede* peace with her. Poor, foolish wretch, who has written or dictated this paragraph! She is to be *punished*, and she is to *retract*, before we negotiate for peace with her! I beg the reader to bear this threat in his mind. Whether he does or not, it will not be soon forgotten *in America*, where, we may be well assured, that the bombarding of a few towns will have no other effect than that of rendering the contest more bitter, and of completing the commercial separation of the two countries. Perhaps, among the things most wished for by the bitterest enemies of England in America, is the burning of a seaport or two. The loss would be trifling in comparison with the advantage to those who wish to cut the two countries asunder for ever. "*Fear!*" "*Alarm!*" What alarm are they in? Those who know them, know how small a sacrifice the knocking down a town would be. The country is a country of plenty. There is more food than the people want. It is not, as in Russia, where famine follows war. To be sure, the inhabitants of the towns which are in danger must experience alarm: but what has this to do with the whole country; and what *gain* will it be to us? we shall have expended some scores of thousands of pounds in the undertaking, and we shall have enemies for ever of many who were not our enemies before.

In the mean while, whatever this writer may say about the *loan* in America, ships of war will be built; a navy will grow up; seamen will be formed in great numbers; and let peace take place whenever it may, we shall have created a formidable rival on the ocean. Nor are we to suppose, if the war continues, that a closer connexion will not take place *between America and France.* Hitherto the war on our part has not had that effect. The American government, as if to give the lie to our insolent writers, has formed no connexion at all with France; but, is it likely, that if the war continue, and the desire of revenge increase, some connexion will not be formed with France? With whom is America to ally herself but with our enemy, who has ships in abundance, which has not, and only wants, just those very sailors of which she has too many? This would give her at once a navy without a loan; or, which would be better for her, the *use of a navy* during war, without the encumbrance of it during peace. Would these spiteful and silly writers like to see Decatur, and Hull, and Bainbridge, on board French ships of the line? Would they like to see a fleet of nine or ten sail manned with the same sort of stuff that fired on the Java from the Constitution? My opinion is, that if the war continue another year, they will see this: and yet they have the audacity, or the stupidity, to say, in print, that they hope the mediation of Russia will be rejected by our ministers! It has always been my fear, and I long before the war expressed it, that it would produce a connexion of this kind with France: and if such connexion has not already taken place, it has, perhaps, been owing solely to the fear of giving a handle to the English party in the states.

If, however, we carry on a war of bombardment, that party will, in a short time, have no weight at all; and the thirst for revenge will produce that, which, under the influence of less hostile passions, might still have remained an object of jealousy. To see a fleet under the allied banners of France and America, would be to me a most fearful object. I am convinced it would present greater dangers to us than we have ever yet had to contemplate; and, therefore, I read with indignation and abhorrence all these endeavours of English writers to exasperate the people of America. I have never believed that the crews of the ships by which our frigates have been beaten were British sailors; I have always believed them to have been native Americans, and I still believe it. But if, as our hired writers have asserted, they were our own countrymen, what is to hinder the ships of France to be manned in the same way? The British sailors, who are now, if there be any, fighting against their own country in American ships, will, of course, be as ready to follow their commanders to French ships; and, if that were to be the case, this war, for the practice of impressment, would have answered a most serious end indeed.

By a stroke of address not without a precedent in the history of our cabinet, we have got into a war with America upon the worst possible ground for us. We talk about the maintenance of our *maritime rights;* and this does very well with the people at large. "What!" say they, "America wants to rob us of our *maritime rights!*" But what is this right? Suppose it, for argument's sake, to be a right, *what is it?* It is the right of *impressing* people in American ships on the high seas. But, still to narrow it; it is the maritime right of *impressing;* and impressing *whom?* Why, *British seamen.* One would think that this should have been the last ground on which to make or meet a war. It is utterly impossible to devest one's self of the idea which this conveys; and equally impossible not to perceive the effect which must be produced by it in the sailor's mind. For either our navy does contain considerable numbers of seamen who wish to seek and find shelter under the American flag, or it does not. If it does not, why go to war with her for this right of impressing them? If it does, how must these same seamen feel as to the cause in which they are engaged? I fancy this is a dilemma that would hamper almost any of the partisans of the American war. I have always been disposed to believe, notwithstanding the assertions to the contrary, that our seamen have not gone over to the Americans in any considerable number; but if, unhappily, I am deceived, I am quite sure that this war will have a strong tendency to aggravate the evil.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

DURING the two years that I was imprisoned in Newgate, for writing and publishing an article upon the flogging of certain English militiamen, at Ely, in England, under the superintendence of German troops, and for which writing and publishing I, besides, paid your Royal Highness a fine of a thousand pounds, in behalf of your royal sire; during that time I endeavoured, in various ways, to expiate my offence, but in no way more strenuously than in trying to dissuade you from yielding to advice, which, as I thought, would, if followed, produce *a war* with the American states. That consequence, which I so much dreaded, and which I laboured with so much earnestness to prevent, has unhappily taken place; and, though it may be of no service, though my efforts may still be unavailing—nay, though I may receive abuse instead of thanks for my pains, I cannot refrain—the love I bear my own country, and the regard I shall ever bear a great part of

the people of America, will not suffer me to refrain from making one more trial to convince your Royal Highness, that the path of peace is still fairly open with that country, and that pacific measures are the only measures which ought even now to be pursued.

In one of my letters to your Royal Highness I endeavoured to convince you, that it was to the base, the prostituted press of England, that we were likely to owe this war; I pointed out to your Royal Highness the means resorted to by that press in order to deceive the people of England; and I expressed my apprehensions, that these means would succeed. That press, that vile and infamous press, which is the great enemy of the liberties of Europe and America, as well as of England, was incessant in its efforts to cause it to be believed, that, in no case, would the American government dare to go to war. It asserted that America would be totally ruined by six months of war; that the people would not pay the taxes necessary to carry it on; that the President, for only barely talking of war, would be put out of his chair; that the "*American navy,*" as it was called by way of ridicule, would be "*swept from the ocean in a month:*" and that, in short, a war with America was a thing for Englishmen to laugh at; a subject of jest and mockery.

This was the style and tone of the hireling press in London, and, with very few exceptions, the country prints followed the stupid and insolent example. Events have already shown how false all these assertions were; and now, as is its usual practice, this same corrupt press is pouring forth *new falsehoods*, with a view of urging on the war, and of reconciling the people to its calamities.

It was my endeavour to show your Royal Highness the real state of the case. I said, that the people of America, though wisely averse to war, as the great source of taxation and loss of liberty, would, nevertheless, submit to its inconveniences rather than submit to the terms which it was recommended, in our hireling prints, to impose upon them. I begged your Royal Highness to disbelieve those who said that the American government dared not go to war, and that Mr. Madison would not be re-elected. I besought you to reflect upon the consequences of rushing into a war with that country, amongst which consequences I included the forming of *a great naval force* on the other side of the Atlantic, and the not less fearful measure of *manning a French fleet with American sailors.* Our hired presses affect to turn into *jest* a proposition said to have been made by the President for the building of *twenty frigates.* If he has made that proposition, however, and if the war continue *only one year*, your Royal Highness will find that the twenty frigates are launched upon the ocean. The ignorant and saucy writers in London, who live up to their lips in luxury, and whose gains are not at all dependant upon the pros-

perity of the country; these men care not how the people suffer. Their object is to prolong the war, which suits the views of those with whom they are connected. They assert whatever presents itself as likely to promote this object, and, therefore, they take no pains to ascertain whether the building of twenty frigates is, or is not, a matter of easy execution in America. If they did, they would find, that the Americans have the timber, the iron, the pitch, the hemp, *all of the produce of their own country;* all in abundance; all, of course, cheap; and as to dock-yards, and other places to build ships, inquiry would teach these ignorant and insolent men, that, in many cases, the timber grows upon the very spot where the ship is to be built, and that to cut it down and convert it into a ship is doing a great benefit to the owner of the land.

And, then, as to the *pecuniary means*, to hear the language of our hirelings, one would imagine that the people of America were all *beggars;* that the country contained scarcely a man of property; that there were no such things as money, house-goods, cattle, manufactures. They must, indeed, confess that the country grows *corn;* but somehow or other, they would have us believe, that there are, in America, no *means*, no *resources*. They cannot disguise from us the fact, that there are fine cities and towns; that there is a commercial marine not far behind our own in point of magnitude; that the exports from the country amount annually to more than half as much as our exports, and that they consist of articles of first necessity; that the country contains all the articles of useful manufactory, and that manufactures are making great progress; nay, that they have arrived at great perfection; that the country is stocked with sheep, that great source of a nation's wealth, and that to so high a degree have these animals succeeded, that many single proprietors have already flocks of more than a thousand head. These facts the hired press cannot disguise from us; or, at least, from those amongst us, who are not wilfully blind. Upon what ground, then, sir, would they have us believe, that America is *destitute of resources?* The things which I have here spoken of, are things of which national riches consist; they form the means of making national exertions; of sending forth fleets and armies. And we ought to bear in mind, that America, that this new enemy of ours, has a population of more than *eight millions of souls*, none of whom are *paupers*, none of whom are clad in rags; none of whom are without *meat* upon their table daily; not one soul of whom would condescend to pull off his hat to any human being. And this is the nation, a nation, too, descended from ourselves, that the hirelings of the London press represent as *destitute of resources!*

Perhaps, sir, the resources of America are estimated according to the *salaries which their public functionaries receive*—and, mea-

sured by this standard, our new enemy must, indeed, appear wholly unable to contend against us for a single day; for the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state, the treasury, war, navy, and all their clerks; that is to say, the whole of the officers of the executive government, do not receive *more than about half the amount of Lord Arden's sinecure*, as stated in the report to the house of commons in 1808. Nay, the *apothecary to our army* does, according to the same report, receive, in clear profits, annually, as much as twice the amount of the salary of the President of the United States. Our chief justice, in salary and emoluments, as stated in the reports laid before parliament, receives annually a great deal more than Mr. Madison, Mr. Monroe, Mr. Gallatin, and the secretaries of the war and the navy in America, all put together. I shall, perhaps, be told that our public functionaries *ought* to receive more than those of America. That is a point which I shall leave for others to dispute. I content myself with stating the facts; but if I am told, that we ought not to measure the salaries of our functionaries by the American standard, I must beg leave, in my turn, to protest against measuring the expenses of war in America by the standard of war expenses in England. I must insist, too, that the resources of a country are not to be measured by the standard of the salaries of its public functionaries. I should take quite a different standard for the measuring of the resources of America. We know that upon a population of *ten millions*, in Great Britain, a revenue of about *eighty millions of pounds is now annually raised*—and that, in these ten millions of people, we include, at least, *two millions of paupers*. Now, then, if they raise but a *tenth part* as much upon the *eight millions* of Americans, who have no paupers amongst them, their eight millions will be four times as much as was ever yet raised in the country in any one year; and it is, I think, not too much to suppose, that an American will bear a *tenth part* as much taxes as an Englishman, in the prosecution of a war declared by the vote of *representatives freely chosen by the people at large*. Eight millions of pounds sterling, raised for three or four successive years, would build a navy, that I should, and that I do, contemplate with great uneasiness; for, as I once before had the honour to state to your Royal Highness, the Americans are as good sailors as any that the world ever saw. It is notorious that the American merchant ships sail with fewer hands, in proportion to their size, than the merchant ships of any other nation; the Americans are active in their persons; they are enterprising; they are brave; and, which is of vast consequence, they are, from education and almost from constitution, SOBER, a virtue not at all less valuable in an army or a fleet than it is in domestic life.

This, sir, is a view of the means and resources of America, very different, perhaps, from the views which some persons might

be disposed to present to your Royal Highness; and if this, my view of the matter, be correct, it surely becomes us to be very cautious how we force these resources into action, and set them in array against us, backed, as they will be, with the implacable hatred of the American people. If, indeed, the *honour* of England required the setting of these resources at defiance; if England must either confess her disgrace; must basely abandon her known rights; must knuckle down to America, or brave the consequences of what I have been speaking of; I should then say, to the words of the old Norman proverb, (adopted by the French in answer to the duke of Brunswick's proclamation,) "*let honour be maintained, happen what will.*"

But, sir, the question: *Does* the honour of England require the making of this perilous experiment? In my opinion it does not; and I now, with the most anxious hope, that, at last, they may be attended with some effect, proceed respectfully to submit to your Royal Highness the reasons upon which this opinion is founded.

The dispute, with regard to the Orders in Council, I look upon as being at an end; for, though all is not quite clear in that respect, an arrangement seems to be matter of little difficulty. But, as I am sure your Royal Highness will do me the honour to recollect, I took the liberty to warn the public, that the very week that the Orders in Council were done away, that that measure *alone* would do nothing towards preventing war with America. I then said, and in the most distinct terms, and without any hesitation, that America would never be content without a complete abandonment, on our part, of the practice of *seizing persons on board her ships upon the high seas.* I formed this opinion upon the general tone of the American prints; upon the declaration of the congress; and especially upon information contained in letters received from friends in America, in whose hearts, strange as it may appear to some, my imprisonment in Newgate seems to have revived former feelings towards me. These letters, written by persons (be it observed) strongly attached to England, for no others did I ever number amongst my friends; these letters assured me, *that the people* of America, not the *government*, not "*a faction*," as our hirelings have called them; that the people of America, from one end of the country to the other, cried for war in preference to longer submission to the stopping of their vessels on the high seas, and taking persons out of them, at the discretion of our officers. Upon this information, coming, in some cases, three hundred miles from the Atlantic coasts, I could safely rely; and, therefore, I did not hesitate to pronounce, that the repeal of the Orders in Council alone could not preserve peace; nor was I a little surprised to hear Mr. Brougham declare, that if that measure did not satisfy America, he, for one, would support a war against her.

The question, then, is now reduced to this: Does the honour

of England demand that she insist upon continuing the practice of which America complains, and against which she is now making war? To answer this question, we must ascertain whether the practice of which America complains *be sanctioned by the usages of the nation;* whether the giving of it up would be to yield any *known right* of England; because, in the case of the affirmative, to yield would be to make a sacrifice of our honour, rather than which, I agree that we ought to continue the war to the last extremity, it being much less disgraceful to submit to actual force, than to submit to menaces.

My opinion is, however, decidedly in the negative; and I will not disguise from your Royal Highness, that I never felt surprise more complete, (to give my feelings no stronger appellation,) than that which I experienced at reading the following passage in the letter of Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell, of the 29th August last:

"I cannot, however, refrain, on one single point, from expressing my surprise; namely, that, as a condition, preliminary even to a suspension of hostilities, the government of the United States should have thought fit to demand, that the British government should desist from its *ancient and accustomed practice of impressing British seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state,* simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be passed to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of that state. The British government now, as heretofore, is ready to receive from the government of the United States, and amicably to discuss, any proposition which professes to have in view either *to check abuse in exercise of the practice of impressment,* or to accomplish, by means less liable to vexation, the object for which impressment has hitherto been found necessary; but they cannot consent to suspend the exercise of a *right* upon which the naval strength of the empire mainly depends, until they are fully convinced that means can be devised, and will be adopted, by which the object to be obtained by the exercise of that *right* can be effectually secured."

Being no secretary of state for foreign affairs, I shall, I trust, be excused, if I am found to understand less of the "ancient and accustomed practice of Great Britain as to this matter: but, sir, I have never before heard, except from the London newspapers, that Great Britian did ever, until now, attempt to take persons of any description out of neutral vessels sailing upon the high seas; and very certain I am that such a practice is not warranted, nay, that it never was thought of, by any of those authors who have written upon public law. I do not recollect a single instance in which we have exercised what is here called *a right;* and if, in the abandonment of the practice, we give up no known right of England, such abandonment can be no dishonour; unless, which

would be a monstrous proposition, it be regarded as dishonourable to cease to do any thing, because the doing of it has been the subject of *complaint* and the object of *resistance*.

The men who conduct the London newspapers, and whose lucubrations are a sore affliction to their native country, have long been charging the Americans with a wish to make England give up her "right of search." Whether this falsehood has arisen from sheer ignorance, or from that impunity in deception, or rather encouragement to deceive, which such writers have so experienced in England, I will not take upon me to determine, but I know well that it is a most audacious falsehood; I know that America has never expressed even a wish to make us give up "*the right of search;*" and if her government were to attempt to accomplish such an end by war, I am quite sure that it would soon lose the support of the people. But "the right of search" is not, and never has been, for a moment, by any writer on public law, considered as a right to search for persons, except indeed, military persons, and those, too, openly employed in the *enemy's service*. "The right of search" is a right possessed by a belligerent power to search for and to seize as good prize any articles contraband of war, such as *guns, powder*, and the like, which may be on board of a neutral ship going to an enemy's port; because, by carrying the said articles, the neutral does in fact aid the enemy in carrying on the war. This right has been further extended to any goods belonging to an enemy, found on board a neutral vessel; because, by becoming the carrier of his goods, the neutral does, in fact, screen his goods, as far as possible, from capture, and does thereby also *aid the enemy*. This is what is called "the right of search;" a right, however, which, as far as relates to goods, has been often denied by neutral powers, and which we actually gave up to the threats of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, towards the end of *the last American war*.

But of *this right*, of *no part* of this right, do the Americans now complain. They yield to the exercise of this right in all its rigour. But they deny that we have any right at all—they deny that we have a pretence to any right—to stop their vessels on the high seas, and to take out of them any *persons* whatever, unless, indeed, military persons in the service of our enemy; and I repeat, sir, that I know of no usage of nations; that I know of no ancient usage of our own even; that I know of no law, maxim, principle or practice, to sanction that of which the Americans complain, and in resistance of which they are now armed and at war; and, therefore, I am of opinion, that to abandon this practice would be no dishonour to England.

Lord Castlereagh talks of our right to "impress *British seamen* from the merchant ships of a foreign state." Impressment may take place in our ports and harbours, if confined to our *own sea-*

men. America does not object to it. It is upon the *high seas* that she objects to impressment; because there the matter *must* be left to the *discretion of the British officer.* It is there a mere matter of power. There is no one to appeal to; there is no umpire; there is no judge to look into proofs, and to decide. The searching officer may, under his discretion, take out as many men as he pleases—he may leave the ship destitute of hands necessary to conduct her a league; and he may take out American citizens as well as English subjects. That this may be done is quite certain, because it has been done in countless instances. Thousands of native Americans, thus impressed, have been released by our admiralty on the official application of the American agents; and, who can doubt that many thousands remain unreleased? General Lyman, late American consul in London, once stated in a report to his government, that there were about 14,000 native Americans then on board our fleet, who had been impressed from on board American ships on the high seas. He might possibly exaggerate; but it is not to be doubted that the number was, and has been, very considerable. And I beg your Royal Highness to take a serious view of the great hardships experienced by Americans thus impressed. Taken from their lawful and peaceable pursuits; dragged into a service, and forced under a discipline, so little congenial with their habits and their prejudices; wafted away to sickly climates, exposed to all the dangers of battle, taken, perhaps for ever, from the sight and knowledge of their homes and friends; and, if, by *chance,* (for it can be nothing more,) restored, at last restored, (as has often been the case,) with the loss of health or of limbs, and at the very least, with the loss of time, and that too in the prime of their lives; and carrying about them for the remainder of their days, feelings towards England which I need not attempt to describe.

Your Royal Highness's heart will tell you, I hope, much better than I can, not what *is,* but what *must* be the effect of such a practice carried on against a people who are not only the children of Englishmen, but of those Englishmen who preferred freedom in a wilderness across the ocean, to slavery in their native land. That it is, sir, that has at last kindled the flame of war in a country where the very name of war was too hateful to be endured.

But in answer to all this, it is said, by Lord Castlereagh, that "the *naval strength* of the empire *mainly depends*" upon the continuation of this practice of impressment. That is to say, if we take the whole of the facts into view, our naval strength mainly depends upon a practice which exposes so many of the American citizens to misery and ruin. The plain meaning of our perseverance in the practice is this: that if we do not continue it, our seamen will desert to the American ships in such numbers as to leave us without the possibility of obtaining a sufficiency of men

to man and fight our fleet. Supposing this to be the fact, it really forms no justification of the practice; for we can have no right to put America to any inconvenience whatever, merely for our own benefit, or to save ourselves from loss or danger. The President, however, in order to show that he does not wish us to receive any injury in this way, and in order, if possible, to put an end to the war, has made a voluntary offer of a law to be passed in America to prevent our seamen from being admitted into American ships, upon condition that we will first abandon our practice of impressment, and give up, that is, restore to their liberty those native Americans whom we have already impressed. Mr. Russell, in his letter to Lord Castlereagh, says:

"While, however, it regards this course as the only one which remained for it to pursue with a hope of preserving any portion of that kind of character which constitutes the vital strength of every nation, yet it is still willing to give another proof of the spirit which has uniformly distinguished its proceedings, by seeking to arrest, on terms consistent with justice and honour, the calamities of war. It has therefore authorized me to stipulate with his Britannic majesty's government an armistice, to commence at or before the expiration of sixty days after the signature of the instrument providing for it, on condition that the Orders in Council be repealed, and no illegal blockades to be substituted for them, and that orders be immediately given to discontinue the impressment of persons from American vessels, and to restore the citizens of the United States already impressed; it being, moreover, well understood, that the British government will assent to enter into definitive arrangements as soon as may be, on these and every other difference, by a treaty to be concluded either at London or Washington, as, on an impartial consideration of existing circumstances, shall be deemed most expedient. As an inducement to Great Britain to discontinue the practice of impressment from American vessels, I am authorized to give assurance that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States."

Really, sir, it is not possible, it appears to me, to suggest any thing more reasonable than this. I can form an idea of nothing more strongly expressive of a desire to put an end to the war. What! shall it be said that England wages a war, when she might terminate it by such means? I trust not, and that we shall not have to weep over a much longer continuation of this unfortunate contest.

I know that there are persons who treat the idea of a law passed by the congress with contempt. But, if this is to be the course pursued, the war will not soon have an end. We *must* treat America with respect. We *must* do it; and the sooner we be-

gin the better. Some of the impudent hireling writers in London affect to say, that no credit is to be given to any act of the American government; that our officers ought not to believe the passports and certificates produced by the American seamen. If this is to be the tone, and if we are to act accordingly, there is no possibility of making peace with America. Peace implies treaty and confidence; but what confidence are we to have in a nation such as our hirelings describe America to be? This arrogant, this insolent tone must be dropped, or peace is impossible.

The fact of our impressing native Americans is affected to be denied, and Lord Castlereagh does not notice the proposition to restore those whom we have already impressed. But, sir, if the fact were not perfectly notorious, that thousands have been released by us, the letter of Captain DACRES, of the *Guerriere*, removes all doubt upon the subject; for, in that letter, intended to account for his defeat by the *Constitution*, he says, that PART OF HIS CREW WERE NATIVE AMERICANS, and they not choosing to fight against their country, he suffered them to be inactive spectators. Now, here we have the fact clearly acknowledged, that we had Americans unwillingly serving on board. And what a lamentable contrast do we find in the same letter, with regard to some *English seamen* said to have been on board the Constitution; to which I beg leave to add, for your most serious moment, the fact, (if a fact it be,) that part of the crews of the victorious American ships, the *Wasp* and the *United States*, were *English*. Nay, it is stated in the Courier newspaper, upon what is asserted to be good authority, that two thirds of the crews of the American ships of war are *English seamen*. If this be true, it is another and a most cogent reason for acceding to the terms of America, and putting an end to the war; for the longer the war continues, the longer will continue a connexion from which such fearful consequences may ensue.

At any rate, it appears to me, that our own safety, if the war is to be continued, will dictate the discharging of all the impressed Americans whom we may have on board of our ships. Fight against their country they will not, unless they be forced, and who is to foresee and provide against the contagion of such an example? Against this evil, however, and against numerous others, which I forbear to mention, the measure proposed by the President would completely guard us; and the respect which it is my duty to entertain towards your Royal Highness, bids me hope that that proposition will finally be accepted.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

AMERICAN STATES.

My two last numbers were devoted principally to the task of endeavouring to convince the Prince Regent, and the public, that it was neither dangerous nor dishonourable to yield to the terms upon which we might have had, and may yet have, peace with America; and to my great mortification, though, I must confess, not much to my surprise, I now see, from the contents of the last Gazette, wherein is his Royal Highness's "*declaration*," that all my endeavours have been of no avail, and that war, long and expensive, sanguinary war, will now take place with an enemy, who, above all others, is capable of inflicting deep wounds upon this already crippled, or, at least, exhausted nation. From the first publication of the letters which passed between Lord Wellington and Mr. Pinckney, soon after the French had announced their intention to repeal the Berlin and Milan Decrees; from the very day of that publication, which took place soon after I was imprisoned in Newgate for two years, (with a fine TO THE KING, which I have since paid, of a thousand pounds,) for having written and published upon the subject of flogging certain English militia men, at the town of Ely, in England, who had been first reduced to submission by German troops; from the very day of that publication I began to fear the present sad result of the dispute which had then assumed a new and more serious character than it had ever before worn. With that fear in my mind, I bent all my feeble powers towards preventing such result. I have failed; opinions and councils the direct opposite of mine have prevailed; and time will show who was right and who was wrong.

Upon former occasions, the real grounds of war have but too often been lost sight of in the multitude and confusion of subsequent events; the government had the address to enlist the passions of men on its side, and the voice of reason has been stifled. But here, as I was from the first resolved it should be, there is a clear, a distinct, an undisguised ground before our eyes; we know well what we are at war for; we know, and must bear in mind, that we are at war for the purpose *of enforcing our practice of stopping American vessels upon the high seas, and taking out of them all such persons as our naval officers may deem to be British seamen.* This is now to become the clearly defined subject of the war with America, The "DECLARATION," which will be found below inserted at full length, does not contain any *new* matter: it is a summary of what our ministers have before alleged and asserted in their correspondence with the American government and its divers agents. But there are some few passages of it which require to be particularly noticed. The question relating

to the Orders in Council has been before so amply discussed, in my several letters and articles upon the subject, that I will not encumber my present remarks with any thing relating thereunto; but will confine myself to what relates to the impressment of persons out of American ships on the high seas. Upon this point the "declaration" says:

"His Royal Highness can never admit, that in the exercise of the *undoubted*, and hitherto *undisputed right of searching neutral merchant vessels in time of war*, the impressment of British seamen, when found therein, can be deemed *any violation of a neutral flag*. Neither can he admit, that the taking such seamen from on board such vessels, can be considered by any neutral state as a hostile measure, or a justifiable cause of war. There is no right more clearly established than the right which a sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey: *it began with their birth, and can only terminate with their existence.* If a similarity of language and manners may make the exercise of this right more liable to *partial mistakes, and occasional abuse*, when practised towards the vessels of the United States, the same circumstances make it also a right, with the exercise of which, in regard to such vessels, it is more difficult to dispense."

The doctrine of allegiance, as here laid down, I admit, with some exceptions; but as to the right of impressing British seamen on the high seas, out of neutral ships, I deny it to be founded on *any* principle or maxim, laid down by *any* writer on public law. Indeed, the "*declaration*" does not say SEARCHING neutral vessels in time of war, is "*undoubted*," and has *hitherto been* "*undisputed*." This is not correct; for not only has even this right been doubted; not only are there two opinions about it in the books on public law, but the writers on public law are, for the most part, *against* the said rights *as we practise it*, and they contend that we have no right to seize enemy's goods on board of merchant ships which are neutral. Nay, the contest has given rise to military resistance on the part of our now ally, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden; and, what is still more, Great Britain ceased, upon their *threats*, to exercise this, even *this*, right of seizing *enemy's goods* on board of neutral ships of war. But this right of SEARCHING neutral ships; what has it to do with the *impressment of persons* on board of such ships? That is what the Americans object to, and are at war against. They are not at war against our rights of *search*, even in our own interpretation of that right. What they object to is, the stopping of their vessels on the high seas, and taking *people* out of them by force: a practice which, I repeat it, is sanctioned by no principle or maxim of any writer on public law, nor by any usage heretofore in the world.

The "DECLARATION" does not assert, as Lord Castlereagh did, in his letter to Mr. Russell, that this practice is sanctioned by any former usage; but it *declares* the right from the *right of search*. It says that, *in exercising* "the right of search, that is to say, the right of search for articles *contraband of war*, and for *enemy's goods*, we have a right to impress British seamen, if we find them. So that this is the new shape of the defence of the practice: we do not now assert that we have a right to stop American vessels upon the high seas, *for the purpose* of impressing our seamen; but, having stopped them for the purpose of exercising our old "*right of search*," we have a right to avail ourselves of the opportunity to take out persons whom our own officers, at their discretion, may judge to be British seamen. This is not even *plausible*, in my opinion; for, what right can we have to impress, if we have no right to stop for the purpose of impressing? I may enter another's house to search for a stolen coat, and if I find there my hat, I may seize it as well as my coat, having due authority for the first; but, be it observed, that to steal the hat was as criminal as to steal the coat; and if I had known or suspected that the hat was there, I might have had a search warrant for the former as well as for the latter.

The law of nations calls the high seas the common right of nations. A ship there is a parcel of the state to which she belongs, and the sovereign rights of that state travel with her. The sole exception is, as has been before stated, the belligerents have a right to search neutrals for *goods* of the enemy, and for *warlike stores* and *troops*, carrying for the enemy's use; because, as far as neutrals are engaged in such a service, they are deemed to be *in the service of the enemy*. In all other respects a neutral ship carries with her, on the high seas, the rights of sovereignty appertaining to the state to which she belongs. Now, it is well known, that no nation has a right to enter the territory of another to exercise any authority whatever, much less that of seizing persons, and carrying them away by force; and, indeed, is it not fresh in every one's memory, what complaints were made against the French for entering the territory of the elector of Baden, and seizing the Duke of Enghein? If we have a right to enter American ships on the high seas, and take out of them, by force of arms, British seamen, what should hinder us from having the same right as to any seaports of America? Nay, why should we not go and seize our numerous manufacturers, who have been (contrary to our laws) carried to America with cloths and cutlery? Their alleging, that they went thither to avoid the effect of prosecutions for libel, or for some other of our state crimes, would be no bar to our claim upon them; and, in short, they could never be safe to the last moment of their lives.

It is said, that the seamen on board of American ships are *deserters*. Be it so. We may be sorry that they do desert; but it is no crime in the Americans that our sailors go into America. Is it not well known that numerous deserters from the Austrian and Prussian armies have, at all times, deserted into the neighbouring states; and is it not equally well known, that the neighbouring state has invariably possessed the undisputed right of giving them protection, and of enlisting them in its service? Why, therefore, should we deem it a crime in America, whose abundance of lands and provisions, whose high price of labour, and whose happiness of the lower orders of mankind, hold out their arms to the whole world? And here I cannot help introducing a remark upon the proposition made by Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell, that the American government should stipulate to *deliver up* all British seamen in the service of Americans. Mr. Russell is said to have expressed himself as having been *shocked* at this proposition, which has afforded an abundant theme of abuse by our hireling writers. But I have no scruple to say, that I firmly believe that it was a proposition that never was before made to any independent state; even to the most petty state of Germany. There was a plan, some years ago, in agitation amongst the states of Europe, for putting in force a mutual surrender of each others subjects, whereupon, the Abbé Raynal remarks, that if it had gone into effect, each of the several states might have taken the motto of *Dante* over the entrance to his *infernal regions*: He who enters here leaves even "*hope* behind." He represents it as the utmost stretch of tyranny; a point, he says, which the world ought to perish rather than reach. And, therefore, though Lord Castlereagh's proposition did not go this length; though it was confined to British *seamen*, we have no reason to abuse Mr. Russell for his expression.

It will be said, may be, that Mr. Russell was ordered to stipulate for the surrender, on our part, of all American seamen. Aye, but the difference is, that Mr. Russell proposed those only who had been *impressed by us*; whereas, we wanted to stipulate for the surrender of those British seamen who had gone into America of *their own free will*. We wanted to have surrendered to us men who were employed in American merchant ships; they wanted us to surrender men whom we had seized in their ships, and forced into our *men of war*. But is it possible that any one can find any thing to object to in a request, that, as a *preliminary*, we should give up the Americans whom we had impressed into our service? What is the state of those men, now in service? What is their state? Has the reader reflected upon this? They must be useless on board of ships, they must not act; they must do no seaman's duty; or they must, according to our own doctrine, lately exemplified at Horsemonger-lane, be TRAITORS, worthy of being hanged, ripped up, and cut in

quarters. His Royal Highness's declaration says, that allegiance to his father, and his successor, begins with a man's birth, and end with his death. And is it not the same with American citizens? Do they not owe similar allegiance to their country? Or is it about to be pretended, that none but kings can claim this sort of allegiance? I do not think that any one, even of the writers of the Times and Courier, will have the impudence to set up this doctrine; but this they must do before they can make out any good ground of charge against the Americans for having demanded, as a preliminary, the surrender of the impressed American seamen. Captain Dacres, in accounting for the loss of his frigate, expressly states, that he had *many Americans on board*, whom he permitted to be spectators, from a reluctance to compel them to fight against their country. And can the reader believe that this was the only instance in which native Americans were unwillingly serving on board of British ships of war? What, then, again I ask, must be the state of those Americans? And what are we to think of those writers who abuse Mr. Russell for proposing to us their surrender, as a step preliminary to any further arrangement? The declaration complains, that America demanded the abandonment of the practice of impressment as a *preliminary* to her passing a law to prevent British seamen from being received on board her ships. The hireling writers have treated this demand as something too insolent to be for a moment listened to. The "DECLARATION" does not treat it in this lofty style; but it speaks of it in pretty strong terms, as thus: "The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of his majesty's naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a *necessary preliminary* to a cessation of hostilities. Negotiation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right, and also without any armistice being concluded: but Great Britain was required *previously* to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negotiate upon the basis of *accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign state*, as the sole *equivalent* for the exercise of a right which *she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.*"

Well, and what then? "*a right*" it is called again; but if America *denied* it to be a right, as she has uniformly done, what wonder was there that she made the proposition? Great Britain might "*feel*," though I should have chosen the word "*deem*," as smacking less of the boarding-school Miss's style, Great Britain might "*feel*," if feel she must, that the practice complained of was

essential to the support of her maritime power; but, did it hence follow that America, and that impressed Americans, should like the practice the better for that? We have so long called ourselves the *deliverers* of the world, that we, at last, have fallen into the habit of squaring up all our ideas to that appellation; and seem surprised that there should be any nation in the world inclined to wish for the diminution of our power. The Americans, however, clearly appear to see the thing in a different light. They, in their homespun way, call us any thing but *deliverers;* and it must be confessed, that, whatever may be our general propensity, we do not seem to have been in haste to *deliver* impressed American seamen.

That one nation ought not to yield a *right,* depending for compensation solely upon the legislative provisions of a foreign state, is very true; but if the right be doubtful; if it be unsupported by any law, principle, maxim, or custom, then the case is different; and then, indeed, the offer of a legislative provision is a proof of a sincere desire to accommodate. If my view of the matter be right, and I verily believe it is, this is the light in which that offer ought to be viewed; and I most deeply lament that it was not thus viewed by the ministers. These lamentations, however, are now useless. The sound of war is gone forth; statement and reasoning are exhausted; the sword is to decide whether England is, or is not, to impress, at the discretion of her naval officers, persons on board American merchant ships on the high seas. There is one passage more in the "DECLARATION," upon which I cannot refrain from submitting a remark or two. After stating that America has made only *feeble remonstrances* against the injuries she has received from France, the "*declaration,*" this "memorable document," as the Courier calls it, concludes thus: "This disposition of the government of the United States; this *complete subserviency* to the ruler of France; this hostile temper towards Great Britain; are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French government."

"Against this course of conduct, the real cause of the present war, the Prince Regent solemnly protests. Whilst contending against France, in defence not only of the liberties of Great Britain, BUT OF THE WORLD, his Royal Highness was entitled to look for a far different result. From their *common origin;* from their *common interest;* from their *professed principles of freedom* and independence, the United States were the last power, in which Great Britain could have expected to find a *willing instrument,* and *abettor of French tyranny.* Disappointed in this just expectation, the Prince Regent will still pursue the policy which the British government has so long and invariably maintained in *repelling injustice,* and in supporting the general rights of nations; and under the *favour of* PROVIDENCE, relying on the justice of

his cause, and the tried loyalty and firmness of the British nation, his Royal Highness confidently looks forward to a successful issue of the contest in which he has thus been compelled most reluctantly to engage." The last paragraph is in the old style, and will hardly fail to remind Mr. Madison of the documents of this kind, issued about *six-and-thirty years ago*. However, the style is none the worse for being old; though one cannot but recollect the occasion upon which it was formerly used.

I regret, however, to find, in this solemn document, a distinct charge against the American government of "*subserviency to the ruler of France;*" because, after a very attentive perusal of all the correspondence between the American and French governments, I do not find any thing which, in my opinion, justifies the charge. The truth is, that the "*ruler* of France" *gave way* in the most material point to the remonstrances of America; and I have never yet read a message of Mr. Madison, at the opening of a session of Congress, in which he did not complain of the conduct of France. The Americans abhor an alliance with France; and if they form such an alliance, it will have been occasioned by this war with us. This charge of subserviency to Buonaparte has a thousand times been preferred against Mr. Madison, but never, that I have seen, once *proved*. It is, indeed, the charge which we have been in the habit of preferring against all those powers who have been at war with us; Spain, Holland, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and, though last, not least, Russia, as will be seen by a reference to Mr. Canning's answer to the propositions from Tilsit. "Subserviency to the ruler of France!" We stop the American merchantmen upon the high seas; we take out many of their own native seamen; we force them on board of our men of war; we send them away to the East Indies, the West Indies, or the Mediterranean; we expose them to all the hardships of such a life, and all the dangers of battle, in a war in which they have no concern: all this we do, for we do not deny it; and when, *after* MANY YEARS *of remonstrance*, the American government arms, and sends forth its soldiers and sailors to compel us to desist, we accuse that government of "*subserviency to the ruler of France,*" who, whatever else he may have done, has not, that I have ever heard, given the Americans reason to complain of impressments from on board their ships. Many unjust acts he appears to have committed towards the Americans: but he has wisely abstained from impressments, which, as I have all along said, was the *only ground* upon which the people of America could have been prevailed upon to enter heartily into a war with any power: it is a popular ground: the war is the cause of the people: accordingly, we find the motto to the war is: "*Liberty of the seas, and seamen's rights.*"

I, therefore, regret exceedingly, that the "declaration" styles America "a *willing instrument* and *abettor* of French tyranny." It is a heavy charge; it is one that will stick close to the memory of those who support the war; it will tend to inflame, rather than allay the angry passions; and, of course, it will tend to kill all hopes of a speedy reconciliation. As to what the "declaration" is pleased to say about the "*common origin*" of the two nations, if of any weight, it might be urged, I suppose, with full as much propriety by the Americans against our *impressments*, as it is now urged against their resistance. I remember that it was urged with great force in favour of American submission to be taxed by an English parliament; but, as the result showed, with as little effect as it possibly can be upon this occasion. There is one thing in this "*calling cousin*," as the saying is, that I do not much like. The calling cousin always proceeds from us. The Americans never *remind us* that we are of the same origin with them. This is a bad sign on our side. It is we, and not they, who tell the world of the relationship. In short, it is well enough for a newspaper to remind them of their origin; but I would not have done it in a solemn declaration; especially when I was accusing them of being the willing instrument and abettor of the enemy. "*Common interest!*" that, indeed, was a point to dwell on; but, then, it was necessary to produce something, at least, in support of the proposition. The Americans will query the fact; and, indeed, they will flatly deny it. They will say, for they have said, that it is not for *their interest* that we should have more power than we now have over the sea; and that they have much more to dread from a great naval power, than from an overgrown power on the continent of Europe. They are in no fear of the emperor Napoleon, whose fleets they are now a match for; but they are in some fear of us; and, therefore, they do not wish to see us stronger.

It is in vain to tell them that we are fighting in defence of the "*liberties of the world.*" They understand this matter full as well as we do, and, perhaps, a little better. I should like to hear my lord Castlereagh, beginning with the declaration against the republicans of France, continue on the history of our hostilities to the present day, taking in those of India by way of episode, and concluding with the war for the *right of impressment*, make it out *how* we have been, and are *defending the liberties of the world*. I dare say his lordship could make it out clear enough. I do not pretend to question the fact of his ability; but it would be at once instructive and entertaining to hear *how* he would do it. "From their *professed* principles of *freedom*:" From these, the "DECLARATION" says, that his Royal Highness expected the United States would have been the last power to become the willing instrument of *French tyranny*. Very true: of *French*

tyranny, but that did not hinder him from expecting them to be the enemy of *impressing men from on board their ships;* and it should have been shown how this disposition proved them to be a willing instrument of French tyranny, or of any tyranny at all. It is useless to revile; it is useless to fly off to other matter. We impress men on board of American ships upon the high seas; we take out (no matter whether by mistake or otherwise) American seamen as well as English; we force them to fight on board our ships; we punish them if they disobey. And when they, after years of complaints and remonstrances, take up arms in the way of resistance, we tell them that they show themselves the willing instruments and abettors of French tyranny. I wish sincerely that this passage had been omitted.

There are other parts of the "DECLARATION" that I do not like; but this part appears to me likely to excite a great deal of ill will; of lasting, of rooted ill will. I do not like the word "*professed*," as applied to the American *principles of freedom* the meaning of that word, as here applied, cannot be equivocal, and assuredly would have been better left out, especially as we never see, in any of the American documents, any expression of the kind, applied to us and to our government. But, to take another view of the matter, why should his Royal Highness expect the Americans to be disinclined towards France, because they profess principles of freedom? *Why* should he, on *this account*, expect that they would lean to *our side* in the war? Does the declaration mean to say, that the government of France is more tyrannical than was that monarchy, for the restoration of which a league was made in Europe in the years 1792 and 1793? From its tone, the declaration may be construed to mean that *our* government is *more free* than that of France, and that, therefore, we might have expected the Americans, who profess principles of freedom, to be on *our side* in a contest against "*French tyranny*." Hem! mum! well, well! We will say nothing about the matter; but it must be clear to every one, that the Americans may have their *own opinion* upon the subject; and they may *express it too*, until we can get at them with an *ex officio*. They may have their own opinion upon the matter; and their opinion may possibly differ from ours. They are, to be sure, at a great distance; but they are a *reading*, and an *observing*, and a *calculating* people; and I'll engage, that there is not a farmer in the back states who is not able to give a pretty good account of the blessings of "*English liberty*."

Besides, leaving this quite out of the question, supposing the Americans should think us freemen, and the French slaves, why should that circumstance prevent them from leaning to the side of France? What examples of the effect of such morality amongst nations have the regent's ministers to produce? How often have

we seen close alliances between free and despotic states neither free nor despotic? How often have we been on the side of despots against free states? England was once in offensive alliance with France against Holland; Holland and France against England; and it ought never to be forgotten, that England, not many years ago, favoured the invasion of Holland, and the subjugation of the States-General by a Prussian army. Have *we* not formed alliances with Prussia, Austria, Russia, Spain, Naples, and all the petty princes of Germany, against the republic of France? Nay, have we refused, in that war, the co-operation of Turkey and Algiers? And as for the old papa of Rome, "the whore of Babylon," as our teachers call him, his alliance has been accounted holy by us, and his person an object of our care and protection. Why then are we to expect that America is to refrain from consulting her interests, if they be favoured by a leaning towards France? Why is she to be shut out from the liberty of forming connexions with a despotism, supposing a despotism now to exist in France? The truth is, that in this respect, as in private life, it is interest alone that guides and must guide; and, in my mind, it is not more reasonable to expect America to lean on our side on account of the nature of the government of our enemy, than it would be to expect a presbyterian to sell his sugar to a churchman, because the only man that bade him a higher price was a catholic. Here I should stop; but an article upon the same subject, in the Morning Chronicle of the 13th instant, calls for observation.

Upon the falsehoods and impudence of the Times and the Courier, that is to say, the principal prints on the side of the Wellesley party, and that of the ministers, I have remarked often enough. I was anxious to hear what the whigs had to say, and here we have it. Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Brougham had pledged themselves to support the war, if America was not satisfied with the repeal of the Orders in Council; and here we have the *grounds* of that support. On this account the article is interesting, and, of course, worthy of an attentive perusal.

"Notwithstanding the tedious length of the papers on both sides, the question between the court of London and the government of the United States is simply *the right of impressment of seamen on board trading ships;* and this is, in truth, the sole cause of the war. If we were to examine the value of this cause to the two parties, it cannot be denied but that to *the Americans it is exceedingly slight*, and to the British *highly material.* The Americans cannot regard it as an *insult*, because *it is a right which has been at all times asserted and acquiesced in by sovereign states respectively.* Then, viewed as an *injury*, what is it? That they shall go to war to prevent British subjects, who have forfeited their allegiance, abandoned their country, and left their families,

probably starving, from being impressed on board their merchant vessels; that is to say, they claim the right to afford an asylum and employ to the *refuse* of the British navy—men without principle, for it is only the profligate that are likely to become the objects of their protection. In this view, then, the point is of little consequence to the Americans; but it is interesting to the British to assert the power inherent in every state to reclaim its subjects; and the time may come when the principle would be equally important to America herself. But, say the American ministers, it is not so much the right itself, as the violent and insulting mode of exercising it that we complain of; for we have, upon reflection, agreed on the principle of international law, that free bottoms do not make free goods, and therefore we have no objection to the search of our merchant ships for contraband of war; but, in that case, whenever warlike stores, &c. are found on board an American vessel, she is detained and carried into a port for adjudication by a competent court. Whether the adjudication be always impartial or not, is another affair, but in this respect nations are on an equal footing, and these admiralty courts, well or ill conducted, are recognized by all maritime nations. But with respect to the impressment of seamen, the act is violent because summary, and because it is subject to no revisal—to no adjudication—and because the individual seized has no means of redress. By this sort of reasoning there is a tacit admission, on the part of America, that it is not to the act itself which they object, so much as to the manner of the act; and, accordingly, we see various suggestions made by the Americans, for entering into an amicable discussion on the means of getting over the outrageous way in which the right is exercised, and of giving security to both nations against the abuse in question. On the other side, Lord Castlereagh declares the readiness of the British government to receive and discuss any proposition on this subject, coming from the American government; though he would not enter into a negotiation, a preliminary to which should be the concession of this right; and so far we think he was clearly right. But is it not monstrous, that two people of common origin, and of almost inseparable interests, should remain at war on a point upon which there is so little difference between them? Surely, without any sacrifice of etiquette on either side, the expedients might be canvassed by which this mighty cause of war might be removed. Let each party promulgate their thoughts on the subject, and if there be an honest disposition to peace, it must follow. The agreement ought to be so drawn as to make it most dangerous to the captain of an American ship to employ a British seaman on board; and, on the other side, to make it equally dangerous for a British captain to seize and carry off an American seaman, under pretext of his being a British subject. Or, in other words, it ought to be made their interest to abstain from those two causes of national offence.

Various modes have been suggested for this purpose. The most effectual undoubtedly would be to ordain, by a treaty, that the subjects of each power, if found on board the merchant's vessels of the other, *should be considered in the nature of contraband of war*, inasmuch as their natural sovereign was thereby deprived of their service in war, and that that should be a cause to detain the vessel for adjudication. By this the American captain, or his owners, would most seriously suffer by having British seamen on board; and, on the other hand, the British captain would equally suffer, if he had all the risk and loss to incur of an improper detention. Against this, however, the arguments are strong. The American captain may have been imposed upon by the similarity of language, &c.; and when brought into one of our ports, where there is a competent court to adjudge the point, a real American seaman might find it impossible to adduce proofs of his nativity. Besides, in both events, the penalty would be inordinate. Another suggestion has been made, that the British naval officer impressing a seaman on board an American vessel, and *vice versa*, should be bound to make a certificate (or what the French call *procès verbal*) to the fact, one copy of which he should deliver to the American captain, and transmit the other to the admiralty to be filed; and that the seaman seized should have his action for damages in the court of law, the certificate to be produced by the admiralty as proof of the trespass, if the person can prove himself to be a native of the country that he pretended to be. We confess we think that this ought to satisfy both governments, for this would make officers cautious in exercising the right, which, at the same time, cannot be safely surrendered."

This is poor paltry trash. But it contains one assertion which I declare to be *false*. It is here asserted, that "the right of impressment of seamen on board of trading ships, is a right which has *at all times been asserted, and acquiesced in by sovereign states respectively!*" I give this an unqualified denial. I say, that it is a right which no nation has before asserted, and that no nation ever acquiesced in. Let the Morning Chronicle name the nation that has ever done either; let him cite the instance of such a practice as we insist upon; let him name the writer, every English writer, on public law, who has made even an attempt to maintain such a doctrine; nay, let him name the writer who has laid down any principle or maxim from which such a right can possibly be deduced. And if he can do none of these, what assurance, what a desperate devotion to faction must it be to enable a man to make such an assertion. The assertion of the "value of the cause" being slight to America, in comparison to what it is to us, has no better foundation. The *value!* what is of value, what is of any value at all, if the liberty and lives of the people of America are of no value? And when we know, when no man will deny,

when official records of the fact exist, that hundreds of native Americans have been impressed and sent to serve on board our ships of war; when this is notorious; when it neither will nor can be denied, what is of value? As to the proposition of making English seamen "contraband of war," it is so impudent, it is so shameful, it is even so horrid, that I will do no more than just name it, that it may not escape the reader's indignation; indeed, there needs no more than the reading of this one article to convince the Americans, that all the factions in England are, in effect, of one mind upon the subject of this war; and I am afraid that this conviction will produce consequences which we shall have sorely to lament, though I shall, for my own part, always have the satisfaction to reflect, that every thing which it was in my power to do, has been done, to prevent those consequences.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 14th January, 1813.

AMERICAN WAR.

IT will be useless, perhaps, but I cannot refrain from calling the attention of the public once more to the gross delusions practised upon it by the hired prints, with regard to this war. At first they said that there would be no war; that war was the cry of the mere rabble; and that though Mr. Madison was himself corrupted by France, the congress were not. When the congress met, they, however, actually declared war. Then our hirelings told us, that the *people* were enraged with both President and congress, and that, as the election of President was approaching, they would turn Mr. Madison out, and that thus the war would be put an end to. That election has now terminated; but until the termination, or, rather, the result, was known, we heard of nothing but the certain defeat of Mr. Madison. He was *sure* to lose his election; and, indeed, several successive arrivals brought us the news of his having actually lost it. To which was added, that his rival, Mr. Clinton, had pledged himself to make peace with England. At last, however, comes the news, *that Mr. Madison was re-elected!* After this, one would have supposed that the hireling press would, at least, have kept *silence* upon the subject; but, no; it had still a falsehood left; and it is now telling the people, the "*thinking people*" of England, that, *next year*, there will be a re-election of the *senate*, when Mr. Madison will have a majority of ten against him in that body, and that, in consequence of such change, he will be compelled to make peace with us. What a people must this be to be thus deceived! And still to listen to such publications; aye, and to rely upon them, too, as im-

plicitly as if they had always spoken the truth! Nothing can, however, be more flattering to the Americans than these statements, which show how uneasy this country is under the war with them; how sorely we feel the effects of it; and how anxious we are to get out of it. There is a coxcomb, who publishes in the Times newspaper, under the signature of VETUS, who would fain make us believe that the people of America, or, at least, the *agricultural* part of the population, are a sort of *half savages*. If Vetus had to write to them, he would not find many fools enough to tolerate his sublimated trash. He imputes their dislike to English politics to their *ignorance*. He does not know, perhaps, that they, to a man, (if natives,) are as well acquainted with all our laws as we are ourselves; that they know all about our excise taxes, and custom house taxes, and assessed taxes, and property taxes, full as well as we do; and that they know all about our law of libel, our sinecures, and our paupers. If he were to go amongst them, and to have the impudence to tell them that these are *proofs of civilization*, they would, or, at least, I hope so, make him remember the assertion as long as he had life in his carcass. The Americans have always had their eyes fixed upon us; and does this foolish man imagine, that they do not know how to set a proper value upon our system of government? When they come to England, as some of them do, they sometimes reach London by the way of *Blackwater*, where, while they behold immense places for the education of officers of the army, they see ragged, or rather naked, children tumbling along the road by the side of their chaise, crying as they go, "*Pray bestow your charity; pray bestow your charity!*" The Americans know how to estimate these things. They are at no loss to draw the proper inferences from such facts; and it is not the trash of Vetus about *civilization* that will cloud their reasoning. The American farmers are great *readers*. There are absolutely *none* of them who do not read much. They know that we pay more in poor-rates only, than double the amount of the whole of their revenue! That fact alone is enough for them. With that fact before their eyes, they will be in no haste to attain what this fop calls a high state of *civilization*. Besides, as to the *fact*, all those who know America, will say that the farmers there are a class of men beyond all belief superior in understanding to those of England, or of any country of Europe. They have *plenty;* they have no dread of the *tax-gatherer;* their minds are never haunted with *the fear of want;* they have, therefore, *leisure* to think and to read. And as to what he says about their being absorbed in the *love of gain*, the fact is the reverse. They have no motives to acquire great wealth, other than the mere vulgar love of money, seeing that no sum of money will purchase them *distinction*, seeing that millions would not obtain them a *bow* from even a negro.

That is a country where the servant will not pull his hat off to his employer, and where no man will condescend to call another man his *master*. Hence it is that the American farmer makes no very great exertions to become rich. Riches beyond his plain wants are of no use to him. They cannot elevate him; they cannot purchase him *seats;* they cannot get him *cities;* they cannot obtain *commissions* or *church benefices* for his sons; they can do nothing for him but add to his acres, which are already, in most cases, but too abundant. He has, from these causes, much *leisure*, and that naturally produces reading, particularly when the residence is in the country. So that the *half wild* man, whose picture has been drawn by Vetus, is wholly foreign from the reality of the American farmer. The American farmer does not hate *England*. He hates a taxing system; but he does not want *war* with England. He wants to have *nothing to do with her;* and though he hates war, he is more afraid of a connexion with her than with a war against her. He wishes to see all those who will be connected with her expelled from his country; and, therefore, he is pleased to see the makers of knives and coats rise up in his own country. To bring about this, to create manufactures in America, was the policy of Mr. Jefferson; an object which has been now attained, through the means of our hostility and of the revolution in Spain. The continuation of the war for about three years longer will for ever put an end to English connexion; and thus, the grand object of Mr. Jefferson's policy will have been secured during his probable lifetime. This silly fellow, Vetus, seems to be wholly ignorant of the subject. He knows nothing either of the character or interests of the American people. He senselessly urges on the war, without at all perceiving the consequences to which it leads. He does not perceive that it will effectually deprive our government of the power of again taxing the coat, or the candlestick, of the American farmer. He does not perceive, that it will stop from our treasury many millions a year. When he is talking of the *folly* of introducing manufactures into America, he does not perceive, that that is the most deadly blow that the Americans can give to our taxing system. From the empty verbiage of this writer, who has been well termed *an old battered hack*, I come to something of more importance, namely, the debate of the 18th instant in the house of commons, upon the subject of the war with America. I, perhaps, should not call it a *debate*, where, as to the only point at issue, all the speakers seem to have been of one mind and sentiment. But be it what it may, it is of great importance to the liberties of mankind; and as such, I shall notice it somewhat in detail. Lord CASTLEREAGH (aye, *that* is the man, Americans!) opened the discussion in the character of Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. This man's name is well known to the world. This is now the man who,

after Perceval, is to maintain the justice and necessity of a war against America.

The papers relating to the negotiation between the two countries had been laid before the house; and, in consequence of this, Lord Castlereagh, on the 18th, brought forward a motion for "an address to the Prince Regent, expressing the regret of parliament for the failure of the negotiation, and pledging themselves to *a zealous and cordial co-operation with his Royal Highness in the prosecution of the war, in support of the rights and interests of Great Britain, and honour of His Majesty's crown.*" This motion was carried with a *unanimous voice*, just as similar motions used to be during the former American war, when about forty of such addresses were carried up to the king. I shall now proceed to notice such parts of the speeches as seem to me worthy of particular attention. Lord Castlereagh set out with relating what had passed in regard to the *Orders in Council*, and after having referred to the time and manner of their repeal, and to the pledges of support of the war given in case that repeal should fail of producing peace with America, he said, as it is stated in the report in the Morning Herald, that "he, therefore, now flattered himself, that government would meet with *that support which had been so liberally promised.* If this was really found to be the case—if every attempt had been made that justice *or forbearance* could suggest to conciliate America; and if, notwithstanding, she had issued a declaration of war, and persisted in carrying it on, after *the concessions* that had been made, where was the man that could refuse his assent to carry on the war with vigour adequate to our means? America would thus see the united efforts of the country, and the unanimity of the house, that had been called forth by the line of policy that she had pursued. If they looked at the documents that had been published by the American government as the grounds of the war, they should look at peace as an object *very distant*, because the American government placed the war on such extensive grounds as could not be removed by this country."

It is very true, that there were people in the house of commons who promised to support the war if the repeal of the Orders in Council failed to satisfy the Americans; but I *made no such promise;* and, therefore, I, though a fly amongst eagles, am at liberty to express my disapprobation of the war. Nay, I most distinctly said, at the time, that the repeal of the Orders in Council would not satisfy the American people. I had, indeed, said so many months before; and I had said it upon a *knowledge of the fact.* That I all along said, that unless we ceased to impress persons out of American ships upon the *high seas*, we should have war; and, therefore, when the ministry were, by Mr. Brougham, reduced to the necessity of repealing the Orders in Council, I, in an address

to the Prince Regent, prayed him to add a relinquishment of the practice of impressment, without which, I positively asserted, that the other measure would fail of its desired effect. Nevertheless, Mr. *Ponsonby*, as the leader of the whigs, did promise support to the war, if the repeal of the Orders failed to satisfy America; and Mr. Brougham did the same. The country was thus misled, and was prepared for a justification of the war. The manufacturers, some of whom came to see me in Newgate, where I had been imprisoned for two years, and sentenced to pay a fine of a thousand pounds *to the king*, which I have since paid to his son, in his behalf, for having written and published upon the subject of the flogging of some local militiamen, in the town of Ely, in England, who had been first quelled by German troops; here, I say, in this prison, I saw some of the manufacturers, who, after the success of Mr. Brougham's motion, were preparing to return home, full of joy in the assurance of a renewed and uninterrupted intercourse with America, and I told them, that they ought to moderate their joy; for that Mr. Brougham's success would not produce the effect they expected, but that, on the contrary, his pledge to support a war, if that measure failed to ensure peace, might be attended hereafter with infinite mischief. They did not absolutely laugh in my face, but I could clearly perceive that they did not believe a word that I said, and that they attributed my gloomy predictions to a feeling which, though I might have been excused for possessing it, really was a stranger, as far as that subject went, to my breast. The truth is, that *they* saw no importance in any thing but commerce; they saw nothing in *impressments* to make a nation go to war; they regarded it as madness to suppose that a nation would suspend its commercial gains for a single hour for the sake of a few thousands of men impressed by a foreign power. I, however, knew the disposition of the free people of America better; I had heard the declaration of the congress on the subject; I knew that that body, whose seats are not bought and sold, spoke the voice of the people; and, upon this ground, together with other grounds that I need not be particular in naming, I founded my assurances to the manufacturers, that the repeal of the Orders in Council would not answer the end they expected from it, and I could not help it. I must confess feeling some slight degree of anger against the manufacturing bodies, when I saw them meeting to vote thanks to Mr. Brougham, without taking the smallest notice of my incessant efforts to prevent that destruction of their hopes which I saw would speedily tread upon the heels of their exultation. However, this feeling has long been extinguished in my breast, and I only regret that I am without the power of affording any portion of assistance to the poor suffering wretches in the manufacturing districts. To return now to the debate: Lord Castlereagh talks of *concessions* made

to America in the repeal of the Orders in Council. I have often shown, that there was, according to the laws and usages of nations, no *concession* at all. Nay, there was, according to our own doctrine; according to our own part of the correspondence; no concession made to America. The thing is shown as clear as daylight, in two words. We all along avowed, that, *in themselves considered,* our Orders in Council were a violation of the neutral rights of America; but we asserted that they were justified by the violation of those same rights committed by Napoleon, and we declared that we would cease our violation the moment France ceased hers. France did cease: we had, according to our own declaration, proof that France had ceased before we made the repeal. We then ceased; but I put it to the common sense of the reader, whether this cessation ought to be called a *concession.* Thus, according to our own doctrine; according to our own diplomatic correspondence; according to our own more solemn acts, the Orders themselves, and the declaration of repeal; according to all these, we made *no concession* at all to America.

Why then talk about concession? It may have an effect here; but assuredly it will have none in America, where the government (a government chosen by, and resting upon, the free and unbought voice of the people) have constantly protested against our Orders in Council, as an open and gross violation of the known and acknowledged rights of America, and as receiving not a shadow of justification from the violent and unjust conduct of France. To talk, therefore, of *concessions*, seems to me to be something intolerable; but to expect that the people of America would, after the solemn declaration of congress to the contrary; to expect that they would *disarm* upon our ceasing to violate one of their rights, while a still more grave subject of complaint existed; to entertain such an expectation as this, appears unaccountable upon any other supposition than that of our ministers and members of parliament being wholly deficient in knowledge relative to the opinions and feelings of the American people, and the means of the American government. Besides, there was another consideration connected with the repeal of the Orders in Council; and that was, that by the repeal we merely announced our intention to *cease to violate a right.* We said nothing about *compensation* for the past. This was very material; for it was impossible that it should be overlooked by the American government, without an abandonment of all the principles upon which it had resisted the Orders in Council. I also pointed this out at the time, for which I was treated as a fool and a friend of France by a Scotch newspaper. The manufacturers of Paisley will, by this time, have discovered, that I was a better friend of England than their impudent countryman, and that I foresaw an obstacle to peace which had escaped the eyes of both the parties in parliament; for Lord Castlereagh now tells

us, that such compensation was demanded as a preliminary to a cessation of hostilities "The Orders in Council," he said, "were *now* wholly out of the question, by the overture for an armistice on both sides; but even on the ground of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the American government had pressed the matter so far, and in such a temper, as to admit of no amicable arrangement. Mr. Russell had put in claims to have *indemnity for all captures made by our cruisers under the Orders in Council since* 1806. He did not say that this *might not have been given up*, but, as the question stood, it evidently appeared that America had shown no disposition to be satisfied with the *forbearance* of this country." Well, if this *might have been given up* on our side, why not give it up *at first*, and see what it would do? However, the demand was made, we see, and I said it would be made. The American government could not avoid making it, without exposing itself to the detestation of the people, as a base abandoner of their rights; rights so long contended for, and sought to be redressed by means of so many and such large sacrifices. Now, our ministers, and Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Brougham, ought to have foreseen that this demand would be made. In not foreseeing it they showed a want of knowledge upon the subject, and also a want of knowledge as to the circumstances in which America stood with regard to France, from whom she was, and still is, demanding indemnity upon exactly the same principle that she makes the demand on us. The reader cannot be too often reminded of the *origin* and *nature* of the Orders in Council. They arose, as we allege, out of the French Decrees of *Berlin* and *Milan*, the two places at which the Emperor was when he signed them. These Decrees violated neutral rights on the seas; but it was declared in the preambles to them, that this violation was rendered necessary by certain Orders in Council of England, which enforced a greater violation of neutral rights. We, upon the appearance of these Decrees, issued other Orders in Council, enforcing other violations of neutral rights. Both parties were complained of by America. Both parties call their measures *retaliatory*. Both parties *allowed* that their measures *violated neutral rights*. Both parties said they regretted that the measures had been *forced* upon them. Each party declared, over and over again, in the most solemn manner, that the moment the other *removed* or *relaxed* his measures, he should find a joyful imitator in the party declaring. America protested against the conduct of both. She said to us that we had no right to violate her rights because they were violated by France; and to France she said, that she had no right to violate her rights because they were violated by us. At last, to put the sincerity of the two parties to the test, she passes a law, which says, that if before the 1st of November, 1810, both parties have repealed their Decrees, their commercial and friendly

intercourse with her shall continue: that if one party does repeal, and the other does not repeal by that day, then her ports shall be shut against the non-repealing power in February, 1811. Napoleon, in the month of August, 1810, issued a Decree, by which his violating Decrees stood repealed on the 1st of the following November. This new Decree was communicated to our ministers by the American minister in London, who expressed his hope that, agreeably to our many solemn declarations, we should hasten to follow the example of France. Our ministers answered in a sort of a vague way; but, at any rate, *they did not repeal;* and in February, 1811, the law went into effect against us. Our goods and our vessels were shut out of the American ports, while those of France were admitted. We asserted that Napoleon *had not repealed his Decrees.* America asserted that he had, but we would not believe her. We insisted that she did not know the fact near so well as we did. In short, we continued to refuse to repeal. At last, the great distresses, and consequent complaints of the manufacturers, led to an inquiry, at the bar of the house of commons, into the effects of the Orders in Council, when such a mass of evidence was produced by Mr. Brougham in support of the proposition, that the non-importation law of America was the principal cause of those distresses, that the ministers (Perceval being dead) gave way; and *the Orders were repealed.* This is the plain and true history of the matter; and I particularly wish the reader to bear in mind, that our Orders had, up to the moment of Napoleon's repeal of his Decrees, *always been acknowledged* by us to contain *a violation of the known rights of neutrals;* but, in our justification, we said, that it was *forced upon us* by the Decrees of the enemy. This was our language up to the moment of Napoleon's repeal. But what says Lord Castlereagh *now?* So far from acknowledging that the Orders in Council enforced a violation of any known neutral right, he contends (if the report of his speech be correct) that they were founded on our known primitive right. The words, as they stand in the report, are these:

"The Orders in Council had been a point on which considerable difference of opinion in this country had prevailed, but they had been abandoned, *not so much on the ground of this country not having* THE RIGHT, as with a view to commercial *expediency.* He rather wished, however, to waive the renewal of that branch of the question, now that the whole proceedings of government were before the house. With respect to the main principles of that system, ministers were *still unaltered in their opinion,* when the conservation of the country rendered it *necessary to resort to it.* At the time the measure was adopted, such a system was necessary, *not only as it respected France, but as connected with the soundest policy for the general interest of the British empire.*

Had it not been for the manly resistance given by that measure to the power of France, France now would have been as triumphant, in a commercial point of view, as she was with respect to the continent. He begged he might always be considered as an admirer of that *system.*" Now, I state that the Orders in Council themselves, and the papers of our diplomatic agents, and the speeches of Sir William Scott, almost explicitly acknowledge, that the measure was to be justified only on the ground of its being a *retaliation on France;* and that, in the two former is expressed his Majesty's earnest desire to imitate France in doing away these obnoxious measures. This was the language up to the moment when the repeal of the French decrees was announced to us. Our language has, indeed, since changed; and it was during the debates upon Mr. Brougham's motions, coolly argued, that the repeal of the Orders would make the Americans the *carriers of the commerce of the world.* But though we have changed our language, it does not follow that America should change hers. She always contended that by the Orders in Council her rights were violated; she always contended, that all the seizures we made under those Orders were unjust; and, of course, she demands indemnity for those immense seizures. But is it really so? can it be possible? can the thing be that a secretary of state has asserted in open parliament, that without any reference to the conduct of France, and that though the decrees of Napoleon did not exist, we had *a right* to do what was done towards neutrals under the Orders in Council; and that, whenever we think proper, we have a right to do the same again? If this be so; if this assertion was made by the minister for foreign affairs, and if it be meant to be maintained, then, certainly, the war with America will be long indeed. Reader, what was it that was done in virtue of these Orders in Council? I will give you an instance. An American-built ship, owned by a native American, manned by native Americans, laden with flour, or any thing else, the growth of America, and bound from America to France, or to any other country, named in the Orders in Council, was seized on the high seas by any of our vessels of war, carried into any of our ports, the ship and cargo condemned, and the master and his crew turned on shore to beg, or starve, or live and find their way home as they could. This was done in virtue of the Orders in Council, and if the report be correct, this is what we have a right to do towards neutrals again, "whenever the *conservation of the country*" calls for it; that is to say, whenever our government thinks proper to cause it to be done! Now, I will not waste my time and that of the reader by any discussion upon maritime and neutral rights; but I will just ask him this one question: If we have a right to act *thus* towards America, whenever we think proper, she being at *peace*

with us, what can she lose in the way of trade, what can she risk in changing that state of peace for a state of *war?* In my next I shall discuss the other points brought forward in this debate.

WM. COBBETT.

AMERICAN WAR.

THIS war, which was spoken of by the hireling of the Times newspaper, and others, with such ineffable contempt, has now assumed a very formidable mien; and those who were so eager for the war begin to revile each other with regard to the conducting of it.

There are, at this time, three political factions in the country; the one that is in possession of the distribution of the public money; the whig faction; and the faction of the Wellesleys and Cannings. The two latter would join if they could; but each aims at the possession of the power of giving places and pensions; and, in short, at being the ministry. These two, therefore, cannot agree wholly; but they both attack, though upon different occasions, and different grounds, those who are in possession of the paradise of Whitehall.

Amongst other objects of attack is that of *negligence as to the American war.* The Chronicle and Times are equally bitter against the ministers upon this subject; they revile them for having plunged the country into a war with America without providing a sufficient maritime force to cope with that new enemy. A *sufficient force!* Why, the Times newspaper spoke of the navy of the United States as a thing not worthy of the name; it laughed at "Mr. Madison and *his navy;*" it predicted that a few months would add that navy to our own; it, in short, spoke of it in a tone of contempt which I should in vain attempt to describe. And yet, it now blames the ministers for not having provided a sufficient force to cope with that contemptible navy; that navy, which was an object of the most cruel ridicule.

The defeat and capture of the Guerriere, the Frolic, and the Macedonian, must, of course, be matter of astonishment to thos who listened to the language of these presumptuous and foolish men; but in what respect are the ministers to blame for it any more than they were for the evacuation of Madrid, and for all the consequences of the unexpected retreat of our army in the Peninsula? The ministers had a great abundance of ships, of all sizes, on the American station; and what were they to do more?

I recollect, and so must the reader, that at the time of the rencounter between *Commodore Rodgers* and *Captain Bingham,* the words in the mouths of all these writers were: "Let one of our

FRIGATES meet with Rodgers, and *we ask no more.*" This wish; this challenge, was repeated a thousand times over; the public cannot have forgotten the fact; nay, the sentiment was universal.

Upon what ground, then, are the ministers now to be blamed? Are they to be blamed, because, upon trial, it has been found that our frigates are not a match for those of America? Are they to be blamed, because they did not entertain a meaner opinion of our frigates, compared with those of America, than any other man in England entertained, or, at least, dared to say that he entertained?

We are told by the writers in the interest of the two OUT factions, that the republican frigates are bigger, longer, have heavier guns, and the like, than our frigates have. "The varlet's a *tall man!*" said Bobadil, when he had been cudgelled. But are these new discoveries? Were the facts not all well known before to all these writers, when they so boldly challenged out the American frigates to combat with ours? When Rodgers attacked Bingham, the size of his ship was well known, and particularly described; and yet not one of them called for heavier ships to be sent out to the American coast. Why, then, are the ministers to be blamed for not sending out heavier ships? Besides, they have heavier ships upon the station, and it cannot be their fault if those ships do not fall in with the American frigates. What are they to do with our frigates? If ours are unable to face the American frigates, what are, I ask, the ministers to do with them? Are they not to suffer them to go on a cruise, lest they should fall in with a *tall* Yankee? In short, it is another of the tricks of faction to blame the ministers for these misadventures of the navy; and the attempts made by the ministerial prints to account for our defeats upon the ground of our *inferiority of force*, is another of the means made use of to deceive the people, and to encourage them in the continuation of the war.

When, until now, did we think of disparity of force? When, until now, did we dream of an English ship surrendering to a ship, the superiority of the force of which it required *a minute calculation* to show? When, until now, did an English captain hesitate to attack a ship of a few guns more than his own? Instead of all the *calculations* that we have seen in newspapers; instead of those swelled-out accounts of the vast force of the American frigates, we should be plainly told, that we have *now* an enemy to cope with, equal to ourselves as far as numbers will go.

Amongst all the *calculations* and computations, however, that we have heard, I have not perceived it any where taken into account, that we have *experience*, which the Americans have not. Where did Isaac Hull gain his naval experience; and where did Decatur? There are two Decaturs, the father and son. They were my neighbours in the country, in Pennsylvania. They were farmers more than seamen, though the elder went occasionally to sea as

commander of a merchant ship. If it be the father who has taken the Macedonian, he must be upwards of threescore years of age; and if it be the son, I am sure it is the first battle he ever was in; for twelve years ago he was but a mere lad. The father was a man of great probity and of excellent sense; and I have no doubt that the son is the same; but, I'll engage, they both have had more experience in raising Indian corn than in naval tactics.

Something, therefore, in our estimates, should be allowed for our superiority in point of *experience*. We have no officer of the navy who has not passed a great part of his life in actual service; we have scarcely one who has not been in numerous battles; and, in the unfortunate cases above spoken of, one of the captains appears to have been of long standing, even in that rank.

When we are speaking of the naval preparations of Napoleon, we always dwell upon the difficulty of his forming naval *officers*—but here we see, in the case of America, that that is attended with no difficulty at all; we here see gallant and consummate commanders start up in a trice; and in a moment is dissolved the charm which bound us in ignorance as to this important species of information.

The truth is, I believe, that amongst the first qualities of a naval commander, are *sobriety*, *vigilance*, and *consideration for his crew*; and these qualities are within the reach of every man. The American government, too, has *a wide range for choice*; with it, no intrigues, commonly called "*interest*," is likely to prevail; because the possession of the powers of the state depend solely upon the *will of the people*; and the government, having *such* support, is not reduced to the necessity of seeking support from any individuals; and, of course, is not exposed to the danger of being compelled to employ, as commanders, or as officers of any rank, persons not recommended by their own good qualities. This is a very great advantage possessed by the American government; an advantage to which, perhaps, it owes those successes which we so sorely lament, and which seem to be very likely to form an era in the naval history of the world.

But let what will be the final result of these transactions, I really can see no ground for accusation against the ministers on account of the misfortunes that have befallen our frigates. Blamed they may be *for the war*. There, indeed, there is matter for blame; because, if my reasoning upon the subject be correct, they might have avoided the war without any dishonour to England; but for this they cannot be blamed by those who are seeking for their places; because some of those very persons were amongst the men who adopted and adhered to the measures which produced the war, and the rest of them have pledged themselves to prosecute it upon its present ground. Mr. Canning and Lord Wellesley were, in succession, secretaries of state for foreign

affairs, while the dispute was maintained against the abolition of impressment of persons on board of American ships. Indeed, the former has expressed his *disapprobation* of the "*concessions*," as he calls them, made to America in the repeal of our Orders in Council. Of course, he cannot complain of the ministers for going to war; and Mr. Ponsonby, as the organ of the whigs, distinctly declared, that if America was not satisfied with that repeal, he would support the war against her. Not, therefore, being able to find fault with the ministers for the war itself, they fall upon them as to their manner of conducting it; and, as I think I have shown, they do this without a shadow of justice. We "jacobins" blame all the three factions; some of them for causing the war, and others for pledging themselves to support it; nor have I the least hesitation to predict, that day after day will tend to convince all persons of impartiality that we are right.

This war we owe entirely to the presumption inspired by our foolish and venal writers. The language of the late Perceval, who talked of not wishing for the "*destruction*" of America, and who spoke of her as of a power depending on his will for her very existence; this language, which will long be remembered, was the general language of the press. We could not believe it possible that a government, the whole of the officers of which, president and all, did not receive from the public so much money annually, as one of our sinecure placemen; we could not conceive that a government who did not get more money for *itself*, would be able to get money enough to *carry on a war* more than sufficient to last our sloops for a few months. We have now found our mistake; and, indeed, the premises which we had in our eye should have led to a directly different conclusion; for would not common sense have told us, that the less of the public money was taken by the officers of government for their own use, the less of it that was devoured by placemen and by others for no services rendered the public, the more there must be for the government to employ in the public service? This would have been the rational conclusion; but to reason thus suited not those who had, and who have the control over ninety-nine hundredth parts of the press of this country. They, therefore, represented America as a nation destitute of warlike means, when they should have made an estimate of her resources upon the grounds stated in my last number. The persons in *high* offices in America are *badly paid*; but (and the fact is worth great attention) those in *low* rank, or no rank at all, are *well paid*. The former have very small salaries; their gains are much less than those of any considerable merchant or manufacturer, lawyer or physician; but the common soldier and sailor are paid at a very high rate; at such a rate as not to make him regret his change from civil life. I should not say, perhaps,

that the former are *badly* paid; because there is something in the *honour* of high office which the common man does not enjoy; and besides, there is something due from every man to his country; and the greater that his stake is in the country the less is his right to draw from her purse. Mr. Madison does, I dare say, expend, as president, every shilling of the 6,000 pounds that, as president, he receives. And why should he not? What claim would he have to the title of patriot, if he grudged to use his talents for his country; or, which is the same thing, if he refused to use them without being paid for their use? If such were his disposition, what claim would he have to the confidence of his fellow citizens? But, with the common soldier or sailor, or other inferior person employed by the government, the case is wholly different. He has nothing but his labour for his inheritance; he possesses no part of the country; his time is his all; and, of course, he is paid for that at as good a rate as if he laboured for an individual.

Those who speculate upon the *resources* of America should not overlook these important circumstances; but hitherto, I am sorry to say, that we have almost wholly overlooked them. I never shall forget the obstinacy of many persons with whom I am acquainted as to the intention of the American government to go to war. They persisted to the very last, that it was *impossible*. They called the declaration of congress "*bullying;*" they said it was "*all smoke,*" and so, indeed, said the hired press, that vehicle of lies, that instrument of ill to England. They have found some fire as well as smoke; they have found that the republicans have something at their command beside words: and when it is too late, I fear that they will find that this is the most fatal war in which we have yet been engaged. One effect of it appears to me to be inevitable; and that is, *the creation of a navy in America.* Pray, good hired men, do not laugh at me; for I am quite serious, when I say, that my fear is that this war will lead to the creating of a *formidable* navy in America. The *means* are all in her hands, and her successful beginning will not fail to give activity to those means.

A navy, a military marine in America, is, to me, a most formidable object. Twenty frigates only would cause an expense to us of millions a year, unless we resolved to yield the West-India Islands at once. I would not advise our government to look upon the rearing of an American navy as something necessarily *distant.* America has swelled her population from about two to about eight millions in the space of less than thirty years. Another ten years may see her population amount to twenty millions. From not being permitted to "make a hobnail," she has risen to be an exporter of numerous useful manufactures. I state it as an

undeniable fact, that she is now able to supply herself with all the articles necessary to man, even in polished life. And if this be so, why should she not be able to *rear a navy*, having already nearly as great a mercantile marine as our own. Whether it will be for her happiness that she should do this is another question; but that she will do it, I think, is most likely; because, in the mass composing every society of men, there is generally a sufficient number on the side of power and glory to decide the nation in favour of the love of those captivating objects. This war, therefore, if not speedily put an end to, will, in my opinion, not fail to make America a manufacturing nation, as far as her own wants call for, and to make her also a naval nation; and will thus, at one stroke, deprive us of our best customers for goods, and give us, upon the seas, a rival who will be daily growing in strength as well as in experience. In my preface to the republication of Mr. Chancellor Livingston's Treatise on Merino Sheep, I showed how necessarily it would follow from the introduction of flock keeping in America, that she would become independent of us as to woollens. Nevertheless, and in spite of all the facts which have from time to time been published relative to the manufacturing of cloths in that country, there are still men to treat with *ridicule*, aye, even with *ridicule*, the idea of America being able to make her own coats and blankets. I remember that, while I was in Newgate for two years, for writing about the flogging of the local militia, at the town of Ely, in England, under the superintendence of German troops, there came a gentleman, who was, I believe, a dealer in wool, to ask my opinion relative to the future commerce with America. After having spent about a quarter of an hour in a detail of facts, which, in my mind, contained *proof unquestionable* that the woollen trade with America was for ever *at an end*, he began a sentence upon the surprising increase of the manufactures in America, which he concluded in words to this effect: "I dare say, that in less than *half a century* we shall not ship a bale of cloth to that country." This put me in mind of the effect that the Botley Parson's sermons used to have upon me; and I lost no time in changing the subject of conversation. I am not one of those who shall regret this independence of America, which I do not think will prove an injury to England in the end; but I could have wished the change to have been *less abrupt*, and effected without war, and without the animosities and sufferings inseparable from war. To me it appears as absurd as it is unnatural, that the American farmer should not have his coat untaxed at the custom house in England. I can see no sense and no reason in it. Nor do I see why the people of England, or any portion of them, should make coats or knives, or any thing else, for the use of other countries, except merely in such quantities as may be necessary to

exchange for wine and oil, and some few other things which really are useful to man.

The use of commerce is to effect an exchange of the products of one climate for those of another; but government have turned it into the means of *taxation*, and, in many cases, that appears to be its only object. An exchange of *English coal* for *French wine*, the former at 30*s.* a chaldron, and the latter at 6*d.* a bottle in London; that would, indeed, be a commerce to be contemplated with pleasure. But a commerce carried on under a code of prohibitions and penalties, such as those now everywhere in existence, is not to be desired. It is an instrument of taxation, and an endless source of war, and is nothing more. Those, however, who are of a different opinion, may look upon the war with America as one of the surest means of destroying, or, at least, diminishing for ever the best branch of what they admire; but while I blame the ministers for the war, I must say that the merchants and manufacturers (I mean the powerful ones) have no right to blame them. The ministers, in their measures towards America, have done no more than pursue *that same system* at which those merchants and manufacturers have a thousand times, and in the strongest terms, expressed their approbation. At the outset of this long and destructive war, who stood forward so readily in support of it as this class of persons? The war-whoop has invariably originated with them. They indulged the selfish hope of seeing themselves in possession of all the trade and all the riches of the world. The English newspapers contain a record of their love of war, of war against any body, as long as it promised gain to them. They have, over and over again, called the war which began in an invasion of France by the Duke of Brunswick, "a *just* and *necessary* war;" but, of late, they appear to have been taught by their poor books and the list of bankrupts, that the war is not quite so "*necessary*," however "*just*" they may still think it. They have, I repeat it, no right to complain against the ministers, who have not deviated from the system of Pitt and Grenville, and who, with regard to America, are only acting upon the very same objects that have been acted upon and pursued from the year 1792 to the present day; and the manufacturers are tasting, as is most meet, of the fruit of the tree of their own planting and protecting.

WM. COBBETT.

RECOLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES.

IT was easy to believe that the enemies of freedom would, upon this occasion, turn their baleful eyes towards the United States of America, and endeavour to stimulate our government, who, let

us hope, however, has too much sense to be so worked on, to wage a war for the *destruction of liberty* in the western world. But I, who fully expected to see this, am really astounded at the speed and the boldness with which the project has been brought forward in some of our public prints, especially the Times, which, in plain terms, urges a war against the United States upon the *same principles* that the close of the war has been carried on against Napoleon; and, indeed, which aims at the subjugation and *recolonization of that country*. Before I proceed any further, I shall insert the article which has called forth these observations.

"It is understood that *part of our army in France will be immediately transferred to America*, to finish the war there with the same glory as in Europe, and to *place the peace on a foundation equally firm and lasting*. Now that the tyrant Buonaparte has been consigned to infamy, there is no public feeling in this country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans. That a republic, boasting of its freedom, should have stooped to become the tool of that monster's ambition; that it should have attempted to plunge the parricidal weapon into the heart of that country from whence its own origin was derived; that it should have chosen the precise moment when it fancied that Russia was overwhelmed, to attempt to consummate the ruin of Britain—all this is conduct so black, so loathsome, so hateful, that it naturally stirs up the indignation that we have described. Nevertheless, there is, in this case, the same popular error that there was, not long since, when France was identified in the minds of most men with the name of BUONAPARTE. The *American government is, in point of fact, as much a tyranny* (though we are far from saying it is so horrible a one) as was that of BUONAPARTE: and as we firmly urged the principle of *no peace with* BUONAPARTE, so, to be consistent with ourselves, we must in like manner maintain the doctrine of NO PEACE WITH JAMES MADISON. The reasons for this are twofold, as respecting this country, and as respecting America. A very little reflection will render them sufficiently manifest. In the first place, hatred of England is the fundamental point in the policy of Mr. MADISON. He is the ostensible organ of a party, all whose thoughts, feelings, and sentiments are guided by this master key. Some of the statesmen of this school have not blushed to assert in full senate, 'that the world ought to rejoice, if Britain were sunk in the sea;' if, where there are now men, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, 'there were no more than a sandbank for the sea-monsters to fatten on, a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.' Such is the deep-rooted antipathy which these wicked men have to the land of their forefathers! With such men Mr. MADISON acts; and he himself, before the accession of his party to power, expressly

laid it down as a principle, (on the discussion of Mr. Jay's negotiation,) 'that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France.' His love for the latter country, however, was but an adjunct of the hatred which he entertained towards us: and he hated us for the very same reason that BUONAPARTE did—because we stand in the way of any state that aspires at universal dominion; for, young as is the transatlantic republic, it has already indulged in something more than dreams of the most unmeasured ambition. We need not here detail the long history of fraud and falsehood by which he at length succeeded in deluding his countrymen into war. Suffice it to say, he had two objects in that war; first, to sap the foundations of our maritime greatness, by denying the allegiance of our sailors; and, secondly, to seize on our colonial possessions on the main land of America, leaving it to a future occasion to lay hands on our insular settlements in the West Indies. Perhaps, when he finds himself unexpectedly deprived of the buckler under which he aimed these stabs at our vital existence—the mighty NAPOLEON, the protector *in petto* of the Columbian Confederacy—he may *be willing to draw in his horns*, and sneak away from his audacious undertakings. But shall we have the extreme *folly to let him off thus?* When we have wrested the dagger from the bravo's hand, shall we quietly return it to him to put up in its sheath? No, no. Mr. MADISON himself, in his very last public speech, has furnished us with a most apposite rule of conduct, which he cannot blame us for adopting, since he avowedly follows it himself—namely, that we should '*not only chastise the savages into present peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears.*' Hitherto we have considered the Americans as identified with Mr. MADISON's government; but is this the fact? So much the reverse, that it has been openly proposed in some of the states to treat for peace with Great Britain separately; and they would act wisely and justifiably in adopting this measure. The eastern states; the most moral, the most cultivated, the most intelligent, the best in every respect, are at this instant reduced to a *complete thraldom by the southern states*, under the forms of a constitution which the prevailing faction *violates at pleasure*. 'The small states,' says FISHER AMES, 'are now in vassalage; they obey the nod of Virginia. The constitution sleeps with WASHINGTON, having no mourners but the virtuous, and no monument but history. *Our* vote and influence (those of the eastern states) avail no more than that of the Isle of Man in the politics of Great Britain." If this was true before the annexation of Louisiana, how much more strikingly so now, that that addition has quite broken down all balance between the states, and poured an irresistible stream of corrupt influence into the channel of the executive! What is very remarkable is, that the preponderance of the southern states is

chiefly owing to the slaves they contain! The number of votes which each state has in the national government, is determined by the whole population. Hence, though the slave has no political existence, he gives a weight to his master over a free man in a different state; and by another curious, but not uncommon paradox in human nature, the slave owner there is generally a furious democrat, and the democrats have hitherto been the most servile of the tyrant's adherents. Clear, therefore, is it, that the free constitution of the United States is either incompetent in itself to afford an equal protection to the wisest and best parts of the union; or else that constitution has been violated and overthrown by the faction of which Mr. MADISON is the ostensible head; and in either case, the oppressed states would act justly to themselves *to separate their interests from those of the incapable and treacherous individual who has dragged them reluctantly into a war no less inglorious than unjust.* When we speak of these and the like crimes, as perpetrated by Mr. MADISON individually, we only mean to use his name in the common way in which persons in eminent stations are generally spoken of. He stands at the head of the list, not but that Mr. GALLATIN may be more artful, Mr. CLAY more furious, Mr. JEFFERSON more malignant, and so on; and besides, there is a ferocious banditti belonging to his party, of whom, perhaps, he himself stands in awe, and who, as they consist of Irish traitors, and fugitive bankrupts, and swindlers, from all parts of the United Kingdom, may easily be conceived to exceed even the native Americans in rancour against Great Britain: but the more shameless and abandoned the individuals are who compose this faction, the greater odium must be cast on Mr. MADISON himself, in the eyes of the moral and reflecting part of the American population. It is a great mistake to suppose that the United States are wholly deficient in characters of this latter description. They have had many wise and many eloquent men, whose words yet live in the hearts and in the meditations of their countrymen. Mr. WALSH, the accomplished editor of the American Review, has attained a high literary reputation even in this country; and though the late FISHER AMES (the BURKE *of the western hemisphere*) is not so much known in this country, he deservedly enjoys a much greater popularity in America. These, and many more such writers as these, have kept alive the fire of *genuine British liberty* in the United States. Whilst, on the other hand, the miserable blunders of the DEARBORNS, and HOPKINS's, and WILKINSONS, and HAMPTONS, and all the long list of defeated generals, have thrown a ridicule on that invasion of Canada which was one of the great baits of the war. Lastly comes the fall of Mr. MADISON's grand patron, attended with the execration and scorn of all Europe. Can we doubt *that a vigorous effort on our part will annihilate the power of a faction alike hostile to Bri-*

tain and fatal to America? Is not the time propitious for winning at least the sounder and better part of the Americans to a union of interests with the country from whence they sprung?

It is impossible to read this article without being convinced that there are men who seriously entertain the wish to see America *recolonized;* who wish to see our king *restored* in America, as the Bourbons have been in France; for Mr. MADISON is the chosen president of the union; he does nothing of himself; it is the president, the congress, and the people, all acting in concert. Yet he is to be *put down;* no peace is to be made with him *any more than with* NAPOLEON; the government of the states *is a tyranny;* the constitution *is violated, or is inefficient;* its existence is *inimical to lasting peace;* the time is propitious for *winning the sounder part of the states,* at least, *to a union of interests with the country from whence they sprung.* These are sentiments and declarations to *begin* with; but, in fact, they go the whole length of recolonization; and that is the project now on foot amongst the foes of freedom, who seem to be resolved to prove to us, that those friends of liberty in America who did *not* wish for the extinguishment of Napoleon, despot as he was, were not without sound reasons for their sentiments. They saw that, though he had betrayed the republican cause, if he were put down, there would be men ready to urge projects of the description of that of which we are now speaking. This language towards the United States was never made use of; sentiments like these were never hazarded while Napoleon was in power; but the moment he is *down,* these men turn their hostile eyes towards America, the only republic left upon the face of the earth! Our quarrel with America *ceases with the war.* There being peace in Europe, the quarrel is at an end without any discussions. But this writer passes over all the subject of quarrel. The American *president* and *government* are *bad.* That is now, according to him, to be the ground of the war; and we are to have *no peace* with them. I will pass over the impudent falsehoods which this writer utters as to the conduct of Mr. Madison, and the nature and effects of the American government; and come at once to what is most interesting to us now; namely, first, whether a war for the recovery of the American states as colonies would be *popular in England;* and, second, whether it would be *likely to succeed.* As to the first, I have no hesitation in expressing my belief, that it would be, for a while at least, the *most popular* war in which England was ever engaged, the reasons for which opinion I will now state. In the first place, peace, real and lasting peace, and a vast reduction of our forces, would be total ruin to a great number of persons and families. All these will wish for war, no matter with whom, or upon what grounds. They will be for the war for the same reason

that undertakers are for deaths, and without being, any more than these, chargeable with any malicious motive. The farmers will be for war upon much the same principles; they being of opinion, no matter whether erroneously or not, that war makes corn dear. Here are *two* very numerous classes of persons. A *third* is the land owners *in general*, who believe that peace will lower their rents without lowering their taxes. The ship owners and builders fear America, who can build and sail much *cheaper* than they can, and who, if left at quiet, would cover the sea with their ships. The great manufacturers ever will be for a war, likely, as they think to tear up, root and branch, those establishments which are not only supplying America herself, but must, in a few years, especially with the emigration of artisans to America, become our rival, and supplant us all over the world. Besides, if America were to be recovered, we should, they think, have a monopoly of supplying her. Even the stockholders, though they might generally wish for peace, might probably be persuaded that the recolonization of America would afford the means of *lessening the national debt;* that America might be made to bear a share of the debt; that the lands there might be sold for our account; and, in short, that this might be made an immense source of income, and an infallible security to the paper system. Of politicians there will be two descriptions for the war: one will see in America a dangerous maritime rival; a maritime power which grows, like her own Indian corn, almost visible to the eye. They will mix this apprehension with the feelings of mortification and revenge arising from the naval victories of America, which are not be washed away by the fall of Napoleon, nor of fifty Napoleons at his heels. These are honourable-minded men, loving their country, not able to endure the idea of her ever, at any time, ceasing to be mistress of the ocean, and so terrified at that idea as to lose sight, in the pursuit of a *preventive* remedy, of all notions of justice, humanity, and freedom. Another description of politicians, animated solely by their *hatred* of whatever gives liberty to man, will see in America what, indeed, they have always seen, and for which they have always hated her, an asylum for the oppressed; a dwelling for real liberty; an example of a people, enjoying the height of prosperity and the greatest safety of person and property, without any hereditary titles, without any army, and almost without taxes; a country, where the law knows nothing about religion or its ministers; where every man pursues his own notions in religious matters; where there are no sinecures, no pensions, no grants of public money to individuals; where the people at large choose their representatives in the legislature, their presidents, governors, and sheriffs; where bribery and corruption are unknown; and where the putting of a criminal to death is nearly as rare as an eclipse of the sun or moon. This description of politicians look at America as *Satan* is said to have

eyed our first parents in the garden of Eden; not with feelings of envy, but with those of deadly malice. They would exterminate the people, and burn up the country. The example of such a people, "sears the eye-balls." They will tell us, that while that example exists, nothing is done; nothing is secured; nothing is safe; they will endeavour to terrify the government and the nation by describing the emigrations which will take place from Europe; the numbers of artisans and of people of enterprise that will crowd to America, adding to her population, extending her knowledge, increasing her means of all sorts, and enabling her, in a short time, to spread far and wide what they call her *disorganizing principles*. This last description of politicians, have the press greatly in their hands; the press is the most powerful instrument; and it will, in this case, have prejudice, supposed private interests, passion, and all, in favour of its efforts. These are the reasons on which I found my opinions as to the *popularity* of such a war; but yet I hope and trust that the ministers and Prince Regent will not be carried away by such notions. It is for them to consider what is best for the country, and permanently best; and not to suffer their judgment to be warped by an outcry, proceeding from the selfishness of some and the rage of others. With regard to the SECOND question, whether a war for the recolonization of America would be *likely to succeed*, I think it would not. I must, however, confess that I agree with the author of the above article, that "the *time is propitious*" in the highest degree. Not only have we an army ready organized; composed of the best stuff; best commanded; best appointed and provided; best disciplined in the world; but we *do not know what to do with it* in the way of employment, and it would be, for a year at least, as expensive in peace as in war. We have more than a sufficiency of *ships of war* to carry this army across the Atlantic, without crowding, and without the aid of a single transport.

In Europe we have nothing to fear; France will, for some years, have enough to do at home. It is the same in Spain and Holland; and, besides, what are any of them to do *without fleets*, and where, in the whole world, is there a fleet, but in England? Now, then, what are the Americans to do against this army and this fleet? I have no doubt that our army would waste the seacoast; that it would at first beat the Americans wherever they met them; that it would, if it chose, demolish some towns and occupy others; that it would make the congress change its place of sitting; but, unless the states *divided*, I have no idea that such a war would finally succeed; and it appears to me that the fall of Napoleon, especially coupled with what will be deemed the ruinous language of the TIMES newspaper, will infallibly silence the voice of faction in America, and will make the whole of the people of one mind as to the necessity of providing for resistance.

The TIMES seems to suppose that the people of America, or, at least, a part of them, and especially in the eastern states, will heartily participate in our joy at the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons. Will they not, on the contrary, be terribly *alarmed?* And will not those who have cried out against the government for aiding Napoleon, as they called it, begin to fear the consequences of his fall, when the project of the *Times* reaches their ears, and when they find that there are writers in England who already openly propose to make war upon them for the *express purpose of subverting their government*, and effecting in America what has been effected in France, namely, a *restoration?* Mr. Ames is complimented by this writer as the Burke of America, and I dare say that Mr. Ames would have liked very well to get a pension of three thousand pounds a year; but in that respect he was not so lucky as his great prototype. Mr. Ames was a poor drivelling hankerer after aristocracy. His party wished to establish a sort of petty *noblesse:* they wanted to make some honorary distinction. The people took the alarm; put them out of power, and they have ever since been endeavouring to tear out the vitals of their country. The fall of Napoleon, however, will leave them wholly without support from the people, when that people hears that the first consequence of that fall is a proposition in the English public prints to treat THEIR *government as that of Napoleon has been treated*, and upon precisely the same principle, namely, that it is a *despotism*. As I said before, I trust that our government is too wise to be led to the adoption of any such project; but if they were, what could our friends in America say? They have been asserting for years past, that *ours* was the cause of freedom against a despot. What will they say if we make war upon them upon the same principle, and for the same end, that we have been making war against Napoleon? By Mr. Jefferson and his party it was always concluded that there was no danger to be apprehended from France under any circumstances; and that if France, if the new order of things was subdued in France, America would be in great danger. Therefore, they always wished, and they acted as if they wished, that France should not be defeated in the result of the war. It is in our power, by making peace with them at once, and waiving all dispute about differences that cannot arise during peace, to show them that their fears were groundless; but will they not, when they see the project of the TIMES newspaper, hold it up to the teeth of their political adversaries, and say, "look *here!*" Here is the first fruits of the fall of the man whose destruction you told us we ought to assist in producing, and to do any thing, "in the upholding of whom, you represented as impolitic and base." This will be the language to those adversaries who will hang their heads with shame, unless the author of the *Times* can make a shift, somehow or other, to con-

vey to them a small portion of his impudence. I think it is clear, then, that the people of America would, in case such a war were to be made upon them, be united in a spirit of resistance; and if they were, I have no idea that ten such armies as all that we could send, well disciplined and brave as our army is, would finally succeed in subduing and recolonizing the country. We might make inroads from Canada; we might demolish towns upon the coast; we might destroy manufactories; we might lay waste the cornfields, and burn many of the mills; we might destroy all the shipping; we might tear the country a good deal to pieces; but I do not believe that we should, even by adding *another eight hundred millions to our debt*, secure one single colony in the territory now called the United States of America. Yet, it is really true, that the enemies of freedom, while America remains what she now is, have gained nothing. Napoleon has been put down; but then he was an enemy of freedom. He was not owned by any friend of freedom. France was not a republic, nor had she a *representative* government under him. The war against him was in the *name*, at least, of the *people*. The example so hateful to the *enemies* of liberty, of a people happy and free, without distinction of ranks, without an established church, without hereditary power or privilege of any sort, with a press now perfectly free, with legislators and chief magistrates periodically elected by the people at large; this example still exists, and the country is yet open to all the world; and to put down this example would, I am of opinion, cost us more blood and more money than it has cost to put down Napoleon. The enemies of freedom promised us *peace durable*, if we got rid of Napoleon; but scarcely is he down, when they propose to us a new war, more, if possible, expensive in its nature, and probably longer in its duration. To be sure, America holds out an alluring bait; it presents employment for governors of provinces, commanders, postmasters, attorneys and solicitors general, secretaries, counsellors of state, taxing people, paymasters, judges, and a long and nameless list of hangers on; but, again I say, I hope and trust that the Prince Regent and his ministers will have too much wisdom to listen to any such mad and wicked project. It is impossible, however, for the people of America not to feel some alarm, and not to make preparations accordingly. This language of our newspapers is quite enough to excite apprehensions; and for this, amongst the rest, we have to curse *a base and degenerate press*.

AMERICA.

An article which appeared in the *Times* newspaper of Monday last, makes me regret exceedingly that the Regent did not answer that part of the city address which expresses a hope that "a *period is put to the ravages of war;* and that we may henceforth participate in the *advantages of a friendly and uninterrupted intercourse with all the nations of the world.*" I regret that his Royal Highness did not speak to and echo this sentiment, because the article above alluded to states, that there is to be a stipulation *in the definitive treaty of peace,* by which all the allied powers, and France, are to *bind themselves not to interfere in the war which England may carry on against the United States of America.* This article is published as dated, and as having been published, at Vienna. It is, doubtless, wholly *false,* though it is very difficult to account for its being published in the capital of the Austrian government, where intelligence of this sort seems so unlikely to be fabricated. Perhaps the *Times* newspaper, which has cried out so loudly for *no peace with James Madison,* and has openly proposed to detach part of the states from the confederation, has fabricated the article itself, by way of feeling the public pulse. Be this as it may, the *idea exists,* and the promulgation of it must have a very bad effect; for though it is impossible to believe that the Prince Regent would propose any such stipulation, there can be no doubt but the very mention of it in our prints will tend to make the Americans more exasperated than they were before.

The effect of this mischievous article would have been, by anticipation, completely destroyed by a single word from the Regent echoing the wish for *universal peace* expressed by the city of London. I am aware that his Royal Highness, by a speedy adjustment of all differences with America, which, indeed, do themselves away by the existence of peace in Europe, will greatly disappoint the feeders on war and the enemies of freedom. As to the former, they might be satisfied with profits equal to the profits of war; but the latter, nothing short of the extermination of the very name of *republic* will satisfy. They see, in the existence of the republic of America, danger little short of what they saw in the republic of France. They see in it a receptacle for the oppressed and enterprising of all nations. They see in it an example of freedom, morality, and happiness, the bare thought of which puts them to the torture. If they could consolidate all the people of America into one carcass, they would, having an arm sufficiently strong, and an arm sufficiently long, cut their throat at a single gash. Such men, if men we ought to call such mon-

sters, talk with delight *of the sending of Lord Wellington's army to the United States;* they revel in the idea of *burning* the cities and towns, the mills and manufactories of that country; at the very least, they talk of forcing Mr. Madison from his seat, and new-modelling the government. They endeavour to excite all the hostile passions here. They are always ripping up our *defeated and captured frigates*, without appearing to recollect that we, at any rate, *defeated and took one frigate from the Americans.* Why then urge us on to *revenge?* Can any revenge that we can take do away these pages of history, any more than the dethronement of Napoleon can do away the history of the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Eylau? At other times they tell us of the danger which, as manufacturers, we have to apprehend from America, who is now, in her turn, becoming an *exporter* of *woollen* and of *cotton* goods. And why should they not export woollens and cottons as well as we? What reason is there that they should not become a commercial nation as well as we or the Dutch? These latter used to have, exclusively, the making of *Gods* for the Portuguese and Spaniards; but, for my part, I see no harm that would arise from it, if the Americans, who have such abundance of wood, were to supply this article to all the catholic countries of Europe, as doubtless there will now be a great call for it, seeing that the pope (to the great joy of this *protestant* country) is now restored to his See.

But in spite of the justice and reasonableness of these sentiments, they do not, and will not, prevail amongst the manufacturers in England, who will look with jealousy and hatred towards America; and perceiving no other way of arresting her astonishing progress in the manufacturing line than that of tearing her to pieces by war, they will be for war with her at any expense and at any risk. The ship owners know well that they have no chance in a *fair competition* with the Americans. They know that the latter can build, sail, and carry at half the price necessary to English ships. This class, therefore, will be for war. The mercantile marine will breed ships of war. This is an object of terror with those who look far forward, and who are unable to support the idea of England *ever*, at any time, becoming the second maritime nation in the world, as in twenty years' time she must, unless the growth of the American naval power can be checked. When we look back to what America was in the year 1784, that is, thirty years ago, and see what progress she has made, and how that progress has gone on increasing in its velocity, it is impossible not to perceive, that unless she receive some very severe check, she must be equal, at least, to England, in naval power, even in the course of ten years. This opinion is general with those who reflect upon the subject; and, therefore, it is not astonishing that some, even good men, who do not hate freedom in the abstract,

should be anxious to see her growth checked, either by demolishing her towns, her ships, her means of strength of all sorts, or by *dividing her states*. There are those, too, who, looking at the fearful magnitude of our debt, and in despair of seeing it reduced by any system of economy, have an idea that it would be as well to venture upon a war of *conquest* with America, in order to obtain the means to pay off part at least of this debt. *They see in that boundless country lands to sell, and a great population to tax.* They imagine they will find means as boundless as the debt itself; and mad as the notion of a war upon such grounds may seem to the Americans, they may be assured that there are numerous persons in England who entertain it. Then think of the delightful prospect which seventeen or eighteen provinces hold out to the hunters after places! Such cargoes of governors, commanders in chief, staffs, port-admirals and officers, custom house and excise people, attorneys and solicitors general, judges, doctors, proctors, paymasters, commissaries, and though last, not least, bishops, priests, and deacons. Only think of this, and wonder not that there are persons who wish for the recolonization of America.

But as the subjects of dispute with that country cease of themselves with the war in Europe, let us hope that all these wild notions will be soon dissipated by the Regent's ministers, who will, doubtless, lose, now, not a moment in giving real peace to the nation. I must confess, however, that I should like to see the ugly paragraph to which I have alluded plainly contradicted by something like *official authority*. It appeared in the Times newspaper of the 2d of May in the following words: The *treaty of Chaumont* is published in the same print of the same day, from the Vienna Gazette; and after the treaty there follows, as also taken from the Vienna paper, this paragraph:

"It is affirmed, that beside the conventions which England has concluded with the other allied powers, it has also made *a secret agreement relative to North America*. By this agreement England has procured from *all* the other European powers the assurance, that after the re-establishment of peace in Europe, *none of them will interfere in the disputes between his Britannic Majesty and North America*, and France is also to engage, in the peace to be concluded, *to subscribe to the same conditions*."

This, as the reader will observe well, was first published at Vienna on the 9th of April, and accompanied the publication of the treaty of Chaumont. If the paragraph be not a fabrication *here*, it is very strange indeed, it being well known, that at Vienna the press is under a rigid inspection and control. *Why* any such stipulation as this? What *need* was there of any, seeing that we have *now* no dispute with America, the very subjects of dispute having ceased to exist with the war in Europe. The dispute related to the taking of people out of American ships upon the high

seas, upon the ground of being English subjects, and also to the extent of the right of blockade and other matters touching neutrals *during war.* Peace with all nations, of course, takes away the very subject of dispute; and WHY, therefore, should England have made a *secret* agreement, in order to prevent any of the other powers, France included, from taking part in this dispute, "*after* the re-establishment of *peace in Europe?*" If I could believe, as I yet cannot, in the existence of such an agreement, I should begin to fear that the regent and his ministers were bent upon a war of *recolonizing*, or at least of *devastation*, in the United States; that they had listened to the suggestions of those who, for the several reasons that I have stated, desire the destruction or the conquest of these states, and that we were doomed now to be engaged in a most expensive and bloody war, while all the rest of Europe enjoyed profound peace; that the time was not yet to arrive when our burdens were to be lightened, when guineas were to return, and when we were, once before we died, to say that our country was living in friendship with all the world.

If this war were to be resolved on by our government, (which God forbid!) it must be confessed that there would not be wanting the ready means of carrying it on with deadly effect. We have more soldiers, more ships, more horses, more arms and ammunition; more, in short, of all the instruments of war, than we know what to do with. Our army is well disciplined; abundantly supplied with good officers; brave in its nature; accustomed to victory! Our navy is in the same state. The European war has ended so suddenly, and was upon so large a scale, that there are provisions and stores on hand more than sufficient, perhaps, for a year's war in America. The undertaking, therefore, would be by no means chimerical, though, in the *end*, I think it would fail. If such a war, and for the purpose urged in our public prints, should be entered on, it is probable that the German legion, being subjects of our king, might be amongst the troops sent out. This is no contemptible army of itself; horse, foot, artillery, engineers; all well appointed, provided, and commanded. In short, there will be no difficulty in sending out an army of fifty or eighty thousand men, beside sailors and marines. To prevent their *landing* would be impossible; and it is hardly necessary to say, *that the whole of the ships of the states*, and *all the maritime towns*, must fall upon the approach of only a fourth part of such an army; *unless the Americans should, previous to its landing, be cured of their self-confidence, and lay by the plough for a while for the use of the musket.*

I trust in the justice of his Royal Highness, the regent, for the rejection of such a project—but, if it were to be adopted, I know it would be popular; and I also see, as every man must, that the powers of Europe, if inclined to aid America, are *unable* to do it.

They have, all put together, not fleets enough to face six English men of war. The maritime strength of the whole world now centres in these islands. The Americans, I hear, rely upon the *friendship* of Russia. Alas! what have *they* to offer the emperor of Russia in return for his friendship? *This is nonsense. The emperor of Russia has other objects of his attention;* and, besides, if we really were to give credit to the article from Vienna, that point is settled at once. So that if this war were to be resolved on, it would soon be seen that the politics of the *federalists*, as they are called, have been wrong from the beginning; and that Mr. Madison, so often accused of being the tool of Napoleon, will have to remind his antagonists, that if America, in good earnest, had taken the side of France a few years ago, she would not now, in all probability, have to tremble lest the advice of the *Times* newspaper should be acted upon. Luckily for the power of England, and for the family of Bourbon, Mr. Madison and his party kept aloof from Napoleon for the sake of a political principle, united with the fear of being reproached with plunging their country into a war on the side of a despot and a conqueror. But it would, if the *Times'* project were adopted, become evident to all the world, that such policy had been the ruin of the United States. I repeat, however, my confident hope, that the regent and his ministers are *too just* and *too moderate* in their views, to listen for one moment to any such ambitious and sanguinary project, against which it is my duty to endeavour to guard them, as I know that there will not be wanting numbers, through the press and otherwise, to urge its adoption. The whole world beside does not, perhaps, contain so many deadly enemies of freedom as England alone. It is here alone where we see it recommended to keep the allied armies longer in France; it is here alone where we hear it said, and see it promulgated, that Napoleon ought to be *hanged* with his code of laws about his neck; it is here alone where we see publications recommending to the king of France to *punish* the late republicans; it is here alone where the press openly expresses its dread of the king of France being too lenient. This description of persons will never be at heart's ease while the people of America are free, and while America is a receptacle for the oppressed. And, indeed, upon their principle, they are right. If they will insist upon regarding the result of the war in Europe as valuable only on account of its having destroyed republicanism in Europe, they are perfectly consistent in urging a war against America, and even a war of recolonization; for unless that object be accomplished; unless the cradle of the revolution become also its grave, little or nothing has been gained over the principle of republicanism. America, now holding out her hand to manufacturers, as well as cultivators of the soil, cannot, *if she remain what she is*, fail to attract prodigious numbers of Europeans, of all ma-

tions, to her prolific and happy shores. Discontent at the changes which have now taken place; despair of ever seeing that which they before had hopes of living to see; shame to remain on the spot where their hopes have been baffled, and their endeavours frustrated; insurmountable hatred of power to which they are compelled to submit, and to the support of which they are compelled to contribute; the weight of taxation; the spirit of enterprise; the hope of bettering their lot in all: these will, if America be at peace, and the road free and clear, carry hundreds of thousands of Europeans to her shores. Artisans, manufacturers of all descriptions, and especially of the most clever and most enterprising men. The augmentation of her population will be hastened; her maritime and all other means will increase; and it will be not at all surprising to see her, in ten years, in a situation to send forth fifty ships of the line, manned and commanded as well as our own.

I confess that this will be the natural consequence of *leaving her what she now is*, and that in any war at ten years hence, she will be able almost to dictate to us both the time and the conditions of peace, there being a limit to our growth of power, and none to hers. But for all this I am decidedly for leaving her to herself. Her states may divide of themselves. That will make her comparatively weak; whereas, by a war, we should *unite them* much closer than they now are. We may, too, *fail* in the object of the war. After expending two or three hundred millions of money, we may be compelled to make peace with her as an independent republic, having greatly weakened ourselves by the attempt to subdue her, tarnished our own military reputation, fixed her fame forever in the minds of men, and what in the eyes of some persons would be worse than all the rest, established upon a rock, never to be shaken, the principles of freedom and of republican government.

I have thus taken a rather extensive view of this subject; but to those who are for a war with America, in order, as the *Times* calls it, *to finish the good work which so happily begun in France*, it might have been sufficient to observe, in very few words, that our choice lies between these two things: either to suffer America to remain the nurse of freedom, the receptacle of the oppressed of all nations, an example of liberty, security, and happiness, enjoyed under an elective government, without hereditary rights, or established church; or to continue to pay the property-tax, and to see our debt yearly increased by loans. Here, Johnny Bull, you have your choice. Which of the two you may take, I really cannot pretend to say; and so upon this subject I must wait patiently the result of your profound cogitations.

As to the state of opinions in America, it appears that, having heard the low state of Napoleon's affairs, the people there were counting with confidence on *an immediate peace*. They had not

then heard of the actual *dethronement* of Napoleon, and of the consequent language of our public prints, accompanied with statements relative to *troops* immediately to be sent off to America. What effect these will produce in the minds of the people and of the government there, I know not; but so slowly do they generally move, it is not probable that the troops will meet with any thing like *an army* to oppose them. The Americans have no experienced officers. They have no discipline. They will, too, I dare say, think that, because they beat England in the last war, they can do it again, and much easier, having now five times as numerous a population. But, in the first place, they will not have to contend against such *generals* as they had to contend against before, nor such officers and soldiers. They will, if our troops really should land in their country, have to contend with those who have defeated *French* armies; with skill of all sorts; experience in the men as well as the officers; with courage, discipline, and the habit of victory. All these will require something more than the Americans have yet thought of. Then, in the last war, America had three great maritime powers on her side, and one power to send her aid in officers and men. Do they now look for assistance from the friendship of *Ferdinand*, or of *Louis*, or of the *sovereign prince of the Netherlands?* Which of the three do they intend to apply to? Or do they expect that the emperor of Russia, who is shortly to come on a visit to England, will, in order to preserve their liberty, send an army of Cossacks to their assistance round by the way of Kamschatka?

Verily, Jonathan, if you repose in such vain hopes you are upon your last legs, if the project of our public writers be adopted by the government. It appears that you have negotiators in Europe; and, I have heard, that they have a great opinion of *their powers of speech*. They, or, rather you, will, in due time, feel the consequence of this error, if it be persevered in long. We here, do not make such long speeches in our diplomatic discussions. We are more laconic; but we use arguments of much greater force than yours. Whether it be owing to our European climate, which, by making the stage of maturity more tardy in arriving, communicates more vigour to the mind as well as the body, from causes similar to those which render the oak more solid and durable than the poplar; or, to that necessity of industry which habituates us to despatch, I cannot tell: but, certain it is, that our negotiators have a much *shorter* way of going to work than yours, and that they seldom fail to be much more successful. You have recently seen what a shilly-shally state the powers of the continent were in till our Lord Castlereagh got amongst their counsellors. They were talking about leaving *to the Emperor Napoleon* a much greater extent of territory than France, under her kings, ever knew. You have seen how soon matters changed after the

arrival of his lordship. You have seen the result; and, having seen that, rely, if you will, on the superior powers of talking possessed by your negotiators! Perhaps you may take it into your head that negotiators, to be chosen from amongst **OUR FRIENDS, THE FEDERALISTS**; that two or three of those "*Burkes* of the Western Hemisphere," of whom the *Times* newspaper speaks; perhaps, it may come into your noddle, that negotiators picked out from amongst these friends of "social order and regular government," will be likely to succeed better than those who were not for open war against Napoleon. *Try*, then, Jonathan; and be sure to fix upon gentlemen who think themselves very clever, and love, of all things, to hear themselves *talk*. Be sure to send men deeply read in Vattel and Puffendorf, and who will write volumes in folio in answer to six lines from our secretary of state. I think that, in order to *conciliate*, your best way will be to send negotiators, who, in following up the sentiments of Mr. Randolph, will lay all the blame of your hostility upon the *democrats*, or *jacobins*, who have emigrated to you from England and Ireland; and if you were to propose to give them up to their natural sovereign, it might, perhaps, as Mr. Randolph would think, obtain you peace upon better terms. *Try* it, Jonathan, and see what effect it will have! In short, try, in all manner of ways, the powers of *talking*——Alas! to be serious with you, your safety lies now in the forbearance, the magnanimity, the compassion of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of England; and, I trust, especially for the sake of the quakers in Pennsylvania, that you will find this a safe reliance. While the Emperor Napoleon wielded the arms of France, you thought yourselves in no danger. But him you did not like. He did not dress to your fancy. One party amongst you abused him, and the other disclaimed all desire to aid his views. Volumes did your negotiators write to convince us that you did nothing to favour him. You got into a nice, snug little war of your own. Still *independent*, you were at war with one of the great belligerents, and so far from allying yourself with the other, you contrived to keep up your quarrel with him, and could hardly be said to be at peace with your powerful enemy's only powerful enemy. Luckily for us, you adopted this policy, and persevered in it to the last. You appear to have put your little independent war as a sort of episode into the grand drama; but it was acting contrary to all the rules of composition not to close the episode before the end of the piece. You may, I hope, safely rely upon the moderation and magnanimity of our Prince Regent, acting in the name and in behalf of his majesty; but I do assure you, that that is your *only* reliance; for if you were rooted out to the last man, your fate would excite very little commiseration in Europe. You thought that you would *hold the balance* between England and France. What fol-

ly and presumption! But it is vain to *talk*. This is a disease of the mind, of which nations are never cured but at the cannon's mouth; and though I could wish much to see you cured, I cannot bring myself to approve of the application of the remedy. Since writing the above, the following important *declaration* from our admiralty has come to hand. The Americans will, I dare say, not think it altogether a *joke*.

"*Admiralty Office, April* 30, 1814.

"The lords commissioners of the admiralty cannot announce to the fleet the termination of hostilities with France, without expressing to the petty officers, seamen, and royal marines of his majesty's ships, the high sense which their lordships entertain of their gallant and glorious services during the late war. The patience, perseverance, and discipline; the skill, courage, and devotion, with which the seamen and marines have upheld the best interests, and achieved the noblest triumphs of the country, entitle them to the gratitude, not only of their native land, which they have preserved inviolate, but of the other nations of Europe, of whose ultimate deliverance their successes maintained the hope, and accelerated the accomplishment. Their lordships regret that the unjust and unprovoked *aggression of the American* government, in declaring war upon this country, after *all the causes of its original complaint had been removed*, does not permit them to reduce the fleet at once to a peace establishment; but as the question now at issue in this war *is the maintenance of those maritime rights which are the sure foundations of our naval glory*, their lordships look with confidence to that part of the fleet which it may be still necessary to keep in commission, for a continuance of that spirit of discipline and gallantry which has raised the British navy to its present pre-eminence. In reducing the fleet to the establishment necessary for *the American war*, the seamen and marines will find their lordships attentive to the claims of their respective services. The reduction will be first made in the crews of those ships which it may be found expedient to pay off, and from them the petty officers and seamen will be successively discharged, according to the length of their services; beginning in the first instance with all those who were in his majesty's service previous to the 7th of March, 1803, and have since continued in it. When the reduction shall have been thus made, as to the ships paid off, their lordships will direct their attention to those which it may be found necessary to keep in commission, and as soon as the circumstances of the war will admit, will bring home and discharge all persons having the same standing and periods of service, as those before discharged from the ships paid off; so that, in a few months the situation of individuals will be equalised; all men of a certain period of service will be at liberty to return home to their families; and the number

which it may be still necessary to retain, will be composed of those who have been the shortest time in the service. An arrangement in itself so just cannot, in their lordship's opinion, fail to give universal satisfaction; and they are induced to make this communication to the fleet, because they think that the exemplary good conduct of all the petty officers, seamen, and marines, entitle them to every confidence, and to this full and candid explanation of their lordship's intentions. Their lordships cannot conclude without expressing their hope, that the valour of his majesty's fleets and armies will speedily bring the American contest to a conclusion honourable to the British interests, and *conducive to the lasting repose of the civilized world.* By command of their lordships. J. W. CROKER."

Thus, then, we have it explicitly declared, that there is to be "AN AMERICAN WAR." Now, we shall see then, whether our ministers are to be talked out of their views, whatever those views may be. The grounds of the war, on the part of America, were the invasion, as they insisted, of their *neutral rights.* The peace in Europe, I should have thought, put an end to the dispute, it being impossible that neutral rights should any longer be claimed. But it seems that I was deceived; I must confess that the cry for war with America is general in this country, now that we have no other powers to fight with, and the resentment of no one to fear. From America we learn the most surprising fact, that a law has actually been passed to prevent the importation of either woollen or cotton goods from any part of the world! Thus are eight millions of people, who only fourteen years ago had not a coat or a gown that was not carried from England, able to supply themselves; and must, of course be, in a short time, able to export those commodities, and at a much cheaper rate than we possibly can. Even ten years ago, America did not grow a tenth part of the wool sufficient for making her woollens. What a wonderful increase of means! To what must such a country arrive in *another ten years,* if left as she is! But my fear is, that even here will be found, by some persons, a cause to make them wish for war.

AMERICAN WAR.

IT appears from recent official accounts, that the Americans are in a fair way of becoming masters of Upper Canada, in spite of all the skill and all the valour which our little army has opposed to them. But the military events of the war are trifling, compared with a transaction just announced to us through the channel of the newspapers. We are told that the American general (Dearborn)

has committed to close custody twenty-seven British subjects, in order to retaliate upon them in the severest manner, in case we, on our side, should punish *naturalized citizens of America*, when taken in arms by us. The article containing this intelligence, I copy, as follows, from the Courier newspaper of the 31st of July last.

" New-York papers to the 30th ultimo have been received in Dublin, and one of the Dublin papers, in announcing their arrival, says, 'Their contents are extremely important, but they are too voluminous for insertion in this day's publication. It appears that general Dearborn had carried into immediate effect the orders of the secretary of war, under that act which empowered the president to have recourse to a system of retaliation, in case the *naturalized* citizens of America should be subjected, when made prisoners, to the laws of a state which had exiled them, or which they had voluntarily abandoned forever. General Dearborn had committed, in pursuance of those orders, twenty-seven British subjects to close custody, on whom it was provisionally determined to inflict the severest retaliation! Those papers likewise contain the official account of the capture of Fort George. They also communicate some official intelligence respecting the attack made on the American army, on the 6th of June, by General Vincent. They say that the American advanced guard had been surprised, and that after a severe conflict, during which their artillery had been taken and re-taken several times, they retired to the main body at Fort George.' Important, indeed, are their contents, if the orders of the American secretary of war have been carried into effect in the manner they are said to have been. The American government here avow their determination to abide no longer by the public law of nations, and claim the power of dissolving the allegiance which a subject owes to the government of his native country. By the chicane of naturalizing our countrymen, Mr. Madison converts them at once into American citizens, over whom, it seems, we have no longer any rights, nor they any duties towards us. They may take up arms against us, and if we make them prisoners we are to inflict no punishment on them! They have aimed a blow—they have attempted the life of their mother country, and the parricides are to have perfect impunity! A more impudent, monstrous, unnatural principle, never was attempted to be set up. But does Mr. Madison think we shall submit to it? We said last Saturday, and repeat it to-day, that 'if Mr. Madison dare to retaliate by taking away the life of one English prisoner, in revenge for a British subject, fully proved to be such, being taken in the act of voluntarily bearing arms against this country, America puts herself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an outlaw.' An army and navy acting against her, will then be absolved from all obligation to respect

the usages and laws of war. Hostilities may be carried on against her in any mode, until she is brought to a better sense of her conduct, and, by returning to the observance of the laws of nations, puts herself again within their protection. This is no time for half measures; and the question is not whether we shall revenge the excesses of sudden passion upon our enemy, but whether we shall support public law against a systematic attempt to steal away our countrymen, and to arm them against us."

This subject is one of very deep interest to both countries; and it ought to be treated with the greatest caution and candour. Let us, upon an occasion so interesting to humanity, endeavour to banish from our breasts all those passions which are hostile to truth and justice. This is an endeavour, which, at any rate, I am resolved to make. Holding in abhorrence the traitor to his country on the one hand, and equally so every attempt to overstrain the severe law of treason on the other hand, I will not imitate this hireling scribe, in using language calculated to produce unassuageable irritation on both sides, and eventually the shedding of much innocent blood. I know very well that the law of nations; that is to say, the general usage of nations, and the principles laid down by those who have written on the subject, fully sanction the opinion, that allegiance is *unalienable;* that is to say, that every man continues, to the day of his death, a subject of the state wherein he was born; and that, of course, any act of his, in open hostility, and especially of arms-bearing against his native state, if it be a voluntary act on his part, is an act coming under the description of *treason.*

This doctrine, generally speaking, is founded in nature as well as in law; for it appears not more unnatural for a son to raise the instrument of death against his mother, than for a citizen to bear a sword against the state wherein he has first drawn his breath. I would, therefore, never consent to the recognition of any right on the part of Englishmen to transfer their allegiance at pleasure to any other state. But in the particular and singular case before us, there appear to me to be very powerful reasons for abstaining from the enforcement of the law against men born in this country, who may be made prisoners of war during this contest with the American states. These persons, it will be observed, have been *naturalized* in America, and, of course, must have resided there many years, because the laws of America do not permit them to be naturalized until after a residence of at least five years. In the next place, they are persons who have not had the premeditated act of treason in view; for they cannot have gone to America for the purpose of entering into the American army, and to fight against England. Divers causes have led to their emigration thither. Some have gone as a sort of voluntary *exiles;* they have banished themselves in order to avoid the punishment with which

the laws of this country menace them on account of certain *political acts*, which those laws denominate crimes. Others have fled thither without being accused of any crime here, in order to enjoy what they deemed their rights as men, not being able to enjoy those rights, as they thought them, in their native country. But the great mass of emigrants from the British islands to the American states have encountered all the inconveniences of a change of country, as well as all the well-known dangers of the seas, for the sole purpose of making their lot in this world better than it was before. This has been the motive of almost the whole of the emigrants from every country in Europe to the American states; a motive wholly foreign from that of committing treason or any act of hostility to their native country.

The situation, therefore, of all these emigrants, is very different indeed from that of a man who, for the express purpose, should go abroad and take up arms against his country. Many and many instances are upon record, however, of very famous men having done even this, without being accounted traitors. A very memorable one may be cited in *prince Eugene*, the companion of the duke of Marlborough in his wars against France. Prince Eugene was a subject of the king of France, and, it is related, too, that he entered into the service of Austria in revenge for some affront or neglect that he had experienced from his sovereign: yet I have never heard that prince Eugene was considered as a traitor. It is very notorious, that in all the European armies there are men of all the states upon the continent; that the army of Prussia, in particular, was made up of men of all nations. Our army, at this time, has in it Germans, Dutchmen, Italians, and Frenchmen. But do we consider these men as traitors to the several countries in which they were born? Yet, be it observed, that they are not persons who are naturalized in England; and it is very well known that they did not come to our country for the purpose of carrying on trade, or of cultivating the lands; but, generally, for the purpose of entering into our military service, at the very time that we are engaged in a war against those who exercised the sovereignty in their respective states. In such a situation of things, it appears to me that we, above all the nations that I know any thing of, ought to be cautious (and I trust our government will be very cautious) in rigidly enforcing the law of treason, on the ground of *unalienable allegiance*.

There is no way of judging safer than that of making the case of an adversary *our own*. Let us suppose, then, that during the war in the north of Europe, in which the king of Westphalia is an ally of the emperor Napoleon; let us suppose that a corps of the *German legion*, who are principally Hanoverians, and whom, I am extremely happy to hear, have been shipped off to be employed in that war; let us suppose that a corps of this celebrated

legion were to be made prisoners in a battle against the king of Westphalia; will the reader say that the king of Westphalia, though now the sovereign of Hanover, would do right in considering these persons as *traitors*, and subjecting them to the punishment which our laws provide for traitors; namely, that of being hanged for some time, cut down before they are dead, having their heads chopped off, and their bodies cut each into four quarters, to be placed at the disposal of the king? Will the reader say that the king of Westphalia would do right if he acted thus towards a corps of the German legion? It will be said, I know, that the king of Westphalia is a *usurper*, and that the persons in the German legion *owe him no allegiance*. Let us see a little, however, how this matter stands. The king of Westphalia does not claim the sovereignty of Hanover in virtue of any right of *hereditary succession;* but he claims it in right of *conquest;* a right upon which we claim the sovereignty over the thirty millions of people who are said to inhabit the kingdom of Java.

It is very easy for us to call Jerome, Joachim, and even Napoleon himself, usurpers. We do this in the heat of our animosity against them; but as we are here talking of an appeal to *the law of nations*, we should consider that that law makes the right of conquest, as applicable to the duty of allegiance, perfectly equal with the right of hereditary succession. It is indeed notorious, that from the moment any portion of territory is conquered, it immediately becomes subject to the will of the conqueror, and that all the people belonging to it owe him allegiance, the sovereignty of the territory being transferred, to all intents and purposes, along with the territory itself. Upon this ground it is that we, when we make a conquest of any island or province, issue proclamations, reminding the people that they now owe allegiance to our king; we command them, in his name, to obey all edicts which our generals may choose to put forth; and in case of conspiring with the enemy, or taking up arms against us, we threaten them with the punishment due to traitors. To say that Jerome is a *usurper* in Hanover, may be very well in the way of talk; but when Mr. Peltier said the same thing of Buonaparte, Lord Ellenborough, on a trial of the former for a libel against the latter, observed to the jury, that Buonaparte was the sovereign of France *in fact*, and that with the question of *how he became so*, we had nothing to do. This is also the language of the law of nations. Cromwell, for instance, was a usurper in England; but he was in fact at the head of the sovereignty of England; and any Englishman found in a foreign army, fighting against an English army at that time, would doubtless have been taken to be a traitor. It may perhaps be said, that though Jerome be actually in possession of the sovereignty of Hanover, *he* was not the conqueror of it, and that the territory has never been ceded to him by its former sovereign. It

may be further said, that we have never made peace since that conquest took place, and that a struggle is still going on for the possession of that country. Whence it may be concluded, perhaps, that he is deficient in that sort of right of sovereignty which would justify him in considering the soldiers of the German legion as traitors. But, unfortunately for this argument, *our own conduct* upon a recent occasion gives to it a complete answer. The king of Sweden did not conquer the island of *Guadaloupe*. It was conquered by us; we have given it to the king of Sweden, while a war is yet going on between us and France for the possession of that island, amongst other objects. Will any one say that the people of Guadaloupe *do not owe allegiance to the king of Sweden?* I believe that no one will attempt to say this; and then I should be glad to hear how any one will make out a clear and satisfactory distinction between the case of the natives of Guadaloupe and the natives of Hanover.

There are some persons, perhaps, who may think that the latter do not stand in the same predicament as the former, because they were out of Hanover before Jerome was made sovereign of it. I am not quite certain as to the fact; but if it were so, it would not, it seems to me, make any alteration in the case; for if a number of the natives of Guadaloupe were to be found in arms in an expedition against that island, they would, of course, be considered as traitors against the Swedish government, though absent from the said island at the time of its conquest by us. This is, indeed, an absolutely necessary consequence of the doctrine of *unalienable allegiance;* for how can allegiance be *unalienable*, unless it travels downwards with the *actual sovereignty;* unless it descends to the successors in the sovereignty, be those successors whom they may? Allegiance can in no other way be unalienable; for the sovereign may die; his family may become extinct; the laws may introduce a new race of sovereigns. Numerous are the instances of this sort; how, then, can we pretend that allegiance is unalienable, unless we maintain that it is inseparable from the actual sovereignty of the soil?

These observations, which, in this comparative view of the matter, might be carried much further, are quite sufficient, I think, to make every reasonable man hesitate before he joins with the editor of the Courier in asserting, that if America attempts retaliation in the way above mentioned, an army and navy acting against her will be *absolved from all obligations to respect the usages and laws of war.* Such a man will, at any rate, see the danger of all attempts to justify the hasty shedding of blood on either side. I have before alluded to the peculiarity of this case. Writers upon the law of nations have never had before their eyes the spectacle of a country serving as a place of refuge for the distressed of all the other nations in the world. If the states of America

had been before them, there might have been found some modifications in their doctrine of allegiance. The states of America were colonies of England: the people speak the same language; great numbers of them are closely connected by blood. The quarrel, in its indigested state, appears to the mind of the mass of people in both countries as a sort of family quarrel. A mechanic, or labourer, born in England, and finding himself in America, has entered into no reflections as to any transfer of allegiance. He takes part with the country in which he is, with no thought about committing treason any more than the inhabitants of the villages of Botley and Bishop's Waltham think about treason in their battles about roads. It is very different, indeed, where Englishmen join Frenchmen, or Frenchmen join Englishmen, against their native countries respectively.

The editor of the Courier speaks of British subjects in the American army as having *attempted to take the life of their mother country*, and calls them "parricides!" He does not consider that the far greater part of these soldiers might have been mere children when they left this country. I have seen hundreds of children (I might say thousands) land in America with their emigrant parents; and if either of these were to be found in arms in the American army, fighting against us, would he have him hanged, his quivering bowels torn out, his head chopped off, and body hacked in quarters, for the offence? Unjust and merciless as hireling scribes generally are, I hardly suppose that the man will go this length. Yet this length he must go, if, in the present case, he justifies our acting *upon the abstract doctrine of unalienable allegiance.* It should be considered that *our own laws* make exceptions as to allegiance. An American may become a British subject by *marrying an English woman.* From the time he so marries, the law gives him the claim to all the rights enjoyed by Englishmen; and the same law imposes upon him all the *duties* of an Englishman. This law, of which no gentleman can be ignorant, has been not long ago acted upon by our government, as I understand, in this way: An American was impressed in our fleet; he was claimed by the agent of the American government, as an American, and his discharge demanded accordingly. The answer was, that he was a British subject, having married an English woman; and the demand of his discharge was refused accordingly. The law, I believe, is, in this respect, the same in America; and, indeed, those who have been acquainted with the American women, will, I imagine, see no reason why this species of *petticoat naturalization* should not be going on there as well as here. Indeed, the law is the same in France as to this matter; upon the principle, I suppose, that, as all good husbands suffer themselves to be ruled by their wives, and as the women are, for the far greater part, most loyal subjects, and most immovably attached to the existing order

of things, be it what it may, a foreigner, when he marries a native, may be fairly looked upon as having become bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the government itself.

Whatever be the *reason* of this amusing exception to the general doctrine, it is very certain that it gives a furious blow to the doctrine itself; for here we see, that we ourselves contend that allegiance *is*, in this case, *alienable;* and how are our generals in Canada to tell whether the British subjects, of whom they make prisoners, have or have not married American women? So that, before we rush on hastily to the conclusion which this impudent scribe would have us adopt; before we give our assent to the hanging and cutting up carcasses, upon the ground of the doctrine of unalienable allegiance; before we give our unqualified approbation to the sentiment that America is become an *outlaw*, and that ropes and ripping knives, and axes and gibbets, ought to make part of our weapons in a war against her; before we suffer ourselves to be thus steeped in the blood which this man seems so anxious to see shed, you see, reader, there are good reasons for us to hesitate and reflect. This savage man, who really seems to have dipped his pen in blood, has, in all human probability, never heard of that law of our own, which subjoins the rights and duties of allegiance to the act of marrying a native woman; and, perhaps, if he had, he would not have cared much about the hanging and quartering of native Americans, married to English women, and taken in arms in *either* service; for you will observe, reader, that the comfort of such a man's situation is, that he is a traitor, if found in arms on *either side*. If we catch him fighting against us, we hang him and cut him up, because he is the king's subject, from *having married an English woman*. If the Americans catch him fighting against them, they put him to death, (for I believe they stop here,) because he is a *native* of America. So that, at this rate, he who marries a foreigner must take good care that he go not to the wars. This hanging and quartering editor would, to all appearance, care but little about the fate of *Americans* who should fall in this way; but I beg leave to remind him, that there are some *British subjects* who have had the indiscretion to *marry American women*. Aye, and what is more, some of these are officers, and of no mean rank and estimation, in our *navy* and *army!* At this moment a great number does not occur to me; but there are *Admiral Knight*, *Sir Alexander Cochrane*, and *Sir Thomas Hardy*, who, unfortunately (according to this man's notion) for them, have married American women. To be sure, one may rather pity than blame them; for to go to America without a wife, and come away unmarried, argues that a man is not made of flesh and blood. Now will the reader say, that if either of these gallant officers, to whom, if I had time for inquiry and recollection, I could, I doubt not,

add a couple of score; will the reader say that if either of them were made prisoner by the Americans, these latter would have a right to consider him as a *traitor?*

Yet if this doctrine of unalienable allegiance, as applied to the American soldiers, is to be received without any modification, why should not these officers, in such case, be considered as traitors, and treated as such? Again, as to *children*, is there not another great exception to this law of unalienable allegiance? A son, born in a foreign country, of English parents is an *English subject.** And I beg the reader to observe that the *rights* and the *duties* of allegiance are *inseparable.* Such a son, though born in America, according to this doctrine of unalienable allegiance, is liable to be hanged and cut to pieces if found in the army of his native country fighting against us. And on the other hand, if found in our army fighting against America, is liable to be hanged as a traitor to her. How many hundreds, how many thousands, how many hundreds of thousands, of men and boys are in this precise predicament! I could name hundreds that I myself personally know, nay, (and surely it is enough to make me speak feelingly!) the very youth who, from my dictation, is putting this identical article upon the paper, would, if he were made prisoner, in fighting against the Americans, be liable to be considered a traitor to the country in which he was born, and to expiate his crime on the gibbet.

Verily, then, we shall do well to pause and reflect before we give into these savage and bloody notions, the offspring, not of patriotic feelings, not of zeal for the honour of the country; but of low, base, disappointed malice, coupled with a hatred of every human being that is in the pursuit or enjoyment of freedom. I do not know what is the real state of the facts; I do not know what number of naturalized American citizens, natives of this country,

* There is a curious distinction made by our law with regard to the children, born abroad, the parents being subjects of the king. It relates to the capability of holding places of profit or trust, or of pensions under the crown. If the parents be either *Scotch* or *Irish;* or if either father or mother be *Scotch* or *Irish,* none of their children can ever, according to law, hold any such place or pension; but if the parents be *English,* then the children may hold such places or pensions. I have often thought of availing myself of this law, and of going and routing out of their places and pensions all the Scotch and Irish coming under this description, of which I will engage there are many scores. The truth is, however, that there are foreigners, real aliens, who enjoy such situations, and while this is the case, it would be hard to drive out the children of Scotch and Irish parents, though they happen to have been born out of the realm. It would be curious to know why this distinction was made by the law; and I should not be at all surprised if it was the work of some person in power at the time, who happened to have relations so situated as to be likely to derive benefit from it. However, such is the law. That I know very well; and I do not promise that I will not one of these days, when I get a little leisure, after the harvest is all in, go and thrust out these illegal intruders, of which I have not the least doubt that I shall find a pretty swarm; for I have observed that these gentlemen of equivocal allegiance are very remarkable for their enterprising spirit, where there is any chance of getting at the public money.

we may have taken in arms; nor do I know that our generals have expressed an intention of considering them as traitors; but if they have taken any such persons, and have expressed any such intention, the arguments which I have offered, are, I think, quite sufficient to induce our ministers to make these generals *hold their hand.* I by no means approve of that loose way of thinking, with regard to the duties of a subject or a citizen, which would dissolve all the ties of allegiance, and justify men, at their mere will and pleasure, to join the enemies of their country, and make war against her; I approve of no such wild notions, which must, in the end, lead to the most miserable of consequences, eradicating from the mind of man every sentiment connected with the love of country; but in this particular case, this case of which the history of the world presents us no precedent, and under all the circumstances, some of which I have mentioned above, of the organization of our own army, I am decidedly of opinion, that to attempt to act towards persons taken in the American army rigidly upon the doctrine of unalienable allegiance, would be a step of which we should in a short time most sorely repent.

All the world must see, at the first blush of the question, that the Englishmen taken in the American army stand upon a very different footing from Englishmen who should be taken in a French army. It is not a question that waits for reasoning—it is one that rushes at once to the heart—which tells every man that these persons, though we may lament that they are there, are not deliberate traitors. The far greater part of them must, according to all probability, be of nearly the same description, as to education and situation in life, and also as to degree of information, as the soldiers of our army; and I put it to the reader's candour to say, whether, if any of the men (I mean the common soldiers) who have so gallantly fought for their country in Spain, had been in America, they would have thought it *treason* to enter the American service, especially after residing many years in that country; having formed entirely new connexions, and perhaps hardly recollecting the place they were born, in England, Ireland, or Scotland? To apply the maxims of the law of treason, grounded on the doctrines of unalienable allegiance, to men so circumstanced, is, I am very sure, to stretch it farther than the common sense of mankind will approve of; and, therefore, I cannot refrain from again expressing an anxious wish, that our ministers will interpose their authority to put a stop to any further prosecution of any such attempt.

It is not impossible, though I do not think it very likely, that some few of those persons who have gone from this country, or who may be said to have fled from this country on account of their political opinions, may have been found in arms against their native country. On their part, there would be no excuse on the

score of *want of information*, but surely, after being so frequently told by the hirelings of the day that it would be a good thing if they were to leave England—after hearing for many years among the loyal elect, the toast of "*Old England—and those who do not like the country let them leave it;*" after hearing a member of parliament, in his place, exclaim, "Those who do not like the country, *damn them*, let them leave it"—after having so long heard themselves thus abused, and thus bidden to go out of the country, surely even these men must be very much surprised, at least, to find themselves accused of a failure in their *duties of allegiance*. There appears to me, too, to be a good deal of *impolicy* in making all this fuss about *traitors found in the American army* or navy. If the facts have been true to the extent in which they have been stated in the newspapers, and which I do not believe, it seems that there was no great wisdom discovered in the divulging of them. I think that if I were a minister I should do every thing in my power to keep such facts from being promulgated; for, after all, what can possibly be gained by it? If twenty or thirty of the men thus taken were put to death, and if no retaliation were to take place, (as I hope it would not,) what should we gain? We might prevent some few British-born subjects from entering the American service, but America has quite men enough without them; men, too, upon whom she can as safely rely. And we should only blazon through the whole world the melancholy fact that, for some reason or other, there were Englishmen ready to take up arms against their country, and in that case, not only to encounter all the dangers inseparable from war, but in addition thereto, the risk of being hanged, ripped up, and chopped to pieces! And would this be a desirable thing? Would it be to our honour to cause this fact to be known in every town, in every village, in every house, in every hovel throughout the civilized world? Say, for mere argument's sake, that this terrible act would be consonant with strict justice—say, for argument's sake, that all the reasons which I have urged against it, and which, in abler hands, might have been urged with much greater force and effect—say that all these reasons are totally devoid of weight, still, tell me where is the *policy* of thus astounding the world into the knowledge of a circumstance so little calculated to impress mankind with a favourable opinion of our character? If it be urged that the evil is of such a magnitude as to call for the contemplated act, even at the risk of national character, to what a lamentable state must we have arrived! But I contend that, be the magnitude of the evil what it may, it is impolitic to adopt the measure to which the ministers are encouraged by this malignant and savage writer; for it is easy to perceive, I think, that such a measure must give rise to a conviction in the mind of every British

subject in America, that the only way to ensure his safety against the claims of England, is to effect the total destruction of that power by which alone those claims can possibly be enforced.

AMERICAN WAR.

We have now the Gazette account of the battle of *Chippewa*, and also the American account of that memorable and important contest. I guessed our force at about three or four thousand men; and it appears now that it did not amount to three thousand, out of which we lost in killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, 878! The Americans say that their force was *inferior* to ours. They state that they have *eighteen* of our *officers* prisoners; and their account agrees with ours as to the numbers that they took in the battle. Our *Gazette* says that we took "*several hundreds of prisoners.*" But why have we no detail? why no detailed *list* of what we have captured? Surely, several hundreds are soon counted. A thousand sheep, spread over a field, are counted in ten minutes. These omissions look suspicious. It is certain, however, that the Americans did *retreat* with the prisoners they had made, and that they had to contend with a most gallant enemy. Numerous as were the battles of Napoleon, and brave as were his soldiers, I do not believe that even he, the greatest warrior that ever lived, can produce from his wars an instance of a contest so well maintained, or, in proportion to the numbers engaged, so *bloody*, as this of *Chippewa*. Our own account tells us that our *first* in command was *severely wounded*, our *second* in command *severely wounded, and taken prisoner;* and when we come to see the American account, we find that their *first* and *second* in command were both so severely wounded, that neither was able to write or to dictate a despatch to the government, several days after the battle. Yet we find that this little band of *raw* troops, (as the Americans must be,) though really left without heads to direct them, took off the cannon and the prisoners that they had captured during the engagement. It appears from general Drummond's account, that the cannon of the two armies were run up to each others' muzzles; that the fight was so very close, and the confusion so great, that the Americans, in one instance, put their horses into the limbers (or shafts) of our cannon, instead of the shafts of their own; and that the Americans *cut down our artillerymen from the very sides of our guns.*

The *Morning Chronicle* expresses its great *satisfaction*, that the expedition has, at last, sailed from Portsmouth to America. A few more battles like that of Chippewa would cause this organ of the whigs to change its tone. As I said before, it does appear

that the Americans, after the battle, *retired some miles;* and so does an army very often, when it has been successful. How many *victories*, good God! did we win in Portugal and Spain without stopping an hour on the field of battle, but retreating from it with all possible speed? Did we not win a most *glorious victory* at Corunna; and did we not instantly embark, in the utmost confusion, leaving the town to the *beaten* enemy? Did we not win a still more glorious victory at Talavera, which earned the winner a *title;* and yet, did we not leave even our *own* wounded to the humanity of Napoleon's gallant army? Now the Americans, though they retired, they retired with our second in command, and a great many other prisoners. Why, therefore, may they not, in fact, have been the victors, if we were the victors at Corunna and Talavera? But it is of little consequence who really gained the victory. The important fact is, that we have now got an enemy who fights as bravely as ourselves. For some time the Americans cut no figure on land. They now have proved to us, that they only wanted *time* to acquire a little discipline. They have now proved to us what they are made of; that they are the same sort of men as those who captured whole armies under Burgoyne and Cornwallis; that they are neither to be frightened nor seduced; and that, if we should beat them at last, we cannot expect to do it without expending three or four hundred millions of money, keeping up all our present taxes, and adding to their amount, or imposing new taxes. These are the facts that are now *proved* to us; these are the natural consequences of battles such as that of Chippewa.

It has been stated in the newspapers, that *admiral Cochrane* has taken BALTIMORE, the capital of Maryland; that *Stonington* has been demolished; that we are about to attack *New-London;* and, therefore, says the writer, Jonathan must *look sharp about him.* Baltimore is hardly taken, and will, I dare say, never be taken, without a most bloody contest. But supposing it to be so; for our ships of great size can go quite up to the city, unless prevented by batteries on shore; suppose the fact to be true, how are we to maintain that position? And if we could maintain it for a year, how much nearer are we to our object? Baltimore is exposed to our attack, from its vicinity to the sea, and from the immense river that opens the way to us to reach it. But what is that place, or even all the state of Maryland, when we are talking of this great republic, inhabited by *free* men *resolved to defend their country?* From the first, it was allowed by me that we should do immense *mischief;* that we might burn many villages, towns, and cities, destroy mills and manufactories, and lay waste lands upon the coast, to the great loss and distress of numerous individuals. But at the same time I anticipated, that these acts would only tend to unite the Americans, and, in the end, produce such

a hatred against us, as would not only render final success impossible, but as would tend to shut us out from all future connexion and intercourse with that great and fertile region. There seemed to be wanting just such a war as this to complete the separation of England from America; and to make the latter feel that she had no safety against the former, but in the arms of her free citizens. We were told, as the reader will recollect, that the *eastern states* would, in case of war, separate themselves from the rest of the union, and join themselves to us. But it now appears that our first grand stroke of destruction was given in these our favourite states. *Stonington*, we are told, is *demolished;* and *New-London* is, we are told, about to share the same fate. These places lie in our favourite state of Connecticut, in the midst of the eastern states, who were to join us against their own republican government! This fact is, of itself, sufficient to overset all the stories about a separation of these states. These states now see what they have to expect at our hands; and, indeed, they did not want to see their towns destroyed, in order to be convinced that their safety lay in their firm obedience to the union, and in the resolution to stand by their own government. It is, I suppose, intended to *batter* them into a separation; but who is fool enough to believe that such a mode will succeed with such a people? The demolition of Stonington will, in all probability, render the name of England so hateful in our favourite states, that no man will dare to raise his breath in defence of her conduct. If we had confined our land war to Canada, it is possible that Mr. Madison might have found it very difficult to make the people see how they were interested in the contest; but the moment we showed our design of carrying fire and sword along the whole coast of the United States, that moment we bound the whole of the people up like the bundle of sticks described in the fable; especially as the manifestation of this design was accompanied, on the part of almost the whole of our public prints, with the open declaration that it was necessary, now that we had the *opportunity* to subjugate America, to counter-revolutionize her, to destroy her government, to reduce her to her former state of dependence on us. It is of great importance that we bear in mind, not only these declarations, but also the *time* when they began to be made.

While the duration of the power of Napoleon was not doubted; as long as there appeared to be no prospect of seeing him put down, a sort of ambiguous language was held as to the object of the war with America. Mr. Madison was accused with being a friend to Napoleon; he and his countrymen were abused; but nothing was distinctly said as to *the object of the war.* As the affairs of Napoleon grew gloomy, our prints, from time to time, grew high in their language as to the object of the American contest; and when Napoleon was actually put down, they threw off

all reserve, and in the most distinct terms, with an air of official authority, they informed us that we were not to lay down our arms till we had effected in America *what had been effected in France.* The government, we are told, was to be done away. Mr. Madison was to be *deposed,* as Napoleon had been. Our army, then in France, were to do in America what they had just done in France; that is to say, they were "to deliver the Americans from an oppressive *usurpation,* and restore them to their *former happy connexion* with a *paternal* government." These declarations were, at the period I allude, daily made in the *Times* and the *Courier.* Nay, it is only a few days ago that the *Times* newspaper, in expressing its regret that the sovereign prince of the Netherlands had sent an ambassador to America, observed, that if he had stopped for *a few months,* he might have been spared the disgrace of sending an ambassador to such people as James Madison and his party. Let it further be borne in mind, that soon after the deposing of Napoleon, there having been a debate in the house of commons relative to the reduction of the navy, there was published in the newspapers of the next day, a paragraph, purporting to be the report of a speech of *Sir Joseph Yorke,* one of the lords of the admiralty, in which paragraph it was stated, that though Napoleon was deposed, we could not yet disarm to any great extent, *seeing that there was Mr. Madison yet to depose.* The newspapers have ever since held the same language. They have, since the deposition of Napoleon, wholly left out of sight the *original* ground of the war. Nay, they pretend to have no ground at all; but insist that, as we now have the *opportunity;* as we have a fleet afloat, and a disciplined army that we know not what to do with, we ought, while the occasion offers, to *re-conquer* America, or, at least, to despoil her in such a way that she shall never again be able to show her nose upon the sea. They have published a list of the *American navy;* and have observed upon it, that if America be not *now* cut up; if she be not *now,* while France, Spain, and Holland are unable to assist her; if she be not *now* crippled past recovery; if she be *now* suffered to have peace; if, in short, she be not *now* destroyed, it is fearful to think of the degree of naval power at which she may arrive in the course of ten or a dozen years of uninterrupted prosperity, having had a proof of what her seamen are capable of performing. That I have here not overcharged, not, in the smallest degree, misrepresented the language of these prints, every reader will allow; and, indeed, I must confess they spoke very nearly the language of the whole nation. How the people of America, from whom nothing can be kept secret, have received this language, I know not; but if I were to judge of their feelings by what I know to be their character, I should suppose that it must have filled them with indignation, if, indeed, that feeling did not give way to that of contempt. They

must, however, have seen the absolute necessity of *union* and of *exertion*, unless they were disposed to become again dependent upon England; unless, in short, they were disposed to become again royal provinces, governed by the sons of the nobility of England. The *time* chosen by our prints for the making of those undisguised declarations was very suspicious. It was the moment when France, Spain, and Holland, were put into a state which rendered it impossible for them to assist America. It was the moment when we were freed from all enemies; when all the maritime force of Europe was in our hands. It was, in short, the *first* seemingly fair opportunity for subjugating America that had been offered us *since the conclusion of the American war;* and this opportunity the language of these prints must have led the Americans to believe was about to be taken for the purpose of executing the project. In the year 1794, or 5, a *Mr. Rutledge*, who was a judge in South Carolina, made a speech, in which he besought his country to join itself with the republic of France in a mortal war against England. "She will," said he, "*never forgive us* for our success against her, and for our having established a free constitution. Let us, therefore, while she is down, seize her by the throat, strangle her, deliver the world of her tyranny, and thus confer on mankind the greatest of blessings." As nearly as I can recollect them, these were his very words. I am sure that I have the ideas correct. I and many more cried aloud against the barbarity of such sentiments. They were condemned in speeches and pamphlets innumerable. But have we not reason to fear that the present language of our newspapers may make the Americans think that Mr. Rutledge was in the right; and make them regret that they did not join the republic of France in the war? If they had taken that step in the year 1795, the republic of France might still have been in existence, and the situation of all Europe very different indeed from what it now is. The English party, the love of peace, and the profits of peace, were too powerful in the United States for those who thought with Mr. Rutledge. Much was said about *principles;* but it was the love of the *profits* of peace which prevailed over every other consideration. The Americans have now seen enough to convince them, that it would have been their soundest policy to have taken *one side or the other*, long ago. What they wished for was, *peace and commerce with all the world;* but they have now found, that to enjoy some peace, they must be prepared to have some war; and that to enjoy independence and freedom, they must make themselves respected in arms. If the war should end without our doing something approaching very nearly to the *subjugation* of America, it will prove a most calamitous war to us. Because it will have added immensely to our debt; it will have left us horribly exhausted; it will have given France a time of peace and econo-

my wherein to recover her wonted means of meeting us by land or by sea; it will have made the Americans both a military and a naval nation; it will have given to these two nations the most powerful motives to a close connexion, dictated by their mutual wants and safety; it will have rendered America not only completely independent of us as to manufactures, but will have implanted in the bosoms of her people a hatred against us never to be removed or mollified. If, indeed, we were to subjugate America, to make the states again our colonies; or were, at least, to destroy all her ships of war; raze all her fortifications; stipulate with her never again to make a cannon, a ball, or a pound of powder; to place in our hands, as guarantees, all her principal seaports, and all the mouths of her rivers; and to abstain from every sort of manufacture in the country. If we were to accomplish either of these, we might have little to apprehend as the consequence of a five or six years war against America. But if we accomplish neither, how will the case stand? Why, thus: she will, *single handed*, have carried on a war against us. She will have, through the world, the reputation of having been able, alone, to *beat* England; for to defend herself against us is, in such a case, to *beat* us. Other nations, sore at the sight of our predominance on the sea, will look up to America as to a balance against us. They will naturally seek a connexion with a country offering innumerable sources of beneficial intercourse. She whose products are so abundant, and so much in request all over the world, and who holds out such great advantages to every man of enterprise, will have all the world, England excepted, for her friends. No nation will envy or hate her but England; because, to every other nation, the increase of her population, her produce, her commerce, and her naval power, must be advantageous. She may, and she doubtless will, *suffer* much in this war. Many of her towns will be knocked down; thousands of her people will be greatly injured. But if she keep on launching ships of war, as she is doing at present, she may have a score of ships of the line and forty frigates at the end of a six years war, manned with such officers and sailors as those whom we have already seen afloat, and to whom we have had the inexpressible mortification to see so many English ships strike their flags, after contests the most desperate and bloody. If this were to be the effect of this war of *drubbing*, how should we have to curse those malicious writers, who, for so many months, have been labouring to cause this nation to believe that it will only be a holiday undertaking to drub, to humble, and to subdue the American nation! I am aware, that there is a description of men in this country who say that, even with all these possible, and even probable, evils before us, we ought to have undertaken, and ought now to proceed with, the war. "Because," say these men, "even if these evils should come *with* the war,

they would all, or, at least the worst of them, come *without* it. Not to have undertaken the war, or to put a stop to it now, would have been, and would now be, to leave the Americans in possession of the naval reputation they have acquired, in possession of all the means of augmenting their naval force, and, what is of still more consequence, in the enjoyment of *real* freedom, and of happiness unparalleled under a *republican* government, at once an example and an asylum to all the *disloyal* of every country in Europe. Leaving her thus, she must, in the present state of men's minds, prove the destruction of all kingly government, and of every hierarchy in the world. Therefore, even failure in the war is no objection to persevering in it, seeing that the worst that *can* arise out of the war *must* arise out of suffering this republic to enjoy peace, especially with the reputation that she has acquired on that element, the absolute dominion of which we have so long claimed. When there is at least a *possibility* of destroying this republic by war, and *no possibility* of avoiding destruction from her without war, reason says, *go on with the war !*"

I know that there are many that argue thus, because I have heard them argue thus. And I must confess that, if I could bring myself to their feelings as to the consequences which they dread, I should be bound to say that their arguments were unanswerable. As the matter stands, I could, I think, give a satisfactory answer; but as every one likes to have something left to be supplied by himself, I leave the reader to give to these arguments such an answer as, after some minutes of sober reflection, his mind may suggest.

Before I conclude, however, I must repeat what I have before said, as to the dilemma in which we are placed. It is very certain that America, at peace, in the enjoyment of such perfect freedom, and such great superiority, under a republican government, the very head of which does not receive above five thousand pounds a year, and having no established church, and no use for the hangman, it is certain that America, presenting this picture to the world, might and would keep alive the spirit of *jacobinism* in Europe; and that spirit might, in a few years, produce very serious consequences. But, on the other hand, to prevent her from presenting this dangerous picture to the world, *we must keep up all our present taxes, and, perhaps, continue to make loans.* This is the dilemma—the grand dilemma, in which we are at present placed, and out of which, I must confess, I do not see how we are to get, unless we were, as the *Times* supposes we shall, to finish this insolent republic in the space of "*a few months.*"

AMERICAN WAR.

THE expedition against the *city of Washington*, or, rather, the result of it, has produced, in this country, the effect which might naturally have been expected: "The Yankees are done for! Their *metropolis* has been *taken!* They ran away at the sight of our troops! Mr. Madison and his government have decamped! The states are left without rulers! The 'ill-organized association,' says the *Times* newspaper, 'is on the eve of dissolution;' and the world is speedily to be delivered of the *mischievous example of the existence of a government founded on democratic rebellion.*" Thus says the *Times*, and thus says a vast majority of this taxed nation. This was to be expected. The *name of metropolis* was enough. The people here were sure to look upon it as the *London* of America; and, of course, to conclude that America was subdued, or very nearly subdued. This is, too, the notion held forth by the newspapers; and, in fact, it universally prevails. Now, the truth is, that the city of Washington is no city at all, except in name. It was *begun to be built* only about sixteen years ago. The congress has not met at it above ten or twelve years. It was built by a sort of *lottery*, the shares of which fell, at one time, to less than 10 per cent. of their cost. The lottery was drawn; the prizes were not paid. I do not, indeed, know what may have been done since I left the country; but at that time it was the general opinion that it never would be a place of any consideration, though the *law* compelled the congress to meet there. "Wherever the *king* is there is the *court;*" but the republican government of America, though they may have had the puerile pride of erecting a *capitol* and a *president's palace*, could not make a city, which implies a numerous population, and great wealth.

But our officers, naval as well as military, appear to have perceived what would hit the taste of war-loving Johnny Bull. Johnny, who has no doubt of his having *conquered France*, would, of course, be delighted at the prospect of conquering America, towards which he would necessarily look on the capture of Washington as an almost last step; and, indeed, I heard some people, usually very sensible, say, upon the receipt of the news, "Thank God, we shall now have peace, and have the *income tax taken off.*" What, in the eye of common sense, is the event of which we have made such a boasting? We have, with an enormously superior naval force, ascended a very capacious bay in America, to the distance of about sixty miles. We have landed an army; we have repulsed the militia of superior numbers; (as *we* say;) we have entered a straggling town of wooden buildings, which our own newspapers had told us the Americans themselves had acknowledged

to be defenceless; we have set fire to several buildings and some ships; we have, thank God, burnt the president's *palace*, and a building on a ridiculously grand scale, called the *capitol*, where the legislature of the union held its sittings; we have then *retreated*, and regained our ships with such haste, that we have been compelled to leave our dead, and many of our *wounded officers*, as well as men, *to the mercy of an enemy*, whom our newspapers call unprincipled, cowardly, and cruel. This is what the Morning Chronicle calls one of the most "*gallant dashes*" of the war. *This* is styled *success*. *This* is a victory to *boast* of. This is to induce the Americans to go down upon their knees, and solicit peace on any terms! Why did our army not *remain* at Washington? When the French got to Berlin, Vienna, Naples, Hanover, Madrid, Amsterdam, they remained in them as long as they pleased. When they got to Moscow even, they remained for some weeks. But we—we capture the *metropolis* of America, and we decamp instantly. We set off in such haste, that we leave behind us many of those who have been *wounded* in the enterprise.

Oh, reader! how has Napoleon been abused for leaving behind *him* his sick and wounded, when he retreated from Russia! and yet we can extol the bravery and wisdom of those who, in our own service, do the same thing! Far am I, however, from blaming Mr. Ross for leaving his wounded behind him; for, in the first place, he was sure that he left them in the hands of a very humane people; and, in the next place, by delaying his departure, he might have added a very long list to his killed and wounded. But it is impossible to find out any apology for Mr. Ross, upon this occasion, without furnishing an apology for the so-much-reprobated conduct of Napoleon. Mr. Ross assigns the best possible reason for his wonderful expeditious retreat to the ships; namely, he was afraid that if he delayed this movement, the *militia might collect in such numbers as to intercept him*. The *militia*. What, that same sort of troops whom he had just overthrown, as it were, by merely showing his red coats? How were they to *collect* in such haste? Whence were they so speedily to come? Thank you, Mr. Ross, for this acknowledgment, though, perhaps, made involuntarily; because it proves clearly that you were fully convinced that you were not among a people on whose cowardice and whose want of patriotism you could place a moment's reliance; because it clearly proves, in short, that if we succeed in this war, we have a people, an *armed people*, to subdue.

There is one fact stated in the report of the enterprise, to which our news writers pay no attention; but which is of very great importance. After the American troops had gone off, and left ours to enter the city, General Ross, our commander, had his *horse shot under him*, as he was going along at the head of his men, by a gun fired from *the window of a private house*. There

can be no doubt that the ball was intended for the rider. This might have given him, and, I dare say, did give him, a tolerable lively idea of what sort of people he was got amongst; and it *ought* to convince wise Johnny Bull, that to follow the advice of the *Times* newspaper, and send a large force into the heart of the country, there to take up a "commanding position," is much easier upon paper than it is upon land. The *Times* and *Courier* are nettled that our commanders did not *date their despatches* from the *capitol*. I dare say that they had an inclination that way; but then the militia might have collected! In short, they had not time to do it with safety. That was the reason why they did not do it! and, for my part, I think the reason quite satisfactory. The episode to the "brilliant dash," seems to have been marked with nearly all the characteristics of the "brilliant dash" itself. Sir Peter Parker, with his ship's company and marines, go in search of a parcel of militia *in a wood*. The reader may not, perhaps, be aware, that there is no sort of resemblance between the American and the English militia. These militia in America receive *no pay*, no *clothing*, no *arms*, from the government. Every man goes out in his own ordinary array, and carries his own arms and accoutrements. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred he finds his own powder and ball. In short, it was a body of the people, voluntarily assembled, and acknowledging no *superior* not of their *own electing*: this was the sort of force against whom Sir Peter Parker marched. They were, as *usual*, greatly *superior in numbers*; and, as *usual*, they were *defeated*, and *ran away*. But, in the *end*, Sir Peter lost his life, and his second in command *succeeded* . . . . . *in what?* Why, in bringing off to the ship *almost all* our wounded!

As to the destruction of the public buildings at the city of Washington, it will give great pleasure to all those who really love *republican* governments. There are *palaces* enough elsewhere. America wants none; and it will, I dare say, be very long before she will see another. There are very good buildings in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and many other elegant and populous cities. There wants no grandeur; there wants no capitol, no palace, no metropolis, no court. All these bring taxes and standing armies; and the Americans want neither. There was, the other day, an article in the *Times* newspaper which struck me as a remarkable instance of the force of habit, and as a clear proof that a man may accustom himself to slavish ideas, till he, in good earnest, regards as a reproach every mark of freedom. The article to which I allude, was a commentary on a paper published by a person to whom the defence of New-York was committed, and who, in a very pressing manner, *invites*, *exhorts*, *requests*, and *beseeches* persons capable of bearing arms, to come forth and augment his force, &c. &c. Upon this, the editor of the *Times* observes, that this officer cuts

a most *sorry* and *lamentable* figure; and he jests most merrily upon the *tone* of the poor gentleman, "who," says he, "*invites, exhorts, requests, beseeches:* any thing but COMMANDS." Well! and what of that? Are the *people* less happy because no one assumes a *commanding tone* towards them? Is their situation less enviable for that? Is their character less dignified because they will not suffer themselves to be *commanded* in any way whatever? They do not like to be *commanded* by any body; and why should we quarrel with them on that account?

This editor, and many others, seem astonished that Mr. Madison should have been two years at war without being prepared for *defence*. But what do they mean by *defence?* Three hundred—nay, twenty hundred thousand men, would not be sufficient to guard every point, where a few men can be landed for a few hours, on a coast (including bays and mouths of rivers) of *three or four thousand miles in extent*. Such adventures as admiral Cochrane gives an account of, might, with such a navy as ours, be performed on such an extent of coast in spite of two or three millions of regular soldiers. The *defence* of America, and, indeed, of any country, does not mean the preventing of the bombardment of a village, or the burning of a city, or the carrying off of "*stock.*" It means the preventing of that country from being subdued, or, so much crippled as to make a disgraceful peace. And this defence, in America, must be *left to the people themselves*. Mr. Madison could raise no regular armies. The people do not give him the means to do it. They know very well that, for want of a regular army, they are liable to have some towns knocked down, or sacked; but they prefer this to the putting of a standing army in the hands of any man in their country. We, indeed, are of a taste widely different. We have field marshals, hundreds of generals, and colonels, and majors, and captains, and barrack-masters, and commissaries, and cadets, and so on. We have military depots, academies, colleges, and so on, to a long list. We have, besides, great numbers of foreign officers, some of whom have had *commands* in England itself, and of counties of England. We have also great numbers of foreign soldiers in our pay. This is our taste. We like to have these people. But, then, we *very cheerfully* pay for all these fine things. We are willing to purchase our safety in this way. Now, as I never heard that the Americans have quarrelled with us on this account, why should we quarrel with them for their *taste?* They prefer a few towns sacked or beaten down now and then, to the paying for a standing army, for barracks, depots, military colleges. Their taste may be bad. They may prove themselves very stupid in not liking to see their streets crowded with beautiful, tall, straight gentlemen, with pretty hats and caps, with furs, and whiskers, with cloaks, and glittering swords, and boots, that shine like japan mugs. But *stupidity* is no

crime; and if they do not like these things, we, who have so much more refinement amongst us, and so much more elevation of mind, should view them with pity rather than with scorn; should speak of them with compassion, rather than with reproach. We might as reasonably reproach them (and the French too, by the by) for not having a taste for *tythes.* We like these too. Mr. Burke said so many years ago. We like to give our clergy a tenth part of our crops. But, then, have we not our churches and cathedrals, our prayers and sermons, our bells and our singing, our Lord's supper, our baptism, confirmation, churching of women, absolution of the sick, and burial of the dead. We have all these things, and a great many more, in return for the tenth of our crops; and the Americans (poor fellows!) have none of them. Yet we ought not to *reproach* them on this account. It is, doubtless, bad taste in them; but, as I said before, bad taste is not *criminal.*

Another thing I wish to point out to the attention of the reader. He frequently sees, in our newspapers, *extracts from American papers,* all tending to degrade the government and decry its measures. Out of the three or four hundred newspapers, published in America, there are, probably, ten or twelve who proceed in this tone. These are carefully sent hither by consuls, or other persons residing there. From these only, extracts are published *here;* and, be it observed, that if we possessed the papers on the other side of the question, we should *be exposed to utter ruin* if we were to publish such extracts from them as it would be necessary to publish in order to give the public a fair view of the state of men's minds in America. But the hireling prints here do one thing for us: they, by their extracts, prove to us *how great is freedom in America.* The *Times* tells us, that one paper in America expresses its opinion that the president himself had a narrow escape from Washington: and that another *expresses its regret that he was not taken by the enemy.* Now, reader, imagine, for a moment, the case of an enemy landed in England, and some writer expressing *his regret that the said enemy had not captured the king!* You tremble for the unfortunate creature. I see you tremble. Your teeth chatter in your head; I hear them chatter: and well they may. How many *loyal* men do I hear exclaim: "Send the traitor to the gallows! rip out his bowels and throw them in his face! Cut off his head! Quarter his vile carcass, and put the quarters at the king's disposal!" Yet we hear the American writers wishing that their chief magistrate had been taken by the enemy; and we do not find that any thing is either said or done to them. Their publications are suffered to take their free course. If they be true, and speak sense and reason, they will gain adherents, as they ought. If false, or foolish, they will only gain the writers hatred or contempt, which, I dare say, has been the case in the instance before us. But, reader, let us

not, with this fact full in our eyes, be induced to believe that the Americans have nothing to fight for; or that any man who loves freedom can wish to see a change in the government; or, at least, in the *sort* of government which exists in that country. As to Mr. Madison, against whom our hired men rail so much, *he* cannot be much to blame for *any* thing relating to the war. It was the *congress;* the representatives of the people; the *real,* not the *sham* representatives of the people—who *declared war.* In fact, it was the people themselves, who were resolved no longer to endure that which they had so long, and so loudly complained of. A war in America must be the people's war. The defence of the country *must* be left to the people. Not only as to the fighting, but as to the time, place, and every thing else belonging to the war. The people know very well the extent of their danger. They are well apprized of every thing. They were aware beforehand that what has taken place would take place; and though many individuals must and will suffer, that will excite no general discontent against the government. Of one thing I am very certain; and that is, that we are carrying on precisely that sort of warfare which all the real friends of republican government would wish to see us carry on. It is a sort of warfare (especially when the *ground* of the war is considered) which cannot fail to *unite* the parties, into which the people have been divided; nor do I think it at all improbable, that we may cause Mr. Madison to be president four years longer than he would have been without our war against his country, and our threat to *depose* him. For many men will naturally say that, though they would have liked to see him, following the example of Washington and Jefferson, decline a third term as president; yet, seeing that his so doing might be interpreted as a mark of submission to us, he ought again to be elected.

The favourite idea in England appears to be, that we ought to send out a great *overwhelming* force, get possession of some place in the heart of the country, and there compel the government to surrender up the republic on our own terms. I suppose that our commanders knew better than to *attempt* any thing of the kind. I suppose that our government knew better than to order them, or to authorize them to make any such attempt. And yet, what are we to do by such a mode of warfare as we are now carrying on? Suppose we were to get possession of New-York, and some other maritime towns, what should we gain but an enormous expense to keep those places? Cooped up in them, how ridiculous should we look! No: we shall never beat that people, unless the *people themselves join us;* and as this has not been the case yet in any one instance, what reason have we to expect but that it never will be the case, in spite of all the allurements held out to that people in the prospect of participating in the support of the army, the

navy, the church, the law, the nobility, and the financial system of the former "*mother* country?" But we must not, in this larger view of the American war, overlook particular events, and especially that just announced to us from *Fort Erie.*

In my last I noticed the bloody battle of *Chippewa.* After that battle, it appears that the contest was renewed (*our* army having been *reinforced*) in the front of Fort Erie, into which the Yankees had retired, and where our gallant countrymen and their associates seemed to have been resolutely bent to fulfil our wishes, and to give them "a *drubbing.*" Alas! the "drubbing" fell upon our own gallant army, who amounted to only about two thousand men, and who were compelled to retreat with all possible speed, leaving 905 either dead, wounded, or prisoners! The American general, Gaines, says, that he destroyed our people *at the point of the bayonet.* Our general says that the angle of a bastion was blown up with two hundred of our men on it. This last might be, and yet the case would not be much altered in our favour. Such a conflict as this I never before read of. It surpasses that of Chippewa; and that surpassed, in point of proportionate destruction, any thing in modern warfare. And it ought to be observed, that a great part of this army of Yankees were *militia;* some of them *volunteers;* and not a man of them who would suffer any one to say that he had him under his *command!* It is, then, a fact beyond all dispute, that the Yankees will *sometimes* fight; and as there is no such thing as ascertaining beforehand the precise time when the fighting fit will come on them, they being such an irregular sort of people, and subject to no kind of discipline, I think it is the height of prudence in our commanders on the Atlantic coast not to venture too far at a time from our ships.

Upon hearing of *the battle of Erie,* (for it cost as many men as several of the *battles* of Wellington,) I was, I must confess, eager to hear what the *Times* writer would be able to say upon the subject. I had half a mind to hope that he would begin to repent of the part he had acted in the stirring up of this war; but on reflection, I concluded that, like the reprobates mentioned in the good book, repentance was not in his power. This conclusion was right, as the reader will now see.

"The *unfortunate event* which cast a partial shade over the successes of our Canadian army, is at length communicated to us in an authentic shape. We extract from the papers received yesterday from that part of the world, a copy of Sir George Prevost's general order, dated Montreal, 25th of August, which states the loss sustained at the attack on Fort Erie, on the 13th preceding, at 802 killed, wounded, and missing. Compared with the whole number of General Drummond's force, this loss is no doubt very considerable; but we are glad to see no hint given that the event is likely to occasion our troops to fall back. The misad-

venture must, no doubt, be ranked amongst *those chances of war* to which the *bravest armies*, and *best-laid plans*, are subject. It was preceded by a brilliant achievement, executed four days before by captain Dobbs, of the royal navy, who, with a party of seamen and marines, most gallantly boarded and took two armed schooners, anchored close to Fort Erie. The consequence of this capture being to deprive the enemy's position of a great part of its defence, Gen. Drummond resolved to follow it up by a general attack on Fort Erie and the American entrenchments. In this daring attempt he had *nearly* attained *complete success*. The spirit of our brave soldiers *surmounted every obstacle*. They had actually entered the fort, and had already turned part of its guns against the enemy's last point of refuge, when suddenly a tremendous explosion took place, which not only destroyed many valuable lives, but necessarily involved all our operations in confusion, and left no alternative but a precipitate retreat to our first approaches. It is *evident*, therefore, that General Gaines's boast of having repulsed our men at the *point of the bayonet* is idle *gasconade*. The *lamentable* result was, in all probability, occasioned by *accident;* but if the American general had any share in it, it was one which reflected more credit on his *policy* than on his *bravery*. To spring a mine on an assailing enemy may be, in such circumstances, an allowable mode of destruction; but whilst *humanity* is pained by contemplating such an event, there is no counter feeling of admiration for the *heroism* of those by whom the *dreadful* deed was executed!"

Oh! you vile hypocrite! "*humanity*" on your lips! on those same lips from which have proceeded so many urgent exhortations to exterminate the Americans; and who, in this very same number of your sanguinary paper, *commend* Sir Thomas Hardy for having bombarded, and, as you then thought, burnt to ashes the dwellings of the people of the village of *Stonington! Humanity!*——This cant may do in a country where cant is so much in vogue; but be you assured that it will only excite contempt in the breast of the enemy. You can discover "no heroism," can you, in the defenders of Fort Erie, who had lost their water-side defence before the battle began? The *three* officers of colonel Scott's regiment, who came out of the battle *alive* and *not wounded*, would, like Job's servants, tell you a different story; unless, indeed, like Bobadil, they were (which I am sure they would not do) to attribute their beating to the *planets*, instead of the American bayonets. For my part, I believe General Gaines's in preference to General Drummond's report. Not because I question the veracity of the latter, but because I know that he *might* be misinformed, and that General Gaines *could not be* misinformed, as to the fact. But, as I said before, this fact of the blowing up of the angle of a bastion does not materially affect the merits of

the case; and, unless the American people be very different in their natures from all other people, the event must have created a wonderful sensation in the country; and I am sure, that, in the eyes of any man in England whose reason is not totally deadened by prejudice, it must have excited a dread that, if we pursue that project of subjugation so strongly recommended by the writers here, we are now embarked in a war of extraordinary bloodshed, of no ordinary duration, and of an expense that will keep on all our present taxes, and occasion constant, annual loans.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

Sir,

DURING the years 1811 and 1812, while I was imprisoned in a felon's jail, for having written and caused to be printed and published, an article on the subject of flogging of English local militiamen, at the town of Ely, in England, and about the attendance of German troops at the ceremony; while I was expiating this offence by two years imprisonment in a felon's jail, and by paying, at the close of the period, *a thousand pounds fine* to you, acting in the name and behalf of your Father, who, during my imprisonment, became afflicted with his present malady; during this long period of seclusion from my home and from the wholesome air, I addressed to you several *letters on the dispute with America;* in which letters I endeavoured to convince you that the dispute, if it terminated in war, might lead to very fatal consequences to this country. I, in these letters, stated clearly the grounds of the dispute; I traced the causes of our ill blood with America to their origin; I pointed out how the dispute might be put an end to without a war; I endeavoured to show you the probable fatal consequences of a war with that nation of freemen, taking up arms *voluntarily*, and upon conviction of the goodness of their cause. I spent whole days and nights in endeavours to warn you against believing the reports of the venal wretches who were labouring to persuade this nation that we had only to go to war with Mr. Madison in order to effect *a breaking up of the American union;* and I was the more anxious on this point, as it was the general opinion, that, unless the states could be induced to *divide*, we never should long be able to cope with them in a war within their territory.

As the vanity naturally belonging to an author makes me conclude that you read these letters with great attention, I will not here go into any detail on their contents. But if we now look at the state of the war in the gross, without any particular feature being taken into view, does it not appear that we should have been fortunate if my advice had been followed? We should never then

have heard of the affairs of the Java and Guerriere, the Macedonian, the Avon, and many others; nor should we have ever heard of the battles of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain.

For the present I will confine myself to the last-mentioned battle, which has excited great attention all over Europe, and has called forth, on the victors, the most unqualified expressions of praise and admiration from our neighbours, the French, where, be it observed, nothing is published but with the consent of the government.

This is a *naval* affair; an affair *purely naval*. There appears to have been no *accidental* circumstance to affect it. The force on each side was as nearly equal as need be, in order to come at *a proof of the relative merits of the two fleets*. The battle, therefore, will be considered of ten thousand times more importance in this light than in the light of its effects upon the campaign in Canada. But, before I proceed to the *consequences* of this battle, I think it best to say a word or two upon the subject of the *place* where the battle was fought. Lake Champlain is partly in your father's provinces of Canada, and partly in the territory of the republic of America. It is, perhaps, 150 miles long, and from half a mile to 10 or 15 miles wide. I do not know that I can much better describe it than by comparing it to the SERPENTINE RIVER in Hyde Park, which is fed out of the lakes in Kensington gardens. The boundary line across Lake Champlain is very neatly and aptly represented by the embankment and bridge which separate the upper from the lower part of the Serpentine River; and the ponds and ditches leading from that separation down through Chelsea to the Thames, very luckily come to represent the British part of Lake Champlain, which empties its overflowings into the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, and which is the only highway from the republican territory to those two chief seats of the power of the house of Brunswick in that country.

Whether it was this strong resemblance in the shape of Lake Champlain and that of the Serpentine River which led, some few months ago, to the ingenious device of exhibiting hostile fleets in miniature on the latter, I have not been informed; but there are few persons in this country, I believe, who do not sorely grieve to think, that in the battles upon these two waters the representation should have differed so widely from that of reality, the accounts of which have recently come to hand. The battle on the Serpentine River, though contested for some time pretty stoutly by the Yankees, was at last decided in our favour. Britannia, I am told, (for I saw it not,) with the trident of Neptune in her hand, was seen crowning her sons with bay, while poor JONATHAN, with his lank hair hanging over his drooping head, stood a captive under

his own flag, which was *hanging reversed* under that of your royal house; thereby indicating not only a naval superiority over the Yankees, but anticipating that, whenever they should dare to meet us, they would be beaten and captured. There was not, I believe, an opportunity of exhibiting this scene to the emperor of Russia and king of Prussia, who were thus deprived of a sight of those signs of ecstatic delight which the people expressed, and of a hearing of their heart-cheering shouts, when they saw poor Jonathan haul down his colours, and when they heard the martial bands strike up "*Rule Britannia, Britannia rule the waves!*" in the chorus of which they joined with their half a million of male and female voices, till the sound seemed to fill all the space between the earth and the sky. The foreign sovereigns were, for want of time, deprived of this sight. But in the harbour of Portsmouth, on the day of your arrival there in company with them, I myself saw, on board of some ships, the flag of poor JONATHAN again reversed, and hanging under that of your Royal House.

Alas, sir! how different has been the *reality* from the anticipating representation! upon Lake Champlain, that Serpentine River on a grand scale, how different has been the event from that of the representation, which drew forth the air-rending shouts of half a million of the people of this country! Aye, of half a million of a people, on whom it is no more than a just eulogium to say, that they are, in every respect, worthy of being the subjects of the king that reigns over them, and of the regent who acts in the name and behalf of that king! There are some few exceptions, to be sure; some few malecontents; some few, whom neither king nor God can please. But, speaking of them in a mass, your father's people are worthy of such a sovereign, and such a sovereign is worthy of such a people.

To return to the battle of Lake Champlain, I have deeply to lament that WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS PUBLISHED RESPECTING IT, and yet it is now the 7th of November. It is not for me to presume to know, or even to guess, *why* no such account has yet been published. So far am I from attempting to *find fault* upon this occasion with men in power, that I am not even disposed to inquire into their motives for not publishing the account in question. I am quite willing to allow, that they are the best possible judges of what they are about; that they know best when to publish and when to be silent. But I may, and I must, lament their not publishing, because, in the meanwhile, the *republican* account is gone forth to the world, and which account is calculated to make a most injurious impression upon the world, particularly with regard to the relative value of the naval characters of the republic of America, and of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. If the republican ac-

count be true, the event was, in this view of it, the most fatal that can be imagined; for not only were your royal father's ships *superior* in both *men* and *guns*; not only was his majesty's fleet *beaten* by the republicans under such circumstances, but it was *taken*, all taken, and that, too, *without any very great slaughter!* The republican account is as follows; and, as you will perceive, it is published from that very city of Washington, the public edifices of which your royal father's fleet and army so recently burnt to the ground.

WASHINGTON, September 19.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Macdonough to the Secretary of the Navy, dated U. S. ship Saratoga, off Plattsburg, Sept. 11.

"SIR—The Almighty has been pleased to grant us a signal victory on Lake Champlain, in the capture of one frigate, one brig, and two sloops of war of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed) T. MACDONOUGH, Com.

Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

BRITISH.

	Guns.	*Men.*	*Killed.*	*Wounded.*
Large ship,	39	300	50	60
Brig,	16	120	20	30
Growler,	11	40	6	10
Eagle,	11	40	8	10
13 Gun-boats,	18	550	two probably sunk.	
Total,	95	1050	84	110

Several of the gun-boats struck; but the sinking state of the large vessels required the assistance of the men in our gallies, so that not being able to take possession of them; they were able to *save themselves by flight.*

AMERICAN.

	Guns.	*Men.*	*Killed.*	*Wounded.*
Saratoga, ship,	26	210	28	29
Eagle, brig,	20	120	13	29
Ticonderoga, schr.	17	110	6	6
Preble, sloop,	7	30	2	0
10 Gun-boats,	16	350	3	3
Total,	86	820	52	58

Thus, sir, if this account be true, (for I do only speak hypothetically,) the royal fleet had *more guns and more men* than the republican fleet, and yet the royal fleet was not only beaten, but all CAPTURED! This American commodore is very laconic. He does not seem to regard such an event as worthy of any very particular detail. He does not seem to have observed any particular instance of courage or skill in his officers and men. In short, he seems to have thought, that what had happened was no

more than what his country would expect, notwithstanding all that the people of England had seen on the Serpentine River. He talks of no difficulties; no dangers; no resistance; and, *if* the account be true, he took the whole fleet before he had killed and wounded *a fifth part of its men*, and before he had lost in killed and wounded only about *an eighth part of his own men*. Mr. Madison, in his account of the battle, if it may be so called, is still more provokingly laconic and reserved. He says, "The British squadron lately came into action with the American on Lake Champlain; it issued in *the capture of the whole of the enemy's ships*. The best praise of Captain Macdonough and his intrepid comrades, is the *likeness* of his triumph to the illustrious victory which immortalized another officer *on another lake*." Thus hinting to the world that such events as this are *nothing new*. Mr. Madison, it was anticipated by the sages who write in the *Times* newspaper, would talk very big about this victory, and thereby blind the people with regard to their dangers. He seems to have been determined to make them false prophets. He does but just notice this victory in a transient sort of way, and dwells with great force, and with studious care, on the *dangers* which the people of the republic have to meet.

Now, sir, this republican account is either *true* or *false*. I do not pretend to say that it is true, though it has not been officially contradicted in any one particular, and though my brother journalists seem, by implication at least, to *admit* the truth of it, I have not, I do not, and I will not, say that it is true, even should every other man in the kingdom say it. But I humbly presume that I may venture to assert that it is either *true* or *false*. If looked on as true, it certainly must produce, and must already have produced, a very great effect on the minds of thinking men in all those parts of the world to which a knowledge of it has extended. It will produce this effect: it will cause it to be believed, that a ship of the royal navy of Great Britain is not equal to the task of combating a ship of equal force belonging to the republic of America, commanded by officers, and manned by men, of that republic. It is impossible for any man, not a fool, or not blinded by some sort of passion, to be ignorant that such must be the effect of this battle, if the republican account of it pass for *true*. It is equally impossible for any man to hope that it will not pass for true, until it be explicitly and officially stated to be *false*, and until it be *proved* also to be false. The world will naturally ask how it has happened that the British government, who are so exact in publishing every account of our naval operations; who do not omit the capture of a merchant-ship, whereof a history is sent to John Wilson Croker, Esq.; should have been so backward upon this particular occasion; that the people who witnessed the anticipating repre-

sentations on the Serpentine River, and who are so eager for news from America, should not yet have been officially informed of the battle of Lake Champlain, though a mention of it has reached Europe, and even England, in the president's speech. The world will naturally ask *how* this has happened. The world, sir, looks very anxiously towards the republic. They see in her a power rising fast to a rivalship with us. They look towards her with rather more than the eyes of impartiality. Our navy has excited great jealousy and envy in the world. That navy the world wishes to see matched, or, at least, held in check. This is not at all wonderful; but, for my part, I shall not state what I look upon as the true causes of it. As a proof of the sentiments prevalent upon this subject in France, I here quote an article from a French paper of the 30th of September:

"*On the situation of the United States.*—The capture of Washington has made a great deal of noise in Europe. It was generally believed, on the credit of the London newspapers, that that event would have a decisive influence on the war which rages between Great Britain and the United States. Already people were expecting to see the American government humbly soliciting peace, and submitting to all the conditions which it might please the cabinet of St. James to impose upon it. Some persons, who judge of the United States from the old nations of Europe, confidently announce the dissolution of the American republic, and did not conceive what could exist after the every way reprehensible destruction of the capitol and other buildings of Washington. It seemed to them that that rising city was the palladium of America, and that its fall must draw along with it that of all the states which compose this great and fine confederation. Profound alarm, it was said, had seized all the inhabitants of the United States; every province was hastening to deprecate British vengeance, by detaching itself from the federal union; Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New-York, Charleston, Savannah, were on the point of opening their gates to the conqueror, and re-entering the colonial system of England. The better informed, however, were far from participating in this opinion. They knew that the great majority of the Americans were attached to their government, and would deem no effort too painful to support their independence. There is much talk of the parties which exist in the United States; but these parties are not factious: they never fail to unite when the country is in danger. In America, as in England, men dispute about the acquisition of power; but their patriotism is never shaken. Their very discussions nourish public spirit, and elevate national pride and the sacred love of liberty above every other sentiment. The strength of the United States is not in the maritime towns; it lies in that numerous population who cultivate the

ground, and seek subsistence in the midst of forests. These hardy cultivators, these indefatigable hunters, form excellent troops, easily disciplined, and who brave every fatigue and danger. They are the sons of men who triumphed at Saratoga and Bunker's Hill. The recollection of these exploits still animates their courage. This inheritance of glory is a national property which they will transmit entire to their descendants. These hunters, known by the name of riflemen, are formidable enemies. They use muskets of a particular kind, and at the distance of two hundred paces they seldom miss their aim. In the war of independence they did a great deal of mischief to the English armies, and deprived them of a prodigious number of officers. It appears certain, that the expedition of the Chesapeake, under admiral Cochrane, had for its object to force the American government to recal the troops which menaced the frontiers of Upper and Lower Canada. This diversion would have been advantageous to the English; but it did not succeed. While the efforts of the British army *expired before Baltimore, the Americans were destroying the English fleet on Lake Champlain, and beating the army of Canada,* which retired with considerable loss in men and stores. On this occasion we have heard mention, for the first time, of those famous militia of the state of Vermont, who so gloriously distinguished themselves in the last war, under the name of *Green Mountain Boys.* They have lost neither their courage nor their renown. The defeat of the English on Lake Champlain exposes the frontiers of Lower Canada. If from Plattsburgh the Americans proceeded to St. John's, a little town badly fortified at the head of the lake, they can arrive in two marches on the banks of the river St. Lawrence, opposite Montreal, and make themselves masters of the beautiful plain of Chambli, the most abundant of all Canada in pasturage and grain. It is not on the coasts that the fate of the war will be decided, but in the interior of the country, and on the banks of Lake Champlain and Ontario.

The English are good soldiers; they possess both honour and courage; but the war they have undertaken against the United States does not depend either on a maritime expedition, or on a battle gained. Obliged to fight at a great distance from their country, they repair with difficulty their losses, either in men or ammunition, whilst the Americans easily recruit themselves. The expenses of England are enormous, as we may judge from the price of a single piece of cannon transported to Lake Ontario. It is estimated to have cost a thousand guineas. The British ministry thought, no doubt, that in taking the advantage of their maritime superiority, to insult the shores of the United States, and to menace the commercial towns with complete destruction, they would have produced in that country a powerful opposition, which would com-

pel the American government to sue for peace. This expectation must be disappointed; it shows how little America is known in Europe. The actual government does not want the support of what is called *the commercial interest;* it derives all its force from the frank and generous adhesion of the farmers, who are the most enlightened men in the United States, and the most attached to their country. Besides, the burning of Washington, instead of abating their courage, has only tended to irritate them against an enemy who tramples on the principles adopted by civilized nations. Mr. Madison, who enjoys the highest honour that can be desired—that of presiding over the destiny of a free people; Mr. Madison, I say, *displays a noble character.* All Americans rally at his voice; and resolutions, full of energy and patriotism, have already been adopted in the greater part of the towns which are most exposed to bombardment and to *Congreve's rockets.* The war has become national; and the Americans, who have fought courageously, will henceforth fight with fury. It is not very difficult to foresee the issue of this sanguinary contest, too long maintained for the honour of humanity. After wasting herself in vain efforts, *England will be forced to grant peace on conditions advantageous to the United States,* and ought to think herself too happy in preserving her empire over Nova-Scotia and the two Canadas. I expect that these reflections, intended to enlighten the numerous readers of the *Journal de Paris,* upon a war more important than is generally supposed, will excite the indignation of the English journalists. Those gentlemen attribute to themselves the exclusive privilege of reasoning upon events, and they are indiscreet enough to consider the Americans as rebels; but this consideration will never prevent me from speaking the truth, and making known freely an opinion which I believe to be just. Nobody esteems the English nation more than I do; but I confess I should be much vexed if she obtained decisive advantages over the United States. She needs neither an increase of influence nor an accession of territory. Her interest imperiously commands her to respect the rights and independence of other people, and no longer to weary fortune."

This, sir, is the language of the French; these are *their* sentiments upon this war against the American republic. She has a friend in every *people* in Europe, the people of this country excepted. The world wishes success to the American republic, because the world envies England her power. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain has, perhaps, caused more real rejoicing than ever was caused by any battle in Europe during the last twenty years.

In your *speech* of the 8th instant, an account of which I have now before me, the newspapers report you to have said, that "notwithstanding the *reverse* which APPEARS to have OC-

CURRED on Lake Champlain, you entertain the *most confident expectations*, as well from the amount as from the description of force now serving in Canada, that the *ascendency* of his majesty's arms throughout that part of North America will be effectually *secured.*" From this it would seem that the "*reverse*" on Lake Champlain is not yet *ascertained* by your cabinet; that it only *appears* that there has been a "*reverse.*" A *reverse* I have always understood to mean a check *after a series of victories.* Whether this be the character of the "*occurrence*" in question, I must leave for abler judges to decide. But I am quite rejoiced to hear that you entertain such "confident expectations" of seeing the "ascendency" of his majesty's arms "secured" in Canada; because I felt, with many others, some fear upon this score, when I found that an army of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, under the commander in chief in person, had retreated in haste, and with great loss, from before a fortress containing five or six thousand Americans. The republican commander asserts, that he captured a considerable part of our army, having, by his *militia* and *volunteers*, pursued it a considerable distance on its retreat. Unless this account be false, there appears to me still to be some little room for fear that the ascendency of his majesty's arms in that quarter will not be maintained. You say, as the newspapers tell us, that you build your confident expectations on the *amount* as well as the *description* of the force now serving in Canada. But this force is exactly the same that appeared before the fort at Plattsburgh; it is not changed since that time; nor has there been any change in the force of the enemy. So that, to me, it does not, I must confess, appear at all likely, that the prospect in Canada should brighten before another campaign has made some very material change in our favour. It is said that Sir George Prevost is *recalled.* If that could give us an advantage over the Yankees; if that could defeat their triumphant fleets, the measure would be of great value.

The newspapers state that you spoke of "the *brilliant* and *successful* operations in the Chesapeake and at the City of Washington." Having lately had the misfortune to see a couple of my barns on fire, I can the better conceive the brilliancy of the scene at Washington. But, sir, while this scene was exhibited there, unfortunately, the republicans were sallying from Fort Erie on the army of General Drummond, and the fatal battle was preparing on Lake Champlain. What are the operations in the Chesapeake, when we look towards Canada? If, indeed, we had been able to REMAIN at Washington, the case would have been different. So far from that, our commander stated that he hastened away, leaving several of his wounded officers behind him, because he feared that the militia might collect, and cut off his retreat to the ships. Incursions like this are not much thought of in the world,

when men are talking of the probable *result* of war. It is true, that the *character* of our movements in the Chesapeake "has produced on the minds of the inhabitants a *deep* and *sensible* impression." But if I am to judge from the message of Mr. Madison, that impression is one of the most resolute hostility towards England; and from every thing that I hear from that country, I am convinced, that a disposition to yield to us, in any one point, was never so far from the breasts of the republicans as since our operations in the Chesapeake. However, we shall not now be *many days* before we KNOW for a certainty what the American *people* say, and what they think, upon the subject of the war. For the congress will go into committees on the matters mentioned in the President's message. Those committees will make reports expressive of their opinions. Those reports will be discussed in the senate and house of representatives. When agreed to, they will be published. When published, they will express the sentiments of the unbought, unsold representatives of a whole people, those representatives being chosen by the free voices of all the men in the country, who pay taxes to the amount of only a penny in a year. There can be no room for doubt in such a case. No man can pretend to say that the congress does not speak the voice of the people. It *must* speak the people's voice. It is elected for a very short space of time. The people have the power to turn out any member in a few months after he displeases them. All the people read. They all look narrowly to the conduct of those whom they have sent to the congress. And, therefore, whatever the congress says, we may be well assured the people themselves say. I dwell with more earnestness upon this point, because our venal prints have long been labouring to persuade us that the American *people* are opposed to their *government*, and because you are reported to have talked of the war begun against us by "*the government*" of America. The *government*, in that country, does not mean any man, or set of men, who *rule over a people*, who *command a people*, to whom the people *owe allegiance*. The people of America acknowledge the existence of no such a power, of no such a thing. They look upon the government as consisting of *their agents*; persons *appointed and paid by them for conducting their public affairs*. They look upon these persons as no more than their *fellow citizens*. The most learned and most wise of their fellow citizens, to be sure; but still, their fellow citizens. The persons so employed have not the power to do that which the people disapprove of; nor can they have the inclination, seeing that they have no *interest* to do that which the people dislike. There is none of them who can have any *private interest* in war; none of them can gain by war. It is impossible to fatten their families by the means of a public expenditure; and as to *patronage*, they know of no such thing,

nor could they derive any advantage from it if they had it. Therefore, whatever the *congress* says, you may be sure the *people* say, in spite of all the malicious and silly assertions of our public prints, whose efforts are continually directed to mislead the people of this country, whose want of information renders them the easy dupes of these designing knaves, having a corrupt press in their hands.

It is stated in the newspapers, that you, in your speech, said that this war originated in the "MOST UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION on the part of the government of the United States." It is to be lamented that you did not take this opportunity of contradicting, in a pointed manner, the assertion contained in Mr. Madison's late message; because he most explicitly asserts, that *we were the aggressors.* He says:

"Having forborne to declare war, until, to other aggressions, had been added the *capture of nearly one thousand American vessels*, and the *impressment of thousands of seafaring citizens*, and until a final declaration had been made by the government of Great Britain, that her hostile orders against our commerce would not be revoked, but on conditions as impossible as unjust; whilst it was known that these orders would not otherwise cease but with a war which had lasted nearly twenty years, and which, according to appearances at that time, might last as many more—having manifested on every occasion, and in every proper mode, a sincere desire to meet the enemy on the ground of justice, our resolution to defend our beloved country, and to oppose to the enemy's persevering hostility all our energy, with an undiminished disposition towards peace and friendship on honourable terms, must carry with it the good wishes of the impartial world, and the best hopes of support from an omnipotent and kind Providence."

Now, sir, what I could have wished to see was a *contradiction* of this assertion, with regard to these *thousand vessels*, and these *thousands of impressed American citizens.* You may be well assured, that this message will be read with deep and general interest on the continent of Europe. This message and your speech are before the world. Not before this nation only, but before all the nations in the world. Every man will form his own judgment upon them. It is not reasonable to suppose that Mr. Madison's assertion will be disbelieved, unless it be *proved* to be false. It may do here for our public prints to call him, as they do, "liar, fool, traitor, usurper, coward," and the like. This may satisfy those who inhabit the country through which runs the Serpentine River; but it will have no weight, or, at least, no weight against Mr. Madison in other countries. His assertion, therefore, relative to the thousand vessels, and the thousands of impressed seafaring citizens, I could wish very much to see contradicted and disproved, in some official and authentic way; for until that be done,

I am afraid that we may lay our account with his being believed by a great majority of the world. And if he be believed; if the world do believe that we really did capture a thousand republican vessels; that we really did impress thousands of seafaring citizens before the congress declared war, I am afraid that it must be doubted whether the declaration of war was wholly an *unprovoked* aggression on the part of America. I am aware that there will be no doubt upon the subject in this country, which never was engaged in a war so popular as this. I believe that if the whole nation, paupers and all, were put to the vote, that there would appear for the war nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand. The press worked up the people to the war pitch, where it keeps them. There are prevalent these notions: 1st, That the republic *joined* Napoleon in the war against us; 2d, That we now are able to *punish* her for this; 3d, That she went to war for the purpose of robbing us of *maritime rights* essential to our *very existence;* 4th, That she may *now, now,now* be crippled forever; 5th, That we ought, at least, to continue the war until we have *effaced* by victories over the republican ships, the recollection of the affairs of the Java, the Guerriere, the Macedonian, the Avon, and of those on the lakes. The events in the Chesapeake, and the description of them, have caused the nation to look upon the republicans as cowards. This is very inconsistent with the before-mentioned notion; but it prevails. So that here are all sorts of ingredients necessary to make a war popular, and popular it is beyond every thing that ever was popular. It is quite useless for any one to attempt to remove any of these notions, which have taken fast hold, and which it will require some years of war to shake. *Jonathan*, therefore, has no ground for reliance on any *opposition* in this country. The opposition in parliament will only be as to the *mode* of prosecuting the war. If they censure, the burden of their censure will be, not against the *war*, but against those who have *not done enough* against the enemy. The war, therefore, has popularity to recommend it. This I allow, and, in so doing, I have the mortification to confess, that all my labours against the war have proved wholly useless. Still I think myself bound to endeavour, as occasion may offer, to give my reasons against its further continuance.

I was happy to see, in the newspaper report of your speech, that you have "*a sincere desire* to bring this war to a conclusion on *just and honourable terms;*" and as Mr. Madison expresses the same desire, let me hope that the conclusion of the war may soon take place, without waiting till more sea battles have effaced the recollection of those which have already taken place. But, sir, what a pity it is that the war did not end with the war in Europe. What a pity it is that Mr. Madison has to complain of *delays* on our part to give effect to our own proposition for a direct negotia-

tion, after we had refused the offer of the mediation of our own ally, the emperor of Russia! And what a pity it is, that the American people have, in our public prints, seen so much abuse of their chief magistrate, and so many threats to *reconquer* their country!

Since writing the above, the *debates* on your speech have reached me. With the exception of Mr. Whitbread, and Sir Gilbert Heathcote, all agreed that America was the *aggressor* in the war, and, as was anticipated, the only fault imputed to the ministers was, that they had been *remiss* in their measures against her; though, on the other hand, it is reported of one member who moved the address, that he said, that "our *successes* against her had been UNVARIED." The first lord of the admiralty stated, that he had not received the official account of the affair of Lake Champlain, which, besides, appeared from the language of the two houses to be considered as but a *trifling* sort of a thing, unworthy of any very particular notice. The speech of Mr. Whitbread was long, and, therefore, cannot be inserted here; but that of Sir Gilbert Heathcote shall have a place in this letter; and, as you cannot suspect him of any disloyal motive, I hope you will give his words a patient attention.

"Sir GILBERT HEATHCOTE rose and observed, that it would have been most satisfactory to have heard from ministers that the negotiations at Ghent were going on favourably. That he could not approve of that part of the address which promised further support in the American war, inasmuch as *the cause of the dispute had ceased since the general pacification on the continent.* When we withdrew our Orders in Council, the Americans had rescinded their relative acts; so that the right of searching American ships for British seamen alone remained as a subject of controversy. When peace was established throughout Europe, we could not think of exercising that right; so that this last point of contention *fell to the ground naturally.* The war must, therefore, be carried on for *other reasons*, for the sake of *what might happen*, and not for any *present grievance.* He thought the situation of the country did not warrant ministers in doing this. Were our finances so flourishing, the property tax a burthen so light and easy that it mattered not what might be the amount of the annual national expenditure? There might be some pretext for ministers to keep on some of the late war taxes, after the country was placed on a peace establishment, provided there was an excess of expenditure, to make up any deficiency in balancing the accounts; but no pretext whatever for retaining such imposts for the prosecution of a war which appeared unnecessary. It appeared to him *that we feared the rising power of America, and wished to curtail it.* This was an important feature in this war, for, if persevered in, we must

be prepared to *completely subjugate our enemy*, or we should be in *a worse state than we now are.*

We had tried to subdue America thirty years ago, and had failed, when she was nothing like so powerful as at present. We should recollect how we left France situated, whilst we were engaged in this contest; she was at profound peace, recovering from her wounds, and, if the war was protracted or unprosperous, *she might join America, or attack us herself.* A strange policy seems to be pursued; whilst we were waging war in America to prevent her becoming a powerful naval state, close at home, in Flanders, we were creating one. Let us recall to mind the history of the reign of Charles the Second, or, in latter times, the politics of the Dutch Cabinet previous to the engagement off the Dogger Bank in 1781, and the march of the Prussian army, under the late Duke of Brunswick, into Holland, in 1787. Would any, one having a knowledge of these transactions, believe that our ministers would, in all times to come, be able so to manage the Dutch Cabinet, as to eradicate all French influence there, as that power we are now creating may not, at no very distant time, become highly dangerous to the naval supremacy of this country. With respect to the conduct of the war, he did not wish now to enter into it; he was *against the war altogether.* In these contests we must expect the alternate vicissitudes of fortune. He had always understood that Sir George Prevost was both a brave and intelligent man, and, no doubt, he had good reasons for what he had done. That in a country like America, after having lost the naval support, on which depended the provisioning the army and conveyance of military stores, with the remembrance of Saratoga and York-Town, he must have been a bold man indeed who would have placed himself, by advancing into the country, *in a situation to be surrounded.* As to what was said in the public prints of the *mortification felt by the troops which had been sent from Spain*, he believed, if more confidence was placed in *their* exertions than on those of the rest of the army, we should be disappointed. In the outset of the last American war, it was boasted here that a battalion of British troops would march across the continent. The flower of our army was sent, and commanded by officers who had served with reputation in the German war under Prince Ferdinand. The result is well known; these troops, as brave as any in the world, were compelled, at two different epochs, *to lay down their arms to the new raised levies of America.* He was *against the continuance of the war.*"

I agree with Sir Gilbert Heathcote in every word that he uttered. But he was almost alone. He had but *one* member with him. Thus, then, we are to go on with this war. A battle is to be fought now between the whole of our navy and army and those of the republic of America. She will not shy the fight. She is

ready for us. The world is now going to witness *the fall of the last republic*, or the *decline of the naval power of England*. There will be no medium after another year of war. We must completely subjugate the Americans; or openly fall before them. We must *beat them;* or they must *beat us;* and the beating must last during the existence of the parties.

Mr. Whitbread asked if there was now any *new ground* of the war. Any *new object*. Nobody avowed that there was. But I fear the Americans will bear in mind, that the moment Napoleon was subdued, and our alarms in Europe were at an end, our public prints, the most patronised, openly proclaimed to the nation that the object now ought to be to *subdue* the American republic, and to bring her back to the *parent* state. And, which is never to be forgotten, the whole of the London prints, in giving what they call a report of the debates in parliament, published a report of a speech, which they gave as *Sir Joseph Yorke's*, who was one of the *lords of the admiralty*, and in which reported speech it was stated that, though Napoleon was *deposed*, we must not yet lay aside our navy, seeing that we had another person to *depose*, namely, Mr. Madison. Far be it from me to assert that Sir Joseph Yorke really did utter this speech: but it is very certain that it was published as his speech in all the London newspapers; that it was so received all over the kingdom; and that its sentiments met with universal approbation. The language of the principal London prints has been, from that day to this, in perfect harmony with the tenor of this speech; and when the news of the burning of the buildings of the city of Washington arrived, it was the common notion that a *viceroy* was about to be sent thither to represent and govern in the name of your royal father. Nay, I verily believe that, if the war ceases without our reconquering the Americans, as the chances are that it may, the people of England will be utterly astonished and confounded! So that JONATHAN must stand clear; for we are now safely launched against him. It is, in my opinion, idle to expect peace with America in a less space than six or seven years; for I am morally certain that JONATHAN will not give in. He, as Lord Melville very justly observed, is at *home;* he has all his men and tools upon the spot; he has been bred to the rifle from his cradle; he has a cheap government, or, rather, he loves to govern himself; and though he may not always feel bold, he will, first and last, give us a good, long, tough battle. JONATHAN, sir, is not subject to fits and starts in his politics and notions of government. We found no rabble at the city of Washington, to cry "*vivent nos genereux allies*," as did the *canaille* at Paris. Men must submit to a musket or bayonet at their breasts; but we shall, I am of opinion, not find submission go much further before us in America.

Mr. *Whitbread* is deceived in supposing that it is the mere burning of the buildings at Washington which has *united*, as he calls it, all parties in America. There never was any party *our* friend, in opposition to their own government; all parties cried out against our conduct. All parties cried out against what Mr. Madison complains of now. And as to a *separation of the states* for *our* sake, no one but a downright fool ever thought of such a thing. It was always a false notion. There never was any ground for it; and experience will show us, that, in this respect, this nation has been listening to knaves, who were seeking their own interests in urging us on to the war.

I am well aware that we shall do *Jonathan* an infinite deal of *present mischief*. And he seems aware of it too. Mr. Madison takes great pains to give his constituents a strong sense of the violent hostility they have to encounter. They are now, even at this moment, getting ready their powder and ball, their rifles and their swords, their haversacks and accoutrements. There will not be a man unarmed, or unprepared for battle, before the opening of the next campaign. A million of free men in arms will be ready to receive whoever shall march against them. The debates in our parliament, the language of our newspapers, which *Jonathan* knows so well how to estimate, will urge him on to measures of preparation. He is expeditious in these matters beyond all nations upon earth. The battle will be a battle fit to engage the attention of the world. I have often been rebuked for endeavouring to draw the public attention to American affairs. I have never been able to persuade any body that America was of any consequence. She has now become of consequence; and if the war goes on, as I fear it will, she will soon be of most fearful importance in the view of every nation in Europe.

Perhaps you do not know that the *present* injuries, which we are able to inflict on America, are the greatest of blessings in the eyes of some of her statesmen. They have always wished for something that would separate her as widely as possible from Great Britain. Whether wisely or not is another matter. They have always wished it; and if they can see this accomplished by the destruction of twenty or thirty towns on the coast, they will think the acquisition wonderfully cheap.

"When to marry or to fight," as some are, "both parties are equally eager; they soon come together." Both parties are in earnest, and eager, in this case; and they will soon reach one another, though the distance between them is so great. The battle will be a famous one. A great *kingdom*, the mistress of the sea, and dictatress of Europe, on the one side; and the *last of republics* on the other. Not only the question of maritime rights is now to be decided; but the question of the nature of governments.

The world is now going to see whether a republic, without a standing army, with half a dozen frigates, and with a chief magistrate with a salary of about *five thousand pounds a year*, be able to contend, single-handed, against a kingdom with a thousand ships of war, an army of two hundred thousand men, and with a royal family whose civil list amounts to more than a million pounds a year. Nothing was ever so interesting as this spectacle. May the end be favourable to the honour and happiness of this country and mankind in general. I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

TO A CORRESPONDENT IN AMERICA,

On the Expenses, the Taxes, &c. of Great Britain, compared with those of America.

Dear sir,

YOUR request would, long ago, have been attended to, if I had had more leisure for the task. For your valuable information relative to your agriculture, your flocks, and your manufactures, I am much obliged to you; and if the two countries were at peace, you should receive from me all the useful information which it is in my power to give you upon several heads, which I shall not touch upon in a letter passing through the *press*, but which, I hope, the restoration of harmony between our two countries may, in a year or two at most, make it convenient for me to communicate to you through the ordinary channel of the post.

You wish to know what is the amount of the annual expenses of our *government;* what is the amount of the taxes paid to the government; what is the amount of our *poor rates;* what is the amount of our *tythes;* and you wish me to show the comparison between these and the expenses and taxes in America. You also wish to have my account of the state of the people here; or, in plainer terms, you wish to know how we stand as to *mode of living*, and as to *crimes and punishments*, compared with the people of your republic.

To perform this task as it ought to be performed, is, I am afraid, beyond my power. I do, indeed, know more about these matters than many of my neighbours, but I cannot hope to discharge the task to your satisfaction, who are so accurate in all your statements and calculations, and who, with all your indulgence in other respects, are not to be satisfied, unless you find others as

accurate as yourself. Nevertheless, I will do all that I am able to do in return for the very valuable information which I owe solely to your attentive kindness, and which serves me as a guide through those numerous errors, with regard to your country, into which I see others of my countrymen continually falling.

I am happy that you have not called upon me for *opinions*; that you have not called upon me for *conclusions*, drawn from premises that I am to state; that you confine your request to an account of *mere facts*; that you have not wished to expose me to the mortification of seeing the effort of my facts destroyed, or perverted, by the superior talents of those who might, with merciless hands, lay foul of my feeble attempts at an application of these facts to the sustaining of any political theory. It is, I perfectly agree with you, the best and fairest way, in such a case, to content myself with bare facts, leaving the reader, whether public or private, to draw his own conclusions; because the points of controversy, if any arise, can be at once decided; and because that reader, who is not competent to draw just conclusions from facts clearly stated, is not worth the attention of the writer, and is of little more consequence in society than a worm or a fly.

In speaking of the EXPENSES of our government, I must confine myself to the *annual* expenses, and, in this case, to the last year's expenses; that is to say, the year which ended on the 5th January, 1814. As, in the comparative part of my statement, I must speak of *dollars* on your side, and of pounds sterling on our side, I will, for the sake of easier assimilation, take the dollar at *five* shillings, instead of *four shillings and six pence*, which is its real sterling value. But the state of our paper currency will fully justify this advance; and, indeed, it would justify a further advance. This, however, is not material enough to induce me to enter into any laboured calculations on the subject; especially, as it is contended here, by a great majority of the government financiers, that our paper money has undergone no depreciation at all.

To begin, then, with the expenses of our government: In *Great Britain* only, for the year ending on the 5th of January, 1814, the total sum expended was 113,968,610*l.* 16*s.* 10½*d.* I speak from documents laid before the house of commons, and, therefore, I run no risk of error or contradiction. This was the total sum, exclusive of the expenditure belonging to Ireland. To go into a *detail*, as to the several particulars, would fill five or six numbers of my REGISTER; but the great *heads* of the expenditure it may be worth your while to know. These were as follow:

Charges on account of the national debt for the year,	£41,897,335	17	5	3-4
Civil list,	1,028,000	0	0	
Courts of justice, mint, salaries and allowances, bounties,	234,937	19	7	1-2
Allowance to members of the royal family, pensions, &c.	332,412	7	4	1-4
Civil list of Scotland,	113,176	4	8	1-2
Other bounties and pensions, and militia and deserters' warrants,	391,456	1	11	1-2
Navy,	21,996,624	9	4	1-2
Ordnance,	3,404,527	11	11	
Army,	29,469,520	10	3	
Remittances to other countries, Hanover, Austria, Prussia, and nine other powers,	15,994,832	14	1	
Miscellaneous services at home and abroad,	4,010,349	18	4	1-2
	118,872,813	15	1	1-2
Deduct sums for Ireland, &c.	4,904,202	18	3	
Total expenditure of Great Britain,	£113,968,610	16	10	1-2

Now, as to the comparison between the expenditure of this government and of yours, I must speak of the latest period of which I have any knowledge of your expenditure; and though you are in a state of war and of unprecedented expense, you must bear in mind that we are in a state of war also. I find an account of your expenditure in Mr. Madison's speech of the 20th of September, 1814, which, by the by, many persons here think will be his *last*, except that which the Times newspaper supposes he will make at his exit from the world. Mr. Madison speaks thus on the subject of your finances: "The moneys received into the treasury during the nine months, ending the 30th of June last, amounted to thirty-two millions of dollars, of which eleven millions were the proceeds of the *public revenue*, and the remainder *derived from loans*. The disbursements for public expenditures, during the same period, exceed thirty-four millions of dollars, and left in the treasury, on the 1st of July, near five millions of dollars."

Taking your expenditure, without fractions, then, it would be, for the last year, $47,550,000, while ours was $455,874,443. So that our expenditure, exclusive of poor rates, tythes, and county and corporation government, is more than *nine times* as great as yours. The population of the two countries, leaving out our *paupers*, is, as I shall show by and by, *nearly equal*, the greater population being, however, I believe, on your side. The paupers must be left out, as you will perceive, because it is impossible that they can contribute, in any way whatever, towards the means of meeting this expenditure.

But *expenditure* is of little importance when compared to *receipts* or *taxes*. Here it is that we touch close upon men's pockets. The means of expending consists in part of *loans*. These loans may, or may not, ever be paid off. You may, perhaps, pay them off by *lands*; we may pay them off by some yet unknown means. What we have to look at, in the most attentive manner, therefore,

is the amount of the *taxes;* because this is what the people really *pay.*

The amount of our taxes, paid into the treasury during the last year, was 74,027,583*l.* 17*s.* 8¾*d.* We are very precise in the keeping of our accounts. According to Mr. Madison's statement, in his speech, the money paid into your treasury, during the last year, was $14,550,000. In dollars, our taxes amounted to 296,110,335; which is rather more than *twenty times* the amount of your year's taxes. But you must bear in mind that there is a considerable difference between the amount *collected,* and the amount *paid into* our treasury.

Amongst other deductions from this latter sum, there was the sum of 3,504,938*l.* 11*s.* 5*d.* deducted from the gross receipt, or collection, for the purpose of paying the "*charges for management;*" that is to say, for the purpose of paying the persons employed in the assessing, the supervising, the surveying, the inspecting, the collecting, the receiving, the transmitting, &c. of money paid into the treasury. Now, 3,504,938*l.* 11*s.* 5*d.* is $14,019,754. So that the bare expense of the getting together of our taxes amounts, you see, to very nearly as much *as the whole of your taxes raised upon you;* that is to say, if Mr. Madison's statement be correct. And suppose each of these persons, one with the other, to receive 50*l.* or $200 a year, here are wages for 70,098 men constantly employed in the business of the taxes; while, suppose you to pay your tax-gatherers at the same rate, you have only 2,504 persons constantly employed in this way.

The *poor rates* form another item of English taxation, in addition to the above; and a very important item it is now become. If you do not know the nature of this tax, and of its application, it may be necessary to state, that this is a tax levied upon all householders and landholders, for the support of such persons as are too poor to support themselves. It is assessed and collected by persons appointed by the taxed people in each parish, called *overseers of the poor;* but before they can proceed to collect any rate, they must have the approbation of a justice of the peace, who is, as they all are, appointed by the crown. In the distribution of this money, the overseers are again liable to the control of the justices of the peace; for they may, upon the application of any pauper, order, without appeal, the overseers to relieve the said pauper, in any manner that they please. This, therefore, is a tax not paid into the treasury, but disposable under the jurisdiction, and at the discretion, of his majesty's justices of the peace. The office of overseer is performed without any pay. It is a *duty,* or *service,* which every taxed householder is liable to be compelled to execute.

Now, then, as to the amount of this tax, which, you will observe, forms an addition to that of the taxes already noticed; it was, in the year 1803, when the report was laid before parliament,

5,348,205*l.* For the last year I have only computation to guide; but that assures me, that the nation paid in poor rates, last year, 7,896,556*l.*, or, $31,586,224; being more than *twice the amount of all the taxes* which you paid during the last year, if Mr. Madison's statement be correct. But that I may not expose myself to the risk of being charged with a wrong computation, I must first state, that no official account of this important matter has been laid before parliament since 1803; and that, therefore, I am forced to resort to computation, the grounds of which I will now explicitly state. I have the means of coming at the exact amount of the poor rates in *Bishop's Waltham parish*, where my farm lies, for the last year. This is a parish subject to no fluctuation of prosperity; it has no manufactories in it; it has a small country town and a large tract of arable, meadow, wood, and waste land. Therefore, I may very fairly take the increase of the poor rates here as a criterion of the increase of the poor rates of the whole country, especially if we find, from the official reports, that the poor rates of this parish had, for nearly thirty years, up to 1803, kept a very nearly exact pace with the poor rates of the whole nation. There were three different periods at which the report of 1803 took the poor rates of the whole nation, and, also, the poor rates of Bishop's Waltham parish; and the statement was as follows, observing, however, that, as to poor rates, we speak of only *England and Wales*, Scotland not being under the poor laws.

England and Wales.			*Bishop's Waltham.*		
In the year			In the year		
1776,	-	£1,720,316	1776,	- -	£58
1784,	-	2,167,749	1784,	- -	670
1803,	-	5,447,205	1803,	- -	1,595

It is quite surprising to observe how exact are these *proportions;* how regularly this parish kept pace, for twenty-seven years, with the whole nation in the increase of its poor rates. But, in order to leave no room for cavil on this head, the subject being one of the utmost importance, we will proportion this parish according to its population: had of *paupers*, in 1803, there being no account of the nation's number of paupers previous to 1803, and there being no likelihood that we shall ever see another,

England and Wales.			*Bishop's Waltham.*		
Population,	-	8,872,980	Population,	-	1773
Paupers, exclusive of persons in alms houses.	-	1,256,357	Paupers,	-	236

Now, if you multiply the paupers by *seven*, in both instances, you will find that they amount to nearly the whole of the population, making it appear that, in 1803, there were nearly *one pauper* to every *seven persons* in the parish of Bishop's Waltham, as well as throughout England and Wales. It was said, in our news-

papers, that the emperor of Russia, and the king of Prussia, expressed their surprise at seeing *no poor people* in England. If this was true, it was clear that their majesties did not look in the *right places*. We now come to the result. The poor rates in Bishop's Waltham parish, instead of the 1,595*l.* to which they amounted in 1803, amounted *last year* to 2,355*l.* 18*s.* 6½*d.* as I know from the poor book now lying before me, and of which sum I *myself* paid more than 100*l.* or $400. If, therefore, this criterion be a good one, and such, I think, it cannot be denied to be; if, in 1803, Bishop's Waltham paid 1,595*l.*, while England and Wales paid 5,348,205*l.*, England and Wales must, *last year*, have paid 7,896,556*l.*, seeing that Bishop's Waltham paid, in the same year, 2,355*l.*, throwing aside the shillings, pence, and farthings.

I return, then, to my former statement, that the poor rates alone of England and Wales, exclusive of Scotland, (where, however, there is something paid in support of the poor,) amounts to more than double the sum which was last year (a year of great expense) paid by the whole of the population of America into the treasury, in taxes of all sorts, direct and indirect.

Then comes another question; namely, what is the relative population of the two countries? I have not the account of your last *census* at hand. I think it made your total population amount to between seven and eight millions. At *this time* I cannot suppose it to be less than eight millions. Take, then, the 5,348,205*l.* of poor rates, in 1803, observing that then there were 1,256,357 paupers, and you will find that we must have now upwards of 1,800,000 paupers, provisions being at this time as cheap, if not cheaper, than they were in 1803. Deduct, therefore, from the 8,872,980 (the population of England and Wales) the 1,800,000 paupers, and then there are left *to pay* the 7,896,556*l.* of poor rates, only 7,072,980 persons, including women and children.

The *paying* population, as to poor rates, is, at any rate, smaller than the population of your republic; and the sum paid exceeds, as I have before stated, *twice* the amount of *the whole of the taxes of every sort* which you paid last year into the treasury of the United States, if Mr. Madison's statement be correct.

Turning towards another view of this interesting subject, we perceive that, if we exclude the paupers, as we rationally must, the poor rates alone amount to more than *one pound sterling*, or *four dollars* a head, on the whole of the population of England and Wales. Our poor rates alone amounted to this on the whole of our population; while, according to Mr. Madison's account, the whole of the taxes of every sort paid into the treasury of the United States, do not amount to more than two dollars a head on your population, even supposing your population to be now little more than seven millions.

The *tythes* form another part of our taxes. I do not mean to speak of them, as some most *loyal* men do, as being peculiarly odious; or, indeed, as being odious at all, either in their nature, or the mode of their collection, in which latter I have never experienced any thing severe or vexatious; nor do I believe that, as far as the clergy are the owners of the tythes, (for they do not own more than about the half of them,) their rate, or collection, is often severe, or unfair, or even troublesome. Still, however, the tythes which Arthur Young, in 1792, estimated at 5,000,000*l.* in England and Wales, must be looked upon as so much money raised upon the land; and certainly it would not be raised if there were no established church, no state religion. In short, the tythes, as far as the clergy are the receivers, must be looked upon as so much money received and expended by the government; so much money given by the government to a description of persons eminently calculated to repay it in support. Nevertheless, I will not include the *tythes* among the *taxes* of the nation. Lord Sheffield, indeed; he who predicted in his book, published in 1783, that you would soon wish to return to your *allegiance*, which, as he made it out, would be found necessary to your very existence as a people; that same Lord Sheffield, in a speech to a meeting of wool-growers, lately reckoned *tythes* among the causes of our farmers' being unable to maintain a competition with those of *neighbouring countries*. I do not give so much weight to tythes; but, still, it must not be forgotten; and when a report to the house of commons, made in 1803, states *the whole rental* of the kingdom of Great Britain at twenty-eight millions, you will perceive that if we take the tythes at Mr. Arthur Young's estimate, of 1792, the tythes amount to more than *a sixth* of the whole rental. Indeed, they must amount to a great deal more; because the tythe consists of a tenth of *the whole of the produce of a farm;* and, of course, it is a tenth of the rent, the labour, the taxes, the capital, the manure, and all other outgoings; and of the profits into the bargain. So that the tythes of the *produce* cannot, I should suppose, be less than a *fourth* of the rental; and, of course, that they amount to about 7,000,000*l.* in England and Wales, at this time; Scotland paying no tythes. But, then, it must be observed, that the *church* does not receive more than the half of this sum. The rest is the property of lay-persons. It is, in fact, private property, and is sold, or rented, as other private property is. Upon the subject of tythes, therefore, I shall not enter into any comparison between your country and ours. All the world knows that you have *no tythes*, and no compulsory payments, on account of religion of any description; all the world knows that the Episcopalians, the Quakers, the Catholics, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, the Moravians, the Dunkards, the Swenfelders, the Seceders, the Unitarians, the

Swedenburgers, and many other descriptions of Christians, each condemning the opinions of all the others; together with Jews and Deists, who laugh at the whole of them; have their assemblies in your country; and that any one of them, or even of Atheists, may become your president, vice-president, or a member of the congress, without any question being asked him with regard to his religion; while it is equally well known, that no man can be a magistrate, or fill any office of trust, in England, unless he first give a *test* of his being a member of the established church, the *head* of which church is the king, who has the absolute appointment of all the bishops and deans, and of the greater part of the beneficed priests. These facts being merely mentioned, I need add nothing further on the subject, except that we have many persons punished in England for publishing works on the subject of religion, while you have no such punishments; and we have recently seen a man imprisoned for eighteen months, and put in the pillory, for republishing a work here which had been first published in your country. Which system is best, and which worst, it is not my present object to inquire. My business, upon this occasion, is merely to state facts which no one can deny, leaving it to the reader to form opinions and draw conclusions.

We will now, then, return to the *taxes*, which we will take in the aggregate, on both sides of the Atlantic; and then, taking the *population* of each country, we shall see how much *we* pay per head, and how much *you* pay per head. There must be a little confusion here, in our part of the statement, because we have regular poor rates, by law, in England and Wales, while Scotland has no such law, though there are collections there also for the support of the poor. This, however, cannot be accurately come at. I will, therefore, leave it wholly out, and look upon the poor rates of England and Wales as raised upon the whole of Great Britain. I will here leave out the shillings, pence, and farthings.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Amount of taxes paid into the treasury, - -	£74,027,583
Paid to the tax-gatherers for collection or management,	3,504,938
Amount of poor taxes, - - -	7,896,556
Total,	£85,429,077
	or,
	$341,716,308

But now, in taking the aggregate of *your* taxes, you will see the necessity of my including those which are raised upon the people in the *several states* for the support of the several *state governments*, which taxes, of course, form an *addition* to the taxes paid to the general government of the United States. My materials for ascertaining the amount of these *state taxes* is not

quite so perfect as I could wish. Yet I have means to do it to the satisfaction of any one whose object is that of arriving at truth. In 1805, Benjamin Davies, of Philadelphia, a man of great research and of great accuracy, published, in his "New System of Geography," an account of the revenues and expenses of *eight* of the states; correct information from the other states, on this head, not being apparently at his command, or within his reach. This, however, is quite sufficient for our purpose; for no reasonable man will suppose that these eight states, and those the principal ones, do not furnish a fair criterion whereon to found an estimate of the whole. His account stands as follows, in dollars and *cents*, or hundredths of a dollar.

STATES.	TAXES.	*Taxes per head on the population of the state.*
	Dollars.	Cents.
Vermont,	10,800	12
Massachusetts,	116,000	21
Connecticut,	19,584	7
New-York,	Rich in public funds, &c.	
New-Jersey,	27,000	12
Pennsylvania,	397,863	76
Maryland,	53,000	16
Virginia,	377,703	43
South-Carolina,	70,000	35
	8) 213	
	Average,	26 5-8

It appears from Benjamin Davies' account, that these taxes, or, rather, these resources, arise, in many cases, from the *interest of stock*, of which the states are the owners, and which make part of the public debt in America. In other cases, they arise from the *sale of lands* belonging to the states. He represents New-York state to be owner of 2,000,000 of dollars in stock, and to hold numerous shares in canals, &c. &c. But I shall suppose that the whole of this sum is raised in *taxes* upon the people, and paid out of their pockets. It will then come to this, that each inhabitant of the American republic pays, in this way, and on this account, 26 5-8 *cents*, or hundredths of a dollar.

You have also, in the great towns, some *poor* to assist. I am quite in the dark upon this head, except as far as observation of some years ago can guide me. This item, therefore, I will take at a guess; and, if I allow that the poor cost *nearly as much as the state governments*, no one on this side of the water, at any rate, can complain of the estimate. I therefore take the state taxes, including poor taxes, at 50 *cents*, or half a dollar a head, upon the whole of your population. I know that you will say that this is a monstrous over-rate as to your poor taxes. But I am resolved not to be complained of on the other side. As to

road rates, turnpikes, watching and lighting, and paving and watering, of cities and towns, I do not notice these in either country, seeing that they are for the immediate benefit of those who pay them.

We will now return to our comparison between the distribution, per head, of our taxes and of yours.

Our year's taxes, including poor taxes, we find amounting to 341,716,308 dollars. Our population in Great Britain, in 1803, was as follows:

England and Wales,		8,872,980
Scotland,		1,607,760
Army and navy,		469,188
Convicts in the hulks,		1,410
	Total,	10,951,338
Deduct army and navy,		469,188
		10,482,150
Deduct convicts on board the hulks,		1,410
		10,480,740
Deduct paupers,		1,800,000
		8,680,740

I make no deduction for prisoners in our jails, whether for crimes or debts; though, as I shall, with sorrow, have to state, by and by, these are worthy of very serious notice, even in the comparative view which we are now making. I suppose that I shall not be contradicted when I say, that it is impossible, upon any rational ground, to include soldiers, sailors, convicts, and paupers, amongst the *payers of taxes;* and that, therefore, the deductions which I have made will be allowed to be necessary to the correctness of the comparison. But to get rid of the chance of a cavil being raised; to put it out of the power of any human being to object to my basis, I will distribute our taxes amongst the whole of the population, and will even take that population at its amount previous to the enormous emigration of natives, and *re-emigration* of foreigners, which the peace on the continent of Europe has produced. Taking the whole of the population of Great Britain, therefore, at 10,951,338, it appears that, for *each person*, old and young, male and female, there were taxes paid, last year, to the amount of *thirty-one dollars and twenty cents;* (throwing away a fraction;) or, in sterling money of England, *7l. 16s.* This, you will observe, is for every soul, whether pauper, soldier, sailor, debtor, convict, or other criminal.

On your side I will take the population, of every description, at only 7,500,000, though it is notoriously much more. Your United States' taxes, last year, amounted to $14,550,000, which,

distributed amongst your 7,500,000 people, imposes upon each a little *less* than $2; and if we add the taxes of the state governments, and the largely estimated poor taxes as above, each person in your republic paid last year, including every species of tax, the sum of $2 50, or 12*s.* 6*d.* of our money, while, as we have just seen, there was paid in Great Britain, for every soul, including soldiers, sailors, paupers, debtors, convicts and criminals in prison, the sum of $31 20; or 7*l.* 6*s.* of our money.

Really (for I must break out a little here) Mr. Madison does appear to have boasted *betimes* of the *fortitude* of your people; of the *cheerfulness* with which they bear the *burdens* which the war imposes on them; of their *giving the taxes*, direct and indirect, with *promptness* and *alacrity!* Let him, before he talks in this way, put the people into our state of trial. Let him try the whole population, man, woman, and child, pauper, soldier, sailor, debtor, convict and criminal prisoner, with thirty-one dollars and twenty cents each, instead of two paltry dollars and a half; and *then* let him talk, if he likes, of their fortitude and patriotism. Our lords and gentlemen, in our honourable houses, talk, indeed, with good grounds, of our *unexampled patience* under our *burdens*. This compliment, which parliaments in former times seldom bestowed on our and your forefathers, and which, to acknowledge the truth, they as seldom merited, is fully due to us. But, really, Mr. Madison has begun a little too soon to compliment his fellow-citizens on their quality of *bearing burdens*. Their twelve-and-sixpenny patience will be thought very little of on this side of the water, where we bear, taking paupers, soldiers, and all, *eleven times as much* without even a whisper in the way of complaint. There was, indeed, a few years ago, a man by the name of Cartor, in Staffordshire, who published an article which was understood to contain a censure on his majesty's commissioners of property tax in that county; but he was soon led to feel sorrow for his conduct; and, since that, the country has not been disgraced by one single soul found to follow the evil example, or to be in the like case offending. Mr. Madison says, that his fellow citizens will *proudly* bear their burdens. But can they bear them so *proudly* as we have borne, and still bear, ours? Has he heard of the bonfires, the ringing of bells, the roasting of sheep and of oxen, the feasts, the balls, and the singing parties, which took place whilst the kings, our friends in the war, were here last summer? Has he heard of the joy at the sight of the exhibition in the Green Park, and that of the sham naval fight on the Serpentine River, which formed so apt a representation of Lake Champlain and its outlet? Mr. Madison must come hither (and the *Times* newspaper expects to have him here) before he can form the most distant idea of the extent and value of *our patience* and *loyalty*. The sum which one good farm pays here, in the various kinds of taxes,

would, if attempted to be collected in America, set a whole township, if not a whole county, of your grudging republicans in mutiny; and compel the magistrate to call out the horse soldiers, if there were any at his command. Let us hear no more, therefore, of Mr. Madison's twelve-and-sixpenny patience. Let us hear no more of his boasts of the fortitude of his republicans, until their *fortitude* makes somewhat of a nearer approach towards ours.

If you will excuse this digression, into which, you will confess, I was so naturally led, not to say dragged, I will now return to my statement of facts, proceeding next to a view of the *crimes* and *punishments* in this country.

As to our *criminal code*, you, who are a lawyer, know full as much about it as I do, except as far as relates to the *experience* in cases of *libel*. It is merely of the number and description of crimes and punishments that I am now about to speak: and, as in other cases, I shall not deal in vague surmises or general observations, but appeal to authentic reports, and build my statements on the unerring rules of arithmetic. Sir Samuel Romilly, who has for many years been labouring to effect a softening of our criminal code, caused, in the year 1811, an account to be laid before parliament of the crimes and punishments, as far as they came before the judges, for several years preceding. Owing to some cause, with which I am not acquainted, the account came no lower down than the year 1809; and it extended no further than England and Wales, leaving out Scotland, where, as I am told, there are in fact but very few crimes and punishments, though the sheriffs and other officers of justice in that country are pretty expensive, and are paid out of what is called the civil list. The summary of the account, of which I have spoken above, is as follows:

	Persons.
Committed for trial,	2721
Convicted,	1573
Sentenced to suffer death,	372
——— to be transported,	401
——— to be imprisoned, whipped, fined, &c.	800
Actually put to death,	57

Beside these, you will observe, there are all the persons who were tried at the *quarter sessions* in the several counties; that is to say, the sessions held by the *justices of the peace*, four times in every year, where as many of the justices as choose to attend form the court, having one of their own body for chairman. At these sessions the offences of a less heinous nature are examined into and punished. But the justices can sentence to *imprisonment, whip-*

ping, fine, and, I believe, they can *transport.* This is the great court for the trial of persons charged with thefts of an inferior order; and, I should suppose, that the number of criminals brought before these courts is twice as great as that of the criminals who are reserved for trial before the judges, who go into some counties but *once* in the year, and into none, except Middlesex, more than *twice;* whereas, the court of quarter sessions is held every three months. However, as I cannot speak here from any authentic document, I shall leave this as a thing whereon for you to exercise your judgment.

As to any *comparison* on this point, between our country and yours, I am wholly destitute of any authentic document, relative to America, touching crimes and punishments. I can, however, speak as far as my own observation went. I lived in Philadelphia about eight years, with every disposition to find fault with every thing that I saw, or heard of, that was amiss. During that time, I never heard of any person, except in one instance, being tried for his or her life; I never heard of a murder, a highway robbery, or of a house being broken open; I never heard of an execution of death on any person, except (the instance above alluded to) of three men hanged, on the banks of the Delaware, for piracy and murder; these men were foreigners; and such was the horror of an execution, even in such a case, that the executioner was obliged to be disguised in such a way that it was impossible that any one should recognise either his person or features, being brought to the spot in a carriage, under an escort of constables, and taken away in a similar manner, so as to make it almost impossible for him to become publicly known. Philadelphia, at the time I speak of, contained about 70,000 inhabitants.

It is, as I observed before, impossible to come at any exact statement on this subject, in the way of *comparison;* but a few facts, notorious on the two sides of the water respectively, will serve to aid you greatly in forming your opinions as to this matter. Here we have laws to guard our *turnip fields* from robbery, and very necessary they are; for without them there is no man in any part of the country who could depend on having the use of his crop even of that coarse and bulky article. To steal corn out of a *field* after it is cut, is punished with *death* by our laws; and if we had fields of Indian corn, as you have, which is a delightful food for several weeks before it is ripe, I cannot form an idea of the means that would be necessary to preserve it from being carried away. As to *poultry,* no man in England has the smallest expectation of being able ever to taste what he raises, except he carefully locks it up in the night, and has dogs to guard the approaches to the hen-roost. In America, at within ten or twelve miles of Philadelphia, it is a common practice of the farmers to turn the flocks of turkeys *into the woods* in the latter end of August; there to re-

main until towards winter, when they return half fat. A farmer in England would no more think of doing this than he would think of depositing his purse in any of the public foot-paths across his fields. In order to preserve their fences, the farmers sometimes resort to this experiment: they bore holes into the stoutest of the stakes, which sustain their hedges; put gunpowder into those holes; then drive in a piece of wood very tightly upon the powder; so that the stolen hedge, in place of performing its office of boiling the kettle, dashes it, and all around it, to pieces. This mode of preserving fences I first heard of at *Alresford*, a town about twelve miles distance from Botley; and though it certainly does appear, at first sight, a very cruel one, what is a man to do? The thieves are so expert as to set detection at defiance; and there is nothing but his fences between him and ruin. I have known a man who assured me, that, by the stealing of his hedge in the month of March, and letting into his wheat land the flocks from the commons, he lost more than 300*l.* in one night and part of the ensuing day. A few weeks ago I myself had a *fire*, by which I lost a couple of barns, and some other buildings. At this fire a numerous crowd was assembled, many of whom came for the purpose of rendering assistance; but one man was detected, while the fire was yet raging, *stealing the lead and iron work of a pump*, fulfilling the old saying, that nothing is too *hot* or too *heavy* for a thief; and it required the utmost of my resolution and exertion, aided by three sons, and a half a dozen resolute and faithful servants, to preserve, during the night and next day, (which was Sunday,) the imperishable and portable part of the property from being carried away. I will just add upon this subject, as an instance of the baseness of our press, that the *Times* newspaper published, upon this occasion, a paragraph, stating that I had most *ungratefully* driven away "the *honest rustics*" who had *kindly* come to my *assistance*. It is very true that I did drive the "honest *rustics*" away; but I succeeded in putting a stop to their thefts, which would, I verily believe, have been nearly as injurious as the fire. Since the fire happened upon my premises, a gentleman, who had a similar accident some few years ago, has assured me, that almost every article of *iron* was stolen from his premises. It is notorious that, in London, the thieving forms a very considerable part of every such calamity. But the thing which better than any other bespeaks the nature of our situation, in this respect, is the exhibition of notices on the top of garden walls, and of other fences, menacing those who enter with the danger of death from *man traps* and *spring guns*. Peter Pindar has immortalized these by introducing them into a poem, where he ludicrously represents the king as intent upon "catching his living subjects by the legs." But he must have well known, that, without them, neither king nor subject could possess the produce of a

garden. Sometimes the *traps themselves* are hoisted up upon a sort of gibbet, in the day time, in order to inspire greater terror; and it is only a few months ago that we had an account of a man being actually killed by a spring gun, in a nocturnal expedition in a garden at Mitcham. Beside these, we are infested by gangs of itinerant thieves, called *gypsies*. The life of these people very much resembles that of the savages whom I have seen on the borders of the *river St. John*, in New-Brunswick; except that the latter gain their food by hunting and fishing, and the former by theft. The gypsies have no settled home; no house, or hut, or place of dwelling. They have asses, which carry themselves, their children, their kettle, and their means of erecting tents, and which tents are precisely like those of the North American savages. The nights they employ in thieving. Sheep, pigs, poultry, corn, roots, fruit; nothing comes amiss to them. What they steal in one place, they spend in another; and thus they proceed all over the country. They commit acts of murder, and theft, and arson, innumerable. The members of this moving community are frequently hanged, or transported; but still the troops of vagabonds exist; and, as far as I am able to judge, are as numerous as they were when I was a boy. But still the great evil, in this view of the subject, is the want of honesty in the labouring class, to whatsoever cause that evil is to be ascribed. Those writers on rural affairs, who have urged the employing of *threshing machines for corn*, have counted, amongst the greatest of their advantages, that they protected the farmer against the *thefts* of the *thresher*. Various are the ways in which corn is stolen by those who thresh it; but I will content myself with one, the information with regard to which I derived from a respectable neighbour. He perceived that his thresher brought a large *wooden bottle* with him to work every day. Being winter time, he could not conceive what should make the man so very thirsty. He watched him: never saw him drink. At last he accosted him in his way home, and after some altercation, insisted upon examining the bottle, which he found to be full of wheat. Thus was this man taking away three gallons of wheat every week, which, at that time, was not worth less than six shillings. It was this, I believe, and this alone, which made my neighbour resolve to use a threshing machine.

Such is by no means an overcharged view of our situation in this respect. Of the causes which have led to it I shall not speak; indeed, I do not know that I am competent. That it is not owing to a *want of penal laws* is very certain. I am unable to say whether your country, at this time, be better or worse situated as to this matter. At any rate, I shall enable you to make the comparison; and as such comparisons, if clearly and candidly made, might be of great use to the people of both countries, I think it is not too much for me to hope that you, in the public manner of

which I am giving you an example, will communicate the comparison to me. But, if you can do it, let us have *authentic documents*. It would be perfectly easy to obtain a year's account of all the commitments, convictions, and sentences in your republic. I should not fear executing such a task with an expense of twenty dollars; and, as the execution of it would give to the world a piece of the most interesting and most valuable information, I will not fear that you, who have all the means in your hands, will decline to undertake it. If you do undertake it, I know that you will execute it with a strict adherence to truth; and, if so executed, it must be productive of great good. Both countries must profit from it, especially if peace should happily be restored between them.

As to the *mode of living* in this country, compared to the mode of living in your republic, I cannot in this letter enter into the inquiry, which would take up more room than I have at present, and also much more time. It is, however, a most interesting subject; because it speaks, at once, to the great object for which civil society was framed; namely, the *happiness of the people*. Even now, however, I cannot refrain from giving you a notion of the manner in which our *labourers* live. I am, strange as it may seem, enabled to appeal to *parliamentary authority* here also. There is now before me a report of a committee of the house of commons on the subject of the corn laws. This committee report the evidence of certain persons examined by them; and, amongst the rest, of a great landholder in Wiltshire, named Bennett, who, upon being asked how much a labourer and his family ought to have to live upon, answered: "We calculate that every person in a labourer's family should have, *per week*, the price of a gallon loaf, and *three pence* over for *feeding* and *clothing*, exclusive of house rent, sickness, and casual expenses." This report was ordered by the house of commons to be printed, on the 26th of July last.

Now, "*a gallon loaf*" weighs, according to law, 8lb. 10oz. avoirdupois weight. This is the allotment for seven days for one person; but, then as you will perceive, Mr. Bennett and his neighbours allow threepence, or five cents a week more, or suppose a cent per day more, for *feeding* and *clothing*. The particulars of the *feeding* and *clothing* that can be had for three pence per week, or thirteen shillings a year, it would, perhaps, be difficult to ascertain, without immediate application to Mr. Bennett; and as that is out of my power, I must leave these particulars to be come at by your powers of divination; adding, however, that as far as my observation has reached, Mr. Bennett's account appears to have been tolerably correct. I am, with sincere esteem, your friend,

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, England, November 15, 1814.

STATE OF THE NATION.

Mr. Cobbett,

So, sir, there is sad news from America! We are not merely repulsed with loss and slaughter, by a set of ragamuffins without red coats; but we also lose our brave, our gallant, our humane, and generous officers. As to the common men being killed, that is nothing; they are only numbered, not named; whereas our officers are always the very best of their species; so that the Americans, in shooting them, are guilty of great presumption, beside downright murder, and a most grievous loss it is to Britain. The shooting a few more of our officers, by those plaguy smock-frocked riflemen, may also prove a material protraction to our recolonizing the continent of America. I should, therefore, be of opinion, that our officers ought to disguise themselves as they did during the last war; for these impudent riflemen are so accustomed to shoot their wild turkeys *flying*, that it will be impossible for a single officer to escape, if they once recognise him.

This consideration alone is sufficient to compel the ministry to leave America unconquered, and patch up a peace; unless, indeed, our interest in the now sitting congress of the legitimate proprietors of the human race, be so great as to cause it to be enacted, that, henceforward, in warfare, it shall be against the law of nations to fire at, wound, or slay, any officer bearing his Britannic majesty's commission. But while we thus complain of the passing events abroad, let us endeavour to remedy some of the abuses at home. It is an undeniable fact, that we groan under an immense load of taxes, which scarcely leave to the many the means of procuring the necessaries of life. We exhibit to the astonished world the spectacle of a *free* nation, paying double the sum in *taxes* of any other country, under the most arbitrary and despotic government, and our protecting parliament loads free-born Britons with heavier burthens than all the ukases of an autocrat imposes on the servile Russian. Yet a very great proportion of these *taxes* go towards the support of those who govern; and without entering at present into a disquisition as to the mode or profusion in which the members of, and adherents to, government are paid, *we must insist* that a certain indispensable duty attaches to them in return for the large salaries they receive from the public, and that to the public they are amenable, who, at the same time, are competent to judge whether that indispensable duty be neglected or inadequately performed.

With the public also a power to remove, or punish, exists; and, therefore, all endeavours to recall such servants back to their

duty, and all inflictions of punishment for a departure therefrom, are not only strictly justifiable and highly laudable, but, in fact, the bounden duty of each individual towards his country. Every such individual would himself depart from the line of justice, and become a traitor, were he, from self-interested motives, tamely to submit to flagrant abuses in the government, and suffer them to be handed down to posterity. This rule fairly laid down, it behooves us to make a strict inquiry into our present ruinous state, and to scrutinize the measures which have brought us into it. Next, let us examine whether the constitutional axiom, that *the king can do no wrong*, extends to his cabinet, or even to parliament. Then, whether a nation is bound to sit down contented with its wrongs, because a white-washing bill, brought in by members of such cabinet, may have been passed by a parliament, many of whose members, if not principals, have been accessaries to the abuses in favour of which the indemnity bill was required—a parliament, who may already have passed bills encroaching upon those liberties they had sworn to defend—a parliament, where it is probable placemen and pensioners abounded, and where such may have had the traitorous insolence to advocate corruption.

To begin with our present situation: After a twenty years murderous, and every way ruinous, war, we are at peace, *for the moment*, with the continent of Europe, but we are still plunged in a savage and destructive hostility with America. During our twenty years continental war, much blood has been shed, while, excepting a few individuals, who, by contracts and commissions, have amassed fortunes, general ruin has ensued, an immense national debt has accumulated, and all our gold has left the country. The concomitants of this are, a stagnation of trade, a rivalship of our manufactures, an impossibility of paying taxes; an enormous increase of paupers, and a *ruinous paper currency*. But peace, it was expected, would have restored our commerce and diminished our taxes. Instead of which, more taxes will be wanted, in whatever shape they may be imposed, to bring up the arrears of the war expenditure; and, in order to engage the people to pay further demands without murmuring, the contest with America is kept up; while peace with France, instead of augmenting the people's resources, has only furnished the superior classes, and indeed all those above daily labour, with an opportunity of emigrating, and retiring from this land of taxes, to various parts of the continent, where they may live, not only reasonably, but peaceably, without the hourly dread of being murdered in their houses by disbanded soldiers and sailors.

These marauders, however, having been *taught* the trade of murder and plunder, we ought to bear no hatred against them, if, when we no longer want their *gallant* aid, they, as their only means of subsistence, set up for themselves, and practise indivi-

dually such acts as they performed collectively, and upon which our highest praises have been bestowed. Peace, instead of augmenting the people's resources, is now opening their eyes, is now bringing them to their senses; they find that all Europe has now rivalled us in our manufactures, or prohibits their introduction; and, while this takes place abroad, they experience at home, in the price of the necessaries of life, that forestalling and monopoly have seized on every article; while the waste lands, instead of being given to the poor, have been universally appropriated to the rich, and the quantity of land thereby thrown into cultivation, instead of having the effect of lowering its price, has only encouraged the landholders to rack-rent their tenants.

Thus, then, the industrious part of the community, owing to the heavy taxes, the decay of trade, and the existing monopoly, have no alternative *at home* but starvation as a reward for their labour; a work house as a retreat, if disabled by sickness or age; and the gallows, if they dare practise, in retail, what their superiors are guilty of in wholesale. They enjoy not even the privilege of the spaniel, who has the liberty of yelping when ill treated; if a man complains, he is instantly deemed seditious, and punished for his temerity. In my next I shall endeavour to point out a radical cure for these evils.

ARISTIDES.

AMERICAN WAR.

THE *Times* newspaper, which was one of the loudest clamourers for this war, now observes, "with *deep regret*, that it has lingered on for so many months without being distinguished by any *memorable stroke*." If the inflammatory and malicious writer of that paper already experiences *disappointment*, what will he experience during the months, yea, and, perhaps, the *years* of this war, which are yet to come? He, when urging on the nation to this enterprise, told them, with the utmost confidence, that in a *few weeks* after war should be commenced, "*the boasted American navy* would be annihilated." Not only has that navy not been annihilated, but it has very much increased. It has annihilated some hundreds of our merchant ships, and has defeated several of our ships of war, some of which, after victory over them, gained in the most wonderful manner, it has added to its own number. It is said, that we are building ships to carry 64 guns, for the express purpose of combating the American frigates. Ours, it seems, are to be called *frigates* also. This is to avoid the *awkwardness* of acknowledging that our frigates are not able to cope with American frigates. Now, if it should happen that one

of these new "*frigates*" of ours is beaten and captured by an American frigate, what will then be said? For my part, were it with me to carry on the war, I would, after what has passed, resort to no such perilous expedient as this, but would, at once, send *ships of the line* against those formidable frigates, without making any apology for so doing. Before the war began, not a word were we told about the frigates. The editors of the *Times* and the *Courier* were only impatient that these frigates should meet ours upon the sea. They said nothing about their stout decks, and their heavy cannon, and their "great big balls." But the moment that the Americans *beat* and *captured* one of our frigates with one of theirs, then we heard these editors, and even the "undaunted sons of Neptune," garbed in blue and gold, exclaiming against the *size* of the American frigates, and the *number of their crews!* We should have thought of all this before we talked of annihilating the American navy in a few weeks. The merchants and underwriters are now petitioning the lords of the admiralty and the Prince Regent to protect them more effectually against this "*contemptible* American navy," which, it seems, has already destroyed their property to the amount of millions, and some of the ships of which are said to blockade, in some sort, part of our harbours in England and Ireland, and are capturing our ships within the sight of land. These gentlemen should have petitioned against *the war*. So far from that, many of them were eager for the war; and do they think that they are to enjoy the gratification of seeing the American towns knocked down, without paying some little matter for it? That the admiralty are employing a great many ships and sailors in this war, our next year's taxes and *loans* will fully convince us; but numerous as their ships and sailors are, they are not, and cannot be, sufficient to cover all the ocean.

The farmers, and landholders, and fundholders, are sighing for the repeal of taxes; but how are they justified in this wish, when it is well known that, to carry on the war, taxes are absolutely necessary; and when it is also well known that those persons were, in general, anxious for the war? Some of them want war to prevent their produce from falling in price; others liked peace with France well enough; but, then, they wished "to give the Yankees a *drubbing*." Therefore, if, to keep up the price of produce, and to give the Yankees a drubbing, taxes are wanted, with what decency can these persons expect that taxes will be taken off? Do we obtain any thing that we want without paying for it, in some way or other? If we want food, or raiment, or houses, or pleasure, do we not expect to pay for them? Can we go to see a play or a puppet-show without money? Why, then, are we to expect to see the greater pleasure of seeing the Yankees *drubbed*, without *paying* for that too? The public seem very

impatient to see the drubbing begin. The *Times* and the *Courier* have been endeavouring to entertain them for a long while, and until they, as well as the audience, appear exhausted. But is it not reasonable that the public should, in this case, as well as in all others, put down their money *previously* to the drawing up of the curtain? In a year or two, perhaps, we shall see the drama commence in good earnest. But is it not enough to be amused with a little dancing and tumbling on the outside *before* we have paid our money? "Send! send away," says the eager editor of the *Times*, "send away a force to *crush* them at once!" But not a word does he say about the *taxes* necessary to pay for the sending and keeping up of such a force.

Our government is composed of wonderfully clever men; but they are not clever enough to make soldiers walk upon the waters over the Atlantic, nor to enact, at a word, loaves and fishes to sustain them after their arrival. To be able to send that "overwhelming force," of which the Times speaks, the government must have *money*; and, as in all other cases, they must have the money *first*. In short, it is unreasonable in the extreme to expect the war in America to be attended with any very signal result, until we have liberally paid two or three years of taxes. The assertion is again made, that the American ships are *manned principally with English, Irish*, and *Scotch*. I find this assertion in the Morning Chronicle of the 6th instant. If this were true, as I hope it is not, what a pleasant and honourable fact this war would have brought to light? No other than this: that many of our seamen, our "gallant tars," the "undaunted sons of Neptune," not only have no dislike to the Americans, but actually have run the risk of being hanged, drawn and quartered, for the sake of fighting in the American service against their own country!

If the world believe these accounts, what must the world think of us? During the long war in which France was engaged, no Frenchmen were ever found in arms against their king and country. Some of them, indeed, embodied themselves under foreign banners to fight, as they pretended, at least, *for* their country, and against those whom they called the usurpers of its government. But, if these accounts be true, our countrymen have *voluntarily* gone into the American service to fight against their country, that country being under the legitimate sway of the glorious and beloved house of Brunswick! The origin of these accounts, so disgraceful to the country, is, probably, the reluctance which our naval officers have to confess defeat at the hands of those *Yankees* whom we were so desirous to see *drubbed*. To avoid this painful acknowledgment, it has been asserted, that we have not been beaten by the Yankees, but by our own *brave* countrymen. But here, again, a difficulty arises: for how comes it to pass that our own brave countrymen have more success on board

Yankee ships than on board of our own heart of oak? How comes it to pass that, the men on both sides being precisely of the same race and education, those in the Yankee ships should beat those in "the wooden walls of Old England?" It has been observed, that they fight more desperately, knowing that they fight with *a halter about their necks.* What an aspersion on "the sons of Neptune!" As if the sons of Neptune, the gallant jack tars of Old England, wanted a halter around their necks, and the gallows and executioner's knife before their eyes, to make them do more in battle than they are ready to do for the sake of their king and country, and from a sentiment of honour! This is, really, giving a cruel stab to the character of our sailors; but such is the sorry malignity of those who publish these accounts of treasonable practices, that they entirely overlook these obvious inferences, in their anxiety to get rid of the supposition that any thing praiseworthy belongs to the character of the enemy.

If these accounts be true, as I hope they are not, why are not the traitors *tried* and executed? Why are they suffered to remain in the American service? Why are they suffered to go on thus, shouting at, boarding, and taking our ships, insulting our gallant officers, and putting our men in irons? Why are they not, I ask again, *tried* and *hanged?* Why are not their warm bowels ripped out, and thrown in their traitorous faces? Why are their bodies not cut into quarters, and those quarters placed at the king's disposal?—But, I had forgotten, that before these things can be done, we must *capture* the ships in which they sail! Is there no *other* way of coming at them? It were well if those, whose business it is to enforce the law against state criminals, would fall upon some scheme to reach them. Cannot the parliament, which has been called *omnipotent*, find out some means of coming at them? In short, these accounts are a deep disgrace to the country; and I do hope, that the lords of the admiralty, who published that eloquent paper, stimulating the sailors to fight against the Americans, will fall speedily upon some means of putting an end to so great a scandal.

I have not time, at present, to enter so fully into the subject of the American war as I shall in my next; but, to the loose observations that I have made, I cannot refrain from adding a word or two on the rupture of the negotiations at Ghent, which is said to have taken place. Who, in his senses, expected any other result? It was manifest, from the moment that Napoleon was removed from France, that the war with America was destined to become a serious contest. There were all sorts of feelings at work in favour of such a war. There was not a single voice (mine only excepted) raised against it. Was it to be supposed, then, that peace would be the work of a few months? Yet this rupture of the negotiations appears to have excited a good deal of

surprise, not wholly devested of a small portion of alarm. It was expected that the Yankee commissioners would jump at peace on any terms. There were thousands of persons, and well-dressed persons, too, who said that the Yankees would not hesitate a moment to *depose* Mr. Madison, and send him to some little uninhabited island. About a fortnight ago some rifle soldiers were passing my house, on their way from Sussex to Plymouth, to join their corps, bound to America. A sergeant, who was at a little distance behind the party, stopped at my door and asked for some beer. While the beer was drawing, I observed to him, that *Jonathan* must take care now what he was about. "No," said the sergeant, "I do not think it will come to any head; for we learned, the day before yesterday, that *Madison had run away.*" I asked him if they had been informed *whither he had run to.* He replied, that he had run "*out of the country.*" He further told me, that we were to have an army of 50,000 men for the conquest of America; and that, if they were not enough, *Russia* had 60,000 men ready to send to our assistance. From this the Americans will judge of the opinions of the people here; for I dare say that this sergeant was no more than the mere repeater of what he heard in almost all the public houses, resorted to by politicians of the most numerous class—but the people are not to be blamed for this delusion. They had it given them, in the report of a speech of one of the lords of the admiralty, not long ago, that we were about to undertake the *deposing* of Mr. Madison; and who can blame them, if they believe that this deposition has taken place? My friend the sergeant, on whom I bestowed my benediction, will, however, I am afraid, find, that this work of deposing Mr. Madison will give more trouble than he appeared to expect; my reasons for which I shall state in my next.

AMERICAN WAR.

THE following account of a battle, and of a *victory* on our part, gained over the Americans, is, perhaps, the most curious of any that ever was published, even in this enlightened Lancaster-school country. Before I insert it, let me observe, that the scene of action lies *in the heart of Canada,* though, from the accounts that we have had, any one, not armed against the system of deception that prevails here, must have supposed that there was not a single American remaining in Canada. The *victory* in question is said to have been gained near the famous falls of Niagara; and we shall now see what *sort* of a victory it was, according to the

account of the commander himself, and which account will become a subject of remark, after I have inserted it.

[Here he inserts the British official account of the battle of the 25th July, in which they admit a loss of killed 84; wounded 559; missing 193; prisoners 42. Total 878.]

Was I not right, reader, in calling this a curious account? Did you ever before hear, except from the mouths or pens of some of our own commanders, of a *victory* of this *sort* before? It is a fault which I have always to point out in *our* histories of battles, that we never begin as the historians of all other countries do, by stating the *strength* of the armies on both sides. We are left here to guess at the force in the field. We are not told what was even our own strength on the occasion. If we had been furnished with this information, we should have been able to judge pretty correctly of the nature of the combat, and of the merits of the two armies. When we find that there has been a total loss of 878 men, including a vast proportion of *officers*, we must conclude that the "*drubbing*" has been on the *Americans* only; for the army under General Drummond did not, in all probability, amount to more than *three* or *four thousand men*. There appears to have been only *four battalions of regulars engaged*, which would hardly surpass 2000 men. What the militia might have amounted to I cannot tell; but as far as I am able to judge from the account, I should suppose that we have lost, on this occasion, *one man out of every five;* so that this is a sort of *victory* that is very costly at any rate. But, except in victories of this kind, who ever heard before of such numbers of *missing* and *prisoners* on the part of the *victors?* When armies are defeated, they have generally pretty long lists of missing and prisoners; but when they gain a victory, and, of course, remain masters of the spot on which the battle has taken place, how odd it is to hear that they have so many people *taken* and *lost*, the latter of whom they can give no account of! And, especially, how odd it is that so many of these taken and lost persons should be *officers*, and officers of very high rank too! Never, surely, was there before a *victory* attended with circumstances so much resembling the usual circumstances of a *defeat*. The commander *severely wounded;* the second in command severely wounded, and made *prisoner* into the bargain; the aid-de-camp to the commander made *prisoner;* several colonels and lieutenant colonels wounded; a great number of officers and men *missing* and made *prisoners*. If such be the marks of a *victory* gained over the Americans, I wonder what will be the marks of a *defeat*, if, unhappily, we should chance to experience a defeat? At any rate, taking the matter in the most favourable light, what a *bloody* battle this must have been! To be sure that is a consideration of little weight with the enemies of freedom, who would gladly see half England put to death, if they could thereby

have their desire of exterminating freedom in America gratified. But this is not all. The battle has not merely been bloody, but it has afforded a proof of the *determined courage of the American army*, and leads us to believe that, if we persevere, the contest will be *long* as well as bloody; and it is the *length* of the contest that we have to fear. The malignant wise man, who writes in the Times newspaper, expresses great sorrow that the "heroes of Toulouse" were not arrived in Canada previous to the late *victory*. But what could they have done *more* than to render the "*success* of our arms *complete?*" And this, we are told, was the case without their assistance.

The same writer, in the same paper, complains of the sovereign of Holland for sending an ambassador to Mr. Madison; and observes, that, if he had waited a *few months*, he might have been spared the humiliation of sending an embassy to Madison, and his set. Hence, it would appear, that this wise man gives our fleets and armies but "*a few months*" to conquer America. It was thus that the same sort of men talked in the memorable times of Burgoyne and Cornwallis. But in those times America had not a population of two millions; she had no government; the greater part of her seaports were in our hands; we had a fourth part of the people for us; and the rest were without money, and almost without clothing and arms. I shall not deny that we may, by the expenditure of *two or three hundred millions of money*, do the Americans a great deal of mischief. I dare say that we shall burn some of their towns, and drive some thousands of women and children back from the coast. But in the meanwhile America will be building and sending out *ships;* she will be gaining experience in the art and practice of war; she will be pushing on her domestic trade and manufactures; she will be harassing our commerce to death; and *our taxes will be increasing*, and annual *loans* must still be made. It is *provoking*, to be sure; but it really is so; that we must leave the Americans in the enjoyment of their *real* liberty; in the enjoyment of freedom which is *no sham;* must be content to see their country the asylum of all those in Europe who will not brook oppression; we must be content to see America *an example* to every people, who are impatient under despotism, or ..... or, (dreadful alternative!) we must be content *to pay all our present taxes, and to have new ones added to them?* Nay, after having, for several years, made these new sacrifices in the cause of "*regular government, social order*, and our *holy religion*," it may possibly happen, at last, that America will remain unhurt; that, having been compelled to learn the art of war, she may become more formidable than ever; and that, in the end, her *fleets*, in the space of ten years, may dispute with ours that trident which we now claim as our exclusive property. Already do we hear persons, who are so eager for giving the "Yankees a

hearty *drubbing*," ask *why* this is not done? They are already impatient for the conclusion, before the beginning has well taken place. They ask *why* the heroes of Toulouse were not at the late *victory?* How unreasonable this is! Just as if the government could convey them in a balloon! Besides, were those heroes to have no time for *repose?* Were they to be set on the moment they had been taken off? The government, to do it justice, have lost no time. They have sent out men as fast as they could get them ready. But it requires *time* to transport men, and guns, and horses, and oats, and hay, and straw, to America; to say nothing about bread, and beef, and pork, and butter, and pease, and rice. Nay, we see that they had to send out the timbers for ships to Canada, where, one would have supposed, there was *wood* enough at any rate. If we were to get possession of New-York I should not be at all surprised to hear that the ministers were sending *fuel* thither for the cooking of the men's victuals. This is very different from what was seen in Portugal, Spain, and France. We shall find no partisans in America; and, especially shall we find nobody to take up arms in our cause. All must go *from this country.* It is a war of enormous expense; and we must expect to pay that expense. If it comes to a close in *seven years* I shall think that we have very good luck. The troops who are going out now, and who have been held in readiness to go out for so long a time, will hardly be able to pull a trigger before next June. By that time the Americans will have half a million of men, and FREE men, too, in arms; and who is to *subdue* half a million of men, armed for the defence of their freedom, and their homes? How did the people of France, as long as the sound of freedom cheered their hearts, drive back, hunt, and lash their invaders. And have the Americans less courage, or less activity, than the French? How silly is it, then, to expect to conquer America in "a few months!" It is a little strange that the government have published no *extraordinary gazette*, giving an account of the great "*victory*," of which we have been speaking. They are not, in general, backward in doing justice to our winners of victories. But it is useless to say much about it. Time will unfold the truth; and, according to all appearance, we shall have *time enough* to learn all about the events, as well as the effects, of the war against the republicans of America. It is strange that we have no account of the *exact numbers* of the prisoners that we ourselves have made. If any *officers* had been *taken by us*, would they not have been *named?* And if we have taken no officers, while the Americans have taken so many of ours, what manner of *victory* is this?

WAYS AND MEANS.

In my last, I noticed the circumstance of ministers having been so hard pressed for money to carry on the war with America, that they had actually found it necessary to apply to the East-India Company for an *advance of duties* on goods not yet imported; or, if brought to this country, not liable to payment of duty for several months to come: and for the sum thus obtained, amounting, as I am informed, to one million two hundred thousand pounds, a *discount* was allowed, though I have not heard to what extent. But this is not the only circumstance which shows that ministers cannot go on without money, and that they have adopted the resolution of raising it, at least for the present, by other methods than that of loans.

Beside the demand upon the East-India Company, which, for obvious reasons, they very quietly submitted to, a requisition has been made upon the other merchants in London, and, I dare say, elsewhere, to pay their arrears of duties on *bonded* goods, which had not for some time been levied, in consequence of the general stagnation of commerce. These gentry, however, do not seem so well *disposed* as the East-India Company are, to comply with the demands of government, and have called a public meeting, for the purpose of taking "into consideration the *very alarming* situation in which they are likely to be placed by the recent determination of the lords of the treasury;" and the Morning Chronicle, which is always *sympathetic* when any thing occurs to indulge its splenetic humour against ministers, has shown its *fellow-feeling* for these merchants, on this very *trying*, very *alarming* occasion, by the following sorrowful lamentation: "The scarcity of money, which has forced the chancellor of the exchequer to the *harsh* measure of *forcing* payment of the duties on all goods that have been bonded above a twelvemonth, will occasion *distress* and *inconvenience* in the city, much more *grievous* than would have been felt by a new loan. The measure of bonding was adopted for the purpose of making this country a depot for the products of different climes—that they might be supplied as the demand arose for them; and it was an admirable contrivance to secure to the country the carrying trade, as well as to ease the merchant when the markets of the continent were shut up against us. These goods have accumulated in the warehouses for five years, and the amount of duties upon them is said to be *four millions sterling*. Now, to force these goods out upon the market all at once, without regard to the demand or price, is a measure of such *severity* as was never attempted before. Many of the original owners are gone. They

disposed of their property, and it may have passed through several hands. In many cases sums have been lent upon the security of those bonded goods; and if they are to be brought forth, and exposed to sale, they must fall to a price *ruinous* to all parties. We suppose that a very strong representation of all the facts will be made to the treasury against the measure, as they are ordered to clear them out, and pay the duties *on* or before *Sunday* the 30th inst. We suppose that the chancellor of the exchequer considered that 'the *better day*, the better deed.' If he should not succeed in procuring this seasonable supply, will this be an apology for requiring a loan, or the funding of exchequer bills after all?"

Those who have been accustomed to consider the writer of this journal the enemy of corruption, will be able to appreciate, by the above article, his *pretensions* to that character. When the unexpected event of the overthrow of Napoleon electrified, as it were, the good people of this country, and almost rendered them frantic with joy, did not the *Morning Chronicle*, on that occasion, *vie* with the prostituted hireling journals in abusing the fallen emperor; in stigmatizing him a *tyrant*, a *despot*, and a *usurper;* and in giving ministers *credit*, nay, loading them with *praise*, for the *noble* efforts they had made to rid the earth of such a monster? Was not this a direct *approval* of every warlike measure of ministers? Was it not a tacit acknowledgment, that every sixpence of money they had levied had been properly done, and met with their entire approbation? But, what is more: Has not this organ of a faction, while canting and whining about the *miseries* and *calamities* of war, given its *hearty concurrence* to the prosecution of the war with America, and *applauded* every step taken by government to recolonize the United States? Even the most servile of all the crew of corruptionists has not been able to excel this contemptible writer in the manner he has *exulted* over the *reverses* of the Americans. Either the editor of the Morning Chronicle is *sincere* in wishing the Yankees a drubbing, or he is *not* sincere. If the latter, then does he labour in vain to be *consistent*, by professions of regard for peace and abhorrence of war, while he acquiesces in, and applauds, the hostile measures pursued against America. But if this new war is not altogether displeasing to the organ of the whigs; if he and his party have resolved to allow ministers to prosecute it their own way, without any molestation from them, how comes it that they are endeavouring, as is evident from the above article, to *paralyze* the hands of ministers? If the war with France required *money* to carry it on; if we could not put down Napoleon without increasing the national debt from *two hundred and fifty nine millions* to NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY; if the deliverance of Europe could not be effected until the country was burthened with an incalculable load of taxes; by what

means is it that we are to *reconquer* America, and to *compel* upwards of eight millions of people, who have shown no liking for our government, to submit to its sway, and to relinquish all the blessings of independence? Is there any other way of doing it but with *money?* To say nothing of their pay, can the men we are every day sending across the Atlantic, to *humble* the Yankees, be conveyed thither without money? They must have food as well as clothing. The seamen must also have food who navigate the vessels, and this not for the voyage merely, but for the whole time it is calculated we are to take in conquering the Americans. Then there is the immense quantity of naval and military stores, necessary for such an army, to be provided for. Can this be done without *money*, or even with a *little* money? No, surely; the war with America, like every other war, can only be supported with money; and where are ministers to look for it but into the pockets of those men who *called* for the war, and who *promised* them their warmest support, if they would only give Jonathan a *drubbing*; who assured ministers that they would consider no sacrifice too great to obtain this desirable object?

What right, then, have these men to come forward, now that the American war has begun in real earnest, and complain of the hardships of making them fulfil their engagements? Or where is the *consistency*, the respect for *principle*, so much talked of by the Morning Chronicle, when it tells us that it would be *harsh*, *distressing*, *inconvenient*, *grievous*, *severe*, *ruinous*, and the Lord knows what, to *force* these men to keep their promises? Is it because they are *alarmed*, because they begin to *feel* the consequences of their *folly*, that they deserve compassion? For my part, it gives me real satisfaction to find these bawlers for war beginning at last to feel *uneasy* for their situation. I wish sincerely they had begun to be *alarmed* somewhat sooner. It would have been for the interest of all Europe; I may say, it would have been for the interest of the whole human race, if these *alarmists* had, twenty years ago, instead of raising a clamour against liberty; if they had *then* felt some of those *compunctions* they now feel, about the *cost* of the war into which they plunged us. As it is, however, no real friend of his country will regret their present alarms. Long, too long, has the majority, the most deserving class of the community, suffered *inconvenience* and *distress*. *Harsh*, *grievous*, *severe*, and *ruinous*, to thousands, have been the measures pursued under the tedious and lengthened reigns of corruption. It is high time, therefore, that the authors of these calamities should themselves have a little experience of the *benefits* resulting from the pernicious system to which they have so long given countenance and support. My only fear is, that they do not *feel* enough; that they are not sufficiently *alarmed* about their situation; and that, notwithstanding all their sympathetic brother

of the Morning Chronicle has so *dolefully* said in their behalf, they will yet be induced to *part* with their money, and to go on believing all that our lying presses tell them about our successes over the Yankees, and the great commercial advantages which these must shortly produce. The chancellor of the exchequer, in the meanwhile, cannot but feel himself placed in a very awkward situation, by the *restive* spirit displayed by John Bull on this occasion; and perhaps is now regretting that he so easily departed from the usual, and more palatable way of raising money by annuity. He was driven to this, I have no doubt, on account of the recent uncommon *fall* in the stocks, occasioned by the anticipation in the money market of a new loan. It was very natural, in these circumstances, to turn his attention elsewhere; and where could he turn it, with greater propriety, than to a quarter where the war had always been most *popular*, and to a fund which, in truth, *belonged* to the country? The money had *in advance* of the East-India Company, can scarcely be considered in that light; but, in the case now before us, it is *admitted*, that there is in the hands of the London merchants no less a sum than *four millions* sterling belonging to the public, that has been accumulating for *five* years, during which, that same public have been submitting to great privations, in order to make up the deficiencies this occasioned. Had the *Morning Chronicle* been properly alive to the interests of the country, it would have called for the *immediate application* of this money to the necessities of the state, instead of advocating the cause of a set of men who have *enriched* themselves by the war, and who, even had they been *losers* by it, have no right to complain; because, had it not been for the support they have all along given to the war, the nation would never have been in its present calamitous state. These *loyalty* men too; these *church* and *state* men; these haters of *jacobins* and *levellers*; what *new* proof is this they are giving of their *patriotism?* Do they wish the country for whom, only a few years ago, they offered to sacrifice their lives and fortunes; do they wish us now to believe that there was no sincerity in these professions? Were they loyal only so long as they were *relieved* from the burdens of the war? Do they regard it as no longer deserving their support than it enables them, by a vast accumulation of foreign products, to keep up the price of these articles, and thus render war advantageous only to themselves? But let me not be accused of ascribing improper motives to these gentlemen. It may be that the Morning Chronicle has misconceived the object of the intended meeting, and thus incautiously rendered its own principles suspected, and exposed its dearest friends to the danger of being ranked amongst the disaffected, the jacobins, and the levellers, who neither delight in war, nor sigh for a participation of the public plunder. I shall not, however, lose sight of the subject; for those who have been the most active in promoting war, and who have derived the greatest benefit

from it, are among the last who ought to be allowed to escape without paying their share of the expense necessary to carry it on. The *Courier*, in noticing that part of the statement of the *Morning Chronicle* which respects the supposed hardship of levying the arrears of duties on bonded goods, says: "The goods have been bonded three, four, or five years; at last, government demands the duty upon them. Is it not the same as if government had given a man permission to defer the payment of his income tax for three years, and then required it to be paid? It must be paid at last." From this it appears that it is seriously intended to put the *loyalty* of our London merchants to the *test*. I hope nothing will occur to induce ministers to abandon this intention. As to what the *Chronicle* says about a loan, or funding exchequer bills, the *Courier* replies, that nothing of the kind is in contemplation; the truth being, "that the *ways* and *means* already provided are sufficient to meet the expenditure to be incurred until some time after Christmas, probably the spring; and the parliament, at its next meeting, will only be called upon to extend the appropriation of them." It might be supposed from this *light* way of treating the subject, that the money raised and expended since the abdication of Napoleon, had been of a very *trifling* nature. But the fact is, independent of all the taxes levied previous to that event being still in existence, no less than fifty-one millions sterling was borrowed subsequent to the year 1812; and if to this is added the advanced duties paid by the East-India Company, and what is about to be raised of arrears on bonded goods, our national expenditure, in the short period of two years, will be found to be equal, if not greater, than what it was during the most expensive period of the war with France. The sum *borrowed* since 1812 is, in truth, only two millions short of the *whole national debt* at the death of George I. and more than a third of its amount at the end of the seven years' war, 1762. These facts will appear obvious from the annexed table, and, I think, must render it sufficiently clear, that means have not been wanting hitherto, whatever may be at present, to give energy to the established system.

King William, of *glorious* memory, was the *father* of our national debt. At his death, in

	Millions.
1702, it extended to - - -	46
1714, death of queen Anne - -	48
1725, ——— George I. - -	53
1762, end of seven years' war - -	141
1782, ——— American war - -	268
1799, beginning of French war - -	259
1802, middle of ditto - - - -	540
1815, month of July - - -	£973,283,159
Of this last sum there has been redeemed by the sinking fund	224,661,932
Leaving of unredeemed capital - -	£748,621,227

But as there is *interest* payable on the money *borrowed* to form the sinking fund, the redeemed capital cannot be deducted, with propriety, from the amount of the

debt, until the annuitants of the sinking fund are paid the principal and interest of the sums they advanced.

I observe, since the above remarks were sent to press, that the meeting of the London merchants has taken place. The chair was filled by that *disinterested* and staunch *loyalist*, Sir Charles Price, who, *poor* man, has more occasion to regret the termination of the war than all the government contractors put together. Whether the *knight* and his brethren had taken the alarm that their loyalty was in danger of being *suspected*, if they went the length the *Morning Chronicle* had done; or whether Sir Charles had agreed to take the chair as a matter of *policy*, to keep down *turbulent* spirits, who might, on this occasion, be disposed to be *clamorous*, it is certain the meeting was conducted in a more *peaceable* and *orderly* manner than there was reason, on the first blush of the business, to expect. The *Courier* report of the proceedings makes the loyal baronet say, "He did not think it necessary for him to make many observations, as he conceived that every gentleman present MUST FEEL how *ruinous* it would be to the trade of London, and what a *cruel hardship* it would be to many individuals, to have those duties strictly levied on so early a day as the 30th. The committee had come to certain resolutions which would be submitted to them, but he should be happy to hear any gentleman who wished still further to elucidate the subject. He hoped, however, that, in whatever observations might be made, the subject would be considered *coolly*, and that no *extraordinary warmth* might be introduced into the discussion. They had only one object—the benefit of the trade; and although they might differ from the lords of the treasury on this point, yet, so far from making any *severe* observations upon his majesty's government, he believed that it was the wish of every one present to support it. *It was, thank God, the best government existing in the world.* The resolutions agreed to by the committee were then proposed, and unanimously adopted. A committee was then appointed to wait upon the lords of the treasury, and point out to them the *ruinous consequences*, both to trade and to the individual merchants, from acting upon the notification that had been given." I am glad it is thus established, beyond dispute, that the merchants of London really *feel* the *ruinous* effects of the measures which they have so long and so strenuously supported. The *extraordinary warmth*, the *severe* observations, of which the chairman was afraid, clearly indicates, that the minds of the trading interest begin to be *seriously* alarmed. Had these alarms been occasioned by any other cause than *individual* interest; had they arisen from a proper conviction of the impolicy of public measures; had the ruined state of the *country*, the rapid and enormous increase of our national debt, the pernicious effects

of our paper currency, and the insupportable burden of taxes. Had causes and considerations like these given birth to these fears and apprehensions, my satisfaction would be greater still. But no—it is *self*, *mere self*, that occasions these alarms. Not an atom of patriotism influences them; these terrors result only from the dread of being compelled to *disgorge* a part of the money which the *bonding monopoly* has enabled them to amass at the expense of public industry. They would willingly apply a remedy to the disease, but then it must cost them *nothing*. They have been *bawling*, for more than twenty years, about the *best government in the world*. This only required a stock of *impudence* and good lungs. Give them reason to hope that another twenty years of clamour will be as *productive* as the last, and they will immediately forget the *ruinous*, the *cruel hardship*, of compelling them to do justice to the country, and bawl as loud as ever. But, as already said, I am glad these corruptionists, who have so long luxuriated on public plunder, begin to feel alarmed at their situation; first, because it is high time they should experience some of those *pangs* that have sent thousands to their graves, and to the workhouse. Next, because, although it is not upon *public* grounds they now complain, something may arise out of these complaints that may open the eyes of the credulous and deluded multitude, and ultimately lead to a favourable change. I see it stated, in all the newspapers, that the emperors of Russia and Austria, and the king of Prussia, have issued orders to recall the excess of *paper currency*, which the great exigencies of the war had occasioned, and, in other respects, are giving their subjects such relief as must convince them that the cry of *peace* is not a deception, and that the benefits resulting from a cessation of arms are not chimerical. But in this *happy* country, *under the best government now existing in the world*, instead of the circulation of *paper money* being *lessened*, instead of the public debt being *reduced*, instead of the *war* taxes being *removed*, they are every day *increasing* to a fearful amount. Everywhere, amongst all classes of society, to whatever side one turns himself, nothing is to be heard but *curses* on the peace. Even when walking along the public streets, it is no way uncommon to be attracted by the *murmurs* of the labourer and the mechanic, who deeply deplore an event, which, they calculated, would be to them the dawn of happiness, but which has not been accompanied with one single blessing. The plain and obvious reason of this disappointment is, people are still in a state of stupid intoxication, of which corruption has dexterously availed itself to plunge the country into a new war. They may complain of sufferings as much as they please; they may talk till doomsday about the hardships they endure; but as long as they do not shake off their present lethargy; as long

as they continue the *willing* dupes, and hug the chains of their oppressors, just so long are they undeserving of compassion, or of a termination of their miseries.

AMERICAN WAR.

When the French war was closed in a manner so satisfactory to those who had been its most strenuous advocates, they, nevertheless, perceived the want of *war* with somebody or other, as being absolutely necessary to the support of that system on which they lived, and which a long war had introduced, and, in some sort, established. It was curious to observe the effect which the peace had upon this description of persons. They *mourned* in their hearts at the success of the projects of the government. They had been, for years, reviling Napoleon; they had been cursing all those who did not join them in these revilings; and yet they *lamented his fall.* In short, they, as I once observed, found themselves in that sort of state which our reverend divines would find themselves in if my worthy friend, Mr. Fordham, were to succeed in his strenuous, but I trust, fruitless, endeavours to persuade the good people of England that there is no such being as the *devil.* There were, at the close of the French war, thousands upon thousands who dreaded the effects of peace; who, in fact, were likely to be almost starved, literally starved, by that event. To these persons, a very numerous, and very busy, and noisy and impudent class, any thing that would keep up the expenses of war, was hailed with joy; and as the American war was the only source of hope, in this respect, the outcry was at once transferred from Napoleon to Mr. Madison, who now became the devil; the man of sin, against whom it was necessary for this *chosen* and *pious* nation to wage war. Unluckily for the cause of peace, the corn in England had become cheap during the last half year of the war; and all that numerous and powerful class who derive their incomes from the land, whether as landlords, tenants, or tythe owners, began to cry out against the effects of peace. With them the American war was better than no war at all. They did not consider what *burthen of taxes* this war would cause. This was quite out of the question. The whole nation, with the exception of the few remaining *jacobins*, went "ding dong" to work, "to give the Yankees a good *hearty drubbing.*" Things are, however, now somewhat changed. The kings are gone; the wiseacres have had their feastings and rejoicings; the *drunk* is over, and nothing but the noisome fumes left. The people, who appeared to exult at the peace, now seem to wonder why they did so. The nation, after the departure of the kings and

their generals, and after the *glorious sights* in the parks at London, seems to resemble a battered old hag, who, in the morning after a rout, sits gaping and yawning, sick of the world and of herself. Every thing is *dull;* and all appears to be changed for the *worse;* the farmer cannot sell his corn at a price proportioned to his outgoings; the French send us all sorts of produce, down even to garden stuffs, at half the price at which we can raise them. The farmer cries out at this; the shopkeeper and tradesman revile the farmer and landholder; they rejoice to see them brought down, and at the same time complain that their business falls off; forgetting that this is the natural consequence of the bringing down of the farmer and land owner. Those who have fixed incomes, and those who carry on no business of profit, those, in short, who are not compelled to remain in the country in order to get their living; a very great portion of these have quitted the kingdom, and have gone to avoid taxes, and to purchase bread and meat upon the continent. This has proved a dreadful stroke to all that part of trade which depended upon luxury; and what is worse, the evil is daily and hourly increasing—for, one tells another, one who has lived in France a *month* for what would have been required to support him here a *week*, tells the news to his relations and friends. A quartern loaf for threepence, a pound of beef for three halfpence, a fowl for fourpence, a turkey for two shillings, a bottle of wine for sixpence! What news for an Englishman, who has a family, who lives upon what is called *his means*, and who, with a thousand a year, is really in a situation to envy a coachman or a footman! No income tax to pay; no exciseman to enter your house when he pleases; no tythe of the produce of your meadow and garden, and pig-stye, and hen-house. What news for an Englishman! who, with the outside of a gentleman, lives in constant dread of a tax-gatherer! No poor rates to pay. Nobody who has authority to make you give part of your property to support those who, perhaps, are really less in want than you. What news for the poor Englishman, who is eternally called upon for money by the overseer and churchwarden! In short, what an escape from expenses and cares! No man can tell on what day, or at what hour, he will be called upon by the government agents for a sum of money; and it is only in certain cases that any man can guess at the amount of the next sum that he will be compelled to pay. What a relief to be at once out of the reach of all such demands! This, together with the cheapness of living in France, cause people to emigrate to that and the neighbouring countries; while all foreigners, of course, have quitted England for their native countries. Those which cannot emigrate have all the taxes to pay, while great part of their sources of payment are gone. Thus, that peace that overthrew Napoleon, which was to bring us a compensation for all our sacrifices, has already made our situation worse,

seeing that, in this *American war*, we have a ground for continuing all the taxes, while the peace with France has taken from us all the means of paying them. Amongst those who wished for the overthrow of Napoleon, were those who had to pay ten per cent. out of their fixed incomes to support the war against him. Oh! said they, let him be beaten, let that cause of the war be put down, and then the tax on us will cease. He is put down. He has been put down many months. The tax has not ceased, and, if it cease, some other tax of equal weight must be imposed in its room, or if this be not done, the American war must cease; and that, too, without "giving the *Yankees a hearty drubbing;*" for, up to this time, they have rather been drubbing *us*, which is a most lamentable fact to go down to posterity. To be sure we have, if report be true, given it them upon the *Serpentine River*, where the British naval flag was everywhere seen flying over the American flag reversed. But, say the Yankee readers, what does this Serpentine River mean? What is the story of this achievement, so glorious to old England, and her wooden walls? I will tell them.

The regent, in the name and on behalf of our "good old king, God bless him," as they say in the toasts at the city feast; the regent, in order at once to amuse and instruct the people of the metropolis, caused, at the epoch of the peace, fleets in miniature to be set on float on a piece of water, in a park near London, called Hyde Park. The piece of water spreads, perhaps, over a space equal to about eight or ten acres. Here the English fleet performed wonders against the Americans, whose frigates they sometimes sunk, sometimes burnt, sometimes destroyed, and sometimes captured. There were some *hottish* fights; but our tars always, in the end, overcame the Yankee dogs, and, at the close of the day, the Yankee flag was seen flying reversed, under the English, in token of the defeat and disgrace of the former. But this was not the only instance in which the Yankees were beaten and disgraced. In Portsmouth harbour, a few days before the continental kings visited that port, I saw the Yankee flag flying reversed under the English on board of several ships. The regent, I understood, came to Portsmouth that very night. How pleasing it must have been to his Royal Highness to behold such a sight! The spectators were in raptures at it. They shouted amain; and, for the moment, seemed to forget even the taxes.

Well, then, who has any ground of complaint? The government cannot obtain for us the reality of what was here exhibited in *vision*, without collecting from us the taxes necessary to support and carry on the war; and until we petition against the American war, we can have no reason whatever to complain of the taxes.

The question of *justice* or of *injustice* seems to have been wholly laid aside for some time past. The giving of the hearty drubbing to the insolent Yankees has supplied the place of all

such topics. But I do not know how it has happened, there are people who now begin to ask, *why* we are still at war? I will, therefore, once more state the grounds of the present war with America, in as clear a manner as I can, consistent with brevity. In 1810, and on to 1812, there existed two subjects of complaint on the part of the Americans against us. They complained that, by virtue of certain *Orders in Council*, issued by us, we violated their neutral rights; and, also, that we were guilty of a gross attack upon their independence, by stopping their merchant vessels *at sea*, and taking out of them *persons*, under pretence of their being British subjects. The Orders of Council were repealed in 1812, and, therefore, that ground of complaint then ceased. But the other ground of complaint still existed. We continued to take persons out of their ships; and, upon that ground, after divers remonstrances, they declared war against us. I ought here to stop to observe that a great error was adopted by the nation at the time when the Orders of Council were repealed. It was said in parliament, and believed by the nation, that, if the Orders in Council were repealed, all would be well, and that a settlement of all differences with America would immediately follow. This assertion I contradicted at the time, knowing that it would prove to be false; because the congress had repeatedly declared that they never would yield the point of *impressment*, that being the term which they gave to the forcible seizure of *persons* on board their ships *on the high seas*. The minister (Perceval) opposed the repeal of the Orders in Council as long as he could, alleging, as one objection to it, that it would not satisfy the Americans and prevent war. The advocates of the repeal insisted that it would satisfy the Americans; and, as a proof of the sincerity of this their opinion, they *pledged* themselves, that in case the repeal did not satisfy America, *they would support the war against her with all their might*. This pledge obtained, the minister had no opposition to fear within doors or without; for the opposition were pledged to support the war, and their prints became, of course, pledged along with them. The people were led to believe, that it was only the Council Orders that had formed the ground of complaint with America; and when they still found that she persevered in the war after the repeal of those orders, they set up a charge of treachery and breach of faith against her. This error, which originated in the desire of the opposition to beat the minister, has produced much mischief. It obtained favour to the war at first; and things taking a lucky turn upon the continent, all idea of a dread of America vanished, and nothing was thought of but *punishing* her for her insolence. But still her great subject of complaint existed. She went to war on that ground; and, therefore, let us now see what that ground really was. It is well known that, whether in language, manners, or person, it is very difficult,

if not quite impossible, in most cases, to distinguish an American from a native of England. We alleged that the American merchant captains sailed with English sailors on board their ships, some of them deserters from the English navy, and that as the American ships were very numerous, and frequently sailed from ports where English men-of-war lay, such harbouring of our seamen became dangerous to the very existence of our naval force, and, of course, put our national safety in jeopardy.

Upon these grounds we adopted a remedy, which was to authorize the commanders of our ships of war to stop American vessels *at sea*, and to impress out of them all persons *appearing to them* to be British subjects. The Americans alleged that, in virtue of this authority, our officers impressed out of their ships *many thousands of native Americans*, forced them on board of our ships of war, compelled them to fight against nations at peace with America, and in a service and cause which they abhorred, took them into distant climates, exposed them to danger and to death, ruined their prospects in life, and filled America with distressed parents, wives, and children. That this *was* the case in *numerous instances*, our government has never denied. Indeed, they could not; for a great number of persons, native Americans, so impressed, were at different times released by the admiralty, on the demand of the American consul in England. But it must have followed of necessity, that many borne away into battle, or into distant seas, would never find the means of obtaining their release; and, indeed, it is well known that many lost their limbs, and many their lives, in our service, subjected to the discipline of our navy. Those, who are for giving the Yankees a good hearty drubbing, will hardly be disposed to feel much for the fathers and mothers thus bereft of their sons, or for the wives and children thus bereft of their fathers. But, I can assure them, as I assured the Prince Regent, in 1812, that the people of America felt very acutely upon the subject; that the newspapers of that country were filled with their lamentations, and with their cries for vengeance. The American government remonstrated with ours; it besought our government to desist from this practice, which it asserted to be a violation of the known laws of nations, an outrageous insult to America as an independent state, and an aggression, in short, which the American nation was resolved to resent.

Our government asserted that it had a right to the service of its own sailors; that the danger to our very existence was so great that the practice could not be given up; that if American citizens were taken by *mistake* they were sorry for it, and would give them up when demanded by their government; but that the practice was of vital importance; for that, without it, our navy would be ruined. The last argument has, indeed, always been the main one with those who have justified the practice of impressment. The

American government, in answer to this, said, " We *do not want your seamen;* we would rather that they were never again to serve on board of American ships; we want none but our own seamen, leaving you yours. But if your seamen have so great a partiality for our service and our country, as to quit you, or, as to be disposed to quit you, in numbers so great as to endanger your very existence as a nation; if this be really so, it is *no fault of ours.* We cannot help their preferring our ships, and our country, to yours, any more than a pretty girl can help the young men liking her better than they like her ugly companions. Their fault is their *want of taste,* perhaps; but, at any rate, the fault cannot be *ours.* Therefore, you have no reason to complain of us; nor have you any right to interrupt our commercial pursuits, under pretence of recovering those whom you call your subjects. There are, perhaps, some Americans who have a *taste for your service.* Keep them, in God's name. We never do, and never will, attempt to impress them from on board your ships; and, indeed, we have no right so to do, such a practice being without a single precedent in the whole list of writings on public law, and in all the long history of maritime nations."

This was the substance of the language of the American government. But they did not stop at asserting that we had no right to do what we did. They said further, " Nevertheless, in order to convince you of our sincere desire not to employ your seamen, we will do much more than strict right calls upon us to do. We think it strange that the jack tars of England, the jolly, sincere, brave, faithful, patriotic, and loyal sons of Neptune, to whom the deity has so long delegated his trident, and who are, as we learn from all your national sayings and singings, so firmly attached to their beloved king and his family; we think it passing strange, that these admirable and single-hearted persons should be disposed to leave your glorious fleet, and to flock to our poor Yankee service; and we cannot but believe that some ill-minded people have calumniated your honest, jolly jack tars, when they have persuaded you to believe that the impressment of the jolly jacks from on board of our Yankee ships is *necessary to the existence of your navy.* However, supposing this really to be the case, we are willing, for the sake of peace, to provide an effectual remedy." They then made these propositions: That whenever an American ship was in *any port,* no matter in what country, any person, authorized by our government, might go to any *civil magistrate* of the port or town, and demand to have surrendered to him any man out of the American ship, upon the allegation of his being a British subject; and that if the civil magistrate, upon hearing the parties, should determine in favour of the claimant, the man should at once be surrendered to him, though such magistrate *should be one of our own justices of the peace,* either in England or in any of our

colonies. And, further, in order most effectually to prevent any British subject from being even *received* on board an American ship as a sailor, the American government offered to pass an act imposing a very heavy pecuniary penalty (so high, I believe, as a *thousand dollars*) on every master of an American ship who should engage a British subject to serve on board his ship; so that any such person so engaged would have had nothing to do but to give information, and receive, I believe, 700 dollars out of the thousand.

With this regulation, and this penal enactment, it appears to me that it would have been impossible for any number of our countrymen to have served in the American ships. Reader, can *you* imagine any way by which the American government could have more fully proved its sincere desire not to injure England by affording a place of refuge to English sailors? If you *can*, state it; if you cannot, I must leave you to discover why these offers were not accepted: and *why* this war was not avoided. But supposing these offers not to have been satisfactory, *why* are we not at *peace* now? The peace in Europe put an end to the *cause* of dispute. Our sailors could no longer desert to American ships, when they were discharged from our own. The peace in Europe put an end to the quarrel, as naturally as the cessation of a shower puts an end to the quarrel of two persons who are contending for the shelter of a pent-house. We had nothing to do but to make a treaty of peace, and *say nothing more about the impressment of seamen.* If the Americans were willing to do this, I am at a loss to discover how the continuance of the war is to be justified. I am aware, indeed, that it has been strongly inculcated in the Times, and other newspapers, that we ought *now, now, now, now,* while all goes on so smoothly; now, while the tide is with us, to *crush America for ever; to clip her wings for a century;* to annihilate her means of forming a navy to be our rival on the ocean. Alas! if this be the project, it is not *America* that we are at war with; it is *Nature* herself, in whose immutable decrees it is written, that no such project shall succeed. We must, to effect this famous project, annihilate her woods, her waters, and her lands; and though our parliament has been called *omnipotent,* its omnipotence is not of that sort which is requisite for such an undertaking. It can do what it pleases with us in these islands; but it cannot reach across the Atlantic, except by its fleets and armies; except by means of the same sort which are opposed to it. *Here* it is omnipotent, because here is no power to resist it; but *there,* a power exists in open defiance of it. Therefore, it cannot do there what it pleases.

It is impossible to say what exploits our armies and navy may perform in America. I shall leave the military and naval operations to *time,* the great trier of all things. But certain it is, that

the gentry, who were so hot for the drubbing, begin to be very impatient. The war, in their view of the matter, appears to languish. Little or no blood is drawn. We hear of no fine towns demolished; none of those fatal things, the manufactories of woollens and cottons, have been destroyed; there are still *American* public ships of war afloat, and more building; and, as to the private ships of war, they swarm even upon the coasts of the "*mother country*," to the great vexation of the Morning Chronicle, who calls them "*insolent marauders.*" Oh! insolent dogs! come into our own channel, and almost into our own ports! Come three thousand miles to insult their natural mother! I wonder they are not afraid of being destroyed by the "British *thunder.*" But, Mr. Perry, who makes use of inapplicable terms? A *marauder* means one that goes to seek plunder *unlawfully*; and if he be detected, he is, generally, hanged—whereas these privateers from America come with *commissions on board.* They are fully authorized by the laws of their own country to do what they do; and even if we chance to capture them, we can treat their crews only as *prisoners of war.* Perhaps Mr. Perry, or his editor, thinks that we ought to be allowed to destroy American towns, and to lay waste the country, without any opposition, or any act of retaliation. Is it not "*insolent*" in us to threaten to reduce the Americans to "*unconditional submission?*" Is it not insolent in us to say in our public prints, and under the form of a speech in parliament by one of the lords of the admiralty, that *Mr. Madison is to be deposed?* Yet all this is allowable, and even praiseworthy. This, however, is not a way to put an end to the war. The dilemma in which the foes of freedom are placed is one of great difficulty. America is the very hot-bed of freedom. While the people in that country retain their liberties; that is to say, while that country remains unsubdued, despotism, under whatever name she may disguise herself, is never safe; and if peace takes place with America, not only will she instantly start, with enormous advantages, in the race of manufactures and commerce, but millions of men and money will flock to her from Europe, which her example will soon again shake to the centre. On the other hand, if the war be persevered in against her, all our taxes must be continued, and loans must annually be made. Which our statesmen will prefer, it would be presumption in me to attempt to predict, and, therefore, I shall, for the present, leave the subject, with just observing, that those who are still for giving the Yankees a *drubbing*, ought to receive the tax-gatherer with open arms, and greet him with an almost holy kiss.

AMERICAN WAR.

I HAVE, from the first, expressed my apprehensions as to the end of this war. I used the utmost of my endeavours to *prevent* it. While shut up in a prison, out of which, at the end of two long years, I went, with the paying of a thousand pounds TO THE KING, for having had the indiscretion to write about the flogging of English local militiamen, at the town of Ely, in England, and about the presence of *Hanoverian troops* upon that occasion; while so shut up, the greatest object of my efforts was to prevent this ill-fated war, the seeds of which I saw sown, and the maturity of which I saw pushed on by those malignant and foul wretches, the writers of the *Times* and *Courier* newspapers. This was the way in which I employed my days and years of imprisonment: my efforts were all in vain. In vain did I show the falsehood of the statements and the doctrines on which the war-whoopers proceeded; in vain did I appeal to the reason and justice, and even to the *interest* of a people deluded into a sort of furor against America. At last the war took place, and the disgrace which we suffered *at sea* completed the madness of the nation, who seemed to have no other feeling than that of mortification and revenge. What! should the people be suffered to live! should they be suffered to exist in the world, who had defeated and captured a *British frigate!* should those who had caused the British flag to be *hauled down* not be exterminated! Disappointment; astonishment; fury! The nation was mad. "*Rule Britannia,*" the constant call of the boasting rabble, at places of public resort, was no longer called for with such eagerness, and was heard with less rapture. The heroes in blue and buff carried their heads less lofty. Their voices seemed to become more faint, and their port less majestic. They seemed to feel as men of honour would upon such an occasion. In short, we all felt that a new era had taken place in the naval annals of the world.

Still, however, the dread of the power of Napoleon restrained many from a wish to see us embarked in a war for the conquest of America. But he was scarcely subdued by the combined efforts of all Europe, when this whole nation called aloud for war, a war of *punishment*, against the American states. And it was openly declared, in the most popular of our newspapers, that we ought never to sheath the sword till we had subjugated the states, or, at least, *subverted their form* of *government*. The pernicious example of the existence of a *republic*, founded on a *revolution*, was openly declared to be inconsistent with the *safety* of our government. It was, besides, distinctly alleged that *now*, *now*, *now*, or

never, was the time to prevent America from ever having a navy. The necessity of destroying her means of having a navy has since been repeatedly urged. It has been stated, and restated, that our naval power must soon come to an end unless we now destroy this republic, root and branch. The defeat and capture of our fleet, and the defeat of our army, on and near *Lake Champlain*, (of which I shall speak more particularly hereafter,) have not at all softened the language of the public prints. The *Times* newspaper, of the 9th instant, calls it "a lamentable evil to the CIVILIZED WORLD;" by which appellation these writers always mean KINGLY GOVERNMENTS. The writer then adds: "Next to the annihilation of the late military despotism in Europe, the subversion of that system of fraud and malignity, which constitutes the whole policy of the Jeffersonian school, was an event to be devoutly wished by every man in either hemisphere, who regards rational liberty, or the honourable intercourse of nations. It was an event to which we should have bent, and yet must bend all our energies. The *American government must be displaced, or it will, sooner or later, plant its poisoned dagger in the heart of the parent state.*" Sooner or *later* you see! The gentleman looks into *futurity*. He does not even hint at any *terms of peace*. He plainly says, that we must *displace the government of America;* that is to say, *change* its *form* and *nature;* subjugate the country, recolonize it, repossess it. Now mind, the *opposition* prints do not find fault with this. They do not deprecate such an object of the war. They surpass even their adversaries in exulting at the burnings and plunderings. They find fault that *more* mischief has not been done.

Thus, then, we see what the nation regards as the object of the war. I say the *nation*, because the *Morning Chronicle*, which is the organ of the *opposition*, is just as bitter against America, as are the Times and the Courier. The truth is, that the only *opposition*, as to the war, will arise out of our *failures*. The opposition will only *blame* the ministers for not having burnt *more* ships, plundered *more* towns, and done *more* mischief. There is, indeed, a sort of dread of the *length* of the war. People are a little *disappointed* that Mr. Madison is not *yet* deposed; that the states have not *yet* separated; that our sons of noble families are not *yet* wanted to go out as governors, and captains general, to Pennsylvania, New-York, Massachusetts, Virginia, &c. &c.; that it will require *another campaign* to bring the deluded Americans *to their senses;* that (and here is the pinch) the *income tax* will be wanted *another year*, and that *another* loan must be made. But "what is *one more* year of expense at the end of twenty-two years of war? And then it will give us such *lasting* peace and security." Thus is fear *hushed;* and when, in addition, the thought of our defeated and captured frigates comes athwart the mind, the

income tax is forgotten, and vengeance, war, and blood, is the cry.

I now proceed to notice more particularly the events which have reached our knowledge since the date of my last article upon the subject. The *plundering of Alexandria* appears to have been the most successful of our enterprises. The American papers give our people great credit for their talent at the emptying of *shops*, and the embarkation of their contents, at which, to do our army and navy (especially the latter) but bare justice, we seem to have been uncommonly adroit. It seems, however, that the squadron, which had the plunder aboard, had but a narrow escape in descending the Chesapeake; but plunder there was, and a good deal of it; and there can be little doubt that the success and profit of the enterprise will act as great encouragements to future undertakings of a similar description; the only danger being, that the zeal of our commanders may push them on faster than a due regard to their safety might otherwise dictate. In an attempt against *Baltimore* we failed. That is to say, we met with a *defeat*. Not in the *field;* but that is nothing to the purpose. We marched and sailed against the town, with all our forces, by sea and land, and we were *compelled* to retreat without doing any thing against that town. The town is safe; and if the war end as this expedition has ended, all the world will agree that America has *defeated* us. We may be sure of this; and, therefore, we must carry on the war till we have subdued America; or, we must make up our minds to the reputation of having been defeated by that republic. A pretty serious alternative; but it is one which must and will exist, and of this we shall become more and more sensible every day, and particularly if we attend to what foreigners say upon the subject.

The expedition of our troops and fleet against Passamaquoddy and the Penobscot, is of a nature so trifling as hardly to be worthy of notice. That territory is no more important in America than the Isle of Sky is in Great Britain. It is a conquest, and so would the Isle of Sky be by an American privateer. What a figure does this conquest make in the Gazette! What a grand affair it appears to be! But, did a thousandth part of the people of England ever *hear* of Passamaquoddy or Penobscot before? It is Baltimore, Charleston, Wilmington, Norfolk, Philadelphia, New-York, Boston, that they have heard of. They have been led to believe, that the city of Washington is to America what *London* is to England, or what *Paris* is to France. Nothing can be more fallacious. There are, perhaps, two hundred towns in America, each of which is more populous and rich than Washington was, or than it was likely ever to be. Besides, we did not *keep possession* of Washington, as the Germans and Russians did of Paris. We did not remain there to erect a *new* government. We only set fire to

a few buildings, and then *retreated*. If an American privateer was to set fire to a few fishing huts on the coast of Wales, should we look upon it as a very brilliant affair? Yet this Washington enterprise was, by the Morning Chronicle, deemed the most *gallant dash* of the war! In the "demonstration," as Admiral Cochrane calls it, against Baltimore, General Ross was killed; and some of our papers call this *foul play!* "The *fellow*," says one of them, "took aim at the gallant Ross from *behind some brushwood*." Well, and what then? Do not our troops shoot from *behind* parapets, and walls, and works of all sorts? And do we suppose that the Americans will not make use of a *bush* when it comes in their way! If this *crying* tone be to be indulged in, we shall, I fear, cry our eyes out before the war be over. We have sent our bombs, and rockets, and rifles, and all sorts of means of destruction; our writers blame our ministers for not sending the means of knocking down towns fast enough; and shall we abuse poor Jonathan if he avail himself of a bush, and of his skill at hitting a mark? General Ross *burnt* their president's house, and a Yankee *shot* General Ross. These are things which naturally occur; and, however we may lament the death of any officer, we must reflect that an invaded people will shoot at their invaders, unless the former are ready to receive the latter as friends.

Before I proceed to notice the late affair on and near Lake Champlain, there are some remarks to be bestowed on certain *characteristic facts* which have *leaked out*, and on certain paragraphs in our newspapers. The Americans are accused of *cowardice*, for having retreated before inferior numbers, and taken shelter in Baltimore. Why was this cowardice? The main object was to defend that great and rich city. The second was to annihilate our army and naval force. To make a long stand in the open country, with raw troops, against disciplined soldiers, was not the way to effect either of these purposes. The main object was effected, and our retreat only, probably, prevented the effecting of the latter. The Times newspaper, a few days ago, remarking on the *cowardice* of the Americans, contrasted with the *bravery* of our army and navy, observed that the cause was, that *they* had no feelings of *patriotism*; that they *cared nothing about their country*. Now, what is the ground of this war? Why, we complained that the Americans *harboured deserters from our navy*; and they complained that we *forced native Americans into our service*. This fact is notorious to all the world. This fact is recorded in our own official documents. This fact makes a part of unquestionable history. Another fact has just been recorded by this same Times newspaper; namely, that two of our seamen were *hanged*, on board the fleet in the Chesapeake, *for attempting to desert to the enemy*. It is also stated, in the same paper, (24th October,) that *about one hundred and fifty* of our soldiers *deserted* on the retreat from

Plattsburgh. Now, let this empty boaster produce us instances like these *on the side of the Americans* if he can; and if he cannot, let him acknowledge himself to be either a deluded fool or a deluded knave. But has Jonathan shown no *zeal* for his country? What was that act of self-devotion which induced a man to expose his property to certain, and himself to probable destruction, by shooting at General Ross, and killing his horse under him, in the city of Washington, after the town was in possession of our troops? By what feeling was the man actuated who exposed his life for the sake of killing General Ross, and who must have been almost alone, since he was hidden behind some brushwood? To what are we to impute the capture of two hundred young men of the "*best families* in Baltimore," found in the foreground defence of their city? Was greater courage, more desperate devotion to country, ever witnessed than at the battle of Chippewa and at Fort Erie? How comes it that during the last campaign we have lost more officers and men, out of twenty thousand employed, than we ever lost in the European war out of one hundred thousand? From what feeling was it that Mr. Madison called, as we are told he has, Mr. *Rufus King* to his councils, and from what feeling is it that Mr. King has accepted of the call?

The Morning Chronicle, that chamelion of this war, now boasts that it foretold *union* against us. It never foretold it. It always *urged* on the war. It called, and it was the first to call, the burning of Washington *a most gallant dash.* However, it is now clear that we have *completely united* the whole country. The *bombarding of Stonington*, in Connecticut, and the *plundering of Alexandria*, in Virginia, have done what all the workings of good sense and public spirit were not able to effect. Mr. Rufus King, whom we regarded as the rival and the implacable enemy of Mr. Madison, has taken a post *under him* for the defence of his country; and we shall now see, that amongst those whom we thought our friends, we shall find the most resolute enemies. Stonington and Alexandria will be constantly before every American's eyes. I always was opposed to the war, and to this *mode* of warfare especially. I knew it would produce that which it has produced. I knew it would render the breach too wide ever to be healed again. I knew that it would produce either the total subjugation of America, which I thought impossible, or our final defeat in the eyes of the world, with the ulterior consequence of seeing America a most formidable naval power, which the recent events on the borders of Canada seem but too manifestly to portend. It is quite surprising to what an extent this nation has been, and still is deluded, with regard to America, and to the nature and effect of this war. It is only fifteen days ago that the Courier newspaper contained the following paragraph:

"There were reports last night of our having attacked and taken New-London, and destroyed the city of Baltimore. Both these events are *probable*, but there are no arrivals from America later than the last despatches from Admiral Cochrane, dated on the 3d of last month. But as the wind has been fair for some days, we hourly expect a fresh arrival. It must bring news of great importance—intelligence from Canada—another attack upon Fort Erie—another conflict with General Brown—perhaps a battle with the American General Izard—the further operations of Admiral Cochrane and General Ross—the result of the expedition under General Sherbrooke—the operations of the Creek Indians, who have already made their appearance upon the frontiers of South Carolina—and "last, not least," the effect of our late attack upon *the minds of the American people*—the steps taken by Mr. Madison, *if he yet remains president, and the measures adopted by those states that were in a ferment against the government*, even before the disaster, and were *not indisposed to a separation from the other states*. No arrival from America was ever expected with more impatience."

Well, the arrival has taken place. The impatiently-expected arrival has taken place. New-London has not been attacked. The attack on Baltimore has *failed*. General Ross is *killed*. Admiral Cochrane has arrived at Halifax for the winter, with the plunder of Alexandria. The effect upon the minds of the American people has been such as to unite even Mr. King with Mr. Madison, who "*yet remains* president." *No* new attack has been made on Fort Erie, but the army of General Izard ,at Plattsburgh, *has* been attacked by our commander in chief, with the "Wellington heroes" under him, with the "conquerors of France" under him, while the American fleet was attacked by ours; and not only have both attacks *failed*, but we have experienced a more complete defeat than, as far as I can recollect, we ever before experienced, the notable affair of the *Helder* only excepted. *Thinking* Johnny Bull! You, who were so eager to give the Yankees *a drubbing*—you, who were so full of fight that nothing but another war would appease you—pray, can you tell me how it is that our ministers, who have given us such exact accounts about the "gallant dashes" at Washington and Alexandria, and who have published such loads of despatches and proclamations about the conquest of the Penobscot territory, not equal in population to the parish of St. Martin's in the Fields; can you tell me how it has happened that this ministry has not *received*, or, at least, has not *published*, the account of the land and water battles at Plattsburgh and on Lake Champlain, though we have Sir George Prevost's general order, issued after the battle, and though we have numerous extracts from Canada papers, dated many days later than the date of the order! Cannot you tell me this, *thinking*

Johnny Bull! you who, when you heard of the capture of Washington City, were for sending out a *viceroy* to the American states? You, who called the Americans *cowardly dogs*, and hailed the prospect of a speedy release from the *income tax*, and the payment of the national debt by the sale of lands, and by taxes raised in America? Well, then, in waiting *patiently* for this official account, we must content ourselves with what the newspapers tell us they have extracted from the papers of Canada. Letters extracted from the American papers make our loss dreadful indeed. General Macomb, the American commander, is represented to have written to his father, at New-York, telling him that he had killed or taken 3,000 of our army, and that he expected to destroy *one half* of it. Our newspapers said that this was *false*. They also said that it was *false* that we had any thing like a *frigate* on Lake Champlain, though it now appears that we had a ship actually mounting 32 guns, and that the largest of the American vessels was rated 28 guns, and carried, as we say, 30 guns. But let us take, for the *present*, the account of the Canada papers, and look with impatience, but with becoming *humility*, to his majesty's ministers for further information. Thus, then, speak the Canadian printers; thus speak the bitterest enemies of America:

Montreal, September 15.

"You have herewith a copy of the general order of the 13th instant, to understand which, requires more than being able to read it. There never was, perhaps, such a composition; for, without knowing the result, one might be led to think we had gained a victory. Report says that our hero, on passing some of the troops on the road, was *hissed* by them; and further, and which I believe to be true, that when the order was given for retreating, General Power rode up to the commander in chief, and begged the order for retreating might be recalled, as General Brisbane was about storming the fort, and would have possession of it in a few minutes—the reply, it is said, was—"My orders must be obeyed," and then a general retreat took place. I do not know with any certainty, having heard no one speak on the subject, but it will not surprise me if we have lost, one way and another, in this disgraceful affair, not less than 800 men. It was a fair battle between the fleets; the fort did not play on the Confiance and Linnet, as has been stated. Captain Pring, in the Linnet, though aground, is said to have fought his vessel for a considerable time after the Confiance had struck."

Quebec, September 16.

"Stories become blacker and blacker respecting our disgrace and misfortunes at Plattsburgh. Lieutenant Drew, of the Linnet, is come in here, being paroled for fourteen days; he states the loss of the fleet to have been, in a great measure, owing to the land forces not storming the American fort; there were only 1,400 men

in it, under General Macomb, who informed Captain Pring, of the Linnet, that every thing was prepared to surrender on the advance of the British army. Report says, that General Robinson is under arrest; that Generals Brisbane and Power had tendered their swords to Sir George Prevost; and that Colonel Williams, of the 13th, had declared he would never draw his sword again while under the command of Sir George. It is said Sir George is gone to Kingston."

Montreal, September 17.

"My last letter to you was of date the 14th instant, when I had the mortification to inform you of our fleet on Lake Champlain being entirely defeated and taken by the enemy, at Plattsburgh, about seventy miles from this place, and when we had an army of 14 or 15,000 regular and brave troops, who only wished to be allowed to storm the enemy's fort, and which every body says would easily have been accomplished, had any other person had the command than Sir George Prevost. We have suffered more disgrace from the incapacity of this man than we will retrieve for months to come, let our exertions be ever so great. There were six of our officers killed on board of our vessels, and twenty are made prisoners; and besides, we must have lost near 1,000 brave men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. It will not surprise me if the expedition has cost about 500,000*l.* Report now says that Sir George Prevost is going up to Kingston to attack Sackett's Harbour, but I am sure he will not be a welcome visiter in the Upper Province. The army retreated most precipitately, and are, in general, at the posts they occupied before the expedition took place, with the loss of about 150 deserters on the retreat, beside a vast loss in provisions and munitions of war. The Wellingtonian soldiers say that the hunters and the hounds are capital, but that the huntsman and the whipper-in are two fools—meaning, I consider, Sir George Prevost and his Adjutant General, Major E. Baynes."

"We have inserted the general order relating to the proceedings of the army and flotilla at Plattsburgh. Candour must compel every one to confess, that the result of the late operations has fallen short of even "moderate expectations." The battle lasted an hour and a half. The force of each squadron, we are informed, stands thus: British, one ship, mounting, in all, 32 guns; one brig, in all, 20 guns; two sloops of 70 tons, each 10 guns, and ten gun-boats. American, one ship, rated 28 guns, carrying 30; one brig, 24; one strong schooner, 18; three sloops, each 10 guns; and twenty-four gun-boats. The crews, tonnage, and weight of metal, are estimated at one fourth superior on the side of the Americans; and we have no reason to doubt our information. We have always considered offensive warfare as the best

mode of securing peace; and recent humiliation has not changed our tone. We may be called to defend points which have, hitherto, not been thought of; and, consequently, the late retreat may not have been ill advised: the fort at Plattsburgh should, however, have been stormed. That part of the labour would have cost less blood and embarrassment than was sustained in the retreat; a retreat that will tend to rouse the energies of the enemy. We might have taken 2,000 prisoners, a fine train of artillery, and immense stores.

"We are not military men, but we call on "every experienced officer" to support or contradict us. If we are wrong, we shall take a pride in confessing our ignorance. The scientific, brave generals, officers, and soldiers, of the duke of Wellington's army, and the others, who have before fought in our cause in the Canadas, did every thing which depended on them to support the noble efforts of their brothers on the water. That distinguished officer, General Robinson, who has been twice wounded this year on the other continent, with part of his gallant brigade, had braved all danger in an assault. Some of the picquets of the fort were torn away, and a few minutes more would have given up the fortification, with an immense train of artillery, into our hands, and every American must have fallen, or been made prisoner. It was thought necessary to check the ardour of the troops, and we must now instantly redouble our energies to obtain command of the lake, or *with humility await our future destiny.*"

Thus, then, according to our own accounts, the Americans had but 1,500 regulars and 6,000 militia, wherewith to make face against 15,000 British troops, commanded by four major generals and Sir George Prevost, a general of long experience, and of great reputation. On the lake we say that the Americans had a *fourth* more than we. *Suppose* they had! I do not admit the fact; but *suppose* they had. A *fourth!* how long is it since we thought a *fourth* too much? Every one knows, that Sir Robert Calder was disgraced for not pursuing *double* his force. We are become very *nice calculators* of force. We shall soon hear, I suppose, that we ought always to keep aloof, unless we can count the guns, and know that we have a superiority. Fifteen thousand men, seven of them from the army of "the conqueror of France!" And these drew off from the presence of 7,500 Yankees, to whom they were about to give a good *drubbing!* Why, it will make such a noise in the world! It will make such a buzz; it will astound "*honest* John Bull," who was, only the last market day, charging his glass, and bragging about sending out a viceroy. The *whole fleet!* What, *all!* Our *little ones* and all! *All* at one fell swoop! It will make Johnny Bull scratch his noddle in search of brains. The chuckling of honest John at the burning of Washington, the plundering of Alex-

andria, and bombarding of Stonington, will be changed into *grumbling*, I am afraid. But come, Johnny, you must not *grumble*. You were for the war. It is your own war. The ministers are not to blame. You insisted upon chastising and humbling the Americans. You would have Mr. Madison *deposed*. You said he had *sided with Napoleon*. You said what was *false*, Johnny; but that's no matter. You called upon the ministers to *depose* him. This I will always say, and can at any time *prove* against you. The *consequences* of this victory of the Americans must be very important. Sir George Prevost is blamed, and, indeed, abused, while the officers of the fleet, the *defeated* and *captured* fleet, are complimented to the skies. When will this folly cease? When shall we cease to be so basely unjust? What would have been said of Sir George, if he had had his army blown into the air, or cut to pieces? If he and *all* his army had been captured, what would have been said of *him* and of that army? Yet this has happened to the fleet, and the fleet are *complimented!* While he, who has saved a great part of his army, notwithstanding the defeat of the fleet, is censured and *abused;* is called a *fool*, and almost a *coward!* Sir George Prevost is neither fool nor coward. He is a man of great merit, is of long standing in the service, has served with great success; and he has shown great ability in being able, with so small a force as he has hitherto had, to preserve a country generally inhabited by a people by no means zealous in their own defence, or rather that of their territory. Let any one look at the situation of Lake Champlain. It extends in length one hundred and fifty miles, perhaps, running above the state of Vermont, and entering our province of Lower Canada in a line pointing towards Quebec. It was very desirable to drive the Americans from the command of this lake, which may be called their high road to Montreal and Quebec. It is the great channel for their army, their provisions, their guns, to pass along; and, completely the sole masters of this lake, it is not easy to conceive how they are to be kept from Quebec without a *very large army from England*. If the Americans had been defeated *upon* the lake, or had been compelled *to retire to the Vermont end of it*, then to have driven back their army also, would have been an object of vast importance; nor would great loss in the attack, on our part, have been an *irretrievable* loss, or been followed by any extremely great danger. But when our fleet was not only defeated, but actually captured, and gone off to double the force of the Americans, even the *certain* defeat of their army could have led to no beneficial result. We must still have abandoned Plattsburgh; the fleet of the enemy would have speedily brought another army to any point that they wished, and would have placed that army fifty or sixty miles *nearer* Quebec than our army would have been.

But if by any chance we had been defeated by *land*, after the defeat on the water, the loss of *all Canada* would, and must have been the consequence, if the Americans had chosen to conquer it, which, I dare say, they would. Therefore, it appears to me, that Sir George Prevost acted the only part which a sensible man, under such circumstances, could have for one moment thought of. He *risked every thing* in the attack, and if he succeeded, he *gained nothing worth having*. The loss of *half* his army, which was the case of the storming of Fort Erie, would have exposed him, even in case of success, to great peril. The Americans could have immediately poured an army (by means of their fleet) more numerous than his into Lower Canada; they could have poured in, all the winter, militia and volunteers, from the populous and brave republican state of Vermont, while our governor had, and could have, no hopes of receiving reinforcements *until the middle of next summer*. For, supposing us to have *spare* troops at Halifax, they could hardly sail thence before the middle of October, and before they might reach Quebec, the ice in the St. Lawrence might have scuttled or foundered their vessels. The St. Lawrence, our only channel to Canada from England or from Halifax, is full of mountains of ice till the month of June. I have seen a large mountain of ice off the mouth of that immense river on the 15th of June. I believe that no vessels of any considerable size ever attempt the navigation of that river much before June. In what a situation, then, would our governor have been placed if he had met with any serious loss in the storming of the fort at Plattsburgh? And yet he is censured and abused for retreating, after the total capture of our coöperating fleet, while the officers of that fleet *are praised to the skies*. About three weeks ago, just after we heard of the burning of Washington City, I met Sir George Prevost's wagon between Portsmouth and Hayant. The carter was whistling along by the side of some nice fat horses. I could not help observing to my son how much happier this fellow was than his master, who had to govern Canadians and fight Americans. It is easy to talk about the "*heroes of Toulouse*," forming part of his army. The "heroes of Toulouse" are said to have remonstrated against the retreat. They are said to have expressed a desire to storm the fort. Sir George Prevost would, I dare say, have been of the same mind, if he had had reason to suppose that one half of the people within, were, as the people of Toulouse were, ready to join him. But he well knew the contrary. He knew that he had to get into the fort through a river of blood. He had just seen the fate of our fleet; and he knew, as "the heroes of Toulouse" might have known, that the men in the fort were of the same stamp as those upon the water. We now find, from a detailed statement in the American papers, coming from

authority, and accompanied by an account of killed and wounded in the naval battle on the lake, that our fleet had 93 guns and 1,050 men, while that of America had but 86 guns and 820 men; our fleet was all taken but the gun-boats, carrying sixteen guns amongst them all. And yet the naval people are *praised*, while Sir George Prevost is *censured*. Whence arises this injustice? Whence this security of the navy from all censure, and even from all criticism? Do we feel that to censure any part of it is to discover to the world that it is not always infallible? Do we suppose, that in discovering our fears of its inferiority, in point of quality, to that of America, we shall make the world perceive the lamentable fact? Are we fools enough to hope that the history of this battle can be hidden from France and the rest of Europe? Why, then, this injustice? Why not blame the naval part of the forces, if blame must fall somewhere? I see no necessity for its falling *any where*, for my part. We had eighty-four men killed and one hundred and ten wounded, which shows that there was some fighting. We had double the number killed and wounded that Jonathan had, which shows that Jonathan was the more able bodied and active of the two. A letter was, a little while ago, published as from one of our officers in the Chesapeake Bay, saying, that Jonathan must now *look pretty sharply about him*. It appears from the result of this battle, that Jonathan *does* look pretty sharply about him. Now, then, let us hear what effect this event has had upon the Times newspaper, which, only a few weeks ago, insisted on it, that the American government must be displaced, that the Americans were cowards, that they cared nothing about their country, and that the states would soon divide, and come over, one at a time, to the *parent* country. Now let us hear what this torch bearer of the war, this trumpet of fire and sword, provoker to every act of violence and cruelty—let us hear what he now has to say; he who has, for three years past, been urging the government on to this disastrous contest.

"Halifax papers to the 6th instant, New-York to the 22d ultimo, and Boston to the 25th, have been received. There is no dissembling that the popular outcry in Canada against Sir George Prevost's conduct, on account of the late operations against Plattsburgh, is very general and very loud. We cannot pretend to determine on the talents of this officer, or on the wisdom of his plans; but we recur to the suggestions which we made at a very early period of the campaign, and regret exceedingly that one of our most experienced generals from Spain was not sent at once, flushed with victory, from the fields of Toulouse *to the heart of the United States*. Was it beneath the dignity of Lord Hill, or even of the duke of Wellington? Fatal prejudice! To *despise*, to *irritate*, and, after all, *not to subdue our adversaries*, is the worst and weakest of all policy. Now we have reduced ourselves

to this dilemma, of being obliged to carry our point by main force, or to retire from the contest *ten times worse than we began it*, with the mere postponement of an abstract question, which has no reference to our present state of peace, *with a fund of the bitterest animosity laid up against us in future, with our flag disgraced on the ocean and on the lakes*, and with the laurels withered at Plattsburgh, which were so hardly, but so gloriously earned, in Portugal, and Spain, and France. The spirit of the British nation *cannot stoop to the latter alternative;* and, therefore, *at whatever risk, at whatever expense,* WE *must embrace the former.* The invaluable year 1814, when the treachery of America was fresh in the minds of the European powers, is past. Already do they begin to relax in their deep and merited contempt of the servile hypocrite, Madison. Already do they turn a compassionating look on the smoking rafters of the would-be capitol. Presently, perhaps, the Russian cabinet may forget that the empress Catherine, to her dying day, treated the Americans as rebels to their legal sovereign; or the Spanish court, while it is endeavouring to rivet its yoke on Buenos Ayres, may join with the philosophers of Virginia in contending for the liberty of the seas. Such, and still greater political inconsistencies we have before now witnessed. *Therefore, let time be taken by the forelock; let not another campaign be wasted in diversions and demonstrations; let not another autumnal sun go down in* DISGRACE TO THE BRITISH ARMS. Commodore Macdonough's laconic note savours a little of *affectation;* but we are sorry he has so favourable an opportunity for displaying the brevity of his style to advantage. General Macomb's orders, however, are *sufficiently lengthy*; and, unfortunately, he also has some unpleasant information to give us. He states that 14,000 British veterans have been foiled by 1,500 American regulars, and some few militia, the whole not exceeding 2,500 men. If he is correct in these estimates, it is surely high time that we should either *give up teaching the Americans war,* or send them some better instructors."

The *former* is the *best,* be assured! Why should commodore Macdonough be charged with *affectation*, because he writes a short letter? *He* has no sons, or cousins, or patron's sons or cousins, or bastards, to recommend for the receipts of presents or pensions. But I have, at present, no room for further comment on this article. I will resume the subject in my next.

AMERICAN WAR.

Negotiations at Ghent ; measures of the American congress ; battle near Fort Erie; Lake Ontario ; despatches about the Lake Champlain battles ; British attack on Fort Mobile.—The negotiations at Ghent, though kept a secret from Johnny Bull, have reached him, as most other disclosures do, through the tell-tale press of America. Oh! that republic, and her press! How many things the world knows through them! Is there no way of reducing *them* to silence? Take it in hand, good people, and see if there be no means of accomplishing it. These negotiations show that *Jonathan*, poor despised *Jonathan*, is not much less smart in the cabinet than he is in the field. Certainly nothing was ever better managed than this negotiation on the part of *Jonathan*. He pricked our brains, and then would do nothing until he heard what the people of America should say. The ground of Messrs. Bayard, Gallatin, &c. was very reasonable; for how could they be expected to have instructions relating to matters *never before matters of dispute?* The substance of the disclosure is this: we asked, as a *preliminary*, that the republicans should give up part of their territory, including those very lakes, and their own borders of those lakes, whereon they have defeated us, and which are their only secure barrier against us and our Indian allies. The president, of course, lost no time in laying these papers before the congress, who are said to have heard them with unanimous indignation; and the *Times* newspaper tells us that "these papers have been made the means of *uniting against us the whole American people.*" Thou great ass, they were united against us before. There were only a handful of "*serene highnesses*" and "*Cossacks*" in Massachusetts, the acquaintance of Mr. Henry, who were not united against us. This, I suppose, is the shift that you resort to in order to cover your disgrace, in having to announce that Mr. Madison is "*yet*" president, and that he is not even "*impeached.*" There is one passage in the last despatch of Mr. Monroe, worthy of great attention. He tells the plenipotentiaries that "there is much reason to presume that Great Britain has *now other objects* than those for which she has *hitherto* professed to contend." Probably he built this presumption on the language of our *public prints*, or on the report of *a speech in parliament*, attributed by those newspapers to Sir *Joseph Yorke*, one of the lords of the admiralty, in which report the reporters made Sir Joseph say, that we had Mr. Madison to DEPOSE before we could lay down our arms. This report was published some time in *May or June;* and in *August* Mr. Monroe's despatch

was written. However, be the ground of presumption what it would, Mr. Madison does not seem to have changed his tone on account of it; and there can be no doubt that the people must have been greatly inflamed by such an impudent declaration. This shows what mischiefs newspapers can do. The war is, in great part, the war of the *Times* and the *Courier*. Let them, therefore, weep over the fate of our fleets and armies in Canada, and at Mobile. *The measures of the American congress* seem to be of a very bold character, and well calculated for a war of long continuation. The president has not been afraid to lay bare all the wants of the government, and to appeal to the sense and patriotism of the people. From every thing that I can discover, the *noblesse* of Massachusetts will not be able to prevent, or even impede, any of these measures. *Johnny Bull* is, in last Saturday's Gazette, treated to an account of the late battle near Fort Erie, from which *Jonathan* sallied out upon General Drummond's army. According to this account, our loss was as follows:

	KILLED.	
Captains	1	
Lieutenants	2	
Sergeants	7	
Rank and file	105	
		115
	WOUNDED.	
Lieutenant colonels	3	
Captains	3	
Lieutenants	10	
Ensigns	1	
Sergeants	13	
Drummers	1	
Rank and file	147	
		178
	MISSING.	
Majors	2	
Captains	4	
Lieutenants	8	
Ensigns	2	
Adjutants	1	
Surgeons	1	
Sergeants	21	
Drummers	2	
Rank and file	280	
		316
		609

A most bloody battle! The armies, on both sides, are handfuls of men. These are battles of a very different description from those of the *Peninsula*, as it was called. General Drummond complains of the *overwhelming force* of the enemy. How came he to *besiege* him then? It was a *sally*, observe, on the part of the Americans; and it is the first time I ever heard of a sallying party being stronger than the army besieging them. In the teeth of facts like these, the malignant ass of the *Times* newspaper has the impudence to say, with as much coolness as if he had

never heard of these things: "A peace between Great Britain and the United States can properly be made no where but in America. The conferences should be carried on at New-York, or Philadelphia, having previously fixed at those places the head-quarters of a *Picton* or a *Hill*." If Mr. Madison had this writer in his pay, the latter could not serve the republican cause more effectually than he is now doing. On Lake Ontario, our newspapers now say, that we have a *decided superiority of force*. Very well. *Let us bear that in mind.* Let us have no *new versions* after a *battle* shall have taken place. The official accounts relative to the affairs at Plattsburgh and Lake Champlain, are the most curious, certainly, that ever were seen. They consist of a mere account of the number of killed, wounded, and missing, up to the time that our army quitted, or was about to quit, Plattsburgh, that is to say, (mind the *dates!*) up to the *fourteenth of September*. Not a word have we about the *retreat* from Plattsburgh, nor about the battle on Lake Champlain, though we have an account from Sir George Prevost, dated on the *fourth of October*. Mark that well. The despatch is said to have been dated on the eleventh, at Plattsburgh, but it contains the account of the losses to the fourteenth! Let us hear the apology of the *Times* newspaper: "The return from the sixth to the fourteenth of September being enclosed in the despatch bearing date the eleventh, is *easily* accounted for, from the circumstance of that despatch not having been made up for some time after. Although despatches have arrived of a *later date* from Sir George Prevost, *none* have been received containing *any account of his retreat*. Private letters, however, *contradict* the American statements of precipitation and embarrassment in Sir George's movements on that occasion. The despatch of the eleventh, before mentioned, *refers* to the action on the lake, but it is *not thought proper* to publish this until an official account of the action reaches the admiralty." Very well, now, let us grant that it would not be *proper* to publish Sir George's account of the action on the lake, though it was such a lumping concern as to require but little nautical skill to describe it; yet here is no reason at all given for not publishing Sir George's account of *his own retreat*, other than its *not having been received*, which is most wonderful, seeing that it is the invariable practice to enclose *duplicates* and *triplicates* of every preceding despatch, when forces are at such a distance. How came Sir George, in his despatch of the 4th of October, not to send a *duplicate* of the account of his retreat, if he had sent that account before? And, if he had not sent it before, how came he not to send it along with his despatch of the 4th of October? The solving of these questions will be very good amusement for the winter evenings of Johnny Bull, who was so anxious "to give the Yankees a good *drubbing*," and who thinks nothing at all of the property tax

when compared with so desirable an object. Reader, pray let me bring you back to the affair of Plattsburgh. It is situated on the side of Lake Champlain, about twenty-five miles within the United States. There is a fortress near it, in which Jonathan had 1,500 regulars, and 5 or 6,000 militia. Against this fort, and force, Sir George Prevost, with 14 or 15,000 men, marched early in September, the fort being to be attacked by water by our fleet at the same time that our army attacked it by land. The attack was made, but the American fleet came up, attacked ours, beat and captured the whole of the ships. Sir George Prevost, seeing the fate of the fleet, retreated speedily into Canada, was followed, as the Americans say, by their army, who harassed it, took some cannon, a great quantity of stores, and many prisoners, and received from the British army a great number of *deserters*, who quitted Sir George Prevost, and went over to them. This is the most serious part of the subject; and, therefore, as the Montreal newspapers had stated that we lost 150 men by desertion, as the Americans made them amount to *a great many hundreds;* and as Mr. Whitbread, in the debate in parliament, a few days ago, said he had heard that they amounted to 2,000, and that, too, of *Wellingtonians*, the people were very anxious to see Sir *George Prevost's account of his retreat.* The ministers said that Sir George Prevost had said *nothing* about *desertion;* and that, of course, *he would have mentioned it* if it had been true. But the *Times* newspaper now tells us that Sir George has sent *no account* of his *retreat; or*, at least, that *none has been received.* According to the ministers, Sir George's account *has* been received, and no mention is made in it of desertion. According to the *Times*, Sir George's account *has not* been received. We must believe the ministers, of course, and must set the *Times* down for a promulgator of wilful falsehoods. But, then, there is a *rub* left; if the account of the retreat is come, WHY NOT PUBLISH IT? This is another riddle, Johnny Bull, for your winter evenings' amusement. The attack of our forces on Mobile, furnishes a new feature to the war. We have before seen the two parties engaged, frigate to frigate, brig to brig, sloop to sloop, and, in two instances, fleet to fleet. We have seen them on land, alternately besieged and besieging. We now see the Americans in a fort, containing only 138 men, attacked by a combined naval and military armament; as to the result of which, after describing the scene of action, we must, for the present, take their own official account. Point Mobile is situated on the main land, on the border of the Gulf of Mexico, not far from the mouth of the great river Mississippi. On this point is a fort, called Fort Bowyer, belonging to the republican enemy, to the attack of which our squadron proceeded in September last. [Here follow the American official accounts.]

I extract these articles from the *Times* newspaper; and yet, in the face of these facts, in defiance of these red-hot balls, the consummate ass would make no peace, except at *New-York* or *Philadelphia*, they being first the head-quarters of a *Picton* or a *Hill!* This is as good a lift as this writer could have given to Mr. Madison, and as hard a blow as he could have given to the *noblesse* of Massachusetts, on whom he and the rest of our war-tribe had built, and do still build, their hopes of ultimate success. Let them look at the attitude of New-York and Philadelphia. I do not say that it is impossible to get at either of those cities, with bomb-shells or rockets; but I am quite satisfied, that it would require a *very large army* to set foot in either of them, even for the purpose of burning and then quitting them, in safety. I will now make an observation or two with regard to *public opinion* as to the American war. People are *disappointed.* The continuance of the *property tax* pinches. But would they have the luxury of war without paying for it? No, no; *pay* they must; or they must put up with what they have gotten, and see the *stars* and *stripes* waving in every sea. They would have *war.* War was their cry. They have it, and they must pay for it.

TO THE COSSACK PRIESTHOOD OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Gentlemen,

I PERCEIVE that there were held, in your state, and at your instigation, and under your guidance and ministry, *solemn fasts and thanksgivings* on account of the entrance of the Cossacks into Paris, and of the fall of Napoleon. Hence, I perceive, that you are called *the Chaplains of the Cossacks;* and sometimes, the *Cossack Priesthood.* That you, who used to be regarded as some of the best men in your republic, and the purity of whose religious motives were never even doubted, should have exposed yourself to the application of such titles, I extremely regret to hear. But it is not my business to give way to private feelings upon such an occasion. It is for me, as far as I am able, and as I dare, to make *truth* known to the world; and as you, in this case, appear to me to have shown a more decided hostility to truth than any other set of men of whom I have heard, not excepting the editors of the London newspapers, it is natural for me to address myself to you upon the subject.

The religion, of which you profess to be teachers, is the *Presbyterian.* I believe, that there are three or four sorts of Presbyterian Christians. To which of these sorts you belong, or whether some of you are of the one sort and some of each of the others, I know not. Nor is it material; it being well known, that,

substantially, all these sorts are the same, and that the religion you profess has existed, and has been the generally prevailing religion in the four eastern states of the republic, where there has been born and reared up an industrious, sober, humane, gentle, kind, brave, and free people, distinguished heretofore, above all others, for their right and clear understanding of the principles of liberty, and for their zeal and undaunted resolution in her cause. Whether the people would have been as good, better, or worse, without the religion that you have taught; whether, discarding, as is the manner of some men, all *mysteries*, and believing in nothing the truth of which cannot be substantiated by undeniable facts, or by incontrovertible argument, they would have been as good, better, or worse, than they are, is a question, which I will not meddle with. But you will excuse me, if I observe, that, while this can possibly be made *a question* amongst rational men, you, who receive *pay* for your teaching of religion, ought to be very careful to excite no doubt in the minds of mankind as to the purity of your views, or the sincerity of your faith.

Your recent conduct does, however, appear to have excited such doubts in the minds of your countrymen. In *my* mind it has done more. It has convinced me that your motives are any thing rather than pure; and that your professions are a mere pretence; a trick to enable you *to live without labour upon the earnings of those who do labour*, just as are the tricks of monks and friars, and of all other imposers on popular credulity, from the golden-palmed showman of the lady of Loretto down to the lousy-cowled consecrators of halfpenny strings of beads, and the itinerant protestant bawlers, whose harangues are wholly incomprehensible, until they come round with their hat to collect the means of recruiting the belly. All the zeal of impostors of every kind; all their calumnies of others; all their innumerable persecutions of those who have endeavoured to withdraw the people from their degrading influence, have had this great end in view: *to extract and secure to themselves the means of living well, without labour, out of the earnings of those who do labour.* I am very sorry to ascribe such a motive to you, whose forefathers fled to a wilderness rather than violate the dictates of their conscience; but truth compels me to say, that you appear to have no claim to an exemption from the general charge. Yet, I am not so unjust as to suppose, much less to hold forth to the world, that *all* the priests of Massachusetts are of this description; but, as I find no account of any *protest*, on the part of any of the priests, against the odious and detestable celebrations and fasts before mentioned, I shall stand fully justified for not making any particular exceptions. If any of the priests of Massachusetts feel sore under the appellation which I have given them, they ought to direct their resentment against those whose conduct has brought it upon them, and

not against me, unless they are able to show that I charge them unjustly.

Had you, indeed, confined your thanksgivings to the release of certain countries of Europe from the arms of an *invader*, a *conqueror*, an *oppressor*, an *ambitious despot*, who, instead of giving *liberty*, added to the civil sufferings of some of the nations whom he overran, having first extinguished republican government, and along with it political liberty in France, where the people had put power into his hands to be used in the cause of freedom. Had you held solemn thanksgivings on account of the triumph of the Cossacks, and their associates, in the cause of the *civil* and *political* independence of nations, you would not have excited indignation in the breast of any reasonable man; for, though some men would have differed with you in opinion upon that point; though some men would have said, as some men thought, that the conqueror could not long have held under his sway so extensive an empire as he was grasping; that, in a few years, the several countries of which it was composed, beginning with France, would, in all human probability, throw off his yoke, and form themselves into independent states, freed from all his, as well as all former shackles; and that, thus, he would, in the end, be found to have been instrumental in establishing liberty, civil as well as religious, in every part of Europe where it did not before exist; though some men would have said this, and would, of course, not have joined you in your thanksgivings for the victories of the Cossacks, no just and considerate man could have censured you, so long as you confined your thanksgivings to the aforementioned objects. But when, in your prayers and sermons, you called the Cossacks, and others engaged on the same side, "the bulwark of your *religion*;" when, with the *Reverend* Mr. PARISH at your head, you called Napoleon *anti-Christ*, and bawled out songs of praise to the Cossacks and their associates for pulling him down; and especially when you maliciously threw on your political opponents the charge of being *the abettors of anti-Christ;* then you excited the indignation of all those who did not turn with disgust from your horrid ejaculations and harangues.

If there was one trait, above all others, by which your sermons and prayers, until of late years, were characterized, it was by your zealous, your violent, not to say foul-mouthed attacks on the Romish Pontiff, faith, and worship. You had no scruple to represent the pope as *anti-Christ*, and as the *scarlet whore* of Babylon, covered with abominations. *How clearly* did you *prove* that he was the *beast* of the revelations; that he had made the world drunk with his fornications; that his seven heads were the seven hills on which Rome is situated; his ten horns the ten principal Catholic sovereigns of Europe; and that his colour was *scarlet*, because it was *dyed in the blood of the saints?* Was there

a sermon, was there a prayer, that issued from your lips, in which you did not call on the Lord for vengeance on this "*man of sin*," and in which you did not describe the Catholic religion as *idolatrous, blasphemous, diabolical*, and as evidently tending to the *eternal damnation of millions and millions of precious souls?*

Every one who shall read what I am now writing, must acknowledge, that this description of your conduct, in regard to the Romish church, is far short of the mark. What, then, have you now to say in justification of your recent conduct? Where is your justification for your violent attacks on Napoleon and his family, to say nothing, at present, of your thanksgivings for the restoration of the ancient order of things, or, in your own language, "the *ancient* and *venerable institutions?*" Where is your justification for your attacks on the Buonapartes? *Others*, indeed, might consistently attack them. Such as thought that the church of Rome and her power were good things; or, such as regarded one religion as good as another, might consistently attack Buonaparte. But *you!* you, who professed the opinions above described; how can *you* apologize to the world, and to your abused flocks, for the part which *you* have taken against him?

The case, with regard to you, stands thus: There was, before Buonaparte's power commenced, existing in Europe a system of religion, or, as you called it, irreligion, having at the head of it a Sovereign Pontiff, with innumerable Cardinals, Bishops, Vicars-General, Abbots, Priors, Monks, Friars, Secular Priests, &c. &c. under him. To this body you ascribed false doctrines, tricks, frauds, and cruelties without end. You charged them with the propagation of idolatry and blasphemy; with keeping the people in ignorance; with nourishing superstition; with blowing the flames of persecution; with daily murdering, in the most horrid manner, the martyrs to the true faith. The Sovereign Pontiff himself, the corner-stone of the whole body, you constantly called *anti-Christ*, the *Scarlet Whore*, the *Beast*, and the *Man of Sin*. And you prayed most vehemently for his overthrow, insisting that the system, of which he was the foundation, manifestly tended to the eternal damnation of the souls of the far greater part of the people of Europe.

Well! Napoleon arose. He hurled down the pope; he overthrew the anti-Christ, the Scarlet Whore, the Beast, the Man of Sin, and with him all the long list of persecutors of the saints. Napoleon and his associates did, in three years, what your prayers and preachings had not been able to effect in three centuries. The pope was stripped of all temporal power; the cardinals and bishops were reduced to mere ciphers; the monks were driven from their dens of laziness and debauchery; the tricks and frauds were exposed; the adored images were turned into firewood; the holy relics were laughed at; the light of truth was suffer-

ed freely to beam upon the minds of the people; religious persecution was put an end to; and all men were not only *permitted*, but also *encouraged*, openly to profess, pursue, and enjoy, whatever species of religious faith and worship they chose. Every man became eligible to offices, trusts, and honours; and, throughout the domains of Italy and France, where a Presbyterian would have been tied to a stake and roasted rather than be suffered to fill an office of trust, or to preach to a congregation, religious liberty was, under Napoleon, made as perfect as in Pennsylvania, and *more* perfect than in your state of Massachusetts.

These are facts which none of you, not even Mr. Parish, will dare openly to deny. They are as notorious as they will be, and ought to be, memorable.

Ought *you* not, therefore, to have rejoiced at this wonderful change in favour of religious liberty? How could you see fifty millions of souls set free without feeling it impossible to suppress an expression of your pleasure? How could you see the fall of *anti-Christ* without putting up thanksgiving to that God to whom you had so long been praying, whom you had so long been worrying with your importunities, for the accomplishment of that object? Was not this an event calculated to call forth your gratitude to Heaven? Ought it not to have been expected from you, that you should speak very cautiously in disapprobation of Napoleon and the French republicans, who had effected what you had so long been praying for, apparently, in vain? Ought you not, if you had spoken at all of the sins of his ambition; if you had blamed him as an invader, a conqueror, a destroyer of republican freedom; to have touched him with a tender hand, considering the immense benefits which religious liberty had received in consequence of his invasions and conquests? Ought he not to have found in *you*, above all men living, if not impartial judges, at least, mild and moderate censors?

If this was what might naturally and justly have been expected from you, what must have been the surprise and indignation of those who saw you amongst the very fiercest of Napoleon's foes; amongst the foulest of his calumniators; amongst the first and loudest of those who rejoiced at his fall; who saw you holding solemn fasts and thanksgivings for his overthrow; who heard you hail with holy rapture the return of "the ancient order of things," and the re-establishment of the "*venerable institutions*" of Europe; who heard you joining in the hosannas of the monks, styling the Cossacks, and their associates, "bulwarks of *religion*," "*deliverers*," and "*saviours*;" who heard you, in the words of Mr. PARISH, shifting, from the pope to Napoleon himself, the imputation of being *anti-Christ*, and charging your political opponents with being the abetters of that "Scarlet Whore," that "Man of Sin!" What must have been the surprise and indigna-

tion of those who were the witnesses of your conduct upon this memorable occasion? How you may stand, at this time, in the estimation of your flocks, it is impossible for me to know; but if you still preserve your former weight and consequence, I must say that you exhibit an instance of success, of which, in an enlightened country, no former set of impostors ever had to boast.

What was that "ancient order of things," the return of which you hailed with such rapture? *What were* those "venerable institutions," of which you thanked the Lord for the approaching re-establishment? *The holy see of Rome* was one, and *the inquisition* was another. Thousands of subaltern "venerable institutions," naturally followed in the train of these; such as the Virgin Mary's house at Loretto; the shrine of Saint Anthony; the holy cross; the exhibition of Saint Catherine's Wheel, of the Holy Thorn that penetrated Christ's cheek, of the Breeches of Saint Polomo, so efficacious with barren wives, especially by a lusty monk. Hundreds and thousands of thousands of these "*venerable*" things, naturally followed the overthrow of him who had overthrown them. All the persecutions of the Protestants; all the frauds, insolence, and cruelty, of the Romish priests must have been in your view. You are not *ignorant* men. On the contrary, you are some of the most cunning even of priests. You knew to a moral certainty that the pope, whom you had formerly led your flocks to believe was anti-Christ, would be restored. You knew that, instead of a milder sway, he would naturally be more rigid than ever in the exercise of his power. All this you knew. You knew that the *toleration* of all Protestant sects, the encouragement of them, the free use of reason on religious subjects, and the free circulation of religious opinions, which were so complete under Napoleon, would be instantly destroyed in the far greater part of Europe. And yet you held a solemn thanksgiving to God that Napoleon had been overthrown, and you had the impious hypocrisy to call his enemies "the bulwarks of *religion*;" you; aye, *you*, whose fathers fled to a wilderness across the sea, rather than live where they were not permitted openly to denounce as damnable the remnants which the church of England had preserved of that very religion of which the enemies of Napoleon were the bulwark, and which you now thanked God for the prospect of seeing restored.

The Holy Father, whom you formerly called the "Scarlet Whore," dyed in the blood of the saints; the "Beast," as you used to call him, whose "mouth was full of blasphemies," remounted his chair even before "the *Most Christian* King" got upon his throne. One of his first acts was to restore the *Jesuits*, that "ancient and *venerable* institution," which had become so odious, on account of its wicked acts, that it had been abolished by all the princes of Europe, and even by a former pope himself.

The next remarkable step was the re-establishment of the *Inquisition* in Spain, where it had been *abolished by Napoleon* on the day that he took possession of the government of that country; and, what is worthy of particular notice, though perfectly natural, "Ferdinand the *beloved*," in his ordinance, dated 23d July last, for the re-establishment of that horrid tribunal, makes use of almost *your very language*, in *reproaching Napoleon with its abolition*, as you will see by the ordinance itself, annexed to this letter.

You yourselves well know what that tribunal was; but, as some of the good people, whom you have deceived, may not know the precise nature of that "*venerable* institution," which Napoleon abolished, and which has been restored in consequence of the successes of your "*bulwarks of religion*," I will here insert an account of it from the last edition of the *Encyclopediæ Britannica*, referring your flocks to Mr. Dobson's greatly improved Philadelphia edition, that they may verify the correctness of the extract, which they will find under the words "*Inquisition*" and "*Act of Faith*," as follows:

"INQUISITION.—In the church of Rome, a tribunal, in several Roman Catholic countries, erected by the popes for the examination and punishment of heretics. This court was founded, in the twelfth century, by Father Dominic, and his followers, who were sent by Pope Innocent III., with orders to excite the Catholic princes and people to extirpate heretics, to search into their number and quality, and to transmit a faithful account thereof to Rome. Hence they were called *inquisitors;* and this gave birth to the formidable tribunal of the inquisition, which was received in all Italy, and the dominions of Spain, except the kingdom of Naples and the Low Countries. This diabolical tribunal takes cognizance of Heresy, Judaism, Mahometanism, Sodomy, and Polygamy; and the people stand in so much fear of it, that parents deliver up their children, husbands their wives, and masters their servants, to its officers, without daring, in the least, to murmur. The prisoners are kept for a long time, till they themselves turn their own accusers, and declare the cause of their imprisonment; for they are neither told their crime, nor confronted with witnesses. As soon as they are imprisoned their friends go into mourning, and speak of them as dead, not daring to solicit their pardon, lest they should be brought in as accomplices. When there is no shadow of proof against the pretended criminal, he is discharged, after suffering the most cruel tortures, a tedious and dreadful imprisonment, and the loss of the greatest part of his effects. The sentence against the prisoners is pronounced publicly, and with the greatest solemnity. In Portugal, they erect a theatre capable of holding 3,000 persons, in which they place a rich altar, and raise seats on each side in the

form of an amphitheatre. There the prisoners are placed; and over against them is a high chair, whither they are called, one by by one, to hear their doom from one of the inquisitors. These unhappy people know what they are to suffer by the clothes they wear that day. Those who appear in their own clothes are discharged, upon payment of a fine; those who have a *santo benito*, or strait yellow coat without sleeves, charged with St. Andrew's cross, have their lives, but forfeit all their effects; those who have the resemblance of flames, made of red serge, sewed upon their *santo benito*, without any cross, are pardoned, but threatened to be burnt if ever they relapse; but those who, besides these flames, have on their *santo benito* their own picture, surrounded with figures of devils, are condemned to expire in the flames. The inquisitors, who are ecclesiastics, do not pronounce the sentence of death; but form and read an act, in which they say that the criminal being convicted of such a crime, by his own confession, is, with much reluctance, delivered to the secular power, to be punished according to his demerits; and this writing they give to the seven judges, who attend at the right side of the altar, who immediately pass sentence."

"ACT OF FAITH.—In the Romish church, is a solemn day, held by the inquisition for the punishment of heretics, and the absolution of the innocent accused. They usually contrive the *Auto* to fall on some great festival, that the execution may pass with the more awe and regard; at least it is always on a Sunday. The *Auto da Fe*, or *Act of Faith*, may be called the last act of the inquisitorial tragedy; it is a kind of gaol-delivery, appointed as oft as a competent number of prisoners in the inquisition are convicted of heresy, either by their own voluntary, or extorted confession, or on the evidence of certain witnesses. The process is thus: In the morning they are brought into a great hall, where they have certain habits put on, which they are to wear in the procession. The procession is led up by Dominican friars; after which come the penitents, some with *san-benitoes*, and some without, according to the nature of the crimes; being all in black coats without sleeves, and barefooted, with a wax candle in their hands. These are followed by the penitents who have narrowly escaped being burnt, who, over their black coats, have flames painted, with their points turned downwards, *Fuego revolto*. Next come the negative and relapsed, who are to be burnt, having flames on their habits pointing upwards. After these come such as profess doctrines contrary to the faith of Rome, who, besides flames pointing upwards, have their picture painted on their breasts, with dogs, serpents, and devils, all open mouthed, about it. Each prisoner is attended with a familiar of the inquisition; and those to be burnt have also a Jesuit on each hand, who is continually preaching to them to abjure. After the prisoners, come a troop of familiars on

horseback, and after them the inquisitors, and other officers of the court, on mules; last of all, the inquisitor general, on a white horse, led by two men with black hats and green hatbands. A scaffold is erected in the *Teniero de Pacs*, big enough for two or three thousand people; at one end of which are the prisoners, at the other the inquisitors. After a sermon, made up of encomiums of the inquisition, and invectives against heretics, a priest ascends a desk near the middle of the scaffold, and having taken the abjuration of the penitents, recites the final sentence of those who are to be put to death; and delivers them to the secular arm, earnestly beseeching, at the same time, the secular power not to touch their blood, or put their lives in danger. The prisoners being thus in the hands of the civil magistrate, are presently loaded with chains, and carried first to the secular gaol, and from thence, in an hour or two, brought before the civil judge; who, after asking in what religion they intend to die, pronounces sentence on such as declare they die in the communion of Rome, that they shall be first strangled, and then burnt to ashes; on such as die in any other faith, that they be burnt alive. Both are immediately carried to the Ribera, the place of execution, where there are as many stakes set up as there are prisoners to be burnt, with a quantity of dry furze about them. The stakes of the professed, that is, such as persist in their heresy, are about four yards high, having a small board towards the top for the prisoner to be seated on. The negative and relapsed being first strangled and burnt, the professed mount their stakes by a ladder; and the Jesuits, after several repeated exhortations to be reconciled to the church, part with them, telling them they leave them to the devil, who is standing at their elbow to receive their souls and carry them with him into the flames of hell. On this a great shout is raised, and the cry is, *Let the dogs' beards be made;* which is done by thrusting flaming furzes fastened to long poles against their faces, till their faces are burnt to a coal, which is accompanied with the loudest acclamations of joy. At last, fire is set to the furze at the bottom of the stake, over which the professed are chained so high, that the top of the flame seldom reaches higher than the board they sit on; so that they rather seem roasted than burnt. There cannot be a more lamentable spectacle; the sufferers continually cry out, while they are able, *misericorda per amor de Dios.* 'Pity for the love of God!' yet it is beheld by all sexes and ages with transports of joy and satisfaction."

People of Massachusetts! Sons of Englishmen, who fled to a wilderness, who sacrificed their dearest connexions to *religious liberty!* Merciful, humane, gentle, kind, and brave people of Massachusetts, though your Cossack priests can view with dry eyes and unmoved muscles this horrid spectacle, does it not chill the blood in *your* veins? Though they, with holy impudence, can

put up thanksgivings for the fall of him by whom this "*venerable* institution" had been overthrown, and of whose fall its revival was a natural, if not certain, consequence; do not *your* hearts revolt at the impiousness, the baseness, the cruelty, of the sentiment?

People of Massachusetts, (for to your hardened priests will I no longer address myself,) what can have been the real cause of this conduct on the part of your priests? In the people of England it was very natural and reasonable to rejoice at the fall of Napoleon. He had immense power; he was near them; he had threatened to invade their country; he had made preparations for so doing. It was, therefore, natural for them to rejoice at his fall; but even here, with the exception of a few hypocrites, despised by persons of sense, of all parties, people did not rejoice at his fall as an enemy of *religion*. Had your priests not put up thanksgivings for the deliverance of *religion*, their conduct might have been passed over; but when they made that the ground of their gratitude to the Cossacks and to Heaven, they invited the lash of censure; they called aloud for the detestation of mankind.

While, indeed, the French nation seemed to have thrown aside *all religion whatever;* while they were setting aside all the memorials and marks of the *Christian era;* while they were apparently all *atheists*, there was some reason for your priests to wish their overthrow. Even in that case, however, they would have shown more confidence in Christianity, if they had been less bitter against the French. Some men thought that their extreme asperity against such writers as Paine, seemed not to say that they possessed ability to defeat him in the field of argument; and, indeed, seemed to argue that they did not feel a sufficient degree of confidence in the goodness of their cause itself; for, if they had been thoroughly convinced, as they ought to have been, that the Christian religion was built upon a rock, and that the gates of hell would never prevail against it, Paine would have been an object of their *pity* rather than of their *persecution*. Their anger against him was madness, unless they apprehended *danger* from his attempts; and if they did apprehend *danger* from those attempts, they showed a want of sufficient confidence in their cause itself, which want of confidence should have taught them moderation in their attacks on the adversary. There was a great outcry about *atheism* in France; but what was it, after all, but letting the human mind loose, to range at pleasure? When every man was at liberty to *say what he liked*, who need have been in fear for the cause of *truth?* He who was an *insincere* Christian; he who *doubted* of the truth of Christianity; he who thought it false, but who professed it from *interested* motives, had reason to rail against the innovators; but he who was a real believer, and whose belief was founded on the conclusions of reason, could not possibly have any ground for alarm, seeing that *freedom of discussion* is, and eter-

nally must be, favourable to *truth;* and, of course, hostile to *error* and *falsehood.* Those, therefore, who are opposed to freedom of discussion, *on any subject,* and who make use of clamours, slanders, or force, to prevent it, may, in all cases, and acting under whatever pretence, be safely considered as wishing to sustain error or falsehood.

But these observations do not apply to the case of the emperor Napoleon. However just the hatred of your priests against the *atheists* of France, there was no portion of that hatred due to him who re-opened the churches, who invited the performance of religious worship, who encouraged the people to make provision for the maintenance of the parochial clergy, who went very regularly to hear mass himself; but who, at the same time, effectually prevented all religious persecution; who countenanced and encouraged all religious sects; who put them all upon a footing of civil and political equality; and who, throughout his vast dominions, was speedily introducing such a system, as to religion, as must, in a few years, have inevitably rooted out every fibre of superstition, and have put an end for ever to that spirit of persecution, which had so long been filling Europe with misery and crimes.

Be he, therefore, what he might, in other respects, he had been, and he was, a friend and protector of religious freedom. This quality, one would have thought, was that which, above all others, ought to have pleaded in his behalf with your priests; yet they rejoiced at his fall; they hailed his enemies as the "*bulwarks of religion;*" they put up thanksgivings for the restoration of the "*venerable* institutions" which he had pulled down; and they even called *him* "anti-Christ," the appellation which they had formerly given to the pope.

Let your priests say what they will of the French republicans, and of Napoleon, the world are witnesses to the fact, that, even though a counter-revolution has taken place in France, that country has derived immense advantages from the revolution; that she is now freed from numerous oppressions before endured; that her agriculture has made astonishing progress; that she has got rid of her *feudal tyrannies,* her *monks,* her *tythes;* that her farmers are now able to undersell ours in our own markets; that her manufactures are greatly increased; and that, as yet, her king has not ventured to overthrow Napoleon's laws, securing to all men perfect religious liberty, and an equality as to all matters connected with religious worship and the public capacities of the professors of different religions. Nothing could be a greater compliment to Napoleon, than the stipulation with the king that NAPOLEON'S CODE, civil and religious, *should remain untouched.*

What ground, then, could *your* priests have for their implacable

hatred of Napoleon? Why did *they* put up thanksgivings for his overthrow? Why did *they* call the Cossacks and their associates the "bulwarks of religion?" Why did *they* call him the oppressor of Spain, who had abolished the *inquisition*, and had driven the monks from their convents and their luxury? What could have been the cause of *their* being amongst his calumniators? How came *they* to join in the prayers and thanksgivings of the jesuits and Dominicans? The truth is, they were actuated by *self interest;* they were alarmed at the consequences to which freedom of discussion might lead. The sudden overthrow of the old establishments of Europe; the great shock which the French revolution gave to long-received opinions; the burst of light which had come into the human mind; these alarmed them. They began to fear that, if religion became out of fashion in Europe, it might become out of fashion in Massachusetts, and leave them in a situation like that of the buckle-makers, when shoe-strings came in vogue. They now began to perceive, that the fall of the pope, and of the Romish superstition and persecutions, would be to them a vast injury. They saw that the French and Napoleon were snatching the very bread and meat off their plates. This was the true cause of their hostility against him; this was the true cause of their thanksgivings for the victories of the Cossacks and their associates, as the "bulwarks of *religion;*" that is to say, the bulwarks of their *bread and meat;* the bulwark of their living well *without labour* on the earnings of *you*, who pay them, and who *do labour*. The same motive would, of course, have induced them to abuse the pullers-down of Mahomet. Nor must they be surprised if the world should suspect that, in a similar cause, they would have made, if they could, a solemn league and covenant with the devil himself, and have called *him* the "Bulwark of *Religion*."

If this conclusion against the Cossack priests of Massachusetts were not obviously deducible from their above-described conduct, unsupported by any other fact; if any other proof were wanted, you have that proof in their electioneering tricks of last year, when, amongst their objections to the electing of a republican, or, as they termed it, *democratic* legislature, they complained of a former democratic legislature in these memorable words: "They *impaired* the constitutional *provision for the support of a public worship*, by releasing the *disaffected* from contributing to the support of *permanent teachers* of piety, religion, and morality."*

* Note. All religions were always *tolerated* in Massachusetts; but there was a law, before the republicans got the upper hand, to *oblige every person* to contribute to the maintenance of *public protestant worship*, to his *own teachers*, if he had any; if he had none of his own, *to the priest of the parish wherein he resided.* The republicans appear to have left every man free to pay to any sect, or to *no sect at all*, as the just and wise William Penn left the matter in Pennsylvania. This was the crime of the republicans, in the eyes of the priests of Massachusetts. Whether the federalists have since saddled the people with a tax on account of religion, I know not.

That is to say, they complained of the "democrats" for having endeavoured to make Massachusetts, in point of religious liberty, what WILLIAM PENN made Pennsylvania, and what Napoleon had made, as nearly as he possibly could, France and Italy, and all the countries which he had conquered. Here we see the REAL ground of the hostility of your priests to the French republicans, to Napoleon, and to the republican party in America. They had long enjoyed the benefices of a sort of *established and dominant church;* they had long been receiving *compulsory payments for their support;* they had long felt the agreeable effects of this "*venerable* institution." The example of France, and the practical effect thereof in America, had shaken their hold of valuable possession; and hence, and hence alone, their abuse of the French and Napoleon; their dread of the continuance of his power; their exultation at his overthrow; and their thanksgivings for the restoration of those "venerable institutions" in Europe; those ecclesiastical powers and profits, which kept their own in countenance, and of which the French and Napoleon had been the determined enemies.

No more need be said. You, the people of Massachusetts, who possess so much good sense, who have so often exercised that good sense as to other persons and things, cannot long remain the dupes of these hypocrites, who, while they have the desire of your welfare in the next world constantly on their lips, are manifestly intent upon securing to themselves, in this world, ease and plenty, at the public expense.

WM. COBBETT.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE following is the decree of the king of Spain, re-establishing the inquisition, published in a supplement to the Madrid Gazette, 23d July, 1814:

"The King our Lord has been pleased to enact the following decree. The *glorious title of Catholic*, by which the kings of Spain are distinguished among the other Christian princes, because they *do not tolerate in their kingdom any one who professes another religion than the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman*, has powerfully excited my heart to employ all the means which God has placed in my hands, in order to make myself worthy of it. The past troubles and war which afflicted all the provinces of the kingdom, during the space of six years; the residence therein, during that time, of *foreign troops* of *different sects*, almost all *infected* with abhorrence and hatred to the Catholic religion; and the disorder that these evils always bring with them, together with the little care which was taken, for some time, in providing for what concerned the things of religion, gave to the wicked un-

limited license to live after their free will, and to introduce in this kingdom, and fix in many persons, *pernicious opinions*, by the same means with which they had been propagated in other countries: Desiring, therefore, to provide a remedy against so great an evil, and preserve in my dominions the holy religion of Jesus Christ, which my people love, and in which they have lived and do live happily, both by the duty which the fundamental laws of the kingdom impose on the prince which shall reign over it, and I have sworn to observe and fulfil, as likewise being the most proper means to preserve my subjects from intestine dissentions, and maintain them in peace and tranquillity, I have thought it would be very convenient, in the present circumstances, that the tribunal of the *Holy Office* should return to the exercise of its jurisdiction: Upon which subject wise and virtuous prelates, and many corporations and serious persons, both ecclesiastical and secular, have represented to me, that it was owing to this tribunal that Spain was not contaminated, in the sixteenth century, with the errors that caused so much affliction in other kingdoms, the nation flourishing at that time in all kinds of literature, in great men, in holiness and virtue: And that *one of the principal means* employed by the *oppressor of Europe*, in order to sow *corruption and discord*, from which he derived so many advantages, was *to destroy it, under pretence that the light of the age could not bear its continuance any longer;* and which, *afterwards*, the self-styled general cortes, with the *same pretence*, and that of the constitution, which they had tumultuously framed, annulled, to the great sorrow of the nation. Wherefore, they have ardently requested me to re-establish that tribunal; and, according to their requests, and the wishes of the people, who, from love to the religion of their fathers, have restored, of their own accord, some of the subaltern tribunals to their functions, I have resolved, that the Council of the *Inquisition*, and the other *tribunals* of the *Holy Office*, should be restored and continued in the exercise of their jurisdiction, both *ecclesiastical*, which, at the request of my august predecessors, the pontiffs gave to it, and the *royal*, which the kings granted to it, observing, in the exercise of both, the ordinances by which they were governed in 1808, and the laws and provisions, which, to avoid certain abuses, and moderate some privileges, it was mete to take at different times. As, besides these provisions, it may, perhaps, be suitable to adopt other; and my intention being to improve this establishment, that the greatest utility may arise to my subjects from it, I wish that, as soon as the Council of the Inquisition shall meet, two of its members, with two others of my Royal Council, both of which I shall nominate, should examine the form and mode of proceeding in the causes appertaining to the *Holy Office*, and the method established for the censure and prohibition of books; and if there

should be found any thing in it contrary to the good of my subjects, and the upright administration of justice, or that ought to be altered, it shall be proposed to me, that I may determine what shall be proper. This is communicated for your information, and of whom it may concern.

"*Palace*, 21*st July*, 1814.

"THE KING.

"*To Don Pedro de Macanaz.*"

To the Knights, Grand Crosses, Commanders and Companions of the Orders of the BULWARK *and the* HENRIADE, *lately assembled in full Chapter, at* HARTFORD, *in New England.*

Gentlemen,

As your occupation appears to have been suddenly put an end to by the peace, which our government has had the wisdom to make with yours, it may amuse and please you to be informed how the glorious work of *deliverance* proceeds in Europe. I was highly delighted to perceive, that you were very careful to avail yourselves of the aid of the *Cossack Priesthood*, during your late deliberations. The long prayers, which it was resolved those gentry should put up, two or three times a day, was not the least interesting part of your measures. It must glad your hearts to hear, that the *pope*, the *Jesuits*, all the *monks* (except in *disorganized* France) have been not only *delivered*, but fully re-established by the efforts of the BULWARK; and that, in Spain, the HOLY INQUISITION has been so completely *delivered* "from the "*fell grasp*," as Mr. RANDOLPH calls it, of Napoleon, that it is now under the paternal sway of "Ferdinand the *beloved*," in full vigour of operation for the support of "social order, and of ancient and "venerable establishments." In this operation it has laid hold of—*who*, think you? Why of those men who, for several years, were fighting and writing for "Ferdinand the beloved;" that is to say, for the BULWARK, against the destroyer of venerable institutions. Some of these "patriots," as they were called, having taken refuge in our fortress of Gibraltar, have been given up by our governor to the beloved Ferdinand, whose government has sent one of them to work *in the galleys* for *ten years*. Another of them has escaped to England, where his cause has been espoused by Mr. WHITBREAD, who, though not a BULWARK man, seems to have been applied to by this BULWARK Spaniard in preference to the government here, though one would have thought that he would fly to his old friends to be

received with open arms. Mr. WHITBREAD has made several very eloquent speeches upon the subject; but, to say the truth, they have produced but little effect upon me, and this for two reasons: *First*, these bulwark men *fought and wrote for Ferdinand;* they called every one a traitor and a miscreant, who did not wish for the restoration of the ancient family, *the venerable institutions*. In the course of their proceedings, they levelled their swords and their pens against the lives of all those, who wished not to be delivered; they drew forth the sweat and blood of their country against him who had put down the monks and the inquisition; they persecuted every man who acted as if he dreaded the *deliverance* of Spain. In their turn they are persecuted; they are sent to jails and galleys; and you will please to observe, that they suffer this from those *for whom they had fought*, in whose behalf they had persecuted others, and are delivered up, too, by an *English* governor. I think, may it please your knighthoods, that this is as suitable, as fit, as exemplary, as any human occurrence can well be. My other reason for taking little interest in the fate of these men, is, that I feel *more* for persons in our English, Scotch, and Irish jails. The patriot who is sent to the galleys, was charged with the crime of LIBEL. He, it is acknowledged, wrote a letter to the beloved Ferdinand, advising him to adopt a *new government* in Spain; that is to say, to consent to *a revolution*, that horrid thing, which is so contrary to those ancient and venerable institutions, to restore which so much blood and money has been expended; and for the restoration of which you have so long and so fervently prayed through the nose, with your eyes turned up towards the ceiling. Now, while there are so many men *in our* jails for writing libels; while I recollect that so many gentlemen were sent from Scotland to Botany Bay, on the charge of attempting a revolution in our government; and while I hear no word from Mr. WHITBREAD in their behalf, that gentleman must excuse me, if I am very little moved by his eloquence, great as it is, in behalf of these Spaniards. There is a Mr. LOVELL who has been in our jail of Newgate about *four years and a half*. His offences were *copying* a short paragraph from a country paper relative to the operation of the PROPERTY TAX, and publishing another paragraph, or letter, relative to the conduct of the transport board towards *French prisoners of war*. He might be in error in both instances; but his affidavits showed, that he was the *author* of neither publication; that he copied one, inadvertently, from a country newspaper, and that he did not examine the other with sufficient care. He was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for each, and was *fined* besides; and he is now in jail, where he has been for a year and a half, wanting ability to pay his fines. Mr. HOUSTON is suffering two years imprisonment and fine for a book on *religion*. Away, then, with the com-

plaints of Don Carrea and Don Puigblanc, and all the dons in the universe, till Mr. Lovell and Mr. Houston, and others, find somebody to *feel* and to *speak* for them. It will vex you very much to know that the French revolution has produced remarkably beneficial consequences to the country. It is now acknowledged, and even proclaimed, by our bulwark newspapers, that France has greatly *improved in agriculture*, during what is called her state of *disorganization*, though we were told by these same newspapers, and by our insipid hireling Mr. WALSH, that Napoleon had left none but old men, women and children, to cultivate the land. These poor, feeble creatures have got the land into such a fine state, that we are compelled to resort to a *law* to *protect* our farmers against their corn, in which article they undersell us in our own markets. The truth is that, in addition to this great improvement in the state of France, the bulwark war has left us a load of taxes, which the land cannot pay without *high prices*. The petitions, which have been presented in favour of this law, tell us, or, rather, tell the parliament, that our farmers cannot sell so cheap as those who pay no *tythes*, *poor-rates*, and, comparatively, very little in *taxes* of any sort. What is this but attacking tythes, one of the most *ancient* and *venerable* institutions in the whole world! and these are bulwark men, too, who petition in these terms! In France they have not been able to restore tythes; or, in your language, to *deliver* the country from the want of tythes. They have not been able to restore the gabelles, the corvées, the feudal courts, laws and rights, nor have they yet seen a *monk* in France since the days of Brissot. They have put up the Bourbons; but they have not put down *the code Napoléon*. At the same time I am reminded of an occurrence that will give you both pleasure and pain: I mean the attempt to assassinate Napoleon by the hand of some hired villain. It will give you pleasure that a villain has been found *to attempt* the deed, and pain to know that it has not *succeeded*. Your *manifesto* has excited a great deal of anger in our bulwark newspapers, one of which observes, that it was "*hoped* and *expected*, that the Hartford delegates would have *declared a separation of the union at once*." On the other hand, you are held in the utmost contempt. You had courage to *menace*, but not enough to *strike*. If any of you were, however, to do here what you have *actually done* in America; that is, to endeavour to *overawe* the king and parliament, you would be hanged, have your bowels ripped out and flung in your faces; have your bodies cut in quarters, and the quarters placed at the king's disposal.——How foolish that would make *henriade* men look!

Yours to command,

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, 22d February, 1815.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL—ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

My Lord,

FROM the report of your speech on the eighth instant, it appears very clearly that your lordship is, by the reporter, made to entertain an opinion that the DIVISIONS amongst the American people are already such that we may rationally hope, by a continuation of the war, to produce a compliance with *any conditions*, or an overthrow of the *union*, in which union alone consists the strength and prospect of future greatness in that rising and fast-growing republic. The words, as given in the report of your speech, were these: "He (the earl of Liverpool) had seen much stronger justifications of the conduct of our forces at Washington, which had been published in America, than any that had been published even in this country. Not only were they not more hostile to us, but the reverse was the case. In places, even where the British arms had been successful, the people had shown themselves in our favour, and had seemed well disposed to put themselves under our protection." Your lordship is not singular in your opinion, if it be your opinion. It is the general opinion in this country. *How* that opinion had been created and kept alive, I will not now inquire. The *means* made use of for this purpose, the "most thinking people" know nothing of. They have opinions furnished them by others, as regularly as soldiers or sailors are served with rations. The lower class are, from their poverty, wholly without the pale of information, true or false, and appear to know and care as little about the acts of the government, and the state of public affairs, as the earth, or any other substance, on which they expend their time and their physical force. The middle class are so incessantly employed in pursuit of the means of keeping themselves from the horrors of pauperism, that they have no time for discussion or inquiry. Many persons, in this class of life, have asked me whether the Americans *could speak English.* Few men in the higher ranks of life know any thing worth speaking of, with regard to the American republic, a nation nearly equal in population to Great Britain, and inhabited, as we now feel, by men full as enterprising and as brave as our own soldiers and sailors. Even the writers who have fanned the flame of this bloody war, know nothing at all about the real state of America; for though they have no desire to promulgate truth; though it is their *trade* to deceive and cheat the people; they show by their statements that they are ignorant of facts, which, if they knew them, would make them able to deceive with less exposure to detection. This being the case, it is no wonder that the whole nation is in a state of

error, as to this matter of primary importance. On the day when the news reached the country, relative to the capture of the city of Washington, I happened to call, on my way homewards from Sussex, at the house of a gentleman, who was as likely to be as well informed as any other gentleman in the country, as to this or any other political matter. The following was the dialogue, wherein I shall exhibit the gentleman and his good wife under the name of Friend:

Mrs. *Friend.* Well, Mr. Cobbett, we shall soon get rid of the income tax [for so it is called in the country] *now.*

Mr. *Cobbett.* Shall we, madam? I am very glad to hear it. It will enable me to get a better horse for my gig. [*She had just been laughing at my scurvy equipage.*] But, why *now*, madam? What has happened to excite such a cheering hope?

Mrs. *Friend.* Why, have you not heard the *news?*

Mr. *Cobbett.* No.

Mr. *Friend.* We have taken the *capital* of America.

Mrs. *Friend.* And the cowardly dogs, to the amount of 9,000 men, ran away before 1,500 of our soldiers.

Mr. *Friend.* President, and all, ran away! Nobody knows where they went to, and the people were ready to submit to us all over the country.

Mrs. *Friend.* Cowardly dogs! Not stand to fight a moment for their capital. They are a pretty nation to go to war with England!

Mr. *Friend.* They ran away like a great flock of South-down sheep before a pack of hounds.

Mrs. *Friend.* The cowardly creatures will never dare show their faces again. What can you say for these Americans *now?*

Mr. *Cobbett.* Why, I say that you appear to know no more about them than about the people said to be in the moon. Let me look at the paper. [*It lay before her on the table.*]

Mrs. *Friend.* No: we must tell it you. It is too long for you to sit and read to yourself.

Mr. *Cobbett.* Well, now mind, I tell you that, instead of putting *an end* to the war, this event will tend to prolong it; and mind, I tell you, that unless *we give up* what we contend for, the war will be of many years' duration, and will be as expensive, and more bloody, than the war in Europe has been.

Mr. *Friend.* WE *give up* to such cowards as the Americans!

Mr. *Cobbett.* I do not mean to give up either *territory or honour.* I mean, give up the point in dispute; or, rather, our *present apparent object.* The Americans, like other people, cannot meet disciplined armies until they have time to organize and discipline themselves. But the Americans are not *cowards*, madam. Their seamen have proved that; and, what I fear is, that a continuance of the war will make the proof clearer and clearer every

day, by land as well as by sea; and, I am *now* more than *ever* afraid of a long continuation of the war; because, if such people as *you* seriously think that we are able to conquer America, I can have no reason to hope that any part of the nation remains undeceived.

Mr. *Friend.* But, do you not think that the *states will divide?*

Mr. *Cobbett.* Certainly not.

Mr. *Friend.* No!

Mr. *Cobbett.* No. And I should be glad to know what are your *reasons* for believing that they will divide. If you will give me any reasons for your belief, I will give you mine for a contrary belief. Do *you* think, madam, that the people of America are weary of living for thirty years without an income tax?

Mr. *Friend.* I have no reasons of my own about the matter. We see, in all our *papers*, that the Americans are a very divided people. They say that they cannot long hold together.

Mr. *Cobbett.* And do you really believe what these corrupted vagabonds put into their columns? You believed, then, of course, that "the American navy would be swept from the face of the ocean in a month;" for so they told you. Yet, how different has been the events! No, no; the Americans are not *cowards*, madam.

Mrs. *Friend.* Have you had such heaps of lemons this year as you used to have?

Such was, as nearly as I can recollect, the dialogue on this occasion; and, as I am sure that the war is continued in the hope, on the part of the *nation*, at least, of deriving success from *a breaking up of the union* in America, which, I am thoroughly persuaded, we shall not effect, or see take place, I will endeavour to show that this, my persuasion, rests on good grounds: and, if I succeed in this endeavour, I shall not yet abandon the hope, to which my heart clings, of seeing peace speedily restored between the two countries, upon terms not injurious to the interest or character of either.

In turning back, now, to the *reported* speech of your lordship, I perceive, and I perceive it with regret, that you are, by the reporter, made to found your opinion of the American disaffection to their government, and of their attachment to our king, in part, upon their having treated our officers, prisoners of war, with great liberality and kindness. I noticed this in my last number. I challenged any one to show the instance in which they had ever behaved cruelly to prisoners of war. I cited the memorable case of Mr. (now Sir Charles) Asgyll, and I appealed to their uniform conduct, during the present war, including the instances of Commodores Bainbridge and Perry. But as the conduct of the former, in this respect, has been most basely slandered in some

of our public prints, I will be somewhat more particular as to both instances, adding that of captain Lawrence.

Commodore Bainbridge captured the Java, off St. Salvadore, on the 29th of December, 1812. His frigate, the Constitution, carried 44 guns, and ours 49 guns, according to the American accounts. Ours, he says, had upwards of 400 men on board. The republicans killed 60 and wounded 170 of our officers and men, and had themselves 9 killed and 25 wounded. After the battle, at their pressing request, Commodore Bainbridge *paroled them all.* The Java had on board Lieutenant-General Hislop and his staff, together with several supernumerary officers and men. The following letter of General Hislop to Commodore Bainbridge will best speak for the latter:

"*Dear Sir,*

"I am justly penetrated with the fullest sense of your very handsome and kind treatment, ever since the fate of war placed me in your power, and I beg once more to renew to you my sincerest acknowledgments for the same. Your acquiescence with my request in granting me my parole, with the officers of my staff, added to the obligation I had previously experienced, claims from me this additional tribute of my thanks. May I now finally flatter myself, that, in the further extension of your generous and humane feelings in the alleviation of the misfortunes of war, you will have the goodness to fulfil the only wish and request I am now most anxious to see completed, by enlarging, on their parole, (on the same conditions you have acceded to with respect to myself,) all the officers of the Java still on board your ship; a favour I never shall cease duly to appreciate by your acquiescence thereto.

"I have the honour to subscribe myself, dear sir, your much obliged and very obedient servant."

The request was instantly complied with. Men and all were released upon parole.

In the case of Commodore Perry, the battle was fought on Lake Erie, on the 10th of September, 1813. With vessels carrying, altogether, 54 guns, he not only defeated, but captured, the whole of our fleet, six vessels, carrying 65 guns, as he stated in his official report; which report, by the by, fully justifies our admiralty as to Lake Erie. I take the following paragraph from his report to his government upon this occasion:

"I also beg your instructions respecting the wounded. I am satisfied, sir, that *whatever steps I might take, governed by humanity, would meet your approbation.* Under this impression, I have taken upon myself to promise Captain Barclay, who is very *dangerously* wounded, that he shall be landed as near Lake Ontario as possible; and I had no doubt you would allow me to parole him. He is under the impression that nothing but leaving

this part of the country will save his life. There are also a number of Canadians among the prisoners, *many who have families.*"

Captain Lawrence, in the brig Hornet, attacked and sunk, in fifteen minutes, our brig, the Peacock, killing between thirty and forty of our men, while the Hornet had only *one* man killed, and *two* wounded. Thus says the American report. Ours I have not at hand. Then comes the following letter:

"New-York, 27th March, 1813.

Sir,

WE, the surviving officers of his Britannic Majesty's late brig Peacock, beg leave to return you our grateful acknowledgments for the *kind attention* and *hospitality* we experienced during the time we remained on board the United States sloop Hornet. So much was done to alleviate the distressing and uncomfortable situation in which we were placed, when received on board the sloop you command, that we cannot better express our feelings than by saying, "*We ceased to consider ourselves prisoners;*" and every thing that friendship could dictate was adopted by you, and the officers of the Hornet, to remedy the inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable *loss of the whole of our property and clothes, by the sudden sinking of the Peacock.* Permit us then, sir, impressed, as we are, with a grateful sense of your kindness, for ourselves and the other officers and ship's company, to return you and the officers of the Hornet our sincere thanks, which we shall feel obliged if you will communicate to them in our name; and believe us to remain, with a high sense of the kind offices you have rendered us, your humble servants,

"*F. A. Wright,* First Lieutenant.
"*C. Lambert,* Second Lieutenant.
"*Edward Lott,* Master.
"*J. Whittaker,* Surgeon.
"*F. Donnithrone Unwin,* Purser.

"James Lawrence, Esq. commander U. S. sloop Hornet."

The American papers added, upon this occasion, the following:

"It is a fact worthy of note, and in the highest degree honourable to our brave tars, that, on the day succeeding the destruction of his Britannic majesty's brig Peacock, the crew of the Hornet made a subscription, and supplied the prisoners (who had lost almost every thing) with two shirts, a blue jacket and trowsers each."

Now, my lord, without going into more particulars, let me ask you, whether you think that this conduct towards our officers was the effect of disaffection towards their own government, of disapprobation of its conduct, of a hatred of the war, and of "a *dispo-*

sition to put themselves *under our protection?*" And, if you answer in the negative, as you must, I suppose, why do you think that the humane treatment of our officers elsewhere indicates such a disposition? Does your lordship see no possible danger in drawing such an inference? Do you think that it is wholly out of all belief, that your being reported to have drawn such an inference may render the treatment of our officers, prisoners of war, less humane and kind in future? Seeing that a disposition in an American citizen to put himself under the protection of our king is a disposition to commit *treason*, in the eye of the laws of his country, would it be so very surprising if, in future, the Americans should be very cautious how they exposed themselves to the merit of such a compliment? I must, however, do your lordship the justice to observe here, that what the proprietors of our newspapers have published as *your speech*, might never have been uttered by you. I would fain hope that they have, in this case, put forth, under your name, the suggestions of their own minds. I, therefore, comment on the thing as *theirs*, and not as *yours*.

In order to show that there is no foundation for the hope, entertained by people here, and so often expressed by our newspapers, *of dividing the republic of America*, I must go into a history of the *parties* which exist in that republic; give an account of their origin and progress, and describe their present temper and relative force. The population is divided into two parties; the REPUBLICANS and the FEDERALISTS. The latter also claim the title of *republicans*, but it is, and I think we shall find, with justice, denied to them by the former.

These two parties have, in fact, existed ever since the close of the revolutionary war, though their animosities have never appeared to be so great, nor to threaten such serious consequences as since the commencement of the French revolution, especially since the first presidency of Mr. Jefferson, whose exaltation to the chair was the proof of decided triumph on the part of the republicans, and plunged their opponents into a state of desperation.

The *federalists* took their name from the general government, which, being *federative*, was called *federal*. Some of the people, as well as some of the members of the *convention* who formed the constitution, were for the new general government, and some were against it. Those who were against it, and who were for a government of a still more *democratical* form, were called at first, *anti-federalists*; but, of late, they have been called *republicans*, in opposition to the federalists, who were for a government of an *aristocratical*, if not of nearly a kingly form, and who proposed, in the convention, a president and senate *for life*. There was at this time a great struggle between the parties—the opposition

of the republicans spoiled the projects of the federalists; and the government was at last, of a form and nature, which was wholly pleasing to neither, but did not, on the other hand, greatly displease either.

The federalists, however, took the whole credit to themselves of having formed the government; and as General Washington, who had been president of the convention, and was decidedly for a federative general government, was elected the president under the new constitution, the federalists at once assumed that they were the only persons who had any right or title to have any thing to do with that government, treating their opponents as persons *necessarily hostile to*, and, of course, unfit to be entrusted with, the carrying on of the federal government.

When the first congress met, under the new constitution, it was clear that the federalists endeavoured to do by degrees, that which they had not been able to accomplish all at once in the convention. They proposed to address the president by the title of *his serene highness*, and to introduce other forms and trappings of royalty, or, at least, of a high aristocracy. Their intention was defeated, to their inexpressible mortification. The people were shocked at these attempts; and from that moment the opposite party seem to have gained ground in the confidence of the people, who abhorred the idea of any thing that bore a resemblance to kingly government, or that seemed to make the slightest approach towards *hereditary* or *family* rule.

When the French revolution broke out: when that great nation declared itself a *republic*, and went even further than America had gone in the road of democracy, the two parties took their different sides. Heats and animosities were revived. While General Washington remained president, however, he acted with so much caution and moderation, that it was difficult for any one openly to censure him. He was blamed by both parties. One wished him to take part with France, the other with England. He did neither, and, upon the whole, he left no party any good reason to complain of him. But when Mr. Adams, who was a native of Massachusetts, where the federal party was in great force, became president, he certainly did, yielding to the counsels of weak and violent men, push things very nearly to an offensive and defensive alliance with us. The violent and unjust proceedings of the French government furnished a pretext for raising *an army*, which was, for some time, kept on foot *in time of peace*, in the very teeth of the constitution. A *sedition bill* was passed, with power of *sending aliens out of the country;* and many other things were done, in the heat of the moment, which Mr. Adams, had he not been surrounded by the Massachusetts federalists, never would have thought of, being a republican at heart, and a real friend to the liberties of his country.

Mr. Adams's presidency ended in March, 1801. He was proposed to be *re-elected;* but he lost his election, and the choice fell upon Mr. Jefferson, who had always been deemed the head of the republican party. The truth is, that the *people* were republicans. Every thing had been tried; threats, alarms, religion, all sorts of schemes; but they took alarm at nothing but the attempts upon their liberty, and they hurled down the party who had made those attempts. Since that time, the government has been in the hands of the republicans. Mr. Jefferson was president for eight years, Mr. Madison for four years, and is now going on for the second four years.

Your lordship knows, as well as any man upon earth, how fond people are of *place* and *power;* and that no part of any opposition is so bitter and troublesome as that part which consists of men whose ambitious hopes may have been blasted by their being *turned out of place.* It now happened, very naturally, but rather oddly, that the federalists became the opposition to the federal government; but they still retained, and do retain their title; *though, really, they ought to be called the aristocrats, or royalists.*

This opposition is now, however, chiefly confined to the *state of Massachusetts,* the state government of which has even *talked* about *separating from the union.* Your lordship has heard of a Mr. Henry, who was, it seems, in close consultation and correspondence with the persons holding the reins of government in Massachusetts *upon the subject of separation,* and who pretended that he was employed by sir James Craig, governor of Canada, for that purpose. Your lordship, I believe, *disclaimed* him and his intrigues, and, therefore, I must believe, of course, that he was *not* employed by our governor. But the people of America have been led to believe that there must have been *something in his story.*

This state of Massachusetts contains a great number of men of talents; many rich men, become so chiefly *by the purchasing, at a very low rate, of the certificates of soldiers who served in the late war,* and by procuring acts of congress to cause the sums to be paid in full,* which, indeed, was thought, and openly said, to be their main object in pressing for a federal government with large powers. These men, now disappointed in all their ambitious hopes; seeing no chance of becoming petty noblemen; seeing the officers and power of the country pass into other hands, without the smallest probability of their return to themselves, unless they be content to abandon all their high notions of family distinction; these men have become *desperate;* and, if I am to judge from their proceedings, would plunge their country into a civil war, rather than yield quiet obedience to that very government which they had been so long in the practice of cen-

* The revolutionary war.

suring others for not sufficiently admiring. But, my lord, though there is a *majority of voices* in Massachusetts *on* OUR SIDE; FOR ON OUR SIDE THEY REALLY ARE, there is a thumping minority on the other side; and what is of great importance in the estimate, that minority consists of the nerves, the bones, and sinews of the population of the state; so that the sum total of our ground of reliance, as to a separation of the states, is the good will of the most numerous, but most feeble and inefficient part of the people of the state of Massachusetts; and even these, I am fully persuaded, are by this day, awed into silence by the determined attitude of the rest of the country.

The same charges, which our vile newspapers have been preferring against Mr. Madison, have been preferred against him by their *serene highnesses* of Massachusetts. They have accused him of a *devotion to France;* they have, in our newspaper style, called him the "*tool of Napoleon;* they, too, have dared to assert that he made war upon us, *without the slightest provocation,* for the purpose of aiding Napoleon in destroying England, "the *bulwark of their religion.*" They have held public feasts and rejoicings at the entrance of the *Cossacks* into France, and at the restoration of the ancient order of things. You will bear in mind that these people are stanch *Presbyterians;* and it would amuse your lordship to read the orations, *preachings,* and *prayers,* of these people; to witness their gratitude to Heaven *for restoring the pope,* whom they used to call the Scarlet Whore, the Whore of Babylon; for the re-establishment of the *Jesuits;* and for the re-opening of the dungeons, the resharpening of the hooks, and the rekindling of the flames of the *inquisition.* Their opponents, the republicans, say, we never were the friends of Napoleon, as a despot, nor even as an emperor; we never approved of any of his acts of oppression, either in France or out of France; we always complained of his acts of injustice towards ourselves; but he was less hurtful to our country than other powers; and, as to mankind in general, though we regretted to see him with so much power, we feared that that power would be succeeded by something worse; and we cannot now rejoice that the pope is restored, that the Jesuits are re-established, the inquisition re-invigorated; that monkery is again overspreading the face of Europe; and that the very hope of freedom *there* seems to be about to be extinguished forever. And this, your lordship may be assured, is the language of nineteeen-twentieths of the people of America.

There are, it is to be observed, *federalists* in *all* the states, which you will easily believe, when you consider how natural it is for men, or at least, how prone men are, to wish to erect themselves into *superior classes.* As soon as a man has got a great deal of money, he aims at something beyond that. He thirsts for distinctions and titles. His next object is to hand them down to

his family. It will require great watchfulness and great resolution in the Americans to defeat this propensity. You have not leisure for it, or it would amuse you to trace the workings of this *would-be nobility* in America. They are very shame-faced about it; but they let it peep out through the crannies of their *hypocrisy*. Being defeated, and totally put to the rout, in the open field, by the general good sense of the people, they have resorted to the most contemptible devices for effecting, by degrees, that which they were unable to carry at a push. They have established what they call "*Benevolent Societies,*" to which they have prefixed, by way of epithet, or *characteristic*, the name of *Washington*. The *professed* object of these societies, who have their periodical *orations, preachings, prayings*, and *toastings*, was to afford relief to any persons who might be in *distress*. The REAL OBJECT appears to have been to enlist *idlers* and *needy persons* under their political banners. These little coteries of *hypocrites* appear to have assembled, as it were, by a unanimous sentiment, or rather, by instinct, to celebrate the fall of Napoleon, and the restoration of the pope, the Jesuits, and the inquisition. But unfortunately for this affiliation of hypocrites, they have little, or no *materials* to work upon in America, where a man can earn a week's subsistence in less time than he can go to apply for and obtain it without work; and, accordingly, the affiliation seems destined to share the fate of the *serene highness's* proposition of twenty-five years ago.

The fall of Napoleon, so far from weakening, will tend to strengthen the general government in the hands of the republicans. It has deprived its enemies of the grand topic of censure; the main ground of attack. The "*Cossacks,*" as they are now sometimes called, of Massachusetts, can *no longer* charge the president with being the "*tool of Napoleon;*" they no longer stand in need of England as "the *bulwark of religion,*" seeing that they have the pope, the Jesuits, the Benedictines, the Franciscans, the Carthusians, the Dominicans, and, above all, *the inquisition*, to supply her place in the performance of that godly office. They will no longer, they *can* no longer, reproach the president for his attachment to *France;* for France has now a *king*, a *legitimate sovereign*, who regularly hears mass. They are now, therefore, put in this dilemma: they must declare openly for England against their country; or, by petty cavilling, must make their opposition contemptible. The former they *dare* not do; and they are too full of spite not to do the latter. So that their doom, I imagine, is sealed; and their fall will not be much less complete than that of Napoleon himself, with this great difference, however, that his name and the fame of his deeds will descend to the latest posterity, while the projects of ennobling themselves, at the expense of their country's freedom and happiness,

will be forgotten and forgiven before one half of them are eaten by worms.

This is my view of the matter. Your lordship will probably think it erroneous; but, if it prove correct, how long and how bitterly shall we have to deplore the existence of this bloody contest.

I am, &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

DESPERATE NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS.

I OBSERVE it stated in the Halifax papers of the 2d instant, that the Prince of Neufchatel, an American armed brig, had arrived at Boston, after sustaining a gallant action of twenty minutes with five boats full of men belonging to our ship of war the Endymion. The account says, that one of our boats sunk during the engagement, "which had on board, at first, 43 men, of whom two only were saved; and another, which had 36 men, was taken possession of, after having 8 killed, and 20 wounded." The Endymion is said to have lost, in all, 100 men killed, wounded, and prisoners; among which, the first lieutenant and a master's mate were killed, and three lieutenants and two master's mates wounded. The Prince of Neufchatel had only "31 men at quarters, including officers, and 37 prisoners on board. Six of her men were killed, 15 severely wounded, 9 slightly, and 8 remained unhurt." It is true that nothing has been published here in an *official* shape respecting this naval disaster; but this circumstance can no more invalidate the truth of the statement than the *silence* which has been kept up as to the fate of the Avon will lead us to doubt that that vessel was sunk by her American opponent. The repulse and disaster attending the Endymion, is not, however, the only naval triumph of the enemy which has been carefully concealed from the public eye. The following article appears in the Paris papers, received to the 22d instant:

Extract of a letter from Mr. John B. Dabney, consul for the United States of America, dated Fayal, October 6.

"Our countrymen have had a brilliant affair. Despising the rights of nations, and violating neutral territory, three English vessels, the Plantagenet, the Rota, and the Carnation, attacked the brig General Armstrong, American privateer, of 14 guns, commanded by Captain Reid, at anchor in these roads. They succeeded, finally, in destroying her, but paid dearly for it, for they had 120 killed, and 90 of their best marines wounded, including the flower of their officers. Captain Reid, with his brave crew, consisting only of 90 men, had only seven slightly wounded."

About ten days ago I received the following letter from an English gentleman at Fayal, which he transmitted by a vessel bound for Lisbon, giving the full particulars of the above affair. It speaks volumes, and must reach conviction to the minds of those who are so far deluded to think, that it is in the power of this country to subdue a people who fight with so much undaunted resolution as the Americans:

Fayal, October 15, 1814.

Sir,

The American schooner privateer General Armstrong, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of 7 guns and 90 men, entered here on the 26th ultimo, about noon, 17 days from that place, for the purpose of obtaining water. The captain, seeing nothing on the horizon, was induced to anchor. Before the elapse of many hours, his majesty's brig Carnation came in, and anchored near her. About six his majesty's ship Plantagenet, of 74 guns, and the Rota frigate, came in and anchored also. The captain of the privateer and his friends consulted the first authorities here about her security. They all considered her perfectly secure, and that his majesty's officers were too well acquainted with the respect due to a neutral port to molest her. But, to the great surprise of every one, about nine in the evening, four boats were despatched, armed and manned from his majesty's ships, for the purpose of cutting her out. It being about full of moon, the night perfectly clear and calm, we could see every movement made. The boats approached with rapidity towards her, when, it appears, the captain of the privateer hailed them, and told them to keep off, several times. They, notwithstanding, pushed on, and were in the act of boarding, before any defence was made for the privateer. A warm contest ensued on both sides. The boats were finally dispersed with great loss.

The American, now calculating on a very superior force being sent, cut his cables, and rowed the privateer close in alongside of the fort, within half-cable's length, where he moored her, head and stern, with four lines. The governor now sent a remonstrance to Van Lloyd, of the Plantagenet, against such proceedings, and trusted that the privateer would not be further molested; she being in the dominions of Portugal, and under the guns of the castle, was entitled to Portuguese protection. Van Lloyd's answer was, that he was determined to destroy the vessel, at the expense of all Fayal, and should any protection be given her by the fort, he would not leave a house standing in the village. All the inhabitants were gathered about the walls, expecting a renewal of the attack. At midnight, 14 launches were discovered to be coming in rotation for the purpose. When they got within clear, or gun-shot, a tremendous and effectual discharge was made from the privateer, which threw the boats into confu-

sion. They now returned a spirited fire, but the privateer kept up so continual a discharge, it was almost impossible for the boats to make any progress. They finally succeeded, after immense loss, to get alongside of her, and attempted to board at every quarter, cheered by the officers with a shout of "no quarter!" which we could distinctly hear, as well as their shrieks and cries. The termination was near about a total massacre. Three of the boats were sunk, and but one poor solitary officer escaped death in a boat that contained fifty souls; he was wounded.

The Americans fought with great firmness, but more like blood-thirsty savages than any thing else. They rushed into the boats, sword in hand, and put every soul to death as far as came within their power. Some of the boats were left without a single man to row them; others with three and four. The most that any one returned with was about ten. Several boats floated on shore full of dead bodies. With great reluctance I state, they were manned with picked men, and commanded by the first, second, third, and fourth lieutenants of the Plantagenet; first, second, third, and fourth ditto of the frigate, and the first officers of the brig; together with a great number of midshipmen. Our whole force exceeded 400 men. But three officers escaped, two of whom are wounded. This bloody and unfortunate contest lasted about forty minutes. After the boats gave out, nothing more was attempted till daylight the next morning, when the Carnation hauled in alongside, and engaged her. The privateer still continued to make a most gallant defence. These veterans reminded me of Lawrence's dying words of the Chesapeake, "don't give up the ship." The Carnation lost one of her topmasts, and her yards were shot away; she was much cut up in the rigging, and received several shot in her hull. This obliged her to haul off to repair, and to cease firing.

The Americans now finding their principal gun, (*Long Tom,*) and several others, dismounted, deemed it folly to think of saving her against so superior a force; they therefore cut away her masts to the deck, blew a hole through her bottom, took out their small arms, clothing, &c. and went on shore. I discovered only two shot-holes in the hull of the privateer, although much cut up in rigging. Two boats' crews were, soon after, despatched from our vessels, which went on board, took out some provisions, and set her on fire.

For three days after, we were employed in burying the dead that washed on shore in the surf. The number of British killed exceeds 120, and 90 wounded. The enemy, to the surprise of mankind, lost only *two* killed, and *seven* wounded. We may well say—"*God deliver us from our enemies, if this is the way the Americans fight.*"

After burning the privateer, Van Lloyd made a demand to the governor to deliver up the Americans as his prisoners, which the governor refused. He threatened to send 500 men on shore, and take them by force. The Americans immediately retired, with their arms, to an old Gothic convent, knocked away the adjoining drawbridge, and determined to defend themselves to the last. The Van, however, thought better than to send his men. He then demanded two men, which, he said, deserted from his vessel when in America. The governor sent for the men, but found none of the description given.

Many houses received much injury on shore from the guns of the Carnation. A woman, sitting in the fourth story of her house, had her thigh shot off, and a boy had his arm broken.

The American consul here has made a demand on the Portuguese government for a hundred thousand dollars for the privateer, which our consul, Mr. Parkin, thinks, in justice, will be paid, and that they will claim on England. Mr. Parkin, Mr. Edward Bayley, and other English gentlemen, disapprove of the outrage and depredation committed by our vessels on this occasion. The vessel that was despatched to England with the wounded, was not permitted to take a single letter from any person. Being an eye-witness to this transaction, I have given you a correct statement as it occurred.

With respect, I am, &c.

H. K. F.

William Cobbett, Esq.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL—ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

My Lord,

In the American newspapers I have seen an article entitled "*British Botheration,*" in which article are noticed, in a most ludicrous, but most provoking manner, all the wise observations made in England as to the cause of our ships being beaten by those of America. At the close of the article, the writer states what he regards as the *real* cause; but which statement I will, for my *health's* sake, refrain from repeating to your lordship. But if this saucy republican gave the title of *botheration* to our former puzzlings upon this head, what will he say now, when the question is become ten thousand times more embroiled than ever?

The speeches attributed to the *opposition*, upon this subject, present matter worthy of public observation. Mr. Horner lays the blame of the failure on the lakes *Erie* and *Champlain*; he

attributes those memorable victories of the Americans to the *ministry*. He complains that you and your colleagues left our naval commanders to contend with a *vast superiority of force*. The American official account, in both cases, makes the superiority of the force on *our* side; and, as to *Lake Champlain*, Sir G. Prevost, himself, gives *us* a superiority of *seven* guns. I am, for my part, at a loss to discover the policy of ascribing every disgrace to the ministers, and every success to the commanders. Of its flagrant injustice there can be no doubt; and it appears to me that its folly is not much more questionable. Wellington was made a duke for his success; but, according to the present way of thinking, or of talking, the secretary of the war department should have been made a duke, and Wellington remained what he was; and the lords of the admiralty should have had all the ribands, stars, and titles that have been bestowed on naval commanders. If to the commanders belong the praises of victories; to them also belong, upon the face of the matter, the blame of defeat.

Much reliance appears to be placed, by the opposition, on the circumstance of Captain Barclay having been honourably acquitted by a court martial. For, say they, if he was provided with a force equal to that of the Americans, he must have been guilty; and, if he was not, the ministers are to blame. They take this sentence of the court martial, therefore, as a proof of the guilt of ministers. But is it not very evident that this conclusion is false? Captain Barclay might be as brave a man as ever existed; he might have acted with wisdom equal to his bravery; he might have had a superiority of guns and men; he might have been defeated; yet he might be perfectly free from any blame; and might, on the contrary, merit honours and rewards; still the admiralty might deserve no censure whatever. The Americans might have abler seamen; they might, from their superior bodily strength and agility, be able to fire quicker than we; they might fight with an unheard-of degree of resolution and eagerness; they might be animated with feelings unknown to the bosoms of their adversaries. What! is it to become a maxim, that whenever one of our commanders is defeated, there must be a *crime* either in him or in the ministry? Must he be punished, or they condemned? Must he be their accuser, or they be his accusers? This would soon introduce a very amicable sort of connexion between the commanders and the ministry.

The truth is, my lord, that there is a degree of mortification, and of shame, attached to these naval victories of the Americans, that drives men, and particularly naval men, who have all the mass of the people with them, to all sorts of follies and inconsistencies. They do not know what to say or to do, in order to get rid of this insupportable mortification. Sometimes Johnny Bull says to Jo-

nathan, "you have got *some* English sailors in your ships."—"May be so," says Jonathan, "but you have got *all* English sailors in your ships."—"Aye," replies John, "but you have got the best of our sailors."—"May be so," says Jonathan, "but, then, how come the *best* of your sailors to desert from your service, to come into mine?"—"No, no!" rejoins John, hastily, "I don't mean the *best men;* I mean that they fight more *desperately* than those we have on board, because the rascals know that if they are taken they will be *hanged.*"—"Oh fie! Johnny," rejoins Jonathan, "do you think that Englishmen will fight better from a dread of the *gallows* than from a love of their king and their glorious constitution?" "No," says John, "*I* said no such a thing. You have got *heavier shot*, and *stronger powder*, and *more guns*, and *more men.*"—"Indeed, Johnny," says Jonathan, "why, I am sure you *pay* enough for your ships, shot, guns, men, and powder. Your navy and ordnance, last year, cost you 25 millions sterling, which is *more than twenty times* as much as ours is to cost us *next year*, though we are building fleets and forming dock-yards, beside defending, lakes and all, three thousand miles of sea coast."——"Well," says John, ready to burst with anger, "what is that to you, what I *pay?* I will pay it, if I like to pay!"—"Oh dear!" says Jonathan, "don't be angry, old friend. I have not the least objection to *your paying;* only, *I* hope I shall not hear any more of your grumbling about the *property tax.*"—"You are a *saucy* scoundrel," says John, foaming with rage; "you deserve a good drubbing, you Yankee dog, and you will *get it yet*—and, at any rate, if *I* pay taxes, I'll make you pay taxes too. If I am miserable myself, I'll make you unhappy if I can."

It is to this mortification, my lord, that you have to ascribe the attacks of the newspapers on the naval administration, which really appears to me to have done *more* in Canada than could have been expected at their hands. You see that the opposition here are supported by the country, who will blame you, blame Sir George Prevost, blame our powder, shot, ships, gun locks; blame any person or thing; blame and execrate all the world, rather than acknowledge that the republicans are, gun to gun, and man to man, our *masters upon the sea.* Far be it from me to censure a reluctance to come to such an acknowledgment. The reluctance arises from a love of one of the best professions of one's country: namely, its fame in deeds of arms. But, then, it is manifest, that this patriotic feeling, if not subjected to reason and enlightened views, may be productive of great injustice towards commanders, or ministers, or both; and may expose the nation to great and lasting misery. The opposition are feeding this feeling. They ascribe every failure to you and your colleagues; and they studiously keep out of sight the *real cause* of those failures.

They justify the war on our part; they fan the flame; they excite false hopes of future success; they say to the people, we have failed hitherto from the fault of the ministry; and, thereby, they cause it to be believed, that better may be done for the future, without any radical change in our political and naval systems; and in doing so, they do, in my opinion, as great an injury as they can possibly do to the country.

Next to the ministry comes Sir George Prevost. Mr. Horner did not know which was to blame, the ministry or the colonial governor. The fleet had been beat and captured, and Mr. Horner was sure that it must have been owing to something other than the fleet itself, or, at least, its commanders. *It* never could be *their* fault. Men who fought two hours and twenty minutes within a few yards of the mouths of the opposing cannon, and whose vessels had not a mast or any thing standing to which a sail could be fastened. Such men could not be in the *fault*. They fought most bravely. They were *overpowered*. They lost their fleet; but ungrateful is the country, and base the man, who insinuates that they ought to have done more. They could do no more. If they had continued to fight, they must have been all blown to pieces, without the power of resistance. No; it was not the fault of the officers of our fleet; it was the fault of the *Yankees*, for being so strong in body, so agile, so dexterous, and so determined. Mr. Horner should have made a motion against them. Suppose he were, next time, to make a motion for *prosecuting* them? If we could get at them in that way, it would soon benumb their faculties.

"Aye," say the people about Portsmouth and Gosport, "it is time *an inquiry* was made! It is a shame that Sir George Prevost is not brought home and *punished*." I can assure your lordship, that this is their language; and they will be quite outrageous when they find that he is not to be punished; but, on the contrary, is to remain where he is. There is no one hereabouts who does not think that Sir James Yeo's letter to the lords of the admiralty is a *finisher* for Sir George. To such a pitch of folly has the nation been pushed by their notions of the *invincibility* of the navy, that a *captain* in that service is looked upon as the absolute arbiter of the fate of a *lieutenant general* of the army, and the *governor of a province, under whose command he is serving*. Sensible men were disgusted at the arrogance of Sir James Yeo's letter; but it was well suited to the capacities and tastes of those who sing, or listen to Dibdin's nauseous trash about the fleet and the sailors.

Upon the heads of those who demand these *inquiries* and *exposures*, be the consequences. These consequences will be, clear proof, that our *naval* officers had *a sufficiency of force* upon both the occasions alluded to, and that *they* were to blame, *if any*

body was, for their defeats. Sir George Prevost will never suffer himself to be regarded as the cause of these calamities and disgraces; and I am very sure that the ministry, having the power, will not neglect the means of justifying themselves. So that all this stir will only tend to make the mortification of the navy greater than it now is; the prejudices of the nation will only receive the greater shock; and the world will only have completer proof of those very facts which we are so anxious to disguise or disfigure.

It was observed, during the debate, that though our ships of war were quite sufficiently provided with the means of "combating an *ordinary* foe, they ought to have been fitted out in an extraordinary way to combat *such a foe as the Americans!*" But suppose the admiralty not to have fitted them out in this *extraordinary* way? Were they to blame for that? Was there a man in the country who did not *despise* the American navy? Was there a public writer beside myself, who did not doom that navy to destruction *in a month?* Did not all parties exceedingly relish the description, given in a very august assembly, of "half a dozen of *fir* frigates, with *bits of striped bunting* at their mast-heads?" Did not the *Guerriere* sail up and down the American coast, with her *name* written on her flag, challenging those fir frigates? Did not the whole nation, with one voice, exclaim at the affair of the *Little Belt*, "only let RODGERS come *within reach* of one of our *frigates?*" If, then, such was the opinion of the whole nation, of all men, of all parties; with what justice is the board of admiralty blamed for not thinking otherwise; for not sending out the means of combating an *extraordinary* sort of foe; for not issuing a privilege to our frigates to run away from one of those fir-built things with a *bit of striped bunting at its mast head?*

It has always been the misfortune of England that her rulers and her people have spoken and have thought *contemptuously* of the Americans. Your lordship and I were boys, and, indeed, not born, or at least, I was not, when our king first was involved in a quarrel with the Americans. But almost as long as I can remember any thing, I can remember that this contempt was expressed in the songs and sayings of the clod hoppers amongst whom I was born and bred; in doing which we conducted down to the earth that we delved, the sentiments of the 'squires and lords. The result of the former war, while it enlightened nobody, added to the vindictiveness of hundreds of thousands; so that we have entered into this war with all our old stock of *contempt*, and a vastly increased stock of rancour. To think that the American republic is to be a *great power*, is insupportable. Some men, in order to keep her down, in their language, and at the same time, not use harsh expressions, observe, that she is only

another part of ourselves. They wish her to be thought, if not dependent upon us, still to be a sort of younger child of our family, coming in after *Ireland, Jamaica, &c.* I met a very worthy Scots gentleman, a month or two ago, who wished that some man of ability would propose a scheme that he had, and without which, he said, *we never should have peace again.* "Well, sir," said I, "and pray what is your scheme?" "Why," said he, "it is very *simple.* It is to form a *UNION* with the American states." It was raining, and I wanted to get on; so that I had not time to ascertain what *sort* of union he meant. This gentleman, however, was remarkably moderate in his views. The far greater part of the nation expect absolute colonial submission; and if our fleets and armies should not finally succeed in bringing a property tax from America into his majesty's exchequer, the far greater part of the people will be most grievously disappointed. So that this *contempt* of the Yankees has given your lordship and your colleagues a good deal to do, in order to satisfy the hopes and expectations which have been excited, and which, I assure you, are confidently entertained.

Of the effects of this *contempt* I know nobody, however, who have so much reason to repent as the officers of his majesty's navy. If they had triumphed, it would only have been over half a dozen of fir frigates, with *bits of bunting at their mast's heads.* They were sure to gain no reputation in the contest; and, if they were defeated, what was their lot? The worst of it is, they themselves did, in some measure, contribute to their own ill fate; for, of all men living, none spoke of "poor Jonathan" with so much contempt. To read their letters, or the letters which our newspaper people pretended to have received from them at the outset of the war, one would have thought that they would hardly have condescended to *return a shot* from a *bunting* ship. And *now*, to see that bit of bunting flying so often over the British flag! Oh! it is stinging beyond expression. The people in the country cannot think how it is. There are some people who are for taking the American commodores at their word, and ascribing their victories to the immediate intervention of Providence. Both Perry and M'Donough begin their despatches by saying, "Almighty God has given us a victory." Some of their clergy, upon this ground alone, call them Christian heroes, and compare them to Joshua, who, by the by, was a Jew. I observe, that when any of them got beaten, they say nothing about supernatural agency; yet there is still a *victory* on one side or the other; and if they ascribe *their* victories to such agency, why not ascribe *our* victories, and of course their own defeats, to this same overruling cause? If Mr. Madison had told the congress, that "Almighty God had been pleased to enable the enemy to burn their Capitol," how they would have stared at him? Yet, surely, he

might have said that with as much reason as Commodore M'Donough ascribed his victory to such interposition. If Commodore Perry, who captured our fleet on lake Erie, had been met at New-York with looks of perfect indifference, instead of being feasted and toasted as he was, and had been told that the cause of this was, that *he* had gained no victory, even according to his own official account—how silly he would have looked! And yet he could have no reason to complain. I perceive, also, many other instances of this aping propensity in the Americans. It is the "*honourable* William Jones, Secretary of the Navy;" the "*honourable* the Mayor of New-York;" "his *honour* the Chief Justice;" and even the members of congress call one another "*honourable* gentlemen," and their "*honourable* friends." I was not, till of late, aware that this sickly taste was become so prevalent in America. This is, indeed, *contemptible;* and England will have, in a few years, a much better ground of reliance for success, in this change of national character in America than in the force of our arms. When once the hankering after titles becomes general in that country; when once riches will have produced that effect, the country will become an easy prey to an old compact, and easily-wielded government like ours. When men find that they cannot obtain titles under the form of government now existing, they will, as soon as they have the opportunity, sell the country itself to any sovereign who will gratify their base ambition. This is the *slow poison* that is at work on the American constitution. It will proceed, unless speedily checked, to the utter destruction of that which it has assailed. Our best way is to make peace with them now, and leave this poison to work. By the time they get to "*right honourables*" we shall be ready to receive their allegiance. When the *bit of bunting* comes to be exchanged for some sort of *armorial* thing, the fellows, who now "fight like blood thirsty savages," as our papers say, will become as tame and as timid as sheep. I am, &c. &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL—ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

My Lord,

THE resolutions in the Common Council were moved by Mr. Waithman, who, in a very clear and strong manner, described the principle and practice of the *properly tax;* and Mr. Alderman Wood gave a horrid instance of its operation. But it was not till Mr. Alderman Heygate spoke that the right string was touched. He said that the *American war* was the cause of the

continuation of the tax; and that the people ought *to petition against that continuation.* He was deceived as to the *new* objects of the war. He does not appear to know any thing about those "*maritime rights,*" of which he talked. The Americans have denied us *no maritime right;* that is to say, nothing that any writer on public law; nothing that any usage of nations; nothing that any principle, any maxim, any practice, even of *our own,* at any former period, has held forth as a *right.* Therefore, the *object* of the war is now as good, at least, as it ever was; and, indeed, it is now *not* in opposition to any principle of public law, it being clear, that we have a *right* to make conquests in America, if we have but the *might.* The "*Whigs,*" then, must not think to shuffle off to the other side, and to be thought consistent in opposing the war, (which they at first pledged themselves to support,) upon the ground that its *object has been changed.* If it has been changed, it has been changed for the *better;* from the right of *impressment* to the *right of conquest.*

But, my lord, the speech, in this debate, which is most worthy of notice, is that of Sir William Curtis, knight and alderman; or, I believe, faith, a baronet. He said that he wished for peace with the Americans, but not till they had been "*confoundedly well* FLOGGED." This sentiment of Sir William has given rise to a *jeu d'esprit* of a correspondent, which *jeu d'esprit* exhibits pretty correctly the view which the Americans will take of the matter; I will, therefore, though no admirer of doggerel, insert it by way of note.* But, my lord, this was no act of *folly* in the baronet. He knew well what he was about. Sir William Curtis is *no fool:* He is, perhaps, as much the *opposite* of a fool as any man in England. He knew that this seemingly-blundering phrase was the very thing to hit the taste of the far greater part of his audience; and, while they were "*laughing*" (as it is said) at *it,* he was, in his sleeve, laughing at *them.* He sees, as clearly as you and I, that there is very little chance of our beating the Yankees; but he sees, that it is the folly of the day to speak of them with contempt, and it answers his purpose to indulge the sentiment as much as he can, without prejudice to his future elec-

* "THE MICE IN COUNCIL."

The Council of Mice (to know what to be at)
Resolv'd that a *bell* should be put on the Cat;
But, when come to the pinch, there was no one could tell
How to find out the heroes to put on the bell.
So, when ALDERMAN WILL (while his neighbour he jogg'd)
Made a move to *resolve,* "That the Yankees *be flogg'd,*"
All those look'd about them, who relish'd the dash,
To seek for the floggers to lay on the lash;
But, looking in vain, in a short time the whole
Of the Council broke up, and skipt to their hole.

PUSS.

tion. That man who gives his support to the property tax, even at this day, and yet contrives that those who so bitterly complain of it shall call him "*honest Will Curtis,*" is *no fool*, my lord; but, on the contrary, an uncommonly discerning and adroit fellow.

It is now said, that we have *relaxed* in our demands on America, and that *peace* is at hand. I hope it is, with all my heart; but we must not only *relax*, we must give up *all* demands, before we shall have peace. I foresee the likelihood of our attempting to claim the *accomplishment of the object* of the war, if peace be made without our *formally* giving up our claim of *right to impress people on board of American ships on the high seas.* Our putting this claimed right into practice was the sole cause of the war; and, therefore, if peace be made, and this question be passed over in *silence*, we shall, as to the *result* of the war, claim unqualified success; and, I think, I shall hear those same venal writers, who have long told us that the war was, on our part, a war for *reducing* the Americans to *unconditional submission*; for *deposing Mr. Madison;* for *extinguishing anarchical government;* I think I shall hear these same writers assert, that *all we wanted* was to maintain this *maritime right;* and that, as the Americans had made peace without our making any stipulation on the subject, we had *won the object of the war;* and, of course, that the war had been just, necessary, and successful.

Foreseeing this; foreseeing that they will attempt to creep out this way, I, as is the custom with vermin-catchers, shall now, beforehand, stop up their hole. The case is this: We stopped American ships on the high seas, in order, as we alleged, to impress our seamen from on board of them; and we not only impressed British subjects, but many republicans along with them. Mr. Madison said we had no right to take *any persons whatever* out of American ships on the high seas; and, after complaining for years, in vain, he declared war against us, in order to compel us to *cease* this our practice. We were then *at war* with France, and he was a *neutral.* Our war with France has since *ceased;* and, of course, our *impressments* would now have ceased, though he had not gone to war. Our character of *belligerent*, and his character of *neutral*, ceasing with our war against France, our impressments would also have ceased. If we make peace with him now, and are at war with nobody else, we shall, of course, not impress. The *practice will have ceased.* That is all that he wants. That is *all that he went to war for.* He needs no *stipulation* upon the subject. He has *resisted the practice by force of arms.* The practice *ceases*, and he makes *peace.* It may be said that we shall, under like circumstances, *revive* the practice; and, if we do, he will revive his *resistance.* He is not at war to obtain from us any *acknowledgment* that our practice was unjust;

for he does not admit the point to be matter of doubt; and, besides, he knows that such acknowledgment would be of no use. So that, if we had made peace with him, the moment the French peace had caused the excuse for impressments to cease, the matter would have stood just as it will now stand, without any stipulation on the subject. Neither party will have given up the point, and yet the war will be at an end, the European peace having *taken out of existence the ground of quarrel.*

What a pity, then, my lord, that you and your master had not followed my advice, and made peace the moment the European war was at an end! Come, my lord, be candid towards me, and confess that, for once, I gave you good advice. By not following that advice, you have got into what is vulgarly called a *hobble.* You now perceive clearly, that, to continue the war, is to incur a certain enormous expense, and to expose the country to great danger of further disgrace; while to make peace, as the conflict now stands, is really to be *beaten;* and, what is still worse, to have created, by this very war, a most formidable *naval rival.*

Let me now take another article from the *Times* newspaper, that oracle of all the fools in England, whether high or low. It is full of matter for observation, refutation, or ridicule; it is a complete picture of the mass of the public mind upon this subject; a mixture of folly, spite, error, and falsehood; and is well worthy of close attention.

"If we could give credit to reports circulated yesterday with much confidence, we should believe that ministers had sacrificed the glory and the best interests of the country by a premature peace with the Americans, at the moment when the latter are *on the very verge of bankruptcy.* Unfortunately, however, for the credit of this assertion, we at the same time learn, that most active measures are pursuing for detaching from the dominion of the enemy an important part of his territory. Accounts from Bermuda to the 11th ultimo inform us, that all the disposable shipping in that quarter have been sent off to the Mississippi. Sir Alexander Cochrane left Halifax at the latter end of October for the same destination; and a large body of troops from Jamaica was expected to assemble at the same point. The American government has openly manifested such extravagant views of aggrandizement, that our eyes ought to be opened to its measureless ambition; and we ought to curb its excesses in time. It is, doubtless, with a view to this just and necessary policy, that government has incurred the expense of such extensive military and naval preparations; and it can hardly be supposed, that whilst they are so largely sacrificing the national resources with one hand, they will render the object of the sacrifice altogether null with the other. Nevertheless, policies that peace with America would be signed before the end of the current month, were yesterday done in the

city so high as thirty guineas to return one hundred. It was even asserted, though without foundation, that the preliminaries had been already digested, and received the signatures of the commissioners on the 3d instant. We have, however, *some reason* to belive that the speculations on this subject are influenced, in some measure, by secret information, issued, for the most unworthy purposes, from the hotel of the American legation at Ghent. After what has been seen of the total want of principle in American statesmen of the Jeffersonian school, the world would not be much astonished to learn that one of the American negotiators had turned his situation to a profitable account, by speculating both at Paris and London on the result of the negotiation. Certain it is, that letters received yesterday from the French capital, relative to the proceedings at Ghent, contain intimations like those which have been circulated here on American authority; viz. that the new proposals of the British will be acceded to on or before the beginning of the new year, provided that no better terms can, ere then, be obtained. The Liverpool frigate is arrived at Portsmouth, from the coast of America, as is his majesty's ship Penelope, from Halifax. By these conveyances various and contradictory intelligence has been received. On the one hand, it was reported that an armistice had taken place between the troops on both sides, in America: on the other, that General Drummond had defeated Brown and Izard with great loss, and forced them to blow up Fort Erie, and retire with the shattered remains of their forces to Sackett's Harbour. The first of these reports is altogether unfounded; the latter is, at least, premature. At the date of the last advices, Fort Erie continued in possession of the enemy; but General Drummond, having received additional reinforcements, was expected soon to make an attack on the position. Commodore Chauncey's fleet was still *blockaded* in Sackett's Harbour by Sir James Yeo; but it was not understood that any attack would be made on that place, by land or water, before the winter set in. Having mentioned our naval commander on Lake Ontario, it is but right to notice that he is to be succeeded in command by Commodore Owen, as Sir George Prevost is, at the same time, to be by Sir George Murray. The comparatively small magnitude of our Lake squadrons, may, perhaps, afford a reason (or at least an official argument) for not employing one of our first admirals on that service; but why one of the first generals that we possess is not charged with the management of so extremely important a land war, it is difficult to guess. The officer thus mentioned may, for aught we know, be a person of ability: certainly his name, to those who remember Ferrol and Tarragona, cannot but be rather ominous; but the nation at large is really indignant at the sort of apathy displayed on this occasion by generals of higher rank and celebrity, who ought not to have de-

clined the American command, merely because it did not promise to be so lucrative as some others. National gratitude has, perhaps, been displayed with premature liberality, if those who have received honours and rewards for former services are to hold back, in proud indifference, when their country *once more needs their presence* in the field of honour. The American navy *grows* under the pressure of a contest with the greatest naval power that ever *existed!* Paradoxical as this appears, it is a simple fact; and it proves more than a thousand arguments the *absolute impossibility there is of our concluding a peace, at the present moment, without rendering ourselves the contempt of our antagonists, and the ridicule of all the world beside.* Shall we ALLOW the *Guerriere* to get to sea with *impunity;* and to bear to every part of the world a visible record of our shame, in that defeat, which entailed on us so many subsequent disgraces? The new frigate of that name, mounting 64 guns, is at Philadelphia, nearly ready for sea. The *Washington,* another new ship, carrying 90 guns, is fitting very fast for sea at Boston; and the *Independence,* of 98, has been recently constructed at Portsmouth, in New-Hampshire. The last-mentioned vessel is considered to be more than a match for the largest man of war ever built in England. She is manned with a full complement of 1,000 prime sailors; and what is also of the utmost consequence, *her weight of metal is far superior to that of any ship in our navy,* since her heaviest shot are not less than 68-pounders. When we have received so many *melancholy proofs* of the effect produced by this *superiority in weight of metal,* and when we have had no less than two years and a half to profit by the *painful lessons,* it must indicate absolute infatuation, if we have not adopted some measures to place our seamen *on an equality* with those whom they have to oppose."

And now, my lord, how different is this language from that of the speeches in which the American naval force was described as consisting of "half a dozen *fir* frigates, with *bits of striped bunting at their mast heads!*" I always said, that this war, if continued for any length of time, would create a *navy,* a *formidable navy,* in America; and is not this creation going on at a great rate? Yet, while this empty fool is exciting our alarms about the Yankee navy, he is crying out against peace, because Mr. Madison's government is on the "very *verge of bankruptcy.*" Without stopping to observe that this is a servile imitation of the language of "the great statesman now no more," in the year 1794, as to the state of France, just 20 years before the war with her ended, how stupid must the man be to rely upon the financial difficulties of America, one moment, and the next, represent her as creating a great navy quicker than navy was ever before created! Pray, mark the fool, my lord. He says, that "the American navy *grows under the pressure* of the greatest naval power that

ever existed." Well, and what is his *remedy?* To remove the cause? To take off that fecund pressure? No; but precisely the contrary; for, says he, the fact "proves more than a thousand arguments the *absolute impossibility there is of our concluding a peace, at the present moment,* without rendering ourselves the *contempt* of our antagonist, and the *ridicule* of all the world besides;" which, being interpreted, means, that the American navy having grown hitherto under our pressure, we ought to continue the pressure, in order to be sure to make it grow to so large a size, that we may make peace with it without seeming to yield to an inferior force. If the words have any meaning, this it is.

But, my lord, the description of the new Yankee ships is false, and wilfully false. It comes, it is said, *from Halifax*, our great naval rendezvous; and is well calculated to provide, beforehand, for the result of combats, which may take place, or, perhaps, may *not* take place, with the *Washington*, the *Independence*, and the *Guerriere*. I told your lordship, that the *American* papers said that the *Washington* was launched at *Portsmouth*, in New-Hampshire; and that she was a 74. Why have these Halifax correspondents swelled her up to a 90 gun ship? I have seen, in the American papers, nothing at all about the *Independence;* but I know that the official report of the secretary of the American navy, last year, spoke of no larger ships than 74's being on the stocks; and if the American navy-board build 90's and 98's, and charge the people only for 74's, the practice there is widely different from ours. How many guns the *Guerriere* may carry I know not; but I believe the description of her to be as false as that of the other two. But, it is but too easy for the world to perceive the *motive* for these exaggerated descriptions of the force of the American ships; and it cannot fail to produce a very bad impression, with regard to us, amongst the people of America, whose eyes are constantly upon us, and who naturally and justly seize on all attempts of this sort, as subjects of the most poignant ridicule.

As to what this foolish man says about the *future command of our army*, why should *he* be so very anxious to see "one of our *first generals*" in Canada? *He*, who spoke of the American army with so much contempt? And, besides, how does he know that we have a *better* than Sir George Prevost? In a late number of his paper, this man observed, that a more famous commander was necessary to prevent our men from *deserting*. He said:—"Too deeply have we felt *the disgrace of being beaten by land and water*, in the last campaign, to tolerate the chance of similar indignities in the next. Besides, we daily see stronger reasons for a *hot* and *short* war, when we contemplate the wasting effect of dilatoriness. Our battalions suffer much from disease, but much *more from desertion*. The *temptations* to this crime, which the

Americans offer, are too strong to be resisted by numbers of our soldiery. We must not shut our eyes to the *fallibility of human nature*, to the influence of example, to the strength of allurement. The *best*, the *only way* to keep the soldier to his colours, is to place him under a commander to whom he can look up *with pride and confidence*, and who will lead him into active and *continuous service* throughout a whole campaign."—So, then, the Americans hold out *temptations*, do they? And the remedy is to send a commander that the soldiers shall be *proud* of, and that shall *keep them constantly employed!* And this will make them not disposed to yield to the Yankee temptations! I could point out a *better remedy*, my lord; and if you will engage that I shall not have my ears cropped off for so doing, you shall *have* my remedy. As it is, I shall keep it to myself. But what a beast this writer must be, or what beasts must he look upon his readers as being, to talk at this rate? If he were *paid* by Mr. Madison he could not serve his cause more effectually than he now does.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

P. S. The London *common hall* have *resolved*, that they do not like the *property tax*; but they seem to like the *American war* very much. I observed to your lordship before, that this was very *unjust*. I do not call it foolish; I do not call it stupid; I call it really *dishonest*. They like the war; they wish to have the war; but they do not like to *pay for it*. It is paltry shuffling to say that the tax belonged solely to the war with *France*. Every man knows that the American war cannot go on without the tax; and, therefore, to approve of the war is to approve of the tax, as much as the approving of chicken at table is to approve of killing them.

AMERICA.

Mr. Cobbett,

IT appears, from the negotiations at Ghent, that we have demanded a new boundary line; that the republicans shall give up part of their territory, including those lakes whereon, it is said, they have *defeated* us. As to the Americans having defeated us, I do not believe a word of it; it must be all false; it is impossible that those poor ragged republicans should defeat a brave, rich, learned people, like us, who live under a constitution of king, lords, and commons. Nobody believes it but the enemies to our government, the jacobins and levellers, who would overturn social order, and our holy religion. But it seems these

wretched republicans, these American vermin, are not willing to accept our *modest* proposals. Nothing will do, I see plainly; nothing will do, but utterly to destroy these rascals; there must not be left a man alive among them; not one, not a single individual; they are not fit to live; not fit to breathe the same air that we breathe; not fit to walk on the same globe. What right have they to property or territory? Are they not *republicans?* Have they not a pure representation? And are they not a nest of *atheists?* Why, the poor wretches have no *established religion*, no bishops, no tythes, and no rates. It is not easy to conceive of a people in a more contemptible condition, and yet they have the *matchless impudence* to refuse to give up a *part only* of their territory, including those lakes, whereon, it is said, and falsely said, they have defeated us. I expect, then, to see shortly these *infidels* completely annihilated by the naval and military power of Great Britain, whose cause, as Mr. Ponsonby is reported to have said in the house of commons, has always been that of *justice* and of *liberty;* and thus, I trust, we shall maintain our *noble* character to the very last. That we can easily accomplish this task, no one but an enemy to social order and our holy religion will dare to doubt, or question. I shall rejoice at this event, as being one of the happiest, most religious, most humane, and most truly moral, that ever took place since the creation of the world. As for you, Mr. Cobbett, though I do not wish to be personal, yet I tell you frankly, that you are not a bit better than Mr. Madison himself, who will shortly be deposed.—Yours, &c.

Dec. 1814. F.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL—ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

My Lord,

THE nation begin to suspect, at last, that this American war may prove an unfortunate thing. If your lordship recollects, I taunted Johnny Bull, flouted him, and gibed him, when, at the outset of this war, he crowed and cock-cock caw'd, at the idea of giving the Yankees a good drubbing. If your lordship recollects that I flouted wise John, and told him that, at any rate, I hoped, if he was resolved to enjoy this sport, he would never let me hear him say a word about the *property tax*, or what he vulgarly calls the *income tax*. I knew, from the beginning, that I should see him galled here. I knew that I should have him on his hip; and here I have him; for he is now crying out against the *tax*, as loud as a pig under the knife of a butcher, though he, at the same time, seems to have no objection to the work of slaughtering going on. In short, so that he is safe himself, and

pays nothing, his delight is in seeing war desolate the rest of the world. But he does not like to *pay*. Rather than pay he would give the world a chance of being at peace, and of ceasing to bleed.

That so amiable a personage should meet with any rubs or crosses in life, must, of course, be matter of regret with his friends, and must remind them of the maxim, that as virtue alone is not, in all cases, sufficient to ensure happiness in this world, the virtuous afflicted ought chiefly to rely on the world to come. This sort of reliance is very suitable to Johnny, at this time; for he has not given the Yankees a drubbing; and yet, the income tax sticks to him like birdlime. The Times newspaper cheers him, indeed, by telling him that he is *causing the Yankees to pay taxes;* that, though he so sorely feels himself, he does not suffer *in vain;* for that he is *making others suffer too.* To be sure, this is a consoling reflection; but still it is not quite sufficient to reconcile him to the continuation of the income tax, seeing that, when called on for the money, he sometimes forgets the delight of seeing others suffer, which he has enjoyed for his money.

But now, my lord, leaving wise Johnny, amiable and honest Johnny, to his taxes and his hopes of giving the Yankees a drubbing, permit me to remind your lordship, briefly, of the *origin of this war;* for, if I have life to the end of it, this origin shall not be forgotten. It is necessary, at every stage, to keep it steadily in view; for unless we do this, we shall be wholly "*bothered*" out of it at last, as we were in the case of the French war.

The war against France was a war against *principles*, at first; it then became a war of conquest, and ended in being a war for *deliverance.* We set out with accusing our enemy with being dangerous, as *disorganizers of ancient governments*, and we ended with accusing them of being dangerous, as *despots.* The French were *too free* for us at the beginning, and *too much enslaved* for us at the end; and it was so contrived as to make more than half the world believe, that the Cossacks were the great champions of *civil and political liberty.* So that, when we came to the close, leaving the French nearly as we found them, not seeing tythes, monks, game-laws, gabelles, corvees, bastiles, or seigneurial courts re-established, we have spent more than *a thousand millions of pounds*, in a war, of the first object of which we had wholly lost sight. We will not have it thus, my lord, with regard to the American war. We will not suffer its first object to be lost sight of. Nobody, as to this point, shall be able to "*bother*" any historian who is disposed to speak the truth.

The war with America arose thus: We were at war with France; America was neutral. We not only exercised our known right of stopping American merchant ships at sea, to search them

for *enemy's goods*, for *troops in the enemy's service*, and for goods *contraband of war*, which species of search, and of seizure, in case of detection, Mr. Madison did not oppose either by word or deed. This was a *maritime right*, sometimes disputed by Russia, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden; but never given up by us, except for awhile, at a time of great danger. This right was never disputed by Mr. Madison during the French war; the exercise of it he submitted to without complaint. This was our "*right of search;*" and this right was enjoyed by us, without any complaint on his part; and this is the right which many people think he opposed, and upon *that* ground they have approved of the war.

But the war had nothing to do with this right, any more than it had to do with our right of bringing coals from Newcastle to London. The war was declared by Mr. Madison against us, because we stopped American merchant ships upon the high seas, and *impressed people* out of them. We said, that we did this in order to recover *our own seamen*, who were frequently found serving in these American ships; but it was notorious, the fact was never denied, and never can be denied, that we *impressed* thus great numbers of *native Americans*, forced them on board of our ships of war, and *compelled* them to submit to our *discipline*, and to risk their lives in fighting for us. These are facts which can never be denied. Mr. Madison, for years, called upon us to cease this practice. We did not cease. He repeatedly threatened war, if we persevered. We did persevere; and, after years of remonstrance, he, or, rather, the two houses of congress, the real representatives of the people of America, declared war against us.

Here, then, is the cause of the war; the sole cause of the war; war long threatened, and, at last, frankly declared, previous to any hostile act or movement on the part of Mr. Madison, or, rather, the congress. For, my lord, though Johnny Bull, wise Johnny, whose generosity would put all other nations into his own happy state; though wise and generous John talks about Mr. Madison's hostility, it is, in fact, the hostility of the *congress;* that is to say, the hostility of the *people;* because the congress are the *real*, and not the *sham*, representatives of the people; and because the congress who declared, and who now support the war, have been chosen *during* the war, and *just before it*. The members of the congress do not purchase their seats; no seats can be bought or sold; none of the members can get any thing for themselves, or families, by their votes. So that, when they decide, it is, in reality, a majority of the people who decide; and the people did decide that they would *resist, by force of arms, the impressment of their seamen.*

The people here generally believe what that infamous print, the *Times* newspaper, tells them, that the *people* of America never

complained of such impressments; but the truth is, that, long before, *years* before, the war was declared, complaints, and most bitter complaints, had rung through the country against these impressments. Letters from the impressed persons were published without end. Affidavits proving the facts. Representations enough to make a nation mad with resentment; enough to drive even quakers to arms. None of these have our newspapers ever copied. None of these have they ever made known to their readers. They have published the harangues of Goodloe Harper, H. G. Otis, poor Timothy Pickering, and other would-be noblesse. They have given us every thing from the free press of America, at all calculated to cause it to be believed that the war is unpopular there; but not a word on the other side; not a word to let us see what were the real sentiments of the majority of the republic. I will now lay before your lordship some of the complaints of the impressed Americans, as published in the American newspapers; for, I am convinced, that even *you* are not acquainted fully of the nature and tone of those complaints, and, at any rate, the publications should, if possible, be rebutted on our part, seeing that they must produce such a hatred of us in the minds of the people of America, as will, if not by some means mollified, lead to a never ceasing hostility. Your lordship will perceive that these statements are sent forth with all the forms of judicial acts; that they consist of statements made on oath; that these statements are certified by legal magistrates, whose names are affixed to them; and that, of course, they are calculated to have great weight with the public. It is not a bad way to make the case our own; to suppose such complaints made in our papers against America, or any other nation; and, then, to judge of the effect that those complaints would make on the people of England, recollecting that the Americans are not base and cowardly more than we are.

[Here follow several depositions, copied from the newspapers, of impressed American seamen.]

Now, my lord, I do not say that these sentiments are *true*. In spite of all the particular details of names, dates, and places; in spite of oaths and certificates, they *may be* false; but as it is to such statements that we owe this unfortunate war, we surely ought to endeavour to *prove* that some, at least, of these statements are false. The republican newspapers teem, and teemed long before the war, with publications of this sort. The blood of America was set boiling with such publications. The vote of congress, for the war, was the most popular vote ever given by that body. It is, therefore, of vast importance that these publications should be counteracted if possible. They are either true or false; if the latter, as I would fain hope, they can be easily refuted; if true, which it would be shocking to believe, certainly we ought to be

very ready and forward to make atonement to the Americans for what they have suffered.

These statements have, too, produced another most serious effect. They have filled the crews with the most implacable revenge. To the usual motives of patriotism and glory, they have added the still more powerful motive of vengeance. Against crews, thus animated, men under the influence of the mere ordinary motive to bravery, really cannot be expected to succeed, without a great superiority of force. I leave your lordship to suppose what would be the effect of statements like these, if the case were OURS. If we were at peace with all the world, and were carrying on our commerce agreeably to the laws of *neutrality*, while the Americans were at war with some other power; and if the Americans were to impress *Englishmen* from on board English ships, bringing up coals from Newcastle to London, were to force them into their ships of war, compel them to fight for America; and, in short, to occasion, in the English papers, statements such as I have above quoted: if this were the case, does your lordship think that *we* should be very quiet? And if such statements would be likely to set us in a flame, are we to suppose that they have had no effect on the Americans?

Here, my lord, as you well know, we have the real cause of that war, which, it is said, is now to engage *a hundred thousand men, two hundred ships of war*, and which cannot cost less than twenty millions a year. It has been asserted, that the congress declared war against us to assist Napoleon on the continent. This is so foolish, that the writers must think that they are addressing it to men little superior to brutes. It was impossible that the Americans could know where Napoleon was, when they declared war. It was impossible that their war should really aid him in his designs against Russia. It was against their interest that Russia should be crushed by any power, and especially by France. The other charge, that America, "like an assassin, attacked us *in the dark*," is equally false and foolish. How could an open declaration of war by a legislative assembly, after *repeated discussion*, be an act deserving such a description? How could that be called an attack in the dark, especially when it had been threatened for years, and when it was followed immediately by an offer for *a truce*, in order again to negotiate for peace?

Here we have the real origin of the war. Terminate as it will, this origin must not be forgotten, whatever efforts are made to put it out of our heads. When the war shall have ended, and we shall sit down to count the cost, this origin must be kept steadily before us.

The *Times* and *Courier* are still labouring to persuade us that there will be a *separation* of the American states; that the four New-England states will declare themselves *independent of the*

general government, and will *form an alliance with old England*. Now, my lord, mind, I pledge myself, that, if any such proposition be seriously made by the friends of the famous Captain HENRY, by the would-be noblesse of Massachusetts, they will very quickly be decorated, not with coats of arms, but with coats of *tar and feathers*. The people of New-England are "*essentially* republicans." They have been, or, at least, a part of them, stimulated by very cunning men, to a violent opposition against Mr. MADISON, and the WAR. But only let them see the *real* objects of the Pickerings, the Otises, the Quincys, &c. and the fall of these men is as certain as the return of spring after winter. It is not by a *large* majority that even the New-England states oppose the war. It is barely "*touch-and-go*" with the opposition, *even there*. What man in his senses, then, can place a moment's reliance on it? And, indeed, the only purpose that it is likely to answer, is, that of *deceiving us*, and inducing us to leave the New-England seaports *safe places for the building of ships of war, and the fitting out of privateers*. The leaving of that part of the union unmolested, while we attack the Southern States, is just what suits America. She has, in New-England, unmolested ports and harbours, out of which to send forth ships of war to annoy our trade, and engage our navy, and into which to carry her rich prizes. The P*********s, the O****s, &c. I really believe to be traitors to their country; or, at least, that they would sell themselves, if you and your master were not too honest to buy them. But hang them! my lord, they are not worth your notice. They talk big, and hold themselves out as of great consequence; but they are poor things. Indeed, my lord, they are. Timothy Pickering used to be thought a very honest man, but, after he was put out of office, he seems to have abandoned himself to the revenge which his disappointment created.

He had not the virtue to follow the example of his venerable employer, Mr. Adams, who, upon being outvoted as president by Mr. Jefferson, said, "I only wished to obtain a majority of votes that I might serve my country, and now I shall endeavour to serve it by supporting him who has that majority." Timothy Pickering, who had been, to the astonishment of all the world, his *secretary of state*; who was no more fit for the office than your coachman would be fit for yours; and who, of course, was inordinately proud of his sudden and unexpected elevation, became furious at the election of Mr. Jefferson, and has ever since been in a sort of mad fit, doing a hundred things, for either of which, in England, he would be sent to jail for a year or two at least. The truth is, that Mr. Adams had the *public good* solely in view, and that Timothy had an eye solely to his *private interest*. Hence the exactly opposite conduct of the two men, when the voice of the country put them both out of power. I am sure

that your lordship, and your colleagues, especially your distinguished colleague now at Vienna, would scorn to purchase traitors in any country; but if you are so disposed; if such men as the famous Captain HENRY could possibly prevail on you to lay out any of our money in this way, on the other side of the Atlantic, such men, though so much applauded in the *Times* newspaper, would not be worth your purchasing.

This is the sort of stuff; this is the rubbish which the *Times* would have us *rely upon* for success against the republic! I beseech your lordship to consider it, as it is, the grossest deception that ever was attempted to be palmed upon mankind. Mr. Madison cannot *silence* these men. *He* has no sops. *He* has none of that potent drug, of the possession of which, Smollet tells us, Sir Robert Walpole used to boast. They will, therefore, keep on barking; but, my lord, be assured, that they are wholly unable to bite.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL—ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

My Lord,

IT has all along been my wish to see England at *peace* with America. My reasons for this I have often explained; and the mode I have pursued has been this; to endeavour to prove that the grounds of hope of success held out to us by such writers as the WALTERS, are fallacious. The *division of the states*, the *impeachment of Mr. Madison*, the *resistance of taxation*, and the various other grounds of hope, I have endeavoured to show, were hollow, as much as was the expectation of sweeping the ocean of the "half a dozen of fir frigates, with bits of striped bunting at their mast heads." The task of counteracting these delusive hopes has increased in arduousness with the progress of the war. Beaten out of one hope, these writers have resorted to others; and, as was the case in the last American war, pride, shame, and revenge, are mustered up, to prolong a war which policy has abandoned.

There is, now, a new delusion on foot. Mr. Walter, the proprietor of the *Times* newspaper, who (shocking to think of!) has been a principal actor in producing this calamitous war, is now endeavouring to persuade the public that the president of America *will be unable* to raise the force voted by congress to complete the *regular* army of that great republic to 100,000 men, by way of *ballot*, or what Mr. Walter calls CONSCRIPTION.

To be sure, this is a measure very well calculated to astound such a man as Mr. Walter, who *knows* nothing at all about the people of America; who receives all his information through the very worst of all possible channels; who appears to be extremely ignorant himself; who publishes purely for gain; who desires to flatter the follies and prejudices of his readers; and who, finding himself the gainer by being the avowed enemy of freedom in every part of the world, has become, to say nothing of his breeding up, a mortal foe to the American government and people. Such a man, who had been led to suppose that the defence of a country, like America, was inconsistent with freedom, naturally relied upon the overthrow of the government, the moment it attempted to raise an army to resist its invaders; such a man would naturally be, as he *has* been, almost smothered in the foam of his own malignity, upon seeing a measure like this coolly proposed by Mr. Monroe, (now secretary of war,) attentively considered by a committee of congress, and smoothly passing into a law, made, or to be made, by the *real*, and not the *sham*, representatives of a free people, elected by that people only a few months before, and knowing that they are again to be elected or rejected by that same people, a few months afterwards. This has astounded Mr. Walter. It has, apparently, given his brain a shock too rude for its powers of resistance. It has upset all his calculations; and he is now crying out for a rebellion in America, as fiercely as he ever cried out for bullets, bayonets, halters, and gibbets, for the rebels in Ireland; but, never losing sight of his old object, namely, to delude this nation into the hope that the *measure must fail*, and that, therefore, we ought *to continue the war*.

Despicable, therefore, as this writer may be; contemptible as is his stock of understanding; mean and malignant as may be his motives, his efforts merit attention, and call upon us to counteract them without loss of time. In doing this, I must first take the best account that I can find of this grand measure of the American government, to which has been given the name of *conscription*. The following is the report of the bill, as republished by Mr. Walter himself:

[Here follows an analysis of the bill reported by the military committee on Mr. Monroe's plan.]

Such is the measure which, Mr. Walter assures us, cannot be *carried into effect;* but says, that *if it could be carried into effect*, would deprive us of Canada in a year, unless we sent out our "great *national hero;*" and, indeed, that, under the bare possibility of such a measure's succeeding, "we ought to cast aside all *European politics*." What a change, my lord! This foolish gentleman used to tell us, that the Americans would be "*reduced*," as the old phrase was, in "a *few weeks*." He has often exhausted all his powers of speech to convince his readers, that this enemy

was too *despicable* to be treated with in the same sort of way that we treat with other nations. There is no expression of contempt, contained in our copious language, which he did not use towards America and her president. And this same foolish Mr. Walter now tells us, that so great is this same America, that, in order to meet her with a chance of success, we ought "*to cast aside all European politics.*"

I beg your lordship, now, to have the patience to read Mr. Walter's remarks, at full length, upon this measure of defence in America. The article is of consequence; because, though coming from such a source, though proceeding from a son, or sons, of OLD WALTER of regency memory, it is what will *give the cue* to almost all the rich people in the metropolis, and to not a few of those in the country. After inserting this article, I will endeavour to show its folly and its malice; and, were the author any other than a Walter, I should not be afraid to promise to make him hide his head for shame.

"No certain or official account of the rupture of the negotiations at Ghent has yet reached this country. Private letters, it is true, have been received, stating that the American commissioner, Mr. Adams, was about to set off for St. Petersburgh, and that Mr. Gallatin had proposed that a single individual on each side should be left at Ghent, to take advantage of any opening for renewing the negotiation; but both these statements are at variance with those contained in other letters of the latest date from Ghent, received by the French mail of yesterday, according to which, the diplomatic intercourse still continued. We repeat, that we do not think this the point to which the public attention ought to be directed. We should look, not to the fallacious terms of an artful negotiation; but to the infallible evidence of our enemy's mind and intentions, displayed in his conduct. The bill for a *conscription* of the whole American population, is a measure that cannot be mistaken. Whilst such a bill is in progress, and before it is known whether the people will submit to its being carried into execution, it would be *madness to expect a peace.* It would be madness to expect a peace with persons who have made up their minds to propose *so desperate* a measure to their countrymen; for, either they must succeed, and then the intoxication of their pride will render them utterly intractable; or, (which is, indeed, more probable,) they must fail, and their failure must precipitate them from power, and, consequently, render treating with them impossible.

"When an *American* gentleman of *splendid attainments*, some years since, composed his celebrated review of the conscription code of that monster Buonaparte, he could not possibly foresee that his own country would, in so short a time, be subjected to the same *barbarous humiliation.* The prime and flower of the

American citizens are to be taken by lot! and delivered over to the marshals, who are to deliver them over to the officers authorized to receive them, who are to act at the discretion, and under the arbitrary direction of the president. Thus does Mr. Madison, from a simple republican magistrate, suddenly start up *a military despot* of the most *sanguinary character*—a double of the *blood-thirsty* wretch at Elba. We are convinced that this sudden and violent *shock to all republican feelings*, to all the habits of the people in all parts of the union, *cannot be made with impunity.* Certain it is that this law cannot stand alone. To give it the least chance of being put in execution, it must be accompanied with all the other chapters of that bloody code by which France was disgraced, and barbarized, and demoralized. Who is to hunt down the refractory conscripts? Who is to drag them, chained together in rows, to the head-quarters of the military division? Who is to punish them, their parents, relations, and friends? Even Buonaparte was many years in bringing to its diabolical perfection the machinery of his system; and carefully as Mr. Monroe may have studied in that accursed school, it cannot be supposed that he has, at one flight, placed himself on a level with his great instructor. It is highly probable that many of the men who have laboured in the details of oppression and violence, under the disturber of Europe, may have, by this time, made their way to America, where they will doubtless receive a cordial welcome from Mr. Madison, and be set to work *to rivet the collar on the necks of the American citizens;* but we own that, 'with all appliances and means to boot,' the president, in our opinion, must fail. Nevertheless, it would be most dangerous to suffer such an opinion to produce the slightest relaxation in our efforts. The British government should act as if it saw Mr. Monroe at the head of his hundred thousand regulars, well disciplined and equipped, carrying the war, as he distinctly threatens he will do, into the very heart of Canada. Late as it is, we must awake. Eight months ago, the Duke of Wellington, with his army might have fallen like a thunderbolt upon the Washington cabinet, leaving them no time for conscriptions, no means of collecting French officers to discipline their troops, no opportunity to intrigue for friendship and support among the continental powers of Europe. It is not yet too late for striking a decisive blow; but that blow must be struck with all our heart, and with all our strength. Let us but conceive the proposed hundred thousand regulars embodied in the course of the ensuing spring. Does any one believe that, without a mighty effort on our part, the Canadas could be retained another year? Would not the exultation of seeing himself at the head of such a force, urge Mr. Madison, at all hazards, to complete his often-tried invasion? Even if his scheme should but partially succeed, and he should be only able to drag on a defen-

sive war for another twelvemonths, who knows what allies that period may stir up for him, under the false pretences of regard for neutral rights, and for the liberty of the seas? On our side, to conclude a peace at the present moment, would be to confess ourselves intimidated by the warlike preparations of the enemy. It seems, therefore, that we have but one path to follow. Whatever was the force destined to act against America, before this DARING BILL of Mr. Monroe's was thought of, *let that force instantly be doubled; let us cast aside all European politics that cross this great and paramount object of our exertions.* Let a general of commanding name be at once despatched to the seat of war. We have often said, and we repeat it, that America is a scene on which the Duke of Wellington's talents might be displayed far more beneficially to his country, than they can possibly be in the courtly circles of the Thuillieres; but if his grace must necessarily be confined to the dull round of diplomatic business, at least, let some officer be sent, whom the general voice of the army may designate as most like in skill and enterprise to our great national hero. Fatal experience has shown us, that no effort of such an enemy is to be overlooked. When the flag of the *Guerriere* was struck, we saw in it that disastrous omen, which has since been but too sadly verified on the ocean, and on the lakes. The triumphs of the American navy have inspired even their privateers with remarkable *audacity.* The present papers mention the cruises of the *Peacock*, the *Chasseur*, and the *Mammoth*, all of which were very successful, and all ventured *on the coast of England and Ireland.* The two latter, being American built, outsailed every thing that gave them chase. This is a circumstance requiring *strict attention on the part of our admiralty.* Surely there must be some discoverable and *imitable cause* of a celerity in sailing, which is so important a point of naval tactics. Mr. Fulton, of Catamaran memory, appears to have employed himself on a naval machine of singular powers. It is described as a steam frigate, and is intended to carry red-hot shot of one hundred pounds weight. When we remember how contrary to expectation was the tremendous effect of the batteries of the Dardanelles, we cannot entirely dismiss from our minds all apprehension of the effect of this new machine of Mr. Fulton's."

Before I proceed to inquire into the *justice* of these charges against Mr. Monroe's bill, I cannot refrain from noticing, in a particular manner, one phrase of this article. Mr. Walter (for, hire he whom he will to write for him, he is the *author*) calls the bill, "this DARING bill of Mr. Monroe's." Mr. Walter is no grammarian, my lord; nor is it necessary that he should be, to qualify him for addressing such people as the well-attired rabble of England, who are his readers. But this is not the thing that

I have in view; *I* want your lordship to mark the word "DARING," as applied to this bill: as if it were a thing which the republic ought not to think of without *our permission;* as if it were like the act of a servant taking up a sword and *challenging his master;* as if it a were a trait of *insolence unbearable* in a nation at war with big John Bull, to take effectual means to resist his attacks on their shores; as if it were *audacious* in them to provide the means of preventing their cities, towns, and villages, from being plundered or burnt. This Mr. Walter, only a few days ago, called Mr. Jefferson "*liar and slave.*" He has a hundred times called Mr. Madison a *miscreant,* a *traitor,* a *liar,* a *villain;* and has as often insisted that no peace ought ever to be made with him. He has frequently insisted that Mr. Madison and his *faction* (the majority of Congress) must be *hurled from their seats.* He has called Mr. Jefferson the *old serpent.* In short, it is the next to impossible to think of any vile term or epithet, which this author has not applied to the American president, and the majority of that congress which is the real representation of the American people. And yet he has the cool impudence to speak of this bill, this measure of *defence,* as if it were something *insolent* towards *us.*

The truth is, my lord, we have so long had to deal with East Indians, and Portuguese, and Spaniards, and Italians, and Germans, and Dutchmen, and Russians, and Imperialist Frenchmen, that we are quite spoiled for a dealing with the Americans. We have, at last, arrived at such a pitch, that we regard it as *insolence* in any people even to talk of resisting us. Mr. Walter is, in this respect, but the mouth-piece of his readers. We must correct ourselves as to this way of thinking and talking, if the war with America continue; or we shall be exposed to the derision of the whole world.

Now, then, as to Mr. Monroe's measure. Mr. Walter describes it as a *conscription;* says that it will subject the people to *barbarous humiliation;* says that it makes the president a *military despot* of the most *sanguinary* character; asks who is to chain the conscripts, and drag them to the head-quarters of the military division; calls the raising of this force putting *a collar on the necks of the American citizens.*

These are the charges which Mr. Walter prefers against this grand measure of the republic; and he observes, that "when an American *gentleman* of *splendid attainments,* some years ago, composed his celebrated review of the *conscription code* of that *monster Buonaparte,* he could not possibly foresee that his own country would so soon be subjected to the same *barbarous humiliation.*" This *gentleman* of "*splendid attainments*" was a Mr. Walsh of Philadelphia, who, having been in France, came over to England, where, under the patronage of the friends of

bribery and corruption, he wrote and published a pamphlet, calculated to aid their views. This pamphlet clearly showed, that the author was one of those Americans, who, by the vain splendour that they here behold, and by the hope of sharing in it, have been induced to apostatize from the principles of their own republican government. This young man, whose work was really a very poor performance, abounding with inconsistencies, and, indeed, with downright falsehoods, had his head turned by the flatteries of the hireling writers and reviewers here; and I should not wonder if his work acquired him the unspeakable felicity of hearing, that *even his name was mentioned* in a conversation between two lords. The great recommendation of the work, was, that it was *not* the work of an *Englishman*. No: it was said to be the work of an *American*, who, *of course*, was a *friend* of the French, and not at all disposed to exaggerate in describing their misery. This was the fraudulent colour under which the work got into circulation. Mr. Walsh was a tool in the hands of crafty men, who dazzled him with praises.

But, now, as to the *resemblance* between Mr. Monroe's measure and the conscription of Napoleon:

1st. The French conscription was decreed by an arbitrary despot, assisted by an assembly whom the people had not chosen. The levy in America, is ordered by a law, passed by the congress, who are the *real*, and not the *sham*, representatives of the people; who have recently been freely chosen by the people; and who, if they desire to be re-elected, must act so as to please the people; the time of their re-election being near at hand.

2d. The French conscript was called out to fight for the support and aggrandizement of *a particular family*, and for the support also of *nobles* in the possession of their titles and estates. It was the honour of the *crown* that the Frenchmen was called on to fight for, and that, too, in distant lands. The American citizen is called out to defend no *sovereign family*, no *crown*, no *nobles*, to give no security, and to gain no renown for *them*, or any of them; but to fight for the safety, liberty, and honour of a country, where there are no distinctions of rank, and where, of course, every individual fights, when he does fight, in his *own* cause as much as in the cause of the president himself.

3d. The French conscription compelled *personal service*. The American levy contains no such compulsion. Every twenty-five men, between the ages of 18 and 45, are to furnish one man. If no one of the twenty-five will serve in person, the whole twenty-five together, are, *according to their property*, to pay a certain sum of money.

4th. The French conscript, while he left, perhaps, an aged father or mother at home, living in penury, was fighting for an emperor, whose wife carried about her person, at the nation's ex-

pense, decorations, which cost as much as would have fed thousands of families for a year. The American levyman knows that his government, all taken together, president, congress, judges, secretaries, clerks and all, do not cost so much in a year as is swallowed by an imperial family in one single day.

5th. France was not *invaded*. This is a very material point. America was, and is *invaded*. Her villages, towns, and cities, have been plundered and burnt. *A continuation* of this mode of warfare has been distinctly declared by our admiral to have been resolved on. It is invasion, it is devastation, it is fire, it is the sword, it is plunder at their very doors, and in their very dwellings on the coast, that the American levy are called forth to repel, to punish, or to prevent. It is no possible, no imaginary, no distant danger, that has called forth this measure from the congress: it is *actual invasion;* it is an enemy in the country, there laying waste, plundering, and killing; lawfully, if you please; but that is no matter. If Napoleon had landed an army here, he would have been justified in so doing by the laws of war; but when we expected him even to make the *attempt* at invasion, did *we* confine ourselves to measures like this of Mr. Monroe? Did we not call upon the *whole* of the people to be ready to come out *under martial law?* But I am here anticipating another part of the subject of my letter.

So much, then, for the *resemblance* between the French conscription and the American levy; and I am sure that your lordship will allow, that they no more resemble one another than this REGISTER resembles the *Times* newspaper. What, then, becomes of Mr. Walter's bombastical trash about *sanguinary despots* and *chained conscripts?* Yet, he will find dupes! He has found dupes for many years; and he will continue to find them upon this subject, I fear, till we shall see an *American fleet* on the coast of Ireland; an occurrence more probable than, at one time, was thought the capture of an English frigate by a republican thing with a *bit of striped bunting at its mast-head*, as Mr. Canning thought proper to describe the American frigates.

But, my lord, it is not with the French conscription alone that I mean to accompany the republican levy. Let us see (for that will bring the thing home to us) what is the nature of this measure of Mr. Monroe, compared with our *militias*.

We have two or three militias; but there are two clearly distinguished from each other: one is called the *militia*, and the other the *local militia*. The former consists of men called out by BALLOT, WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO THE AMOUNT OF THEIR PROPERTY. Each man, so called on, must serve in person, or must, out of his own pocket, find a man to serve in his stead; and seeing that the service is, in all respects, except that of being sent over sea, the same as that of

regular soldiers; seeing that the man may be marched to any part of the kingdom, may be quartered in camp, in barracks, and is subjected to all military pains and penalties, the price of substitutes has long been so high that no labourer or journeyman has, out of his own pocket, been able to procure a substitute. Now, you see, there is a wide difference here; for the man of small means in America has twenty-four others to assist him in paying the money necessary to engage a substitute. Twenty-five men are put into a class. If one of them goes to serve, the others are able to make him a handsome compensation. If one of them choose to serve, the money, in lieu of the service of one man, is to be collected from twenty-five men. And, which is the beauty of this admirable scheme, when it comes to the payment of money, each person is to pay, not the *same* sum, but *a sum in proportion to the amount of his means.* In England, the names of *all* of certain ages, in each parish, are put into a box, out of which the number wanted are drawn. It happens, of course, that, of four, one is a rich merchant, another a farmer, another a journeyman tailor, and another a labourer. Each is to serve in person, or find a substitute. The price of the substitute is as high for the poor as for the rich. The two latter, therefore, who have no property to defend, must serve, or they must rake together the means of paying for the defence of the property of the rich, and thus involve themselves in debt, and expose their families, if they have any, to misery. But, you see, Mr. Monroe's scheme most effectually provides against this. It puts all the male population, between 18 and 45, into classes of twenty-five men. Each class is to send one man. If they agree amongst themselves who shall go, the thing is done. If none of them choose to go, then the twenty-five are to pay a sum of money; but *here* they are not to pay *alike;* the journeyman tailor and the labourer are not to pay like the merchant and the farmer; every man of the twenty-five is to pay *in proportion to his property;* and thus does the burden of defence fall, with arithmetical correctness, on the thing to be defended.

And *this*, my lord, is what Mr. Walter calls a "*conscription;*" this he calls a measure of "*barbarous humiliation*" to the people of America; for proposing this measure he calls Mr. Madison a "*sanguinary despot;*" this is the measure which, he says, will *never be submitted to* by the republicans. The foolish man will soon have to announce his astonishment at the complete success of the measure; if he has not, I will acknowledge myself to be as great a fool as he.

But, to proceed, our *local militia* were to serve only within their several *counties*, but their service has now been extended; though, except in cases of *urgency*, they are to be called out only a month in the year. Here no man must get the means of

hiring a substitute from any *insurance*, or *club*. He must make no bargain with his master to work out the amount of the penalty. He must *swear* that the *ten pounds* comes out of his own present means, or he *must serve in person*. In this case, however, we approach a little nearer to Mr. Monroe's excellent scheme; for in this militia, we proportion the property of him who refuses to serve; though a rich farmer still pays only about *twenty pounds*, while the poorest of his labourers must pay *ten pounds*, though, certainly, the property of the former may be estimated at two or three thousand times greater than the property of the latter. Now, according to Mr. Monroe's scheme, a couple of farmers would find themselves classed with twenty-three labourers and journeymen blacksmiths, collar-makers, wheelwrights, &c. &c. And, of course, the two farmers would pay 24-25ths of the penalty; or, which would be the natural result, one man, out of the twenty-five, with a handsome reward from the rest, would cheerfully take up the musket instead of the dung-fork, or the sledge-hammer.

But the most important distinction still remains to be noticed; that is to say, that we have, for twenty years, had a militia on foot, under *martial law*, under officers *commissioned by the king*, under the *regular discipline*, lodged in *camps* or *barracks*, marched to *every corner of the kingdom*, without any actual *invasion of the country*. These regiments have been kept up, the balloting has been going on, and no invaders have come to burn our villages, towns, and cities; or to plunder them, or lay them under contribution: While, in America, we are invading and laying waste; we are taking *permanent* possession of one district; we are compelling the people to swear allegiance to our king; we have a mighty naval force continually menacing the seacoast; we have one army afloat here, another there, more are out, and this Mr. Walter is calling till he is hoarse for more troops to be sent to devastate and divide the country, to overturn the republican government, and reduce the people to unconditional submission; all this he is doing, while he is, at the same time, crying out against the "*barbarous*" scheme of calling upon the people of property to defend their country, either in their persons, or with their purses. Ay, my lord! fool as Mr. Walter is, he perceives that Mr. Monroe's is an infallible scheme for raising an army in a short time, and for keeping that army complete. He, fool as he is, smells powder in every line of this scheme. But it is his business to misrepresent, to disfigure, to induce his well-dressed rabble of readers, and you, too, if possible, to believe, that the scheme *will fall*; and that, *therefore*, we ought to carry on the war with all imaginable energy. I trust, however, that you are not to be misled by him, or by any body else. I trust that you will see the danger which this wise and equitable plan presents to

us. I trust that you will at once abandon all hopes of extorting any concession from a country which has now shown, that difficulties and dangers, as they press upon her, only tend to increase her energy, to raise her spirit, and make her more formidable. I have respect enough for the understanding of your lordship to believe, that you have read Mr. Monroe's letter to the chairman of the military committee with great attention, and not without some degree of alarm. But the conclusion of it is so very important, that I cannot refrain from again calling your attention to it.

"I should," says he, "insult the understanding, and wound the feelings of the committee, if I touched on the calamities incident to defeat. Dangers which are remote, and can never be realized, excite no alarm with a gallant and generous people. But the *advantages of success* have a fair claim to their deliberate consideration. The effort we have already made has attracted the attention and *extorted the praise of other nations.* Already have most of the absurd theories and idle speculations *on our system of government, been refuted and put down.* We are now felt and respected as a power; and *it is the dread which the enemy entertain of our resources and growing importance, that has induced him to press the war against us after its professed objects had ceased.* Success, by *discomfiture of his schemes,* and the attainment of an honourable peace, will place the United States *on higher grounds,* in the opinion of the world, than they have held at any former period. *In future wars, their commerce will be permitted to take its lawful range unmolested.* Their remonstrances to foreign governments will not again be put aside, unheeded. Few will be presented, because there will seldom be occasion for them. Our union, founded on internal affection, will have acquired new strength by the proof it will have afforded of the important advantages attending it. Respected abroad, and happy at home, the United States will have accomplished the great objects for which they have so long contended. As a nation, they will have little to dread, as a people, little to desire."

I beseech your lordship's serious attention to these important words. I allow, that peace now made on the basis of the *Status Quo* would be *success* to America. I have often said this before. To *defend* herself against us, single handed, will be *most glorious triumph* to her, and will elevate her in the eyes of all the world. But, then, my lord, to repeat once more what I have so often said, what will be the consequence of her success at the end of a ten years', or a five years' war? How much greater would then be her triumph? How much greater her weight in the world? How much more proud her defiance of us? How much more powerful her navy? How much more exasperated her people against us?

I confess, that, after all that has been said here about Mr. Madison; after all the threats of our press to *depose* him; after all the "*liars, traitors, hypocrites,*" &c. that the press has called him; after all the expectations of seeing a *viceroy* sent out to Washington city, it would sink the heart of John Bull down into his shoes to see a peace made with this same Mr. Madison, without extorting *something* from him. But you and your colleagues ought to despise this national folly, created by the venal men, who live by misrepresentation and falsehood; whose tables are furnished with the fruits of flattering popular prejudices.

I confess, too, that the friends of Captain Henry; that the would-be *noblesse of Massachusetts;* that the *federalists* in general, would be put down forever by a peace with Mr. Madison, on terms honourable to America, made at this time; and which peace would clearly have been obtained by the wisdom of his measures, and the bravery of those whom he has employed. But hang these scurvy noblesse, my lord! They are poor creatures. They cannot assist us. The population of America is *essentially* republican, from one end to the other. These poor things have tried their utmost; and they have failed. As long as they are stimulated with the hope of forcing open the offices of government by the misfortunes of their country, they will talk big about *a separation of the union;* but the moment that that hope dies within them, you will see them as quiet as mice. And really, I do not know of any thing more likely to kill that hope than the scheme of Mr. Monroe, which will not only bring forth an efficient army *now,* but which will hold an efficient army *always in readiness* at a week's notice, while, at the same time, it will obviate the necessity of a *standing* army and of a great *permanent expense,* and will prevent the executive government from acquiring a patronage inconsistent with the principles of republican government, and dangerous to political and civil liberty.

I confess, moreover, that there is another class of men, whom you would mortally offend by making a peace that should be honourable to America: I mean, the *haters of freedom.* I do not mean . . . . . This moment has arrived the *Courier* newspaper with news of the PEACE. I do not not know how to express the pleasure I feel at this news, or the gratitude, which, *for this act,* I, in common with my countrymen, owe to your lordship and your colleagues. Far be it from me to rejoice at what the *Times* calls the *disgrace of the navy of England,* and the *humiliation of the crown;* but being fully convinced, the longer the war had continued the more disgraceful and dangerous would have been the result, I do most sincerely rejoice at this auspicious event, and certainly not the less on account of its being calculated to baffle the views of that hypocriti-

cal faction, who have still the impudence to call themselves *whigs*.

I am, &c. &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, 28th December, 1814.

AMERICA.

Mr. Hunt's motion, and Sir John Cox Hippisley's speech, respecting her.—The Courier's attack on Mr. Binns, a publisher at Philadelphia.

AT a meeting of the county of Somerset, on the 9th inst. a curious occurrence took place with regard to the peace with America. I will first give the account of it from the TIMES *newspaper* of the 16th inst. and make on it such observations as most naturally present themselves. The reader should first be informed, however, that the meeting was held for the purpose of discussing a petition to parliament against the *property tax*, or *tax upon income*, which tax ought, by law, to expire in a few months, but of which tax, it is supposed, the government means to propose the *continuation* or *revival*. The following is the report of the Times:

"ON Monday last, at the meeting of the freeholders, &c. holden at Wells, to petition parliament for the repeal of the property tax, after the business of the day was disposed of, (an account of which has already appeared in this paper,) Mr. HUNT remarked, that the meeting should not disperse without expressing its thankfulness to those by whose efforts peace had been made between us and America. He therefore read a resolution, which he submitted for their approbation: 'That the thanks of this meeting are due to those by whose exertions peace with the Americans, the *only remaining free people in the world*, has been restored to this country.' Sir J. C. HIPPISLEY could see no reason whatever for calling the Americans *the only free people in the world*, and should certainly divide the meeting if the motion was persisted in. It was a LIBEL on *our own country;* for his part, he HATED THE AMERICANS. They were *a set of slaves* to the government of France, and—(some expressions of disapprobation arose;) when Mr. DICKENSON said, that he certainly must join in deprecating the resolution. He hoped the meeting would not consent to compliment any nation at the expense of our own, and of every other on the globe. He had *considerable reason* for believing that the congress at Vienna was now employed

in endeavouring to *unrivet the chains of the suffering Africans;* and, engaged as the powers of Europe were, in so sacred a cause, he could not consent that any aspersion, direct or indirect, should be cast upon them. Mr. HUNT then requested the sheriff to put the resolution, which, upon the show of hands, was negatived by a very *considerable majority.*"

Whether there be any *free country in the world* still remaining, besides the republic of America, is a question that I do not choose to decide, or to give my opinion upon. But I cannot help observing, that the question was decided in the negative by a meeting of the county of Somerset only by a "*considerable* majority;" and, I must further observe, that the report of this "*considerable* majority" comes to us through the *Times newspaper*, that channel of skunk-like abuse of America, and all that is American. Let it be remembered, too, that the power of deciding who had the majority lay wholly and absolutely with the sheriff, who is an officer appointed by the crown. This being the case, the words, "*considerable* majority," will be pretty well understood to mean *any thing but a large majority;* and, perhaps, some people may doubt whether there was any majority at all. At any rate, the county of Somerset *divided* upon the question of whether America was, or was not, *the only free country left in the world.* This was, at least, a question for which *many* were in the affirmative. It was received and put to vote without any marks of disapprobation; while, on the other hand, he was *hissed* who said that he *hated* the Americans, and who called them *the slaves of the French government.* And *why*, good Sir John, do you *hate* the Americans? What have they done to you? You say that they are the slaves of the government of France; but you do not find it convenient to produce any proof of what you say. This, Sir John, is one of the old stale falsehoods of the *Times* newspaper, which you are retailing at secondhand, like a Grub-street pedler. You are, in this instance, a poor crawling imitator of a wretched grinder of paid-for paragraphs. *Prove*, or attempt to prove, what you say. Attempt, at least, to prove, that the Americans are the slaves, or have been the slaves of the French, or you must be content to go about saddled with the charge of having made an assertion, without being either able or willing to show it to be true. I assert, that the Americans were not, in any shape or degree, subservient to France. I assert, that they all along acted the part of a nation *truly independent.* I assert, that they, in no case, showed a partiality for the government of Napoleon. If any proof were wanted of their having placed *no reliance upon France*, we have it in the fact, the fact so honourable, so glorious to them, and so unfortunate for us; I mean the fact of their *continuing the contest after Napoleon was put down*, and still, as firmly as before, *refusing to give up to us one single point*,

though they saw us allied with all Europe, and though they saw the whole of our monstrous force directed against them, having no other enemy to contend with. This *proves* that they placed no reliance upon France. When they declared war, they saw us with a powerful enemy in Europe. Upon that circumstance they, of course, calculated, as they had a right to do; but when that enemy, contrary to their expectation, was put down all of a sudden, and the whole of our enormous force was bent against America, she was not intimidated. She still set us at defiance; she faced us; she fought us; and, at the end of a few months, instead of receiving a *viceroy* at Washington, as we had been told she would, she brought us to make peace with her without her giving up to us one single point of any sort. Deny this, if you can, Sir John, and, if you cannot, answer to the people of Somerset for the speech which the *Times* has published as yours. But, Sir John, why do you HATE the Americans? You cannot, surely, hate them because they pay their President only about six thousand pounds a year, not half so much as our APOTHECARY GENERAL receives. You, surely, cannot hate them because they do not pay in the gross amount of their taxes as much as we pay for the mere collection and management of ours. You, surely, cannot hate them because they keep no sinecure placemen, and no pensioners, except such as have actually rendered them services, and to them grant pensions only by vote of their real representatives. You, surely, cannot hate them because, in their country, the press is *really* free, and *truth* cannot be a *libel*. You, surely, cannot hate them because they have shown that a *cheap* government is, in fact, the strongest of all governments, standing in no need of troops or of treason laws to defend it, in times even of actual invasion. You may, indeed, *pity* them, because they are destitute of the honour of being governed by some illustrious family; because they are destitute of Dukes, Royal and others, of Most Noble Marquises, of Earls, Viscounts, and Barons; because they are destitute of Knights of the Garter, Thistle and Bath, Grand Crosses, Commanders and Companions; because they are, in spite of the efforts of the Massachusetts intriguers, still destitute of Illustrious Highnesses, Right Honourables, Honourables, and Esquires; because they are destitute of long robes and big wigs, and see their lawyers, of all ranks, in plain coats of gray, brown, or blue, as chance may determine; because they are destitute of a church established by law, and of tythes you; may, indeed, *pity* the republicans on these accounts; but, Sir John, it would be cruel to hate them. To hate is not the act of a christian, and very illy becomes a man like yourself, who has been a hero, a perfect dragon, in combating the anti-christian principles of the French Revolution. Pity the Americans, Sir John. Forgive them, Sir John. Pray for them, Sir John. But do not hate them, thou life

and fortune defender of our holy religion. Pray that they may speedily have a King and Royal Family, with a Commander in Chief and Field Marshals; that they may have a Civil List and Sinecures; that they may have Lords, Dukes, Grand Crosses, Clergy, Regular Army, and Tythes; *pray* for these things, in their behalf, as long as you please; pray that the Americans may have as good a government as we have; but, because they have it not, do not *hate* them. I was really very happy to perceive that you were *hissed* for this sentiment at the county meeting. I was happy to perceive it, because it was a sign, that the people of England were coming to their senses upon this, the most important of all subjects. Why could you not have expressed yourself in terms less hostile to every generous and humane feeling? I confess that Mr. HUNT's motion, though, if he thought it *true*, he was right in making it, might fairly be objected to by any one who thought differently. But you might have reprobated the endeavour to describe England as *not free*, (if you regarded her as being free,) without saying that you *hated* the Americans. This it was that shocked the meeting; and, accordingly, it hooted you, as appears from the report, as published even by the Times newspaper. Every effort ought now to be made to produce reconciliation with America; and you appear to have done all that you were *able* to do to perpetuate the animosities engendered by the war. Mr. DICKENSON managed his opposition to the motion more adroitly. He observed, that the holy war powers, now in congress at Vienna, were, "*he had considerable* reason to believe," engaged in an effort to unrivet the chains of the *African* slave; and, therefore, he could not consent to any motion that might seem to glance against *their* people being free. So Mr. DICKENSON concluded, it seems, that, if the "sacred cause" powers should settle upon some general prohibition against the increase of slaves *in the West-Indies*, there cannot possibly remain any thing like slavery in Russia, Prussia, Poland, Germany, Bohemia, Transylvania, Sclavonia, Italy, Spain, or Portugal.

I should like to have heard the chain of argument, through which this member for Somerset arrived at such a conclusion from such premises. I suppose that it must have been something in this way: That the "sacred cause" powers are all perfectly sincere in their professions; that, being so, it is impossible to believe, that they would show so much anxiety for the freeing of the Africans, while they held their own subjects in slavery; and that, *therefore*, it is impossible to believe, that the people of Russia, Germany, and Hungary, are not all perfectly free. I dare say that Mr. Dickenson said a great deal more upon the subject, and produced *facts* as well as arguments to prove that Mr. HUNT's motion was an unjust attack upon those powers; and I confess that it would be a great treat to me to see those *facts* upon paper.

AMERICA AND ALGIERS.

As the war which has now begun between the "*democratic rulers*" of America, and the "*regular government*" of Algiers, may lead to important consequences, it is proper to insert here the grounds of this war, as far as we can come at them. We have the American official accounts only. America has a tell-tale sort of government. It has no state secrets. It blabs out the proceedings in negotiations, while the negotiators are still assembled. Not so the regular government of Algiers, which is one of the "*ancient and venerable institutions*" which the Bostonian noblesse so much admire; one of the "gems in the crown of ancient glory," of which Mr. Chateaubriand speaks so feelingly, and so foolishly; one of the *links* in the *chain* of the "*social system*" which has recently been under the hammers of so many able artisans at Vienna. The regular government of Algiers does not make any *prefaces* to war. It observes a dignified silence *till it has actually begun and made some progress in the war!* till it has made a good haul of the enemy's ships, before he knows that he is looked upon as an enemy. This is the practice of the regular government; the "ancient and venerable institution in Algiers." I shall now insert, first, an account of the grounds of war from the *National Intelligencer*, published at Washington; next, the report of congress on the subject; and, last, the *act of congress* declaring war against Algiers. For the reader will observe, that, in the irregular government of America, war cannot be declared by the chief magistrate, without the consent of the people's *real* representatives. I reserve a few remarks to follow the documents.

There is one circumstance connected with this Algerine war, which I think worthy of particular notice; and that is, this regular government began, it appears, its depredations on the Americans, just as the latter were entering upon *war with* US! Some of our modest and honourable gentlemen; some of our most *honourable* men, have called America an assassin, because she made war against us while we were at war against Napoleon. What will they say now of the venerable head of this African state? The same *honourable* worthies have said, that because America went to war with us while we had to fight Napoleon, she was the *slave* of Napoleon. But I hope they will not apply this reasoning to the present war between America and Algiers; I fervently hope, that no one will pretend, that, because Algiers went to war with America, while America had to fight with us, Algiers was the *slave* of England! As to the result of the war, I

have no doubt that the dey will not have to rejoice much at the success of his undertaking. A dry blow, instead of millions of dollars, are likely to be his portion. As an Englishman, I must wish that the Algerines may be beaten by those who have, unfortunately, so often beaten my own countrymen.

The TIMES newspaper has told us, that it is *suspected* that the Algerine war is, with America, a *PRETEXT for increasing her navy.* Indeed, doctor! and in what civilian have you discovered that America is restrained from augmenting her navy at her *pleasure?* What need has she of *pretexts?* I know, indeed, that, amongst your other follies, you did, during last summer, insist upon it, that, in making peace with America, she should, at least, be compelled to *stipulate not to have any ships of war beyond a certain number.* But the stipulation was not obtained; and, now, instead of big menaces, you throw out your *suspectings* for the cogitations of the wise John Bull. Away, driveller! and await a similar fate to your predictions as to the taking of New-Orleans.

LITERARY FUND AND WASHINGTON BENEVOLENT SOCIETY.

I HAVE observed that, year after year, this institution becomes more like a common *charity* concern. A parcel of lords, and other men of *purse,* take the *chair,* and take the lead. This last meeting was, I see, presided over by the *duke of Kent,* in the same way as the Lancaster school meetings, and other meetings for the assistance of the poor and miserable. The consequence of this must be, that the *poor devil's politics* will serve as the measure of the bounty he is to receive. The original design of this fund must be totally overlooked. The design, I believe, was, *to prevent authors from selling their pens;* whereas, now, I should suppose the principal design to be *to purchase the pens of authors,* or to keep alive *poor slaves* whose works are well meant towards their patrons, but destitute of the talent necessary to make them sell. I observed, that the "*founder's*" health was drank, and that the "*founder,*" Mr. DAVID WILLIAMS, was not *named.**

Mr. David Williams wrote some excellent political tracts in support of the principles of *freedom;* he also translated some of the works of Voltaire on the subject of *religion;* never did he expect that this institution would tumble into such hands as have now got hold of it. The truth is, that the scheme was a very

* He was the author of *Lessons to a Young Prince,* which have been erroneously attributed to Edmund Burke.

good one. Its object and its tendency was to encourage *literary merit*, and to *make authors honest* and *independent*; but it has now manifestly been converted into a sort of *poor-list* for decayed *literary hacks*. They tell the world that they do not publish the *names* of the parties who receive charity. They are very *wise in this*, for the public would soon see what the real object of the fund was, if they could see the *names of the persons relieved*. In short, this, like almost every other "*charity*," as they are called, is neither more nor less than *an adjunct of the government*, or, rather, of *the system*. What jacobin, or jacobin's wife, (*unless she first betrayed her husband*,) was ever relieved by any of these societies? They are kept up for the purpose of *keeping the needy in good humour*, or of rewarding *faithful, decayed slaves*. Here the man who has paid a fortune in taxes often comes, cap in hand, and receives back the means of getting a dinner.

It is curious to observe, that the *aristocratic faction in America* have resorted to *a trick of this sort*. They set up, some few years ago, a society, which they called the "WASHINGTON BENEVOLENT SOCIETY," which, it appears, has branched out all over the country. The object of this trick was to *collect little groupes of the most needy and mean-spirited part of the people*, and, by the means of donations in *money, clothes, books*, and *medical aid*, to attach them to the aspiring rich, and thus to found a sort of AFFILIATION *against the republican government*.

The name of WASHINGTON was taken *for the purpose of deception*, and, as a *party word*, opposed to the name of FRANKLIN, JEFFERSON, or MADISON, who were thus to be held up as having deviated from the principles of the man to whom American gratitude has given what, perhaps, American wisdom and justice would have given largely, but certainly with a less prodigal hand.

Availing themselves of this amiable weakness, *these crafty enemies of their country's freedom* have been working up the people *here and there, by the means of these societies*, to an opposition to the government. They hold their stated meetings as our "charities" do. They make *speeches, compliment one another*, extol the virtues of Washington, who, though one of the first of patriots, never was fool enough to bestow his money in the making of paupers. Shut out of the legislative assemblies by the people's voice, they harangue at these meetings, and thus continue to *keep themselves in wind*. *Silly* as the thing is, however, *in itself*, I would have the Americans be upon their guard against it. It is aspiring *aristocracy* in its most alluring guise; it is imposture of the most dangerous kind. It tends to the creating of *pauperism*; to the forming of a class in the community who have no interest in supporting the rights and liberties of the nation, and who are to be bought and sold like cattle. These societies ought to be

resolutely attacked and exposed. A little matter would break them up amongst a sensible people. I wish I could show the people of America the effects of pauperism in England; I wish I could make them see the degradation which it has brought upon the land of their forefathers—there would need nothing more.

[COBBETT is very much deceived, if he supposes that this society is either respected or respectable; if he had seen it march, on the 4th instant, with all the advantages which a festive day could give it, when every hand was suspended from labour, and when those who abhorred independence, and sickened at the celebration, were compelled, by the force of public sentiment, to appear pleased, while their hearts grieved; had he seen the Peter Washingtons on that day, where every notorious *tory* and the underlings of *English agency* looked for the only solace they could find in the congenial feeling of hatred to free and equal government, in that wretched club—Cobbett would have seen *many of his own abettors*, a few of those *who wrote* for his *Porcupine*, some who, during the war, gave, as public toasts, the "*transportation* of Madison to Elba;" a number of poor boys in their Sunday coats; a few decent looking men, among whom the wreck of the world had made havock, and whose *poverty, and not their will*, placed them there, as the only mode by which certain kinds of business dependent on English agency can be obtained. This society is perfectly harmless, in a social and a political light; for, very fortunately, it is in hands which always have been distinguished more for blind zeal than judgment, and whose folly renders it odious, even among the most respectable and sedate of the federalists, who are repressed by decorum from participating in a scheme which was set out upon a suggestion of the English minister, Jackson, commenced at the same point as the Hartford convention, and had in view the same object; which in its by-laws betrayed the cloven foot of England, by pursuing the same system as Liston procured to be set on foot in 1797—8, and which Cobbett himself encouraged—the determination *not to employ in any business, nor to deal in any transactions*, nor to countenance in public or private, any citizen who did not recognise the Washington Benevolent Society—the mode by which England has divided, and distracted, and ruined many nations.] *Aurora.*

To the Earl of Liverpool—on the part which America is likely to take in a war between England and France.

My Lord,

FROM several parts of America I have received thanks for my letters to your lordship on the subject of the American war. The people in America think, or, at least, many of them think, that those letters had great weight in producing the peace of Ghent, than which you and your colleagues never adopted any measure more wise, nor in better time. Yet, *you* have never *thanked* me for my advice. You, to whom the peace was much more necessary than to Mr. MADISON, have never acknowledged your obligations to me—you have appeared to be sulky about all, though I taught you so exactly what to do, in order to avoid the great evils which were coming upon you from all quarters. The consequences of the American war were foretold by me nearly two years before the war began. I told you that you would have war, if you persevered in seizing men on board of American ships on the high seas. You did persevere, and you had war. I told you that the Americans would beat you in fighting, if you continued the war for two years. You continued the war, and

they did beat you. I told you that you would never have peace if you demanded any concession from America. You insisted on great concessions on her part as a *sine qua non* of peace; and, after three months more, you made peace by giving up every thing, not excepting the *sine qua non* itself. In short, you expended fifty millions of money, and lost, I dare say, thirty thousand men, in accomplishing nothing, except creating a navy in America, causing her manufactures to flourish, and implanting in the hearts of Americans, for ages, a hatred of the English government.

I remind you of these things, in order to bespeak your attention on the present subject. I shall here deal in prophecies again; and shall not be at all afraid of proving, in the end, not to have been a false prophet. You appear to me now to be in a very fair way of adding another six hundred millions to our debt, and of bringing the guinea up to forty shillings, instead of twenty-eight shillings, at which point it is now arrived. I wish to prevent this; and if I do not succeed, I shall, at any rate, have these pages to refer to, when the mischief has taken place, and when few beside myself will be able to say that they did all in their power to prevent it.

I am of opinion, that France alone is now, as she was in 1793, more than a match for the coalition against her. But I am further of opinion, that, before the war against her be six months old, *you will find America taking a part in it*, unless you absolutely abstain from every thing that can be construed into a violation of neutral maritime rights.

War, or peace, with America, will depend upon the opinions of the *people* in that country. The people there are really and truly represented in the congress. There are no vile *sham* elections in the United States. That which the people wills, will be done. The Americans are a *sensible people;* they all read from a press which is *really free;* they discuss all political matters freely; they love peace; they would prefer peace; they would make some sacrifices to peace; but they will never hesitate a moment in preferring war to slavery or dependence.

Now, then, what is likely to be the view which the Americans will take of the present scene in Europe? And what are likely to be their feelings with regard to what is passing in this quarter of the world? It is very easy for our corrupt press to persuade the alarmed and selfish part of England, that it is necessary to plunge the country into war, in order to root out the present government of France. But it will not be so easy for any body to persuade the American people that such an undertaking is just. They will see the matter in its true light; they will see that Napoleon has been replaced at the head of the government, by

the will of the people of France; they will see that he has had the wisdom and virtue to abandon his ambitious projects; they will see that he has voluntarily confined himself within the ancient limits of France; they will see that he has tendered the olive branch to all surrounding nations; they will see that he means to contend solely for the independence of France; they will see that he has returned, as nearly as circumstances will permit, to the principles of 1789; they will see that he has provided for the people being *really represented* in the legislature; they will see that there is to be no religious persecution, and no predominant church in France; they will see that the French people have derived great benefits from the revolution, and that now all these benefits are to be confirmed to them; in France they will see a *free people*, and in Napoleon, they will see *the soldier of freedom.*

On the other hand, they will ask, what right England, or any other power, can have to interfere in the internal affairs of France? They will ask, why England should not treat with him now, as well as at Amiens; why not treat with him as well as with the directory at Lille? They will ask, why England should refuse to treat with him, from whom she received the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad? They will ask, what can be the *real* object, the *ultimate* object, of a coalition of those powers who were assembled at Vienna, and who were disposing of states at their pleasure?

The Americans have seen the republic of Genoa given to the king of Sardinia; they have seen Poland parcelled out between Prussia, Russia, and Austria; they have seen the fleet of Denmark taken away; they have seen the people of the republic of Holland sunk into the subjects of a king; they have seen the republic of Venice transferred to the emperor of Austria; they have seen the pope replaced with the Jesuits at his heels; they have seen, that in Spain, where a free constitution had been formed by men who had been fighting on our side, the king has been brought back; that he has destroyed this constitution; that he has treated the makers of it as traitors; that he has re-established the inquisition which Napoleon had abolished; that when two of the alleged traitors took shelter in Gibraltar, they were given up to their hunters, and that when complaint of this was made in our parliament, the reply was, that "*we had no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of Spain.*" The Americans will ask, why this principle is not applied *to the domestic affairs of France?* They will ask, not for vile, foul-mouthed abuse of Napoleon and the French people; but for some *proof* of our right to interfere against him.

Having seen all these things; having seen what we and our allies have been at in every part of Europe; having seen that the

people of France is the only people in Europe living under a government approaching towards a resemblance to their own; they will want very little to assist them in forming a correct opinion as to the real object of the war against France, if such war should now, without provocation on the part of France, be resolved on.

It appears to me, therefore, that the American people will, at least, feel great interest in this war, much greater than they felt in the last war; and that as they have just laid down their arms, after a contest in defence of their maritime rights, they will, the moment they hear of this war, prepare again for that defence. America, in all likelihood, will again be the only neutral nation. There will be no *Berlin and Milan decrees* to give a pretence for *Orders in Council*. So that, if we trench upon her rights, her ground of war will be cleared of all confusion. She will stand upon her *indisputable* rights; and, if she be left in the full and free enjoyment of her advantages as a neutral power, she will carry on three-fourths of the commerce of the world. Our cruisers may keep at sea, but it will be only to witness the increase of her mercantile marine, and all the proofs of her wonderful prosperity. France will receive all that she wants from foreign countries by American ships. America will supply her with colonial produce, and with certain articles of manufacture. The latter will, through the same channel, find an outlet for much of her abundant produce. These two countries will become much more closely connected than ever, and we should come out of the war shorn of our means, while the means, of all sorts, of America, would be found to be prodigiously increased.

But, my lord, is it *quite certain* that the people of America would not feel strongly disposed to take part in this war against us? They see that France is the only country left with a government resembling their own. Great as is their distance from Europe, they have felt that, when left to be dealt with single-handed, their very existence, as an independent nation, was put in jeopardy. There were many persons in America who loudly blamed the president, Washington, for not taking part with the French, even when America had not a single public ship of war. They reasoned thus: That England was, from the nature of her force, as well as the situation of her dominions, the only enemy that America had to fear; that she had never ceased to demonstrate a hostile mind towards America; that she saw, in America, not only a successful example of democratic revolution, but a dangerous rival in commerce and maritime power; that she only waited for a *favourable moment* to use all her force to crush this rising rival; and, *therefore*, it was less dangerous to declare, at once, for the republic of France, and make common cause with her, than to wait the issue of the contest; in which, if France should fall, America

could not long survive, without, at least, another long and bloody war upon her own soil.

This was the reasoning against neutrality, in 1793. How these reasoners must have triumphed, in 1814! when they saw all ground of dispute between England and America removed by the close of the war in Europe; when they saw that, instead of this producing in England a disposition to make peace, it only produced redoubled activity in the war; when they read, in the very same English newspaper that told them of the abdication of Napoleon, that NOW, NOW, NOW! was the happy moment for crushing America; for putting an end to "the existence of the *mischievous example* of *democratic rebellion*" exhibited in the American Union; when they heard their president, and the majority of the congress, denominated, in these same papers, "*rebels* and *traitors*;" when they saw, in the report of a speech of a lord of the admiralty, that Mr. MADISON was to be *deposed*, as Napoleon had been deposed; when they saw the breaking up of the American Union represented as absolutely necessary to the well-governing of other nations; when they saw the fleet called upon officially by the lords of the admiralty to finish the American war, in such a way as would *ensure the* LASTING TRANQUILLITY OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD; when they heard the English prints call upon the people of New-England to separate themselves from the union; when they heard it predicted, in these prints, that Mr. MADISON would be put to death, and that the people would form *a connexion with the* PARENT *state;* and when, upon the heels of all these predictions and threats, they saw an army actually sent off *from France* to fight against America; when they saw that identical army, which had been engaged against Napoleon, sent to invade America by the way of Lake Champlain; when they saw the war of fire and plunder carried on upon their sea-coast; when those who were for war on the side of the French republic, in 1793, saw all these things, in 1814, how they must have triumphed!

America must feel great confidence in herself from her past achievements. The skill and bravery of her seamen and land troops must give her great confidence. But there is no man who reflects, (and the Americans are a reflecting people,) who will not perceive that, with all her valour and all her virtue, America has had a very narrow escape; and that, if all had been *quite settled* in Europe, she would have had to carry on a much longer and more bloody contest. It cannot but be evident to the American statesman, that if France were to be completely subdued; if she were reduced to that state to be obliged to receive a ruler dictated by us and our allies; if her hands and feet were thus tied for ages; and if the situation of all Europe were such as to leave the whole undivided power of England to be employed against Ame-

rica, the situation of the latter would be, at least, very *unpleasant*, not to say *precarious*. And if such a person considers what were the *real* objects of England in 1814, the manner in which the war terminated, and what an *excellent memory* she has, he must be a bold man indeed if he feel no apprehensions at the total subjugation of France.

It has not been forgotten in America, that directly after the abdication of Napoleon, there appeared an article in our newspapers, stating, that there was a SECRET ARTICLE in the TREATY OF PARIS, stipulating, that *none* of the parties, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France, should interfere in our war against America. This news was given as copied from the *Vienna Gazette*. The Vienna Gazette is under the immediate control of the government there. The Americans paid great and deserved attention to this: and must they not have lamented to see France reduced to such a state? They afterwards saw that there was no safety for their ships of war, or their prizes, in the ports of France. They saw, in short, that the Bourbons, holding their power almost at the mercy of England, afforded not the smallest hope of any support against so formidable a power as England. *Then it* was that many Americans blamed Mr. MADISON, not for resisting the exercise of our alleged right of impressment; but, on the contrary, for not having sooner made war against us in alliance with France. They told him that he was, at last, in a state to be able to appreciate the *wisdom* of keeping aloof from France, on account of the *title* of her ruler. They laughed at him for his scruples to make common cause with an emperor, while we saw England having allies in the Turk, the Pope, the Algerines, and the Indians; and they laughed at him the more, when they recollected that America had won her independence while in an alliance, offensive and defensive, with a Bourbon king of France.

However, many of the causes which kept America aloof from France are now removed. The principles of 1793 are again adopted in France; the system of reforming, by means of conquest, is abandoned; Napoleon will have learnt how to respect the rights and to value the character of America. *Experience* has taught the Americans what they have to expect under certain circumstances. The latter are in no danger from France; they never can be in danger from France; and Frenchtown and Alexandria will remind them what danger they are in from England.

It is said, by some persons in America, that though it might have been wise to seek permanent security, in 1793, by entering into the war on the side of the republic of France, it would not be wise *now*, seeing that America has become so much more able to defend herself than she was in 1793, a proof of which she has given in her recent war against the *undivided* force of England. On the other hand it is contended, that, though America be so

much more powerful than she was in 1793, England, loaded as she is with debts and taxes, is more formidable than she would have been in 1793, even if she had then subdued France; for though the *people* of England suffer, the *government* has more force at its command; and, what is more for its advantage, the country is brought into that sort of state which makes *war almost necessary*. If her paupers have increased three-fold, her armed men and her means of destruction have increased five-fold. She is become a nation of fighters. She possesses all the means of destroying. And, say these reasoners, it is not only subjugation against which America ought to guard; it is her duty to guard herself also against devastation and plunder. Besides, say they, England has now less powerful motives to the exercise of forbearance towards America. While the latter was without manufactures; while England had almost a monopoly in the supplying of America; the former saw in the prosperity of the latter the means of augmenting her own riches and power. But *now* the case is different; England sees in America even a manufacturing rival; and, what is still more provoking, she sees in America a rival in *naval power* and renown. Therefore, say they, she must and she will desire our destruction; whether she will attempt it again will depend upon her and our means of attack and resistance.

It must be confessed that our infamous newspapers have given but too much reason to the Americans upon this head. For they have published lists of the American navy, and accounts of the American shipping and manufactures; and, having dwelt upon their magnitude, and on their rapid increase, they have called upon your lordship and your colleagues to prosecute the war for the purpose of destroying these evidences of rising power and wealth. They have contended that it was just to carry on war against America; to destroy her navy; to destroy her shipping and manufactures; and to obtain, at least, a stipulation from her *not to build ships of war beyond a certain number and a certain size*. They have contended that such a war would be *just;* that we should have a *right* to impose such conditions; and that *our safety* demanded that we should.

If I am told that these are the sayings of a set of foolish writers in newspapers, my answer is, that I have seldom seen any of these people promulgate any political opinion without its being, in the *sequel*, very clear to me, that it was not in their own foolish heads that the sentiment had been hatched. These men are, in fact, nothing *of themselves;* they have no principles, no opinions; they care nothing about the matter. They are the mere tools of those who speak through them, whom they not unfrequently despise, but from whom, and through the means of whom, they live comfortably, and sometimes get rich.

Upon the whole, therefore, my lord, it is not to be apprehended, that, if we make war upon France for the avowed purpose of deposing Napoleon, the people of America will feel a strong disposition to take part with France in that war. And, if they were so to do, have we not great cause to fear, that the war would be extremely injurious to us by sea as well as by land? The American privateers, though without a port to take shelter in on this side of the Atlantic, did great mischief to our commerce even in the channel. What, then, would they do if all the ports of France were open to them, and shut against us? If, in short, America were in alliance with France, what English ship, unarmed, could hope to escape capture? And, is it to be hoped, that, in such a case, the skill, the discipline, and undaunted bravery of the American navy would not be communicated to that of France? Emulation might do a great deal towards sending forth fleets able, in a short time, to cope with those of England. Really, if we wish to keep these two nations asunder, it appears to me that we have no way of accomplishing the wish but that of keeping at peace.

If America were to join France in the war, we should, doubtless, tell her, that she was acting a very base part; that she had received from us no provocation; that we had not meddled with her; that we had expressed our anxious desire to live at peace with her. But, my lord, might she not answer?—very true; and you have received no provocation from France; France has not meddled with you; France has expressed her anxious desire to live at peace with you; and yet you have gone to war against France:—if, therefore, it be base on my part to make war upon you, after you have begun war upon France, where is your justification for having begun that war? Besides, have *you* no *ally?* You boast of having all Europe on your side. And shall France have no *ally?* Shall you have twenty allies against the old ally of America; and shall it be deemed base in America to become the *only ally* of France? You say that yours is a war of *precaution;* so is mine. You fear that *Napoleon may,* one day or other, *get* to London; and *you have been* at Washington, at Frenchtown, and at Alexandria.

It is a favourite saying, or it used to be, in America, that it was her true policy to *keep aloof from European politics and wars.* General Washington several times expressed this sentiment. But *can* she do it? If General Washington had seen the congress house in flames, the other day, and had seen our people so busy in packing up goods at Alexandria, he would, I imagine, have begun to think, that it was not so easy a matter to keep aloof from European *wars;* and if he had lived to be made acquainted with the famous Captain HENRY's exploits, I think he would have had his doubts as to the possibility of keeping aloof from European *politics.* Even we, in England, say, that America

should keep at peace, though we ourselves are always at war in some part or other of the world; though there is no war in which we have not a hand. The truth is, that America *must* take a part in the wars and politics of Europe. Here are powers in Europe who can reach her, who have colonies in her neighbourhood, who have an interest, or think they have an interest, in injuring her. They combine and co-operate with one another; and she must form alliances too; or she cannot be many years an independent nation.

It was impudently asserted, not long ago, that America had acted a *foul* part towards us, in the war; and she was called *an assassin,* who had attacked us in the *dark.* I was pleased to hear, from *such a quarter,* a sentiment of *abhorrence* against *assassins;* but I was displeased to hear such an act attributed to America; because no charge was ever more false. It is notorious that America used every effort, and made every sacrifice, short of a surrender of her independence, to maintain peace with England; and that, so far from attacking us in the dark, she gave us notice, for years beforehand, that she would repel, by force, our seizure of her seamen, unless we ceased that practice. What, then, could be meant by this charge of assassin-like conduct? Really, we seem to have taken into our heads, like the cock on the dunghill, that *all the world was made for us!* that no nation is to form an alliance, nor even to think of defending itself by its own arms, if we disapprove of it. When our interest, real or imaginary, is in question, the interest of no other nation is to be thought of. The question with America, according to this presumptuous whim, was to be, not whether she suffered injury; but merely whether it was conducive to our interest to impress her sailors. If it was useful to us to do this, she was to deserve annihilation if she did not quietly submit to it, and to all its cruel and degrading consequences.

We proceed upon the same notion with regard to alliances amongst foreign powers. What! America make alliances with any power but us! Dreadful presumption! Presumption which merits all the weight of our vengeance! What! America seek safety, when we think it best to keep her in continual danger! America make an alliance for the purpose of defending herself against us, whose public writers, at least, devoted her chief magistrate to the gibbet, and herself, to a return under the mild protection of "the PARENT state!" Nor are there wanting writers in America to hold the same language; but they are met by men who are able to contend against them. *There* the press is *free,* really free; and there truth will prevail.

A good specimen of this insolent way of talking was given by *Sir John Cox Hippesley,* who, at a late county-meeting in Somersetshire, said, that the Americans, or, at least, their presi-

dent, and the majority of the congress, were *the slaves of the late tyrant of France*, a *proof* of which they had given in their late *war against us*. So, because America, in defence of herself, went to war with us, while we were at war against Napoleon, she was to be deemed the *slave of Napoleon*, who had no power to hurt her, and who had never called on her to go to war in his behalf. She was to stop till our war with him *was at an end*, before she sought to defend herself. It was *baseness* in her to assert her own rights, at the end of many years of complaint, because we were at war with Napoleon.

This insolent language, my lord, is little calculated to heal the wounds of America. She will, in spite of all we can say, reflect on her past danger, and she must have lost her usual wisdom in profiting from experience, if she does not *now* seek the means of security betimes. That, with all her natural reluctance to war, she will be disposed to do this, I am certain; and it will, I imagine, require but a slight provocation to induce her to act upon that disposition. It has been announced to us, that Switzerland has been informed that there are to be *no neutrals* in this war against Napoleon. Hamburgh, Tuscany, Genoa, and several other states, felt the effects of such a principle during the first war against republican France. Denmark felt those effects during the last war. America will consider of, and judge from the past; and your lordship may be assured, that she will not want the means of doing what her permanent safety shall manifestly demand.

I have thus, my lord, stated to you, what I think will be the view that the people of America will take of the present scene; what I think will be their feelings; and I have pointed out the consequences which I apprehend from those feelings, if we enter upon the war against France on the ground which is at present set forth. The Americans, I repeat, are prone to peace, as every uncorrupted nation is; but as it was said, the other evening, that it was better to go to war now, with a strong alliance on our side, than be compelled to go to war at the end of an exhausting armed peace, without allies; as this was deemed triumphant reasoning, in England, in behalf of offensive war, you must not be surprised if it be imitated, in America, in behalf of a war of defence.

I am, &c. &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, May 6, 1815.

To the Earl of Liverpool—on the political effects produced in America by the peace of Ghent.

My Lord,

It was frequently observed by me, in former letters, which I had the honour to address to your lordship, during the war with America, that if you were, at last, as I foretold you would be, compelled to make peace without *humbling* America, and, indeed, without *subduing* her, or nearly subduing her, the result would be honourable to her, seeing that she would, in a war single-handed against England, have succeeded in *defending* herself. It was clear, that when once the contest became *a single combat*, to *defend* herself must be to her *triumph*, and to us *defeat*. And if she came out of the war without any, even the smallest concession, her triumph over us must raise her greatly in the estimation of her own people, and of all the world. She *did* come out of the war in this way; and the natural consequences have followed.

I do not know that I have before noticed the fact in print, but it is now time that I should; I mean the curious fact relative to the *proclamation of peace* with America. We know that peace with any power is usually proclaimed by HERALDS, who, starting at St. James' Palace, go into the city, with a grand display of armorial ensigns, accompanied by troops in gay attire, and by bands of martial music, stopping, from time to time, to read the king's proclamation of the peace. This was done at the *peace* of *Amiens*, and at the *peace* of *Paris*. Indeed, it is the *usual* way in which the cessation *of* war is proclaimed.

Now, then, how was the peace with *America* proclaimed? There was no procession at all; there was nothing of the usual ceremony. But the Courier newspaper, and, I believe, that paper only, informed the public, that "*peace with America was proclaimed to-day, by reading the Proclamation, in the* USUAL WAY, *at the door of the Office at Whitehall.*" This was all, and I will be bound, that even the people passing in the street did not know what it was that was reading. This is what the Courier calls the *usual* way of proclaiming peace! There was no illuminations; no firing of guns; no ringing of bells; no demonstration of joy. In short, the country which had been so eager for the war, and so unanimous for its prosecution, seemed not at all to regret that it never knew the exact period when peace returned. It felt ashamed of the result of the war, and was glad to be told nothing at all about it.

But, *in America! There* the full force of public feeling was made manifest. The country resounded from New-Orleans to

the utmost borders of the lakes; from the orange groves to the wheat lands buried four feet deep in snow, was heard the voice of joy, the boast of success, the shout of victory. I, who had always felt anxious for the freedom of America; I, whose predictions have been so completely fulfilled in the result of this contest; even I, cannot keep down all feeling of mortification at these demonstrations of triumph, related in the American prints now before me. Even in me, the Englishman so far gets the better of all other feelings and consideration. What, then, must be the feelings of those, my lord, *who urged on, and who prosecuted that fatal war?*

An American paper now before me, the Boston "*Yankee,*" of the 9th of December last, gives an account, copied from our London papers, of our *Jubilee* last summer, when "old BLUCHER" was so squeezed and hugged, and had his jaws so nastily licked over by the filthy women, who were called "ladies." This Yankee calls it "*John Bull's great national jubilee;*" and, I assure you, the famous victory gained by the naval force of England over the American fleet on the *Serpentine River* is not forgotten! But the editor of the *Yankee* has made a mistake. He thought it was the *Thames* on which that memorable battle was fought. Not so, good Mr. *Yankee.* The *Serpentine River,* as it is called, is a little winding *lake* in Hyde Park, about the width of a large duck pond, and is fed by a little stream, or, rather, *gutter,* and empties itself by the means of another gutter at the other end. It was this quality of *lake* that made the scene *so very apt.*

These are mortifying recollections, my lord; and I do not know that they will be rendered less so to you by the addition of the reflection, that, if you had followed my advice, there never would have been any ground for them.

The political effects in America of such a peace must be wonderful. Indeed, they evidently are so. The men who, in the New-England states, were forming open combinations against Mr. Madison, are, as I told you they would be, covered with that sort of disgrace, that deep disgrace, which defeated malice always brings upon its head. They appear, from all I can gather, to have become the butt of ridicule, after having long been the object of serious censure. These men are suspected of *treasonable* views and acts. At any rate, they are chargeable with a *real attempt* to destroy the liberties of their country, in revenge for their rejection by the people. They were defeated in their grasp at the supreme powers of the union, and they have endeavoured to do as the baboon is said to have done with the fair lady; that is, destroy that which they could not possess.

Mr. PICKERING, to whom the TIMES newspaper looked up as the "*hangman* and *successor* of Mr. Madison," *now* talks like

a very hearty republican; but the poor gentleman seems to know very little of what is going on here. He says, that you made peace because so *many petitions were poured in against continuing the war;* and your lordship knows, that *not one* such petition was *poured* in. He says, that the *failure at New-Orleans* will *put you out of place.* Poor gentleman! how little, how very little does he know about you! He says, that *the opposition have clamoured for peace.* It was the opposition who urged on the war, and only found fault with you for not doing the Yankees *more* mischief than you did. Yet *this, this* is one of them, to whom we have looked as capable of overthrowing Mr. Madison! *This* is one of the men who was to "*reunite* the colonies to the parent state!"

It is very true, I acknowledge, that a dangerous faction has arisen in the republic. I see very clearly, that *wealth* has introduced a taste for what are called *honours.* Vanity is making a desperate effort to decorate men with titles. The *law* forbids it; but vanity is at open war with law. The germ of aristocracy, which was discovered in the New-England states, and, in a few instances, in some of the others, at the end of the war of independence, has grown out now to full view. There are *squires* and *honourables* in abundance. There are the "*honourable* the governor;" "*his honour* the judge;" and so on. These men will soon begin to regret that they have no one to give them permanent titles; that they have no "*fountain of honour.*" That which men regret the want of, they endeavour to obtain, whenever an occasion offers. The priests of New-England appear to be working hard to procure something in the way of an *establishment.* Hence the joy of both these at the restoration of the Bourbons, the old French Noblesse, the Pope, and the Jesuits; and, hence, they will, I venture to predict, be as abusive of Napoleon, Carnot, Fouche, Redœrer, and Merlin, as is our TIMES newspapers.

In the mean while, however, *the people* are sound republicans; and it will take some years to overset their government, though the manners and tastes of many may be corrupted. The following letters, which I have received from America, will show you that the war, and especially the *peace*, have produced a great change in that country. They will also show you, that, long ago, I had hit upon the true nail, and that you ought to have paid attention to me sooner than you did. The newspapers from America breathe a spirit of resentment, which it should be our object to allay, if possible; but, really, the language of our prostituted press was such, that, added to the "*character* of the war," it is almost impossible that reconciliation should take place during an age to come.

Before I conclude, I beg leave to call your lordship's attention to the statements in the American papers, relative to *our treatment of the American prisoners of war;* also to call your attention to certain *intercepted letters* of our officers, relative to *plunder;* and further, to call your attention to their charges relative to the *parole* given by GEN. PACKENHAM, when he was about to assault, and to take, as he expected, New-Orleans. I *dare* not *copy these.* Newgate is not so pleasant as Botley. But still I do most anxiously wish to see these papers published here, because they might then be met by denial and disproof, if *not true.* This is a serious matter, my lord. If we dare not publish *here,* they dare do it in America; and there it is that the effect will be produced injurious to us. I dare say, that long before this will reach the press, *all these charges, all these horrid narratives, will have been collected in America, published in a permanent shape, and, perhaps, translated into French.* Thus will they be read by all the civilized world, the people of England excepted; but, thus have I done my duty in pointing these things out to your lordship, which is all that I dare do in this case.

I am, &c. &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, 29th May, 1815.

TO CORRESPONDENTS IN THE U. STATES OF AMERICA.

I have, within these few days, had tendered to me, through the *post,* a *small* parcel from America, with "*newspapers*" written on it. This parcel had, as appears by the *post mark,* been sent from *Liverpool* to *London,* and from London to Botley. The charge on it was *nine shillings and sixpence sterling;* that is to say, however, in our paper money, being about, at this time, *a dollar and a half.* I did not take the parcel, of course, much as I wished to see its contents. From this account, it will be perceived, that unless parcels of newspapers, coming from America, be actually conveyed *by the bearer of them,* either to me, at Botley, (which can seldom happen,) or to London, the object in sending them must be defeated; for a file of daily papers, for only one month, sent me by post from any out port, would cost, at least, the price of a good fat hog. I remember one parcel which came to me, charged with *nine pounds some odd shillings of postage,* which is now the price of a hog of seventeen score weight. As I am very desirous to receive, frequently, papers from America; and as the papers in that country are not, as ours are, loaded with a tax equal to more than one half of the retail price, I will point out the manner in which they may be sent to

me. The parcel should be addressed to me, by name, "*to the care of the publisher of Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, London.*" But it ought, if the vessel go to London, to be carried by the master or mate, or by some careful person; and if the vessel arrive at some out port, the parcel, with the same direction on it, should be carried to some office, whence a *London coach* departs. There it should be delivered, and the bearer should see it *booked* as we call it. By these means American papers will reach me with very little trouble, and at an expense of which I should think nothing. All *single letters* from America may be addressed to me at Botley, near Southampton, and be put, at once, into any post-office in this country. The hirelings, who conduct nine tenths of the newspapers in London, have all possible *facilities* in receiving American newspapers. But they publish from them that only which suits their purpose. Their object is to mislead the people here; or, to keep them in the dark; and they cull out every passage calculated to answer the end. Besides, there are very few papers (the *National Intelligencer* excepted) which are sent to England, except the papers called *federal*. The persons who send these papers, if not *English* by birth, are English by connexion. Thus we see only one side of the picture; and hence it was, that malignant and beastly as is the editor of the *Times* newspaper, for instance, the fellow really might be deceived himself by the cuckoo clamour of the aristocratical American newspapers; but, hence, though I could get a sight of none but the same sort of papers, *I was not deceived*, because I had had that experience which enabled me to put a proper value upon what I saw in these papers. It is of great consequence to *the cause of truth and freedom*, that the republican papers should come to us from America, and that other republican works should also reach us; for it is from this island that opinions and facts go forth to produce impressions on the minds of the world. Bound up as our press is, we, by one means or other, contrive to get a great deal into circulation. We are nearer the grand scenes of action than you are; and if you wish your principles and your example to have their due and speedy effect, we must be the principal vehicle of them. Some one at Philadelphia has recently sent me a parcel of American papers, received at Philadelphia from other places, from which I perceive, that my *letters to Lord Liverpool* have been republished in all parts of the republic, from Boston to Savannah, from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. Flattering as this is to my self love, it is much more gratifying to me as a proof of the powers of the press, and as the foundation of a rational hope, that the day is not distant when tyranny, wherever it may exist, will fall beneath those powers. Letter VI. to the earl of Liverpool, I wrote, I remember, in a room in a farm house, one morning when I was detained by rain. I might have

thought it; but, certainly, I had not then the most distant idea that what I was then writing would so quickly come back to me in another print, after having been read on the banks of the Ohio and those of the Mississippi. This single fact; the sight of only one such print, is to me more than a compensation for all that I have suffered in the cause of truth and freedom.

But it is of far greater importance as a stimulant to future exertion, and as suggesting additional care in planning and executing. But why should not the *friends of freedom* co-operate? We see how firmly bound together its enemies are; how they, for the furtherance of their grand object, mutually sacrifice all their prejudices, and even their petty conflicting interests. You have heard the saints of Hartford rejoice at the restoration of the pope. The Holy Father has embraced the Dey of Algiers, who calls him a Christian dog. Why should not we aid each other? You are better off than we are. You have free presses in every seaport; your seaports are numerous; your masters of vessels have a direct communication with you; you can easily come at all that we publish. While your continent, and all its presses and literary productions, are shut from us by hundreds of obstacles of which you have no idea, our enemies have their regular correspondents, their communications always open; they know here all that is passing in your country; while we are wholly in the dark; while we are deprived of the use of all those powerful weapons, which your unrestrained press would put into our hands. I hope that these considerations will be sufficient to induce some one of you at least, to forward to me, in the manner above pointed out, such papers and other publications, as are likely to be of benefit to the cause of truth and freedom, and of which you can want no assurance of my *will*, at any rate, to make the best possible use. America now begins to make a great figure in the world; but her *example*, which, if made universally known, would be of more weight than her military or naval prowess, is, from the causes above stated, of comparatively little service. I take this opportunity of expressing my best wishes to Mr. MATHEW CAREY, of Philadelphia, for a very excellent pamphlet, which he has had the goodness to send me, entitled, "*A Calm Address to the People of the Eastern States, on the subject of the Representation of Slaves; the Representation in the Senate; and the hostility to commerce ascribed to the Southern States.*"—I should be obliged to some one, to send me any work or works, giving an account of the *expenses of the government*, and *state governments*, of America; also of her shipping, commerce, debts, taxes, &c. &c. And if Mr. CAREY, or some other person equally capable, would spend a few hours in giving me an account of the

prices of *provisions* and *labour*, I should deem it a particular favour. These may have changed since I left America.

WM. COBBETT.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have (22d May) received from some friend in Philadelphia, a small file of *Auroras*, containing the "EXPOSITION *of the* CAUSES *and* CHARACTER *of the War.*" This paper, it appears, is *official*, and was ready for *official promulgation*, just at the time when the news of the peace arrived. I never read so *able* a paper; never one calculated to produce so great an impression. It is an invaluable document for history; a noble monument of the power of the human mind. If our government have received this paper, and if they will but read it carefully, they will, I am sure, clearly see, that any attempt either to delude, subdue, or check the rise of America, must fail of success. The paper would fill about four whole Registers, perhaps. But, though I cannot *insert it*, it will be of great use to me; and I beg the sender to accept of my best thanks.

Botley, near Southampton, May 20, 1815.

To Lord Grenville—on the Constitutions of England, America, and France.

My Lord,

IN the published report of your speech of the 24th of last month, on the subject of the war against France, we read the following passage: "As to *new constitutions*, he (Lord G.) was firmly of opinion, that a good constitution could only be formed by the adoption of remedies, from time to time, under the circumstances which required them. The only instance of exception mentioned was that of America: but *that did not apply*. The founders of that constitution acted with *great wisdom*. It was framed so as to produce as little change as possible in the *existing laws* and *manners* under the altered form of government, which, though a *republic*, was constructed as nearly as the difference would admit, on the MONARCHICAL form of OUR OWN CONSTITUTION."

This passage, my lord, owing, I dare say, to the want of accuracy in the reporter, is not so clear, or so correct, as one might have wished; but its meaning evidently is, that constitutions of government cannot be well formed *all at once;* that the American constitution of government *bears a very near resemblance to our own;* and (taking in the context) that the constitution of government now adopting, or settling, in France, is a *bad constitution* or *system*.

As to the first of these propositions: that a constitution cannot be well made *all at once*, it is of little consequence as to the object which I have in view; for the French have been more than 25 years forming their constitution; and, however mortifying it may be to some people, the *laws* of France, even while the Bourbons were on the throne last year, were, *for the greater part*, laws passed by the different *national assemblies*, or, as some would call them, the *jacobins*. It is a very great mistake to suppose that Napoleon, either in his *constitution* or his code, began anew. He did little more than arrange, classify, reduce to order, and provide for enforcing the laws, under whatever name, passed by the different assemblies; and *this* was the *code* which the Bourbons promised to adhere to and support. So that the constitution of France, as it now stands, has been the work of 26 years, not only of *study*, but of *experience*. It is very curious to hear so many persons abusing, or ridiculing, the French constitution, and, in almost the same breath, saying, that it is *no more* than what the people had under Louis XVIII. This looks a little like *insincerity*.

It is, however, the alleged resemblance between the English and American governments which is the most interesting object of examination at present; though it will, before I conclude, be necessary to see a little what resemblance that of France bears to each of the former governments. I take your lordship to mean, of course, that there is a very near resemblance between the English and American governments *as they really are in operation*. Not as they are to be found in books written about constitutions. What Montesquieu, and De Lolme, and Blackstone, and Paley, and a long list of grave political romance writers have published upon the subject, we will leave wholly out of the question. Your lordship was talking, and so will I talk, of things AS THEY ARE, and not as they *ought to be*; or as they are, from parrot-like habit, *said to be*. And here, my lord, I beg leave, once for all, to state, that I am offering no *opinions* of my own upon this subject. Your lordship, according to the published report, says, that there is a near resemblance between the English and American governments. This fact I deny; but that is all. I do not say that the American government is *better* than ours; nor do I say that it is *worse*. I only say that it does *not resemble* ours. Which is the best and which is the worst I leave to the decision of the reader, in whatever country he may live.

But, before I enter on my proofs of the negative of this, your lordship's proposition, permit me to observe, for a moment, on the desire which is so often discovered in this country, *to induce other nations to adopt governments like our own*. No sooner do we hear of a change of government in any country, than we

begin urging the people of such country to adopt a government *like ours.* The newspaper people, the Walters and Perrys, and the like, are everlastingly telling the French that they ought to come as *nearly as possible* to our *admirable mixed government.* Those cunning loons, the Edinburgh Reviewers, chant the same litanies in every succeeding number. They despair of the French, because they reject our excellent model of government; and they predict that the American system cannot endure long, because it has none of those bodies of *nobles* or *large proprietors*, who are the best *guardians* of the *people's rights*, standing, as the latter do, between the people and the prince! This was their talk, indeed, *before* your lordship and other great noblemen joined the ministers in support of the war. What these place-hunting critics will say *now* is a great deal more than I am able to guess. Thus, too, it was, that *Burke* ranted and raved. The French, according to him, ought to have been half put to death, because they despised the "admirable" mixed government of England.

How he ran on; what bombastical balderdash he published upon this subject, your lordship knows as well as I; and you, doubtless, remember, that when *answered* by *Paine*, instead of attempting reply, he pointed out the work of his antagonist to be replied to by the attorney general! Now, my lord, what can be the *real cause* of all this anxiety to get other nations to adopt our own sort of government? It is not the usual practice of the world to be so eager to induce others to share in one's happiness. If a man, by any accident, finds a parcel of money in a field or a wood, does he run away to bring his neighbours, or even his cousins or brothers, to enter into a search with him? Did we ever hear of a tradesman, who had a set of good customers, endeavour to introduce persons of the same trade to them? Did ever handsome woman try to make any other woman look as handsome as herself, even though that other were her sister, nay, her daughter? If an individual make a valuable discovery, so far is he from communicating it to the world, that he, if he can, will obtain *a patent* for it, and thereby the right of punishing whoever attempts even to *imitate* his wares. What, then, can be the *cause* of our anxiety to make other nations partakers of the blessings of our government? We take special care to keep from them all we can in the way of *commerce.* We have a law for encouragement of our own *navigation*, to the discouragement of that of all other countries. We have laws to prevent the carrying to other countries, *machines* to facilitate the making of *manufactures.* We have laws to prohibit the carrying of the produce of our colonies to other countries, until it has been brought here. We have laws to prevent the exportation of *live sheep*, lest other countries should get our breeds. We have laws to punish *arti-*

sans and *manufacturers* who attempt to leave this country, and also to punish the masters of the vessels in which they are attempting to escape; the avowed object of which laws is to prevent other countries from arriving at our state of perfection in manufactures and arts. How is it, then, my lord, that we are so generous as to our *political possessions?* Generous, did I say? Nay, obtrusive and impertinent. We are not only tendering them with both hands at once; but we really *thrust* them upon the world; and, if any nation be so resolutely delicate as to refuse to receive them, let that nation look to itself!

"Will you give me a penny?" said Dilworth's beggar to the priest. "No." "Will you, for the love of Christ, give me a half-penny, then, to keep me from starving?" "No." "Will you, then, give one farthing?" "No." "Pray, then, since I must die with hunger, give me your *blessing*, reverend father." "Kneel down, my dear son, and receive it." "No," said the beggar, "for if it were worth but one single farthing you would not give it me; so you may e'en keep your blessing to yourself." But we greatly surpass the priest; for while we withhold *commerce*, *navigation*, *manufactures*, *arts*, *artisans*, *manufacturers*, *breed of animals*, &c. &c. we not only *offer* our *blessing*, but we *abuse* those who reject it; and there are those amongst us who scruple not to say, that the nation which has the *insolence* to refuse to share in our *political happiness*, ought to feel the *force of our arms*. To what, then, fairly shall I ascribe this desire to induce other nations to adopt our sort of government? It is notorious, that men seek for companions in *misery* and *disgrace*. Never was there a bankrupt who did not wish to make his appearance in a copious gazette. The coward looks bold when he has fled amongst a crowd. The country girls, who anticipate the connubial tie, always observe, and very truly, that they are *not the first*, and shall *not be the last*. It is said, that persons infected with the plague feel a pleasure in communicating it to others. To ascribe to a motive like any of these our desire to extend our sort of government to other nations would be shocking indeed. Yet, lest we should expose ourselves to the imputation, I think it would be best for us to be silent upon the subject; or, at least, where nations decline to adopt our system, to refrain from expressing any *resentment* against them on that account. John Bull's may be the best government in the whole world; it may be very laudable in him, very disinterested, very humane, extraordinarily generous, to urge other nations to partake in his blessings. He may *lament* the blindness, or the obstinacy, or the perverseness of the nations who refuse to accept of his offer. But why should he be *angry* with them? Why should he be in a rage with them? Why should he *quarrel* with them on that account?

We will now, if your lordship pleases, come to the *resemblance* between the English and the American governments. They are *both* called *governments*, to be sure; and so are the kites and pheasants called *birds;* but assuredly, though I pretend not to say which is the best, or which is the worst, they *resemble* each other no more than do these two descriptions of the feathered race. To substantiate this assertion, I shall take the material points in the two cases, and state them in opposite columns, that the contrast may at once strike every eye.

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.
A king, having the sovereign power settled on his family by hereditary descent. His heir may be an old man or woman, a boy or a girl.	The chief magistrate is a PRESIDENT, freely elected by the people every four years, and he must be 35 years of age.
The king's civil lists amount to more than *four millions of dollars* annually, or 1,000,000 of pounds sterling, beside the allowances to the royal children, queen, &c. &c. amounting to nearly 400,000 pounds more.	The president receives a compensation for his services which cannot be augmented during his presidency, and this compensation is 25,000 dollars, or 6,000 *pounds sterling*.
The king, *without the consent of any part of the legislature*, makes treaties, and even treaties of *subsidy*, agreeing to pay money to foreign powers. He appoints ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, judges, and all other officers whatever.	The president, with the *consent* of the *senate*, who are elected by the people, can make *treaties*, *two thirds* of the senators concurring. With the *same consent* he appoints *ambassadors*, *public ministers*, *consuls*, *judges*, *&c.*
The king can do *no wrong*. His person is *sacred* and inviolable.	The president may be *impeached*, and when he is tried in senate the chief justice is to preside.
	He can only be *dismissed* and *disqualified* by the senate; but, beside that, he may be afterwards, for the same offence, *indicted*, *tried*, *judged*, and *punished*, according to law, like any other *criminal*.
The king can *declare war*, and *make peace*, without any body's consent.	The president *cannot declare war*. Nor can he and the senate together do it: it is done *by the congress;* and is an *act* passed by the representatives of the people.
The king grants pensions to whom he chooses under 6,000 dollars a year. He has more than 100,000 pounds a year placed at his disposal for *secret services*, of which no particular account is ever rendered, even to the parliament.	The president can give no *pension*, nor, even with the consent of the senate, make any grant whatever of the public money—not even to the amount of a dollar. Every thing of this sort is done by the *congress*, comprising the whole of the representatives of the people.
The HOUSE OF PEERS hold their seats by *hereditary right;* but the king may make new peers whenever he chooses. They may be old or young, present or absent, abroad or at home.	The SENATE consists of two members from each of the states in the union. They are elected by the state legislatures, who have been *elected by the people*. They serve for *four* [six] *years*. The constitution *positively forbids* the granting of any title of nobility. Every senator is to be not under thirty years of age when elected, and is to be a resident in the state for which he is elected.
The HOUSE OF COMMONS consists of county members and city borough members. Be the county great or small, it sends two members—and, as to the *cities* and *boroughs*, London and Westminster, which contain about 800,000 persons, sends six members, while Old Sarum, Gatton, and many other places,	The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES consists of members from the several states, *a number proportioned to*

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

containing not a hundred persons each, send each two members. The members are elected for *seven years.*

The *qualifications* for county members 600*l.* a year in land; and 300*l.* a year in land for borough members.

The *qualifications of votes* are too various to be half described. In counties the *freeholders* only vote, and these do not form a twentieth part of the payers of taxes. A house or a bit of freehold land worth 40 shillings a year gives a vote; while houses and lands to the amount of thousands a year, if retaining any of the feudal character, give no vote at all But the best account of this matter is to be found in the petition presented to the house of commons, and *received* by that house on the 6th of May, 1793. In that petition it is stated—

	Members.
"That 30 peers *nominate*	66
influence	39
	105
"That 71 peers *nominate*	88
influence	75
	163
"That 45 Commoners *nominate*	61
influence	22
	83
"That 91 Commoners *nominate*	82
influence	57
	139

"ABSTRACT.

	Members.
"That 71 Peers and the Treasury return by nomination and influence	170
"That 91 Commoners return by nomination and influence	139
"Total members, returned by private patronage for England and Wales, exclusive of the forty-five for Scotland.	309

"That in this manner *a majority* of the entire house is chosen, and are enabled, being a majority, *to decide all questions* in the *name of the whole people* of England and Scotland."

All the ministers have seats in one or the other of the houses, and a great number of their *secretaries* and *clerks* beside. In 1808, when an account of this matter was ordered to be printed by the house

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

the population of the states, according to actual enumeration. They are elected for *two years.*

The *qualification for members* is merely that of having attained the age of 25 years, and having been 7 years a citizen of the United States.

As to the *qualification of voters*, it is simply that of having *paid taxes*, and being in a state to be *called on for taxes.* There are, in the different states, slight differences in the regulations as to voting; but, generally and substantially, *the paying of taxes, small or great in amount, gives a right to vote.* Of course, as the president, senate, and representatives are all chosen from this source, they are *all really the representatives of the people.* It is manifestly a government carried on by the people, through their delegates.

No person holding an office under the government can be a member of either house; and no one can be appointed to any place, (during the time for which he was elected,) if such place has been

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.
of commons, there were 76 persons in that house who received, amongst them, 178,994 pounds sterling a year of the public money. What was received in this way by the peers and their families I have no means of knowing But, not only can members of either house enjoy the profits of places or of grants, they can receive appointments and grants *while they are members.* They frequently take part in voting money to themselves But there is this *safeguard,* that, in some cases, at least, when a member receives a lucrative appointment, *he vacates his seat,* and must, if he continues a member *be re-elected!* It is, however, very rarely that his "*constituents*" refuse to re-elect him! Oh! la belle chose!	created during the time he was in the legislature.
The king can dissolve the parliament *whenever he pleases;* and the parliament has been dissolved, at every change of ministry, for some time past. He can, also, prorogue the house *at his pleasure.*	The president has no power to dissolve the congress or either of the houses, nor to adjourn their meetings, unless they disagree upon the subject. Nor can he call them together at any but at periods fixed by law, except on extraordinary occasions.
If the king disapproves of a bill, he rejects it at once, without assigning any reasons.	If the president does not approve of a bill passed by the two houses, he sends it back, with his objections but if two thirds of both houses persevere, the bill becomes a law
The king alone coins money, raises troops, and fits out navies.	The congress alone has power to coin money, to raise troops, to build and equip ships.
The privilege of *habeas corpus* was suspended in England for several years, during Pitt's administration, when there was neither *rebellion* nor *invasion.*	The privilege or writ of *habeas corpus* cannot be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it America has lately been invaded in several parts, has had her towns burnt and plundered, her coast ravaged and devastated; and yet the *habeas corpus was not suspended.*
It is treason to *compass the death of the king;* and this may be by *writing,* or *talking,* and *indirectly* as well as *directly.* The crime of treason, here, is against the *king;* in America, it is against the *United States;* that is to say, against *the people.* By an act of this king's reign (to last *till his death* and a year longer) it is declared to be *high treason* to endeavour to *overawe the king,* or *either house of parliament, into a change of measures or councils;* and, at one time, it was *high treason* to send to any person in the dominions of France a bag of flour, a flitch of bacon, or a bushel of potatoes.	*Treason* consists *only* in *levying war* against the UNITED STATES, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.
In England, the *church establishment* receives, in rents and tythes, about an *eighth* part of the amount of the rental of the whole kingdom. All the bishops, deans, prebends, and the greater part of the beneficed priests, are appointed by the crown. There are *test laws,* which	"No law shall be made by congress respecting an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." No religious test is required of any man to qualify him for any office. Any man may publish what he pleases about religion. No tythes in America.

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.
shut out from political and civil privileges great numbers of the people; and men are frequently severely punished, put in *felons' jails*, and *fined* and *pilloried* into the bargain, for writing printing, or publishing, their opinions about religion. The bishops have seats in the house of peers. Marriages are not legal unless sanctioned by the priests of the established church.	Marriages are settled under the eye of the civil magistrate, if the parties choose.
As to the liberty of SPEECH and of the PRESS, many acts have been passed to abridge both; but particularly one of the 12th of July, 1799, which suppressed all *political* societies, and all societies for *debating* and *lecturing*, except under *licenses* from the king's justices of the peace, or police magistrates. Even lodges of the poor childish freemasons were compelled to have a license to meet, and to be *registered;* and, even after this, the king's justices might order any lodge to be discontinued; that is to say, broken up. The king's justices, in case of disobedience of this law, might punish at once, by a fine of 20 pounds, or three months' imprisonment; or, if the offenders were convicted on indictment, they were to be transported for seven years. Public-house keepers were to lose their licenses if they permitted such meetings at their houses. Every place for lecturing, debating, or reading newspapers, where money shall be paid, is to be deemed a disorderly house, unless previously licensed. The king's justices were authorized to take the license from any publican; that is to say, to put an end to his trade, upon receiving information that seditious or immoral publications were read in his house. As to the PRESS, every printer is, by the same act, compelled to give notice to the clerk of the king's justices, that he keeps a press or presses for printing, and he is to receive a certificate of having given such notice. The justices' clerk is to transmit a copy of the notice to the king's secretary of state, in whose office the names and places of abode of all the printers, and the number of the presses, &c. &c. are all nicely registered. *Letter Founders* are to do the same; and, moreover, they are to keep an account of the types and printing presses that they sell, and are to produce them, whenever required, to *any* justice of the peace Then, again, the name and place of abode of the printer must be printed on every paper or book; and any one issuing forth, dispersing after published, any paper or book, without the name and place of abode of the printer, to be punished by the forfeiture of 20 pounds.	No law can be passed abridging the FREEDOM OF SPEECH, or of the PRESS.

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

The printer is compelled to keep a copy of every thing he prints; he is to write on it the name and abode of the person who employed him to print it, under the penalty of 20 pounds. Persons selling or handing about papers *may be seized* and carried before a justice, to have it determined whether they have been offending the law. Any justice may empower peace officers to search for presses and types HE *suspects* to be illegally used, and to seize them and the printed papers found. As to newspapers, the proprietors, printers, and publishers, are all compelled to go to the stamp-office and make an affidavit of their being such, and also of their place of abode. They are compelled to deposite one copy of each paper at the office; and this copy, with their own affidavits, is all that is called for in proof of their being all guilty of any libel found in the paper.

An act was passed on the 18th of December, 1793, making it *death* for any part of the people, above 50 in number, to meet for the purpose of petitioning, unless notice and authority for holding such meeting be given to, and obtained from the king's justices. The penalty of DEATH, without benefit of clergy, occurs no less than nine times in this act. This act, not to spin out its details, puts all political meetings wholly under the absolute authority of the justices, sheriffs, and other officers; who can, in some cases, prevent their taking place at all; and in all cases, put an end to them at their sole discretion. First, a written notice, signed by seven householders of the place, is to be given of a meeting; this notice is to be conveyed to the clerk of the justices. The justices, thus apprized of the meeting, arrive; and if they hear any body propounding or maintaining propositions for altering any thing by law established, except by the authority of king, lords, and commons, they may order the offending parties into custody. There needs no more. This is quite clear. It may be excellent; but it is impossible to find any thing like it in America.

According to the amount, ordered to be printed by the house of commons in 1808, the following are a few of our sinecures:

Auditor of the Exchequer, Lord Grenville	£4,000
Teller, Earl Camden	23,417
Earl Bathurst	2,700
Clerk of the Polls, Hon. H. Addington	3,000
Chamberlains, Hon. F. North	1,755

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

No law can be passed to abridge the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition for a redress of grievances.

There are no sinecures in America.

ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.	AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.
—— Montague Burgoyne* £1,660 Master and Worker of Mint, Earl Bathurst 3,000 Register of Admiralty and Prize Courts, Lord Arden 38,556 It is stated that there are great *deductions* out of this; but it is not said *who* receives them ——£77,788 This is not being very select. I could have easily selected much fewer places or pensions, to have made the same amount.	The whole of the civil government of the United States, President, Congress, Ambassadors, Ministers, do not cost 70,000*l.* a year.
Here I will not take our *fifty thousanders*, like the Duke of York's, but will take a few of the *small fry*, and especially the anti-jacobin authors, or their descendants Joseph Planta £120 Mrs. Burke 1,200 Sir Francis d'Ivernois 200 Rd. Cumberland's children 200 Mrs. Mallet du Pan 200 Rev. Herbert Marsh 514 Wm. Gifford 329	There are no pensions, except granted by congress for actual and well-known services.
The English government collects from the people 7*l.* 16*s.* each, a year, including the whole population, men, women, children, paupers, soldiers, sailors, convicts, and prisoners of all sorts.	The American government collects from the people 12*s.* 6*d.* each, a year, in taxes, taking in the whole of the population.
The king has state coaches, horse-guards, foot guards, several palaces, and parks at the public expense.	The president has none of these.
People kneel, and kiss the king's hand.	Nobody ever kneels to the president, or kisses his hand.

* This Mr. Burgoyne has just written a circular letter to his neighbours in Essex, calling upon them to spend their *last shilling*, if necessary, in a war against the Emperor of France, whom he calls every thing but an honest man. N. B. Mr. Burgoyne has had this place for more than thirty years! Will he now give it up, seeing that money is so much wanted for this just and necessary war?

I could, my lord, proceed much further were it necessary; but from what we have seen, I think it is plain, that there is no likeness whatever in the two governments. As to that of France, as it is now new modelled, it appears to me to resemble the American rather than ours. People in France vote for members of the legislature, upon the principle of representation and taxation going hand in hand. There are no feudal titles or rights in France. The peers are, in fact, no more than eminent citizens, having no great estates attached to their titles and seats. There is, and there is to be, *no established religion*. The two Chambers in France, like the Congress in America, are forbidden to pass any law respecting a predominant church. Religious opinions are to be

free. There are to be no books which may not be freely commented on and examined into. There is to be nothing so sacred that reason may not approach it. There are to be *no tythes* in France, consequently no *benefices* to bestow. This is a government certainly very much like that of America. Mr. Grattan observed that the French people had exchanged the paradise of the Bourbons for the "*eternal damnation* of a military despotism." May be so; but they seem resolved not to have feudal titles and courts; monasteries and tythes; gabelles, corvées, and game laws. May be so; but it has not been proved.

In conclusion, my lord, give me leave to suggest, that it would be as wise in us not to cry up our sort of government so much. If it be better than that of France, why want them to have one like it? Most of my neighbours are well enough content if they are but able to get good crops themselves, without thinking much about those of other people. We are always calling the French our enemy, and representing their power as so dangerous to Europe; and why should we then fret ourselves because they will not be happier than they are? It would certainly be wise to let them alone; for, by evincing such an everlasting anxiety about their *form of government*, I am afraid that we shall give rise to a suspicion, that it is their form of government, and not the ambition of their chief, that we dread, and against which we are about to make war. I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

To Mr. Niles, Proprietor of the Weekly Register, published at Baltimore, in the United States of America.

Sir,

AFTER thanking you for the numbers of your publication, which you have been so good as to send me, I proceed to the subject of this letter, the object of which is to give to the people of the *last remaining republic* some information, which they might not be able otherwise to obtain, relative to the effects produced, and likely to be produced, by the recent events in France; information which it is very necessary for you to possess; for the time may not be *distant*, not near so distant as you imagine, when you yourselves will feel some of the consequences of the events to which I allude.

This second fall of Napoleon has caused wonderful joy in England, amongst the higher orders, and especially amongst the *boroughmongers*, who have been now, a second time, delivered; or, at least, have obtained a respite a second time. The *reaction*, which will certainly come, may operate against them.

But, in the meanwhile, they get rid of their alarms, which were, a month ago, greater than at any former period.

The *boasting* here is beyond all conception. Though the fact is notorious, that the Prussians and the Belgians were fighting on our side against the French; though it is notorious that we held a vast superiority of numbers and of means of all sorts, we talk here as if the victory were wholly *our own*. *Two hundred thousand pounds*, at the first slap, has been voted to the "great lord," as the Spaniards call him. What did you vote to Mr. JACKSON, who won a more decided and more glorious victory at *New-Orleans?*—Burke, with his pension in his pocket, calls *nobility* and *honours* the CHEAP defence of nations; and so they may in countries whose people do not receive *money* along with the honours. But this grant of money, enormous as it is, appears to be only a beginning. A proposition has been made to make a grant to the *Duke of York*, as commander in chief of the army, he having, in that capacity, provided the army for the duke of Wellington to fight with. He has been paid a pretty good salary for this, to be sure; but this, it seems, is not enough. It is, therefore, now proposed, or at least has been proposed by a member of parliament, to give him money on account of the success of the army.

You will ask, what takes place in this respect, when we get *beaten?*—as in the case of Plattsburg, Lake Champlain, Lake Erie, New-Orleans, &c. Why, we hold our tongues. We do not talk about the matter, except to praise the valour of our troops for a day or two. Indeed, the country people in England, and a great many of the towns people, *never know* any thing of such defeats. The London newspapers, which alone have any wide circulation, are employed in the spreading of falsehood and the suppressing of truth. The country newspapers, with very few exceptions, are the mere gutters, through which pass a part only of the filth of the more copious London sewers; but it is, if possible, the worst part. When the news of your grand achievement at New-Orleans arrived, it was at once asserted, that WE had *gained a great victory*. Details even were published. The same was repeated, with trifling variations, for a week. Thus the country papers had time to play their part. The victory was believed in from one end of the kingdom to the other. At the end of a fortnight, out slipped the account of the *defeat* in the *middle of a Gazette*, stuffed up with advertisements and promotions. We could not accuse the government of *not publishing* it; but, in fact, the mass of the people never either saw it, or heard of it; and, to this hour, there is not a man in the village, in which I now sit writing, who does not believe that we gave you *a hearty beating at New-Orleans*. In short, the mass

of the people in this country know less of the affairs of the nation than any people that I ever heard of.

At present, however, it would be unreasonable to expect us to show any thing like moderation. Not only do our newspapers approve of the proclamation of Louis XVIII. in which he talks of *punishing traitors;* but they are preparing their readers to expect a direct interference, on our part, in the regulating his government, and *even in the choosing of his ministers.* We are told, in so many words, that we have a *right* to demand *the death* of some of the "rebels;" that we have a right *to compel the king* to adopt a *strong government.* In the meanwhile, others are proposing to strip the city of Paris of statues and other ornaments, to bring them to England to adorn a monument to be erected in memory of the late victory. There seems to be no bounds to the degradation to which some of our writers wish to reduce the French people and name. Some demand *real, solid securities* for the future. This, perhaps, means *Dunkirk,* before which our Duke of York fought a battle once. *Calais,* perhaps, too. The demolition of the basin of Cherbourg. There is no knowing where we are to stop. You remember the punishment that our *pious* king RICHARD I. inflicted on his rebel subjects in the garrisons which opposed him after his return from his crusade to the Holy Land! *That,* as being the most *effectual* mode of preventing the future *propagation* of rebels, may, perhaps, appear to the boroughmonger writers as the mode to be adopted towards the French people upon this occasion.

That there will be *bloody vengeance* taken now, there is no doubt. The recollection of the battles of Genappe, Dunkirk, Austerlitz, Marengo, Hulen, Wagram, Eylau, Friedland, Moskwa, Smolensko, the Helder, the capture of Rome, Naples, Turin, Amsterdam, Madrid, Hanover, Moscow, Berlin twice, Vienna twice; in short, the defeats, the humiliations, the shames, and the bodily fears of a quarter of a century, and, above all, the *exposures of the priests,* are now assembling all their force to obtain vengeance. The convention of the *Helder,* and the convention which gave Maria Louisa to the arms of Napoleon, are *now to be avenged.* The pope has to get vengeance for his humiliation; and so they have all. But what are they to do? They cannot *kill* the people of France. All Europe, with more than a million of men in arms, and with fifty millions of English money, will replace Louis on the throne of France. But they cannot *remain in France;* and if they do not remain in France, *they cannot keep him upon that throne.* He is now, *as last year,* moving along towards the capital under the protection of more than half a million of soldiers, who have made war, and are making war upon Frenchmen, fighting on their own soil, and in its defence. As long as Frenchmen are kept down by the bayonet, he will, of course, re-

main there; but, how long will that be? He was on the throne last year: but he was not there six months after the hostile armies had quitted France. To hear him *threaten* the French, as he did some time ago, with chastisement by foreign armies, 1,200,000 in number of men, was natural enough; but to hear him now talking of their *sorrow* at his departure, and of their *joy* at his return, is calculated to fill one with admiration at the impudence of his advisers. He knew well, that it was under the bayonets of foreigners *only* that he dared advance; that he, or any of his family, dared show their nose in France; and yet, even while he is following close upon the heels of those foreigners, he boasts of being the object of the *love* and *admiration* of the French people! No, no, Louis; you are restored, as you were last year, by *foreign bayonets;* and the question is yet to be decided, whether those bayonets will be able *to keep you on the throne.* You have yet a stormy time to pass. The battle between light and liberty on one side, and darkness and despotism on the other; that battle which began in 1789 is still going on. It may rage less fiercely for a time! but it will not be put an end to unless by the triumph of the former.

As to the conduct of Napoleon, upon the last occasion, it was useless for him any longer to attempt to support his authority as a *sovereign;* and, indeed, it would have been well if he had resigned immediately after his return from Elba. This was fully expected by many men in England; and it appears from his last act that we have heard of, namely, *his abdication in favour of his son*, that he was only restrained by his foolish attachment to the Austrian princess and her child! After all, his glorious deeds; after all his famous battles; after all his wise acts of legislation; all his magnanimous proceedings; all that he had done in the cause of mankind; after all this, how painful is it to see him vainly hankering after the preserving of *a crown* to his family! and, which adds to the mortification, to a son which he had by the daughter of *a king;* and, of an *Austrian*, too! It is melancholy to think of. If it had been the son of some *tradesman's* daughter! But to risk the freedom and happiness of that gallant nation, who has twice carried him victorious to Berlin, and twice to Vienna; to risk the freedom and happiness of that brave people for the sake of the grandson of a king, and that king an AUSTRIAN KING, too, is horrible to think of. If, upon his return from Elba, he had frankly acknowledged his great error, namely, that of connecting himself with the old royal family, and had declared again for a *republic* in name as well as in substance; if he had done this, and had called for the *convention*, no power in Europe would have moved against France. But when men saw that the *emperor* was still to remain; that they were again to have an *empress* to maintain with all her royal progeny; and that they were likely to

descend in fee from father to son; when they saw this, they could not possibly feel any portion of the old republican fire warm their hearts. Say what they would, still it was a battle between an *emperor* and a *king*.

Then the *new nobility*. It was impossible to animate *a people* in their cause. They had suffered under the *nobility* before. It was difficult to see why a man should risk life or property for the sake of preserving to these gentry their *titles*. To see these old republicans forming a *house of peers*, and calling themselves *dukes* and *counts!* This was, indeed, no more than a consequence of the *imperial* part of the plan; but it could not fail to fill with apprehension all those who wished well to the republican cause, and who recollected that it was under the banners of "*liberty and equality*" that Brunswick was chased out of France, and that the coalition of kings was covered with disgrace, in the memorable years 1793, 4, and 5. The truth is, that to defend France against such a coalition, all the energy of a republic was necessary in those years; and it was become now as necessary as ever. But such energy could not exist under an *imperial* and *aristocratical* government. The French people felt no more what they felt in the first years of the revolution. The proprietors were anxious about their *land;* but that alone was not sufficient.

Nevertheless, in spite of these errors of Napoleon, he is entitled to the gratitude of mankind. He pulled down the pope, the monks in Spain and Italy, the inquisition in those countries. He carried light and liberal principles to dark and enslaved nations. He formed a code of wise and just laws; or, at least, he confirmed those which had been passed by the republicans. He was a soldier, too, fond of military glory, but, without arms he could not have effected what he did effect in favour of civil and religious liberty in distant countries. Much of what he did will now be undone; but it will be impossible for all the kings and priests in the world to make men as ignorant and submissive as they were before he marched over the Alps. The enemies of freedom, the black-hearted friends of despotism, flatter themselves that now they shall see mankind as superstitious and as slavish as they were a quarter of a century back. They will be deceived. They will never again see a touch of the "*holy thorn*" sought after in France as a cure for a cancer. The present race of perverse old women cannot live forever, and they will have *no successors*. The young ones do not, and will not, believe that holy water will preserve them from thunder and lightning; and, unless they believe *this*, there is no fear of their husbands becoming slaves. The common people in England believe in an almanac, called "*Moore's almanac;*" they believe that the cunning people who publish it have a *knowledge* of *events* of all sorts, and especially the *weather*. Many of the farmers refer to this almanac to know when

they ought to cut their grass or to slay their pigs. You will hardly believe this in America; but I, in the face of my countrymen, assert it to be a fact. The men who sell this book find their accounts in it. It is sold by the company of stationers, who serve our rabble, in this respect, in the stead of priests. The people of France are far more enlightened. The pairings of St. Andrew's nails, which used to be a most precious relic, would now be used only as manure in that country. The breeches of Pocomo, so wonder-working in former times, would now fetch only their worth as old rags. Napoleon (and that was his greatest fault) gave, in some sort, a sanction to falsehood, and hypocrisy, and imposture, by *going to mass*. He did not, indeed, compel any body else to go to mass: but his *example*, in this, was of evil tendency. The act was, besides, a *compromise* with fraud.

Still the world owes him much, and particularly for having, by his return to France, left no doubt in the mind of any man, that in the restoration of the old family the *French people* had no share. It was always asserted that the French people longed for the return of the Bourbons. Louis was called *le desiré*. But now it must be clear to every body, that he was, and now is, restored by FOREIGN FORCE ALONE. The case is now too plain to be confused or misrepresented. It is a triumph of kings or priests over republican institutions. None doubt of the triumph; no one can deny that; but it is not the act of the *people* of France. They had tried the ancient dynasty before; they had tried the new order of things; the ancient dynasty was restored; and they again drove away the ancient dynasty, which is now again (by this time, I dare say) restored by the means of a combined foreign army, who have defeated the armies of France.

So sensible are the aristocrats of this, that they, even now, are almost afraid of the ultimate consequences of their success. They do not see their way clearly out of the adventure. Are the foreign armies to be *kept up in France?* Is France to be *disarmed? How long* can either last? The truth is, France is too extensive and too populous to be long kept down. She is not, and cannot be, loaded with debts. The moral effects of the revolution cannot now be eradicated. It is useless, in short, to restore the king, unless they could also restore the breeches of St. Pocomo, and the virtues of the holy thorn. These, and *divine right*, must rise together, or neither can stand for any length of time. The king, who will hardly call himself *le desiré* this time, has, in his proclamation to his "loving subjects," denied that he ever meant to restore the *tythes* or the *feudal rights;* and yet these are of *older date* than his title to the throne. At any rate, he will never long maintain his throne without them. They are as necessary to his political power as food is to his body; or,

rather, as swords, guns, and powder, are to the army now employed in his restoration.

So you see, that a counter revolution is not a thing so easily accomplished as many seem to imagine. Your New-England noblesse and priests will, I dare say, rejoice exceedingly at this triumph of the kings and priests in Europe; and we, in England, have, in some sort, good reason to boast of it; but still, if Napoleon were to be murdered to-day, and all the old republicans hanged up to-morrow, the thing would not be more than a tenth part over. *Foreign armies must remain in France*, or there is no security for the king's remaining on the throne. When, then, is this state of things to terminate? Not, at any rate, before another hundred millions are added to the debt of England; and even for years to come, it will be impossible for the allies, upon their principles, to *disarm* to any considerable extent. The whole of Europe is in a ferment. *Light* has gone forth, and it is impossible to put it out. Hanging and quartering will do nothing towards it. Men must again believe in the virtues of *holy water*. That was the main prop of the power of the Bourbons; and without that, they will in vain endeavour to keep themselves long upon the throne without the aid of foreign armies.

How a sensible man in France, quietly settled on his farm, must laugh at all that is passing! He must be highly amused at seeing us taxed anew to the amount of a tenth part of our possessions for the purpose of forcing him and his countrymen to endure the sway of a Bourbon; a Bourbon *desiré* too! He must laugh to see how we are fretting, and fuming, and arming, and fighting, and paying away our money, to prevent him from being a republican citizen. He must wonder what we are taking all this trouble, and incurring all this expense *for*. But if he knew what *boroughs* were, his wonder would soon cease. If he knew what effect these have in making us so generously anxious about the regularly governing of other countries, he would soon cease to be surprised at our late zeal and our present joy.

You, in America, understand this matter well. I read, with great pleasure, in many of your papers, the just descriptions which you gave of *our motives in these wars*. But you may be deceived as to the *effect* of them. *Nations* are often ruined while their *governments* are gaining *force*. We are screwed up to a war pitch, and, while we are at *war*, we are strong. You saw how we were enfeebled by the last peace, short as was its duration; and, I assure you, that there is now, in this country, a general *dread of the effects of peace*. Our situation is this, the taxes, on account of the debt, and the army and navy, are, and must be, so great, that England must be the *dearest* country in the world. Even this second restoration of the Bourbons will, I should suppose, cost us about *four millions* of taxes annually,

FOR EVER, which alone is more than the whole of your revenue. As to *discontents* in England, think nothing of them; they are not worth your notice. But income, ingenuity, industry, will all seek cheap living; and those who have to buy goods will go to the cheapest market. This debt and army will produce a serious change in our affairs, in a short time. We may, possibly, see the French people tolerably ill treated; but that will not *pay* our taxes.

By these wars against the French, we have added nearly *fifteen millions a year* to our *peace* taxes. And what have we got which we might not have had, if we had remained at peace? The French had then *a king*; they then had abolished *feudal rights*; they then had abolished *tythes*. And have they not done so now? But the noblesse are now to have their *titles*. The fools might have had their *chateaux and their lands*, if they had not run away to join the foreign armies; and now these are sold away from them. What, then, have we gained for our fifty millions of taxes to be paid annually in peace? Ask your New-England *right honourables* this, and they will tell you that we have got a great deal; for, that we have got "regular government and social order." I am yours, &c.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, near Southampton, 5th July, 1815.

TO ——— ———

Gentlemen,

I BEG you to communicate my thanks to the Republican Citizens of Albany, and to assure them that I think myself highly honoured by their present, especially when I take into view the grounds on which it has been presented, and the enlightened state of the public mind, in the country whence it has traversed the ocean to find me in this obscure village.

Certainly, if my advice had been followed by the statesmen of England, the late war with America would never have taken place. But I am far from certain that, seeing the result, the war has not been, or, at least, will not prove, in the end, beneficial to *mankind*; and that is to say, beneficial to the real representative, or, *self-government*. For, without freedom, what is man better than the beasts of the field. These have an abundance to eat and drink, to wear, and whereon to repose; and, therefore, are not in any wise surpassed in happiness or in dignity by the subjects of despots, whatever *names* or *forms* the despots or despotism may assume. And, without *real* representative government, freedom cannot exist. There are only two states in civil society: one, in which the governed give their assent to the laws; the other, in which laws are made without their assent. The

first is a state of freedom; the other a state of slavery. In the one case the people submit to rules agreed on by *themselves;* in the other they submit to a *master.*

The suit of clothes which you have sent me, proves very clearly that you can make as fine and as beautiful broadcloth as any in the world. Those to whom I have shown it, say it is the very finest they ever saw. But though I rejoice exceedingly at your astonishing progress in this and other branches of manufacture, which, for the reasons given by me in my preface to a republication of Mr. LIVINGSTON's work on sheep, I look upon as a change in the affairs of the world, singularly favourable to the happiness of all people, and as unfavourable to the cause of despotism; still the war has been more beneficial to mankind in another way, the events and the termination of it having clearly proved, that, to defend a country against the most powerful, and active, and best disciplined enemies, there need be neither standing armies, privileged orders, titles, decorations, nor expensive government, provided the *people* be the makers of their own laws, the choosers of their chiefs, and be, at the same time, enlightened in their minds. This is the great, the important, the most useful fact, which the late war has established beyond all dispute.

The pensioned BURKE talked of *titles* and *privileges* as the *cheap defence of nations;* as if he had forgotten the immense sums of money with which these are always accompanied. You will see that nearly *a million of dollars* have been voted to *one* of our commanders for one victory, beside nearly *two millions before* for other military services. These sums would make a deep cut into the whole of your country's revenue for a year. But, while this is going on, it has been stated in parliament that the county jails are filled with debtor *farmers*, and the country swarms with paupers. If, indeed, the pensioned BURKE had seen you, with a PRESIDENT, costing 25 thousand dollars a year, and with generals and commodores, unpensioned, untitled, urged on solely by the love of freedom and a sense of duty, not only defending the sacred soil of their country, but performing deeds of heroism without a parallel in the annals of European nations, with all their titles, decorations, and pecuniary rewards; if he had lived to see this; if he had seen the war wound up by a *village lawyer* at New-Orleans, with a band of raw militia, whose officers even were scarcely in uniform, by defeating, and putting to flight, after an immense slaughter, superior numbers of the best disciplined, and bravest, and best commanded invaders that Europe ever had to boast of; if he had lived to see this, and to see your brave countryman, JACKSON, without title or pecuniary reward, return, perhaps, again to his occupation at the bar—then, indeed, the pensioned BURKE might well have exclaimed, *behold, here, the cheap defence of nations.*

It is by establishing, and making known throughout the world, facts like these; it is by affording such lessons and such examples to mankind, that the late war has done a good which far outweighs all the temporary misery which it occasioned. Those lessons, and those examples, must, in the end, produce their due degree of effect. But give me leave to avail myself of this opportunity to express my anxious hope that it will be the constant object, the never-ceasing care of the people of America, to guard, as they would guard the apple of their eye, those principles of their constitution which forbid the creating of *privileged orders*. To you the introduction of *titles* would be the death of freedom. The very first step towards that fatal measure would be followed by a corruption of manners and every evil of civil society. Whenever men in such a state as yours begin to wish to place themselves and families above the mass of their fellow-citizens, they start without restraint in the career of all sorts of baseness. The appellations and epithets of *Squire*, and *Excellency*, and *Honour*, and *Honourable*, given amongst you, *without thought*, in general, have a mischievous tendency. What have you to do with these old badges of the feudal times, or these modern inventions of European courts? The president, the governor, the members of congress, the secretary, the ambassador, the commodore, the general, the judge, the sheriff, the mayor, the justice, the doctor, the priest, if you have one, are sufficiently designated and sufficiently honoured when they are called by the name of their office. Any thing further smacks of *aristocracy*—which, wherever great riches are accumulated, requires to be watched as narrowly as those weeds, which, if not checked in time, would completely overtop, subdue, and destroy the crops destined for the food of man.

The happiness of America arises *chiefly*, not from the *great* learning possessed by any part of her citizens, but from the enlightened state of the minds of *the whole population*. This has arisen from the means of education which *all* possess. These means arise, not so much from the superior industry of Americans (for they labour less, far less, than the people of England) as from the cheapness of their government, which may *safely* be cheap, because it is strong in the good sense, the information, freedom, and happiness of the people. Next to your enlightened state of mind comes, as a cause of your happiness, that *moderation* in the desire to amass wealth, which is the natural consequence of an absence of titles and family distinctions. All the money of Peru would not place either of your sons above the son of your poorest neighbour. Since, therefore, no great end is to be obtained by the possession of wealth, men are less likely to use unjustifiable means in obtaining it, as well as less likely to apply it to a corrupt use, or to heap it on one child to the ruin of all the rest. Hence that equal distribution of property; hence that

stubborn spirit which makes the labourer refuse to call his employer *master;* hence that consciousness of self worth, which makes meanness and crimes so rare; and hence, in the Americans, that fidelity to their country and their colours, and that contempt for their enemies, which naturally must produce, and which already have produced, such wonderful effects.

Introduce family distinctions and primogenitureship, and all these blessings vanish at once. It would not take ten years after that to fill your country with sinecure placemen and pensioners, political spies and informers, hired writers, fraudulent and servile domestics and labourers, and paupers too base to be numbered amongst them. If you want an instance of the lengths to which a thirst after titles and family distinctions will lead men, look at Napoleon. See that wonderful man; that matchless soldier; that wise lawgiver; the brave, the generous, the acute, the experienced Napoleon; see him, even to the very last moment of his power; and when he knew that that power was just departing, in all human probability forever from his grasp, still clinging to his unfortunate desire to have *royal descendants.* There can be no question that it was this desire, and the acts which it produced, that finally have led the kings and their subsidized armies to Paris. When the French people had been used to an *emperor* for some years, they were no longer ashamed to think of receiving a king. The emperor, by moulding the republic into an empire, prepared it to become a kingdom. This he manifestly did for the sake of *family;* from that accursed motive of *vanity,* which has ruined the reputation of so many really great men, and has plunged so many nations into misery. Guard against the indulgence of it in your country, I beseech you. You are, happily, free from titles and family distinctions. Make it a rule to look upon every one as an enemy of the country, who makes the smallest attempt to introduce them; and thus will you keep the scourge from amongst you.

Another evil for you to guard against, is, any increase in the power of the *priesthood.* If you look at Europe, you will see the amount of the evils which this power has produced. The struggle now in France is, in fact, between the priesthood and freedom of thought. If the enemies of France do not restore the power of the priesthood, they will do nothing at all, at least towards the accomplishment of their great object: that is, the eradicating of what they call the jacobin system: whenever the priesthood have power, that power is sure to be employed on the side of what is called "*regular government;*" that is, the keeping of men in order by coercive means. It is very odd, but the fact is so, that even you find priests of all denominations pull together in *this way,* though they are daily and hourly *accusing each other of teaching false doctrine.* Each tells you that it is

sinful not to believe in what he teaches, while he tells you that all other sorts of priests are to be listened to also, though all those others tell you that he is in the wrong. How can you account for the wonderful zeal of the protestant clergy of Europe to restore the pope and catholic religion? Does not this zeal put the subject in a light so clear as to make it impossible longer to misunderstand it? Does it not show, that priests of all denominations, though they pronounce the creed of each other to be damnable, make common cause as towards the people? Does it not show, that they are all on the side of "*strong government?*" Therefore, take care to give them no means of possessing an influence in your political affairs.

By the same conveyance, I received a printed copy of proposals for republishing, in an octavo volume, by Messrs. BELDEN and Co. of NEW-YORK, *my Letters on the late War*. This also, has, as may be supposed, given me great pleasure. It is another striking instance of the great power of *the press;* and it is a proof to me, that my labours are not thrown away. It is another motive to industry. When, after long tugging against wind and tide, the almost exhausted and despairing mariner sees his little bark beginning to make ahead, courage returns to his heart, and strength to his arms; he makes new and greater exertions; and, finally, he overcomes all obstacles. So, I hope, it will be with me. I now see that I have forced great and valuable truths amongst the millions of freemen who inhabit America, as well as amongst my own countrymen. I feel pride, which I cannot, and which I do not wish to disguise, when I reflect, that what I write in this little village, is, in a few weeks afterwards, read by many millions of people here, and in another hemisphere, and those, too, the most enlightened of mankind. I must be, and I am, proud to see these essays of mine, written, sometimes, in the space of a day, and amidst cares innumerable, and pursuits that demand and receive my attention from daylight to dark, thought worthy of being moulded into pamphlets and books. And this gives me the greater pleasure, when I reflect, that no *advertisements*, no *puffs* nor *reviews*, that no extraneous aid of any sort, has ever been resorted to by me; but that my essays, unsupported, and unprotected, have been sent forth to find their way throughout the world.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I shall announce, through this channel, my intention to put into execution, a measure which I have long had in view, which I am certain would be greatly beneficial to the people of America, which I had actually begun while in prison, and which was laid aside on account of the war. I have perceived, from several American writings on *agriculture*, and especially from *Mr. Livingston's work on sheep;* and, indeed, I know the fact from my own observation, that your *long winters*

and *late springs* are a great impediment to the keeping of so large numbers of all sorts of animals which afford sustenance to man, and especially of sheep, as might otherwise be reared and maintained. I am of opinion that it is in my power to teach you, speaking always from my own knowledge and actual experience, how to remedy the defect of a want of abundance of suitable food for all such animals during these seasons. I mean to say, that if any farmer, who now farms in the *old* way, as I saw it in Pennsylvania, will follow my instructions, he will be enabled, with scarcely any additional capital or expense, to double the quantity of live stock upon his farm. A book, having this object in view, is now preparing by my eldest son, and will be sent to be published in Philadelphia, in the month of November next. I mean the manuscript will go hence, in, or before that month.

With these views, gentlemen, and not with the views of our *agricultural societies*, whose minds seem, in general, to partake essentially of the earth, whence they take their appellation, I propose to communicate the intended instructions *on the culture and preservation of winter and spring food for cattle and sheep*; and if the communication should be attended with success, it will always be a gratification to me to reflect, that it will be justly thought to have arisen, in some degree, or, at least, to have been accelerated by the gratitude which has been excited by your obliging and public-spirited letter.

I cannot, even here, conclude, without congratulating you most cordially on the *defeat of the Algerines* by the gallant Decatur and his no less gallant companions. Even in *this* your republic has given a blow to tyrants in general. Even in *this* your example is of great weight. Even in *this* does the world see a proof of those sound and just principles, which are the basis of your political institutions. To free the captive from the lash of barbarians; to restrain them from future cruelties; to punish them for past torments inflicted on the innocent; to make the sea the safe highway of nations; to avenge the insults and the violences committed against freemen, these are motives of war worthy of America. A Louis, king of France, acquired the title of SAINT Louis, because, at the instigation of the pope and the priests, he fought against these same Algerines to make them change their *religion*. Your ground of war is very different: it is that of a free and enlightened people, drawing the sword in the cause of unequivocal justice and humanity. Our newspapers, and so will it be with the reviews and magazines, (except the *Monthly Magazine,*) are very *dry* and *shy* upon this subject. They notice the account of your victory, but they do it in a way which clearly shows that they are *very sorry for it*. They do not say this in so many words; but that this is their feeling is manifest. The truth is, they feel it to be a blow against tyranny

generally; and they also smell danger, though distant, in the encouragement which it will certainly give to the *growth of your navy*, which, to them and their supporters, is the most hideous of all ideas. They think, and, indeed, they say, that France will now be *crippled for a century*; and I shall not be at all surprised, if they soon begin to inculcate the necessity of *crippling you* for a like season. I will take care to convey to you an account of their proceedings; and, once for all, let me beseech you most earnestly TO READ THIS ACCOUNT WITH ATTENTION.

Be you *united*, however, and you have nothing to fear. No compromise with *traitors*; no compromise with men who *clearly* aim at the subversion of your *freedom;* but *moderation* towards all who honestly differ in opinion. *Mutual concession* there must be among those who honestly differ, or your country will be *divided* and *enslaved*. Let not a consciousness of your valour *lull you into a false security*. You are all armed, can all shoot, are all willing to fight; but there wants *organization*. You want adopted, and that, too, *directly*, the plan of *Major Cartwright*, detailed ina little work called "ENGLAND'S ÆGIS;" that is, the means of *effectually defending the country without a standing army*. I wish this work was in the hands of your governors and president. Once organized according to the plan of that work, you might set all the world at defiance; without such organization the time *may* come when your country will be in imminent danger.

The duty of every free man, and his very *first* duty, is to prepare himself for the defence of his freedom. To *say* that he is always *ready to fight* in that defence to his last breath is not enough. Actually to *be* ready to do this is still short of the mark. He should not only be ready and willing so to fight, but he should be *able* to fight, to exert his courage and patriotism *to the greatest possible advantage*. And this is not to be accomplished without *organization;* without *constant attention* to this great duty; without *cheerful submission* to regulations agreed on; without an *ever-active* vigilance; without, in short, making *all private concerns give way* to this paramount consideration. This is the way to preclude the necessity of a standing army, with all its accompaniments of heavy taxes, dissolute manners, and insidious distinctions; this is the way to live, in safety, at peace with all the world; this is the way, and the only way, to preserve inviolate your political institutions, to prevent the prodigious increase of your population and your wealth from endangering your liberties, and to hand down to posterity that happiness and freedom, that ease and plenty, which you have received from the hands of your wise and gallant fathers.

With these reflections deeply impressed upon my mind; with an anxious desire that they may awaken attention in your country; with sincere wishes for the happiness of your country in general, and of yourselves in particular,

I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM COBBETT.

Botley, July 16, 1815.

TYTHES.

THE article which I have given below with this title, taken from the *Cork Chronicle*, I hope my friends in America will read with attention. It shows them what they are to expect if their *Cossack Priesthood* should succeed in their attempts to establish a dominant church. Not only will they exact a tenth of their corn, and their cattle, which grow and are fed in the fields, but their fruit, their apples, their pears, their plumbs, and all those choice and delicious products which constitute the kitchen garden, and are so consoling to the heart of man, will be tythed by these rapacious fiends, who, as was the case in France before the revolution, had the impudence there to assert, that the earth and its fulness is their heritage, and that the people, over which they had assumed a sway, were created merely to be fleeced by them. It is for this, and this only, that the priesthood in America are exerting themselves to overthrow the republican government. They feel, that under a frugal government, which is careful to teach every man his duty in society, without calling in the aid of *spiritual teachers*, there is no chance of their being able to establish an empire over the mind. This, the foundation of all their power, being unattainable, their grand object is to bring into discredit that system which presents so formidable a barrier to their encroachments.

From the Cork Chronicle.

Bishop of Cloyne's Court.—Our readers may recollect that we called their attention some time since to the subject of certain citations issued from this court at the suit of the Rev. Thomas Carson, Rector of Kilmahon, for the recovery of tythe of green clover, apples, pears, plumbs, and cherries, which grew in a kitchen garden. On Tuesday last, the court was crowded to excess, principally a very respectable number of gentlemen, assembled to witness the proceedings. However, upon reading the citation, it was discovered that it was erroneously filled, so that the claim of the Rev. Pastor was dismissed, after going through part of the

evidence. We have been informed that the vicar general took this opportunity of censuring, in very strong and energetic language, such novel modes of proceeding as the present, and expressed his hope that this would be the last time he should witness claims of this nature brought into his court. However, we have been informed that the Rev. Mr. Carson *declared in open court his intention of recommencing the suit.* It was brought against Wm. Abbott, Esq. of Ballymalee, a young gentleman connected with the most respectable families of the society of friends, throughout the country, and from whose well-cultivated farm, of 133 acres, the Rev. Pastor requires a considerable yearly income in tythe. This gentleman has been remarkable for his very kind attention to a widowed mother, and a number of brothers and sisters, who were left a burthen upon him at a very early period of life. The same Rev. Gentleman was dismissed upon two other citations on the same day, one of which was for the tythe of a small quantity of flax which grew in a head land of a cornfield, the tythe of which had been duly paid.

To the people of all parties in the United States of America—on the necessity of their being prepared for the defence of their country.

BEFORE this reaches you, you will have heard of the great events which have taken place in Europe. Those events, if you seriously look at them, will convince you that it is high time for you to betake yourselves to the means of making your country a *durable* asylum for the oppressed of all nations; a *safe* abode of freedom. This is in no way to be done, but by *arming yourselves*; by keeping yourselves *constantly* armed; by being, at *all* times, ready to enter the field of battle; and this state of preparation is to be effected only by *wise organization.*

If you look into our newspapers of a fortnight past, you will see, that they have now openly and unreservedly promulgated principles, according to which your country might be *laudably* invaded, your cities laid in ashes, your women violated, yourselves robbed and murdered, even in the hour of peace. You will see, that they recommend the *perpetual imprisonment*, or the *murder* of NAPOLEON, who has given himself up as a *prisoner of war*, whose victories were never stained by cruelty or insult to the captive, and to whose clemency so many old reigning families owe the preservation of that power, under the combination of which he has, at last, fallen. You will see, that they recommend the murder of every man who has distinguished himself by his exertions against the

horrible feudal and ecclesiastical tyranny formerly existing in France. You will see, that they almost literally thirst for the blood of every man in France, who has done, or who is suspected of wishing to do, any thing to preserve the liberties of the French nation. You will see that, now that Napoleon is wholly unable to act against the kings of Europe, these men are directing their malice against all that they think likely to oppose their views of *universal oppression*. You will see that, as the king of France does not appear disposed to shed blood, and to strip the people almost of their very skins, these men are urging the allies to take the work into their own hands. You will see, in short, that they have now undisguisedly avowed, that England and Europe can never be *safe*, while one particle of freedom is left in France, while any thing but misery and slavery are left in that populous and extensive country.

We are not to believe it possible that these savage, these murderous recommendations, will be followed; nor, if followed, are we to believe, that the wishes of these fiends in human shape would be accomplished. We are not to believe it possible, that any *king*, or any *minister*, will entertain the wish, much less attempt the deed, of making neighbouring, or rival, nations wretched "*for a century*," lest their growth and prosperity should endanger his power and means of living in splendour. We are not to believe it possible, for instance, that any king, or minister, of England, will ever entertain the horrid wish of "*putting you back for a century*," that you may not be able to cope with him. But, while you actually see that there are public writers, even in this country, who not only openly avow such wishes, and that, too, with respect to America, as well as with respect to France, ought you not to think it possible, that, in some part or other of the world, sooner or later, the principles of these men may possess the minds of those who may be able to *endeavour*, at least, to put them into execution?

These writers are men of *great weight* in the world. You have seen the numerous instances in which they appear to have been the dictators of faction in mighty affairs. Their writings are never to be despised. They are always to be *attended to*; and I beseech you *to attend to them*. They hate you mortally, chiefly because you are *really free*, and because you exhibit to the world the great example of order, tranquillity, prosperity unparalleled, under a government of such mildness and cheapness. They are men of excellent memories: *revenge* is never extinguished in their breasts; from the same motive that they now recommend the murder of the great and generous conqueror of the continent of Europe, they would, if they had the power, tear your bodies to pieces. Be you assured, that these men will die without having felt one single moment of solid satisfaction, unless they

see your political institutions destroyed, your country made a heap of ruins, and yourselves reduced to the most degrading slavery.

While you know that such passions are existing in the world; while you see that the human mind may be so brutalized, so corrupted, and so hardened against the feelings which nature inspires, it becomes you to guard your liberties and your lives; to begin *betimes* to prepare for their protection against the acts to which such passions may finally lead. And let not any *party* amongst you suppose, that these men, if they could stir up an enemy against you, would make any *exceptions in favour of that party*. Until they saw half a million of the allies in France they were applauding the *royalists*, and urging them on to cut the throats of their republican countrymen. But *now* they make no *distinction*. It is now *France* that is to be punished, it is *now*, not Napoleon, not the jacobins; it is *France* that is to be "*put back for a century*." Only think, for a moment, of the *means* that must be used to accomplish such a purpose. Only think of the pillaging, the murders, the acts of devastation, which are necessary even to afford a chance of effecting such an end. Only think of the rancour, the bloody mindedness, that must have engendered such an idea. These men now applaud the *federalists*, whom they call the "*sound* part of the people." But if they could urge any power to invade you, the federalists would soon find, as the royalists in France now do, that it is against the *whole country*, against the prosperity and happiness of the *whole nation*, that their hatred is directed. Now and then, when thrown off their guard by some particular cause of exasperation, they confound, in their abuse, *both parties* under the name of "*the Americans*;" and I have been not a little amused at reading, in a Boston federal paper, serious, but very *plaintive*, remonstrances upon this score, stating, "that it is *unjust* in these, our writers, to *confound* the different descriptions of Americans thus; that they ought to *discriminate*; that they are right in venting their hatred against the *democrats*; but that they should recollect that the *federalists* are a very good and respectable sort of people, lovers of order and religion, and that, besides, they actually fight the battles of these writers in America." Let these malignant men only be able to stir up the means of doing you mischief, and the authors of these humble wailings will soon see that their hatred, like the bullet, is no respecter of parties or persons. Before the allies were in France, they told us that all the "*sound* part of the community" (keep this phrase in mind) were decidedly in favour of the king, and especially the "good and respectable *Bourgoisie*." But *now* they announce to us, with delight, the sums of money and the masses of food and drink which, as they tell us, the allies are compelling the "*sound*" as well as unsound to pay. They tell us, with par-

ticular satisfaction, that the "honest old marshal Blucher" is quartering his soldiers upon the people of Paris; that is, upon the "*good* and *respectable Bourgoisie*," who were so hearty and faithful in the cause of the king. This is the treatment they approve of as to the royalists in France; this is the way in which they turn round upon their friends there. And would they not do the same towards their *friends* in America?

I will here insert a passage from the TIMES newspaper, and one from the COURIER, under the date of the 28th July, 1815, in order to give you a specimen of the views of our leading public prints. And, again and again, I beseech you to *mark well* their conduct: for I tell you, as, indeed, you must know, that they are not *singular* in their way of thinking. We will first hear the COURIER:

"We have been given to understand that the conditions which the allied sovereigns think it necessary to dictate to France in her twice captured capital, will be made known in a few days. One of the French papers on Monday announces that the treaty of Paris is to be maintained; that of course the territory of France remains untouched; that there are to be contributions imposed for the expenses of the war, all participation in which, it is understood, have been renounced by two of the powers; (we trust we are not one;) that the allied troops will soon retire, except about 150,000 Russians, who will evacuate the country by 25,000 at a time, in proportion as the French army becomes reorganized; that the emperor of Austria has declared, that wishing to avoid all cause of jealousy or umbrage, he will not leave a single Austrian corps in France. The Journalist then concludes, with compliments to the magnanimity of the allied powers. Magnanimity! call *it rather folly;* but we do not, and cannot believe them to be capable of *throwing away, in this manner, the advantages they have gained,* and of sacrificing their duty to their subjects. Leave the French territory as it was! and thus leave her *the power to disturb again the repose of Europe!* Endanger Belgium! For will any man say she can be secure whilst France keeps her northern fortresses? The paragraph, therefore, in the Paris Journal cannot be correct. The following arrangement, we hear, will be found to be nearer the truth. The immediate disbanding of the army of the Loire by the king; an ordinance to that effect may be expected in a day or two. Why not extend the decree to the other armies of France? The raising another army comprised of men who have proved their fidelity to the king. The delivery *en depot* to the allies of the three strongest fortresses till this new army is raised and ready to act. Eight millions of francs as an indemnification to the allies of their expenses. (800 *millions would not indemnify them.*) The *punishment* of the principal offenders to be left to the prudence of the king. If such

be the principal outlines of the new arrangement, we can only say that they will be *any thing but satisfactory*. A new army *may* be faithful and loyal to the king, and the king *may* be pacifically inclined; but *suppose he should not;* suppose *his successor should not;* suppose he should be forced to follow the warlike impulse of the nation. The real, *wise*, and *safe policy*, is, to *reduce the power of France;* that is the only way to prevent her from disturbing the peace of Europe. It is with nations as with individuals. Who of US, after being *HUMBLED BY AN ENEMY, IS NOT ANXIOUS TO BE REVENGED OF THAT ENEMY?* We should insist upon the *surrender*, or, at least, the *razing*, *all the northern fortresses of France;* we should make her *give up the spoliations of Louis XVI.* Why not bestow *Lorraine upon Austria*, and *Alsace upon Prussia?* Lastly, every one of her *pictures and statues should be removed.*"

Pray, mark well the words which I have put in large capitals. Mark the words: "who of *us*, after being *humbled by an enemy, is not anxious to be revenged of that enemy?*" Mark these words, write them, engrave them in your minds; never lose sight of them for a moment. They speak to *you*, and that, too, with a voice of thunder. But, to turn to France. You see, *now*, they are for acting as if the king, ay, as if the Bourbon king was *their enemy*. He was every thing that was good, till the allies got possession of the capital, many of the fortresses, and a large part of the territory of France; before that time, these men only wanted to get rid of Napoleon, that *disturber* of Europe; but the moment France was in their hands, they could no longer trust *even the king*. They *now*, as you see, wish to dismember, and cripple, and even destroy *France*. They now cry for the destruction of the power, not of any men, or any party, but the power of *France herself*.

Let us now hear the editor of the TIMES of the same date. After calling upon the government to murder Napoleon; after asserting, that, if he be not publicly put to *death*, Despard was *murdered*, he proceeds thus:

"Is it considered what effect the knowledge of his being in existence must necessarily have on the disaffected in every part of Europe? They will think, and think with truth, that the allied sovereigns are *afraid* to touch the life of a man who has so many adherents and admirers. This, of course, will increase the number of his adherents, and the fervour of their admiration. If in the depth of his degradation, their idol can inspire respect; if the cultivators of religion, and virtue, and loyalty, are forced to bow down before the splendour of his crimes, even when under eclipse, what must they do at the happy moment, when he bursts forth again from behind the cloud; a moment towards

which his followers will look with more devout anxiety than the Indian does to the first dawning of a day, marked by astrology as the most fortunate of his life. Indeed, it must be granted, that the extraordinary escapes which this man has had from the hands of justice, are well calculated to create a kind of superstition in the minds of those who have been already dazzled by his fame. He trusts himself to those whom he has most injured, as Daniel braved the fury of the lions, or as the three brethren walked through the fiery furnace: and our folly, our cowardice, works the miracle of his safety! As long as he lives, therefore, treason and rebellion must be everywhere at work. His escape, his release, his reappearance must be constantly expected. Instead of an infamous criminal, he will be considered as an injured prince, unjustly kept from the embraces and salutations of a longing people; and when at last he breaks prison, (which sooner or later he undoubtedy will do,) his return will be more triumphant, and his power more firmly consolidated than ever. He is to be guarded by an English regiment. But the whole regiment is not always on guard; is it imagined that an English sentinel alone, can neither be bribed nor eluded? In the English army, too, it may be asked, whether there are none of those *weak and unreflecting men, who admire daring successful crime?* To speak *plainly*, is it not a *known fact*, that *many even of the English officers are personal admirers of Napoleon Buonaparte?* Most of these young gentlemen (for it is of the younger sort that I speak) have no better reading than the *Morning Chronicle*, or the *Edinburgh Review*, or some other worthless production, in which this monster is usually described as the first of heroes, the great captain of the age, &c. It is no wonder that such studies should dazzle their imagination, and confound their moral sense; and we may be assured, that *so long as Napoleon Buonaparte lives*, this *very serious evil* will go on increasing."

Now, can you suppose that a monster like this writer, who would commit a deliberate murder in revenge on a man *for being an object of admiration*, would not, if he could, gladly cut all *your* throats, men, women, and children? The fears that the wretch feels and describes are a proof of the falsehoods of his accusation; for if Napoleon's deeds were such as he asserts them to have been, what reason can there be to take away his life, lest so large a part of mankind should still feel an interest in his fate? He would have Napoleon murdered, *not* because he has done that which has made him an object of hatred and contempt, but because he has done that which has made him an object of love and admiration. Having thus disposed of Napoleon, he comes to the French army, the whole of whom also he seems to wish to see disposed of in the same bloody way.

"The first point," says he, "and without which all others would be nugatory, is, that the army of the Loire, whatever may be the terms on which the king may be disposed to accept of its submission, shall be disbanded; an intimation to that effect will, we have some reason to suppose, be published in a day or two. If the troops give up their arms, disperse, and retire, as they will be required to do, their past rebellion, atrocious as it has been, will be overlooked; but should they obstinately persevere in their criminal conduct, we suppose that they themselves can hardly wish to be forgiven; a preponderating force will be sent against them. Indeed, that this army, got together by treason, led by the traitor himself into the field, and there defeated, should think it possible that it can coexist with any regular and legal government, is incredible. Our great doubt as to the *effectual execution* of this article, results from the character and habits of the men; they are chiefly *without homes*, inured only to camps, garrisons, battles, and familiar with no other hopes than such as are incident to those courses of life, plunder, advancement, or what they term glory; so that it is *next to impossible that such men should ever learn to limit themselves to the sober expectations of* TRANQUIL LIFE."

So that, if these men may attempt to prevent the absolute and entire conquest of their country, they are not to *expect* to avoid being hanged! and, if they lay down their arms, and are willing to disperse, they "have *no homes*," and it is impossible, or next to impossible, that they should ever return to *tranquil life*. At once *ruffian* and *hypocrite!* He knows well that if that army could be completely annihilated, France would have no chance of salvation. But let me beseech you to recollect what these men *formerly* said about the persons composing this same army.

While Napoleon was leading this army to victory; while this army was following him over Europe, these writers *bewailed their fate*. They were then poor, unhappy youths, dragged from the firesides of their fond and respectable parents, tied hand and foot, and thus carried to the army, and compelled to fight. Oh! how these writers "pitied" them and their parents! Ay, that they did, from the bottom of their souls! Vile hypocrites, and they now call these same persons *robbers*. They say they are "*without homes*," and recommend the massacre of them, it being next to impossible that they should return to *tranquil life*.

And do your *federalists* imagine, that *they* would be put in possession of power, if these men could stir up a conquering enemy against you upon their principles? If once they saw your country overrun, your government put to the rout, they would that very moment talk of the whole of you in a lump. They would call every thing *folly*, "*criminal weakness*," short of the utter ruin of your country. Nay, have you not already had a

specimen of their moderation? Before the victories over Napoleon, last year, they always talked of "the *sound* part" of you. They only wished to *defend* our rights, and to live upon good terms with you. They said that the "*sound* part of the people" were with them; and that the war party were a *French faction*, who hated England because she was the great "bulwark of religion." Do you remember how they changed their tone, all in a moment, when they heard of the fall of Napoleon? Do you remember that they then said that *no peace* could be made with JAMES MADISON; that no treaty ought to be signed, except *at the head-quarters of the English army in the heart of the United States?* Do you remember how soon they dropped all distinctions in their invectives, and called for the *flogging* of "*the Americans?*" Do you remember that they insisted, that no peace should be made with you, until your political institutions had been subverted, until your civil and political state had been destroyed; until that "*mischievous example of successful* DEMOCRATICAL REBELLION" had been done away? Until this was effected, they said that there could be *no safety* for the regular governments of the civilized world. Not a word did they *then* say about the *sound* part of the community; not a word about the *federalists;* not a word about "the *good people* in the eastern states;" not a word about Mr. Otis or the other Misters, whom they used to praise. They looked upon the conquest of your country as *sure;* and they were preparing for calling aloud for the "*punishment*" of you *all.* It was the "mischievous example of the success of *democratic rebellion*" that they wished to destroy. And were not the *federalists* democratic rebels, as well as the rest? *All* your presidents, and *all* your governors, were, according to these men's views of the matter, "democratic rebels." What reason, then, could they have to suppose, that they were, by these writers, intended to be spared any more than the rest of the people? In all their praises of "the *sound* part of the people," they were actuated by the desire of obtaining the aid of the federalists in rendering your ruin more certain and more complete.

Two months have not passed over our heads since these writers were applauding the sending of arms and ammunition to the *royalists of La Vendee*, whom they called *brave, faithful, religious*, and whom they urged on to exterminate the *jacobins*, as they called them, who were opposed to the Bourbons. Now, because the Vendeans do not seem to relish the total conquest, the dismemberment, and utter ruin of their country by foreign armies, they confound them with the army of Marshal Davoust; they lump them along with the other parties; and even accuse them of *ingratitude!* They are called *ungrateful to England*, because they do not appear inclined to aid in the despoiling even

the king of his territories; even that king to fight *for* whom they received their arms and ammunition! But what is this more than they had before done with regard to your federalists? When they saw notices of the meeting of the *convention* at *Hartford*, they chuckled with delight; they cheered them on; they applauded the conduct of the promoters. But when the convention broke up, with merely agreeing to an application to be made to the several states to join them in demanding a reform of the federal constitution, our writers turned round upon them with reproaches of all sorts. "What!" said the Times newspaper, "is THAT ALL? We expected a *division of the union to be declared at once;* or, at least, the impeachment of Madison and his associates. These conventionalists are men of no *vigour*. Why do they not, like the *brave Vendeans*, take up arms and co-operate *with our naval and military commanders?* This was what *we expected:* or, at the very least, we expected the *neutrality* of the New-England states to be declared. As things now stand, these states ought no longer to experience our *forbearance*, seeing the *ingratitude* with which our past forbearance has been repaid."

Was there ever impudence like this heard of before? Is not *this* insulting the feelings of mankind? And what humiliation must it have been to Mr. Otis and others to have been objects of such men's praise? I do not impute to the Hartford convention the base design of aiding in the subjugation of the country, and in the destruction of freedom amongst men; but if we take the then circumstances of America into view, it is impossible to deny that they intended so to embarrass the general government as to compel it to do what would have been disgraceful, at least, to their country, in order to sink their rivals, and raise themselves upon their ruin, and this was, to say the least of it, carrying party spirit to an unwarrantable length. There is no doubt in my mind, nor in that of any man of information that I have ever conversed with on the subject, that it was the encouragement held out by the conduct of men in the eastern states which prolonged the war after the peace of Paris; and, indeed, it was that encouragement which, more than any thing else, *produced the war*. I hope that those men will now take warning. That they, like the *Vendeans*, will *now* see, that the praises bestowed on them by our writers are only upon the presumption, that they are ready to cut the throats of their countrymen, and to aid in the subjugation of their country.

If I were asked *why* these writers of ours should be such implacable enemies to the freedom and happiness of mankind; *why* they should desire to stir up war, internal strife, and all manner of evils against every nation where freedom is enjoyed, I might answer, that I am not bound to show the *cause* of their abominable wishes,

having so clearly shown *that they have those wishes.* But the cause appears to be this: they see, they *feel*, that the weight of the taxes in England, joined to other causes, must, if the world be left in quiet for years, produce a great degree of decline in this country. These men have, for many years, been bawlers for war. They now tell us that the war has been crowned with glorious success; but they foresee that peace *to us* will be not what peace *usually* has been. They saw that the peace of Paris, instead of crowding our ports with ships and goods, and filling our streets with the bustle of trade, produced a calm, a stillness, as to trade, truly gloomy. They saw that our own people flocked to France for comfortable living. They saw enterprising tradesmen and manufacturers flocking to America. They saw the houses in and near London untenanted. They everywhere heard of the decay of trade, and of ruined farmers. They saw that without a law to raise the price of corn, the taxes could not be paid by either landlord or tenant. They saw, in short, that the war had created the cause of impossibility to live in peace; while France on one side, and America on the other, held forth the temptations of liberty and abundance. And they saw, which, observe, was not the smallest object of their terror, that the landlords and tenants, in almost every part of the country, complained of the hardship of *tythes*, and pointed out the *example of France, where tythes had been abolished.* They know that we have about forty-five millions of pounds, or 180 *millions of dollars*, a YEAR, to pay in taxes *for ever*, being the interest of the debt, instead of the nine millions of pounds, or 36 millions of dollars, which we had to pay on this account *before the war.* They see, that in consequence of the increase of industry produced in France by the revolution, and of our burdens produced by the war, the French are able to sell in our markets at much less than half the price that we *must* sell at, or *must* leave the taxes unpaid. They see all these things. They are seized with a panic, *that the "tight little island" will become* as desert as that on which CAPTAIN LAKE put the poor fellow *Jeffries*, who was saved by the kindness of one of your countrymen; and, in the rage, inspired by their forebodings, they would, if they could, render every other country too miserable for man to live in. They do not recommend the reducing of the *army* to what it was before the war. They know that this would not answer their purpose. They might recommend the reduction of the *navy*; but, then, *you* stare them in the face. The *civil list* is indispensable. They would recommend to wipe off the debt; but, then, the whole system crumbles to atoms. Their last resource is, the hope, by their writings, to stir up the means of *making other nations still more wretched.*

The state of this country, as regards the means of enjoying happiness, may be pretty correctly estimated by this one fact; name-

ly, that a notice has been given, in the house of commons, that a measure will be proposed, early in the next session, *to lay a tax upon the property of all persons who shall go to reside out of the king's dominions*, from which tax those residing in them shall be exempt. I do not believe it likely for such a law to pass; but, after what we have seen, I do not pronounce it to be impossible. At any rate, the idea has been seriously enough entertained to produce its mention in parliament. Reflect, then, for a moment, on the means which must be used in order to assess such a tax; reflect on the immediate superintendance which it would give the government over the person of every man of property: reflect on the vassal-like degradation to which it would reduce us: reflect on the passions which such a state of restraint would engender; and, then, form to yourselves an idea of the desperation which must have been the parent of such a proposition. The truth is, that the amount of the taxes is now so great, that all but the immense fortunes are sinking under the weight; and that, too, with a rapidity that is quite astonishing. The necessities of the government require so large a part of every man's income and earnings, that numbers are seeking the means of escaping from the demand. Taxes, when excessive, must create paupers, because they go on pressing the whole of a people downwards: and, of course, those who are but just above the poor list, are forced into it. It has lately been stated in parliament, and that, too, by GEORGE ROSE, that the beggars, the *common beggars* in the metropolis alone, have increased to *thirty thousand!* Equal to nearly half the whole population of Philadelphia, when I lived in it. This fact appears to have been stated by George Rose, as introductory to a measure for *putting a stop to the evil.*

But how? Would he send the beggars to the country? We are overstocked already. Observe, trifling as is this village, scarcely a day passes without bringing one, and generally more, beggars to my door. The *vagrant act* warrants us in taking them before a justice, and having them *punished.* But who will take the trouble, even if he wishes to do it? Thus are they left to wander about. They swarm over the country like the vermin upon their own bodies; and are produced by causes nearly similar. I have here stated two striking facts; my authority is the parliament itself. I state them *here*, in the face of the country, and I thus invite contradiction if that be possible. Let me, in this place, observe, however, that I do not look upon myself as bound *to refrain from making use of the press of America*, when I shall think that I ought to state truths *which I dare not state here;* but I never will send to that press, any thing, which even a federalist will not say, that I ought to be permitted to publish in any part of the world. I write with the strong desire of its being *read.* I see several millions of readers on the other side

of the Atlantic. I know many facts, many arguments occur to me, which I am anxious to convey to the whole world if possible; and if I am forbidden, under enormous pains and penalties, to convey them through the press of this country, is there any reason why I should not convey them through the press of a country, where the prohibition does not exist, and where any one is at liberty to contradict, or to canvass, all I may say? The French and English writers, who used to have their works published at the *Hague*, at *Amsterdam*, at *Geneva*, or elsewhere abroad, were never regarded as guilty of *foul play;* but, on the contrary, were, by every lover of truth, applauded for the zeal which urged them to resort to this method of overcoming the obstacles to its promulgation.

To return now to the *cause* of the malicious efforts of the writers of whom I have so often spoken, and to draw your attention to which efforts, is the principal object of this address; this cause appears to me to be the *apprehensions* which the present state of England excites, joined to a hatred of the very name of *liberty* and *revolution*, contracted by these illiberal men ever since they heard them associated with the name of *Frenchman*. This, I am well convinced, is the real cause of their rancour against France and America, both of which, as they constantly show, they would gladly see utterly annihilated. Whether there be OTHER PERSONS, who entertain the same apprehensions and wishes, I must leave you to conjecture. But I know that *they* do, because they discover the fact by their words. They have said that America must *be put back for a century*. They have called the *attention* of the government to the *growth of your navy*. They have said that, if it be not *strangled in its birth*, it will be dangerous.

They actually proposed to make you give up all your ships of war, to stipulate never to build another, and never more to cast a cannon or a ball.

You will laugh at this; but I beg you not to laugh at it; or, at least, to do something else besides laugh. In the whole extent of the world, it may happen, that their principles may find the means to work up some power to assail you. Therefore, I say, be *on your guard*. Peace is what you ought to desire; but it is peace accompanied with safety. To preserve peace you must *always* be well prepared for your *defence*, at least. The navy you will not neglect. Its increase is not dangerous to your freedom; or, not in the way or degree that a larger standing army would be considered to be dangerous. It is the necessity of adopting, now, in the hour of peace, an efficient system of internal defence: defence of your territory and homes, that I am anxious to impress upon your minds. A large body of soldiers by profession, you cannot have without destroying your liberties,

You must all be prepared to *march* from your immediate homes; and all be able to make a *skilful* use of your arms.

Mr. JOHN CARTWRIGHT, who is generally called *Major Cartwright*, from his having been a major in the Northamptonshire militia, who quitted the service, as a lieutenanant of the navy, in the year 1775, or 1776, because he would not fight against what he deemed the cause of freedom; who, to the age of seventy-five, has persevered for forty years, and still perseveres, in unremitted endeavours to obtain a reform in parliament; this venerable patriot, beloved by all who know him for his gentle and amiable manners, and honoured for his talents and integrity even by those who are the enemies of his political principles, seeing the danger of invasion on the part of France, in the year 1803, and seeing the government in great consternation as to securing the means of defence, republished a work which he had published some time before, entitled ENGLAND'S ÆGIS, a copy of which he sent to all the members of the royal family, to all the ministers, and many other men of weight in the country. To this work, a copy of which is sent to Mr. *Mathew Carey*, of Philadelphia, I beg leave to call your attention. In *some* of its *details* it cannot be adopted by you, on account of the difference in the division of the territory, and of the civil authorities of the two countries. But its objects being to put the country in a situation to be able, at all times, to defend itself against any enemy, however numerous and valiant, without a standing army, and without regular soldiers; its basis being the *duty of arms bearing*, inseparably from the *right of representation in the legislature*, it appears to me, that all its *principles*, and all its *outlines* are exactly suited to your case.

In the hope that what I have said may awaken amongst you some portion of that serious reflection which the subject demands, and in the stronger hope, that you will derive great and useful information from the work of Mr. Cartwright,

I remain your friend,

WILLIAM COBBETT.

P. S. Since writing the above, the *peace* between America and the Algerine dey has been announced as a *report*. Perhaps your commodore had authority to make peace. Certainly, with such a power, cannon balls are the best negotiators. Whether the pirates will abide by the treaty or not, if it *has been made*, your government has done itself great honour in the affair. This event will not, however, give satisfaction *all over the world*. Algiers was a sort of *cur* to be *set on* as occasion may require. However, you have broken his jaws, and made him retire to his den for the present. This is truly a noble use to make of naval

power! It cannot fail to enhance your name, to give pleasure to your friends, and to add to the mortification and vindictiveness of your enemies. I do not believe the news, but if true, here is another thing which Mr. Madison has accomplished previous to his being "*deposed.*"

Botley, 28th July, 1815.

To Mr. John Cartwright, the implacable enemy of tyranny— on the peace between England and America.

Dear Sir,

BEFORE I proceed to the proposed subject of this letter, I think it right just to notice, that I have, in addressing you now, omitted the addition of *Esq.* at the end of your name. It is become high time for us, and all those who think as we do, to partake, in no degree whatever, in this sort of foolery, especially when we are writing, or speaking upon the subject of a peace, which has been made with a nation, whose Chief Magistrate never pretends to any title above that of "*fellow citizen,*" which he shares in common with all the people of the free and happy country, at the head of whose government he has been placed by the *unbought* votes of his "fellow citizens."

I shall in this letter endeavour to state clearly, and with as much brevity as the nature of the subject will admit, *the real causes of the peace;* and then we shall come at those *consequences* which, I think, we shall find to be of the utmost importance to the cause of freedom all over the world.

The peace has been produced by various causes. When Napoleon had been put down, this country was drunk with exultation. The war with America was generally looked upon as the mere *sport of a month* or two. Our newspapers published reports of speeches, or pretended speeches, (for it is the same thing in effect,) in which the orators scoffed at the idea of our having any trouble in subduing a people, with two or three thousand miles of seacoast, defended by raw militia, and by "*half a dozen fir frigates, with bits of striped bunting at their mast heads.*" This phrase will be long remembered. One of our orators called the Americans, as he had before called the Reformers, "a *low and degraded crew,*" having amongst them "*no honourable distinctions;*" and he expressed his *pleasure,* that they were, as *he said,* fighting on the side of our enemy. They were, in his eyes, so contemptible, that he was *glad we had them for enemies,* and especially, as, in their chastisement, *republicanism* would be humbled in the dust, if not wholly destroyed.

Such were the sentiments of the greater part of the nation, at the time when the Kings and Potentates of Germany paid us a visit, and when the "*bits of striped bunting*" were seen reversed under the royal flag on the *Serpentine River*. There had, indeed, occurred, before that time, events, which, one would have hoped, would have checked this contemptuous way of thinking. The defeat and *capture* of the *Guerriere*, the *Macedonian*, the *Java*, the *Peacock*, and divers other smaller ships of war, by that republic, whose very name we affected to despise, might have been expected to create a *doubt*, at least, of our power to annihilate the republic in any very short space of time. But the nation had been cheated here, too, by the corrupt press, who persuaded them, that all these losses arose from causes other than those of the skill and valour of the Republicans. At one time, it was superior numbers; at another, heavier metal; at another, our own seamen inveigled into the republican ships. This delusion was kept up for two years, until the incursion in the Chesapeake seemed to have closed the scene; and, you will bear in mind, that, at that time, it was the almost universal opinion, that our Regent would soon send out his *Viceroy* to Washington City.

It was even at this very moment, however, that the tide began to turn. The gallant little army of republicans on the Niagara frontier, had before proved, at *Chippewa*, that they were made of the same stuff that composed their ancestors; and, at *Fort Erie*, they now gave a second most signal proof of the same kind.—— While these never-surpassed acts of devotion to country were performing on the borders of Lakes Ontario and Erie, Lake Champlain exhibited a spectacle, which struck with wonder all the continent of Europe, and which, in fact, astounded every man of sense here, who had before clamoured for the war. It is true, that this was only a *repetition* of the scene, exhibited the year before on Lake *Erie*, where, with an *inferior* number of men and guns, the republican Commodore Perry had beaten and actually *captured*, the whole of our fleet under Commodore Barclay; but all eyes were at that time fixed on the continent of Europe. The expected fall of Napoleon, and the real victories over him, made the loss on Lake Erie (a loss of immense importance, as is *now* seen) to be thought nothing of. Our great object *then*, was Napoleon. He once subdued, the republic, it was thought, would be done for in a trice. To suppose that she would be able to stand against us, for any length of time, appeared, to most men, perfectly ridiculous. A far greater part of the nation thought that it was *our army* who had put down Napoleon. Indeed, the commander of them was called, "the *conqueror of France;*" and, it was said, that a part of the conquerors of France, sent to America, would, in a few months, "*reduce*" the country.

A part of them were, accordingly, sent thither; and now we are going to view their exploits against the republicans on the borders of Lake Champlain. The governor general of Canada, Sir George Prevost, having received the reinforcements from France, *invaded* the republic at the head of 14,000 men, with *five major generals* under him, four troops of dragoons, four companies of royal artillery, one brigade of rocketeers, one brigade of royal sappers and miners. The first object was to dislodge the republicans from *Fort Moreau*, near the town of Plattsburgh, on the edge of the lake, about 15 miles within the boundary line of the republic. In this fort were 1,500 republican *regulars*, and not more, and 6,000 volunteers and militia from the states of Vermont and New-York, under the command of a very gallant and accomplished citizen, named *Macomb*, a brigadier general in the republican service. While Sir George Prevost attacked the fort by land Commodore Downie, with his fleet, was to attack it by water. The attack on both sides, commenced at the same time; the land army met, as far as it went, with a very gallant resistance, though it behaved, on its part, with equal gallantry; and Mr. Macomb must, in all probability, have yielded, in time, to a force so greatly superior, if the attack by water had not been frustrated. But on the water side, the republican Commodore *Macdonough*, though his force was *inferior* to ours, and has been *so stated in the official despatch of Sir George Prevost himself*, not only *defeated* our fleet, but *captured the whole of the ships*, one of which was of 36 guns, while the largest of the republican ships was of no more than 26 guns! The governor general, seeing the fate of the fleet, knowing that the taking of the fort after that would only lead to a speedy retreat from it, and fearing the consequences of an attack on his way back to Canada, raised the siege, and hastened back towards Montreal with all imaginable speed, pursued by the little republican army, and leaving behind him, as the republicans state, immense quantities of stores, ammunition, &c. beside great numbers of prisoners and deserters. They may have exaggerated in these their accounts, but the Canada newspapers stated that 150 of our men deserted; and, which is a thing never to be forgotten, our ministers have *never published in the Gazette* Sir George Prevost's account of his memorable *retreat*, though they have published his despatches relating to all the movements of the army *before* and *after* that retreat.

This blow did, in fact, *decide* the question of war, or peace. There was much blustering about it here; it was affected to treat the thing *lightly*; the *Times*, and other venal newspapers, represented it as a mere *trifling occurrence*, which would soon be overbalanced by sweeping victories on our part. But upon the back of this came the brilliant success of the Republicans in repulsing our squadron, and burning one of our ships before Fort

Mobile, in the Gulf of Mexico; and thus, while we had to vaunt of our predatory adventures against the city of Washington, the town of Alexandria, and the villages of Frenchtown and Stonington, the fame of the Republican arms, by land as well as sea, sounded in every ear, and glowed in every heart, along the whole extent of the sixteen hundred miles which lie between Canada and the Mexican Gulf.

In Europe these events produced a prodigious sensation. Those who wished to see a check given to the all-predominant naval power of England, rejoiced at them; and every where they excited and called forth *admiration of the Republicans*. There had been, during the struggle on the Continent, no leisure to contemplate the transatlantic contest; but it now became an object of universal attention; and Europe, so long accustomed to regard English naval invincibility, when the force on both sides was equal, or nearly equal, as a thing received and universally admitted, was surprised beyond expression at the undeniable proof of the contrary. The world was now called on to witness the combat between England and America *single handed*. The former was at the summit of power and glory; she had captured or destroyed almost all the naval force in Europe; those powers who had any naval force left were her allies, and were receiving subsidies from her; she had an army of regulars of 200,000 men, flushed with victory; she had just marched part of this army through the heart of France herself; she had a thousand ships of war afloat, commanded by men who never dreamt of defeat. This was the power that now waged war, single handed, against the only *republic*, the only *commonwealth*, remaining in the world. The friends of freedom, who were not well acquainted with America, had been trembling for her. They did not seem to entertain any hopes of her escape. They thought it scarcely *possible*, that she should, with her democratical government, and her handful of an army, without officers, and without stores, resist England even for a year single handed; and they saw no power able, if willing, or willing, if able, to lend the republic the smallest degree of assistance.

But when the battles of Lake Champlain were announced; and when it was seen by the president's message to his fellow citizens of the congress, that the republican government marched on with a *firm step*, and had resolved not to yield one single point to our menaces, or our attacks, a very different view of the contest arose. The English nation, which had been exulting in the idea of giving the Yankeys "*a drubbing*," began to think, that the undertaking was not so very easy to execute; and seeing no prospect of an end to the war and its expenses, they began to cry out for the abolition of the greatest of those taxes, the existence of which depended on the duration of *the war*.

In the meanwhile, the ministers, *previous* to their knowledge of the battles of Chippewa, Fort Erie, Plattsburgh, Lake Champlain, and Fort Mobile, had put forward, at Ghent, very high pretensions. They had proposed, as a SINE QUA NON, the expulsion of the republicans from *a considerable portion of their territory*, in behalf of the savages in alliance with us; they had demanded, though not as a *sine qua non*, the *surrender of the Lakes to our King*, even with the prohibition to the Americans to erect fortifications on the borders which would remain to them; they had demanded a line of communication between Quebec and our territories east of the Penobscot, *through the territories of the Republic*. The American negotiators declined any discussion of these conditions, until they should *receive instructions from their government;* alleging, and very justly, that this was the *first time* that any such grounds of war, or dispute, had been mentioned by us.

These demands having been transmitted to the president, he, instead of listening to them, laid them before the congress, with an expression of his indignation at them; and in this feeling he appeared only to have anticipated his fellow citizens throughout the country, with the exception of a handful of aristocratical intriguers in the state of Massachusetts. New and vigorous measures were adopted for prosecuting the war. The congress hastened on bills for raising and paying soldiers and sailors; for making the militia more efficient; for expediting the building of ships; erecting fortifications; providing floating batteries. In short, it was now clearly seen, that the government of the republic was equal to a time of war as well as to a time of peace; that we had to carry on a contest, at 3,000 miles distance, against a brave, free, and great nation; and that the aristocratical faction, on whom some men had depended for aid, were sneaking off into pitiful subterfuges, afraid any longer to show a hankering after our cause.

In this state of things; with this prospect before them, the ministers wisely resolved to *abandon their demands*, and to make peace, *leaving things as they stood before the war*. The opposition, who had pledged themselves to the support of the war upon the *old* ground, that is to say, upon the ground of *impressment*, began to protest against it upon the ground of *conquest;* and if the war had continued, there is no doubt that they would have greatly embarrassed the ministry upon this subject, especially as the continuation of the war was the only remaining excuse for the continuation of *the war taxes*, against which petitions were preparing in every part of the kingdom. Here we cannot help observing how wise it was in Mr. Madison to *make public* our demands. If these had been kept secret till after the close of the war, how long might not that war have drawled on? The

demands would *never*, perhaps, have been known. How wise is it, then, in the Americans to have framed their government in such a way as to prevent mischievous state secrets from existing! How wise to have made *all* their rulers *really responsible* for their acts! How wise to secure, upon all important points, *an appeal to themselves!* The President was very coarsely treated here by some persons, who ought to have known better, for having *exposed the conferences*. It was said to be an act unprecedented in a *civilized* nation. "*Civilized nations*," you will perceive, mean nations governed by kings and other hereditary sovereigns; and, in that sense, the Americans certainly are not a *civilized* nation. But *why* should such papers be kept secret? Or, at least, why should they not be made public, if the government chooses to make them public? When once a government has despatches in its hands, there is no law that deprives it of the liberty to make what use of them it pleases. Nothing could be more fair than Mr. Madison's mode of proceeding. The aristocratical faction, whom we called our friends, were crying out for peace; the whole of the American people were represented, in our newspapers, as disapproving of the war, and as wishing for peace on our terms. What, then, could Mr. Madison do more just and more candid than publish to the people the whole of those terms? "There they are," said he, "decide upon them. Say, will you have peace upon these terms? I am, myself, ready to perish, rather than make such a peace. Now, let me hear what *you* have to say." A nation of free men agreed with him, that they would perish rather than yield to such terms; and, indeed, rather than yield to us "one single point," though of ever so little importance. The result has been, that peace has been made, *and not one single point has been yielded to us.*

We now come to the most important and most interesting part of our subject; namely, THE CONSEQUENCES of this peace, made at such a time, and under such circumstances. Considered as to its probable and almost necessary consequences, it is, in my opinion, an event of infinitely greater importance to the world than any that has taken place since the discovery of the Art of Printing. But I will not enter further into the subject, till I have laid before you, or, rather, put upon record, for the sake of reference, some of the overflowings of gall, which this event has brought from the throats of the sworn enemies of freedom. You have observed, that those public prints in England, which were the most bitter against Napoleon, have been also the most bitter against the American president; a fact which ought to make people reflect a little before they give way to such outrageous abuse of the former, though *we* must always regard him as a traitor to the cause of liberty, having married a king's daughter, made himself an emperor, and propped up and created kings, for the

sake of his and his family's aggrandizement. Still, it is clear, that the writers, whom I have now in my eye, *thought him more favourable to freedom than those who have succeeded him;* because, no sooner was he down, than they set upon the American president with the same degree of fury with which they had attacked Napoleon; and they recommended the *deposing of him*, upon "the *same principle*," they said, that they had recommended the deposing of Napoleon. *You* will not fail to have observed this, and to have traced it to its true source; but I am afraid that it has passed unobserved by but too large a portion of the nation.

There are several of our public prints, indeed, a very great majority of them, in country as well as in town, which have urged the *justice* and *necessity* of extinguishing the American government; that "*ill organized association;*" that "*mischievous example* of the *existence* of a government, founded on *democratical* rebellion." This peal was rung from one end of the country to the other. But the print, which led the van in this new crusade against liberty, was that vile newspaper, the *Times*, to which paper we and the world owe no small portion of those consequences which will result from the peace of Ghent, followed by such a war. This print was, upon this occasion, the trumpet of all the haters of freedom; all those who look with Satanic eyes on the happiness of the free people of America; all those who have been hatched in, and yet are kept alive by, bribery and corruption. To judge of the feelings excited in the bosoms of this malignant swarm by the peace of Ghent; to enjoy the spectacle of their disappointment and mortification; of their alternate rage and despondency; of the hell that burns in their bosoms; to enjoy this spectacle, a spectacle which we ought to enjoy, after having endured the insolence of their triumph for so many years; to enjoy this spectacle we must again look into this same print; hear their *wailing*, view the *gnashing of their teeth*, see now the foam of revenge, and then the drivel of despair, issue from their mouths, teeming with execrations. With the *help of the ministers*, we have, for once, beat the sons and daughters of corruption; and if we bear our success with moderation, let us, at any rate, hear and laugh at the cries of our always *cruel*, and, until now, insolent enemy. It is right, too, that the republicans themselves should know what these wretches *now* have to say; these wretches, whom nothing would satisfy short of the subversion of the republican government; short of destroying that "*mischievous example*, the existence of a government, founded on *democratical* rebellion." As far as I have been able to do it openly through the press, I have, during the war, as you will have perceived, made known the denunciations of these wretches against the liberties of America; and it may not be less

useful to make known their wailings, their fears, their despair at the peace ; and the republicans of America ought always to bear in mind, that these same wretches, who are ready to gnaw their own flesh at seeing their hopes of destroying liberty in America blasted ; they ought always to bear in mind, that these same wretches it was, who praised, and who still praise, the conduct of Governor Strong, Mr. Otis, Mr. Pickering, Mr. Goodloe Harper, Mr. Walsh the reviewer, and their associates. The FEDERALISTS, too, amongst whom there are many worthy men, look steadily at these facts ; and consider how it must stand with their reputation, when it is notorious, that *all* those in England who *praise*, or give the *preference* to them, have been using their utmost endeavours to urge this nation on to fight against America, until they saw " the *world delivered* of the *mischievous example* of the *existence* of a government, founded on the principles of *democratical rebellion.*" It is for the worthy part of the FEDERALISTS to consider if these notorious facts square with their reputation, whether as republicans, as freemen, as faithful to their country, or, even, as honest men. As to the Strongs, the Otises, the Goodloe Harpers, the Walshes, they have, in this way, nothing to lose. Every sound mind is made up with regard to *them*, and others like them ; but, I should think, that the *praises of the Times newspaper* must make the great body of the federalists look about them.

We will now reperuse the articles, to which I have so often alluded. I will insert them, without interruption, one after another, according to their dates, reserving my remarks, if any should be necessary, for the close; and requesting you to pay particular attention to the passages printed in *Italics*, or in CAPITALS.

29*th Dec.* 1814.—" Without entering at present into the details of the treaty, (on which we have much to observe hereafter,) we confess that we look anxiously to its non ratification ; because we hope an opportunity will be afforded to our brave seamen to retire from the contest, not, *as they now are, beaten and disgraced;* not with the *loss of that trident,* which Nelson, when dying, placed in his country's grasp; not *leaving the marine laurel on the unworthy brows of a Rodgers ;* but with an ample and full *revenge* for the captures of the *Guerriere*, the *Macedonian*, the *Java*, and the numerous other ships that have been *surrendered* on the ocean, besides the *whole flotillas destroyed on lake Erie and lake Champlain.* Let us not deceive ourselves. These victories have given birth to a spirit, which, *if not checked*, will, in a few years, *create an American navy truly formidable.* They have excited in other nations, who *foolishly* envy our maritime preponderance, an *undissembled joy*, at beholding our course *so powerfully arrested.* Perhaps it would not be asserting

too much, to say, that they have *detracted as much from the opinion of our strength by sea, as the victories of Wellington have enhanced that of our strength by land.*"

30th Dec. 1814.—"The state of the funds may be said to afford a most striking comment on the text of those who have the front to call the treaty of *Ghent* '*honourable*' to this country. What? An honourable peace with the last of our adversaries, with a populous and commercial nation, and yet a depression in the public funds! The thing is impossible. There is a moral inconsistency in the facts. But the truth, unhappily, peeps out in the course of the eulogy bestowed on this famous specimen of diplomatic ingenuity. The peace is, like that of Amiens, a peace of *necessity;* and upon what grounds? 'A leaning to certain points,' it seems, has been 'hinted' at the congress of Vienna. Now, let us put this mysterious language into plain English. It can bear no other construction than this, that Russia, or Austria, or Prussia, has avowed an inclination to support the innovations on public law, which Mr. Madison asserts. Might not this have been foretold? Was it not foretold in this paper above six months ago? Was it not the very argument we urged, for pushing the war in America with the utmost vigour, whilst yet the field was open, and our adversary without allies? And is it not a motive for the same conduct, even at this late period? If any of the powers who have received our subsidies, or have been rescued from destruction by our courage and example, have had the baseness to turn against us; it is morally certain, that the treaty of Ghent will confirm them in their resolution. They will reflect that we have attempted to force our principles on America, and have failed. Nay, that we have *retired from the combat with the stripes yet bleeding on our backs;* with the recent defeats at Plattsburgh, and on lake Champlain unavenged. To make peace at such a moment, they will think, betrays a deadness to the feelings of honour, and shows a timidity of disposition, inviting further insult. IF we could have pointed to America overthrown, we should surely have stood on much higher ground at Vienna, and everywhere else, than we possibly can do now. Even yet, however, IF we could but close the war with *some great naval triumph*, the reputation of our maritime greatness might be *partially restored;* but to say, that it has not hitherto suffered in the estimation of all Europe, and, what is worse, of America herself, *is to belie common sense and universal experience.* 'Two or three of our ships have struck to a force vastly superior!' No, not two or three, but many, on the ocean, and *whole squadrons on the lakes:* and their numbers are to be viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of the two navies. *Scarcely is there one American ship of war which has not to boast a victory over the British flag; scarcely one*

British ship in thirty or forty, that has beaten an American. Our seamen, it is urged, have, on all occasions, fought bravely. Who denies it? Our complaint is, that with the *bravest seamen*, and the most powerful navy in the world, we retire from the contest when the balance of *defeat* is so heavily against us. Be it accident, or be it misconduct, we inquire not now into the cause; the certain, the inevitable *consequences* are what we look to, and these may be summed up in a few words: *the speedy growth of an American navy*, and the recurrence of a new and *much more formidable American war.* From that fatal moment when the flag of the *Guerriere* was struck, there has been quite a rage for building ships of war in the United States. Their navy has been nearly doubled, and their vessels are of extraordinary magnitude. The people, naturally vain, boastful, and insolent, have been filled with an absolute contempt of our maritime power, and a furious eagerness to beat down our maritime pretensions. Those passions, which have been inflamed by success, could only have been cooled by what, in vulgar, but emphatic language, has been termed '*a sound flogging*;' but, unfortunately, our Christian meekness has induced us rather to kiss the rod, than to retaliate its exercise. Such false and *feeble humanity* is not calculated for the guidance of nations. War is, indeed, a tremendous engine of justice; but when justice wields the sword, she must be *inflexible.* Looking neither to the right nor to the left, she must pursue her blow, until the evil is *clean rooted out.* This is not blind rage, or blinder revenge; but it is a discriminating, a calm, and even a *tender* calculation of consequences. Better is it, that we should grapple with the *young lion*, when he is first fleshed with the taste of our flocks, than wait until, in the maturity of his strength, he bears away at once both sheep and shepherd. The Chatham, of 74 guns, (built in memory of the Walcheren expedition,) is ordered to be manned, and will, it is supposed, be sent to America, to strengthen the preparations for that extended system of warfare, which must take place if the president should delay the ratification of the treaty. We are well convinced, that every ship, and every soldier, employed in maintaining the vital contest for our maritime ascendency, far from diminishing, will add a proportional weight to our influence at Vienna; but in, truth, Vienna, and *all its fetes*, and *all its negotiations*, are infinitely *insignificant to us* NOW, compared with the *growth of an American navy*, and the probable loss of our transatlantic provinces."

2d January, 1815.—"The year which is just concluded will rank among the most remarkable in history. It has seen the downfal of the most formidable despotism that ever threatened the security of the civilized world. It has witnessed the restoration of a PATERNAL GOVERNMENT to the country

which had for five-and-twenty years passed through the greatest variety of afflicting revolutions. It has beheld all the sovereigns of Europe assembled personally, or by their representatives, *in peace*, to lay the foundations of permanent tranquillity, and to construct anew the social edifice, by the proportions of equity and moderation. ONE WORTHLESS, FAITHLESS HORDE ALONE PERSEVERED in *those atrocious plans*, which they had undertaken, in *concert with the fallen despot, for their own selfish aggrandizement.* Punishment hung over the *guilty heads* of these men, bankruptcy had swallowed up their resources, despair stared them in the face. It was hoped 'that *some signal instance of vengeance* would have been hurled against them,' and that the year would have closed with the triumph of *justice and of Britain.* ALAS! We have been compelled to witness not only the frustration of this hope, but the elevation of our calumniators and *assassins* to the height of insolent exultation, on the *ruins of our maritime greatness.* THE NAVY OF BRITAIN IS DISGRACED FOR EVER: and, oh! shame! the fame of the immortal Nelson is eclipsed by the vaunts of the vulgar braggart Rodgers. A Sunday paper asserts, that the ratification of the degrading treaty of Ghent, by an illustrious personage, was a duty MOST RELUCTANTLY PERFORMED.—— We doubt it not. The truly English feelings which prompted so zealous an adherence to the cause of *patriotism in Spain*, and to that of *loyalty in France*, must have been tortured beyond the power of words to express, by the fatal necessity (if necessity it was) which compelled the signing away the honour and future safety of THIS ONCE NOBLE COUNTRY! May the present year elapse *without producing* a confirmation of our sad forebodings! Our firmest hope lies, in the present instance, as it did during the negotiations of Chatillon, in the arrogant insanity of our adversary. In mulish obstinacy, Mr. MADISON is not a whit behind his great ally. In vanity and self-confidence, the FISKS, and CLAYS, and SMILIES, and WRIGHTS of the congress cannot be overmatched. It is, therefore, the firm persuasion of those who best understand American politics, that the treaty will not be ratified. For this event, we repeat, government ought to be fully prepared. The nation, too, ought to be satisfied, that a powerful army, and a general of the highest reputation, are *ready on the spot*, either to *compel* the enemy to ratify the treaty, or to punish its non-ratification. The officers of the class just specified have, moreover, a right to have their characters placed in a fair light before their countrymen; for in all companies, for some time past, have been heard murmurs, not loud but deep, at their apparent backwardness to appear in the field, where their services have been, and still are so much needed. If, contrary to our hopes and expectations, the treaty should be ratified, the consequences are

easy of development. The Americans, vain of what they will consider as their demonstrated superiority over us by land and sea, will dream only of more audacious pretensions, and new plans of conquest. Their regular army will be augmented, and placed on the Canadian frontier. *Their heavy metalled ships, and new steam batteries, will be multiplied with the utmost celerity.* Their intrigues to stir up rebellion in Canada will be redoubled, and, unhappily, with a far greater chance than ever of success, inasmuch as the Canadians will be but too apt to conceive their interests sacrificed by the present treaty. All this while WE SHALL BE BOUND OVER TO OUR GOOD BEHAVIOUR IN EUROPE; for the moment we embark *in war here*, the redoubtable Captain PORTER will again hoist the flag of FREE TRADE AND SAILORS' RIGHTS, and this will furnish at once a pretence and a signal for driving the hated English from Canada. How long the West-Indies will remain to us, after the loss of our North-American provinces, we leave to the sagacious calculations of those who can contrive a cheap and easy method of supplying our islands with flour, staves, and lumber, from other quarters; or who will secure to us the Newfoundland fishery, when we are expelled from the whole American continent. Little has been added to what the public already know of the treaty. Indeed, we have been assured, that what was circulated as the first slight sketch of its contents, gave rather too favourable an idea of it in two very material points, the Newfoundland fisheries, and the East-India trade. It was generally understood, we believe, that the Americans were specifically excluded both from the one and the other of these advantages; but the truth is, (says our informant,) "that neither of these points is mentioned in this impolitic treaty."

7th Jan. 1815.—"Our correspondent (at Paris) states, that since the unexpected news from Ghent, the *Americans at Paris* have been everywhere TREATED WITH THE MOST MARKED RESPECT. They have, in general, assumed, at all public places, *their national cockade*, both as a means of attracting to themselves those attentions, and also to prevent their being mistaken for English, and exposed as such *to the affronts* which of late have been openly shown to our countrymen."

Thus have we before us the wailings of the sons and daughters of corruption. There is, you perceive, one reigning fallacy in all these attacks on the peace; that is, it is all along presumed, and taken for granted, that our situation, with regard to America, would have become every day *better and better*, if the war had been continued. Now, so far from this being any thing like certain, it was not even probable, and was barely possible. The chances were all on the other side; the republicans had not only resisted, but had repulsed, the onset; they had followed up their blows with astonishing rapidity; and even at the moment when the conclusion of the

peace was announced, intelligence came to hand that they had just driven our army and fleet from Pensacola, a main hold, whence our next attack was intended to have been made.

"IF," says this trumpet of corruption, "our navy had struck some great blow; IF we had done" *this*, and done *that*, and done *the other*, then we might have made peace. But IF we *could do none of these;* IF we had failed in all our attempts; IF we had lost still more frigates and fleets, what would THEN have been our situation? The malignant wretches are senseless with rage. They are savage at the loss of their prey. You, who are an old hunter of wild beasts, may have seen something in the conduct of disappointed bears or wolves resembling that of these foes of freedom, who are now looking towards America, foaming with rage and roaring for revenge.

It is impossible not to feel great satisfaction at seeing the murderous wishes of these men disappointed. But our satisfaction ought by no means to rest here. The great question with regard to the excellence of *really free government* has now been decided in a way that must inevitably produce conviction throughout the whole world. The fate of the republic of France had excited great doubts in the minds of men disposed to cherish liberty, as to the capability of that sort of government to be carried on in practice for any length of time, especially if it had to contend with the difficulties and dangers of war. The enemies of liberty delighted in representing real freedom as incompatible with national *defence* and *independence*. When reminded of the government of America, they smiled, and observed, that it might do very well *as long as America remained at peace;* but that her first year of war would crumble it into dust, and expose to the mockery of the world the vain theorists who had extolled it. In short, this was the point always laboured at:—*That for a nation to be able to defend itself in time of war against a formidable enemy, it must have an almost despotic government, and a standing army, with all their retinue.*

How sincerely will *you*, who have so long, so zealously, and so ably maintained the contrary, rejoice to see that this position, so degrading to mankind, has now been fully disproved! You, in your excellent publications, and Sir Francis Burdett, in his speeches, have uniformly insisted, that the safe defence, and the only safe defence, of a nation against a formidable enemy, was to be found in *the arms of free men;* that, in order to induce a people to fight in defence of their country, they must feel that they have *something to fight for;* that the strength of a government, in the hour of real danger, consists solely of *the attachment of the people;* that a nation, enjoying real freedom, informed by a press really free, and all having *a voice in the choice of their represen-*

tatives, never yet was, and never would be, subdued by an invading enemy.

The rise, progress, and result of the American *wars* (I mean both of them) have now put the truth of these, your favourite doctrines, beyond all doubt. Where are now the knaves who have so long scoffed at you as a visionary, and who have had the profligacy to assert, that bribery and corruption were essential to *efficient* government? Where are now those who apprehended *anarchy* from *universal suffrage?* Where are now the sticklers for *influence* and *virtual representation?* In America every man who pays *a tax*, of any sort, however small, has a vote. He assists in electing, not only the members of the state legislators, and those of the congress, but also the governors of the states, and the president himself. No man has any authority, no man has any voice in making laws, who has not himself been elected, and in the election of whom every man paying a tax has a voice. Yet the world NOW SEES, that a government thus formed, and a people thus governed, are a match for the most formidable power at this day in existence. The world now sees, that a nation thus governing itself, and fully sensible of its freedom, is not only active in its defence, but is capable of deeds of valour, such as were never before recorded by the pen of the historian of any country or any age. Let the advocates for the buying and selling of seats do away, if they can, the effect of this glorious example.

The writer, whom I have above quoted, and who was so anxious to see "the world *delivered* of the *mischievous example*" of the existence of the American government, says, that our navy has been defeated; that it has been beaten upon the ocean and on the lakes; that we have been beaten by land and by sea; that we have been disgraced for ever; that we have retired from the contest with the stripes on our backs; that we have had the trident snatched from us; that we are scoffed at upon the continent of Europe. Now, then, if this be true, who is it that has thus humbled us? What mighty potentate has been able to accomplish all this? It is a *republic;* a nation whose chief magistrate receives only about 6,000*l.* a year, and the whole of whose ordinary revenue does not amount to so much as we, in England alone, pay *for collecting* our taxes; a nation without a standing army; a nation with a press through which *any* man may publish *any* thing respecting *any* public person or measure, or *any* opinion on the subject of religion; a nation without dukes, or lords, or knights, or esquires; and without any distinction of rank of any sort being known to the law; a nation without an established church, without tythes, or any compulsory payment to the priests of any worship; a nation where bribery and corruption are unknown; where no man calls another man "*master;*" and where

a handful of gold would not purchase from the labouring man the pulling off his hat even to his employers. The *consequences* of truths so striking, and now so notorious, are much more pleasing to anticipate than they would, I imagine, be safe to describe.

There are some who pretend, that the republic has *gained* nothing by the war; and those hireling gentlemen, who write in "the *Quarterly Review*," tell their readers, that she has made peace "without accomplishing *any one of the objects* for which she went to war." These hired critics are either wholly ignorant of the matter, or they are endeavouring to mislead their readers. At any rate, I will once more state the case, and then we shall see which party has been baffled in its attempts.

America declared war against our King, because he *would not cease to impress persons* (not being soldiers or sailors in the enemy's service) from on board her ships on the high seas. This was the ground of her declaration of war. A treaty of peace has been made, and that treaty *says not a word* about the impressing of persons on board of American ships. Therefore, say these wise reviewers, she has *not gained her object.* Poor slaves! they dare not look at the truth; which is this: America went to war with us, while we were at war with France, and while America was neutral. Our king having made peace with the French, there ceased to be any pretext for impressment; and that being the case, America was willing to make peace immediately, without any stipulation about impressment, because the war in Europe having ceased, her character of neutral would have ceased, and our impressments would also have ceased. She wanted no *stipulation* to protect her against what she always asserted to be a wrong, and which wrong she had *resisted by arms, until it ceased.* Accordingly, we find Mr. Monroe instructing the republican negotiators not to *bring forward* the subject, it being quite *unnecessary*, seeing that America had *resisted* our pretended right of impressment *by war*, and would, of course, resort to the same mode of resistance, if the execution of the pretended right should be revived. You will observe, too, that it was *our King's negotiators*, who brought forward the subject at Ghent. Therefore, if there was any defeat of object here, the defeat was on his side. We went to war to assert our right of impressment. We have made peace without obtaining any stipulation with regard to that right, real or pretended. If we revive the exercise of this right, at any future time, Mr. Monroe, in his published despatches, says, that America is ready again to resist it by force of arms.

The disappointed, malignant man, whom I have so largely quoted above, exclaims, that we are "now *bound to our good behaviour* in Europe;" for, that the moment we dare to go to war, we shall have Capt. Porter sally out upon us with "*freedom*

of commerce and sailors' rights" inscribed on his flag. Nothing is more probable. Indeed, it is quite certain, that the "bits of striped bunting" will bear this motto, if our king revives his orders of impressment. But the likely thing is, that his Majesty will *not revive* those orders; and then we shall have the happiness to see ourselves living in peace and friendship with the people of America, and shall be grateful to his Majesty for the blessing.

But has the republic *gained nothing* by the war? Has she gained no English ships? Has she gained no renown? Have the affairs of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, the Java, the Peacock, the Avon, those of Lakes Erie and Champlain, and Mobile and Pensacola, and Fort Erie and Fort Moreau; have these memorable actions, and many others, yielded her nothing in point of reputation in the world? Is it nothing to have been able, with her infant navy, to have *resisted* with success the maritime power of England single handed? Is it nothing to have called forth the admiration of the world by acts of bravery like that of the General Armstrong privateer at Fayal? Is it nothing to have made her implacable enemies in England express their mortification at seeing her citizens in Europe complimented wherever they go, in *consequence* of her success against such a mighty power? Is it nothing to have proved to the world, that, let who will attack her, she stands in need of no foreign aid; no hired fighters of other countries; but that her own citizens are equal, not only to her defence, but to the carrying of her "bits of striped bunting" in triumph into every sea, against even a superior force? Is it nothing to have shown, that, in the midst of such a war, which most people thought put her very existence in jeopardy, she has doubled, nay, quadrupled, her naval force, including her numerous important captures from us; and that she has steadily proceeded in the extension of her naval plans, buildings, and arsenals? Is it nothing to have proved, that her government, though free as air, is perfectly adequate to the most perilous of wars? Is it nothing to have thus entitled herself to the confidence of other nations, and made her *friendship* an object to be sedulously sought after by every power of Europe; and to have done this, too, in a war in which it was published that all these powers had, by a secret article in the treaty of Paris, bound themselves not to interfere? Is it nothing to have shown, that she wanted the interference of none of them; that she was able, single handed, to fight her own battles, and to come out of the contest, not only unmutilated, but covered with glory? Is it nothing for her chief magistrate; for that very Mr. Madison, whom our malignant and insolent writers, and others, marked out to be DEPOSED; is it nothing for Americans to have seen this their plain fellow citizen, with a salary of less than 6,000 pounds a year, with no heralds, guards, or gilded coaches, conducting her affairs, through this trying season, with

so much ability, so much firmness, and, at the same time, with such tenderness for liberty, as to refrain from a resort even to the mild law of his country against those who have made use of that liberty for purposes of the blackest and basest treason? Is *this* nothing, you venal English writers? Is this nothing? Is it nothing to hear the chief magistrate of a country say: "let my calumniators alone; let the traitors to freedom and America proceed; I rely on the good sense and the virtue of the people; the cause is the people's, and they will be my defenders?" Is *this*, too, nothing gained?

Yes, it is a gain, not only to America, but to mankind; for who will now be impudent enough to assert, that political freedom, that religious freedom, that a press wholly uncontrolled, are *incompatible with national safety in times of war?* Who, upon the ground of a *probability of invasion*, will call for a suspension of the laws made for the security of men's liberty and lives, when the world has now seen the republic of America declared in a state of rigorous blockade, mighty fleets and armies at the mouths of her harbours and rivers, her soil invaded at several points, her towns and villages bombarded or plundered, and her capital itself in flames, without producing the suspension, even for an hour, of any law, and without arresting or diverting the ordinary and gentle course of justice for a single moment?

I need say no more. Here is the object on which the friend of freedom will rivet his eyes. Here is a dagger to the heart of tyranny; and, as such, it is worthy of being presented to you. The total overthrow of the aristocratical faction in America; an immense emigration to that country; her consequently rapid increase of population and power; the creation of a great maritime force in the republic; the independence of South America. These are amongst the *consequences* to be expected; but that consequence which I consider of more importance than all the rest, is, the benefit which the cause of freedom will receive from the example of America, now become so conspicuous a nation. Away, *now*, with all their trumpery about Poland, and Saxony, and Belgium, and the Congress of Vienna! Let them do what they like with the Germans, and the Cossacks, and the Dutch; let them divide them and subdivide them in any manner that they please; let them whisker them or knight them according to their fancy. We can *now* look to growing millions of free and enlightened citizens, descended from the same ancestors, and speaking the same language, with ourselves, inhabiting an extensive and fertile country, tendering food and freedom to the miserable and oppressed of every other clime, and a PRESS for the promulgation of those truths which these unfortunate beings have so long been compelled to suppress.

I am, with the greatest regard and respect, your faithful and most obedient servant.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

[This letter has never before appeared in print, as far as we can discover. We received it, in manuscript, about the same time that we learnt our proposals for publishing Cobbett's Letters had been received in England. The reasons for suppressing this letter in the Register, we cannot understand. We received it in a mutilated state, and there were about twenty lines which we were utterly unable to decipher. It was addressed to the Publishers of Cobbett's Letters, in an envelope, without a line accompanying it.]

TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

My Lord,

WITHIN the last week I have received a bundle of American newspapers, for which I am indebted to a gentleman of that country, who left them with my publisher, with the remark, that he did not wish to see me; that I was personally unknown to him, but that he presumed I would turn them to good account. I really did not know what better account I could put them to, than to peruse them instantly, and inform your lordship of their contents.

The first paper I laid my hands on, was, what they call in America, a country paper, and is published twice a week: it was headed, in *large capitals*, GLORIOUS NEWS! UNPARALLELED VICTORY! obtained by the AMERICAN ARMS, under GENERAL JACKSON, *at New-Orleans.* This, naturally enough, caught my attention, and without disturbing another of them, I sat down to read it, thinking that you might like to hear what kind of a story Jonathan told of this battle; very little of which, as regards matter of fact, has as yet come to the ears or understandings of the enlightened people of this island. Should I tell you that it was with astonishment that I read of this unexampled defeat and carnage of the forces, under Major-General Pakenham, the brother-in-law of our own immortalized living general, the Duke of Wellington and Marquis of Talavera; should I so say, I, who have so often told you, so often forewarned you of what would be the fate of all the armies you should send to America, should I own to you my astonishment at their being beaten and driven off the field by a Yankee general, what would your lordship think? You certainly could not suppose, that in this hour of your mortification I would attempt to insult your feelings, by presuming to flatter you; or, that I would give you credit for plans and operations which have met every disaster, by saying that they merited otherwise. No, indeed, it is from no insulting motive of flattery, against which, I

know your deadly antipathy, but from real downright truth that I now declare to you, that when I read this disastrous account, astonishment is but a weak word to express my feelings. My lord, I was amazed! I was under the agony of an ague, and the very highest paroxysm of fever. I, who have ever said, from the day of the sailing of the 44th and 85th regiments, under General Ross, that they only went to meet disgrace; and which has proved as sure, as many other things which I have told you. I, who have ever and anon, been repeating to you, that your sappers, your miners, and your rocketmen, were nothing at all in comparison to a Kentucky rifle, in the hands of a back-woodsman; shall I again own it, even I was amazed. I will not impose upon you, by saying, that I did not most religiously calculate, that the whole army under General Pakenham would be beaten, had they been twice the number: and you must recollect, my lord, that I deprecated the cruelty of sending men from the continent to America, who were but just panting from their fights and fatigues in Spain and in France; yet, although I calculated on their being beaten, I did not expect to see them shot down, one hundred men, rank and file, for one of the enemy. No, this would indeed be arrogance, should I say it; it would be assuming a foresight for disaster, of which, I assure you, I have no pretensions; and had I ventured to predict it, I should have merited a strait waistcoat. But as I said, I really expected all your forces would be beaten. I expected to hear of hard fighting, and a bloody business on both sides, but I candidly confess that I never dreamed of hearing of a slaughter of five thousand British troops, and that in all this havock, the enemy in killed and wounded, should not exceed twenty-three solitary militiamen. This account, if it was not corroborated by such testimony as would silence the most sceptical, I would put behind the fire. It would be a pleasure to me if I doubted it; but I assure you it looks to be too true! Such a havock as this, was never before made in a British army. The American papers state the force landed, as being only between nine and ten thousand men, one half of which was killed. We had the opinion here, that this force amounted to sixteen thousand men; had it been thirty thousand, it would have shared the same fate.

This military miracle, for I can call it nothing else, really places all Buonaparte's former victories in the shade; they bear no comparison; in a word, it has not its parallel any where. The strongest fortress that ever was besieged, Gibraltar itself; refer to history my lord, I beg of you, for three hundred years, and see if you find any thing like it. Gracious God! It is too shocking for animadversion. Half a dozen more such expeditions, and I fear we should have scarcely men left to walk the parade at St. James's, or to change duty at the Horse Guards.

And now, are you not satisfied that I have not been your enemy, as many of your particular friends and advisers would have you think me? You must not cast blame upon me, because I did not tell you that this dreadful unprecedented catastrophe would be the result of your expedition to the southern coast of America. You must acknowledge you never informed me of its destination, or what was expected from it; indeed, if you had so far condescended, although I should, without doubt, have forewarned you that it would have met defeat, I never would have gone so far as to say, that the whole army, or the greater part of it, would be killed, without scratching their enemy.

And here, I must not omit mentioning the reward which the American congress bestowed upon their gallant officer, General Jackson. Gallant, I am forced to call him, although he has been our severest enemy. I find in the paper before me, of the 6th of February, (the latest I have,) that Mr. Troup, a deputy from Georgia, recommended the adoption of a resolution, that the thanks of congress be presented to General Jackson, and, through him, to the brave officers and men under his command; and that the president be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck and presented to him. This resolution was twice read, and referred to the committee of the whole house, and I regret that I have not the papers which confirm it, although I have no doubt but that it met a unanimous adoption. This is the reward which the American government are in the habit of showing to bravery; and the bravest man in it neither looks for, nor expects, a greater remuneration. Had General Jackson been less skilful, yet, had he shown perseverance, bravery, and patriotism, he would have received the approbation of his countrymen and his conscience, though, perhaps, not the thanks of congress. But alter the position, and let us suppose that Sir Edward Pakenham had been successful; what would you and the British parliament have done for Sir Edward? Would a dukedom have been too much for him had he gained possession of the *embouchure* of the Mississippi, that great key to all the commerce of the western states, even to the heart of Pennsylvania? Would the dukedom of Orleans, in reversion, with a grant of as many thousand pounds sterling as there are stars in the firmament, been too much, in your imagination, for the man who would have possessed himself of this magical padlock and key, which opened or closed at pleasure, the gates of all the commerce of a country seven times as large in extent as England and Scotland together? And yet, my lord, the American general who defended this all-important *passe par tout*, more important than that of your secret cabinet, and who, in defending it, gave such a lesson of military self defence as never army of the earth received before, is, doubtless, well contented, satisfied, and grateful, with the thanks of his countrymen; and I

would wager that he values the little gold medal, in weight not above a doubloon, full as much, or more than you or your generals would value the dukedom and the estate. This is neither more nor less than the effect of education and habit. The American officer, or private, when he takes the field to defend his country, has but one object in view—to do his duty. Aggrandizement, military or civil honours never trouble his imagination: he has enlisted to fight, and fight he will; if honours accompany his exertions, so much the better. Pensions, places, and pecuniary recompenses, are, as yet, unknown amongst this people; and I should not be surprised, on the disbandment of the army, if General Jackson himself should return to the ranks of private life, without one sixpence more pay than that which his commission entitled him to.

There are various excuses to be made for your lordship in this late warfare, as well as for Don Quixotte when he fought the windmills—you had both mistaken your adversaries; but there is one excuse, to wit, that of taking wholesome advice, which you cannot lay claim to. Had the Knight of the Rueful Visage listened to Sancho, he had not been unhorsed; and had you listened to me, you had not been prostrated with the Prince Regent's speech in your hand, promising to close the war with glory to the arms of England. My lord, there are men who will not take advice from those who are able to give it them; among the number "I reckon," as they say in America, yourself. Had you known these people whom you dreamed you could flog into submission but half as well as I do; had you known their thorough contempt for pomp, for grandeur, for titles, and for many other things which your lordship's generals, as well as your lordship, prize above all other considerations, you never would have been led into the error of thinking, that by threats, by rods, or by bribes, you could succeed in subduing them. I reassert it, my lord; they are a wonderful people, and such you must admit you have found them. There is not such a people in the world beside: and the reason they are such a people, is, as I have oftentimes said before, that each man feels his independence; he has not in this world a superior, whom he regards or looks up to with awe. Not that this people do not do justice to talents and virtue; they respect and honour them, but they worship them not; indeed, they rather watch them, knowing that superior talents, if misapplied, may mislead and do much injury. They regard with reverence and awe, nothing less than the Divinity, or his image upon earth; and if they have a weak side, on which they can be assailed without suspicion, it is this one. The clergy, and the clerical officers, are held, throughout this extended region, in more respect than the established clergy of our country are in England. The reason is obvious: with them they have hitherto been the pastors and protectors, the advisers and the friends, and, under the man-

tle of the sacred order, they have bound the will as well as the duty. With us it is different: the abuses of religion are more spoken of among us than its benefits. Hence it is, that if these people have a weak point, it is here you must look for it; and I have already observed and remarked on it in the state of Massachusetts, in different letters I have written, which, I trust, may do good in opening the eyes * * * * * * * * * *

(*About ten lines defaced.*)

* * * * * the poorest man in this country cherishes the idea that his son has as fair a chance for the highest offices as the richest man's son in the land; and General Jackson himself, who has certainly achieved a greater land victory than any your lordship can cite from all the numerous bulletins of slaughter, in the archives of *******, never was educated for a military life, nor did his father before him ever dream that his son should immortalize himself at the cannon's mouth, or in the deadly breach. These acts, and this spirit, which display themselves among this people, are momentary; what their duration may be, henceforward, will depend much upon the policy of England: they are now approximating to a military people; if you fan that flame, my lord, I will not answer where the conflagration shall cease.

I never get into America, but my subject runs away with me; I am obliged to return to my starting post. Here lays the map of this surprising country, and its extensive environs, which Sir Edward Pakenham was to have subdued. I trace with my finger the meanderings of the Ohio, from its junction with the Monongahela and waters of the Alleghany at Pittsburgh, down to ——, its falling into the Mississippi stream, nearly a distance of 3,000 miles. Here, indeed, I must own you made a bold move, to say the least of it, when you directed the attack against New-Orleans. What, my lord, are you doubtful of the boldness of this measure? Of the grandeur of this conquest? Next to your taking possession of the mountains, valleys, and level land, in our sister planet, by a squadron of balloons under Garnerin, it certainly would have proved the most entertaining circumstance, and the most productive of astonishing events, that has enlightened us within the century.

I have said, that General Jackson was not educated for a military life; I made the assertion, which is uncommon with me, without being positive as to the fact; but taking it for granted, that affairs, as regarded military minutiæ, on the breaking out of the war, were pretty nearly as I left them in that country, I considered that I did not hazard much in saying so; however, in perusing my newspapers, (and I write as I read, with the view of aiding information,) I met with an account of this said General Jackson's career, and it confirms what I have before said. The account I have read is taken from a paper printed in Virginia,

called the Richmond Inquirer: It states that he was born in North Carolina, and educated for the bar; that he was a member of the Tennessee convention; then, a member of assembly; and, afterwards, a senator of the United States; since that, a judge of the supreme court: that after having filled this station with honour, he turned his attention to military life, and soon rose to be a major general of militia. The account speaks highly of his private character and disposition, and states that he is about fifty-five years of age.

This is the way, my lord, that these people make their generals; or, rather, I should say, this is the manner they have hitherto made them. We have our black gowns, and wigs with three tails, our counsellors, our barristers, and judges, but we rarely see any of them turn out, and take the tented field. As regards wigs, no man in America, that has hairs enough to keep his head warm, whether he belong to the bar or the pulpit, ever thinks of troubling a periwig-maker's shop; with us, we call them perfumers. Yet, although they don't wear wigs, they are not without wits; and I assure you, that they esteem the inside of the head as of much more value than the out. I have repeatedly mentioned, whether I am believed or not, I can't say, that you can scarcely find a man in that country who cannot read and write; and that the village blacksmith is frequently seen to put down the Gazette, to shoe a traveller's horse. Thus it is that General Jackson, after having been a member of a convention, a member of assembly, a senator, and a judge, commences, in what we would call the decline of life, the arduous profession of arms; and this, with motives very different from pecuniary ones; for his private fortun is said to be independent. Now, I believe I might assert, that such an instance is not found among us once in fifty years, and I am inclined to believe, they would be scarce, even in the alarm of French invasion. It really would be ludicrous to see some of those non-descripts we meet with at Doctor's Commons, performing the manual under a drill sergeant.

My lord, history has hitherto confined herself to the *Maid* of Orleans, and the exploits she performed against our Henry's generals, Talbot and Salisbury. Hereafter, it will speak of the *Man* of Orleans, and it is as well we should know who he was; and although not, like the maid, inspired by a religious phrensy, he was certainly inspired to do us more mischief in one fatal hour than a twelvemonth can repair. Whatever idea you may have of my heart, I assure you, in the language of sincerity, it aches on this occasion. Would to God, I had not to record it! This battle has cost me some agonies, in common with many others of his majesty's subjects. The British troops, on that day, immortalized themselves for their bravery; never was more heroic gallantry displayed by men. The Americans themselves attest it;

and there were brave spirits who fell on that field, deserving of a better memorial than the temper of the times can now afford them, whose valour should live in marble and in brass.

My lord, we have met dreadful humiliations in this contest: the supremacy of the British flag has been destroyed in the eyes of all Europe, and, what is still worse, in our own. All our demonstrations by land, have met with disaster upon disaster, not to say disgrace, except in one solitary instance—I mean the attack upon the capitol of Washington; and here we displayed a ferocity in setting fire to the president's house, and burning a library, for which the Americans pretend to accuse us of Vandalism. Notwithstanding all the injuries at home and abroad, which this unnecessary war has inflicted on us, the Times paper, when it heard that peace had been concluded at Ghent, instead of rejoicing, was the first to throw a firebrand in its face. "Let us" says the Times, "yet see one of our first generals sent out. Let us behold a British force in America, capable of intimidating Madison and his congress. Let us hope to see the war concluded with one blow, that may not only chastise the savages into present peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears." This is the language held out to deceive, and to irritate passions which should be assuaged. What would the Times want? What kind of generals? What kind of armies would he send out to subdue that country, which he considers as easily intimidated as the island of Jersey or Guernsey? Have we not had generals of the first talents, and the best of veteran troops employed? What a Drummond, a Ross, a Pakenham, and a Gibbs, could not perform with a hundred thousand men, who could? Had the Duke of Wellington been at Orleans, what would have prevented his sharing the fate of Pakenham? He has no more claim to invulnerability than another man, and a Kentucky rifle would no more have missed fire, if directed against him, than against another—its mark it never misses.

The American papers state, that the watchword and countersign of the English army was, *booty and beauty;* for the honour of English officers, I doubt this statement. If one brave man was alive, who fell on that field, I could ascertain the fact; and if I found the statement false, I would desire the Americans to contradict it, which I am convinced they would do upon a refutation properly authenticated. These people are generous as well as brave; they have displayed their generosity in many instances, which must have made an impression even upon yourself: they would use their best endeavours to take the life of their enemy; but they would no more strip him of his honour than they would a wounded soldier of his shirt. This assertion of the American newspapers is a stigma on all the military of the kingdom. As you, my lord, can easily ascertain the fact, I beg of you, if found,

as I believe it, a misstatement, that you will, for the honour of the army, contradict it.

And now, before I close this letter, which I intended should not tire you, being written on a subject which I entered upon with pain. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * (*Here twelve lines, and upwards, are entirely defaced, and without any connection we read*)—a corrupted majority denationalizes a state, and weakens its energies. (*Another break of about six lines.*) Fortune has apparently been propitious—what we have lost by one contest we have gained by another. Let us not lose this also. I adjure you to reflect on what ground it is we stand—a few missteps, and we might find ourselves plunged into miseries, against which there is no combating, and no retreat.

Above all, let me impress upon you, to be sincere in this pacification with America; endeavour to forget that she ever had been a colony to Great Britain. This is the most pernicious recollection we have among us; and I know that among many of your counsellors and bosom intimates, and even by many members of the royal family, this ridiculous recollection is still maintained, and the idea still cherished, that she might become so again. It is an illusion of the weakest, as well as the most injurious stamp. If you wish to avoid another war with these people, which I forewarn you will prove the most calamitous one that Britain ever waged, you must treat them as an independent and high-minded people. Should you do this, and curb the insolence of petty officers in our navy, who disgrace their flag by usurping an authority to which they have no title, you may succeed in making friends of a nation, which, in a few years to come, will hold the highest rank in the estimation of the world. Let the disasters of this war be constantly before your eyes, and do not believe that a prolongation of it would have produced any changes for the better. The wisest step, since its commencement, was its conclusion; for had it continued another year———but I forbear, my lord, I wish not to provoke an irritation; things that are past had better be forgotten, provided our memories will admit of it. Botley is still a very pleasant place, notwithstanding my year's confinement in Newgate, and the money I paid to his majesty.

Did I think that you would accept of advice from a man who really has never deceived you, and who has told you more truths about America than you ever learnt from any man living, I would recommend you to admonish the prince, if he wishes to preserve the interests of his kingdom, to place the commercial relations with America on the most favourable footing. The late contest has lost us much, and cost us more, than I can pretend to keep an account of; of this, however, you, my lord, need no information. A part of this loss may yet be retrieved, but it must be by wiser measures than we have hitherto adopted. Let

me caution you not to drive the people of America to become a manufacturing nation; should you do this, you lose a third of your strength. You may consider this as a preposterous idea; but I assure you I see symptoms of their becoming one much earlier than I ever imagined. This has been one of the many serious evils resulting from the misunderstanding with America; I view it as one of the greatest; and should you have any doubts on this head, you may easily satisfy them, my lord, by engaging an able linguist in all our various vernacular tongues, and travelling through the different manufacturing towns in England and Scotland, when, I engage, you shall find my fears are not without foundation.

I am, my lord, yours respectfully,

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, March 20, 1815.

FINIS.