



R E F L E C T I O N S

O N T H E

Present State of Affairs, &c.



[Price One Shilling and Six-pence.]

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

Present State of Affairs

AT

HOME and ABROAD.

BY A. Y * * * *, Esq;

Author of the Theatre of the present War in North
America.



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DEDICATION.

T O T H E

Right Honourable

WILLIAM PITT, Esq;

S I R,

IN writing this little
work, I have taken
a the

ii DEDICATION.

the greatest care to avoid flattering any party, and to offend none. It was proper therefore to pursue the same plan in this dedication, which encouraged me to address it to you.

DEDICATION. iii

If censure be that tax,
to which only the eminent
are liable, praise is a tri-
bute which can only be
claimed by them ; and as
it is sacrilege to prostitute
it to the undeserving, it
is not less impious to re-
fuse it to the most worthy
of mankind.

iv DEDICATION.

All the virtues which render a man amiable in private life, joined to eloquence, public spirit, and heroick resolution, the most shining qualities which can adorn a statesman, are so confessedly in the possession of Mr. P I T T, that I look upon myself to be
as

DEDICATION. v


as secure from the suspicion of flattery in this address, as I am conscious it is remote from my intention. I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant,


A. Y.



Advertisement.

SINCE these sheets were sent to the press, my prediction has been accomplished with respect to Guardaloupe, as the reader will observe in the perusal of them ; and I hope the Conquest of Martinico will speedily concur in proving to the world that I am no false prophet,

A. Y.






R E F L E C T I O N S

O N T H E

Present State of Affairs, &c.

 HIS small tract is introduced to the public, neither with a dedication, preface, or introduction; these in general are intended more to prepossess the reader in the author's favour, than for any other purpose. All I shall say concerning the following lines, is to assure the reader that the reflections contained in them are very candid, and entirely impartial, and wrote to pleasure no particular party or Faction. I hope the

A

public

public will be both instructed and entertained with the following tract, but that must be left to time to determine.

We are now advanced pretty deep in the present war against France ; success has been much divided ; our affairs in the beginning wore a gloomy appearance, we lost that valuable fortress Minorca, a constant bad success attended a just cause in North America, and our trade suffered greatly by the french privateers ; it is true, we were demolishing the french trade at the same time, but not with so rapid a success as we did in the late war ; but at this present time, when our affairs are governed by ministers who have the good of their country at heart, I thank God the tables are turn'd, we have seen a better success attend our men of war and privateers in destroying the enemy's trade ; that important place, which is of so much consequence to this nation, Louisbourg, is taken ; we have seen the french coast insulted by a british navy, their fortifications demolished, and their ships burnt in their own harbours : in North America we likewise exult in our turn, and even now make use of the natural power which we have in that country to a good purpose, the french have been defeated, and fort Frontenac is demolished. We have
like-

likewise been pretty successful in the West Indies, in ruining the enemy's trade; and, in all probability, the force which is now sent thither, under Mr. Hopson, will give a good account of some of the french islands: but the thing which is of the greatest consequence to us, is an expedition against Quebec; if that city was in our possession, we might with reason demand our own terms at a peace, not only for ourselves, but even for our allies. But to desist from these general reflections, and to proceed; I will begin with some remarks on the present state of affairs on the continent of Europe.

Never was the state of affairs in a more interesting crisis than at present; a man cannot recal to mind the late unexpected change in the system of Europe, without amazement; and I think it is almost impossible to conceive that the present unnatural connections on the continent can subsist a considerable time; I mean, longer than the next peace. Let any man reflect on the natural consequence of the present posture of affairs, and I make no doubt but he will be of the same opinion. It is not many years since the queen of Hungary was the darling of the times; her praise was celebrated by every mouth, and it was then

then thought we could not do too much for the house of Austria, our natural ally, and accordingly was liberal to the last degree of our blood and treasure in her defence ; then the king of Prussia was looked upon in the most infamous light ; he was a lawless invader, and an infractor of treaties. But how strangely are things reversed ? the queen of Hungary is abused as a most ungrateful monster, and the once hated king of Prussia is become the sole reigning favourite.

So strange an alteration in the general plan of politicks all Europe over has taken place, that it naturally leads us to consider the grounds of so surprizing a change. France is certainly the secret cause of the present commotions that distract all Europe, this will always be disowned by the french, but I think to every impartial man who traces things to the very beginning it will appear very clear. The empress queen, tho' possess'd both of ambition and revenge would have found those passions too expensive for her to gratify, had it not been for the secret assistance she received from the french court ; without this assistance neither Russia nor Saxony could have been brought to tread in those paths which have since been so destructive to both those powers, but more particularly so

to

to the latter. France was embroiled in an unequal contest with England upon the continent of North America, she fought to change it into an european war in which the electorate of Hanover was to be a pledge for the conduct of Great Britain. In this state it became necessary for us to think of new alliances, and in this extremity we cast our eyes on Ruffia, and we accordingly signed the treaty of Peterburgh, which has been as much extolled as it has been censured, but then as affairs were, it certainly was but a prudent precaution : by this treaty Ruffia was to furnish us with 15000 horse and 40000 foot, to be transported and maintained by her in case we or our allies should be attacked. This at first sight seems very plain to have been designed to put a check to the designs of the french, whose interest it was to draw us into a continental war, in order to do which it was necessary to light up the flame in Germany, thinking that would be sufficient to answer the desired end.

In this critical conjuncture it was undoubtedly the interest of Prussia to keep every thing still in Germany, he therefore openly declared that his intention was to hinder the march of any foreign troops into Germany, whether French or Ruffians,
 &c.

&c. for the king of Prussia knew very well that if the french moved to attack Hanover, or any of the british allies, that in consequence of her treaty, Russia would be obliged to march to their defence and that he should be involved in the perplexities he strove to avoid.

This procedure of the king of Prussia gave rise to the treaty between our king in quality of elector of Hanover and the court of Berlin ; tis thought this was the reason of the Russians turning enemies of the king of Prussia, but there is not the least foundation for the supposition, for no man can possibly think otherwise than the court of Russia formed bad designs against his prussian majesty, long before his connections with us. As to the scheme for the recovery of the dutchy of Silesia, it is very evident, that this was agreed to some time before, altho' that province had been ceded by the empress queen to the king of Prussia in the most solemn manner at three different times, by the treaties of Breslau, Dresden, and afterwards by that of Aix la Chappelle in october 1748. Such is the faith of princes ! Nevertheless it has been proved by the king of Prussia in the most clear manner, that Saxony was to accede to the treaty concluded between the empress

press queen and the empress of Russia, by which treaty hostilities were only to commence in case the king of Prussia should be the aggressor, from which time the interesting parties tortured their invention to find some plausible reason to consider him in that light : the result of so much treachery and falsehood was a resolution taken in a great council held october 1755 to attack the king of Prussia without further discussion, whether that prince should happen to attack any of the allies of the court of Russia; or one of the allies of that court should begin with him.

From what I have said it appears I think pretty plain that the treaty of Versailles was not occasioned by our treaty with Prussia. The french had long before been tampering with the court of Vienna.

Any instrument of revenge against Prussia was agreeable to the empress queen, otherwise she would never have consented to an alliance with France, her old inveterate and natural enemy : But urged by her own implacable malice on one side, and tempted by the cajoling arts of the french on the other, she became the dupe of their policy, and even suffered them to take possession of part of her dominions. This ap-

appear'd very plain, for when his britannic majesty demanded of the court of Vienna the stipulated succours, in consequence of an apparent design in France to attack his electoral dominions, those succours were denied.

Then was the time, and not 'till then, that his majesty of Great Britain found it necessary to conclude an alliance with the king of Prussia: So that this alliance cannot properly be said to have produced the treaty between the courts of Vienna and Versailles, but rather the previous knowledge of their mutual enrigues seems to have occasioned the treaty with Prussia.

How strange the consequences of this great change in the political system of Europe appear at present! We now see our old ally the house of Austria (for whom we have wasted such mines of gold and rivers of blood) in arms for her antient and natural enemy, France, an enemy that has on all occasions for many hundred years done all that was possible to level the house of Austria in the dust. We see the king of Prussia, who formerly was so docile, that his armies march'd according to the dictates of the court of Versailles, now the most dreadful enemy France has on the continent,
 who

who now puts a fatal bar, upon the perfidy and ambition of the french court.

Who could have imagined that France, Austria, Russia, Saxony, and Sweden, would all at the same time attack the king of Prussia who a few years ago was looked upon by all Europe to be but a petty potentate, and who could much less have supposed that this petty prince would have been able to have stood against these united enemies, and even to carry the war, which they themselves had lighted up, into the very bowels of their own dominions.

But, to proceed. In the midst of a security grounded upon the faith of the germanic body, the house of Austria, the empress of Russia, the kings of France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and Sardinia, and the States General, the french have entered the electorate of Hanover, and laid it waste by fire and sword: Men in our circumstances cannot be silent, whose case is so very greivous; but can any man think it will stop here. All Europe is involved in the fate of this electorate: By this method of invasion the french have violated the laws of nations, which is common to all, and introduced such maxims as tend to destroy the whole commerce of mankind.

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They therefore who have power, must consider that their own safety is in danger, if they delay the resentment of such infringements of the publick faith of treaties: for it is evident that the fortune of Europe is soon to be decided; either France must be permitted to take possession of countries at her pleasure, or the arms of all nations must unite to stop her progress.

We have seen Hanover in the possession of a french army, and treated with a barbarity which one would not expect from a nation which boasts of its humanity, and politeness, had we not before seen the manner that nation has treated the counties which through the chance of war has had the misfortune to be overcome by superior numbers; witness the Palatinate.

I cannot help observing here the extreme bad conduct of our court in their plan for the defence of this electorate. How ill judged it was to send his royal highness the duke of Cumberland, with an army so much inferior to the french that all they could do was to be witnesses of the enemies success, and even the few troops they had were so ill provided with all necessaries, particularly artillery, that the french general could encamp within cannon shot of the hano-

hanoverian army, when the duke's artillery would not reach the french ; so manifest a disadvantage one may easily suppose our enemies made the best of : and accordingly, the enemy were constantly cannonading the hanoverians, while themselves were in perfect safety.

And here we are very naturally led to mention the scandalous state in which the electorate of Hanover was in with respect to its defence, that an electorate which maintains 40000 men should have no magazines, no arsenals, nor no cannon of above 15 pounders ; these are matters of fact, which speak nothing very much in favour of the regency of Hanover, however to save an inquiry, which must be equally disagreeable to the reader and myself, I will proceed.

It has been insinuated, I know not with how much reason, that the duke of Cumberland signed the convention of Stade by order of his B——c M——y.

If this is the case let any one but take the trouble to look over a map of Germany, and I believe he will easily perceive that his P——n M——y has very good cause of complaint against the conduct of the

army of observation (a very good name!) and which was published in the Utrecht gazette from Berlin. It is there very rightly observed, that if that army after the battle of Hastenbeck had marched directly toward Wolfenbüttele, and taken post behind that town, or Magdeburg, or Halberstadt, it might have waited securely under the cannon of Magdeburg for the junction of the prussian forces, instead of which it turned off to the lower Wesel, retiring successively from Hamelen to Nyenburg, Verden, Rottenburg, Boxtelhude, and lastly, to Stade; where for want of assistance and elbow room, they were made all prisoners of war, with the greatest ignominy. They made a march of 150 miles to get themselves coop'd up in a corner, instead of taking the other road, which was only about 100 miles, and would have lead them to a place of safety; by this unaccountable conduct, as they farther observe from Berlin, the king of Prussia was deprived of the assistance of 30,000 good troops which in the close of the campaign might have put him upon an equality with the french and the army of the empire; whereas according to the best accounts he had not above 45,000 men to face them with, when he should have had 75,000 which was thought sufficient
to

to force the french to take up their winter quarters on this side the Wefer.

In this uncommon state of Europe, the ruin of Prussia was daily expected; but providence which baffles human policy has directed events quite contrary to all human expectation. We have been taught by the surprizing operations of the late campaign, that the strong ought never to be confident, nor the weak dejected. The king of Prussia has miraculously defended himself, against the powerful and unequal combination formed against him, his enemies who secure of conquest had parcelled out his dominions as a prey to the confederacy, have had the mortification to find him take possession of their own.

He has taught all Europe a lesson of wisdom and fortitude, and he has hitherto triumphed over all the efforts of superior force against him, by a glorious conduct, which has made his name revered and dreaded by his enemies, and admired with surprize and veneration by his friends. But to account for so surprizing a change, we should consider that his prussian majesty is at this day at the head of the best armies in Europe; we should also remember that his many great victories have disheartned
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his enemies ; we should consider in what a pitiful manner the french were drove home, the austria's have been successively defeated, the russians driven back, the sweeds conquer'd, and as for poor Saxony, I leave any man to judge of the condition in which she is involved. Such great success is owing to his prussian majesty's prudence in foreseeing what would be requisite to carry on the war ; for in our times it is wealth that supports arms, and even the conquering a whole kingdom wo'nt maintain the army that conquers it, at least this is very seldom the case : if an army was to receive no other pay than what they make by plunder, the general of that army especially, if he be their sovereign, fights to great advantage, his enemies country supplies him with clothing and provisions, and by that means he is able to expend his revenue in those articles only where it is absolutely necessary.

It was his prussian majesty's wisdom that made him foresee and provide for the demands which he found were likely to be necessary ; and in this manner by proportionating the means suitable to the ends he had in view, his conduct has been extolled by those who judged only by the event, and admired in silence by those who looked into it more closely.

How stupidly ignorant or partial must they be, who condemn his puffian majesty so greatly for his prudence, which taught him that it was better to avert the danger he was in, rather than await it, and this induced him to strike the first open blow, for tho' the attempt was hazardous, and the consequence uncertain, still such a step was quite necessary.

But this wise prince finding that a war was unavoidable, and likewise knowing that his own dominions were by no means able to sustain it, as they would be entirely ruined if made the seat of war, he resolved very wisely to lay that burthen on his enemies shoulders, and the great advantage he has made of Saxony, sufficiently proves the good policy of this monarch's proceeding. Hence it is that this king has been able to carry on one of the most expensive and burthensome wars, at his enemies expense, without laying any additional taxes on his own subjects.

The interest of the three great contracting parties to crush the king of Prussia, clash very much with each other. The ambitious views of France, which have always been pursuing their plan of universal monarchy, and can never take place 'till the
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the house of Austria is disabled, will sooner or later disgust the queen of Hungary. And it is far from being improbable, that the Czarina has meditated a separate peace with the king of Prussia; for she must soon be sensible that she is made the dupe of her allies, and she then may possibly turn her arms against the invaders of his britanic majesty's electoral dominions, in revenge of the conspiracy, which on her first coming to the crown the french ambassador formed to dethrone her.

It is to me very surprizing that the germanic body should so little consider their own interest as to furnish their assistance to the ruin of their own constitution; how can it be for their advantage that France and the house of Austria should join their arms to crush a member of the germanic body? — So long as these princes continue to favour the designs of France so long are they courting their own ruin; instead of joining with so powerful a league, as that between France and Austria, they ought to assist the king of Prussia with all their forces in order to preserve some balance of power in that country, they (at least the protestant princes) should remember that the king of Prussia at his entrance into
Saxony

Saxony declared that he would be buried in the same grave as the protestant religion and the liberties of Germany. They should consider that the empire of Germany is the natural enemy of the french king, and has been so for some hundreds of years, and altho' France may inveigle some of them by fair promises, which she never intends to perform, still 'tis only with design to make them the instruments of their own ruin ; let them be assured that the king of Prussia's interest is so firmly connected with the liberties of the germanic body, that the one and the other will without doubt be buried in the same grave, to use his prussian majesty's own words. Let these members of the germanic body suffer a little for their bad policy, in yielding so tamely to the frenchified dictates of the aulic council : they will be soon convinced that the design of France is not to raise the house of Austria, nor, particularly to humble the king of Prussia and the elector of Hanover ; but to foment a war in the bowels of the empire, by which the germans are to cut one another's throats ; and thereby make them unable at any time to resist her usurpations on their continent : Such is the policy of France, and such the impolitic behaviour of the German princes.

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Now

Now let any man consider what I have said, and I believe he will conclude that it is certainly our interest to assist the king of Prussia ; for though so much has been said concerning the house of Austria's being the old and natural ally of Great Britain, yet that cannot be mentioned now as a plea for our not changing our measures in consequence of our friends having changed their's : Can it be supposed that we should have any thing to do with the empress queen after she has thrown herself into the arms of France, who is our natural enemy ; and sure that change will be very surprizing, that ever makes us and France natural friends ; but in fact the empress queen can have no excuse, at least any tolerable one, for acting as she has ; and I think every impartial man must look with great horror on the base perfidy which appears in so glaring a manner, in that queen's behaviour in regard to the king of Prussia.

As to the simple figure which the elector of Saxony, king of Poland, makes at present, it would be worthy of pity, was it the first time ; but when a man is turned out from home to wander abroad for conspiring against his neighbour, and suffers great hardships, yet is reinstated in his property, and then falls into the same error again :

gain : Such a blockhead, richly deserves to be treated in the manner this vagabond king is, of whom it is difficult to say whether he is the greatest object, of pity or contempt.

It is a point much disputed whether we should assist the king of Prussia with men or money ; for my part I think if we consider our own interest in the least, we should determine to send no troops to Germany, but lend all the assistance to that great monarch in our power by supplying him with money : If he has that, the regularity of the discipline of his troops and the fame of his victories will encourage many to enlist under his banner ; and I am informed that even his prussian majesty himself prefers this method of assisting him—all that I can say on this point, would be to expatiate perhaps too freely on the badness of the measure of sending national troops into Germany, and I cannot remember this without recollecting how earnest that great minister and statesmen Mr. P — was against sending any troops there ; and now that gentleman is still at the head of the administration of affairs, and yet suffers troops to be sent ; I must own I am heartily sorry for it, as I cannot but conceive it to be detrimental to the interest of my country.

I think it will not be amiss here to observe the bad politicks in sending so few ; if it was resolved to send any troops, undoubtedly they should either have sent enough to have looked an enemy in the face, or none at all : It should likewise be remembered that the commander in chief of the british forces in Germany, is a post of great importance, so great as to require a general endowed with conduct, courage and experience ; and not one whose only claim for so important a command is having an estate of fifty thousand pounds a year.

We stand now on a very critical footing : We are engaged in a war against a potent enemy, and are deserted by our faithless allies the wavering Czarina, the perfidious austrian and our phlegmatic friends the dutch ; French councils direct all their operations, and the neutrality of the dutch is of more service to France than if they were to join that kingdom with their whole force and declare war against England. These neutral carriers, actually extend the trade and commerce of France in time of war further than she herself could probably carry them in time of peace, and these inconveniences will never be effectually removed whilst the treaties of 1667 and
1674

1674 subsist on their present establishment. But let any man consider whether 'tis for the advantage of the dutch to encrease the power and trade of France ; but when a nation is govern'd by a company of Merchants who have no notions of any honor, honesty, or conscience, when I say a nation has such governors, we must expect such behaviour.

England can never have the least prospect of a lasting peace with France, unless we can now succeed in reducing their power : We see to what an extent they have carried their trade and commerce, and how they have supplanted us in almost every branch of traffick ; we find by their excellent regulations and œconomy, they are able to undersell us, and it is to be apprehended that they will in time monopolize our trade. We should seize the present opportunity of checking their progress, and restraining them within such bounds as may leave us nothing to fear from their competition. It must be acknowledged that the strength and riches of France, are never so well known as by their losses : notwithstanding she has within these few months lost upwards of 100,000 men in Germany (a loss that would be insupportable

ble on our shoulders) notwithstanding the immense sums she has dissipated amongst the northern powers, in keeping them either neuter or steady to her interest ; and notwithstanding her furnishing the queen of Hungary, the electors of Saxony and Bavaria, and the other german princes, her allies with very considerable sums to put their troops in motion, yet we have seen her still able to pour new armies to the assistance, and fresh recruits of money into the pockets of her friends.

This powerful kingdom has recovered from the severe check her arms received at the battle of Crevelt. She put the russian troops, whose mistress was under great difficulties about the conduct she was to observe, once more in motion, but to how much purpose the battle of Zorndorf speaks. She has fixed his danish majesty in his neutrality, a point which few imagined they could compass ; and her armies in Germany are so recruited as to be superior to the hanoverians. The sweeds have commenced their hostilities against his prussian majesty, which shows the result both of french gold and french councils.

Indeed

Indeed we have here only view'd the fair side of the question; it must likewise be considered that as yet his prussian majesty has in the most glorious manner withstood the repeated and powerful attacks of so many enemies, and we may reasonably expect to see a successful campaign begun early in the spring; one very great advantage which the prussian monarch enjoys, is that happy confidence which reigns in the minds of those soldiers who have commanded victory, and been accusom'd to success; they go to the battle with as much allacrity and chearfulness, as they would do to a banquet; they know they are commanded by their own sovereign who runs the same risque as the meanest soldier in his army; and may the almighty continue to bless their arms with such success as will ensure a happy peace, when those brave fellows deserve to wear those laurels which they have so gloriously won.

I shall next consider the present state of our affairs in America, and remember that the war we are now engaged in, was enter'd into entirely on account of our colonies, which shows that we are at last come to know their value:
having

having premised this, I think it cannot be disagreeable to the reader to reflect a little in so ample a field.

We are at present engaged in a contest with France in America, the result of which most certainly is to gain a power and dominion, which must sooner or later command all that continent with the whole trade of it, if not many other branches of trade ; which must all fall into the hands of France sooner or later, if we suffer her to secure her present encroachments on the british dominions in North America, as may be made to appear very plain. This is the subject of our present dispute in America. And when two nations, who want neither courage nor affection to their cause, have such a pledge as this at stake ; there is no wonder to see constant jealousies and frequent ruptures between them. But they who are negligent in it I am affraid must suffer by it. This we have learned already by fatal experience ; but by the present posture of our affairs in that part of the world, we have great reason to believe, that for the future we shall see better management there. Not to mention any other consequences of the neglect of our affairs in America, it was certain

certainly this that has brought the nation into the present war.

The french indeed would endeavour to persuade the world of the very reverse, and tell us, it was the too great attachment of this nation to its interest in America that has made them kindle this war in Europe. But if we enquire into the real truth of the matter, it will appear to every one, that it was rather the little regard that this nation has all along paid (till very lately) to its concerns in America; by which our frontiers there, were left open and defenceless, and our colonies unguarded and exposed to the invasions of the french from all quarters, that made them take the opportunity of the beginning of this war to seize a great part of the british dominion there, which this nation so far neglected that the french and others seem'd to think they did not belong to it for that reason.

It has been very justly observed that even in all states the great thing to be consider'd is, power and dominion, as well as trade. Without that to support and protect our trade it must soon be at an end. But if we consider the extent of those vast inland countries of North America, and the numbers of natives in them, with the still
D greater

greater number of people they must maintain, the power they must necessarily give to any state possessed of them, must appear to be very great, and sufficient to command all the trade of America; it is by acting on this principle of gaining a power and dominion, that the french have gained such a trade with it, which will still encrease as long so we mind nothing in Britain but trade, and nothing in America but planting.—How foolish it is to suppose, that the great continent of North-America, is not of consequence enough to demand so much care; this is a notion which has been long ago exploded. Even in point of trade, and immediate returns to Britain, those inland countries, are much more valuable, than many seem to reckon them. It is generally imagined that it is only the sea coast that is of any great value to Britain; and that as for the rest, it is too remote to be valuable; but we see by the accounts of them, what a prodigious and extensive water-carriage there is all over them, by which any commodities almost may be brought from thence to a british market. It was but a few years ago, and in this present age, that we seem'd to have reckoned any places worth planting in our tobacco colonies, beyond the falls of the rivers, or the navigation for british vessels, because it was imagined, we could
not

not bring tobacco from them; but now those places are become the center of these colonies, and tobacco is made and brought to Britain, from beyond the Apalactican mountains, and has been for some years. But if we can bring such a cumbersome and bulky commodity as tobacco from thence, how much easier will it be to transport other lighter commodities from the remotest parts of those inland countries, especially by the navigation they afford; and there is no doubt, but that many such commodities hereafter mentioned might be made in them; not to mention the great quantities of skins and furs, the richest commodities in all North-America, that are got in them without either risk or charge, with which alone the french colonies are able to make such a figure, and to vie with us in the manner they have lately done.

Much has many times been said concerning the American coloninies of Britain, throwing off their dependance on their mother country; but there has, in general, been a wrong notion formed on that point. The thing that breeds a jealousy between Britain and her colonies, is not power, but manufactures, in which they interfere with one another: And as the people in-

crease, their manufactures and the necessity for them, must increase likewise ; which will be the first cause of a rupture between this nation and her colonies, if ever such a thing should happen. The only way to prevent this, if the people grow numerous in the colonies, is to put some other employments in their hands that may serve them instead of manufactures, and may make them depend upon Britain for the very means of their support ; of such employments there are numbers, which both they and the whole nation have the greatest occasion for ; as the making of hemp, flax, silk, wine, oil, raisins, currants, almonds, indigo, madder, salt-petre, pot-ash, iron, pitch, tar, timber, and all other naval stores ; all which might be easily made in some one or other of our plantations in North-America, and they are the things which this nation chiefly wants. It appears from an estimate that has been made of them, that Britain does not lay out less than three millions a year upon those commodities, and that chiefly in money ; which drains it of its substance, and keeps up a ballance of trade against the nation, while it might be supplied with them from the colonies for manufactures : This would be the way both to secure the dependence of the colonies, and to reap the benefit of

of them; and at the same time to promote their growth and prosperity likewise.

There is no occasion to tell the reader, that our American colonies have been long known to the most intelligent to be the general source of the trade and commerce, and consequently of the naval powers on which this nation so much depends; but these invaluable colonies have been long marked out as such by our declared enemies, and are become the object both of their envy and resentment; our enemies not only endeavour to wrest some of the most important parts of them out of our hands, to prescribe laws to the whole nation, and bounds and limits to it, upon its own territories; but they have already over-run such a part of the british dominions, in North America, that if they remain in possession of their usurpations and encroachments there; this nation seems to have no security left for any of its colonies in America. How strange soever this must appear to those, who are not acquainted with the present state of our, and our enemies possessions in that part of the world, yet it is strictly true, as may be almost clearly perceived by any one, who
will

will take the trouble to examine a correct map of North-America.

The situation of the french in North-America is every way as convenient to execute all their schemes above-mentioned, as our situation is inconvenient and disadvantageous to prevent them. They have had all their designs in view for many years, have been constantly preparing themselves for those purposes, and have thereby put themselves in a situation proper to execute them; while we, for a long time, never once thought of them, not even till the very beginning of this war; it was this their situation, that made them take that otherwise desperate step to secure the river Ohio in 1753, and has made them so successful in it. For this they began to prepare themselves immediately after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by securing and fortifying Niagara, that leads to that river. They had many settlements to back and support them there, as well as about Fort du Quefne, when they seized that place, while we had only some straggling settlements on the Ohio, with a small fort, hardly garrison'd, and at a great distance from our other more secure settlements, and separated from them by mountains. By this means, they could hardly fail to
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secure the river Ohio, by one stroke, as we see they did.

In consequence of this step, the french have at once intercepted our communication entirely, with all the nations of that vast continent, and so awed those Indians who were formerly in our interest, that very few of them remain faithful to their engagements with us, and no wonder, for how can it be expected, that if we will not exert the strength we have in that country, how can we expect the Indians will stand by us, when it manifestly endangers themselves.

Let any man compare the strength we have in North America with that of the enemy, and he will then either impute our hitherto bad success, to mismanagement, or to our disadvantageous situation; for my part, I am of opinion, it is owing to both; our force has certainly at several times been badly lead on, and our situation with respect to our enemy as disadvantageous. But it would be unpardonable after having given this bad state of our affairs there, if I was to proceed, without mentioning the just hopes I have of a better, and more glorious campaign in North-America, the ensuing year, especially
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as the command there is now in the hands of an officer, every way equal to his task, and who has given us a sample of his skill and judgment in the conquest of that important fortress, Louisburgh: and I make no doubt, but that every honest Briton rejoices, like me, to see so extensive and critical a command in the hands of an officer of such abilities.

The consequence and result of our contest in America is a naval power, which depends upon trade and commerce, as that does now in a great measure, upon the plantation in America. The American colonies are now become considerable, and real objects worth attention; great part of the maritime trade of Europe centers in them; and Britain has not perhaps less than 5000,000*l.* sterling a year from them, besides the chief support of its natural power. The French seeing this, and that their naval power was ruined by Britain in the last war, were resolved to strike at the root of our power and prosperity, and source of our trade and navigation, the American colonies. And if they once get a superiority there, as they must do by getting possession of all those vast regions there, which they are contending for, they must soon become superior to Britain

tain both by sea and land, especially as they have so many more men.

Ever since the last war, the French have been going on with great diligence to strengthen themselves in America; and to get the better of the power of Britain there, which only crosses their designs every where. And if they had not been a little too forward and premature in the execution of their designs in North-America, it is the opinion of all who are the best acquainted with those things, that it would not have been in our power to have opposed or prevented them; which I think is very evident from what we find their resistance to be, as it is. How shall we ever be able to oppose them again, if they are once well settled and fortified, encrease and multiply, as they must do in all those vast and extensive countries in America, that they have now over-run with such a handful of men? They must then certainly give law to Britain, and all others in America, if not to all Europe with it.

The encroachments of the French upon the British territories in North-America, have plainly been the cause of the present war, and have brought this nation into a greater charge, and expence than might

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have been sufficient to have secured all that continent, if it had been duly attended to in time. But the little knowledge of those remote countries, and the diversity of opinions about them, seem not only to draw our attention from them, and to cross every measure that has been proposed about them, but must have occasioned the total loss of them, if we had continued to neglect them in so scandalous a manner. But it is necessary we should enquire a little more particularly into the situation and importance of those places that are in the hands of the french.

Crown Point, as it was the first of their incroachments, so it is for the present that, which annoys our colonies the most; it was erected since the year 1730 upon lands belonging to ourselves, on purpose to attack and distress us whenever it should be found proper or convenient, as any one might have perceived at first sight, and as the consequences have but too fully proved. This fort is so advantageously situated for annoying us that the french can muster up their whole force here, to attack us with very little inconvenience to themselves; it effectually covers all Canada, and blocks up our passage entirely into that country,

country, while it leads the french directly into New England and New York, unless we have a standing army there to oppose them, which we have been obliged to keep two years for no other purpose. This fort is both a nursery and a battery of the french against us, and at the same time a safeguard to them ; If it had not been for this place alone, and the security it gives the french in Canada, it is plain they durst not have attacked us any where in America, nor have brought this nation into the charge and expence it has incurred on that account. Of what consequence then are those places in the woods and desarts of America, as some call them, when they fall into the hands of the french ? surely we ought to neglect none of them after this, which was not thought worth notice a few months ago.

But in speaking so much of Crown Point, let us not forget Niagara, which is I think the most important of all the french forts ; it stands in the midst of the country of the six nations, and is the chief, and almost only pass, into the interior parts of North America, both from north to south and

from east to west, either from the french settlements or ours : In short, the importance of this place is almost inconceivable ; it is a key to the whole continent, it awes and commands all the indians of North America ; it secures all the inland trade of that continent : it lays our colonies open to the inroads of the french and indians. — Such is the consequence of this place !

Niagara is even of much greater importance than the country on the Ohio, for this reason, because it commands it : If we were possess'd of Niagara, the french in Canada would be cut off from all communication with the Ohio and from almost all their encroachments on us : but if we suffer the french to remain in possession of this important post, our colonies will at all times be open to their invasions.

At first sight we may perceive that Niagara commands, in a great degree, all the five great lakes of Canada, and joins and connects the two french colonies of Canada and Louisiana ;—in short, I think I have made the importance of this place appear in a very clear light,

light. But it is necessary that we should say something of the river Ohio and fort du Quesne, a place, though of not so great importance as Niagara, yet was of consequence enough to engage this nation in the present war.

The country on the banks of the Ohio is one of the finest in the world, and is secured by fort du Quesne which the french built in 1754 in a country, which by right belonged to us : It is one of those important spots situated in North America, which commands many miles : Fort du Quesne and Niagara joins together all the straggling settlements and colonies which the french possess in the whole continent of North America. Was I to say all that might with propriety be said of this most important post, it would swell this tract much beyond its design'd bounds, but I will desist, as I have great reason to believe that it will no longer be such a thorn in our sides, as hitherto we have found it to be, especially as the command of our forces in this country is now in the hands of a man who will exert his so well known abilities in defence of his country and the real annoyance of its enemies.

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By the usurpation of these three places alone, Crown Point, Niagara, and du Quesne, not to mention their other encroachments, we see the french cut us off from any further communication with North America, and secure all the rest of that continent to themselves; they will never be without an opportunity to do whatever they think fit, so long as that chain of forts abovementioned, with which they have surrounded our colonies on all sides, is allowed to stand. There are so many batteries erected against us, not only to deprive this nation of its just rights, but to distress and annoy us, whenever they have a mind: There they constantly keep troops, stores and magazines of all warlike engines, and muster their forces together; while our people mind nothing but planting, and are entirely defenceless, open and exposed every where.

This war in all probability will stop the encroachments of the french for a time, and even very likely repell them within their just bounds; but it can never secure our colonies entirely for the future, without our turning over quite

quite a new leaf in that part of the world. — There is an absolute necessity the exact bounds of the dominions of each nation there be defined with the greatest nicety, and not to leave the most important article of all to be adjusted by commissaries. Another point to be settled at the next peace is of still greater consequence, and that is the UNION OF OUR COLONIES; much has been said on this critical point, but I flatter myself that it will be no difficult matter to make it clearly appear that such a union is necessary and practicable.

As to the necessity of it, let any man reflect on the inequality in numbers and power between the two nations on the continent of America, and let him consider the success each have had there, he will perceive that as yet we have done very little, not so much as to defend ourselves, so far have we been from getting the better of our enemy. I don't contradict but that we have gained a battle, under Sir William Johnson, but then we have lost one under Braddock; we have taken fort Frontenac, but we have lost Oswego; and there

there may have been a few inconsiderable skirmishes, in which we possibly may have had the advantage ; but we have been repulsed with ignominy before Crown Point and du Quesne ; I would not be here thought to cast a slur on those brave men who lost their lives in the service of their country at both of the abovementioned places, but rather on those who plann'd the expeditions, and who did not act either with judgment or prudence in their conduct, when they undervalued the strength of their enemy in so egregious a manner, as was manifest they did then.

From hence I think 'tis plain, that although the great force we have in America is superior in number to that of our Enemy ; still it has as yet been so badly conducted, that this, and the badness of our situation, in comparison with that of the french, has put us more upon a par than many are willing to believe : Concerning our situation, it will not be amiss to particularize a little farther.

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In all the immense and extensive possessions which the french have in North America, they have but three places to guard on the continent, Crown - Point, Niagara, and fort du Quesne; while we have some hundreds. They have likewise a convenient water carriage to all their forts, settlements and forces, while we can hardly get at ours, or at them, by many tedious and expensive marches by land. By this means their force is easily assembled and united, and lies compact together about Montreal, fort Frontenac, Niagara and Crown Point, which are all convenient to support one another; while our force is dispersed in a single extended line, along the sea coast, and cannot be drawn together with half the ease and facility that the french can.

I shall next consider the practicability of uniting our colonies, to enable them the better to with -

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stand their enemies : The scheme I would propose is—To unite all our colonies on the continent of North America together ; to appoint one viceroy over the whole, who should have the chief command of all the troops in his government : That there should be a small establishment of regular land forces, as in Ireland : That there should be a parliament established consisting of Members sent by all the colonies, the following proportion has been thought not amiss for the intended end,

New England

				Members.
New England	—	—	—	20
New York	—	—	—	7
Nova Scotia	—	—	—	4
Pensilvania	—	—	—	15
Virginia	—	—	—	12
Maryland	—	—	—	8
Carolinas	—	—	—	10
Georgia	—	—	—	6
Jerseys	—	—	—	4

In all 86

Some are of opinion that the number should not be less than 100 members ; and it may be so ; it would be an easy matter to proportionate them in the same degree to any number. Every scheme that can be offer'd, must have its imperfections.

Some will object, that the colonies would not submit to part with their charters ; but every method ought to be taken to force a due obedience.

In reflecting on the present state of our affairs we should not forget the West Indies.

From the best information I can get, the french at present greatly exceed our islands in the quantity of sugars which they produce, and it is as certain that they are far less on the decline in that trade than we are, at least as things stood before the war ; that they cultivate great quantities of indigo ; a trade which our colonies in the West Indies

Indies have entirely lost ; that within these few years they have sent to Europe abundance of coffee, which our islands have not sufficient encouragement to raise ; and that upon the whole, we have the greatest reason to be jealous of France, in that part of the world. What advantages they derive from the noble island of Hispaniola, we have seen : What must they do if they come to possess the whole of that island, which in the cutting and shuffling of a treaty of peace is no way impossible ? We shall then change the indolent spaniard for the neighbourhood of the lively, vigilant, and enterprising french. And what a ravelry in peace, and what a danger in war, that neighbourhood is, even now, and much more will probably be, is but too apparent. Jamaica is near it ; and for so valuable a possession in so dangerous a situation, perhaps not so well defended. If, besides this, the french should retain the islands of St.

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Vincent, St. Lucia and Tobago, though they should only turn them into plantations for firewood, lumber, and provisions, as in such case it would seem most adviseable to do with some of them at least, what an advantage to their colonies ! What an annoyance to ours ! Which they in a manner surround, and can, in some measure, hold besieged by the private armaments they may from thence fit out.

These last mentioned islands were left neutral at the last peace ; or in other words, they were left at the extinction of the old, in just the order proper for kindling a new flame, and in all respects, as if things were ordered for that very purpose : Indeed nothing can be attended with worse consequences than these political after - reckonings, which the party who has the advantage at making the peace , never finds it his account to settle or adjust ; but there they lie, full of matter of litigation,
full

full of idle occasions for formal buſineſs ; full of ſtrife and of ill blood ; and when a proper time occurs , of bloody and expenſive wars. It were better, at any rate; all at once to know what we are to depend upon ; the beſt or the worſt we have to expect. 'Tis to be hoped, that at the next peace things will not be left in that dangerous manner.

At preſent we ſtand (as to the preſent force there) upon pretty good ground ; the forces under Hopſon are much ſuperior to any thing the french have there, and I have ſome reaſon to have ſanguine hopes of ſucceſs from the expedition under that general.

Indeed our colonies in the Weſt Indies are of that importance , that it would be folly, to the greateſt degree, not to have continually there in time of war, a force ſufficient to protect our own colonies and annoy thoſe of our enemies.

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We have seen what damage our ships have done to the french at Martinica by surrounding that island and cutting off their supplies of provisions; we had so much encouragement given us by our late success in intercepting the french ships there, that it would be unpardonable not to continue our endeavours to that end; I have some hopes that either Martinico or Guadeloup will fall a sacrifice to the superior force and efforts of the british strength in that part of the world; these conjectures are built upon solid and rational foundations.

I cannot help mentioning in this place, the behaviour of our pretended friends the dutch: These neutral carriers extend the french trade almost to as high a pitch as the french themselves could in time of peace, and manifestly against both the laws of nations,

tions, and the particular treaties subsisting between us, and the plan of conduct which we observe towards them is certainly in every respect just and according to our treaties. I would be here understood that the dutch behave in an ungrateful manner towards us, in not joining with us in the present war against France; for tho' certainly it is their true interest to reduce the power of France upon a par with her neighbours, yet the difficulty in doing that, is certainly the only nonplus that the states general were under—I hope an englishman can't with any conscience imagine that they will ever trust us so far as to join us in a hearty manner against France, when the treaty of Utrecht is so fresh on the minds of every one. It would be absurd even to the greatest degree, to suppose this.

But I hope the power of Britain will display itself in such a manner, as to make it appear we can carry on a war

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success

ſucceſsfully even without allies, we have but one, his pruffian majeſty, and he is far from affording us much aſſiſtance : I am ſure we have reaſon to rejoice at the great ſucceſs our arms have met with in the late campaign, which has certainly been concluded in a glorious manner ! In America we have taken Louiſburg, fort Frontenac, and we have ſince made ourſelves maſters of Fort du Queſne, a place of the greateſt importance. Our fleets and armies have menac'd the french coaſt, the one has burnt the ſhips in their own harbours, and the other have demolish'd the fortrefſes on their coaſt ; Africa, the Eaſt and Weſt Indies have experienced the power of the Britiſh flag ; which have been carried into thoſe remote regions with conqueſt for its attendant : Our armies on the continent of Europe have drove the french from their momentary acquiſitions , with a rapidity almoſt unequal'd. And our victorious ally,

ally, the king of Prussia, has triumph'd over all his enemies in the most astonishing and no less glorious manner. These are the effects of that wisdom and prudence, which for this last year has appeared in so conspicuous a manner in the British councils : And may the name of our Ministers who have conducted the helm of state with such great abilities continue to be as famous, as every one must allow, they have deservedly been accounted.

F I N I S.