

THE
DETAIL AND CONDUCT
OF THE
AMERICAN WAR,
UNDER GENERALS
GAGE, HOWE, BURGOYNE,
AND
VICE ADMIRAL LORD HOWE:
WITH
A VERY FULL AND CORRECT STATE
OF THE WHOLE OF THE
EVIDENCE,
AS GIVEN BEFORE A
COMMITTEE of the HOUSE of COMMONS:
AND THE
Celebrated Fugitive Pieces,
Which are said to have given RISE to that
Important Enquiry.
THE WHOLE EXHIBITING A
Circumstantial, Connected and Complete History
OF THE
Real CAUSES, RISE, PROGRESS and PRESENT STATE
OF THE
AMERICAN REBELLION.

THE THIRD EDITION.

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ADVERTISEMENT to the THIRD EDITION.

THE failure of success in the American War having deeply engaged the public attention, the following COLLECTION has been made of the CHARGES in and out of Parliament, that are said to have given rise to the enquiry into the conduct of the war, of the EVIDENCE given at the Bar of the House of Commons, and of the STRICTURES that have been made during the course, and since the close, of that enquiry; in order to lay before the public a comprehensive view of that most Important Question.

In this edition many INTERESTING PAPERS have been added: The reader will readily distinguish these additions, as they are marked in the table of contents: It is hoped the Gentlemen who sent the several inclosures, will be satisfied with the manner in which they have been arranged. From the great additions and the new arrangement, the whole forming a regular series of the transactions of the war, it was found necessary to alter the Title from *A View of the Evidence* to that of

The DETAIL and CONDUCT of the AMERICAN WAR.

In the first editions, the Evidence given before the House of Commons, was, unavoidably, from the hurry of an early publication, in a great degree imperfect: but in this, the whole has been given in a very full and correct manner, nothing but the trivial and uninteresting questions being omitted.

* * * The MONTHLY REVIEW for July last, in giving a character of this Work, which it does in the most favourable terms, concludes thus: "It is really a melancholy retrospect which is here given of our military exploits in attempting to reduce the revolted colonies; and the whole concludes with a *Review of the War*, which is written with a spirit, that may serve alternately to freeze and fire the blood of the indignant reader."

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C O N T E N T S.

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DETAIL and CONDUCT
OF THE
AMERICAN WAR

WITH
A very FULL and CORRECT

View of the Evidence.

Lord Howe in a speech in the House of Commons, April 29th, 1779, Ld. H gave the following reasons for demanding an enquiry into his own and his brother's conduct: "They had been arraigned in pamphlets and in news papers, written by persons in high credit and confidence with ministers; by several members of that House, in that House, in the face of the nation; by some of great credit and respect in their public characters, known to be countenanced by administration; and that one of them in particular, Governor Johnstone, had made the most direct and specific charges."

The Pieces alluded to by his Lordship are inserted, to give the reader a full and connected view of the subject.

Letter from BOSTON, April 25th, 1775.

AFTER a variety of commotions, all of which portended blood-shed, a rebellious war broke out on the 19th of this month; on that day our troops were attacked at Lexington and Concord, the whole country rising upon them, and a straggling encounter ensued from these towns to this place: but as you will have a narrative of that business from others who saw more of it than fell to my share, I shall confine myself to the giving you a short state of this country, and an enumeration of the causes which have produced this rebellion.

Since my arrival in this quarter of the world, I have endeavoured to obtain from the most intelligent people, some authentic information respecting this country and the opinions of its inhabitants. What follows is the result of my political enquiries. Every person I converse with here is of opinion, that the present insurrections are

principally owing to the instruction and encouragement the rebels, have, for many years past, received from desperate and nefarious factions at home, enemies both to the church and constitution of England, comprehending various descriptions of men, from the disaffected or disappointed Peer and Commoner, down to the snuffing Oracles of non conformist conventicles.

Number of people.

The white inhabitants on this continent are estimated at upwards of two millions; more than one fourth of this number are reckoned to occupy the four New England provinces and colonies. In this province of Massachusetts, the people are computed at three hundred thousand, calculating from their militia lists, in which, it is said, they number upwards of sixty thousand men. I know it is industriously propagated throughout America, that the number of souls exceeds four millions, but that, from good authority, is only a political fiction fabricated to inspire the people with high ideas of their own power.

It is confessed, that in this province, very early notions of independency have at times been apparent; that every where for a course of years the rapid population of the northern and middle colonies have been spoken of with exultation; and that it has been a pleasing topic of conversation with many, that in some future period, when such a large continent should be well peopled, it would naturally disengage itself from the domination of a very small and distant territory: but these last discourses have always till of late been considered as the effusions of ignorance, or the fanciful reveries of speculative men.

What hastened to approximate the present resistance, was the little attention given by government at home, for the long space of 150 years, to the regulation of the colonies. Before the act laying stamp duties passed, the internal polity of the several provinces should have been reformed.—Regulation of their respective subordinate legislatures should have preceded taxation.

Our want of policy.

But the last war would have been a proper time for laying a tax, or introducing a regulation of their governments; when possessed with the dread of being driven into the sea by the French, they were lifting up their trembling hands to this country for aid; and when England was expending thousands of men, and millions of money in their defence:—not surely when the French had been swept from the continent; when all our troops were withdrawn; when the Americans were conscious of the advantages accruing to them from our remote situation; and when they felt and prided themselves in their own strength.

The repeal of the stamp act was yet more injudicious and impolitic than the enacting it. It is generally admitted that it might easily have been enforced; for no conveyance of property could be legal, without a submission to the act; and if it had not been repealed, it would in many respects have enforced itself. The Americans were also at that time totally unprepared for rebellion, and the quartering a regiment or two in three or four of the principal towns on the continent, under proper orders, must soon have decided the dispute:—but since that fatal repeal, no conduct on our part, whether gentle or vigorous, could be of any avail;—the rebel leaders had always a fictitious colour in which to represent it;

—gen-

—gentle measures, said they with much apparent contempt of us, were only the effects of our fears and of their firmness;—and on vigorous measures, they recurred with vehemence to their favourite cry of oppression.

Little need be said of governors or their abilities; they contributed, not indeed designedly, to bring forward the present com-<sup>Misre-
sentat</sup> motions. In their dispatches to government, they imputed all the ^{Gover} opposition made to them, to the turbulent efforts of a small faction, which being credited at home, prevented ministry from adopting such early measures as are necessary to counteract meditated insurrections. Perhaps, if they had informed ministry that their opposers composed great part of the people, it might have been thought prudent to have removed men who owned themselves unpopular,—a decree seldom relished by his Majesty's representatives.

Unhappily for England, governors either saw not, or would not see, the true state of this country, till every circumstance that offered wore the face of speedy revolt.—Then most certainly they were frequent enough in their representations, but the Americans from their long preparations will set out with many advantages.

You may judge of the good policy of some governors from an action of one of them, confessedly of the first abilities in his rank. After the tumults and insurrections that followed the stamp-act, when every man of common penetration saw that independency was the aim of the leaders of the populace, this gentleman, though no soldier, in a fit of military enthusiasm, sat down, and with much satisfaction to himself, compiled, not a short book of militia exercise. In fact, the genius of the Norfolk discipline, was transfused into this imprudent publication. And what may be thought still more extraordinary, the regiments here till very lately lent the militia some of their best non commissioned officers to discipline them.

The American leaders acted very artfully till they were ready to <sup>Art
meri
lead</sup> throw off the mask. Though they vented every degree of abuse against their governors for misrepresenting them, as they said; yet they constantly made strong professions of loyalty to the King. These professions were intended to affect the credibility of whatever representations governors might make of their seditious conduct. If they gained belief, then they outwitted both governors and administration; if they did not, it gave them farther occasion of continuing their unwarrantable clamours and outrages, which keeping the minds of the common people in constant irritation and ferment, they were ready for any desperate attempt.

Openly and secretly abetted and pushed on by a traitorous opposition at home, every art and assiduity were exerted to keep the people in this inflamed state of mind.—The trifling duty on tea, and the importation of it into America by the East India Company, were only pretexts for rising in arms; if these had not occurred, they would have seized any other opportunity that offered; and if none had, their fertile, impatient, and prepared minds would have created one. Some make no doubt, if we act *with proper spirit*, but that the partizans of rebellion will soon be convinced of their error, and that those very people whom they have deluded will turn out their bitterest enemies; these argue from the rebels being all raw men, from their soon exhausting their present magazines,

from the difficulties they will meet with in obtaining farther supplies, from their being almost all married which must make their loss of men more heavily felt, and from their being in every respect a despicable crew when compared with our veterans. Others think that the contest will not be so soon terminated, as the country is extensive, and said to be unanimous ; and that the severities of war, and the dreadful experience of the miseries attending their wanton revolt must be felt sometime before their pride will be properly lowered.

Their worthy correspondents in England, you must understand, have assured them that their friends, with the opposition at their head, are increasing every day ; and that there will be insurrections in every corner of the kingdom in their favour. Though we laugh at this intelligence, yet the ministry will have enough to do in the struggle, to remedy the evils that have been accumulating for these last hundred and fifty years, from the political neglects of their predecessors.

Some hopes against the revolt becoming general, are derived from the character of the northern inhabitants not being very popular in the southern colonies ; they are said to be designing and selfish ; but, perhaps, this is a more general character in nature than has been imagined, and that the New England men only differ from others in their mode of shewing it. In the mean time, it appears to me, that every step they take seems to have been preconcerted. Their independent clergy and their lawyers have been great promoters of rebellion.

I have now given you the true state of this country, as far as I could collect it from the most sensible and impartial people. I have alluded in particular to the conduct of the Massachusetts, as this province has always dictated to, and been followed by the other colonies and provinces.

In addition to our political negligence respecting the colonies, opposition had some very ripe and forward spirits here to work upon, all which, added to their own desperate exertions, rendered a rebellion inevitable.

Situation. The first settlers in this country were independents, both in religious and political opinion, and their tenets have been carefully transmitted through every generation to their present descendants ;—the progress of their population has also been very rapid ;—these together with their great distance from England, have all tended to weaken the idea of any durable connection with, or dependance on the mother country :—These are causes arising from education and natural situation.

Impolicy. No proper attention had been given, for a century and an half to the regulation of their internal government ;—we had either impolitely drove the French out of Canada, or after having done it, we impolitely neglected to establish some other equivalent check over them ;—we had never accustomed them to obedience whilst they were few in number, consequently weak, and scattered in thin patches over an extended continent, yet thought proper to expect it from them, when they were grown numerous, rich, and powerful, at a time too, when we had comparatively speaking, no military

Battle of Concord.

tary force in the country :—These are causes arising from our own impolitic conduct.

The Americans and opposition made the most of all these circumstances; but it may with truth be said, that it was opposition that called forth the Americans to rebellion; without their fostering aid for these last ten years, this country would yet have been in peace. However, on the most comprehensive view, this rebellion is the result of the natural situation of the Americans, of our own political blindness and negligence, and of the most unremitting treachery and criminal depravity of an abandoned opposition, who with a baseness beyond example, seem to have united every effort to betray their country.

Letter from BOSTON, July 5th, 1775.

AN almost constant hurry, a succession of unexpected events, and a crowd of reflexions during my few leisure hours, have till the present day prevented my writing. But I shall begin regularly. Gen. Gage was both well informed and prudent in fortifying Boston neck. The rebels had laid a plan to surprize the town, to cut off the troops and the loyal subjects. This was discovered through the strong inveteracy of some of the conspirators, who could not help enjoying before hand in conversation, the pleasure of the massacre. Proper measures were taken to prevent it; but no search made for concealed arms. The evening of St. George's day was the time fixed; the officers doors were to be particularly marked. A hint from the bible.

The 18th of April, at eleven at night, 800 grenadiers and light infantry embarked at the common, under Lieut. Col. Smith, and landed at Phipps's farm. The object, to destroy a rebel magazine at Concord, about 20 miles distant. On their route, early next morning, the 19th, at Lexington, they were opposed by a body of armed men, who from fences fired upon our advanced guard, but were soon dispersed. Arriving at Concord, we executed the purpose for which we were detached, throwing into the river near an hundred barrels of gun powder, a quantity of salted provisions and flour, and destroyed three guns, and some gun carriages. Capt. Parsons sent forward from the bridge with three companies, on his return found that Capt. Laurie who had been left to possess it was driven off; luckily for him and his party the rebels did not break up the bridge, or he and his men would have been cut off. On this spot they found three of Laurie's men who had been wounded, dreadfully mangled by the rebels; they were scalped, their ears cut off, and gouged, this last is pushing the eyes out of the sockets, and yet these miserable men were still alive. From Concord back to Lexington, we sustained a constant fire from every fence, house, hollow way, and height as we passed along. Here Lord Percy joined us with the first brigade. He had left Boston at 9 o'clock that morning: It was a necessary reinforcement, for the whole country were in arms, and all the picked men for 40 miles round. We got back to Boston with the loss of upwards of fifty men, and many

many more wounded. This finished our excursions against rebel magazines. I cannot tell the rebel loss.

Strange
blunders.

Our secret had been ill kept, the rebels knew our intention and were prepared for us. Lieut. Col. Smith's party would have been destroyed had not Lord Percy joined him, and even he was almost too late from two stupid blunders we committed. The general ordered the first brigade under arms at four in the morning; these orders the evening before were carried to the brigade major's; he was not at home; the orders were left; no enquiry was made after him; he came home late; his servant forgot to tell him there was a letter on his table; four o'clock came; no brigade appeared; at five o'clock an express from Smith desiring a reinforcement produced an enquiry; the above discovery was made; at six o'clock part of the brigade got on the parade; there they waited expecting the marines; at seven no marines appearing, another enquiry commenced; they said they had received no orders; it was asserted they had; in the altercation it came out that the order had been addressed to Major Pitcairn who commanded the marines and left at his quarters, though the gentleman concerned in this business ought to have recollected that Pitcairn had been dispatched the evening before with the grenadiers and light infantry under Lieut. Col. Smith. This double mistake lost us from four till nine o'clock, the time we marched off to support Col. Smith.

Manuscript copies of the following very important and curious letters between General Howe and one of his most respectable constituents in Nottingham having been communicated as genuine, and as a master key to that general's future conduct in protracting the war—they are here laid before the public.

Copy of a letter from Mr. Kirk, grocer in Nottingham, to Gen. Howe,

S I R,

I CANNOT easily describe the discontent and disappointment which appears among a very great number of your constituents here, on account of your having accepted a command in the expedition against our American brethren. From the opinion I had of your integrity in general, I voted for you at the late election, notwithstanding you had in some recent instances acted contrary to my sentiments. I took the liberty to tell you so, and asked you the following questions: viz.

Mr. Kirk's
curious
questions.

Whether you thought our whole army would not be insufficient to conquer America?

If you did not think the ministry had pushed this matter too far?

Whether if you should be appointed to a command, you would refuse?

And

Whether you would vote for the repeal of the four acts of parliament, which you are now going to enforce?

If I am not mistaken, and I believe you will allow that I am not, you answered to every one of these queries in the affirmative. This out of pure regard to your interest here, I have made known to
numbers

numbers who were in the same state of suspense with myself, as to the propriety of our conduct at the election; and it has served to remove in a great measure the ill impressions, by which you yourself was very sensibly affected while among us.

We are however assured, that Gen. Howe is preparing to embark for America, in order to enforce the acts. Judge, if you can, the confusion this occasions among your friends. The most plausible excuse that is made among us, is, that the King sent for you, and what could you do!

Now I must beg leave to say, that I think you might have acted the part of a great man, in refusing to go against this people on many accounts; but to say nothing of politics, your brother died there; they have shewn their gratitude to your name and family, by erecting a monument to him who bled in the cause of freedom amongst them; to him who dared to act in opposition to a court, when his judgment informed him that opposition was right; and yet—he was a soldier. Our passions were wrought upon at the election, by the mention of his honoured name in a paper, which you may perhaps remember; and may I not mention it to you with a wish, that you would follow so amiable, so disinterested, so revered a character? I believe you have not even an enemy who would impute your refusing to go to want of courage; nay, your courage would be made more conspicuous by the refusal.

If you should resolve at all events to go, I dont wish you may fall, as many do, but cannot say I wish success to the undertaking. Wishes he may fall.

These, Sir, are the sentiments of many here, as well as of

Nottingham, }
Feb. 10, 1775. }

Your obedient servant,
(Signed) SAMUEL KIRK.

General Howe to Mr. Kirk.

S I R,

I HAVE read your letter of the 10th with so much the greater degree of concern, as I had flattered myself I had removed all those prejudices you had entertained against me, when I had the pleasure of being with you at the election. The rancour and malice of some of those who were not my friends at the election, fills me with astonishment in the instance you mention, of their wishes for my fall in America.

My going thither was not my seeking. I was ordered, and could not refuse, without incurring the odious name of backwardness to serving my country in a day of distress:—so contrary are men's opinions here, to some with you, that instead of the grossest abuse, I have been most highly complimented upon the occasion, Complimented by opposition.
those who are even averse to the measures of administration.

Every man's private feelings ought to give way to the service of the public at all times; but particularly when of that delicate nature, in which our affairs stand at present. Whatever opprobrious names I may be called by at Nottingham, I am encouraged to say, that no such epithets will be put to it in any other quarter; I entreat you in particular to suspend your judgment in these matters, until the event proves me unworthy of your support.

One

G. Howe's
opinion of
America.

One word upon America :

You are much deceived, if you suppose that there are not many loyal and peaceable subjects in that country. *I may safely assert, that the insurgents are very few, in comparison of the whole people.*

There are certainly those who do not agree to a taxation from hence, but who do not wish to sever themselves from the supremacy of this country. This last set of men I should hope, by their being relieved from the grievance, will most readily return to all due obedience to the laws.

With respect to *the few*, who I am told desire to separate themselves from the mother country, I trust, when they find they are not supported in their frantic ideas by the more moderate which I have described, they will from fear of punishment subside to the laws.

With regard to trade, this country must now fix the foundation of its stability with America, by procuring a lasting obedience to our laws : without which it can never arrive at that permanency, so absolutely requisite for the well being of this empire.

I am, Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,
(Signed) WILLIAM HOWE.

Queen Street, }
Feb. 21, 1775. }

Description of CHARLESTOWN NECK.

Description
of field of
battle.

THE scene of what is called the battle of Bunker's hill, was the peninsula of Charlestown. It lies directly opposite to the north part of the town of Boston, from which it is separated by Charles river, which in this place is about 450 yards wide. The length of the peninsula from north to south is about a mile, and at its southern extremity it is a little more than half a mile broad, and from hence it gradually grows narrower to the isthmus. Upon the south west point of the peninsula the town of Charlestown stood, and to the south east there is a rising ground, that projects a little outwards, which is called Morton's point. On the east is Mytic river, which is about half a mile over, and on the west is a large bay and a mill-pond.

The isthmus which joins the peninsula to the continent, is rather artificial than natural. It is not more than 30 yards in width, and is so low and flat as frequently to be quite overflowed by the tides. Immediately adjoining to the isthmus, upon the continent, is a large level common, through which the road to Cambridge lies.

Upon the peninsula there are two principal heights. The first begins at the isthmus, and rising gradually for about 300 yards, forms a large round smooth hill, which sloping on each side to the water, commands the entrance into the town of Charlestown. This is known in the country by the name of Bunker's hill. It is considerably higher than any other ground on the peninsula, and it is here that the Americans ought to have taken post on the night of the 16th June, instead of breaking ground upon Green's hill, which we have always mistaken for Bunker's hill.

Green's hill is situated nearly in the middle of the peninsula, the slope from it is gradual, and nearly equal on every side, except towards Bunker's hill, to which it is joined by a ridge of high ground running

running from north to south in the form of a saddle. From the summit of Bunker's hill to the summit of Green's hill is just half a mile, and from Green's hill to Charles river, which separates the peninsula from Boston is 500 yards. The grounds being chiefly cultivated for grass, there were very few trees upon the place; but as it was owned by a great number of different people, almost every house keeper in the town of Charlestown having a separate pasture for a cow, it was intersected by a vast number of fences, except at the north end of the peninsula, about the summit of Bunker's hill, and from thence to the isthmus, where a large tract of ground being owned by one person, it was perfectly smooth and free from obstructions.

Letter from BOSTON, July 5th, 1775.

ON the 17th June, at day break, we saw the rebels at work throwing up intrenchments on Bunker's hill; by mid-day they had completed a redoubt of earth on the height about thirty yards square; and from the left of that, a line of about half a mile in length down to Mystic river: of this line 100 yards next the redoubt were also earth, above five feet high, all the rest down to the water consisted of two rows of fence rails, the interval filled with bushes, hay, and grass, which they found on the spot. Early in the afternoon, from a battery in the corner of the redoubt, they fired seven or eight shot into the north end of the town; one shot went through an old house, another through a fence, and the rest stuck in the face of Cobb's hill. At this time their lines were attacked by Major Gen. Howe at the head of 1600 men, composed of twenty companies of grenadiers and light infantry, forty men each, with the 5th, 38th, 43d, and 52d regiments. Gen. Howe commanded on the right with the light infantry and grenadiers, Brig. Gen. Pigot on the left; while Pigot attacked the redoubt, Howe was to force the grass fence, gain the rebel's left flank and rear, and surround the redoubt. Our troops advanced with great confidence, expecting an easy victory. As they were marching up to attack, our artillery stopped firing, the general on enquiring the reason, was told they had got twelve pound balls to six pounds, but that they had grape shot; on this he ordered them forward and to fire grape. As we approached, an incessant stream of fire poured from the rebel lines, it seemed a continued sheet of fire for near thirty minutes. Our light infantry were served up in companies against the grass fence, without being able to penetrate; indeed how could we penetrate, most of our grenadiers and light infantry the moment of presenting themselves lost three-fourths, and many nine-tenths of their men. Some had only eight and nine men a company left, some only three, four, and five. On the left Pigot was staggered and actually retreated; observe our men were not driven back, they actually retreated by orders: great pains have been taken to huddle up this matter: however, they almost instantly came on again and mounted the redoubt. The rebels then run without firing another shot, and our men who first mounted gave them a fire or two on their backs. At this time, Warren, the rebel com-

Attack of
rebel lines

12 lb. ball
to six pounds
ders.

Warren.

mander fell: he was a physician, little more than thirty years of age; he died in his best cloaths; every body remembered his fine silk fringed waistcoat. The right flank of the rebel lines being now gained, and not the left as was intended, their whole body run along the neck to Cambridge. No pursuit was made.

Errors in our attack.

We have lost 1000 men killed and wounded. We burned Charlestown during the engagement, as the rebels from it exceedingly galled our left. Major Pitcairn was killed from it. Too great a confidence in ourselves, which is always dangerous, occasioned this dreadful loss. Let us take the bull by the horns, was the phrase of some great men among us as we marched on. We went to battle without even reconnoitering the position of the enemy. Had we only wanted to drive them from their ground, without the loss of a man, the Cymetry transport, which drew little water, and mounted 18 nine pounders, could have been towed up Mystic channel, and brought to within musket shot of their left flank, which was quite naked, and she could have lain water borne at the lowest ebb tide; or one of our covered boats, musket proof, carrying a heavy piece of cannon, might have been rowed close in, and one charge on their uncovered flank, would have dislodged them in a moment. Had we intended to have taken the whole rebel army prisoners, we needed only have landed in their rear and occupied the high ground above Bunker's hill, by this movement we shut them up in the peninsula as in a bag, their rear exposed to the fire of our cannon, and if we pleased our musquetry: in short, they must have surrendered instantly, or been blown to pieces. But from an absurd and destructive confidence, carelessness, or ignorance, we have lost a thousand of our best men and officers, and have given the rebels great matter of triumph, by shewing them what mischief they can do us. They were not followed, though Clinton proposed it. Their deserters since tell us, that not a man would have remained at Cambridge, had but a single regiment been seen coming along the neck. Had we seen and rejected all the advantages I have mentioned above, even our manner of attacking in front was ruinous. In advancing, not a shot should have been fired, as it retarded the troops, whose movement should have been as rapid as possible. They should not have been brought up in line, but in columns with light infantry in the intervals, to keep up a smart fire against the top of the breast work. If this had been done, their works would have been carried in three minutes, with not a tenth part of our present loss. We should have been forced to retire, if Gen. Clinton had not come up with a reinforcement of 5 or 600 men. This re-established the left under Pigot, and saved our honour. The wretched blunder of the over-sized balls sprung from the dotage of an officer of rank in that corps, who spends his whole time in dallying with the schoolmaster's daughters. God knows he is old enough—he is no Sampson—yet he must have his Dalilah.

A Dalilah the cause of the artillery blunder.

Another circumstance equally true and astonishing is, that Gen. Gage had undoubted intelligence early in May, that the rebels intended to possess Bunker's hill; yet no step was taken to secure that important post, though it commanded all the north part of the town. He likewise had an exact return of the corps that composed the rebel army then investing the town; of every piece of cannon they

Evacuation of Boston.

they possessed; of their intended lines of blockade; and of the numbers expected, and on their march from the other provinces.

We are all wrong at the head. My mind cannot help dwelling upon our cursed mistakes. Such ill conduct at the first out-set argues a gross ignorance of the common rules of the profession, and gives us for the future anxious forebodings. I have lost some of those I most valued. This madness or ignorance nothing can excuse. The brave men's lives were wantonly thrown away. Our conductor as much murdered them as if he had cut their throats himself on Boston common. Had he fallen, ought we to have regretted him?

Letter from NEW YORK, March 9th, 1777.

AS probably you may not have heard the true particulars of our flight from Boston, about this time last year, I shall give it you. Soon after our victory as it has been called on Bunker's hill, Gen. Howe succeeded to the command of the army. This for some time gave pretty general satisfaction, as Gen. Gage was thought too tame, and by some suspected of a predilection for the Americans, arising from his family connections. The critical situation of our affairs demanded men of vigour and enterprize. Some complained of his complaisance to the Boston select men, of his saying they were good sort of people and saved him much trouble, and of his gossiping with the Commissioners. These people, you may believe, admired Gen. Howe for the opposite qualities, which they said, or imagined, he possessed. He was an officer of experience, and tried courage; the select men would be proscribed; every American distrusted; and the Commissioners would not be permitted to thrust their noses into his house. All tittle tattle and gossiping were to be banished head quarters. Even the blunders at Bunker's hill were forgotten, so happy were most people at the change. His reserve and retirement were imputed to an indefatigable attention to the duties of his station, and his personal gloom and moroseness were apologized for from the vexation that a great mind, always intent on important objects, must feel from frivolous or impertinent intrusions. It was a considerable time before this was discovered to be only a fancy picture. The man's retirements were found *not* to be the retirements of business; and his habitual moroseness, *not* to be the sensibilities of a great mind disturbed by impertinence. We remained the fall and winter waiting reinforcements. In March the rebels appeared on Dorchester neck, which commands the south part of Boston, as Bunker's hill does the north part. We had once a detachment on this height, but abandoned it. The rebels discovered its importance, and as soon as the season permitted, occupied it. We embarked 2000 men to attack them, but a violent storm prevented the execution. Next day, the rebels were thought too strongly posted; and soon after orders were given for an evacuation. Thus by a palpable neglect of our own, we were forced to abandon a town with disgrace, which had cost us at least 2000 men to keep; and that too, just on the eve of our receiving the expected reinforcements. In fact, our safe retreat was owing to a secret capitulation

Boston ca- pitulation with the rebels. They were to allow us to run away
pitulation. quietly, and we were not to burn the town. It is impossible to enumerate the immense variety of goods that were left, particularly woollens and lincos. A rich, and what is more, a much wanted supply for the rebels. Had we attacked at Dorchester, we most probably should have been repulsed. Our detachment was too weak; and the rebels, by Sullivan's advice, had got more than 100 hog-heads filled with stones to roll down the hill and break our lines as we advanced. When it was determined to run away, the general convened the principal officers and made a speech to them on the occasion, and some even of them who disliked him most, confessed there was real merit in it, which greatly perplexed them, as they were sure it was not his own, and yet they could not discover where he had got it.

Though our reinforcements were by this time thought to be at sea, no care was taken to leave a sufficient force off the harbour to prevent them running into the mouth of the enemy. Indeed the Renown, Capt. Banks, was left in Nantasket road, but it never
700 men lost appeared he had proper orders, for on the first salute from only one piece of cannon, he made the best of his way for Halifax; whereas, he should have continued cruising off the harbour to give information of our retreat. This was a capital blunder, the result of the most impenetrable stupidity, and lost us Lieut. Col. Campbell and 700 men, who run right into the harbour of Boston, not knowing but that place was still in our hands.

Our voyage to and from Halifax was just like any other sea voyage, where troops are much crowded together.

Last August on Long Island we rejected an opportunity of terminating the rebellion; the rebels when defeated ran into their lines in the utmost disorder, our grenadiers were following them with great ardour, when the general after much difficulty, called them off. Had our troops been allowed to go on, not a soul of the rebels would have escaped. A lady, whose husband and brother were rebel officers, has given us the following fact: on their defeat they rushed into the house, and desired her to fly with her child, as they
Rebel escape expected every moment to be cut in pieces. She did so; but could not get within a quarter of a mile of the ferry, the rebel croud was so great, and they were in such trepidation, that those in the rear were mounting on the shoulders and clambering over the heads of those before them. What a glorious opportunity did Gen. Howe here reject of finishing the war with eclat. We threw away three days in regular approaches, during all which time the rebels were ferrying themselves over, for it was the morning of the 30th before their rear embarked.

Lord Howe could send two frigates up the North river, for a whim of his own, and expose them to the fire of at least 100 pieces of cannon, but he lay almost within sight of the ferry, and let the rebel army cross it, tho' it was a branch of the sea near a mile wide, for three days, or at least two days and a half, without sending any of his numerous squadron to annoy them. I asked a warm friend of the admiral's, why his lordship did not bring his heavy ships against the batteries on the East river, and cut off the rebel retreat, as well as risk his frigates for no purpose up the North river? The re-
ply

Battle of Brooklyn, on Long Island.

ply was, the admiral did not chuse to risk his Majesty's ships; thus his lordship will not risk his Majesty's ships; the general will not risk his Majesty's men; for these reasons the rebels escaped, and the rebellion continues. Reb-lic
continues

Every day presents new blunders, we have lost three regiments of Hessians in the Jerseys this winter, and nearly an equal number of our own men from our foraging parties; all from not supporting and protecting our line of cantonment formed last year. Our commander has been enjoying his pleasures while every thing has been going to wreck in the Jerseys. What do you think of the favourite sultana's losing 300 guineas in a night at cards, who three years ago would have found it difficult to have mustered as many pence? Dont you think this Boston lady in high luck? As to the husband his various places are reckoned at 6000 l. a year: it is said he does not save a shilling:—but he looks fat and contented. Sultana's
profusion

REMARKS on General HOWE's own account of his proceedings on LONG ISLAND, in the Extraordinary Gazette of October 10th, 1779.

UPON any undue miscarriage in our land or sea service, every man's love of justice, and regard for the public interest, will lead him to wish, that wheresoever the fault lay, there may fall the public censure and disgrace: that the innocent may not suffer, and that the guilty may not escape. If a measure has been originally wrong and ill concerted, or was in itself too hazardous or impracticable; and we lay upon a commander the blame of not having succeeded in it, we may lose a good general, and retain a bad minister. If, on the other hand, the measure, as originally planned, was right and proper, and we blame the minister, because the general misbehaved in the execution, in that case we may lose a good minister, and retain a bad commander. Every honest man must see, that the public interest is much concerned in the making this necessary distinction.

The conduct of all oppositions is little different. In every miscarriage their invariable rule of practice has been to justify the commander, and lay the blame on the minister. Far from feeling any concern for their country, and expressing a just resentment at any misconduct in the commanders; they hold themselves rather obliged to them for disgracing the service, and furnishing them with a fresh ground of attack upon their rivals. Upon the miscarriage at Carthagen in 1741, ministers, they said, had starved the war, and tied up the hands of the commanders. Afterwards, their own letters, which Vernon published, proved the leaders in opposition knew the falshood of this charge. But it served their purpose to give it out, and the people were made to believe it. Upon Admiral's Byng's misbehaviour in 1756, Mr. Pitt told the House, in his own favourite and absurd idiom, he found no criminality in Mr. Byng. Mr. Pitt himself, when he came to be minister, upon the misconduct at Rochfort, experienced something of the same kind. But as the Newcastle party had, as he said, lent him their majority, the opposition was too feeble to make head against him. Conduct
oppositio

If in projecting any distant expedition, a minister shall have formed a good and proper plan, and furnished a sufficient force for the execution of it, he has discharged his part, and done all that is incumbent upon him. The manner of making use of that force, and of carrying the plan into execution, that lies with the commander. When Lord George Germain became secretary, the British interest in America was at its lowest ebb. Our troops had been ingloriously pent up in Boston, and still more ingloriously driven out of it. The whole American empire was reduced to Halifax and Quebec, and Quebec itself was besieged. In this low state of our affairs, Lord George Germain took the seals, and gave a vigour to our councils unknown to them before. By engaging a large body of foreign troops, and sending the earliest succours up the river St. Lawrence, the whole of Canada was recovered, a fleet was built at St. John's, and the rebels were beaten from off the lakes.

Gen. Howe at the head of between twenty and thirty thousand men, and attended by a great fleet, landed on Long Island, a force much superior in number, and much more in discipline to that which opposed him. By a just disposition the out-posts were all forced; ten thousand of the rebels, as the general himself counts them were defeated; besides the killed, wounded, and drowned, eleven hundred of them were made prisoners, and the rest fled with the utmost precipitation into their lines, pursued by the victors close up to their trenches. Filled with all the ardour of success, the troops would instantly have entered their camp, when the general thought he had, for that day at least done the rebel army damage enough; and chose to give them time to recover their fright. Let us read his own account of the affair: "The grenadiers and 33d regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musket shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn; from whence these battalions, without regard to the fire of cannon and small arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights, so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm, that it required repeated orders to prevail on them to desist from the attempt. *Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt*; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way, in the front of the works, out of the reach of the musquetry." Can the reader wonder, that the troops were thus eager for the attack, and that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist, when the general himself was of opinion, and every other man plainly saw, that the lines must have been forced, and the whole rebel army taken or destroyed? Even without any previous defeat, the army which attacks another in their trenches is generally thought to have the advantage. But there is scarce an instance to be found, of a defeated army precipitately flying into their trenches, ever defending themselves against a victorious army of near double their number. The French generals ascribed their losing the battle of Turin to their staying behind their lines. Prince Eugene had certainly never won it, if when he had got up to them,

Howe says
our men
would have
carried the
redoubt.

Battle of Brooklyn, on Long Island.

them, he had delayed the attack, and had thought only of besieging them with regular approaches. King William lost the battle of Landen by trusting to his lines, which Marshal Luxemburgh attacked as soon as he came up to them, without giving him time to cross the river in the night and escape him.

Had the commander in chief chosen to follow the judgment of the other generals, and stormed the lines, the rebel army was at their mercy, and the war would have been at an end. Was it the fault of ministers at home, that the rebellion was not brought to so happy a period? Was it the minister that suggested the giving up all these advantages, by calling off the troops in the midst of victory, and the hiding them in a hollow way, out of the reach of musket-shot; and then, after two days delay, deliberately opening trenches at six hundred yards distance? From this slow and solemn preparation we might think, that these lines were as strong as those of Donawert; which yet the Duke of Marlborough stormed the same evening that he came up to them. But did we ever hear of a great and victorious army's being stopped in the midst of their conquest, for forming regular approaches against the ditch of a line, which was three miles long, and only three or four feet deep? Did not the rebel fugitives run over the ditch and breast work, wherever their pursuers suffered them? and could not British troops as easily have followed them? Were these lines guarded by any such rocky precipices as those which the Hessians stormed at Fort Washington? Had the redoubt, for which the success of twenty thousand victors was stopped, a tenth part of the strength that nature and art had given to Fort Montgomery, which yet Gen. Clinton stormed with one quarter of that number, without losing three minutes upon regular approaches? The loss of a hundred men, which other generals thought would be the greatest they could sustain in forcing the camp; and the putting an end to the war, by the deletion of the rebel army, would have been the saving of ten thousand brave men's lives, which have been lost by protracting it.

But it was apparent, we are told, that the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches. Doubtless:—but they helped him to a much cheaper one: and that was to move off, and leave them to him. Were not the same boats, which carried the rebel army from New York to Long Island, lying ready to bring them back from Long Island to New York? Had the admiral destroyed any one of them? Could they wish for more than three days leisure to collect and add to them all the vessels in New York, and the adjacent places, to carry them off? Could he think that they would not exert their utmost diligence to save themselves from the destruction which they hourly expected. Inflancess do not often occur of a general's vigilance being thus eluded. And we may justly wonder, that a whole army of twelve or fourteen thousand men, with almost all their baggage, and stores, should move off, across an arm of the sea, twelve hundred yards over, without the general or admiral knowing any thing of the matter; that their very centinels, to say nothing of their artillery, should be drawn off, and our advanced centinels give no notice of it. There are, indeed, who say:—But let others write what they hear;

Howe's not pushing his victory, nor the minister's fault

Opinion of other generals.

hear;—I would confine myself to the general's own account of his suffering them thus to escape. One of the greatest military achievements of the Prince of Parma's life, was his conveying his army across the Seine, after being shut up by the French in a peninsula of that river; and nothing ever happened more mortifying to Henry the fourth. But our sea and land commanders suffer a beaten army, instead of a victorious one, to ferry over an arm of the sea, without making any the least apology. The general having at his own cheap rate got possession of the lines, seems quite at ease; and, far from expressing any mortification at their escape, treats their flight out of the island rather as a matter of triumph.

Ld. Howe's conduct.

The noble admiral's account runs much in the same strain: "The Roebuck, Capt. Hammond, was the only ship that could fetch high enough to exchange a few random shot with the battery on Red Hook; the ebb making strongly down the river soon after, I ordered the squadron to anchor. On the night of the 29th, the rebels abandoned all their posts and works on Long Island, and retired with precipitation across the East river to the town of New York." If a crow had fled over the passage, could he have spoken of it with a calmer indifference? The reader will observe, that the journal of the fleet's proceedings ends on the morning of the 27th: whether and which way the wind veered during the three following days, is not said. All, which we at this distance can know, is, if the tide of ebb made it necessary to cast anchor, to prevent the ships being carried down, that in those three days there were six tides of flood to carry them up,

Lines three miles and only 26 cannon.

The expression, "leaving their cannon in all their works, manifestly leads us to conclude, that they did not take any away. If this was the case, and we look to the list of the cannon taken, in what a contemptible light must all these lines, redoubts and batteries appear. The brass pieces were taken in the rout of the 27th. From that day therefore to the 30th, a great army, with forty pieces of artillery, beside their field equipage, attended by a fleet carrying many hundred guns, are all stopped in the full career of victory, and kept in awe for three days together, by lines, redoubts and batteries of *three miles extent*, containing all of them put together only *twenty-six pieces of iron ordnance*. All these various movements, necessarily attending the retreat and embarkation of ten or twelve thousand men, with the best part of their cannon, baggage and stores, were performed without any the least interruption from either army or fleet, which lay so near: and that too on the very night of a full moon. Either the ships, on one of the foregoing days, could have pushed up beyond the ferry, and prevented that vast transportation; or, they could not; because, I suppose, that the batteries on the two shores, and on Governor's Island, rendered it impracticable. But then the general could not but know this.

Rebels escape.

And the public might have expected that he would have pressed the enemy so much the more, and given them no time to escape from him at land; since he knew he could not intercept their passage at sea. The nation surely need not repent the having put this gentleman at the head of an American establishment for fifty four thousand troops, attended with ninety six ships of war.

Observations on Sir William Howe's own account of his Conduct at Frog's Neck and White Plains, as related in the Gazette of December 30th, 1776.

SIR William Howe having called for papers for the satisfaction of the public, and thereby invited us to read them, I have perused his letter of Nov. 30th 1776, and Lord Howe's of the 23d, and here offer what has occurred on the occasion. The observations are confined solely to the general's and admiral's own accounts.

It is currently told, that when Gen. Heister was upbraided with the loss of the Hessian brigade at Trenton, and asked, How he came to trust it to such a drunken fellow as Rhall? the reply made was, *Sir if you will tell me, why you would not make an end of the war at the White plains, I will then give you an answer.* The hearing of this story led me to read over the general's own account of this affair. It sets out with telling us "The very strong positions the enemy had taken on New York island, determined me to get upon their principal communication with Connecticut, with a view of forcing them to quit the strong holds in the neighbourhood of King's bridge, and if possible to bring them to an action." The map, or any inhabitant of New York will inform the reader, that the principal road of communication between King's bridge and Connecticut is through New Rochelle: that the whole tract of land south and southwest of Rochelle forms a peninsula, shut up on three sides by the North river and an arm of the sea called the East river: that there were only two roads by which the rebels at King's bridge could escape out of this peninsula; the one due north towards Canada, and the other north east through Rochelle towards Connecticut: that White plains lies out of this peninsula, a few miles to the northward; and that Frog's neck is a point of land, at the bottom of this peninsula, forming the south east corner of it.

Description
of Frog's
neck.

Every one must understand by the general's own expressions, that he meant to avail himself of the benefit of the fleet, to land at the back of the rebels upon the Connecticut road, and attack them without delay. This was a wise and just measure, and so obvious an one, that many people wondered he did not pursue it above a month before, when the army lay at Newtown on Long Island. From thence he might have avoided the dangerous navigation of Hellgate; and by landing at Rochelle, and taking post between that and the North river, have shut up the whole rebel army.

To a common understanding two things seemed necessary; the first was landing as near as possible to the road of communication; the other was the marching directly up to it, and cutting off the enemy's retreat; or, if they *did* move, attacking them immediately before they had time to entrench. But the general thought differently on each of these heads. Instead of landing at Rochelle or close to it, at Myer's neck, where the second division of Hessians afterwards *did* land; and where the army would have been upon the principal road of communication; and in three hours march might have possessed themselves of the posts on the Brunx and White plains, before the enemy could have got thither;—he chose for his landing place, a point that runs farthest south east into the sea;

Capital
blunder.

and is the single point upon the whole coast, which was the most remote from the road of communication he was to cut off. As even at this remotest place, the army had only 10 or 12 miles march, either to the enemy at King's bridge, or to the principal communication at Rochelle, we might have hoped that he would immediately have proceeded to action: We had the more reason to expect that nothing would have detained him, because he tells us, that *he had made all previous arrangements before he set out*; and yet no sooner is he landed, than he judges it necessary to stand still *six* days, waiting, he says, for stores and provisions.—With his brother attending him, and a fleet of transports able to carry 10 months provisions, and *all his previous arrangements*, he is afraid of his army starving in six days.

Afraid of
starving.

If there *was* any intention to intercept the enemy, the general ought to explain how this motion tended to further it; otherwise the reader's own plain sense might lead him to think, that it was the only visible way to frustrate it. Had he after having sent a part of the fleet up the North river, landed his army at Rochelle, and possessed himself of the two roads between the North and East rivers, he would have shut up the rebel army in the peninsula of New York, and obliged them either to lay down their arms, or to fight him upon what disadvantageous terms he pleased.—But this would have been the stroke of a master, and might have put an end to the rebellion.

Instead of landing to the northward and shutting them up, he chose to land at the farthest point of ground to the southward, which let them escape. It does not appear how this movement of the generals could be of service to the royal army; but it manifestly answered two very material purposes to the rebels; it discovered to them the general's design, and gave them *six* days leisure to provide against it. Accordingly they took the warning; and as his own letter tells us, formed a chain of entrenched camps behind the Brunx; and sent forward a detached corps to mark out and entrench a strong camp on White plains, as a secure place for them to retreat to.

How the
army subsisted.

But when a delay of *six* such important days is ascribed to the waiting for provisions, it is impossible not to ask ourselves, *on what* it was the troops subsisted, till this their grand stock arrived? *Doubtless on the provisions they brought with them.* And would not these have fed them upon a march of ten miles to Rochelle, and eight more to the Brunx and White plains, as well as during near a week's residence in this new-acquired peninsula? The troops embarked on Friday night, landed at nine on Saturday morning on Frog's neck, and left it next Friday noon. Had the Duke of Marlborough commanded, after passing the East river he would have posted himself on the enemy's communication, or attacked them, in *six hours*, while our modern general keeps his army in inaction *six days*, waiting for provisions, which surely could have been brought him to Myer's neck or Rochelle, just as easily as to Frog's neck. In 1708 Marlborough marched an army of 180 squadrons and 112 battalions, 15 miles, two nights successively, in a close country, levelled the roads, crossed the Dender, threw bridges over the Scheld, and at 4 o'clock afternoon, without a moment's delay, attacked

attacked the French in a strong country, full of enclosures, defiles, and morasses, and that very evening won the battle of Oudenard. The progress of modern warriors is more deliberate: when Gen. Howe, being determined to force the enemy from their strong holds, and, if possible, bring them to action, had crossed the East river and landed at Frog's neck, he spent nine days in going the first ten miles to Rochelle, and seven more in going the other eight miles to White plains. After the nine days various haltings till the enemy should move off and secure their retreat, our army encamped the 21st October near Rochelle, and from thence marched the remaining eight miles by the 28th, but the general not chusing to attack the enemy that day, made a disposition to do it three days after on the 31st, but then the night and morning proving wet, the general informs us the attack was postponed.

Rows and marches 28 miles in 17 days.

What were the disadvantages attending rain is not mentioned, but there were some manifest advantages; the royal troops had bayonets; the rebel rifle men could not have them; and many of the others, it is said, were without them. In the attack of entrenchments, the less the assailants depend on their fire, and the quicker they march up, the better. Yet we have twice seen the Americans suffered to go off unattacked upon account of rains, which must always damp the fire of the defenders; and in the last instance, the rain by wetting their cartridges, rendered them incapable of making any fire at all. From the 28th October to the night of the 1st November, the rebels seem to have presumed on the general's long sufferance, and then at last recollecting themselves, they abandoned their entrenchments. On this the general's letter observes with the usual triumph; "we immediately took possession of them, and the Hessian grenadiers remained upon the ground." Thus a modern general, instead of preventing the enemy moving off by the quickness of his motions, rather warns them by the slowness of them; and a professed determination of bringing an enemy to action, now means, the deliberately moving up to them, and then standing still as many days as they think fit, till they shall be disposed to move off without fighting. Our camp October 21st was within eight miles of the enemy, and the rebels moved off unattacked the night of the 1st of November, though the general has told us twice in his letter that he was determined to bring the enemy, if possible, to action.

On the 28th," he tells us, "the enemy's advanced parties were driven back to their works; that Col. Rhall with a brigade of Hessians had seized a height on the other side of the Brunx, from whence their right flank might be galled: that the 5th, 28th, 35th, and 49th regiments, followed by the Hessian grenadiers, after crossing the Brunx under the fire of the enemy, had attacked and beaten them from another height; that this material post being gained, the Hessian grenadiers were ordered forward upon the heights within cannon shot of the entrenchments." After gaining these material posts, so advantageous for attacking them in flank and turning their line, we might have thought it impossible not to bring on an action: but instead of immediately attacking them, he contents himself with standing still, as if waiting for them to attack him. After a part of our army had forced the

flanks the enemy and tops.

passage of the river and had gained the heights on the enemy's flank, instead of our hearing that the rest of the army was ordered to pass and improve these advantages, the general's letter calmly tells us, that "*the right and centre of the army did not remove from their ground; that in this position the troops lay upon their arms that night, and with very little alteration encamped next day.*" Must there not have been some *little alteration* in the general's countenance at least while he was writing this. Could he think it possible for us not to ask, To what purpose was it that the troops had forced the passage of the Brunx, routed a part of the rebel army, and gained these advantageous posts, if the army were to sit still and do nothing when they came there? The friend of his country, who now sees a French war brought upon us by the not finishing the American, must surely feel a deep concern on so mortifying an occasion.

As the general's letter acknowledges that on the 30th of October, it was *dangerous* for the rebels to remain in their then position, was it not equally dangerous on the 28th, when the royal army was rather *stronger* than on the 30th, and the rebel camp was confessedly much weaker. Yet on that very 28th, when the terror of seeing their outposts routed and driven in, and of seeing their right flank exposed, was fresh upon their minds, the general far from intending to bring them to action, ordered away six of his regiments, as if he thought himself *too strong*; and then the next morning, observing the enemy had improved the day's respite he had given them, in strengthening their camp, resolved to give them two days more, while he sent for the fourth brigade, and two battalions of the sixth from New York, as if he was now *too weak*; and even after waiting two days for their arrival, made no use of them when they were come; but chose to allow the rebels one or two days more to see their danger and escape.

Gen. Howe
both too
weak and
too strong.

Upon the whole, examples might perhaps be found of an enemy escaping by a delay of a few hours, or a single night; but it will be difficult to point out an instance in history of a commander's owning, that it was *judged expedient to march up to the enemy, and endeavour, if possible, to bring them to action*, and professing himself determined so to do; and then keeping his army *inactive* for several days together, within cannon shot of the enemy, when he himself tells us, that the state of the two armies was such, as to make it *dangerous* for the enemy to stay where they were, and much more prudent for them to move off.

The foregoing remarks have been confined solely to the general's own account, as it stands in the gazette.

Nothing can be more surprizing than the general's chusing to divide his short voyage of 20 miles into two, and landing half-way at Frog's neck, as if it were merely to tell the enemy where he was going, and then remaining six days there, as if in order to give them time to fortify the proper posts, and secure their retreat. No reason has ever been given for his *going* there, tho' some of his favoured officers have attempted an apology for his stay there. The general, say they, was mis-informed;—not surely in the position of Frog's neck! No one could inform him, that the way to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the *northward*, and thereby bring
them

them to action, was to land his army at the most extreme point to the *southward* of them. But the general was mis-informed about the nature of the ground at Frog's neck, and did not know but he could have marched his army out it.—The general himself has not hinted at any disappointment of that sort; and perhaps he may not thank his friends for bringing a *charge*, rather than an *apology*. Did ever any general chuse for his landing place, a detached part of a coast, without having first fully informed himself whether it was an island or not? Did ever general disembark his army upon a point of land, whose very name spoke it to be a peninsula at least, without knowing whether there was a way out of it or not? Did ever general put his army upon a march, without enquiring whether he had not a morass or river in his way? yet these are the reasons which have been assigned for his stay there. Reasons, which recoil with double force, against his ever having gone there.

Apologies rather charges against him

A captain of rangers making new discoveries in the inland forests of America, might come to a river or swamp he was not aware of;—but the chusing a route for a royal army, in a well inhabited country, only 10 miles distant from the capital, without informing himself of what every native of New York could have told him, is a case perfectly new, and not easily to be accounted for. Had this been a sudden resolution, taken up on some unexpected emergency, that might have been some alleviation to our concern; but it was a measure which had already been a subject of six weeks deliberation; and had he studied six months longer, he could not have found out a spot more improper.

The general himself speaks of Frog's neck as a place well known, and needing no explanation. The admiral calls it a peninsula. A former gazette of the 21st of December describes it as an island. The proprietors of the lands and mills at the outlet, *one at least of whom was then with the general at New York*, could have told him, that for all the purposes of marching an army it was really an island; the only outlet being over an artificial causeway of wooden logs, laid in the marsh, the breadth of a single waggon, and a bridge over a gut or arm of the sea, made of the same materials. It is hardly necessary to apprise the reader, from the former gazette, that the rebels had taken up this bridge and causeway; for there was but *one man*, I suppose, in New York, who would not have expected it.

After having several of his men shot from the higher grounds in their march along this neck, the army found a river or creek before them, and an enemy behind a breast work on the other side of it. Here the general found himself at a stand; he could not go on; and this therefore like his other *forward movements*, ended only in a *backward retirement*.

Ridiculous situation Frog's neck

During the six preceding weeks, the troops from their camp in Long Island, might have had the shortest and most commodious passage from White's town to Rochelle; but the general now perceived, as the result of his long deliberation, that instead of his getting upon the enemies road of communication, they had got upon his; that a small part of theirs, had shut up the whole of his army; and that he had chosen a position, which so far from enabling

abling

bling him to bring the enemy to action, had tied himself up, and rendered him utterly unable to act at all.

The army was attended by the king's ships and a fleet of flat boats, in a manner that never army was before, and therefore could not be lost; but without that resource, they must probably have been reduced to the necessity of starving, or surrendering to a handful of rebels that shut them up.

The two known requisites to the success of every military enterprise, are secrecy and expedition. Secrecy the general had given up, by thus stopping half way; but his and every other consideration should have prompted him to expedition. The fleet of boats which had rowed him the first half of this way, lay ready to carry him the other half. As the extent of this his territory, was but three or four miles over; we might have hoped that *every part* of it could have been reconnoitered in as many hours; and that finding he could not go on, he would have extricated himself and army from a situation equally ridiculous and mortifying. The general however, chose to act otherwise; and instead of instantly embarking again, and rowing the next tide to Rochelle, he kept the king's troops for six days in this state of humiliation, as if it were only to make them the laughing stock of the Americans;—Who both friends and foes, all asked, the one with indignation, and the other with triumph, **HOW THEY EVER CAME THERE?**

Friends and
foes ask
HOW THEY
CAME
THERE.

Letter from NEW YORK, December 10th, 1777.

IF you was in this town, you would be surprized to find the Howes so unpopular; they have been so here all this campaign. The total loss of Gen. Burgoyne's army can only be imputed to them. To possess the lakes and the North river, and by that means to separate the northern and southern colonies, seems to have been the expectation of the King, Ministry, Parliament, and the nation. Had Gen. Howe gone up the North river, instead of acting to the southward, that line of separation would have been formed in July; Gen. Burgoyne's army would have been saved, and both armies, conjunctly or separately, might have acted against New England, which would have been striking at the heart of the rebellion. Before winter, Connecticut might have been conquered, or at least destroyed, and then the rebel inhabitants must have taken shelter in the provinces of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire, and there they must all have starved or submitted in the space of a few months, as those provinces never yet maintained their own inhabitants. All this might have been done; admitting, however improbable, that Washington had forced our posts on the North river, and passed it, which is not likely he could do, not having boats, and having both our armies and shipping opposed to him.

Plan to con-
quer Ame-
rica.

Supposing therefore, as the most probable case, that he could not pass the North river, he must either remain a tame spectator of the conquest of New England, or attack Staten Island; for New York he could not approach without passing the North River. That island might easily have been defended, as very strong posi-
tions

tions may be taken on it, it is greatly protected by the shipping, and the posts there could easily be reinforced and supported. Besides, Washington, in attempting the North river, might, in the course of the campaign, have given Gen. Howe an opportunity of attacking him with success. Gen. Howe might then have either conquered or destroyed Connecticut, and then the rest of the northern rebel colonies, must either have starved or sued for pardon. The conquest of the southern provinces, would the ensuing year, have followed of course. Now all the business is to begin over again on our part, under infinite disadvantages, the defeat and capture of Gen. Burgoyne's army having raised the insolence of the rebels to the highest pitch, and they now boast that they are invincible.

In fact General Howe's round about voyage to Philadelphia, and turning his back on the very place where he ought to have acted, has done more to strengthen the rebellion than all the committees and congresses among the rebels, and their confederates at home. General Howe in his retreat from the Jerseys, in his embarkation, in his stay on board the transports before he sailed, in his voyage to the mouth of the Delaware, where he played at bo-peep with the rebels, and, in his circumbendibus to Chesapeake bay, expended near three months of the finest time of the campaign; and all this to go out of his way, to desert his real business, and to leave Burgoyne, with 6000 regulars, to fall a sacrifice. There never was a campaign so injudiciously conducted. By going up Chesapeake, and marching to the Delaware, he was under the necessity of sending his store-ships and transports round again to the Delaware, to meet him, and there the troops were nearly starved, as well as the inhabitants that remained in Philadelphia; the rebel craft and frigates, under the protection of Mud Island and Red Bank, cutting off his communication, by water, with the fleet, for more than two months.

Rebellion confirmed, and Burgoyne sacrificed.

In short, except the mere matter of fighting, and his victories have never yet amounted to any thing, the rebels taking post on the next hill, and defying him, all his campaigns exhibit only a succession of blunders. He defeated Washington at Brandywine, but was himself surprized at German town, during a thick fog, and the consequences might have been fatal, had not Lieut. Col. Musgrave, with six companies of the 40th regiment, made a surprising stand in a stone-house; this gave time for our line to advance and repulse the enemy. Fifty-two men lay round the house, four of them on the steps of the door. The rebels had time to bring five pieces of cannon against it, but fortunately for us, it was cannon proof, none of the shot entering but at the windows. After this, the Hessians were repulsed in an attack on Red Bank, with 22 officers, and 371 men, killed and wounded. The gallant Col. Donop, the best officer of the Hessians was mortally wounded; two Hessian grenadiers, attempting to carry him off, were shot dead under him, and he was left by his own desire. He died about eight days after, on the 29th of October, and was interred by the rebels, with military honours.

Musgrave saves Gen. Howe's army.

Let Gen. Howe's successes on the Delaware be ever so great, they will never sufficiently apologize for the desertion of our army from Canada, by his going to the southward, and spending almost a whole

whole campaign at sea, and within sight of the steeples of Philadelphia. His insignificantly shrugging up his shoulders, when he heard of Gen. Burgoyne's disaster, and saying, with an air of indifference, "Well, it will only make the war last another campaign," will not be considered by his superiors, and the nation, as a proper vindication of his own conduct.

Clinton's
weak effort.

Gen. Clinton made a weak effort to assist Gen. Burgoyne by going up the North river, but too late to be of any service. He and his friends indeed say, that his not going sooner was want of leave from Gen. Howe; that he sent to the Delaware three times for leave to make a push up the North river: that Gen. Howe's answer to the first request was, "To mind his former orders;" to the second, that "he would think of it;" to the third, that "the trial might be made, but he thought it would be of no service." The fact is, he might have gone up the river a month sooner than he did, without the parade of sending three times to Pennsylvania; but that time was spent in going with three separate parties into the Jerseys a cattle-hunting. In the cattle exploits he never thought of sending for leave.

Imprudence
of G. Tryon

The injudicious conduct of Gen. Tryon, formerly Gov. Tryon, has been of infinite prejudice to the cause of the mother country. On the first arrival of the army here, he followed the army wherever it marched, administering oaths of allegiance to the inhabitants. These oaths were readily taken; and from the gazettes we find, that the governor did not lose such a favourable opportunity of puffing off his affiduity. As the army did not remain long in one place, the rebels again took possession, and barbarously murdered several of Gov. Tryon's converts, forced others to join the rebel army, and plundered the effects of all who refused. This, has in a great measure, deterred even the most loyal subjects from taking the oaths till they find they are to be protected.

In Gen. Clinton's excursion up the North river, near a thousand stout fellows came to claim the benefit of the proclamation, and proposed to enlist in the new corps; but Gen. Tryon, who never let slip any opportunity of appearing consequential, immediately assembled them together, pronounced a pompous speech to them, and tendered the oath to them with much formality. The country folks took the oath with great pleasure, and then having got their protections in their pockets, they thought it best to return home to their own habitations, till his Majesty's troops had conquered the rebels. In this manner, were so many able-bodied recruits lost. Gen. Tryon takes another method to convert the rebels; he sends out officers with flags of truce, loaded with sermons, to distribute among them. The Chief Priest of the Moorfields tabernacle could do no more. With these sermons the rebels light their tobacco-pipes, or expend them in other necessary uses.

Our troops
superior to
foreigners.

It is universally felt, that our native troops are far superior to any other for the war carried on here. The foreign troops may be as good as them in Germany, but they are not so here. This may easily be accounted for on the principles of human nature; our men, in fighting for their country, feel an interest which cannot be supposed to possess or actuate foreign troops; and on that account they attack with more alacrity, and resist with more firmness. It
has

has been the policy of the rebels, always when opportunity offered, to attack the foreigners in preference to the British; as on them they found, by experience, they could more readily make an impression. This was strongly verified in Gen. Burgoyne's different engagements. The Hessian grenadiers are noble troops, and form an exception to these observations in some degree. For the reasons above given, we do not wish for any more foreign troops in this country, unless it should be thought proper to send out Hanoverians; who as they would fight for their own Prince, may naturally be supposed to feel a stronger interest than those who are only influenced by pay and military renown.

But if Howe is to waste the national strength in campaigning, to no manner of purpose, on the Delaware, the English nation had better give up the point at once, than sacrifice so many thousands of brave men, merely to pamper his folly. Such a man as Lord Percy, who would have followed the true interest of his country, without jealousy or envy, would have done more last June and July, by going up the North river, than Gen. Howe has done in three campaigns, or is likely to do in three more, unless he is better instructed or changes his plan of operations. Next campaign, Howe, if he should still command here, and should be so obstinate as to continue on the Delaware and its environs, will draw out the war till the English are wearied out.

Even should he be victorious in that quarter, his victories will not be of any service, as Washington can always be supported both from the northern and from the southern colonies. It is presenting himself to the rebels, where they are most impregnable; and where they can concentrate all their forces and all their resources, and where victory itself can bring no other advantage with it to him, but possession of the field of battle. No line of separation between the southern and northern rebels can be formed from the Delaware, The North river, and the lakes George and Champlain, form the key of America. If Gen. Howe went to the Delaware out of ignorance, he is unfit for the command; if he went out of any other motive, he is unworthy of it. If he is continued here, he will either remain on the Delaware, expending the blood and treasure of the nation to no purpose, or he will move to the northward, leaving a garrison in it, and not less than 10,000 will protect it; or he will abandon it altogether, which is hardly to be expected, as that would be confessing in the strongest manner, the futility of his former operations. By this you see, he has only a choice of difficulties, if he supports his great conquest of Philadelphia, or disgrace if he deserts it. In deserting the northern army, he has inextricably ruined himself, he has no choice left but to resign; and his character as a great officer, is gone for ever. Besides, in a fortnight from this, it is probable he will be frozen up for two months; so that we are not likely to hear any thing of him, or the army under his command, till the month of March next year. The Delaware generally freezes about the beginning of the year, and the ice, for the most part, renders the navigation impracticable, or very dangerous, till some time in March. The people here have no hopes from our present commanders; they have been sufficiently

North river
and lake
the key of
America

Howe, is
fit or
worthy
command

tried ; the only expectation left us is, that better men next campaign will pursue better measures.

Letter from NEW YORK, December 16th, 1777.

G. Howe's
misconduct.

IT is an unanimous sentiment here, that our misfortunes this campaign have arisen, not so much from the genius and valour of the rebels, as from the misconduct of a certain person. Our commander in chief seems not to have known, or to have forgotten that there was such a thing as the North river ; and that Gen. Burgoyne, with his small army, would want support in his attempt to penetrate to Albany ; as the inhabitants of that country were the most rugged and hardy, and the best accustomed to arms, of any of the northern rebels. If Gen. Howe had been so happy for himself and his country as to have moved up the North river, instead of going to sea in the middle of the campaign, all America could not have prevented the junction of our two armies ; and that of Gen. Burgoyne's would have been saved ; and a strong line of communication from St. Lawrence to New York would have been formed by the lakes and posts on the North River, dividing the northern from the southern provinces. Had this been done, the rebellion would have been half over, even without a battle. But some people seem never to have looked at the map of America ; or, if they did, they have proved to us, they did not understand it. Since Philadelphia was taken, Gen. Howe has never been able to get out of sight of it ; and the whole campaign appears to have been spent in taking that single town, which if we keep, will cost us an army to defend. In truth, merely through misconduct, instead of our expected successes, we have met with nothing but misfortune and disgrace. The deserting Burgoyne has lost us 10,000 men and upwards, in regular troops, Canadians, and Indians, and in loyal subjects adjoining to Albany and the lakes ; and the glorious acquisition of Philadelphia will cost us a garrison of 10,000 more, unless Gen. Howe while this rebellion lasts, means to protect that darling conquest with his whole army.

Advantages
of the North
river.

Whereas, if the communication had been formed by securing the North river and the lakes, the operations of our army to the northward would have covered New York, Long Island, and Rhode Island, which would have enabled Gen. Howe to take the field with at least 10,000 men more than he has been able to do in Pennsylvania. In that case he would only have had the northern rebels to contend with ; for Washington could not have passed the North river while the eastern banks were defended by our posts, and the whole river occupied by our armed ships, floating batteries, gun boats, and other craft. Then the taking of Connecticut, a small but fertile colony, and the storehouse of New England, would have ensured the conquest of the northern colonies. They must have thrown down their arms, or starved ; for I cannot suppose, that a body of militia could have defeated an English regular army, amounting at least to thirty thousand men, and as well appointed in every respect, as any army that ever took the field ; and the men of that army roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm in the cause

of

of Old England, and inspired with indignation against the rebels, for their multiplied acts of treachery and barbarity. But the spirit, the vigour, and the lives of many of our brave fellows in the main army, have been lost by pursuing the most ill advised measures, the carrying on the war from the Chesapeak bay and Philadelphia, places in which the rebels can bring their whole force against us, and where all the advantages we may gain, can avail us nothing farther than keeping possession of the ground on which our army encamps. In fact, there is not a common soldier in the army but knows, that deserting the North river lost Burgoyne and his army; that his being fought down has given the rebels a tenfold confidence, and thrown a gloom over the aspect of our affairs in America.

The rever
on the De
laware.

The errors of the last campaign are now considered as trifles, having before our eyes the gross and mortifying blunders of the present. We anticipate here the astonishment and depression, the clamorous lamentations, the bitter complaints, and the general indignation, that will successively arise at home; but we repose the greatest confidence in the steadiness of the ministry, and in the vigour and abilities of the noble lord at the head of the American department. I have not time, and beside it would be tedious, to mention ail our expectations. I shall only say, that till reinforcements are sent us, our operations in this country are likely to be for the most part defensive; and the success of our future measures will greatly depend on the military genius who is to conduct us next campaign. Our losses this campaign will greatly animate opposition and the rebel partizans in England; and we expect to see little else in the London prints, than croakings of the downfall of England, and the triumph of America. It would not be an unadvisable measure to suspend the *habeas corpus* act, with respect to treasons committed in England; that would go a great way towards uniting you at home.

Depressio
at home.

Gen. Burgoyne, with the wreck of his small army, has been some time near Boston, between Charlestown neck and Cambridge. Our transports are now at Rhode Island with an intent to take them on board. I sincerely wish them all embarked, for I am much afraid the rebels will make use of some subterfuge to detain them.

Rebels wi
detaim Bu
goyne.

The more one reflects on the manner this campaign has been conducted, the more one is astonished. If the intention is to conquer a country, there is an absolute necessity for occupying the principal passes; more especially if that country is extensive, and the inhabitants numerous. In doing this, you divide the forces and resources of the enemy, and, as I have already remarked, you may beat them in detail. Now the grand pass in British America is the North river, and the lakes George and Champlain, which must be possessed if there is a serious intention to bring this rebellion to a speedy conclusion. But if you would rather have a ten years war, and a hundred millions additional debt, then you may continue to indulge Gen. Howe, or any other general, who may succeed him, in amusing himself and the army with a sea voyage in the middle of the campaign, and in leaving whatever armies you may send via Canada, to be swallowed up by the New England

Must bring
the war on
the North
river.

men. It is not any apology to the nation, in Gen. Howe and his friends saying, that Burgoyne thought himself strong enough; his duty, if he undertook any thing of his profession, was to be on the North river, and not to spend the campaign and waste his own army, in a part of the country where even his victories are useless. If any thing effective is intended next campaign, the war must be brought back to the North river. After occupying that with shipping and small craft, and possessing some of the strongest posts on its banks with troops, you may then carry your whole force into New England, which would not resist a vigorous campaign, or allowing it did, however improbable, the reduction of Connecticut would starve the rest of that country into submission; you then have only the southern colonies to subdue: they would not make a desperate resistance after the conquest of their northern friends.

If Gen. Howe intends to keep Philadelphia, which has cost him a whole campaign, and the nation 14,000 men, including Burgoyne's army, and the killed and wounded, sick and dead of his own army, he must either remain near it himself, or leave a small army to defend it. If he remains near it, I cannot comprehend how America is to be conquered; nor can I conjecture how he is to march forward, as Washington is only twelve miles from him, so strongly posted that he does not chuse to attack him. It is true he may, by crossing the Delaware on his right, return again to the Jerseys; or on his left, he may pass into Maryland; but in either of these provinces, after having patrolled the country, with Washington at his heels, he will do no good without coming to a battle and gaining a decisive victory, unless he should chuse to surprize the whole world again by another sea trip. Whichever of these methods he follows, an army must be left at Philadelphia, so that our conquest becomes a burthen; for the troops required to garrison that single town, would have supported the communication on the North river, which would have disunited the rebels, and gone a great way to quell the rebellion. You see I do not presume to think he will abandon Philadelphia; as that might subject him to be asked, why he spent so much time, men, and money to take it?

Resentment
of army on
shipping
southward.

January 1st, 1778. I suppose that Lord Howe has arrived at Rhode Island by this time. He has failed to that quarter, on purpose to expedite if he can, the embarkation of Gen. Burgoyne's troops. I am much afraid the rebels will invent some scheme to detain them altogether. Our gallant commander has expended at least 14,000 men this campaign; and to console us for the loss, has had the honour of appointing Mr. Galloway, formerly one of the rebel Congress, sole superintendant of the port of Philadelphia. Perhaps such a grand stroke, and the pleasure of reading his letters, minutely displaying his retreat through the Jerseys, which made our brave fellows almost gnaw their own flesh out of rage, may also console you. By God, had you seen our common men, when they ferried them over to Staten Island, they would have struck you with such a complicated picture of mortification and resentment, as would have left a lasting impression.

It took the nation till the third year of this rebellion, to place a body of troops in this country sufficient to conquer it; the intent of
send

ending Burgoyne to Canada, was for no other end than to penetrate by way of the lakes, while Gen. Howe went up the North river; yet the moment this is brought within our view, Howe, as if afraid of joining Burgoyne, turns tail, goes to sea, and deserts the very business upon which the whole nation was intent. There is a general dissatisfaction here and at Philadelphia. All the territory we possess in Pennsylvania, is the point of land formed by the confluence of the Delaware and the Schuylkill, measuring nearly five miles in length, by two in breadth. The town itself is included. This, and the ground on which our army encamps, are the sum of our conquests this year.

You will observe, that your humble servant does not despair of the Commonwealth. Indeed, whining and despondence are excusable, when the times demand firmness and vigour. In defiance of ill conduct and the times, were you to see us sometimes you would laugh heartily; in our barrack the army list is produced, more than once a day, to conjecture upon a commander in chief; for we no longer look for one in America, since Burgoyne is in the hands of the enemy.

Letter from NEW YORK, May 5th, 1778.

GENERAL Clinton failed for Philadelphia the first of this month to succeed Gen. Howe in the command of our army. Our situation is such at Philadelphia, that we ought not think of any decisive action in that quarter. Gen. Clinton indeed may very easily, and it would be a credit to our arms, march across the Jerseys to New York, and re-unite all our forces, in readiness to act as the exigency of our affairs may require; but if he should retire by sea, it must give the rebels additional confidence, and be a proof either of the weakness of the army, or the imbecility of our new commander. There never was, since the existence of time, an army more ardent for battle than ours now in America; they only want to be led on, to prove that they will conquer or die for their country; they think that the concessions lately made at home to the rebels, arise from a want of confidence in them, which irritates them exceedingly. They say, they have often been presented to the enemy;—have sometimes been permitted to attack them;—but never have been led to follow their victory with effect. They have had a soldier, but not a general. Gen. Howe's dependants here say, that he had his plan of operations from home, and that he was not to deviate from the orders sent him. These gentlemen have been easily confuted by reading to them the following paragraph of Gen. Howe's own letter, dated June 3d, 1777. "The campaign will now immediately take place in the Jerseys; and I shall proceed as occurrences may arise, according to the plan made known to your lordship in my former dispatches." This extract always silences them;—it proves that he formed the plan of the campaign 1777, and only deigned to communicate it to administration. Another circumstance ought not to be forgot: he complained in the same letter of the camp equipage not arriving till the 24th of May; and his letter would lead us to conceive it had retarded the opening

G. Clinton

G. Howe plans his own.

His conduct refutes his excuses.

of the campaign. After this, the army was marched up to Washington's entrenchments in the Jerseys, and marched back again, and embarked for Philadelphia by the romantic navigation of Chesapeake bay. The camp equipage was most certainly carried on board the ships, but it was not landed with the troops at the head of the Elbe, but sent round by sea to the Delaware, in which river it remained till the end of the campaign. It would appear that the commander, as his own letter states it was relieved from much anxiety by the arrival of the equipage, but that when it did arrive, he did not think proper to use it for the accommodation of the troops.

If Gen. Howe had acted with vigour, and in concert with the Canada army, all the force of the rebels could not have withstood them. Instead of that he subdivided our forces, leaving Burgoyne with 6000 men, to attack a country inhabited by near a million of people; and with 18 or 20,000 men, went a summer voyage by sea, to land in a country and take a town, which he never durst, or never thought proper to quit for more than one day's march. If all these forces had been properly combined, the rebellion would by this time have been over. Indeed there is no military man who understood any thing of his business, but foresaw inevitable destruction to the cause and glory of his country, whenever it was first whispered that the embarked troops were bound to the southward. For some time at New York we were at a loss for their destination, as pilots one day were shipped for the northward, and another day for the southward, and all carried off in the fleet. As soon as their plan transpired, an universal despondence among the loyal Americans took place; men of moderation were silent and looked stupified; and men of vigour and penetration, expressed their doubts, sorrow, contempt, and abhorrence, just as the circumstances of things presented themselves. If Gen. Howe had carried the war up Hudson's river, he would have saved Burgoyne's army, crushed rebellion, and re-established our tottering empire: for himself he would have gained immortal glory. His grateful country would have covered him with honours, and our latest posterity would have revered his memory. But unhappily for us, we have seen in part and are likely to continue to see, the melancholy reverse of all this. Yet amidst the distresses of our country, one cannot help lamenting the fate of that man, whose very heart must be rent, when he reflects on the honour and glory that awaited him, but have now for ever passed away.

The honour
and glory
he lost.

Letter from NEW YORK, May 17th, 1778.

THE great line of ill conduct in this quarter, you must have already felt at home. By the most injudicious division of our forces in America, the cause of England has, for the present, been ruined. With an army sufficient for the conquest of this country, Gen. Howe, instead of going up the Hudson, left one third of his army to garrison New York, and with the rest went to Philadelphia, to perambulate its environs during most part of the campaign, and then composedly took up his winter quarters in that town; whilst

whilst Washington, with not more than 7000 men, stationed himself at Valley Forge, only twenty four miles distant, and was still in the same position by the last accounts which arrived here only a day or two ago. Every body in this place, and at Philadelphia, are in amazement that 7000 raw troops, speaking comparatively with our own, and these raw troops half naked, should block up a veteran army double their number. You have asked me in more than one letter, what were our reasons for going to the southward at the very time that our northern army was approaching the head of the Hudson? This is as incomprehensible to us as it is to you; for we see by the King's instructions to Gen. Burgoyne, and Col. St. Leger, which we had by the last ships from London, that they were never to lose sight of a junction with Gen. Howe, which of course implies, that he was either to favour their approach by moving up the Hudson, or by attacking Washington in the Jerseys early in the spring, or summer, at least hinder him from detaching any of the continental troops to reinforce the northern rebel militia. This I aver is evident from the instructions that have lately been printed in this town. At this critical juncture, their two excellencies go to sea with the whole fleet and grand army, leaving our northern, or Burgoyne's army to perish, for want of that support which his Majesty and administration, and the nation had undoubtedly ordered, and expected would be given them. The rebels who are not deficient in penetration, laugh, and say, "Your general, by his movements, made us a present of Burgoyne's army, and left us also a greater one in New York, if we had mustered force enough to take it." Supposing that Washington had any genius, God knows, he had no occasion to exert it against us; our folly, ignorance, or envy, did every thing for him! It was impossible in the whole extent of America, to fix on a more disadvantageous spot than Philadelphia to carry on the war from. That town, as soon as taken, must have been abandoned, or protected by the whole army. Indeed, the going there, and the covering it, have lost us a campaign, all our northern army, some thousands of our southern army, and what is infinitely more to be regretted, our national honour.

It is a mercy, a saving grace to the general that you have recalled him; for he never seemed inclined to abandon his charming conquest. He and his army, his brother and his fleet, have done little else for the best part of eight or nine months, than hover round it, forming the great Mr. Galloway's satellites. You will observe, that the reasons against carrying on the war from Philadelphia were numerous: by going there, our army was divided; New York with an immensity of King's stores, and other valuable property endangered; our northern army consigned to destruction; Philadelphia, a town that could not be kept without an army; that country just in the centre of the rebel provinces could be equally supported by the northern, and southern rebels, and of such a nature, that no commanding post could be taken, either to divide or over-awe the enemy: the river, a long and dangerous navigation, full of shoals, and subject to freeze in the winter; so that our fleet must either remain in the winter blocked up by the ice, or separate from the army, by moving off before the cold set in; and,

the rebels in possession of both shores, could, from their various hours, act with the greatest prospect of success against our merchant ships and transports, either going up or coming down.

Propriety
of acting on
the North
river.

On the contrary, by acting on the Hudson, our army remained in full force; Gen. Howe could have begun the campaign with at least 6000 more troops; his operations to the northward and his possessing the Hudson, covering all our posts, he would have cut the rebel country in two; against either half of which Burgoyne and he united, might in the ensuing campaign have carried on the war; he would have saved Englishmen from the greatest and most mortifying disgrace that ever befel them as a nation, and he himself would have been the greatest man in our annals—he would have acquired immortal glory. How the voyage to Philadelphia came to be undertaken, a movement so contrary to common sense, to the general judgment of the most intelligent people here, to the most obvious rules of war, and apparently contrary to express instructions from home, and at the first glance so evidently ruinous to the cause of England in America, is a question, which, I believe, their two excellencies only can explain.

Character
of L. Howe.

Lord Howe certainly came out with the most compleat idea of his own weight and importance: it cannot be doubted, that, on his arrival here, he imagined, that condescensions from him would far outweigh any exertion of our national strength. But we are now confident he is recovered from that idea: he certainly had a great predilection for the Americans; his brother's monument in Westminster Abbey, at the expence of New England, it is supposed, led him to believe, that all America revered himself, and would gather round him as their sole mediator. But Franklin who had made a tool of him in England, as well as of many others, soon convinced him of his want of importance. The following circumstance may give you some notion of the situation of the refugees here. You must understand, by refugees, the gentlemen who have been driven off, on account of their uniform attachment to government; not your rebels who came in upon proclamation, to regain their estates that were in possession of the King's army. A number of refugees long settled in the southern colonies, and mostly Englishmen, who had been stripped of the greatest part of their fortunes, applied to his lordship for letters of marque to cruize against the rebels; but he sternly replied, "*Will you never have done oppressing these poor people? will you never give them an opportunity of seeing their error?*"—This was the answer of the King's admiral to a body of his Majesty's loyal subjects, whom these poor people, as his lordship called them, had treated most barbarously, had banished from their habitations, and sequestered their estates, in order to carry on the present rebellious war. This conduct, however, could not hold long; letters of marque have been since granted. I do not give this as a secret; it has been long publicly talked of here. The gentlemen who received such a rebuff, you may be sure, were not silent upon the occasion. His lordship's great error is, in thinking himself equal to every thing. We do not know that he communicates with any person but his brother. Their measures, therefore, are purely their own. In making him a politician, they have put him quite out of his latitude. Yet after all, as a man, he is deservedly
esteemed.

His stern
reply to the
refugees.

esteemed. His moral character is unimpeachable in every respect: he is quite the contrast to a certain person; and, in the naval line, he has not a superior. The bravest man could not wish for a more able, or a more gallant commander.

In some instances we have not been remarkable for our good conduct in this neighbourhood. Governor, now Gen. Tryon, who is the pink of politeness, and the quintessence of vanity, chose to distinguish himself by petitioning that the provincials under his command should occupy the out-posts at King's bridge; he had his wish for a long time, by which we lost numbers of our best recruits. The man is generous, perfectly good natured, and no doubt brave; but weak and vain to an extreme degree. You should keep such people at home, they are excellent for a court parade.—I wish Mrs. Tryon would fend for him.

I have not entered on the scenes of dissipation and gaming that have been practised and countenanced, or, as the general's friends correct us, "permitted." I have drawn a curtain around wanton wives and witty daughters; for a public man ought to stand or fall by his public actions; if these are right, we may smile at his private amusements; besides, my respect for the ladies will not permit me to enter on this subject, though a rich one; and yet it is a tempting story,—so animating,—so seducing, that I must drop the pen to preserve my own principles.

Vanity of
Tryon.

Gaming &
the ladies.

Letter from NEW YORK, May 18th, 1778.

IT must be confessed, that the rebels triumph greatly in baffling Howe's army at Philadelphia; but that ought not to make us despair; for, if his bad generalship divided our forces, instead of combining them, by which we suffered the loss of Burgoyne, and had our grand army pent up in Philadelphia; that is no evidence of our weakness, or the rebels strength, but simply a proof of Howe's deficiency in military knowledge; who deserted our northern army which was co-operating with him, and failed to a town that took his whole army to guard it. You must conquer the rebels and bring them back to their allegiance.: You have no other alternative but victory or destruction. I make no doubt, but many of the people of property among them, would be glad to come to an accommodation, as the burthen of maintaining the rebellion falls chiefly to their share; but the rabble, of which the army is mostly composed, having all the power in their own hands, must be beat before any thing like a submission can take place. Your own safety and existence as a nation, will not allow you to desert this business were you so inclined. If you was to adopt Dean Tucker's plan, and grant them independency, you would commit an act of political suicide. You ought to be sufficiently convinced, that no tie can bind the rebels but force. You would soon lose your Newfoundland fishery, or be under the necessity of entering into a war for its protection: you then would have all the work to begin again under infinite disadvantages. Your West India islands would soon follow; nature herself seems to have attached them to the American continent, and, whoever possesses this country, must eventually com-

Victory &
ruin.

Independence
rubbishous.

mand the islands. France, though she now supplies the rebels, may have cause in future to curse her folly. It is neither the interest of France, nor Spain, to enable the colonies to shake off their dependence on Britain; but I do not say it is not their interest to weaken us by keeping up the ferment. If your European politicians were as wise as they ought to be, they would have foreseen, that the freebooters of the united states of America, would be infinitely more formidable, than those of the petty states of Africa. All the commercial states are deeply interested in this business.

Danger to
all mari-
time states.

Supposing the Americans independent, and that they should think proper to seize the Dutch ships, or the French, or the Spanish, or the Portuguese, what remedy could any of these powers have? I conjecture none of them would fit out fleets and armies, and send them so far as this to the westward.—But they might appoint convoys;—that is true;—yet the Americans, when left to themselves, will soon have a fleet equal to any of the above states.

In fact they could enrich themselves alternately with the plunder of every mercantile nation in Europe, without any of those nations being able to do them a material injury, or obtain any adequate satisfaction. Such will be the blessed effects of American independency to all the European commercial states. A more ruinous circumstance however awaits Great Britain. America is a rich, healthy, fertile country; provisions, in time of peace, are not a fourth of the price they are in your kingdom. Your manufacturers, your labouring men, your people of small fortunes and large families, and others of good fortune, but an enterprising mind, would all flock to the new independent states; for though provisions are only about one fourth the price, yet labourers and workmen's wages are four times higher than in England. Your people who come, may get land for nothing, or for a small quit rent next to nothing; and the turbulent politics of our new republics, would afford an extensive field for men of vigour and enterprise to struggle in. No laws you could pass at home could keep your people. Never was a nation so bound to exert itself as Great Britain in the present crisis; if, for the sake of a momentary but delusive quiet, you patch up a rotten accommodation with the rebels, the glory of Britain is set for ever; and from the terror, she will become—the contempt of nations.

Exertion &
conquest;
or ruin and
contempt.

M A T T E R O F F A C T .

Addressed to Lord George Germain.

TO combat the whole force of official representation conveyed to your lordship, would be a task from which I should shrink, was I not fully convinced of your lordship's zeal for the public service, and the penetration with which you can distinguish truth. I assure your lordship, in the most solemn manner, that I have no other motive for the trouble I now take, but a hearty zeal for the honour of the nation. I am totally unconnected with any of the parties which distracted the public service in America last campaign: I am neither under the bias of obligation or resentment towards any of the three generals; nor have I the smallest wish either to abet faction on this, or rebellion on the other side of the Atlan-

tic. To the eternal disgrace of those concerned in both, history cannot furnish a single example of so wanton and ungrateful a rebellion, or of so unprincipled an opposition to government. Having been an eye witness to the proceedings of the Congress to the period when they took the desperate step of declaring independency, and personally acquainted with many of the principal members, I beheld them daily taking their tone, and forming their measures from the conduct of the faction at home. In the declaration of independency indeed they stepped before their friends here a little but these soon followed. Leaving both to the infamy that must attend their proceedings, I shall pursue my design of pointing out to your lordship some part of the blunders, the venality, the insolence, the incapacity, and the tyranny which pervade almost every department of the army in America.

Faction at home the tutors of Congress.

I need not say a word to convince your lordship of the misconduct on Long Island, in permitting a beaten and dismayed army, cooped into a corner of an island, to pass a wide ferry, by small embarkations, without the loss of a man. It is acknowledged the rebels were there at the mercy of the royal army, but that a reluctance to shed the blood of his Majesty's subjects restrained it. Possibly it may be pleaded that the same reluctance prevailed in allowing them to escape from the city of New York, and afterwards from King's bridge; that it permitted them to retreat leisurely from the action at White Plains, where M^r Dougal's brigade was defeated; and finally, to induce the royal army to retreat, when they had driven the rebels into a situation of the greatest distress and dismay, ready to have dispersed, had any attack been made upon them. Here we left them to return and storm fort Washington, after we had allowed Mr. Washington to pass the North river in our view; occupy fort Lee, and escape from thence with more than double the garrison of fort Washington. Possibly this was a piece of generalship, as we took those garrisons prisoners; but it was changing the system upon which we had before acted, unless it was thought beneath the courage of the royal army to take rebels, until we had suffered them to get safe into their very strongest post. Allowing Mr. Washington to escape through the Jerseys when he had not above five and twenty hundred poor, dispirited, naked fugitives to attend him is a thing without example. I beg your lordship will look upon the map of New Jersey for a moment, and then endeavour, if possible, to conceive why a body of troops were not detached from New York to Newark, Elizabeth town, or even Amboy, to cut off his retreat, put him between two fires, and oblige him to surrender, and by that means put an end to the war, which the rebels themselves have often confessed it would certainly have done. Was not this something worse than a blunder, or even indolence? I can assure your lordship, that many of the most judicious leaders among the rebels were even astonished at it, and were so free as to declare to me, that they supposed the war would have been too short, had it been put an end to in one campaign.

Misconduct in Long Isl.

New York.

White Plains.

The Jerseys

A halt at Brunswick for want of orders, when the fugitives were in view, allowed them time to retreat to the Delaware, and to cross that river, to the astonishment even of themselves. Yet has this

Brunswick.

Our astonishment suffers no rest.

Trenton.

march been extolled to your lordship, and the public has been insulted with the publication ; whilst every man in America stood astonished, and every loyal subject there was chagrined and disappointed—fully convinced that nothing less than blindness directed by ignorance, could have allowed such an enemy to escape in such a situation. But, as has constantly been our lot, our astonishment was not suffered to rest long upon the past, the future misconduct soon called it off. A line was formed from Mount Holly on the Delaware, to the village of Newark, by occupying open villages. The same army which would not detach a part to intercept Mr. Washington in his flight, was extended in a line of nearly a hundred miles, without a single redoubt to cover any one post. A brigade of Hessians commanded by a drunken madman, was placed in Trenton ; the most important post, forming the angle of the whole line, and nearest the enemy, whilst the British light infantry, the best troops in the universe were, (contrary to all custom and order) placed 13 miles in the rear at Prince town. Gen. Grant having intelligence that Mr. Washington intended to attack Trenton, instead of ordering up the light infantry from Prince town, sent only twenty light horse, and twenty-four light infantry to Trenton the day before. Rhall seeing so little precaution taken by the general, looked upon the intelligence as false, and got drunk as usual. The consequences which almost naturally followed were such, and they are at the same time so notorious, that I shall spare your lordship the pain of seeing them recited. It is sufficient to say, that those naked, dispirited runaways, whom we allowed to slip out of our hands a few days before, returned upon a victorious army, and in two or three successful actions, killed and took half their own numbers, obliging us to abandon all our posts in Jersey, except Amboy and Brunswick, and a regiment stowed into the few houses in Bonham town to keep open the communication.

Thus, from being in full possession of that whole province, we were reduced to those three villages, the farthest extending fourteen miles into the country. Here the army remained all winter, obliged to fight for every mouthful of forage and fresh provisions which they obtained: with what loss the returns of the army will best shew. And permit me to ask your lordship, was it not most shameful ? I will venture to assert, that in the history of all the wars which ever yet existed, in the annals of all military misconduct which ever yet appeared, there is not a single example to take shelter under. Great military geniuses have often changed the nature of a war from the defensive to the offensive, by some stroke of military skill in the field, or have with an inferior force insulted their enemy in his winter quarters, and even obliged him to relinquish them. But this was where troops were superior in native courage, or excelled in discipline ; where they were in want of none of the necessaries for making war, and had fortified towns to cover them in case of a defeat ; or where the enemy could not be reinforced. But in the instance before us, not one of all these causes can be pleaded. Washington was but three thousand strong when he attacked Trenton, and those men so fatigued and benumbed with the cold, that they were unable to handle their arms ; and it was with the greatest difficulty any of them recrossed the Delaware, and near
half

half of them died, or were rendered unfit for duty. I speak from *authentic information*, my lord. At no time during the winter was the rebel army above five thousand strong, often not three, and those in want of almost every article of cloathing. Yet with that inferior, naked force, Mr. Washington blockaded our army in their quarters, and remained the whole winter in unmolested possession of every town within ten miles of them, often nearer, occupying a circle of at least sixty miles. In which situation he continued until he was reinforced in spring, when he approached within a few miles of Brunswick; and was permitted, though still inferior, to post himself in so strong a position, that it was not thought prudent to attack him. The army therefore quitted Jersey, relinquishing a whole province, of which they had been in full possession six months before, without even having made a single effort to recover the honour they lost at Trenton (though Mr. Washington was often reduced to two thousand men at Morris town) leaving the rebels all the advantage and credit they obtained by that action, which alone enabled them to recruit a single man.

Howe retreats from Jersey.

Before I quit Jersey, allow me to point out to your lordship some other parts of our conduct, and the consequence attending it. Upon the army entering Jersey, a proclamation was issued, promising protection and pardon to all such as should remain in their houses. The people pretty generally remained, and many thousands received printed protections, signed by order of the commander in chief. But neither the proclamation nor the protections saved the people from plunder, nor from insult; their property was taken or destroyed, without distinction of persons. They shewed their protections. Hessians could not read them, nor would not understand them, and the British soldiers thought they had as good a right to a share as the Hessians. This I assure your lordship was very generally the case while the army was advancing into the country, was and were in possession of it. In their retreat it was still worse; all who did not leave their wives and children, and abandon their property, were considered as rebels. When the rebels re-possessed themselves of the country, they treated all who had taken protections with the utmost severity. Thus was this whole province either irritated against his Majesty's government, by a breach of faith, or abandoned to persecution, where they had shewn any loyalty. No step was taken to conciliate their affections. The disloyal were not disarmed, nor arms put into the hands of the loyal, though both might have been done with the greatest ease. No steps of sound policy were pursued to secure the country; it was finally abandoned, and a proof given that proclamations and protections were no assurance of safety fit to be relied on.—An awful example! which the leaders in rebellion have not failed to avail themselves of, and which I can assure your lordship I have beheld the bad effects of on more occasions than one. I will not pretend to say that Jersey has not always been as rebellious a colony as any of the thirteen, but I assert that there always has been many thousands of loyal subjects in it, and there would have been at this hour double the number there are in it, had it not been for the misconduct I have now pointed out to your lordship. In such cases the people should never be deceived, much less abandoned to destruction,

Ruinous effects.

when

when they were promised protection. Protection ought never to be promised by government, but it should be afforded at all risks; much less promised without even an intention of performing; which I am sorry to see, from the correspondence your lordship has published, it was not in this case, as it there appears that it was not intended to keep possession of Jersey.

Having conducted the commander in chief out of the Jerseys, I shall leave him to perform his seven weeks voyage to Elk river (after having first taken a peep of a week into Delaware bay, to know if it was navigable) while I shall beg your lordship's attention to the affairs of the town and province of New York. I do not like to treat of public scandal; I will not let fall a single word upon any man's intrigues, where they do not interfere with the public good; where they do, the public has a right to know the cause of supineness and inattention in a general, or of corruption in a commilitary. Gaming must ever prove of the very worst consequences in an army, and totally ruinous if the example should happen to be set publicly by the commander: it then destroys subordination and respect, encourages licentiousness, and all discipline falls of course. A young officer who beholds his general every evening at a pharotable, I will not say lose his temper, though certainly subject to fret like other men who play a game of chance, in which there can be no amusement but as it gratifies avarice—I say, the young officer who beholds his general in such a situation, will soon lose the respect to his station, which he has lost to his person, when he is allowed to sport as freely at his elbow on his slender income, as the general does upon his princely revenues. He is ashamed not to do it; he expects to make his court by it. There is little economy in an army where high gaming is allowed; it is beneath the man who plays at night for hundreds, to trouble himself next day how he is to live upon his pay: He runs in debt for his necessaries, and the country must be plundered to supply his mistress. I ask you, my lord, can the general, or any other officer of rank, pretend to restrain, much less punish, an inferior for plundering, when he perhaps won all the poor gentleman's money the night before? To this cause, perhaps, as much as to the example set by the Hessians, may be attributed the scandalous height to which plundering is arrived at in the army. And yet, my lord, I cannot suppose that this was the cause of officers of very high rank taking large quantities of wine, tobacco, and valuable effects belonging to merchants at New York, who were known to be loyal, and who eagerly embraced the first opportunity of joining the King's troops. This must have been done under the impressions of that favourite idea, “that Parliament has declared America to be in rebellion, and that therefore every man in it has *ipso facto* forfeited his estate, and holds it entirely at his Majesty's mercy,” that is at the disposal of the army:

Your lordship will be astonished when I assure you that this is not only a prevalent opinion, but almost universal one. That it has been eagerly embraced and supported by a certain governor now in a military character, and I have been well assured it is cherished even at head quarters. Thus my lord, have I endeavoured to assign reasons why many loyal and respectable citizens have been plundered

Gaming ruinous in a General.

Bad effects on officers.

ed of their furniture and effects, under this comprehensive mode of forfeiture. Plundering under such an idea, is only making free with what belongs to the King. The gentlemen cannot have read the act they speak of, nor distinguished that, it only says numbers of persons, not all; and even if it did, that it would be necessary to try a British subject by a jury, in order to confiscate his estate: I speak from undoubted facts, my Lord, facts that will be heard of in a yet more serious mode. I point them out generally, in hopes that your lordship, in your humanity and justice, as well as for the honour of your country, and the British arms, will take some speedy and effectual method of putting an end to such pernicious and disgraceful proceedings. All such as have resisted the torrent of rebellion, and thrown themselves upon the protection of his Majesty's troops, should be shewn that they have acted wisely as well as virtuously; and that the army was sent there to protect, not to plunder and insult them. That arch plunderer, Gen. de Heister, offered the house he lived in at New York to public sale, though it was the property of a very loyal subject, who had voluntarily and hospitably accommodated him with the use of it. This may be nothing astonishing in a Hessian. But I have seen the furniture of good and loyal subjects, men who are suffering restraint or imprisonment among the rebels, sold by public auction; the carriages of gentlemen of the first rank seized upon; their arms defaced, and the plunderer's arms blazoned in their place; and this too by British officers. An officer of high rank took forcible possession of a gentleman's carriage and horses, after it was well known that he had received his pardon from the King's commissioners: he used it for several months, and was with difficulty prevailed on to give it up. This was acting under the strongest delusion, to speak of it in the mildest terms; not even allowing the King's pardon to save American property from the general passion for confiscation. It was the same officer who made so free with another gentleman's wine, and even offered it in presents by the pipe to his friends: a man, who from ostentation and weakness, has vibrated between the desire of popularity as a magistrate, and the vanity of being considered as a military genius. I conceal his name, because he really has good qualities, which break sometimes through the cloud of imperfections that surround them. I have thus particularised some instances, least your lordship should suspect the truth of my general assertions.

From this irksome subject, allow me to draw your lordship's attention on Hudson's river. There we see forts stormed with the intrepidity and spirit which ever accompanies British troops, when properly conducted; but with a loss of brave men, which must be the more regretted, as we gained nothing but mere honour by it,—the ground being left to the rebels to improve upon their past errors. Why a delay was made of eight days before the army proceeded higher up the river, we are ignorant of. Your lordship will recollect that the highland forts were taken the 6th of October; *Ætiopus* burned the 13th; and that Gen. Burgoyne did not sign his convention till the 16th. I have been assured by undoubted authority, that the city of Albany was totally defenceless, serving only as an hospital for the rebels, and as a lodgment for their small magazines of provisions. The river is undoubtedly navigable for frigates within twelve miles

Loyalists plundered.

Curious fact

Clinton's delays.

miles

miles of Albany. There was no force even to oppose open boats; gondolas could have guarded them to the wharfs of the town. Why then did not the troops proceed immediately to Albany? the taking of which might have been effected without the loss of a man; and would have obliged Mr. Gates to have returned hastily, or have crossed the Hudson's river for want of provisions. The latter would undoubtedly have been the case, as it is certain he had not two days provisions collected for his army, except what was in Albany. Putnam could have been no impediment, as he could not possibly cross the river to attack Albany, had he been in a condition. This measure would have infallibly enabled Gen. Burgoyne to retreat in safety, or to have formed a junction with the forces from New York at Albany, and thereby have saved the honour of the British arms. If it had not been found practicable to keep possession of Albany, the passage to New York was safe and easy.

Might have saved Burgoyne.

Your lordship will plainly perceive that there was time sufficient between the 6th and the 16th, to have effected all this. Perhaps it will be pleaded that Sir Henry Clinton was restrained by his orders, "to remain on the defensive." This did not operate more strongly against taking possession of Albany, than against storming the forts in the Highlands. Whatever it proceeded from, the army only amused themselves with burning *Æfopus*, and the houses of individuals which stood close to the river's bank. If fire be necessary to accompany the sword, permit me to ask your lordship, why was it reserved for the province of New York, beyond all comparison the most loyal colony of the thirteen? Why was it distinguished by an unnecessary destruction? Why did no sort of declaration whatever accompany the army as it penetrated into the country, acquainting the inhabitants how to conduct themselves, holding forth safety to the loyal at least, many thousands of whom your lordship is well assured are in that colony? Why have these loyal people been treated the worst? I pray your lordship to enquire into the state of the colony, you will find that 1500 loyal subjects joined Gen. Burgoyne in his short progress into it; that near 5000 from it have joined the other armies, and that 4000 have returned their names in the city of New York, to serve as militia, for the defence of that town. In pity and in justice, my lord, I hope you will enquire why these things have been done? and that, instead of a continuance of such conduct, the loyal and repenting will have some distinguishing indulgence shewn them, should the army move that way next campaign. Policy enjoins it. That province so gained, would ensure the reduction of the rest, as the loyal there would greatly increase, and essentially aid his Majesty's army.

10,500 men armed for Britain.

If after what has been already seen in the provinces of Jersey and New York, the public could be surpris'd at any misconduct or proof of incapacity, the expedition to the head of the Elk river must surely produce that effect. Great geniuses in a variety of difficulties, choose that which is most easy and practicable. It belongs only to the conductors of the King's armies in America, to choose that which is most difficult, tedious, and uncertain. I will pass over the absurdity of declining a march of twenty four miles from Somerset court house in Jersey to the river Delaware, which might have been performed in one night, and the river crossed before a tim-

Egregious misconduct.

mid and greatly inferior enemy would have ventured to quit his strong hold. Such a step would have put us in possession of Philadelphia in three days, instead of three months, and subjected that whole province to the royal army; and it would also have put every magazine the rebels had formed in that country at once into our hands, to the total ruin of their cause. Why the fleet did not proceed up the Delaware river, instead of losing five weeks in sailing round to the Elk—is one of the most unaccountable parts of all our misconduct. It is well known that the danger of the navigation in the Delaware is not greater than in Chesapeak bay, and that the former is wider and more commodious for ships at Chester, which is within sixteen miles of Philadelphia, than the river Elk is so far up; it was also equally unfortified; the banks of the Delaware are low, and easily commanded by ships of war. Had the fleet proceeded up the Delaware to Chester, seven weeks time would have been saved; the horses belonging to our army would have been fit for use; little land carriage would have been necessary, from the place of landing being so near to Philadelphia; and the fleet would have been near to the army, ready to have afforded all necessary aids, and even to have secured a safe retreat in case of any disaster.

An action so decisive as that of Brandywine, would have enabled the King's army to have pursued the fugitives the same day to Philadelphia, as the boats would have been at hand ready to have crossed the Schuylkill, the only river in its way. The great quantity of stores laid up in Philadelphia would have fallen into our hands, and probably in the general confusion, the Congress themselves. A great deal of time would at least have been saved, which proved to be so necessary at the close of the campaign; and it would also have been the saving of several vessels loaded with baggage, cloathing, and merchandize, which were lost in the river, owing to its being so late in the season before they could be dispatched from New-York, after we were certain the army would be able to keep possession of Philadelphia. Had either of these plans been pursued, the business of the campaign would have been so forward, and with so small a loss from sickness, that the troops which were called away from New York might have been spared, and thereby ensured a junction with Gen. Burgoyne.

What a different face would our affairs have worn in America at this hour? Your lordship must be convinced, from your own information, that the rebellion would have been at an end. Behold the reverse of all this. Five weeks were lost in going round to Elk; the horses of the army were almost entirely rendered unfit for service; the troops were landed in one of the most unhealthy countries in America, in the most sickly season; and obliged to halt near a fortnight in order to collect horses, and to refresh, after so tedious a voyage. The landing was made sixty miles, instead of sixteen, from the principle object of the campaign; the troops subjected to a long march through a very difficult country, and obliged to attack the rebels at a very great disadvantage, crossing a river in their front, separated in two distinct bodies, and ever liable to be encountered by the whole force of the rebels. The fleet could not co-operate with the army, but was dismissed to go round into the Delaware; no possible retreat was left in case of any disaster; if they had

Brandy-
wine.

Folly of his
voyage.

been repulsed, it must have been fatal, as they were unprovided with provisions; victory, in short, was absolutely necessary to their preservation. They must be masters of the country in order to exit. The bravery of the troops saved their commander the disgrace, and the nation the misfortune, which seemed due to his indiscretion.

There is great magnanimity and true courage, in firmly encountering dangers and difficulties when the service absolutely requires it; but where a general exposes his army to it unnecessarily, and by that means protracts the war, when a plain, safe, and expeditious method offers, it is incapacity, or madness in the extreme. Fortunately the fleet had a more expeditious voyage returning from Elk, than it had going thither, and sailed safely up the Delaware, which a few weeks before had been deemed so dangerous; or the army would have been in a very disagreeable situation, notwithstanding the victory they had obtained.

Rebels run
in 14 hours,
we take 15
days.

Few victories were ever more easily won, than that at Brandywine; and no army ever fled in greater confusion or dismay than the rebels; in fourteen hours after his defeat, Mr. Wallington was on the banks of the Schuylkill, near thirty miles from the place of action; the inhabitants of Philadelphia were in the utmost consternation; large quantities of stores were lodged in it; the royal army had but to march on, and all must have fallen into their hands, without another shot. Instead of this, the army moved with the greatest caution in pursuit of a broken and dismayed enemy, who no longer thought of disputing a pass with the intrepidity of the King's troops. Instead of marching along the plain and broad road to Philadelphia, the army filed off, and marched slowly and cautiously across the country, then up the Schuylkill, and then down again; by which means sufficient time was allowed the rebels to recollect themselves, recover their spirits, and remove their stores from Philadelphia.

At last, when nothing remained in it worth taking, the city was entered in triumph, fifteen days after the victory at Brandywine. If this conduct does not proceed from a total want of capacity, I hope it is to be attributed to nothing worse: courage certainly was not wanting; yet the ardor of the troops has been constantly restrained. Upon every defeat we have given the rebels, we seem to have been afraid of a vanquished and broken rabble, that we despised before we defeated them. This, my lord, is a paradox which people endeavour to account for in various ways; some attribute it to indolence, others to over caution, and some even to a fear that the war would be too short. I own I cannot agree in the last, with regard to the person who has the chief command, though I may suspect some of those in his confidence.

Battle of
German
town.

The action at Germantown needs no other comment, than that it was similar to all the battles we have fought. His Majesty's troops gained a complete victory, and yet they were so much restrained in the pursuit, that the rebels escaped with a very considerable loss. The victorious troops were not thought sufficient to pursue the enemy they had defeated, until the grenadiers were brought up from Philadelphia, eight miles distant; the pursuit was

then

then permitted, but the rebels had by that time collected themselves, and got to such a distance, that it was totally ineffectual.

The forts on the Delaware were taken after such a delay, such a series of blunders, and with such loss, that they were indeed a very dear purchase. The expedition to White marsh, is, in the opinion of many, a most singular instance of incapacity. The King's army marched up to the front of the rebel encampment, and finding it fortified too strongly to be attacked, without farther examination were led back to Philadelphia. Here was another occasion lost of crushing at a blow the rebel power. I assert, as an undoubted fact, that the rebel camp was totally unfortified in the rear; and had the King's army turned their left flank, and attacked their rear, success was certain; nay, their destruction must have ensued, as the rebels were greatly inferior even in numbers. If the general had but remained in their rear only two days without attacking them, Mr. Washington must either have decamped before him, or have marched out and given him battle, as it is well known he had not above one day's provision in his camp. This we learned even before we got back to Philadelphia, and ought certainly to have known it sooner, did not a dislike to business, and indolence, retard our success. It is inexcusable in a general, at all times, to be so ignorant of his adversary's situation: in a civil war, when intelligence is so easily obtained, it is criminal.

At White marsh, success certain

Thus we have twice allowed Mr. Washington to shew all the world, that he is capable, with an inferior force, to choose such a camp as he can remain in with safety. Such camps, my lord, are to be found in almost every parish in America. What then is our situation? Must we not either relinquish all hope of conquering America, or change our commanders, and with them such a disgraceful system? The idea of fighting upon any sort of equal terms, is totally exploded among the rebels; the best we can expect is, that they should wait for us in a camp which they deem secure, in which we should either surround them, and cut off their supplies, or we should embrace the occasion like men accustomed to victory; feeling our superiority in valour and discipline, and even in numbers, we should storm their camp, and at a blow annihilate rebellion. Your lordship knows that in such cases it is even safest to be the assailants; the idea of superiority, with which it inspires every breast, almost ensures success, and few attempts have failed in storming a fortified camp. Instead of declining it, it is a situation which we should wish the rebels to place themselves in. I assert that this is the general language, and even the murmurs of the royal army at this hour in America. Bunker's hill and Trenton have had very unhappy effects upon all our military proceedings in America. It belongs only to men of genius to draw advantage from their past errors; a mere soldier is incapable of it; he falls into despair and inaction, for want of mental resources. In the winter quarters, before the disaster at Trenton, the troops were too much extended; ever since they have been so much collected, as to lose the advantage of our victories. At Bunker's hill we despised situation; we have ever since fallen into the opposite extreme.

Must change our commanders.

I think it totally unnecessary to dwell longer upon the expedition to the head of Elk river, or upon the operations of the army until they

Want of ability in our operations.

they went into winter quarters. I am persuaded your lordship, and every man of the least information in this country, must be convinced of the absurdity of the one, and of the dilatoriness and want of ability in the other. The public may see that from these two causes the advantages of the campaign to the southward have been very unequal to their hopes, or indeed to what they had a right to expect, even if it had not sacrificed Gen. Burgoyne's army. The people give their money freely; the zeal and intrepidity of the troops are unquestionable; but that the advantage which ought to arise from both should be lost, through a total want of capability in planning, and activity in executing, must mortify every good and loyal subject in an extreme degree. I acquit your lordship of having planned the southern campaign; I know it was sent home recommended by many in respectable rank and situations, particularly from Amboy. You gave way to the deception, (your lordship perceives I speak from information) and large promises were made, that many thousands of loyal subjects would join the royal standard as soon as it should make its appearance in Pennsylvania. The deceiver now lays the fault upon the general for not extending his forces, and affording a greater appearance of protection. He may be right as he is in high trust and favour under him. An unlimited power over the liberty of his fellow citizens is intrusted in him. He who never was esteemed by one of them, is now placed over them.

Folly of occupying Philadelphia.

The town of Philadelphia, my lord, is all we have for millions expended last campaign. How far such a conquest is advantageous to us, or facilitates the future progress of our army, I leave to your lordship to judge from the official dispatches you have received, and the report of every officer who has arrived from America. From its natural situation, Philadelphia is incapable of being fortified. An army must be left to defend it; and a fleet to keep open the communication with it by water; the banks of the river are equally hostile as before, and difficult to guard; and after all what does it command? is there any natural boundary which can be established? any important post which can be seized upon by the possession of it? it is divided by the Delaware from the Jerseys; a small guard of militia on the opposite bank watches every motion made in the town with impunity; and the passage for boats is obstructed near three months in the winter. The country westward from Philadelphia is one of the most difficult in America. In short, the army is at sea in that country; the general finds it so, and knows not how to proceed; he is at his wit's end.

Howe offers terms disgraceful to us

After having taken this review of the proceedings towards conquering America by arms, permit me call your lordship's attention to the means made use of to effect it otherwise. A message was sent by Sir William Howe to Congress, offering to treat upon such terms, as could not be justified upon any other grounds than absolute despair. The time chosen for this too, was when they were flushed with the defeat of Gen. Burgoyne's army. This message was sent by one Brown, through the medium of Mr. Willing of Philadelphia. Brown was a clerk to the house of Willing, Morris, and company. Morris is one of the members of the Congress, has been one of the most active, and without whose assistance it is

confessed the Congress could never have established a credit in France. His brother, one of the house, is now their factor in France, and the Congress are supplied under the name and credit of Messrs. Willing, Morris, and company; though I do not believe that Mr. Willing himself has any share in the business. Happily the Congress treated the message with contempt, and imprisoned the messenger. I say happily, because I assert, that had a treaty been disgracefully concluded with Congress upon the terms offered, Great Britain would only have retained the shadow of sovereignty over America, and that even would not have lasted ten years. I assert this to be a truth;—the public will comment upon it.

When Gen. Howe landed at Elk river, he published a declaration, assuring those who should remain peaceably in their houses, protection both in person and property. I will not enter into the scandalous detail of plundering during the campaign, but shall confine myself to what has passed since the troops have been in winter quarters. The property of loyal subjects has been taken at the will of commissaries, who have paid for it or not as they pleased; flour was purchased from several persons when the army was in great want of it, before the navigation of the river was cleared, and generous prices were promised; yet twenty shillings only were paid at a time when the worst flour was sold at fifty shillings per hundred; and some persons were even threatened with being sent prisoners to the Provost, because they presumed to ask for any payment at all. A great and generous salary has been settled upon a commissary to place him above the corruption of his office. It was not considered that this man was taken from the school of the India House, and familiarised to the peculations of the East. This gentleman too, the friend of the virtuous Duke of Grafton, talks of the rights of America, declares himself a whig under the American acceptation of the word: he even presumes to assert, that the general is of the same sentiments. I know it is absolutely necessary that the army should have comfortable quarters; but is it just, my lord, that loyal subjects should have their houses crammed with soldiers, while many who have been rebels, and still would be so if they dared, are exempted? this I aver is the case in too many instances; even the houses of those gentlemen who are now prisoners in Virginia, have been filled, and none excused. Is not this inequitable and impolitic in a high degree? is not this shewing, that to have been in rebellion is the best road to favour and kind treatment? there is but one way of accounting for such conduct.

Oppression.

Peculations

If we turn our eyes to the city of New York, we see the most singular and absurd system of government imaginable. There we behold the governor of the province acting as a general officer only, while a military governor commands with absolute power in the city, and the mayor acting under him, exercises a civil authority, under a military controul. Still the government of New York is far preferable to that of Philadelphia. The military governor is a man of rank and character, unconnected with provincial party, and uncontaminated with rebellion; it is not necessary for him to make a show of too much zeal to cover his past misdeeds. He is a man inferior to none for good judgment and humanity, and a knowledge not

Great character of Gen. Robertson.

not only of that town, but of America in general : he acts as a father to the people over whom he pretides.

The luxury and licentiousness of the army have reached your lordship's ears too frequently to make it necessary for me to expatiate on that head. What can the nation expect from a luxurious and licentious army, and an indolent and dissipated general? our affairs absolutely require the industry, economy, and regularity of an Amherst; with the fire and genius of a Wolfe. A regiment might be formed of idle, useless commissaries, quarter-masters, agents, and forage masters; there are twenty of these appointments now, where there was one last war in America. The rebellion will never be at an end, while there are so many idlers fattening upon the spoils of England and America. While our West India islands are in the utmost distress for lumber, at least five hundred thousand slaves are suffered to rot in cellars, and on wharfs at Philadelphia, under pretence of a scrupulous adherence to law, though licences are granted to the vessels of favourites to import cargoes from different places, contrary to all law and good policy. And though no merchant could obtain permission to export these slaves, yet the commissary general was allowed to do it to Corke, under the pretence that it was for the use of the contractors. These were hog-head slaves, my lord, to make beef barrels.—The trick is too glaring! I have spoken freely, my lord; I have done it from a conviction arising from the fullest information, and from the most hearty and zealous desire of seeing the present rebellion in America speedily crushed, and law, order, and constitutional liberty restored to that unhappy and deluded country, under the British government.

Indulgence
to favourites.

GOVERNOR JOHNSTONE'S SPEECH, March 22d, 1779. On Lord Howe's Conduct in America.

AS I differ from the noble lord (Howe) who spoke last in almost every thing he has said, I will consider the heads of his discourse separately, and give my reasons to the House for this disagreement. His lordship has first alledged that no reinforcement was sent to him, because of the two line of battle ships mentioned by the noble lord at the admiralty, one was intended to attend on the Commissioners in case they thought proper to return immediately, and the other was destined to bring his lordship home; still the two ships, Trident and Ardent, were there; the admiralty had a right to reckon upon them, as it could not be supposed that either the Commissioners, who sailed in the Trident from England a week later than d'Estaing sailed from Toulon, or the Ardent, who sailed with the convoy a little before them, could possibly have left the ports of North America before the packet, which sailed the 5th of May, would announce the approach of the French squadron, and therefore they were ships to be considered as on the spot, to be used and depended upon as the event has proved.

Ld. Howe
reinforced
with 2 ships

The admiralty had further, reasons to expect that the whole of lord Howe's force would have been *collected*, especially the two decked ships, because they had sent his lordship very early notice
of

of the failing of Monsieur la Motte Piquet, and of the certainty of a war with France: in this case his force was far from being despicable. *Why* the two decked ships were not collected after two months notice, is a question on which I am persuaded his lordship will be able to give very good reasons. I can vote upon the subject, because I am sufficiently acquainted with the facts necessary to form my judgment, but I question if an hundred members in the house know the actual force lord Howe had under his command, or the confidence the admiralty could have that this force would be collected.

D'd not collect his force.

The next point the noble lord states, and the honourable gentleman who made the motion has enforced the same argument, is, that in case Mons. d'Estaing had found our army at Philadelphia, and our ships in the Delaware, that the army would have been starved, and the shipping destroyed. This opinion is general throughout the nation; it has been favoured by the friends of administration, to enforce the wisdom of their measure in abandoning Philadelphia so opportunely as they did. It has been agreed to by this side of the House, to magnify the risk which our fleet and our army run by their bad management. But on this subject, as I may probably do on many others, I differ from them both. I maintain, as I always have done, that the abandoning Philadelphia at the moment we did, was most fatal to our affairs in North America; and that supposing no such orders had been given, and Mons. d'Estaing had arrived off the Delaware as he did, that neither the ships in that river, nor the army at Philadelphia, run any risk from that circumstance, for six or eight weeks at least, by which time we must have been relieved from any impressions of restraint, by the navigation of that river being interrupted.

No risk from d'Estaing.

First, I say, that the navigation of that river is so intricate, that supposing the buoys cut away, the best pilots of the country could not have traced out the channel to have ascended the river with such ships as those under Mons. d'Estaing, in eight or ten days.

Next I assert, that none of the 74 or 80 gun ships, without being lightened, could have passed the flats, as the Trident went on ground twice at the top of high water, not from missing the channel, but from the shallowness of the water, and this ship draws three feet less water than any of the French 74 gun ships.

Thirdly, I assert, that supposing Mons. d'Estaing, with his whole force, had actually ascended the Delaware, above the flats, that all our ships, both men of war and transports, could have been moved into safety, above the chevaux de frize; or the transports could have been removed above the chevaux de frize, and the ships of war moored in a half-moon below, with flanking batteries on each side of the river, which was in possession of our army. We should also have had the advantage of sending fire-ships down the stream among the enemy. The river is not so broad as the Thames at Gravesend, and d'Estaing after passing through a hot fire in ascending, must have been repulsed in the same manner which experience has demonstrated we were capable of doing by the late attack at St. Lucia, where Admiral Barrington, with a very inferior force indeed, has shewn, what men, not willing to despair, can accomplish.

A. Barrington a noble example.

For my own part, after considering the subject on every point, again and again, I really think, so far from any danger by the direct application of the force of the enemy in the Delaware, that there was hardly any risk from any thing that could have been done by them, in that river, against the resistance of our ships and army; New York would have been the place in danger. But it is always to be remembered, if orders had not been given for leaving Philadelphia, our great ships of war would not have been in the river Delaware, and therefore New York was equally capable of receiving the defence, which they actually did present when d'Estaing came off that port. So that on every alternative, the operations of his force would have been equally abortive.

But the noble lord says, the army would have been starved. To my knowledge, there was five weeks provisions for the army in Philadelphia, and still greater quantities in the river when we arrived there, though it had been determined to leave the place. I know how justly high the character of the noble lord stands for naval reputation; no man could esteem it in a higher degree than I did myself, *before* the transaction I am going to speak of. Perhaps my disappointment was the greater on that account, and the estimate I made of the force of the enemy, was less from the opinion I had of the vice admiral who commanded our fleet. I understand his conduct has received repeated applause from officers of high reputation in this House, while I was absent from sickness; but this shall not prevent me from speaking my own opinion freely on this, and every other subject. I have been told the two noble admirals (Keppel and Howe) have been pouring incense on each other's heads in very copious streams. I agree they stand in the most respectable light on account of their *former* services; and I also agree with my friend below me, that in case any minister has been guilty of any improper conduct, that has driven such men from the service of the state at this critical moment, when the exertions of all good men are so much wanted to repel the common enemy, that such a minister should feel the indignation of this House, and of his country at large. But if it should appear on the other hand, that any set of military men, in their several pretensions, are become too high for the state, I hope there is still left in the nation, virtue and spirit sufficient to repel such claims, and ability enough to be found in the naval department to resist the power of our enemies, even if the two noble admirals were no more.

Ld. Howe's character lowered with him.

Too high for the state

Administration has certainly great credit in dispatching the two packets from Falmouth, to give the noble lord notice of the sailing of the Toulon Squadron, and the packet that did arrive in America having fallen in with that squadron, from every particular which the captain related, it was evident to me, beyond a doubt, that they were bound to sweep the coast of America, from Virginia northward. The packet arrived the 29th of June, and certainly gave sufficient time for every preparation to be made for receiving the enemy, who did not arrive off New York till the 11th July. Whether those preparations were made, or otherwise, is a question I shall not now enter into.—I mean at present only to take notice of some assertions in a pamphlet that has been circulated with great industry, as preparatory to mislead our judgments in the question of

of to day. This performance I can hardly attribute to the noble lord to whom it relates : it is too fulsome flattery to suppose he had any share in it, or that he can give it the least countenance now ; nor should I have envied his lordship any of the praises bestowed by so idolatrous an author, if he had not taken notice of so insignificant a person as myself, and misrepresented my opinions. His patron might have enjoyed the glory of making a bridge of boats to pass the army over the rill that separates Sandy Hook from the main, with the assistance of all the boats from fifty sail of pendants, four hundred transports, and two hundred flat boats, without any interference of mine. I am willing the House should understand this marvellous work was equal to every thing in ancient story, and even superior to Cæsar's bridge over the Rhine ; but in that part which respects myself I cannot so easily submit.

Now, Sir, I assert before you, and the whole world, that what is imputed to me by the author of this pamphlet is not true. I never obtruded myself into the society of any set of men ; the moment I heard the French fleet had appeared, I thought it my duty to go down to Sandy Hook in the night to offer my poor services ; neither did I ever bewail our deplorable situation from the circumstance of the French squadron coming on the coast of America. I thought it a lucky circumstance. I expressed that sentiment to all with whom I conversed. I am glad I did not know the imminent danger we were in until I came to this city, the centre of all true intelligence, otherwise I might have passed more uneasy hours. I also deny that I ever asserted Lord Howe had a superiority over the French squadron, when they appeared off the port of New York. If the noble lord can remember *any thing* that passed between him and a person of so little consequence as myself, he must know, that so far from entertaining that sentiment, when the noble lord talked of *going out* of the harbour to *give them battle*, I said that I thought he was not of sufficient force to hazard an engagement ; but I always thought, with a proper disposition of his force, he was fully capable of defending the entrance of the harbour. What I said then, and what I assert now, is, that after the junction of the Cornwall of 74 guns, the Raifonable of 64, the Renown of 50, and the Centurion of 50, all heavy metal ships, Lord Howe was equal, if not superior in force to the French squadron. I give it also as my opinion, with deference to better judgments, that when his lordship appeared off Rhode Island, though he did not take the whole of his force with him, that he was fully equal to Mons. d'Estaing, and I reckon in the following manner :—His fleet was the best manned that ever went to sea, commanded by brave judicious officers ; the French were ill manned and sickly, and damaged upon entering and returning through the fire of the batteries on Rhode Island. I shall read the list of the two squadrons, and the manner I class them.

Fulsome
flattery.

Ld. Howe
equal if not
superior to
d'Estaing.

	Guns.	Pounders.		Guns.
I esteem the Cornwall	74	18 & 32	} a match for Cæsar beat by Isis of 50	74
Eagle of	64	18 24		} Languedoc
Experiment	50	12 12	} Tonant	
Trident	64	18 24		} Guerrier
Roebuck	44	9 18	} Hector	
Raisnable	64	18 24		} Protecteur
Phoenix	44	9 18	} Zele	
Somerfet	70	18 32		} Marseilles
Nonfuch	64	18 24	} Valiant	
Richmond	32	12		} Provence
St. Albans	64	18 24	} Fantasque	
Venus	36	12		} Sagittaire
Ardent	64	18 24	} 9 & 18 pounders.	
Pearl	32	12		
Preston	50	12 24		
Apollo	32	12		
Isis	50	12 24		
Vigilant	20	24		
Centurion	50	12 24		
Sphinx	20	9		
Renown	50	12 24		

Note. Lord Howe had, besides these, the Nautilus sloop of 18 guns, Carcass and Thunder bombs, Strombolo, Sulphur, and Volcano fireships, four row galleys, and two tenders, besides the Leviathan, capable of mounting 70 guns, and actually carrying 44, left at Sandy Hook; and the Nabob and Supply, two old East India ships, taken into his Majesty's service, and mounting 36 guns each, and 236 men, that sailed with the fleet, but which Lord Howe sent to the West Indies. If too weak, why leave the Leviathan behind? Why detach the Nabob and Supply?

Ld. Howe when superior trifles away 8 days when d'Estaing lay dismasted within 20 leagues of him. *Will any seaman say that the ships, as they are arranged, can be deemed inferior in any point of the line? But the Languedoc was dismasted and lost her rudder in the storm. The Marseilles was dismasted in the storm. The Cæsar was beaten by the Isis, and driven into Boston. The Monmouth of 64 guns, another of Byron's squadron, had joined Lord Howe at Sandy Hook on the 18th, yet d'Estaing lay at anchor in the open sea for eight days, where he raised jury masts, within 20 leagues of Sandy Hook. Lord Howe waited from the 17th to the 24th of August before he followed, though he had then confessedly so superior a force.*

But it may be said although Lord Howe had a superiority by the addition of his heavy frigates, yet it was impossible they could be brought to act in the disposition in which I have placed them. This I admit, but at the same time I contend, that Lord Howe had a complete line of heavy ships, capable of lying along side the French ships, and in half an hour's action, every one knows the line of battle must be broken, when all the frigates could have come to have acted to the utmost of their force. If this is not admitted, it would be impossible for Lord Howe, or any other officer, to have availed himself of the advantage of any number of larger ships; for supposing

supposing his frigates had all been 50 gun ships, still no greater number than the ships opposed to the enemy's line can act at the beginning, until they are broken and scattered, which must always happen, as I said before, in half an hour in every sea engagement. The generality of mankind are confounded in their opinions by the weight of metal, and the number of guns stated, without knowing the real circumstances attending those apparent disproportions. I reckon an English 64 gun ship a match for any 74 gun ship out of France. The difference between the actual force of two such ships is not so much as people imagine. They generally count the difference of ten guns, but in fact the difference upon the real efficient batteries is only two guns, the rest arises from the guns on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, which are light, and are not of such consequence, and are often in the way of working the ship. Respecting the weight of metal, I think the English 64 has a great advantage over the French 74. Experience has convinced me, that the French 36 pounder (equal to our 42 pounder) is a gun that cannot be managed sufficiently quick. Whatever gun is above the seize of being loaded by one man to a sponge, and breeched about by one man to a handspike, I esteem too large for action. I believe the 18 and 24 pounders, which all our 64 gun ships carried, to be the fittest guns for use in a close engagement; the quickness of their fire, and the certainty of pointing them well and easily, does more than compensate for the difference of damage when they hit. I do not say this will be the case in an engagement like Mr. Keppel's, on the contrary tacks, where the ships came up scattered, and the enemy have time to load again before they meet. Here the heavy grape shot does great mischief to the sails and rigging. I speak of a close engagement on the same tack in the usual manner. I think also, that one of our new 50 gun ships, with 12 and 24 pounders, is nearly a match for a French 64. What happened in this very transaction will vindicate my opinion. The Isis, one of the world of the 50 gun ships of Lord Howe's Squadron, fell in with the Cæsar, the finest 74 of d'Estaing's fleet, and a flag ship too, and in a fair engagement the Isis beat the Cæsar. Much praise is undoubtedly due to the captain, officers, and seamen of the Isis, for this extraordinary gallant action, but it shews at the same time that my opinions are not extravagant. The Jupiter, one of our 50 gun ships, very ill manned, has lately had an engagement with the Trident of 64 guns, and the issue has been favourable to my opinion. The battle was drawn without any claim to a superiority by the French ship. I could give many proofs in the history of naval engagements, that my opinion is justified by experience, nor do I know any instance where it can be contradicted upon any trial that has been made. But the House will observe by the list of Squadrons which I have read, that no such disproportion of force existed, because any difference that may appear in the ships of the line was fully compensated by the assistance they would derive from the frigates, three of which were two decks, and one (the Vigilant) an old India ship of 20 24 pounders. All the others, excepting the Sphinx, were heavy metal frigates of 36 and 32 guns, carrying 12 pounders on the main battery.—These, Sir, are the opinions which I am ready to avow,

English 64
equal to :
French 74
& 50 to 64

Gallant ex
amples.

and I have a certain conviction in my own mind of the truth of what I advance.

Ld. Howe might have beaten d'Estaing.

I am still at a loss to know whether the noble lord himself really thought his squadron was inferior in force to that of Monf. d'Estaing. I have never heard this asserted by any officer who served in the fleet. I have always heard it alledged, that his lordship was manœuvring for the wind, and meant to give d'Estaing battle, but was prevented by the storm. If so, I conclude he expected to defeat his opponent, which would have proved his superiority, and I sincerely believe this would have been the case, had the two squadrons engaged. As to all the dreadful consequences of famine, or surrender of the army, which the noble lord has enumerated, supposing Monf. d'Estaing had got possession of Sandy Hook, I cannot subscribe to them in the extent he has stated. I have been informed, that by driving Long Island there would have been found six months subsistence for the troops, besides the various means of obtaining supplies through the sound, while the blockade of that port could not have been continued without relief above six or eight weeks at most.

ADDRESS to LORD HOWE,

On his Conduct in America.

MY LORD,

Ld. Howe's former services.

YOUR Lordship is justly respected for your moral character, and I feel all the gratitude an individual ought to feel for your former services. In 1755 your lordship commanding the Dunkirk of 60 guns, fired two or three broadsides at the Alcide of 64, on which she struck, being furrounded by Admiral Boscawen's whole fleet. In 1757 in the Magnanime of 74 guns, you cannonaded the fort on the isle of Aix with success. In 1758 you was commodore of a squadron that covered our descents on the coast of France, and showed great personal courage at the unfortunate re-embarkation at St. Cas. In 1759 you was present at the rout of Conflans's fleet; but your lordship, as well as every other man then present, knows, that the weight of the action was sustained by those truly gallant officers, Captains Dennis and Speke. Your lordship's conduct on these and other less important occasions, gave the nation hopes, that when you should be entrusted with a principal command, you would acquire additional honour, and merit additional gratitude. In what manner you have fulfilled the national expectation, comes now to be considered.

To form a just estimate of your lordship's services in America, it is necessary to examine your conduct on that station. Your character has been of late so puffed and blown up by the language of flattery, and the hot breath of faction, that timid men have supposed it too exalted for scrutiny; but every man ought to be amenable to his country. Impressed with this sentiment, I shall review your operations on the coasts of America with a firm and decided impartiality.

Your lordship arrived off New York in July 1776, the reinforcements arrived the middle of August, and the operations commenced
the

the 27th of the same month. We have your lordship's own authority for it, that Gen. Howe communicated to you his intention to attack the enemy, and "his wishes that some diversion might be attempted by the ships." This your lordship literally performed, and made *only an attempt*. But let us read your lordship's own account: "I gave direction to Sir Peter Parker for proceeding higher up in the channel, towards the town of New York, next morning, (the 27th) with the *Asia*, *Renown*, *Preston*, *Roebuck* and *Repulse*, and to keep those ships in readiness as occasion might require; but the wind veering to the northward soon after day break, the ships could not be moved up to the distance proposed; therefore, when the left column of the army were seen to be engaged with the enemy in the morning, the *Roebuck*, Capt. Hammond, leading the detached squadron, was the only ship that could fetch high enough to the northward to exchange a few random shot with the battery on Redhook, and the ebb making strongly down the river soon after, I ordered the signal to be shewn for the squadron to anchor." A commander, my lord, of common understanding, who was anxious to perform his duty, would not, like your lordship, have trusted to the chance of the wind blowing favourably, for the placing his ships in their proper stations, at the very instant they were wanted there. He would the day before have taken advantage of the fair wind that *then* blew; for your own letter says, that the wind did not veer to the northward till after break of day on the 27th, which implies that previously it had been fair; but granting on the 26th that it was not fair, that very circumstance was a strong reason for sending the ships up with the flood tide that very day, which would have carried them nearly "the distance proposed;" and then with the next morning's flood, which ever way the wind veered, they might have been moved up to their stations, "*in readiness for being employed as occasion might require*," or in other words, they might have acted with effect against Redhook, being the right flank of the rebel defences on Long Island, and also on the rear of their right, at the very time the general was attacking them in front; and under cover of the ships, the bomb vessels directed by Col. James might have thrown shells either into the rebel works on Long island, or Governor's island, or into both. This my lord, would have been making an effectual diversion, instead of which you made only an abortive attempt,

Blunders at Redhook.

But my lord, according to your sagacious arrangement of the time of proceeding, the leading ship could only exchange a few random shot with the battery at Redhook; the others were prevented from acting at all; and the officers and men had only the pleasure of looking on at a distance, but not of assisting in the battle.

You lay within a few miles of both New York and the rebel works on Long island. If two flood tides would not have been sufficient to have carried up the ships, you might have taken two and twenty if necessary, on the previous days. You saw the rebels were determined to give battle in their then position. It was your duty, as well as the general's *wish* to combine the land and water attack. The station then for your attacking ships before the attack commenced, should certainly have been just without the range of

the

the enemy's batteries ; being so placed, one flood tide carried them into action. By neglecting these precautions of moving up when the wind was favourable, or with the flood tides previously to the day of attack, your proposed diversion miscarried. Did your lordship think that operations either by sea or land, could possibly succeed without the use of rational means ? Did your lordship think that a simple signification of your sovereign will and pleasure, the moment your operations were commencing, would render the elements submissive to your nod ? Did your lordship dream that the winds would be as obedient to your commands as the sun was of old to those of Joshua ?—If you did, it is a pity some of your favourite officers did not whisper in your ear,—that miracles had long ceased.

Ld. Howe
not a Joshua

What your lordship did the remainder of the 27th, and the whole of the 28th, 29th, and morning of the 30th, you have not thought fit to inform us. Certain it is, that the whole of the rebel army on Long Island, that remained after the action of the 27th, crossed an arm of the sea within a few miles of your fleet. It was no doubt prudent in your lordship not to mention the variations of the wind during the above mentioned days. But the flood tides might have carried your ships up to the batteries on Redhook and Governor's island, and a spirited attack must have demolished them.—The last is a small, low, flat island, the fire from the men of war, if they had been brought up, would have tore up the whole surface of it ; the grape shot, and the men in the tops at same time overlooking and firing down upon the rebels, would have given us every wish for advantage, and would have rendered it impossible for a rebel head to have appeared without being instantly blown to rags. The silencing these works gave you the command of that arm of the sea called the East river, and irretrievably cut off the rebel retreat. The rebels were very deficient in cannon, they had few but what were old and honeycombed ; many even on the grand battery in the fort on York island, the strongest battery in the revolted territory, were broken and defective, and secured round with iron hoops : such brittle artillery would have hurt none but those who used it. In 1762, that excellent officer admiral Pococke, who so often, with a much inferior force beat the enemy last war, placed three ships against that high and almost impregnable rock the Moro castle, and made a very serviceable diversion in favour of our land attack ; a desperate service indeed, when compared to the feeble defences, and inferior batteries which were opposed to your numerous fleet.—But you, my lord, with a much greater object in view, and an infinitely easier task to perform, managed so awkwardly, and in such an unseamanlike manner, as to do, just nothing at all. In 1758, admiral Boscawen, that brave and active officer, sent in his boats in the night into the harbour of Louisbourg during the siege, under the very mouths of the enemy's cannon, and took two French men of war. But your lordship would not risk a single man or ship against a rebel battery, though the capture of their whole army on Long island must have been the consequence of your acting with vigour. It is a serious truth, the general and your lordship acted in concert. He threw away three days in regular approaches, against a weak and extended entrenchment, nearly two miles in length,

length, from which a defeated and panic struck enemy were running away every night; and during all that time also your lordship lay supinely inactive, which gave the rebels all convenient leisure and opportunity to escape. Your *unaccountable inactivity* on this important occasion, was an evident proof, either that you had not a good will to the service, or that you had not a capacity equal to your command. It was an unhoped for salvation to the rebels, who had nothing before them but instant death or captivity;—It gave them an opening into the whole of your future conduct;—and it confirmed the rebellion. You, my lord, are a very rigid officer;—you would have cashiered, as far as your own vote went, an inferior, for a neglect of infinitely less importance; and perhaps you might have thought it worthy of enquiry, whether that neglect was wilful or accidental, whether it arose from incapacity or disaffection.

What share your lordship had in the ridiculous landing at Frog's neck, and in the more ridiculous stay there, I shall not at present enquire. I shall only observe, that if that absurd business was owing to the waiting for provisions, as the general has said,—Where were those hundreds of transports that were under your lordship's direction? Where was your foresight, when you embarked an army without their provisions?

I shall now attend your lordship to New York: There, it is declared, you denied the refugees permission to cruize against the rebel trade. Your surly demeanor on that occasion, and the stern reply you are said to have made, (*see page 36*) marks a strong antipathy to these loyal and distressed subjects, and seemingly a warm compassion for their rebellious persecutors. How such an extravagant speech, universally said at New York to have been uttered by you, and which has never been contradicted, comported with your situation as commander in chief of the King's fleet, I leave your superiors to determine.—But what I know to be fact, is, that from that period *until* the day of your final departure, every man of common penetration despaired of the British interest in America. In Parliament you gave another colour to this part of your conduct, and in the true stile of opposition, when you had reason to expect a heavy charge against yourself,—you brought an accusation against ministry. You asserted that granting letters of marque at New York was a prejudice to the King's service, by encouraging the seamen to desert. Your lordship must be conscious in your own mind, that this charge was not, nor could not be of any validity, when you reflect that you had it always in your own power to take back from private equipments, not only any of your own men who might have been seduced, but also their whole ships companies, whenever you should see cause for so doing. But if farther conviction should be thought necessary, experience has since furnished us with an incontestible argument. A more liberal policy than your lordship's was adopted at home; letters of marque were ordered to be granted at New York; the matter has been put to proof; and no such inconveniency as your lordship chose to dread has ensued. The merchants there at first converted many of their trading vessels, and afterwards their prizes into privateers, and the additional hands wanted to man them has been fully supplied by engaging those who fled from the rebel oppressions, many thousands

Incapacity
disaffection.

Refuses let-
ters of
marque.

of

of whom are now serving on board of private cruizers, fitted out by the loyal subjects of New York.

Reasons for refusing.

But whatever predilection your lordship might have for the rebels, or however strong it might be, self interest, that admirable quickner of mercantile ingenuity, suggested to the merchants, that one powerful motive for your refusal, was, a desire to benefit the navy ALONE by the captures from the enemy, of which it is sufficiently well known the commander in chief has ONE EIGHTH PART; but that of those taken by private ships of war, he has NO PART AT ALL.

This opens a view to the wealth acquired by your lordship. Under the magnitude of Sir William Howe's blunders and dissipation, your lordship's FUNDS seem to have escaped the general attention. It has been my task on this occasion to bring *them* forward along with your lordship, however shy you may be of public notice. Though much has been said of the general's money acquisitions in America, yet whatever he did make, it will be readily understood, that a constant attendance on the Pharo table is a matter of profit and lots, and that even amidst a scene of plunder, where there are many favourites, little is left for the principal. Besides his opportunities were fewer, and his favourites more numerous than your lordships.—But as to you, my lord, you had no expensive attachments:—all that immensity of wealth that flowed into your coffers, —THERE RESTED.

17,000 soldiers carried to sea for their health

We come now to that ruinous expedition, which, if it was not of your lordships own conception, had, at least, in all appearance, your hearty concurrence; and being altogether a sea manœuvre, must be charged in part to your account;—that most destructive operation to the southward by the Chesapeak, which has involved this so lately flourishing empire in such mortifying and shameful disasters. I shall not enter into a long comparative view of the preference a landing on the banks of the Delaware, ought to have had over a landing on the banks of the Elk;—a sea voyage to the southward in the midst of a campaign, when the northern army was approaching the head of the Hudson, was at best a wild plan; but such a tedious one, as that to Chesapeak, in the very teeth of the southerly winds which prevail during that season, was one of the most frantic that could enter into the human mind. Yet distracted as was the scheme and the execution,—advocates have been found. A worthy knight in evidence has told us with a solemnity truly Cervantic, “that the south winds were attended with such un-“ common hot weather, that if the troops had been ashore at that “ time, they must have suffered exceedingly.” So, Heaven preserve us! it was beneficial to the troops, and doubtless to the service, to give the army a months cooling at sea, in the heat of the campaign! Indeed, there is so much of the ridiculous blended with the baneful in that Quixote expedition, that our passions rise in civil commotion, and involuntary laughter bursts from us, amidst storms of indignation.—But let us quit this distressing topic, and leave it with the general.

There is an uniform perverseness in your lordship's mind and proceedings. The moment any business becomes your duty, you seem to persevere in counteracting it. You adopted and persisted in
your

your sea campaign with our land army, contrary to common sense, contrary to the opinion of every friend to this country; and to carry your purpose entered into a month's conflict with opposing elements.—All this you did, for no other reason that we can perceive, than because it was your duty to do otherwise. But now at the end of that unfortunate campaign, when it became your indispensable duty to order transports to Boston, to embark Gen. Burgoyne's troops as settled by convention, you took the lead of the rebels, and were the first to propose a breach of that convention; under the frivolous pretence, that light transports could not gain the port of Boston at that season. Thousands of men, my lord, at that time within your lordship's communication could have informed you, that for years they had seen and known vessels enter the port of Boston during every month in the winter, but more particularly at that very season when your lordship declared it scarce practicable; for the latter part of the fall, and the beginning of winter, were always the periods in which most of their trade arrived; the north westerly seldom setting in before Christmas; and even a north westerly would have carried the transports from New York to Martha's Vineyard, where they could have lain in perfect safety till a fair wind sprung up, 24 hours of which, would have put them safe into Boston harbour. Sometimes in three, five, or seven years, vessels are blown off the coast: vessels we know are at times blown off from every coast: but such unfrequent instances by no means constitute a general impracticability of access in the months of October, November, and December. It was your duty my lord to send the transports to Boston if practicable; of this you could be no judge; for you never made the attempt. The first proposal for a breach of the convention coming from your lordship, did not escape the observation of the rebel congress; they made public mention of it in one of their edicts; they shewed they were willing to profit by your example; and instead of a partial breach of the convention as proposed by you, they, by a single declaration annihilated the whole.

Proposes a breach of the Convention.

I shall but just touch on your lordships conduct in winter 1777-8 at Rhode island. There you certainly was very happy, if fulsome addresses procured by your flatterers could make you so. At this time your orders stripped New York of all the fresh provisions that could be collected in that neighbourhood, and which even the two deckers were employed in carrying to you. This my lord you did, rather than distress the rebel country around you, which was full of live cattle, particularly Martha's Vineyard, where Gen. Grey soon after, by Sir Henry Clinton's order, levied a contribution of upwards of 10,000 sheep and bullocks. Thus my lord, the loyal subjects, the army and navy at New York, had all the fresh provisions carried off from them, whilst the rebels under your eye enjoyed plenty and peace.

Strips New York of provisions, but leaves the rebels in peace.

We come now, my lord, to your grand manœuvres in 1778, when the French fleet appeared. Governor Johnstone has already, in a very masterly manner, delineated your dilatory, indecisive, wavering conduct. To his speech I refer the reader. But I shall proceed to state some things only slightly hinted at, or wholly passed over by him.

With 13
ships runs
from 12.

Your lordship informs us very *guardedly*, that you anchored off point Judith August the 9th *in the evening*. Point Judith may be about three leagues from Newport, the town you went to relieve. But we know from very good authority, that your lordship's fleet was seen by the garrison of Newport *in the morning of that day*; and that an officer from the garrison was *instantly* sent off by Gen. Pigot, to communicate to you their situation and that of the enemy. Ten sail of the French line had entered the harbour the day before, under a heavy fire from our batteries; the other two ships of the French line were up the Narraganset passage; and two of their frigates in the Seaconnet passage. An active and intrepid officer would have stood close in and blocked up the enemy in this divided state, or obliged them to fight, if they chose to come out, under all the disadvantages they necessarily laboured under. But your lordship thought it best to remain at a distance, and the wind coming fair for the enemy next morning, d'Estaing very judiciously took advantage of your neglect, stood out to sea, and united his fleet. It was then your lordship, to use a sea phrase, cut and run, as is said, at no small expence to the nation in anchors and cables. You, my lord, had *thirteen* line of battle ships, from 50 to 74 guns, d'Estaing only *twelve*, from 50 to 84 guns. If your ships in general were not so large as the French, they were infinitely better manned. You had the choice of seamen from many hundred transports, and besides your marines, you had the veterans of our army.

Leaves his
ship on the
eve of battle

The 10th and part of the 11th you steered *from* the enemy, manœuvring for the wind; but failing in that, you say, you "shortened sail about four in the evening to await the approach of the enemy, having some time before moved" yourself "from the Eagle into the Apollo frigate, to be better situated for directing the subsequent operations of the squadron." But a storm prevented this seemingly intended engagement. Now, my lord, I shall not dispute your intention to engage; but I cannot acquiesce in those ill placed and fulsome encomiums, which your partizans have lavished on your new manœuvre of quitting your ship in the line of battle, and moving into a frigate, on the eve of a general action. I shall not contest your being better situated for seeing the engagement; but I deny your being properly situated. The commander in chief sharing the dangers of battle, acts even as an incentive to the bravest minds, especially if his force is *rather* inferior to that of the enemy. This, you have declared yours to have been. Though few officers are of your opinion, as the French were both sickly and ill-manned, and had been damaged in passing and re-passing our batteries at Newport; whereas you had a 50 gun ship more than the enemy, and the best manned fleet that ever put to sea. Our Hawke's, Boscawen's, and Blake's never dreamt of withdrawing their persons from the danger of battle, on a pretence of being better situated for directing. This nation originally gained the superiority of the seas by our *fighting* admirals, but now we have nearly lost it, by admirals who chuse to be *better situated*.

But the imprudence of this innovation on the service is palpable. You are at all times, as you actually was on this occasion, liable to be separated from your fleet by accidents of weather, in a very poor state of defence indeed for a commander in chief. Granting the same separation when in a ship of the line, at least no frigate or
frigates

frigates of the enemy could make a prize of our admiral. Even your lordship, four days after, appeared to be sensible of your former folly; for when you heard a firing, you proceeded not in a frigate, but in the Centurion. This innovation also always exposes you to be captured by the enemy, if they should be stronger in frigates; or at least to have "your better situation" not a little discomposed, if but a single frigate should attack you, as might have happened very probably in this case, the enemy having the weather gage. Surely, my lord, it was a glorious situation for you, to be tumbling about in a dismasted frigate, gaping around you for you fleet, and your fleet scattered on the sea in search of you! You cannot forget, my lord, that in this ridiculous distress, when you was hurrying from the Apollo into the Phœnix, and from the Phœnix into the Centurion, and from the Centurion back again to the Phœnix, like a man out of his wits, that your blundered upon the French fleet, and was happy in effecting a second escape. So much for this novelty of your lordship's introduction. The short history of your expedition to Newport is this: you failed to relieve it, and ran away the day after you got sight of it: you failed to meet the French, then ran away from them, then waited for them, then blundered upon them by accident, and finally escaped to New York.

Hurries
from ship
to ship.

Your lordship is much respected by every man of feeling and fortitude, for the justice you have done to the resolute efforts of Captains Dawson*, Hotham, and Raynor, all in 50 gun ships, in their several engagements with the Languedoc, Tonant and Cæsar, of 84, 80, and 74 guns. These are noble examples of the spirit of your officers. It is greatly to be regretted you did not lead them on to a more general trial.

On the 15th, my lord, you saw ten sail of the French squadron at anchor within 20 leagues of Sandy hook; you knew two of them were dismasted; you got to the Hook the 17th; there you found your whole fleet. The Monmouth of 64 guns, one of Admiral Byron's squadron joined you the next morning. Your fleet had suffered no material damage in the late storm, by your own account, if we except the bowsprit of the Reasonable, and mainmast of the Cornwall, which were sprung. Had you left these two behind, though in their then state, they might surely have been esteemed equal to any French dismasted ship, you had still 12 ships complete to attack the 10 French, two of which at least, were dismasted, as your letter tells us. Would such a favourable opportunity, my lord, have been refused by any enterprising officer, zealous for the honour of the navy, zealous

14 ships t
10 dismasted
Fr. ships.

* Capt. Dawson has commanded a King's ship on the American station, for no less a time than 14 years in continuance, excepting one voyage to Portsmouth. He is greatly distinguished for his vigilance, activity, and spirit. The latter he displayed in an eminent degree at the beginning of the rebellion, in an engagement with a vessel of superior force in the bay of Boston; and in the attack on the fort at Michias in 1777, under Sir George Collier, in which expedition that fort, three rebel magazines, and 30 sail of ships and schooners were destroyed. And yet by the printed lists, it does not appear, that he has had interest enough to obtain the rank of post captain.

Might have
beat the
French, ru-
ined the re-
bels, & fav-
ed the W.
Indies.

for his country's welfare? Had you embraced this glorious occasion, in the manner you ought to have done, and put to sea again on the evening of the 17th, with only the 11 ships that were in complete order,—the French in such wretched condition only a few leagues distant, you must have fallen in with early on the 18th, when two of their ships from five in the morning to near eleven, were in chace of Admiral Byron in the Princess Royal of 90 guns then alone; and in your progress out you must also have met the Monmouth. In that case, my lord, we cannot doubt but it would have been “a proud day for England.” Your success too, at this time, would have given us the whole rebel army besieging Newport; for you had almost a certainty of reaching Rhode island before the 30th, the southerly winds, your lordship *knows*, are almost constant at that season, your arrival would have infallibly cut off the retreat of the rebel army. And as Sir Henry Clinton got there the 31st with the army from New York, the whole of the rebels must either have surrendered or been starved upon the spot for want of provisions. In such a situation we would not have had the trouble of fighting them. A stroke like this would nearly have crushed the rebellion, and certainly would have saved Dominica, St. Vincent's, and the Grenades. In this easy manner, my lord, might you by a little goodwill, and but a little promptitude and spirit, have not only gained for yourself immortal glory, and the eternal gratitude of a generous people; but for your country, you would have retrieved all that your brother had lost us;—you would have wiped off the stains of all that shame and misfortune with which he had covered us.—But, my lord,—the navy in you,—*saw the brother of the General!*—Glorious opportunities hourly offering, and hourly rejected!

Sends Sir J.
Wallace
for news.

If your lordship thought the relief of Newport a more important object, than the total destruction or capture of the French fleet, though they lay so near to you, that you could hardly put to sea without falling in with them,—Why did you not instantly bear away for Newport? But either of these would have been doing capital service, for which reason, we suppose, you did neither. One thing indeed you did, which gave us a decisive proof of your weakness, or of your disgust at the business, in which, unhappily for us, you was employed,—you dispatched the gallant Sir James Wallace in Quest of News to Newport. You exposed that brave officer to be overpowered by the whole French fleet; he only escaped through his own intrepidity, superior seamanship, and superior knowledge of the coast. Thus, my lord, with two grand national objects in view, and pressing themselves upon you,—you idled away a week in port, keeping 14 sail of the line to repair a sprung bowsprit and mainmast. Whilst you was so notably occupied in this important business, d'Estaing with the alertness of an officer who saw his danger, though God knows he was in none from you, raised juremasts and steered for Rhode island, where he arrived the 20th off Newport, and sailed for Boston the 22d, being unfit to keep the sea, and still, though without reason, afraid of your crushing him in his helpless condition. As for your lordship, you only crept out of port the 24th, after being repeatedly assured that he was gone off. Then, it is true, you followed him, but still after your own manner, and arrived time enough to see him safe at anchor in Boston harbour, and covered with batteries just constructed, which
would

would have deprived you of the inclination to attack him, had you ever possessed it. In this manner, my lord, d'Estaing, who was farther from Newport than you, who was dismasted, and who had jury masts to erect, got to Newport *five days* before you stirred one inch;—before you, my lord, who had only to put to sea with 11 fail of the line undamaged.

When you fled before him from Point Judith, you run him almost out of fight the first 24 hours, according to your own account!—But when you was to pursue, you had a bowsprit and mainmast to refit!—Eleven fail of the British line in complete order, could not overtake ten fail of French crippled and dismasted. —Yet the French lay eight days in this disabled condition, within 20 leagues of the great Lord Howe, raised jury masts, then made a voyage of near an hundred leagues, and besides that were several days a head of him before he crawled out of port.—And what was the great Lord Howe doing all that time with his fourteen fail of the line?—PATIENCE GRACIOUS HEAVEN! *Repairing a Bowsprit and a Mainmast.*

d'Estaing's activity, & Ld. Howe's loitering.

I can trust myself no longer on this subject, and your lordship will readily acquiesce in my quitting it. I shall take my leave with the following observations, which you, my lord, and a suffering nation, well know where to apply.

Chusing our commanders out of those factious parties which have always most wickedly opposed every measure of government, seems to have overwhelmed this ill fated country with the most alarming misfortunes, and most humiliating disgraces. The daring factions that reign in this kingdom appear destitute of every laudable principle. They exert themselves in parliament, in calling for every sort of information that can reveal our plans, or expose our weakness to the enemy. Out of doors numberless publications are disseminated to lower the funds, to ruin the public credit, and to infuse distrust and dismay in the hearts of the people. Even treason is fulminated from the pulpit; yet from the bosom friends of such men have we taken our commanders. *In consequence*, we have seen one general leave another to be swallowed up by the rebels, and retreating from the enemy on shore, exhibit a new wonder to the world,—a land campaign converted into a summer voyage. This is opening a new source for the genius of pantomime; and though such an eccentric notion might have succeeded with *Harlequin*, it may ruin a nation. We have seen one admiral fly before an enemy, whom he went to fight, and from a garrison which he sailed expressly to relieve; and soon after, when he saw with his own eyes, the enemies capital ships dismasted, he loitered away the time, though his force was then superior, whilst the enemy towed their disabled ships, from under his nose into port. We have seen another fight an equivocal battle against an inferior fleet, in which two victories were gained and nobody defeated. Such novel campaigns, besides the misfortune that attends them, are not only disgraceful to us, as a nation, in the eyes of all mankind, but this disgrace is accumulated beyond the power of addition, by our being mobbed and rioted into illuminations of our own infamy! If a drunken mob appeals us, where is the vigour with which we are to oppose and to combat rebellion, and a foreign enemy?

Opposition commanders ruin the nation.

A V E R Y
FULL and CORRECT VIEW
O F T H E
Whole of the Evidence
O N T H E
Conduct of the AMERICAN WAR.

As given before

A Committee of the House of Commons last Session of Parliament,

May 6th, 1773.

FREDERICK MONTAGUE, Esq; in the Chair.

EARL CORNWALLIS.

He was called in, and was induged with an armed chair within the bar; he was placed between the bar and the table; he sat two or three minutes with his hat on; but when the examination began, he rose, and gave his answers uncovered.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

I AM happy to take this public opportunity to declare my great regard and veneration for the character of Sir William Howe. I think he has deserved greatly of his country; and has served it with fidelity, assiduity, and great ability. I beg the House will understand I do not come here to answer questions of opinion, but questions of matter of fact; the private opinions of a subordinate officer can give very little satisfaction; they may not do justice to the character of the honourable general, or to my own.

Character
of General
Howe

It is extremely difficult to obtain from the inhabitants a knowledge of the face of the country: it is in general so covered with wood, and so favourable to ambuscades, that reconnoitering can afford but an imperfect knowledge: I never saw a stronger or more defensive country. Our movements were much embarrassed and retarded in the field by the difficulty in getting provisions, and from the closeness of the country. I did not see the enemies lines at Brooklyn; I was on the left; I never heard it suggested that they could have been carried by assault. It was supposed at that time the enemy's

my's main strength was on York island. I know of no delay in landing on York island; the preparations partly depended on the naval department; nor of any avoidable delay prior to the moving from it. From political motives, the general's reasons for not attacking the enemy's entrenchments October 28th, after the defeat of the corps on their right, cannot be explained. The country in their rear appeared strong. I could not have pursued the enemy from Brunswick without greatly distressing the troops. We could not pass the Delaware at Corriels ferry; there were no boats; the river not fordable. I suggested taking post at Trenton and Burdenton; I think myself bound to answer for it; the holding so large a part of the Jerseys; 3 or 400 inhabitants taking the oaths every day for a least ten days; the obtaining forage and provisions, made it advisable: human prudence could not foresee the surrender of Col. Rhall's brigade. I have the highest opinion of those brave troops: the imprudence and negligence of that officer occasioned the misfortune: on all other occasions these troops behaved, and I dare say ever will, with the greatest courage: this very brigade at fort Mifflin, was the admiration of the army.

Detail of operations.

In the beginning of 1777, Sir William Howe took great pains to be informed of the enemy's situation at Middlebrook; but the intelligence was by no means encouraging. There were solid reasons against attempting the Delaware through the Jerseys. No delay in moving to and embarking from Staten island. I must decline any reference to private consultations. Whether the expedition to Pennsylvania was a powerful diversion in favour of the northern army is matter of opinion. I heard 2000 rebels under Maxwell reinforced Washington after the battle of Brandywine. The manoeuvre that brought on that battle reflects the highest honour on Sir William Howe. The Schuylkill is not fordable on the Derby route: it would not have been easy to have crossed there. Col. Donop desired me to represent that he had not been sufficiently considered: Sir William Howe directed me to assure him, the first opportunity should be taken to give him a suitable separate command. Col. Donop was much pleased with his command against Redbank; his orders were discretionary. I never heard Lieut. Gen. Knyphausen was dissatisfied with them. Col. Stirling while at Billingsport with three battalions represented to me at Philadelphia, that he could not proceed to Redbank without a considerable reinforcement. An extraordinary storm of rain, which broke down the dykes and damaged the works, much retarded the attack on Mud island.

Went give opinions, but gives heartily.

Examined by Lord Howe. When I mentioned the landing on York island depended much on the naval department, I did not mean to hint there was any unnecessary delay. I can assure the House, while the noble lord commanded in America, the troops met with all possible assistance from the navy; the greatest harmony subsisted between them; his lordship's character cannot be more revered by the seamen, than it is by the soldiers.

Examined by other Members. I never heard the enemy at Brooklyn were retiring. There was no getting behind the enemy's lines without forcing them. I do not know these lines were complete; I did not see them during the action; I was detached to Newtown;

on my return they were nearly demolished. It was reported the rebels had 6 or 8000 men on Long island.

Pursues
with a bat-
talions.

At Brunswick we arrived the night of Dec. 1st, after a march of 20 miles; very bad roads; our subsistence only flour; constant marching prevented baking the flour; the artillery and baggage horses were quite tired; that proves our not being in a good condition for a long march; the bridge over the Rariton was broken, which stopped us one day; if the enemy could not have passed the Delaware at Trenton, they might have marched down the east side of it; we could reap no great advantage from such a pursuit. I think the troops with me were two battalions light infantry, two of British and three of Hessian grenadiers, the 42d and 33d regiments. The fourth brigade under Gen. Grant seven miles in our rear at Bonham town. Also two companies yagers, and 16th light dragoons. Col. Griffin, a rebel adjutant general met me, I was unwilling he should see the troops they were so few. The troops were in condition to march before the 6th Dec. Our left column reached Prince town on the 7th an hour before sun set; the second column between nine and ten at night: I understand part of the enemy quitted Prince town that morning; I know not their number; they were said to be without artillery or baggage; I do not recollect our numbers. I cannot speak to the enemy's rear passing the Delaware on the 8th; they kept a small detachment in Trenton till we got near it; I do not think their rear was in any danger from us that day. Though the troops were able to pursue before the 6th, yet as the enemy had so much the start of us, there was no great object for the march; we wanted reinforcement for the communication between Brunswick and Amboy; and a considerable body of troops then passing the North river under Gen. Lee, required some attention. I know of no promises about Dec. 20th, 1776, from any chiefs in Pennsylvania to aid Gen. Howe.

America is a very strong country, very rugged, very hilly, and very woody; this is in some degree applicable to all parts in which I served. I know little of raising the provincial troops. Breadth of the sound between Long island and New York about 1000 or 1200 yards. I know no place where we could have taken post so as to discern what was passing at Brooklyn. [*His lordship would not repeat private conversation, as to Sir Henry Clinton's not believing it possible that Sir William Howe intended carrying the army to the southward.*] I have been up and down the Delaware, but only in the night. From the Elk to Philadelphia, plenty of provisions; we received no provisions from the Delaware till we reached Philadelphia. I told Col. Donop that Sir William Howe by no means wished him to sacrifice the troops; that if Redbank could not be easily carried, to give notice, and reinforcements and artillery should be sent him; but that if it could be easily carried, the general wished him to *brusquer l'affaire*. I do not know how near the grenadiers and 33d pursued the enemy to their lines at Brooklyn, or that it required repeated orders to make them desist. After the enemy fell back to the heights near North castle, they left a corps on the heights of the White plains: orders were given for an attack, but a violent rain prevented. Rain spoils roads, and prevents drawing artillery up steep hills. *Quest.* If the powder was wet, an
attack

At Redbank
Col. Donop
to brusquer
l'affaire.

attack might have been made with bayonets? *Ans.* I do not think I said the powder was wet. The soldiers generally carried on their back three days provisions, sometimes four days. On carriages and horses in Pennsylvania, we could carry more than in the Jerseys; 22 days rum, 6 days pork, 12 or 14 days bread, as we trusted to find flour and cattle in the country; in the Jerseys we must have carried more meat, and less bread and rum. [*His lordship refused again Sir William's reasons against attacking the enemy at White plains. Would not answer the question, Did the Hessians refuse to charge? but repeated his encomiums on the Hessians.*] Sir William Howe was highly esteemed by the officers and soldiers of the army. I understood it to be the general's directions to halt at Brunswick; but could I have struck a material stroke I should have moved forwards. I think I received no reinforcements between the 1st and the 6th. Sir William Howe joined me on the 6th with the 4th brigade, and then I went on under his orders.

MAJOR-GENERAL GREY.

He was indulged with a Chair without the Bar.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

THE Americans in general so very much against us, they deserted the country wherever we came, and no intelligence could be depended upon. The part I saw is the strongest country I ever was in; every where hilly, covered with wood, intersected by ravines, creeks, and marshy grounds. Little or no knowledge could be got by reconnoitering. Best calculated for the defensive; every one hundred yards that I have seen might be disputed. Could seldom march but in one column, consequently very slow. A stronger or more solid diversion could not have been made in favour of the northern army, than the expedition to Philadelphia. The division of the army at Brandywine was a masterly movement, deceived the enemy, and brought on the action with almost certainty of success. After the action every thing was done that could be done, another action was once nearly effected, but the weather prevented and rendered it impossible. The route by Derby might have retarded the possession of Philadelphia, the bridge being destroyed, we crossed the nearest ford. The fords below were guarded with cannon. No improper lenity was shewn. Laying the country waste would have been attended with much inconvenience to the troops in case of revisiting the same parts; it would not have terrified them into obedience; it would have been highly blameable without very decisive orders to have carried on so horrid a war. Troops could not be spared to occupy Red bank, as 5000 men were then detached at Philadelphia and Wilmington; if they could they would have been exposed to the fire of the galleys and other vessels. Heavy rains and high tides much delayed the siege of Mud Island. The enemy were so strongly posted at White marsh it would have been highly imprudent to attack them; and at Valley Forge so strong both by art and nature it would have been very unjustifiable, I know of no omissions; Sir William Howe did all that

Gen. Grey's
description
of America
and people.

that was possible for the king's service and the honour of the British arms. In the beginning of 1777 it would have been wrong to have attacked at Middlebrook, in that strong country with as strong a one in the rear.

Examined by other Members. I do not know the height of the point at Red bank, nor of the galleys; nor what angle their cannon must have been placed in; nor if the breeches of the cannon must have been lowered; but I know Donop's troops suffered greatly from them. I arrived June 5th, 1777, we passed to Amboy the 11th; troops cannot take the field till there is a sufficiency of green forage. The enemy were very far from contemptible. Any great loss on our part not be recovered that campaign; the Americans could recruit at pleasure; the same army attacked us at German town, though they had been defeated three weeks before at Brandywine.

On Hudson's river I think Washington would have avoided an action, and thrown great force into the highland forts; if Sir William Howe had gone up, Washington might have cut off his retreat and provisions. Sir William could not have prevented him doing this with ease. I think that with the present force in America there can be no expectation of ending the war by force of arms. Washington as strong at Middlebrook and Brandywine as during my time in America. At Brandywine he had 15,000 or 16,000 regulars, besides militia; I believe 15,000 men under arms. At Monmouth court house in 1778, he had about 14,000. I left America November 28th, 1778; our provincials were then called 6000, but not complete. Washington was supposed 10,000 men at Valley Forge. I never was up the North river; I have heard it is a strong country. From New York to Albany better than 150 miles. Sir William Howe must have possessed both sides to have supplied his army by water, or before frigates or sloops could have attended the army. No hopes of conquering America with the present force there; an army little superior would by no means end the contest; even with a very superior army it would be very uncertain. I never thought our army there any ways adequate to the purposes of conquest. No more lenity shewn than would have been to a foreign enemy. Severity would not now signify. Every place was so totally deserted that we got very little but by going into the woods for the cattle. Impossible to prevent the driving off cattle there.

Strength of
the rebels
in 1777 and
1778.

I looked on it impossible to land high up in the Delaware, from the very great force of the enemy in galleys, fire-rafts, and fire-ships. If we had landed below Newcastle, the march would have been more difficult than going by Chesapeake; Cecil court house where the troops landed quietly, was only 16 or 17 miles from Newcastle. I do not think the army could have landed at Newcastle so easy as at the Elk river; the march would have been as difficult; there would have been 8 or 9 creeks and rivers to pass, besides the Schuylkill. I don't know landing would have been practicable above or about Newcastle; the boats and transports to land 14 or 15,000 men, the river full of fire-rafts, fire-ships and galleys, and the strong tides would have made it very difficult. Some provincials were raised in Pennsylvania, I cannot tell their numbers; nor that Washington's army was diminished by marching southward; he always seemed to have force enough. I think

Against
landing in
the Dela-
ware.

if Washington had a wish it would have been for Sir William Howe to have gone up the North river. The evacuation of Philadelphia had the very worst effect; many who held out till then took the oaths to the States; and it threw a damp over the whole army. You can never determine the war now by depopulating the country; they would not suffer you to do it; it would be a very bad way of doing it. It is impossible to carry on any very important operation at a distance from the fleet, unless you have a navigable river, and are masters of both sides of it, with vessels to carry the stores. We could not get sufficient provincial troops to defend Philadelphia, whilst we carried on operations at a distance. Gen. Grant's return and the 5000 men going out, would be far from adequate now to ending the contest. A defeat of the Americans can hardly be decisive; the country renders a retreat in general so very secure. There might be a few deserters from the Germans as is usual in all armies. From Newcastle to Cecil court house is 16 or 17 miles. I must speak at random if I mentioned the number necessary to end the war with success. Sir William Howe did not consult me on the expedition to Philadelphia. Sir William to have done any good up the North river, must have established himself on both sides, that would have so weakened him that Washington might have attacked him at any time; or if he marched too far up, Washington might have come between him and New York. Washington would have crossed at King's ferry, or any where between that and the Highlands. It would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to have gone as high as *Ætopus*; the forts in the Highlands must first have been taken; and if Gen. Howe had sat down before them, Washington would certainly have come between him and New York. There appeared more friends to us in Pennsylvania, but they did not join us in arms. I intermixed with the inhabitants in Pennsylvania and Jerseys. From the time I landed, the beginning of June 1777 to the 20th of November 1778, there was not in my opinion, a number of troops in America *altogether* adequate to the subduing that country. I don't think Gen. Howe could have taken the Highlands; he must have besieged them in the face of a superior army, and Washington placing himself between him and New York. I have been in the Jerseys, and from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia. I spoke of the part I have been in. At present the King's authority extends no farther than York Island and its dependencies, Staten and Long Island. I considered the country that I saw and the troops; and that our army was not adequate to the conquest.

Against going up the North river

SIR ANDREW SNAPE HAMMOND,

Examined by Sir William and Lord Howe, May 11th, 1779.

I Commanded a squadron of frigates on the coasts of Delaware and Virginia a year and a half. I was employed several months in watching the motions of the rebels on the Delaware, before the arrival of our fleet off the entrance of that river on the 30th of July, 1777; the British fleet were 250 sail. I don't know any river so difficult of navigation; large ships can only pass at certain times of the

Rebel wa-
ter force.

the tide. I reported that day that Washington had crossed the Delaware, and was marching down to Wilmington. From Cape Henlopen up to Reedy island is marshy, low land, very full of creeks; the communications with the upland only by causeways; from Reedy island to Newcastle, some places marshy and in others some tolerable landing places: from Reedy island to Chester the channel so narrow till you pass Newcastle, the fleet would have required 4 miles anchorage, lying within cannon shot of the shore in all places, within musket shot in some: the tides run between 3 and 4 miles an hour: the rebel water guard 2 frigates at Philadelphia; and at Mud island a ship, 18 eighteen-pounders; a frigate, 28 twelve-pounders; 2 xebecs, 2 twenty-four pounders in bow, 2 eighteen-pounders in their stern, and 4 nine-pounders in their waist each; a brig, 16 six-pounders; 2 floating batteries, one of 12 eighteen-pounders, the other of 10, the guns moveable on either side; 13 row galleys each 1 gun from 32 to 18 pounds; 36 row boats or half galleys, each a 6 or a 4 pounder; 25 or 30 fire-rafts of 5 stages each, chained together. Our ships, boats, and small armed vessels not adequate to oppose them on night service, the Cornwallis galley excepted.

Examined by other Members. Between Reedy island and Newcastle marshy, with some landing places; above Newcastle to Wilmington creek an entire marsh. An army can land any where, where there is no opposition: I understood Washington was at Wilmington with his whole army. I suppose the rebel army would have marched to the spot where our troops meant to land. A land officer can only answer whether the rebels could have kept Newcastle, if they had marched there. I think the rebel army was at Wilmington the 30th of July. *Quest.* Do you see any reason to have prevented the rebels from marching to Elk, in the same manner as you suppose they might have marched from Newcastle to Wilmington?

Ans. I have little knowledge of the marching of armies. By the map, from Newcastle to Elk is 17 miles; from Cape Henlopen to Elk, 350. The Chesapeak navigation in general easy; there are some difficulties. Distance between Reedy island and Newcastle 5 or 6 miles. Any where between the shoals the fleet would have been exposed to the fire-rafts. *Quest.* Was not the fleet on returning to the Delaware exposed to the fire-rafts? *Ans.* They came in detachments, and we then possessed the lower chevaux de frize: that was 18 or 20 miles from Reedy island. *Quest.* Might not the fleet have gone up in detachments the 30th of July? *Ans.* That depends on the commanding officer. The breadth of the river at Newcastle is 3 miles;

Description
of the De-
laware at
Newcastle.

the navigable channel 2 miles; and below much narrower; the narrowest part between the Pickpat shoals and fort Penn half a mile. For the fleet to come to anchor off Reedy island fit for landing the troops, would have taken 4 or 5 days, with a fair wind 3 or 4 days. The enemy's water guard would have been the greatest impediment in landing the troops, the row galleys in particular go in shoal water, and would lie on the flats of the river, where our ship guns could not bear on them. The ship guns could certainly bear on the bite at Newcastle. I do not know how the ebb tide runs in the St. Lawrence, the Humber, or the Severn. I think 3 and a half knots a very rapid tide. I never heard the St. Lawrence runs 10 knots an hour. The stronger a tide runs, the dan-

ger

ger from fire-rafts greater, if the channel is the same. Opposite Newcastle they would have floated on every part of the river, but as they were directed by the gallies they would only be used in the channel. The enemy's water force was constructed to fire in the stream of the tide: The tide runs too rapid for ships of war to ride with springs on their cables; I had found the gallies troublesome, and little in my power to annoy them; they were now stronger; and would not have been idle on an occasion so important as landing our army. On the 7th and 8th of May 1776, 13 gallies with fire ships, came within point blank shot, and had two engagements with me, one of 5 hours, the other of 6 hours; I had two men killed, 2 frigates beat the rebel water force. 6 wounded, the masts much damaged, and the sails all useless. The gallies were so small that it was difficult to hit them with our cannon shot. I had the Roebuck of 44 guns, Liverpool 28 guns, and 2 armed tenders; the Liverpool was damaged, and several men wounded. On the 30th of July Lord Howe had 2 fifty gun frigates and 3 frigates. I had the Roebuck and 3 frigates in the Delaware. When the rebels burnt fire-rafts, the gallies never quitted them till they were within half gun-shot. They attacked me first off Chester; an island directly off, with a shoal extending from it, reduces the channel to one-third of a mile wide, we were taking men on board, within half-gun shot, they lighted the fire-rafts and fired from the gallies, the tide run very strong, the ships were forced to slip their cables, when they cast, their guns reached, and drove the gallies off, and the boats towed the fire-rafts on shore: the ships run great risk of being a-ground. The precautions taken prevented the fire-rafts taking effect. *Quest.* This happened where the river was only one-third of a mile wide, at Newcastle the channel is two miles wide, might not the admiral's skill and precaution have equally prevented it at Newcastle, had the fleet gone up the 30th of July? *Ans.* It would have then been so capital an object to the enemy, that they would have acted in the night with all their force; and if they had behaved with spirit they must have put the fleet in confusion; we had no boats proper to withstand their 36 row boats and 13 gallies. I think it very possible for the gallies to have passed between the frigates and towed their fire-rafts down to the fleet. The gallies could lay in shoal water till they had effected their purpose, and then have run into any creek above or below, there is shoal water on each side, except at Newcastle, above and below which is also shoal water. There are both above and below Newcastle little inlets, where the gallies could place themselves, and from the lowness of the marsh do execution with their guns, when the frigates could see nothing but their masts. It is only gun shot from shore to shore, except just above Newcastle, a 36 gun frigate can lie at the wharf; a 50 gun ship within a very little as near; on the 30th of July I know of no enemy's batteries along the river below Billingsport: I believed Washington had crossed the river and gone to Wilmington. The enemy had no water guard or shore defences in Chesapeake. Breadth of the navigable channel of the Delaware at Newcastle 2 miles; the enemy attacking us in landing our troops would have been attended with the worst consequences; in so narrow a channel it would have been impossible for the fleet to have got under sail in the night-time. The enemy could have greatly annoyed the

South wind
in the day ;
north in the
night.

the ships with cannon though they had no batteries. The landing an army in the face of an enemy always to be avoided if the service can by other means be effected ; saw no exception to this rule in the Delaware. From Cedar creek to Reedy island no boat could land without armed men opposing them. The regiments of militia in each county 4 or 500 men, Rodney, a brigadier general commanded ; they were the militia of the lower Delaware counties. Cape Henlopen to Cape Charles 140 to 150 miles. I never gave any public advice to Lord Howe. I suppose the admiral was informed of all the obstructions in the Delaware before leaving New York. The fleet did not delay two hours off the Delaware ; the north wind just then sprung up ; before it was southerly ; continued at north only that evening. End of July south winds prevail ; the west and north west frequently ; especially in the night. (In the use of fire rafts I confined myself to the night, but the enemy's fire ships might have been used with the same effect in the day against a fleet at anchor.) The southerly wind only in the day, the northerly in the night. From Reedy island to Newcastle, wind fair and flowing tide in a single ship an hour's sail, different with a fleet. I conceive the enemies galleys would have taken their position when our fleet stopped to land the troops ; their fire-ships and fire-rafts could not have acted if the wind fair and a flowing tide. *Quest.* At Newcastle where you admit a frigate can come to the wharf, and a fifty gun ship almost as near, could any number of galleys given any serious obstruction to the landing an army ? *Ans.* I never pretended to deny the practicability of landing an army in the Delaware ; I have only spoken to the expediency of it. Water in the narrows not less than 6 or 7 fathom deep ; on the flats of Morris Listons which are the worst in the river, 25 or 26 feet at high water ; the tide rises and falls about 8 feet. Newcastle has the Christine river on the right, 10 or 12 miles before fordable ; I am not well acquainted with the lower parts ; it has George river on the left at some distance. If the rebels had had time and opportunity to have placed their vessels, they could have made the landing very difficult. From Newcastle to Cecil court house 17 miles. *Quest.* In that march would it have been necessary to ford the Christine, or any other river ? *Ans.* I don't know the interior country but from the map. On the 30th of July the rebel brig and schooner galleys, several latten galleys and row boats were at Reedy island ; the rest at Mud island ; from Reedy island to Mud island 25 or 26 miles in the course of the river. If no obstruction a 64 gun ship can go to Philadelphia at high water. The first obstruction was the chevaux de frize at Billingsport, 20 miles above Newcastle. A 64 can lie at all times as high as Chester. The fleet must have anchored every night ; we had 79 boats for landing, manned from the ships of the line, 12 men, a cockswain and officer in each. Had the fleet gone up, the channel in many places only a short gun shot wide ; the enemy might have annoyed the fleet from every advantageous point : this chiefly above Newcastle, but also some below. The narrow navigation in the Chesapeak forced the fleet to anchor every night, though there were no obstructions. The army certainly landed three weeks later there, than they might in the Delaware ; it was an unusual passage, we had reason to expect to get to the head of the Chesapeak

Number of
flat boats.

Chefapeak in less than a week. But the south winds brought such un-
common hot weather, that if the troops had been on shore they must
have suffered exceedingly; 10 leagues from the Delaware met the south
wind; boats carry 45 men if the way short, and water smooth; the
longest detention I know of a ship from going up in July and Au-
gust, about 3 days, this a single ship not a fleet; when the trans-
ports were safe, they manned their boats; could not do it when
they were to move. Wind in general southerly delayed the fleet
to Chefapeak; in the Delaware it would have been a fair wind to
carry the fleet up to Newcastle.

The length
of voyage to
Chefapeak
good for
the troops.

The rebels could have brought their water force from Mud to
Reedy island in one ebb tide, the ebb runs 7 hours, the flood 5; had
the wind been north, the fleet would not have got to Newcastle in 10
days; a ship at anchor at Reedy island, if weather moderate and no ac-
cident, might reach Newcastle an hour before high water. Off New-
castle the fleet would have taken 4 or 5 miles anchorage. I believe
the enemy would not have lost the opportunity. Informed as I
was, I think the going up Chefapeak bay a very wise and proper
measure. From our ships could not see the rebels crossing from Long
island to New York. I think a ship could not have been stationed
between New York and Brooklyn without being exposed to the
enemies batteries.

MR. MONTRESOR,

Formerly a Captain of Engineers, but lately resigned.

Examined by Sir William and Lord Howe.

I Served 29 years; acted part of 1776 as aid de camp, and in
1777 as chief engineer. It would not have been prudent to
have assaulted the lines at Brooklyn August 27th, 1776. The lines
were from Wallabout bay to a swamp that intersects the land between
the main and Redhook, which terminates the lines; one mile and
a half extent, including the angles, cannon proof, five redoubts,
or rather fortresses, with ditches, as had the lines that formed the
intervals, fraised on the parapet and counterescarp, the whole sur-
rounded with formidable abbatties; finished on every part from
Wallabout swamp on the left to the swamp on the right; the left
of the line towards Wallabout runs from the rising ground at fort
Putnam in a straight line to the Wallabout swamp; a single man
could not pass round the left of the line; Sir William and I could not
get out there; we returned and went out at a fally port. I have no
experience of regular approaches to attack such lines; but in 1758,
at Ticonderoga I thought our failure was from want of approaches.
We should have lost a considerable number of men had we attacked
the lines at Brooklyn; after they were evacuated, I was the first
person in the works, and had the greatest difficulty with a corpo-
ral and six men to get through the abbatties where there was no one
to oppose me. We were retarded at Mud island by the rains and
tides, the platforms of the batteries were even overflowed.

Description
of the rebel
lines.

Examined by other Members. I don't know our numbers the 27th
of August, 1776; the enemy 8 or 10,000 men. [*Would not say if
the rebels were or were not veterans.*] When Baron Dieckau was ad-
vancing

vancing to attack Sir William Johnson, Col. Eyre, chief engineer, formed the waggons in front, leaving intervals for the cannon, and forming an abbatties in front contributed to the success. I have already said that the whole rebel line had an abbatties before it. When a line is constructed and has two flanks to it, they are only redans; but inclosed in the gorges with similar faces then they are redoubts; they could not be taken by assault, but by approaches; rather fortresses than redoubts. At day break, 4 o'clock, I gave the alarm of the evacuation; 25 minutes after the piquets marched. To have carried on the approaches allowing every thing prepared would have taken 3 days. The artillery and apparatus were to bring from New Utrecht or Yellow Hook to the north east of the Redhook. I imagine the rebels would not have ventured off in the day. I do not know what orders were given to Brigadier Gen. Agnew, general officer of the night, 29th of August. The piquets have advanced parties to watch the enemy; small parties could not discover the enemy going off; only a desperate party would attempt to have looked into a work, or have got to the crest of a work, and they could not discover an evacuation till they were there. I am not acquainted with the North river navigation, but thoroughly with the defences the rebels made on it: 40 gun ships have gone to the highlands, 2 or 3 miles above King's ferry, I was present when Sir William Howe called off the troops, it would have been improper to have suffered them to storm the redoubt, the artillery was not up, no fascines to fill the ditches, no axes for cutting the abbatties, no scaling ladders, or proper apparatus for the assault of so respectable a work. The rebel works judiciously planned, but ill executed. [*Would say nothing of the strength of either armies.*] In the river Delaware the works at Billingsport defended the lower chevaux de frize; those of Mud island the upper. The width of the river, comprehending Mud island, 3500 yards; from Redbank to Mud island, 2700 yards. The east bank opposite Mud island higher than the west bank. Had we possessed the east side above Billingsport, could have destroyed the rebel shipping above that post. Amboy to Redbank 44 miles. It would have taken 24 hours to have brought up cannon and apparatus to attack Brooklyn redoubt. When we got to Brooklyn we commanded the place of embarkation thoroughly. Some rebel boats not then put off; only the *debris* of the rear. I was at Brunswick the 14th of June 1777, when the movement was made to draw the enemy from Quibbletown; cannot mention numbers; I saw nothing more than their situation in the mountains; they seemed formidable there and difficult of access; I was two miles distant; know nothing of Washington's stores, or of the possibility of surrounding him; or cutting off his provisions; or obliging him to surrender or fight; or how near we were to him; or even the name of the place where Gen. Howe encamped; or the distance of the army from Quibbletown; or the strength of the rebels; or the practicability of bringing them to action; or the post at Trenton, or if a plan of defence was recommended to the officer commanding there; nor any thing of Redbank. Donop landed at Gloucester point, but I cannot tell its distance from Redbank.

Nothing in readiness for assaulting the lines.

Knows hardly any thing.

Produced drawings of the operations from the 27th of August to the

the 18th of September 1776 ; of the descent on the island of New York, with the rebel works for their defence ; of the five rebel redoubts that formed the line of defence for covering the rebel retreat across Brooklyn ferry to New York : and of the rebel lines at Brooklyn.

CAPTAIN ROBERT M'KENZIE.

Secretary to Sir William Howe.

Examined by Sir William Howe, May 18th.

HE produced two letters, one from Gen. Burgoyne, and another from Gen. Clinton, with Sir William Howe's answers.

General Burgoyne's Letter.

Sir, *Camp before Ticonderoga, July 2d, 1777.*

I wait only some few necessaries of the heavy artillery, which have been retarded by contrary winds on the lake, to open batteries upon Ticonderoga. Ticonderoga reduced, I shall leave engineers to put it in an impregnable state. It will be garrisoned from Canada, where all the destined supplies are arrived. My force therefore, will be left complete for future operations. I shall implicitly follow the ideas I communicated to your excellency in my letters from Plymouth and Quebec. I have the honour to be, with every sentiment of respect and attachment, &c. &c.

Gen. Burgoyne's letter.

(Signed) J. BURGOYNE.

General Howe's Answer.

Dated 17th July, 1777, the day he embarked for the expedition to Chesapeake.

Dear Sir,

I received yours of the 2d inst. on the 15th, and have since heard of your being in possession of Ticonderoga. I have received your two letters from Plymouth and Quebec, and shall observe the contents. There is a report of a messenger of yours to me having been taken. Washington is waiting our motions here, and has detached Sullivan, with about 1500 men, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Pennsylvania, where I expect to meet Washington ; but if he goes to the northward contrary to my expectation, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you. After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide yours. But my wishes are that the enemy be drove out of this province, before any operations take place in Connecticut. Sir Henry Clinton remains in command here, and will act as occurrences may direct. Success be ever with you. Yours, &c.

G. Howe's answer.

(Signed) W. HOWE.

P. S. Putnam is in the highlands with about 4000 men.

General Clinton's Letter to Sir William Howe.

Sir, *New York, 25th July 1777.*

I this moment received intelligence of Washington's march towards Morris town : will send your excellency the particulars by express. There is ——— an officer ——— in the rebel army, who I think may be easily got at, and be of infinite use to your

Gen. Clinton's letter.

your excellency; he served as — — in — —. Suffice it to say, he is by all accounts a complete rogue, and understands enough of the business he is now employed in to be of use. I sincerely wish your excellency every success, being your most obedient, &c.

(Signed) H. CLINTON.

General Howe's Answer.

G. Howe's
answer.

Sir, *Eagle, off the mouth of the Delaware, 30th July, 1777.*

This morning I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th. Having fully considered all circumstances, and from the information of Washington's march to the Delaware, I have determined to proceed immediately to Chesapeak bay, in order to land at the head of it. Had our passage here been more successful, we might possibly have landed in the Delaware in time to have got between the Susquehannah and Washington's army, which there would not now be the least prospect of; you will therefore be so good as to send your commands to me at the head of Chesapeak bay. It is not possible for me to say at this time when I may be able to send reinforcements to you; but I beg you will be assured, that I shall not fail to do it as soon as expedient; in the mean while, if you can make any diversion in favour of Gen. Burgoyne's approaching Albany, with security to King's bridge, I need not point out the utility of such a measure. The regular troops at Staten island may certainly be withdrawn, leaving the defence of it to Skinner and his provincials, if the enemy do not shew any thing to put it in danger from the Jerseys after Washington's departure. I shall not lose sight of your intention respecting the officer in the — — with Washington.

Your most faithful and obedient servant,
(Signed) W. HOWE.

LIEUT. COL. Sir GEORGE OSBORNE,
A Member in his place.

Examined by Sir William Howe.

Gen. Howe
gave previ-
ous infor-
mation of
attack at
German-
town.

COLONEL Donop very frequently after the misfortune at Trenton acquainted me, that if Col. Rhall had executed the orders he delivered to him from Sir William Howe, to erect redoubts at Trenton, it would have been impossible to have forced Rhall's brigade before he could have come to his assistance from Bordentown. On the day before the action at Germantown I was to the right of the infantry, with the grenadiers of the guards, Sir William Howe gave me orders a little before sunset to move on in front with the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards to Major Simcoe's post, about half a mile in front of the line of infantry, acquainting me I might expect the enemy at day break next morning. The firing of the enemy began exactly at or near the time Sir William Howe acquainted me it would do. During the siege of Mud island, two nights the rains fell so heavy, we could not carry on the works, and one night the water rose so high, it was with difficulty we saved the cannon in the chief battery.

Examined by other Members. I cannot answer when the reinforcement marched to sustain the post at Germantown; I was on the right flank;

flank; the attack began considerably to the left, full three quarters of a mile from my post. The rebels marched about 9 or 10 miles to make that attack; the attack must have lasted an hour and an half. *Quest.* Do you apprehend the time from the first attack until the rebels retreated, to have been *no more* than an hour and an half? *Ans.* As I was not there, I said at first, I only spoke by guesses. [*He would not give an opinion whether our troops were more fresh to pursue than the rebels to retreat.*] *Quest.* Notwithstanding the information from the commander in chief, do you conceive that our army was surprised at Germantown or otherwise? *Ans.* After the information I received, I was not in any danger of being surprised. *Quest.* Do you conceive any other part of the army was surprised? *Ans.* I beg to decline that question. *Quest.* Was it the general opinion of the officers that some other part of the army was surprised or not? *Ans.* That is the same question in other words; I can merely add, that the officers I conversed with were always well satisfied with the care Sir William Howe had of the army. The Hessian chasseurs were on the left of Germantown, and Gen. Knyphausen commanded that wing. I never asked Gen. Knyphausen if Sir William Howe apprised him of the probability of his being attacked that morning; and being only a lieutenant colonel, the general did not acquaint me with all the orders he gave. I had the honour of the King's commission of muster master general and inspector of the foreign troops.

Never asked if Gen. Knyphausen was informed.

GENERAL SIR GUY CARLETON'S

Evidence on the Expedition from Canada.

Called in and Examined by General Burgoyne. May 20th, 1779.

I Received a letter from the Secretary of State, I think the 12th of August 1776, mentioning the reasons that made it expedient for me to remain in the province of Quebec; the date of that letter was long before the return of Gen. Burgoyne from Canada to Great Britain. The artillery I had prepared for the campaign, on a supposition that I was to go myself, was in concert with Gen. Phillips; it does not strike me that there was any great difference in that allotted to Gen. Burgoyne. I did not think myself justified by my orders to grant Gen. Burgoyne's application for troops to garrison Ticonderoga. I approved of Gen. Burgoyne's motives for proceeding from Skeensborough to fort Edward. I had no reason to disapprove of any part of his conduct, while under my command.

Examined by other Members. In general so considerable a corps seldom moves without artillery; but the precise number must depend on a variety of circumstances, which the discretion and judgment of the commander must determine. Every gentleman in this house must be a judge whether Gen. Burgoyne's orders to march to Albany, were positive or not. The orders are before the House; the House are as competent to judge as I am. I demanded a reinforcement of 4000 men, or at least four battalions; only a very small part were sent out, and part of that arrived late in 1777. *Quest.* Should you, had you been in Gen. Burgoyne's situation, and acting under the orders which you knew he received, have thought

Wont say if the orders were positive or not.

yourself bound to pursue them implicitly, or at liberty to deviate from them? *Ans.* What I would have done, I really don't know; the particular situation, and a man's own particular feelings must determine that point. When such questions are put to me, I shall pray to be excused answering them, but I will not evade them.

Quest. Is it your opinion, that the best movement Sir William Howe could have made for the purpose of forwarding the execution of the orders under which Gen. Burgoyne acted, would have been to have sailed with his army from New York to Chesapeake bay?

Ans. Had I had the honour to have commanded on that side, I don't know what I should have done myself. I was so little informed, that I could form no judgment of the propriety or impropriety of his conduct. I had frequent accounts from the whole extent of the inhabited country to Albany, that numbers were ready to join the King's troops, should they penetrate so far. I had also information that a formidable militia might be raised to oppose his Majesty's army. *Quest.* Did you give any advice about employing the Savages? *Ans.* I do not recollect that I said any thing about them.

EARL OF BALCARRAS.

Called in and Examined by General Burgoyne. May 27th, 1779.

I Commanded the British light infantry attached to Brig. Gen. Frazer's corps. Gen. Burgoyne and Gen. Frazer lived in friendship and confidence. Gen. Frazer was in general consulted. Gen. Frazer's proportion of artillery was according to his own requisition. Of his corps about 150 killed and wounded at Huberton; the enemy that day certainly behaved with great gallantry; the nature of the country, our fatigue, the care of our wounded, &c. prevented farther pursuit. The action was on the 7th of July; and Gen. Frazer's corps rejoined the army on the 9th at Skenefborough. Between that day and the march to fort Edward, we were making roads to fort Anne. Had the enemy maintained the post on the ascent to Pitch Pine plains in the march from fort Anne to fort Edward, artillery would have been of great use in dislodging them. Had they defended Schuylers island, they could not have been forced without a numerous artillery or heavy loss. We could not turn that post without greatly risking our boats and portable magazines. I lived in habits of intimacy with Gen. Frazer; his temper was open, warm, and communicative, but reserved in matters of confidence. I never heard him express disapprobation at passing Hudson's river; his corps passed it by a bridge constructed of rafts and boats; torrents carried it away; his communication with the army was cut off; he repassed the river in boats and scows, and expressed his regret at being obliged to return. Had he been attacked in repassing, the only means of safety must have been to get under cover of the fire of our artillery. There was a general impatience to pass the river and advance on the enemy. On the 19th of September, notwithstanding the passage of the ravines, and the thickness of the woods, the column of Gen. Frazer's march, and that of the British line led by Gen. Burgoyne, arrived at their respective

Numerous
artillery
necessary.

respective posts, with great precision in point of time. The British were attacked partially at one o'clock; the action was general at three, and ended at seven. The nature of the country prevented judging what attacks were in force, and what were feints. We remained masters of the field; the enemy behaved with great obstinacy and courage; it was too dark to pursue with effect. The King's troops took up ground rather nearer to the enemy the next morning. From that time to the 7th of October, the outposts of Gen. Frazer were within half a mile of the enemy's outposts. Nature of the country made reconnoitering very difficult. The enemy's riflemen and irregulars were an overmatch for our Indians and Provincials. Gen. Frazer's corps to October 7th, continually at work, securing their own posts, and opening the front to oppose the enemy. When he was wounded, the command of his corps devolved on me. Two redoubts were erected on our left to cover our boats and provisions. After the retreat, the lines were attacked with as much fury as the fire of small arms can admit. The cannon were of very great use in repulsing the enemy from my post. The possession of that and Col. Breyman's post by the enemy, would have laid open the flank and rear of the camp of our line. We retreated in the night in good order and without loss; were under arms in momentary expectation of battle all the 8th; retreated the night of the 8th in good order and without loss; in the day and night of the 9th, incessant rain, roads bad, cattle nearly starved, and the troops forded the Fishkill, the bridge being destroyed by the enemy. The troops greatly fatigued. The enemy had a battery which commanded the ford over Hudson's river. I heard a cannon shot had discomposed the general's table. When the first council of war was held, the 13th of October, we could not find a spot which was not exposed to cannon or rifle shot; Gen. Burgoyne declared he was ready to take the lead in any measure they should think for the honour of the British arms; unanimous for treating; Gen. Gates's proposal to lay down our arms in our intrenchments rejected with disdain by Gen. Burgoyne; the council of war concurred with him; the counterproposals by Gen. Burgoyne were unanimously approved; when Gen. Gates had agreed to them, but the copies not signed, on intelligence in the night by a spy, Gen. Burgoyne proposed to suspend the treaty and trust to events: the council were of opinion the public faith was plighted, but there was a difference of opinion, and also on what might be expected from the different corps in desperate cases. After the convention, Gates's army passed before Generals Burgoyne and Phillips in silence and good order, and at all times when I was opposed to them they fought with great courage and obstinacy. They seemed 13 or 14,000 rank and file under arms, exclusive of the corps on the other side of Hudson's river.

Battles Sep.
19, and Oct.
7th.

Unanimous
fortreating.

Examined by other Members, and by Gen. Burgoyne occasionally. Gen. Burgoyne always possessed himself in every situation of danger and difficulty, and had the confidence of the army. At Cambridge they were satisfied with his efforts to procure them redress, and with his prosecuting Col. Henley. I never heard any officer or soldier express dissatisfaction at his return to England. It was their wish he should go to Europe to justify his own and their conduct.

duct. He shared at all times the dangers and afflictions in common with every foldier ; they looked on him as their friend, and would have received him in person, or any accounts of him with every mark of affection.

Rebels al-
ways at-
tacked.

There were no works at the ascent to Pitch Pine plains, I spoke merely from its situation ; there might have been different ways of dislodging the enemy without attacking that post. The reason the rebels never defended their intrenchments was,—they always marched out and attacked us. I never heard Gen. Frazer express his approbation of the passing the Hudson. I had no information of the rebels being ready to decamp after the action the 19th of September, or of their baggage being packed up. October 7th our lines to the right were stormed and carried. The possession of fort Edward and the adjoining country, cut off the retreat of any garrison in fort George. *Quest.* Does your lordship think it would have been prudent, or just to brave troops, who had suffered severe loss, to attack an enemy the morning after that loss, posted within intrenchments which it was impossible to reconnoitre ? *Ans.* That attempt was tried the 7th of October, and did not succeed. *Quest.* Were not the enemy reinforced between the 19th of September, and the 7th of October. *Ans.* I think it is likely they were. Our loss was very considerable the 19th of September ; numbers of men wounded that day, joined their corps the 7th of October. The enemy fought at all times with courage and obstinacy. The advantages gained by the enemy proceeded from their local situation, and not from want of zeal or bravery in the British troops ; we were taught by experience that neither their attacks nor resistance were to be despised. I commenced my service in America. About the 3d of October, Gen. Burgoyne gave out in orders that powerful armies were acting in co-operation with that he had the honour to command. The army looked forward to that co-operation with pleasure. I did not know we were to expect no co-operation till after the convention was signed. Sir William Howe's going to the southward was reported in the army before we passed Hudson's river. I never knew that report was confirmed at all. [*He would not say he was surpris'd or disappointed, or both, when he heard that report, or if the army expressed themselves pleas'd at the news.*] The opinion I gave in the council of war was, that the corps I commanded were willing and zealous to undertake any enterprize, that Gen. Burgoyne would be pleas'd to employ them upon. *Quest.* When

Our Gene-
rals for
breaking
off treaty.

advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North river did you think the treaty of convention had gone so far that it could not be broken ? *Ans.* I thought and declared that Gen. Burgoyne was at full liberty to break off that treaty in the stage it then was, and I could not conceive the public faith was engaged until the treaty was actually signed and exchanged. *Quest.* Whether Gen. Burgoyne, Gen. Phillips, and Brigadier Hamilton did not coincide with you in your opinion ? *Ans.* Gen. Burgoyne was of my opinion ; I hope the other members will soon be in a situation to declare theirs. After that question was decided, the concurrence for signing the convention was unanimous. The account of the Highlands being taken, and of Sir Henry Clinton's coming

coming up the North river, was first known in the night of the 16th October.

CAPTAIN MONEY.

Examined by Gen. Burgoyne.

I WAS deputy quarter master general under the command of Gen. Burgoyne in 1777; after Lieut. Col. Carleton returned to Canada I was superior officer in that department. The woods were so thick it was impossible to reconnoitre the country without a party; I always had one sent with me. The army was 6 or 7 days in making the road from Skeensborough to fort Anne; between fort Anne and fort Edward we were not delayed an hour, the rebels had made a very good road. The possession of the country about fort Edward prevents getting of artillery or stores from fort George, but a garrison might get through the woods. Had the army gone by lake George, 3 or 400 batteaux must have been carried up out of lake Champlain to lake George; drawing 400 batteaux over land would have delayed the army a fortnight longer than they were delayed. I was also commissary of horse: I took orders, and reported to Gen. Burgoyne and Gen. Phillips: the orders were invariably precise and pressing to forward the provisions: at Duer camp August the 18th, positive orders were issued against any officer taking horses or cattle from the provision train; and carrying merchandise, and *even sutler's stores and officer's baggage* positively forbidden till the transport of provisions should be over; and two barrels of Madeira and two barrels of rum were seized and sent to the hospital. About the end of August I heard Gen. Burgoyne say to Gen. Phillips and Col. Carleton, that one month's provisions would be worth £. 100,000 to Great Britain. Authority was given to buy or hire ox teams, and all draught cattle taken were appropriated to the transporting provisions: only 180 carts, and between 20 and 30 ox carts could be mustered; these would carry about 4 days provisions: from accidents of weather and roads, and tired state of cattle, sometimes only one days provisions could be brought in a day: took 6 hours to draw a batteaux from fort George to fort Edward. The carts were unloaded at fort Edward, the contents embarked in batteaux, these were unloaded at upper falls of fort Miller, and a second time unloaded at the lower falls: the horses were too feeble to bring forward the daily provisions to fort Miller: September 1st, 30 horses were useless from fatigue: the artillery had a separate contract for horses: we could not have collected a month's provisions sooner, without the utter ruin of the contract horses. On 19th September, the enemy's fire much heavier than ever I saw it any where, unless at fort Anne: the 20th, 21st, and 62d regiments were engaged from 3 afternoon till 7 evening, the rebels had 9 regiments opposed to the 3 British: when the 62d regiment came out of action, they were not 100 rank and file; next morning the 3 regiments were not in condition to go upon any service whatever. The enemy gave way very often, and finally about 7 o'clock. Not practicable to pursue. From that day to October 7th I was often out reconnoitering. The enemy's right were post-
ed

400 bat-
teaux for
the rout by
lake George

After ac-
tion 19th
Sept. 62d
regt. not
100 men

German
ron Oct. 7.

ed on a hill very near the river, on the top a strong breast work, at the foot an abbatties; as there are no general officers, or older officers than myself from the army, I hope that no military man will think me presuming, to have attacked these works would have risked the loss of the whole army, and with little probability of success. I never saw the left wing till taken prisoner. On the 7th of October the rebels advanced to attack our left; I was astonished to hear their shot fly so thick, after our cannonade had lasted a quarter of an hour. I did not see the British grenadiers forced back, I saw them taking a different position, several broke their ranks, but on some aid de camps calling to them for shame to continue their ranks, they marched to their station in good order; a battalion of Brunswickers on the left of the artillery went off as soon as the firing began, and I did not see a man left behind on the ground: after some difficulty that battalion was brought to make a stand in the rear, but in no order. I did not see Gen. Reidesfel endeavour to stop that battalion, but I saw an aid de camp of his and a brigadier major with their swords drawn keeping them up, afterwards I saw Gen. Reidesfel on the right of the artillery with the battalion perfectly formed. This battalion giving way contributed to the loss of the action; but before Sir Francis Clarke died of his wounds, he told me he received his wound in bringing orders for the artillery and detachment to return to the camp, and to his being wounded I attribute the loss of the artillery, if not the loss of the army. There was an entrenched ground on the left of the rebels that commanded their whole camp and lines; if the army had got possession of that ground I believe the rebels would not have staid one hour in their camp. Gen. Arnold foreseeing that, marched out October 7th, without orders from Gen. Gates. He also advised the going out to meet Gen. Burgoyne and engaging him before he approached the lines; the reason was, if Gen. Burgoyne should ever come near enough to use his artillery, he would certainly take their camp, and in that case their troops would never stand any where; but though they should be defeated in the woods, their troops would after that have confidence in their works.

Examined by other Members, and by Gen. Burgoyne occasionally.

Delay to
bring up
provisions.

The army entertained a very high opinion of Gen. Burgoyne's conduct; he had the full confidence of the army to the last moment; after the desertion of Ticonderoga it was not thought the rebels would stand any where. The reason for the Bennington expedition in the general orders August 17th Duer camp, was to provide a supply of cattle to enable the army to proceed without waiting for their magazines. The army remained till the 13th September before they crossed Hudson's river, to bring forward provisions and artillery, to enable the general to give up his communication. The army thought it their duty to proceed and fight the rebels. We never foraged to the right of the camp at Freeman's farm. On October 7th while the troops were in the field, Gen. Frazer ordered the boatmen and drivers of his brigade to forage in the rear of the troops. On the 5th of October Gen. Frazer mentioned to me that there was forage to the right of his camp; but the ground on which it was, was then in possession of the rebel advanced post. If the troops had arrived at New York time enough to have enabled Sir

Henry

Henry Clinton to have come up the North river a week sooner, our army would not have been lost. I never heard any of the officers say Gen. Burgoyne had acted wrong, but many said if he had retreated when Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North river, the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he ever have forgiven himself. [*He would not mention the opinion of the rebels on Gen. Howe's expedition to Pennsylvania, nor the language of the military at New York on that subject. Sir William Howe objected to such questions.*] If the army had taken the route on the east side of Hudson's river, part of the way was a swamp, and they could not have marched near enough to have covered the provision batteaux from the rebel force on the west side. The army expected a co-operation from Sir William Howe on the North river from the order given out by Gen. Burgoyne at Freeman's farm. From fort Edward troops might certainly carry provisions sufficient for the march to Albany; but there was no passing the Hudson well without a bridge of boats; and I think the delay of carrying boats, and throwing a bridge over, would have more than consumed such provision as they could have carried with them. Had the army got to Albany we should have found a number of loyal subjects to have joined, and done every thing in their power to have established the army at that place. The army could not have reached Albany by taking a circuit and avoiding the swamps on the east side of the river; for the enemy being on the opposite shore, would have opposed the passage of the army, the river at Albany being three times the width it is at Saratoga.

Burgoyne's
army ex-
pected a co-
operation.

EARL of HARRINGTON.

Examined by Gen. Burgoyne. June 1st, 1779.

I WAS captain of the 29th grenadiers, and supernumerary aide de camp. At Huberton the enemy at first showed great spirit, but they gave way in great confusion when the British troops rushed on them with their bayonets; not practicable to pursue farther; we ran some risk in pursuing so far. In July was present at a council with the Indians just arrived under Major Campbell and Mr. St. Luc, and had been at a former council at lake Champlain; Gen. Burgoyne forbid scalping except the dead, which they insisted on doing; he offered rewards for prisoners, and enjoined good treatment. Soon after a party of the enemy lying in ambush with a design of taking or killing Gen. Burgoyne in visiting an out post near fort Anne, were taken by the Indians; a captain then taken, and prisoners brought in by them on many occasions, declared they had been used with much humanity. On the murder of Miss MacRea, Gen. Burgoyne at a council, Gen. Frazer assisting, threatened the culprit with death, and many of us feared he would put it in execution; policy alone prevented it; had not the man been pardoned, I imagine the Indians would have gone over to the enemy. They were refrained from going out without a British officer who was to be responsible for their conduct. Gen. Burgoyne told Mr. St. Luc, that he would rather lose every Indian than connive at their enormities. At fort Edward many quitted the army with-

Gen. Bur-
goyne pro-
hibited
scalping.

Bennington
expedition
Reidefel's
plan.

out leave, caused by the restraint upon their cruelties and habits of plunder. The expedition to Bennington, and Lieut. Col. Baum's appointment, were Gen. Reidefel's wish. Capt. Frazer's corps sent with him were in high esteem for their gallant behaviour on all occasions; they were volunteers from the British regiments. Col. Baum was satisfied with his strength; on receiving a letter from him in the night, Col. Breyman was immediately ordered to march and support him, being the corps nearest him. I never heard Gen. Frazer disapprove passing the Hudson. I never heard it doubted but that we were to force our way to Albany. No army could be in higher spirits at that time, more eager to advance, or more desirous to engage. Had Gen. Burgoyne halted at fort Edward, his character would not have stood very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy.

On the 19th of September, the army marched in three columns; the German line flanking the artillery and baggage pursued the course of the river through the meadows, and formed the left column: the British line marched parallel to it, at some distance, through the woods, and formed the centre column: Gen. Frazer's corps, with the grenadiers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large *detour* through the woods, and formed the right column. Farther on the right were flanking parties of light infantry and provincials: the country was intersected by the deepest ravine I ever saw. The advanced party, the picquets of the centre column commanded by Major Forbes, exploring the way by which the column was to pass, fell in with a considerable body of the rebels posted in a house and behind fences, which they attacked, and after a great deal of fire, nearly drove in the body of the rebels; but on finding the woods quite round them filled with the enemy, they were obliged to retire to the main body. Gen. Frazer on the firing detached two companies to support Major Forbes, on their appearing the enemy quitted their post, and the whole line was instantly formed with the utmost regularity; I do not include the left column, the Germans, who did not come up till late in the day. The action lasted from 3 o'clock till near 8. The 20th, 21st, and 62d British were engaged most of that time; the enemy fought very obstinately; different attempts were made by the general's orders to charge the enemy with bayonets, but all failed from the heaviness of the rebel fire and thickness of the woods, except the last, when the British troops finally drove them out of the field. The Germans came up in time to give the enemy three volleys, I heard their coolness and steadiness highly praised. I do not recollect our loss. The three British regiments I apprehend were not in a condition to attack next morning, nor for the next ten days. Had the army moved to gain the left of the enemy's entrenchments, before the redoubts were raised that commanded the plain near the river, the batteaux, stores, and hospitals would have been exposed to attack; as would the bridge of boats for foraging on the east side of the river, forage being scarce on the west side. The bridge was finished in one night, the *tete du pont* and other works took some days. The general mentioned to me his expectation that if Sir Henry Clinton succeeded in forcing the highlands, the enemy must abandon their entrenchments without fighting. On October

Action at
Stillwater
Sept. 19.

7th, I carried orders to Major Gen. Phillips at the end of the action, to draw back the detachment as soon as possible to the camp, the enemy having turned both their flanks. This duty was committed to Gen. Phillips, while Gen. Burgoyne returned to take measures for the defence of the camp. I met Sir Francis Clarke as I was searching for Gen. Phillips; I acquainted him with my orders, and wished he would assist me, that no time might be lost; that was the last time I saw Sir Francis; soon after he received the wound of which he died. In the heat of the action, when the Germans were giving way on the left of the British artillery, Gen. Reidesel appeared to me to act as a brave and intelligent officer. On our return the camp was attacked as Gen. Burgoyne had foreseen. Soon after the enemy got round the right of our camp, we expected an attack on our rear, and I was dispatched to Brigadier Gen. Hamilton to order the works in the rear to be manned with all the soldiers that could be spared from the defence of the front. The first intelligence of Col. Breyman's being killed and his post carried, was from an officer, who seeing a number of men round the fires of that post, took them for Germans it was so dark, and did not discover his error till he was fired upon, they proving a party of the enemy who had forced the works. Gen. Burgoyne used his utmost efforts to rally the Germans and recover Col. Breyman's post, but without effect, from the darkness of the night, and the entire confusion in which they were; no other troops could be spared, every regiment was occupied in defence of its own lines, which were certainly not overmanned.

Action October 7th.

The night of October 7th, the army retreated in good order, and took a new position by day light: they were under arms all the 8th, in continual expectation of action; were cannonaded greatest part of the day, and the advanced corps posted on a hill, were under an almost continual fire of the rifle men of the enemy. At Gen. Frazer's funeral on the afternoon of that day, the redoubt in which he was buried was very heavily cannonaded during the ceremony, and even previous to this they fired at those attending the corpse on its way thither, which I suppose was accidental: all the generals and their aid de camps attended. The retreat on the night of the 8th, and on the day and part of the night of the 9th, was made in perfect good order. The 9th was exceeding wet, and the troops much fatigued. I saw a corps of the enemy in force opposite Saratoga; they had a battery that commanded the ford on Hudson's river; the general and other gentlemen at dinner were obliged to remove finding themselves in the range of that battery. Lieut. Col. Sutherland was recalled with his detachment from repairing the bridges and roads, on apprehension of an action. Our scouts reported the enemy were in possession of both sides of the river between Saratoga and fort Edward. Gen. Burgoyne mentioned forcing the ford over Hudson's river, of cutting a way through the enemy's right, and attempting a rapid march to Albany, or by a night march to gain the fords above fort Edward. If Gen. Phillips had offered to make his way with a body of troops to Ticonderoga I think I should have heard of it. Since I came to England I heard he offered to attempt an escape through the woods with one or two guides to defend Ticonderoga. The day before the council

Gen. Burgoyne's proposals to the Council of War.

was called the state of the army was as bad as possible ; numbers few, provisions short, position not a good one owing to the nature of the country, one hill overtopping another to the distance of some miles. Our situation in the opinion of every one did not entitle us to better terms ; few expected so good.

Fortifying
camp from
Sept. 19, to
Oct. 7th.

Examined by other Members, and by Gen. Burgoyne occasionally. Numbers of Indians left the army at different times ; some were on the Bennington expedition ; there was no officer in the army of sufficient rank to have commanded such an expedition, who had ever been in that part of the country ; many of the provincials on that expedition were of that very country. On passing the Hudson the army did not doubt of reaching Albany : I dont know whether the general doubted it. Between the 19th September and 7th October, the army was strengthening its position ; 5 or 6 redoubts were erected, the *tete du pont*, lines before the camp, and outworks to the lines. My situation did not entitle me to receive intelligence. It was understood the rebels suffered more than the King's troops on the 19th Sept. I apprehend the whole rebel army was not engaged : their army was so numerous, their loss was not felt as ours. The scarcity of forage was not foreseen in the extent we experienced. I never heard the 1400 horses were thought too numerous, even a scarcity was complained of. We lost some small part of the heavy artillery, the rest was brought back to Saratoga : the army appeared to retreat as expeditiously as possible, I cannot conceive leaving the artillery would have made a difference of 4 miles in the march. *Que?* Were the heavy artillery, in effect, of any use in the retreat ? *Ans.* As it happened they were of no other than that of not being turned against us. If spiked, I understand spikes are easily removed, and almost impossible with such tools as are carried with an army to knock off the trunnions of brass cannon. I do not remember the baggage being any impediment in our retreat. The intelligence of Col. St. Leger's failure arrived in August I think : I dont recollect if before passing the Hudson. If the battle expected at Saratoga had been on the plain, our heaviest artillery would have given us a manifest superiority in that particular. The transport of batteaux and provisions could not have been carried on without the number of horses we had. The army had, and I believe still have a confidence in their general : there never was an army more deservedly pleased with the conduct of their general. The American artillery was served slowly, but not ill. Our retreat I thought was impracticable either with or without artillery. From Saratoga to Albany may be 32 miles, the country strong, woody, and a great number of hills : Albany is in a bottom very much commanded. At Albany must have drawn our subsistence from New York, if not masters of the Mohawk country. As matters have turned out, it certainly might have been better to have returned after the engagement of the 19th Sept. than to have staid and fortified the camp, but I believe no one thought so at that time.

MAJOR FORBES.

Called in and examined by General Burgoyne.

I Was Major of the 9th regiment. Near fort Anne at half past 10 in the morning the enemy attacked us in front with a heavy and well directed fire : a large body of them passed the creek on the left, and from a thick wood fired across it on our left flank : they then began to recross the creek, and attack us in rear : it now became necessary to change our ground to prevent being surrounded, we took post on the top of a high hill on our right : here they attacked us very vigorously for two hours, and they would have forced us, had not some Indians come up : the rebels soon after gave way. September 19th I commanded the British picquets, I was attacked with great vigour from behind railed fences and a house, by rifle men and light infantry : I was wounded very early : Gen. Burgoyne brought up the British line to support me, and formed at the first opening of the wood : Gen. Frazer's corps arrived precisely in time to occupy the heights on the right of the British line when the action begun, and sent two companies of light infantry to my support : as soon as the 9th regiment came out of the wood, they filed to the right, at a small distance from the left of Gen. Frazer's corps, with orders to occupy two houses, one company in each, and defend them to the last extremity. The 21st and 62d on our left were attacked about 3 o'clock ; at the same time a great deal of firing to my right with the advanced corps : an officer informed Gen. Burgoyne the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the 62d ; on which the 20th was formed on their left. Some light infantry coming then to occupy the ground of the 9th ; it was ordered behind a deep ravine, as a corps de reserve : I saw nothing after that. Before the action, the 9th regiment was 250 and odd, rank and file fit for duty. The four regiments about 1100, and the advanced corps under Gen. Frazer 1200. The 24th regiment was with the advanced corps ; six companies of the 47th guarding the batteaux and provisions ; two with the advanced corps ; one company at fort George, and another in an island in lake George. *Quest.* How many of the 1100 of the line were killed and disabled in the action ? *Ans.* I heard the surgeon say, there were more than 500 of the whole in the hospital ; I can't say how many were killed. From my wounds I did not join the regiment till the 8th of October, but several officers said from the loss that day, it would have been imprudent to have attacked an enemy in intrenchments after the action. Being in the hospital I know several men recovered so as to do duty the 7th of October. We got back to Saratoga at 8 at night of the 9th. The troops had been under arms, without repose or regular refreshment from the 7th in the morning : there was a great deal of firing in the rear, and we constantly looked for an attack. The battery on the other side of the river at Saratoga commanded the ford : the ground on our side would not have enabled our artillery to silence that battery. Could we have passed that ford, yet on our march to fort Edward we must have passed Battenkill ford, which could not be done without artillery to cover us, the enemy being posted on the other side ; the

Action at
Fort Anne
July 8th.

Half the
British line
killed or
wounded
Sept. 19.

20th regiment without an enemy to oppose them, took a considerable time to pass that ford, owing to the depth of the water, rapidity of the current, and the stones so slippery that several men fell into the river. At the councils of war Gen. Burgoyne mentioned his readiness to undertake any measure they should think for the honour of the British arms. The council was unanimous to treat; Gen. Gates's first terms were unanimously rejected; when it was decided by the majority that the treaty could not be suspended without a breach of public faith, it was unanimously signed.

Examined by other Members, and by Gen. Burgoyne occasionally.

I do not know the rebel camp was completely intrenched September the 19th; I understood they completed it afterwards. Did not hear they received considerable reinforcements between the 19th of September and October 7th. I can't say how many of the 500 wounded joined the army. The army could have defended themselves longer at Saratoga had they had more provisions. After the action September 19th, had I known of Sir Henry Clinton's letter mentioning attacking the Highlands, I should not have thought either a retreat or immediate attack adviseable. We expected a co-operation from Sir William Howe on the North river. I think if Sir William Howe had operated on the North river, instead of going to Philadelphia by Chesapeak, Gen. Burgoyne's army would not have been made prisoners. I did not expect great opposition, after taking Ticonderoga. A co-operation was generally talked of in the army; but not by authority till early in October. Had Sir Henry Clinton's operations on the North river taken place in time, they might have been attended with very good consequences; good effects have accrued from powerful diversions. *Quest.* What effect had it on the spirits of Gen. Burgoyne's army when they found there was to be no co-operation between them and the army of Sir William Howe? *Ans.* We never knew but there was to be a co-operation.

Had Gen. Howe co-operated, Gen. Burgoyne had been saved.

CAPTAIN BLOOMFIELD

Of the Artillery.

Called in and Examined by General Burgoyne.

I Was Major of Brigade of the Royal Artillery. In 1776 Gen. Phillips recommended to demand a farther supply of artillery and stores for equipping gun boats, and for the boats to be sent out in frame work. Sir Guy Carleton approved of the stores and artillery, but disapproved of the boats being sent out. I lived chiefly with Gen. Phillips: I have no doubt but he must have determined the proportion of artillery. The light brigade went by Skenefborough, the park brigade and stores by lake George. The heaviest artillery was left behind. Left at Ticonderoga, 6 heavy twelve-pounders, 1 light ditto, 4 light three's, 4 royal mortars and 12 cohorns. Left on board the Royal George; 2 heavy twenty-fours, 2 thirteen-inch mortars, 2 ten-inch, 4 eight-inch, 5 royal mortars, and 8 cohorns. Sent back to St. John's in the Radeau, 14 heavy twenty-fours, 2 eight-inch howitzers. Left at fort George, 4 medium twelves, 2 light fixes, 2 eight-inch and 2 royal howitzers.

Artillery specified

With

With Col. St. Leger, 2 light sixes, 2 light threes, and 4 cohorns. Left at St. John's, 4 light sixes, 5 light threes, and 4 cohorn mortars. The quantity brought forward with the army were, 4 medium twelve-pounders, 2 light twenty-fours, 18 light sixes, 6 light threes, 2 eighteen-inch howitzers, 4 royal howitzers, 2 eight-inch mortars, and 4 royal mortars. All these were properly field artillery; heavy artillery is of a distinct nature, and much heavier than the guns of the same calibre which we had in the army. Our light field artillery did not exceed the usual proportion. The use, to dislodge the enemy from such posts as every where present themselves in that country, and from which it may be impossible to dislodge them without heavier artillery than six-pounders. Necessity
for heavy
artillery. The position at Schuyler's island, the passages of Hudson's river and Battenkill, the position at the Forks of the Mohawk river, had they been defended, would have required the park of artillery: had the army reached Albany, and encamped there for the winter, there can be no doubt that heavy artillery would have been necessary. Howitzers and small mortars are of infinite service against log work abbaties, and against intrenchments: small mortars particularly against redoubts, and where the enemy are within a small space. I do not conceive the transport of artillery interfered with that of the provisions. To bring the artillery from fort George to the bridge over the Hudson, required no more time than was necessary for the carriages themselves to pass that distance. Before October 7th had the army moved to gain the enemy's left, without previously constructing redoubts on the heights that commanded the plain, the bateaux, provisions, and hospital, would have been left open to attack from the enemy's right; the largest guns we had were exactly adapted to that service. October 7th the artillery was posted on a cleared spot surrounded by woods, the skirts of which, on our left, where the attack first began, was distant about 200 yards: Battle Oa.
7th. The 2 medium twelve-pounders were on a small eminence near the center of this cleared spot, between the German picquets and a detachment of the Hesse Hanau regiment: on the enemy's column approaching, the fire of the twelve-pounders and 4 sixes was directed to it, notwithstanding which they drew up behind the trees, along the skirts of the wood, and after driving in the Germans, kept a warm fire of musquetry on the guns and troops posted about them: Soon after I heard a firing on the right, towards a cleared spot, separated from us by a wood, on which the light infantry were posted on very commanding ground: on their retreating, as also the 24th regiment, who were in the wood on our right, the enemy appeared on an eminence on our right, and cut off the retreat of the artillery: at this moment, about 20 minutes after the action commenced, I was wounded, and can give no farther account of that day's action.

Examined by other Members. The horses attached to the British artillery before passing the Hudson were about 400. Eighteen 6-pounders at 4 horses each, 6 threes at 3 horses each, 2 royal howitzers at 3 each; remainder for park artillery, ammunition and stores. After passing fort Edward our oats did not load a waggon; we were obliged to collect forage in the neighbourhood of the encampment. The park of artillery remained at fort Edward no longer

ger than necessary ; it would have answered no end to have moved before the bridge was thrown over Hudson's river. If the heavy park artillery had not attended the army, it would have made a difference of 237 horses, but I cannot answer whether the army was furnished with carts to have employed those 237 horses.

LIEUT. COL. KINGSTON.

Called in and Examined by Gen. Burgoyne. June 3d, 1779.

Artillery
settled be-
tween Gen.
Carleton &
Phillips.

I Served as adjutant-general under Gen. Burgoyne, and also as secretary. I looked on myself as in the entire confidence of the general. No order from Gen. Burgoyne for any augmentation of the artillery went thro' me, nor did I ever hear of any such order being given. I believe Gen. Burgoyne had the greatest confidence in the knowledge and abilities of Gen. Phillips, and that the proportion of artillery had been arranged between General Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, at the time the latter expected to command the expedition. As to the incumbrances of the baggage, General Burgoyne issued orders, May 30th, 1777, at Montreal, for the regiments to leave behind, their blanket coats, legging, and all baggage that could be spared in summer ; and that the officers should not encumber the service with more baggage than might be absolutely necessary for a campaign, where the movements were expected to be sudden and alert. July 12th, orders were again issued at Skeensborough, "that the injunction respecting officers baggage not having been complied with, warning is now given to send back by the batteaux all baggage not indispensably necessary ; or upon the first sudden movement, it must inevitably be left upon the ground." July 18th, Gen. Burgoyne wrote to Gen. Reidesfel that the baggage of the British officers was already sent back ; and that many of them had only retained a small tent and one cloak bag ; and pressed Gen. Reidesfel to take measures that the order might have due force. As to horses, Gen. Phillips applied to Gen. Burgoyne June 4th, at Montreal, for horses for the ammunition carriages and field artillery, stating that as on the strictest information none were to be had on the route nearer than Albany, and even when there it would require time to get them ; that if Canada was not to furnish them upon corvees, there were but two modes of procuring them ; one by purchasing, the other by contract ; the first was difficult, uncertain, and liable to great imposition, and the expence uncertain ; that he had seen this mode attempted and fail : that the contracting for them, was a more simple and certain plan.

Number of
carriages
and horses.

The commissary-general's calculation of horses and carriages for conveying 30 days provisions for 10,000 men was, 1125 carts, 2 horses to a cart, in all for carts 2250 horses ; allowing 3 lb. to the ration, and 800 lb. to the cart load. Gen. Burgoyne's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, July 7th 1777, required only 500 carts with 2 horses each, and states this requisition as much below what would be adequate to the service, and would barely carry 14 days provisions ; Gen. Phillips demanded 400 horses for the artillery ; and even then there remained unprovided for, the transport of batteaux from lake

George

George to Hudson's river, the carriage of the tents of the army, and many other contingencies.

July 1st, strength of regular troops at the highest, at the opening of the campaign, rank and file, fit for duty; British 3576, Germans 2919, total 6495. British artillery 257, German 100, recruits 154, total 511. Canadians 148; Provincials 83, but they increased afterwards; Indians between 3 and 400. September 3d, additional companies joined the British, about 300 men; but from killed and wounded, and the garrison left at Ticonderoga, the army was at no time equal to its first number. Garrison of Ticonderoga, 462 British, rank and file; 448 Germans, in all 910. Gen. Reidesel was detached towards Castletown, to protect our wounded at Huberton, to alarm Connecticut, and to encourage the loyal inhabitants. Gen. Burgoyne's letters to Gen. Harvey are explanatory of the motives on which he acted.

First Letter, dated *Montreal, May 19th, 1777*. "I have reason to be satisfied with all that has been done, and with most things that are doing. The preparations under the direction of Gen. Phillips have been executed with a diligence, precision, and foresight, that entitle him to the fullest praise. I shall give all possible jealousy on the side of Connecticut, to make their forces cautious of leaving their own frontiers, but I shall make no movement that can procrastinate my progress to Albany. I had the mortification to find the whole design of the campaign handed about at Montreal, almost as accurately as if copied from the Secretary of State's letter. By me not a man has been let into the secret. Sir Guy Carleton I am confident has been equally secret. I am led to doubt this imprudence has been committed from private letters from England; and wish you would ask my friend d'Oyley*, who he can suspect to be so unguarded; it is not of great consequence except as to St. Leger's expedition; but such a trick may be most prejudicial in other cases, and should be guarded against."

Gen. Burgoyne's letters to Gen. Harvey.

Second Letter, dated *Camp on the Bouquet, near Lake Champlain, June 22d*, enumerates the difficulties that impeded their progress; and among others, the inactivity, and sometimes disobedience of the Canadians.

Third Letter, dated *Skeensborough, July 11th*, on the local rank of the lieutenant colonels; contract for horses and carriages; embarrassments, &c. and the inactivity and desertion of the Canadian corvee.

The army in marching by Skeensborough was a head of the provisions, which went by lake George. On the first arrival at fort Edward, and previous to the roads being mended, little more provision arrived than for immediate consumption. I never saw an officer more attentive to his duty than Sir Francis Clarke, he was always exceedingly accurate, (produces Sir Francis's memorandum

N

book,

This piece of treachery might spring from opposition. To ruin an expedition furnished them with that favourite topic of their declamation, the incapacity of Ministers. Mr. d'Oyley soon resigned.

book, and reads) "August 5th, victualling out this day; from "difficulties of roads and transports no provisions came in this "night. August 6th, at 10 this morning not quite enough arrived for the consumption of two days." All intelligence agreed that there were many well affected inhabitants towards Bennington. The substance of the proposals from Gen. Reidesel to Gen. Burgoyne for the Bennington expedition, was to try the affections of the country; to disconcert the enemy; to mount the Reidesel dragoons; to complete Peters's corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses and carriages. [*The original rough draft delivered in.*] I shewed the rough draft to Gen. Phillips, we had a long conversation on the slow arrival of provisions; he said he looked on this as a very good idea, that he saw no objection, and asked me if I knew of any. I shewed it also to Gen. Frazer, he desired me to leave it with him, he came early next morning to my tent, and expressed a disapprobation of the Germans being employed in it. I observed to him, that since the honour gained by the advanced corps at Huberton, I believed Gen. Reidesel was desirous of having the Germans employed; and also mentioned our obtaining provisions by it, and thereby getting quicker to Albany, than waiting the slow transport from fort George. I desired him for the friendship he had for Gen. Burgoyne, if he saw any real objection to this plan, to express himself fully and freely to Gen. Burgoyne himself; that the scouts and guides being attached to his (the advanced) corps, he might thro' them know more of the country than I did; I therefore pressed him to mention his objection, if he had any, to Gen. Burgoyne; I think he said, but am not certain, "the Germans are not a very active people, but it may do." I pressed him at parting to go to Gen. Burgoyne, if he thought it would not do. He said no, and went off, Many of our provincials were well acquainted with that country, in particular Capt. Sherwood. I never heard any of them express apprehension of its success: after part of it had taken place, Sir Francis Clarke received favourable accounts from Col. Skeene, who assisted Col. Baum. From the mouth of Battenkill to Bennington, south east about 27 miles. When Col. Breyman was ordered to support Col. Baum, from Sir Francis Clarke's memorandum book, "August "15th, at five this morning, corps de reserve, Col. Breyman, ordered to march. August 16th, in the night an express with an "account of the repulse. Sunday, August 17th, the general with "the 20th regiment advanced on the road to Sancoick, and met "Col. Breyman returning." This was between 1 and 3 o'clock. On St. Leger's expedition. "August 12th, this morning received "intelligence of an action near fort Stanwix." Both before and after this failure very great efforts were made to bring forward provisions. I never heard the march of the artillery interfered with the transport of provisions. September 1st, British fit for duty 2635; Germans 1711; 300 additional joined us the 3d, number of the artillery as before, about 500.

July 11th, 1777, Gen. Burgoyne requested Sir Guy Carleton to garrison Ticonderoga from Canada, lest his effective strength might become inadequate to the services intended. This Sir Guy declined; and Gen. Burgoyne replied, "I must do as well as I can,

Gen. Frazer
against the
Germans
being em-
ployed in
the Ben-
nington ex-
pedition.

“ can, but I am sure your excellency as a soldier will think my situation a little difficult. A breach into my communication must either ruin my army entirely, or oblige me to return to restore it, which might be the loss of the campaign. To prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and fort George must be in respectable strength. I must have posts at fort Edward and other carrying places. These drains, added to common accidents and losses of service, will render me very inferior in numbers to the enemy, whom I must always expect to find strongly posted.”

Baggage guards, care of the sick, boat men, and other contingencies, with the defence of the batteaux and moveable magazines, were such additional drains, that the British line, September 19th, amounted to little more than 1100 men: of these 76 were killed, 240 to 250 wounded, and 28 or 30 missing; loss of the line about 350: I was by Gen. Phillips in the front of the line, when the 20th regiment made the last charge, they were much fatigued, yet they moved on with spirit. After the firing ceased, the 62d regiment did not exceed 50 or 60 men; Col. Anstruther and Major Harnage were both wounded, great many other officers killed and wounded, that regiment suffered greatly. It was not in the power of men to keep up a better fire than the artillery did for several hours; there were 48 with 4 guns; I saw Capt. Jones, a very gallant man who commanded them, killed, and other officers wounded, and I think 36 of the men were killed and wounded. Our loss in all rather more than 500. On the next day, I should have been sorry to have ordered those regiments, after such gallant sufferings, to have attacked an enemy reported four times the number of our whole force: add to this, the country a very thick wood, and we could not reconnoitre the rebel camp in that space of time. On Sept. 22d, a letter from Sir Henry Clinton mentioned his intention of attacking fort Montgomery. I never heard that any officer of any rank entertained a thought of attacking the enemy again at that time. Some very confidential scouts much under the direction of Gen. Frazer, were of opinion, from a bridge the rebels laid over the Hudson, that Mr. Gates on the approach of Gen. Clinton would pass the river and go towards New England. I lived intimately with Gens. Frazer and Phillips, and Mr. Twiss the engineer, but I never heard any officer express an idea of retreating after the action of 19th Sept. or a disapprobation of our remaining in that camp without either attacking or retreating. The right of the enemy too strong to be attacked with any prospect of success. Scarce a day passed without consultations between Gens. Burgoyne Phillips and Frazer; and no day I believe after the action of the 19th Sept. The movement Oct. 7th, was to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's left, and if expedient to attack them there. The force left in the camp under Brigadier Gen. Hamilton was not more than sufficient to keep the enemy in check. I think I must have heard had there been any difference of opinion between Gens. Burgoyne and Frazer: Gen. Frazer only expressed a difference of opinion in employing the Germans at Bennington; he was pleased with the manner in which the troops passed Hudson's river. On the 7th Oct. Gens. Phillips and Reidesel exerted themselves very much to form the broken troops, and to make the retreat as regu-

July 11th,
Gen. Burgoyne's de-
spairing
letter.

After acri-
on Sept. 19,
62d regt.
only 62
men.

No idea of
retreating
between
Sept. 19, &
Oct. 7.

Affecting
fight at G.
Frazer's fu-
neral.

lar as possible. After the retreat was become general, Sir Francis Clarke asked me if I had ordered the artillery to retreat; I said I would not take that upon me, as there was a major general of artillery in the field, confessed to be a very excellent officer. Sir Francis told me he was going from Gen. Burgoyne to bring off the artillery. About the instant of parting a very heavy fire came from the enemy, and I have since reason to believe that Sir Francis at that time received his wound. On the 8th the enemy formed a line in the meadows, and made a demonstration of attacking us, they cannonaded us very much. That afternoon, I shall never forget their cannonading during Gen. Frazer's funeral: he had desired to be buried privately in one of the redoubts. Gens. Burgoyne, Phillips, Reidesel, and other officers out of respect to his memory, and to honour him in the eyes of the army, contrary to his request, attended his funeral: the enemy were in this instance very defective in humanity: they kept up a cannonade on the redoubt during the whole funeral service, which was performed with great solemnity and deliberation by Mr. Brudenel the chaplain.—I never saw so affecting a sight. On our arrival at Saratoga, Lieut. Col. Sutherland was detached to repair bridges and roads, that we might continue our retreat on the west side of the river, but was recalled on the enemy preparing to attack us in great force. The attack was suspected under cover of a thick fog then prevailing: after the convention a rebel general informed me that on receiving information that they would be very much exposed to our artillery when they came on the plain, he retreated and sent notice to another general, though his senior to retreat also; and that Gen. Gates approved and confirmed his orders. Previous to the council of war, the generals had determined to try a night march, abandoning the carriages and baggage, and orders were given to deliver as much provision as the men could carry; but from difficulties in getting out the provisions, it could not be accomplished; and we had intelligence the next day that the enemy possessed both sides of the Hudson between us and fort Edward in force: 1500 men were posted on the east side of Hudson's river to dispute the ford; 2000 between us and fort Edward on the same side the river; and 1400 more also opposite Saratoga a little above the first party; all of them were posted previous to the action of the 7th Oct. In answer to a message from Gen. Burgoyne, Gen. Gates gave a solemn affirmation on his honour, that he had made no detachment during the treaty. Gen. Burgoyne put the question to the council of war, if the treaty in its present situation was binding on the army, or his honour engaged in signing it? they were of opinion it was. Gen. Burgoyne was clear he was not bound; but among others, was compelled to yield on the following considerations: that relief from Gen. Clinton was improbable while their provisions could be made to last; *blank* declares his post untenable, and if convention is not signed apprehends considerable desertion; *blank* thinks 47th not to be depended on; *blank* is of the same opinion; *blank* thinks 62d disheartened by the situation of their post, and not equal to their former exertions;—several officers think the men in general desirous of the convention;—many of the best officers absent by sickness and wounds from all the corps;—though the other officers at the head of the British think they can

Gen. Bur-
goyne for
breaking off
the treaty.

answer

answer for their men if attacked on their present ground, it is evident they do not think any part of the army in that elevation of spirits necessary for desperate enterprizes;—to break off the treaty now, renders a renewal hopeless, as our condition must every hour grow worse;—a defeat would be fatal;—a victory would not save us, having neither provisions to advance nor retreat against an enemy, who by experience we know are capable of rallying at every advantageous post;—and that the life and property of every provincial and dependant on this army, depends on the execution of the treaty.

I apprehend when the officer said the 47th was not to be depended on, he meant they were so low and weak they were not capable of vigorous exertions, but nothing that implied a want of spirit to endure as much as they were able. I never heard of a proposal of Gen. Phillips to make a way with a body of troops to Ticonderoga; but I heard him make an offer, which I thought a spirited one, to risk attempting a passage with one or two of our best guides to defend that fortress. Return of Gen. Gates's army signed by himself, 12 brigadiers, 44 colonels, 45 lieutenant colonels, 49 majors, 344 captains, 332 first lieutenants, 326 second lieutenants, 345 ensigns, 5 chaplains, 42 adjutants, 44 quarter masters, 30 paymasters, 37 surgeons, 43 mates, 1392 serjeants, 636 drums and fifes, 13216 present fit for duty, 662 sick present, 731 sick absent, 3875 on command, 180 on furlough, total, 18,624. The brigadiers were Nixon, Poor, Learned, Glover, Paterson, Warner, Stark, Bailey, Whipple, Brickett, Fellows, Woolcut. Besides the above there were the upper staff of the army, batteaux men, artificers, and camp followers. The men on command were on the rear and flanks of the King's troops. At signing the convention, British present and under arms 1905. Germans 1594, in all 3501. Nov. 1st fit for duty, British 2086, Germans 1633, rank and file in all 3719; the difference arises from people recovered, and perhaps a mistake in the first account taken. Not a shilling of the military chest that I heard of fell into the hands of the enemy. I kept the secret service account; Gen. Burgoyne never appropriated any part to his own use; he paid out of his own purse, expences that ought to have been charged to the public; such as presents to people who distinguished themselves, acts of charity to women who had lost their husbands, and on other occasions; he was subject to all the expences attending a commander in chief, with only the appointments of a lieutenant general; and I believe his appointments were not equal to his expences.

Examined by other Members, and by Gen. Burgoyne occasionally. The returns of British and Germans are rank and file; provincials at first 83, on Sept. 1st, 680, we had not arms for them all. *Quest.* What allowance of waggons to a regiment? *Ans.* I do not recollect any waggons we had to allow. Regimental baggage was carried chiefly in batteaux. The quarter master general knows more of the baggage than the adjutant general. I had not much leisure to pay attention to the ladies; I know very little of their beauty or their numbers. *Quest.* Would not 2000 women be a considerable object with respect to provisions? *Ans.* I should have been sorry to have had 2000. *Quest.* How many were there? *Ans.* I cannot

His reasons
for acquies-
cing.

Rebel army
18,624.

British ar-
my, 3719.

not give a tolerable guess; by the commissary of provisions return, very few were victualled from the stores. The dragoons if mounted might have been applied to very useful services. The contract for horses was for bringing forward provisions and artillery; the contractors never meant them for dragoon service. If any party did make its way back to Canada, it is likely to have been a party of provincials who run away when repairing roads; our guides said if we attempted it we must break into small parties and go by Indian paths. The commissary told me the provincial women were supplied from the men's rations. I never heard the women were any impediment. I never heard a doubt of our reaching Albany, meaning soon after taking Ticonderoga; the army was well provided. If a junction with Gen. Howe could have been formed, I am of opinion the misfortune at Saratoga would not have happened. If the expedition under Gen. Vaughan could have come up the Hudson about the action Sept. 19th, Mr. Gates would hardly have kept his army together without he had returned to New England.

Ques. If the troops under Gen. Vaughan would have had so powerful an effect, even so late as September, What effect do you suppose the whole army under Sir William Howe, assisted by all the fleet and craft, would have had as early as the beginning of July, immediately after the impression which took place among the enemy after the defeat at Ticonderoga? *Ans.* Most certainly a great army upon Hudson's river near Albany would have contributed very much to our making our way to Albany. I looked upon our force not to be equal to forcing our way to Albany without some co-operation. I had no where to expect it but up the Hudson's river from New York. Col. St. Leger's success would have been of use. Mr. Gates, we had been old acquaintances formerly, when the King's troops went by with accoutrements on, asked me if it was not customary on field days for arms and accoutrements to go together? I told him there was nothing in the convention relating to accoutrements. He replied, "you are perfectly right:" and turning to some of their officers said, "if we meant to have had them, "we ought to have inserted them in the convention."

If G. Howe had co-operated, they must have been saved.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN'S Speech,
Giving a Sketch of the Evidence to be produced by Administration.

June 8th, 1779.

LORD George Germain rose and opened the evidence in favour of administration. He said his object was by no means to accuse any gentleman; but to defend the ministry from the reflections thrown out against them. He trusted that when gentlemen considered Gen. Grey had been only one year and five months in America; that he had seen no more of the country than what lies between the head of the Elk and Philadelphia; and between that city and New York; they would be of opinion, however high he stood in his military character, that he had certainly formed a very light and hasty judgment of the unanimity of America; especially when the evidence to be produced should prove, that a very considerable part, if not a majority of Americans, were friends to Great

Great Britain ; that this would appear the more striking, when the Committee should find, that there were actually regimented in our service, more Americans than were to be found at present under the rebel commander in chief. That farther lights would be thrown on that point, by proofs, that we can raise men in America for five or six dollars each, while the Congress could not get them under 266 ; and by the last dispatches he had received, the Congress bounty for recruits amounted to £. 75 sterling a man. Presumptive evidence should be brought to prove the disaffection of the Americans to their new government, from the circumstance of Congress voting 50,000 men, yet they never had been able to muster more than 20,000 in one army. As to the adequacy of the force sent out, his lordship had no doubt about it ; in his opinion it had been adequate, not to the reduction of America united against us, but divided as they were, to the reduction of the rebellion. He repeated again, that he did not understand the object of the southern expedition by the capes of Virginia. If the general had landed at Newcastle in the Delaware, and had his favourite route to Philadelphia been by the head of the Elk, he would have had a fine short road to Philadelphia ; the general's reason for not landing there, *that the enemy was in force at Wilmington*, he should prove to be *chimerical* ; for he should demonstrate to the Committee, that there was no enemy in force within fourcore miles of Newcastle ; so that Sir Andrew Snape Hammond must have been misinformed at least with respect to the land force. His lordship also observed on Sir William Howe's not having made a diversion in the Massachusetts ; for that purpose he certainly could have spared 3000 men ; for he required only 11,000 for his southern expedition, yet had full 14,000 at the battle of Brandywine, while Washington had no more than 10,000. Sir William indeed had said, and said truly, that the rebel army consisted of 15,000, but in these were included the drivers, sutlers, and followers of the camp, and he had evidence who could prove to a man, that the number of fighting men in Washington's army in that battle, amounted to no more than 10,000. If a diversion had been made in the Massachusetts, Gen. Gates never would have been able to have mustered the army with which he had forced Gen. Burgoyne to surrender. With regard to the northern expedition, he thought it highly justifiable from the nature of the service which made the French undertake quite a similar one in the last war ; and as to its practicability, the general himself in whose hands it failed, had never entertained a doubt about it until the unfortunate affair at Bennington, from which he dated all the disasters that befel our northern army. Every post where opposition could be expected had been taken ; but the enemy by our delays in bringing up immense trains of artillery, and a great suite of provision carriages, was suffered to grow stronger ; for when Gates went to take the command of the rebel army, it consisted of no more than 2,500 men ; but by our delays it was suffered to increase to 18,000. That his lordship had summoned Gen. Robertson to the bar, whose long residence in America, upwards as he understood of 24 years, whose high and deserved rank in the service, and presence on the spot when the rebellion broke out, furnished him with every reason to expect that his evidence would be

Rebels at
Brandy-
wine only
10,000,
Howe
14,000.

Great cha-
racter of
Gen. Ro-
bertson.

accurate

accurate and important; and that he was in every respect, from his long experience and local residence enabled to give the most satisfactory information to the Committee.

MAJOR GEN. ROBERTSON.

Called in and examined by Lord George Germain.

I HAVE served about 24 years in America, as quarter master general, brigadier, and major general. I have had frequent opportunities of mixing with, and learning the political sentiments of the inhabitants, and believe that the few artful men who brought about the declaration of independence, were the only people who rejoiced at it. Even after that declaration, when Lord and Gen. Howe arrived at Staten island, the people cherished the thoughts of a reconciliation; and Washington's army, on seeing flags of truce passing between the armies, expressed such joy on the occasion, that their commander gave out an order on the 20th of August, assuring the troops that there was no treaty, although he had, only 3 days before sent the proposals of Lord and Gen. Howe to the Congress. From all my enquiries, and from conversation with those best able to give me information, I understand more than two thirds of the people would prefer the King's government to the tyranny of the Congress. If the people of that country who are suffering from acts of friendship to us, were treated by us as enemies, and told they were so, it would naturally cool their friendship, and tend to make them enemies. The armies of the Congress have not filled; they have often threatened, and been obliged to draft their militia. They used every exertion in 1776; but I never heard from good authority of their collecting any army of more than 16,000 men. When Sir William Howe approached the Delaware in Dec. 1776, the rebels under Washington who retreated through the Jerseys, were not above 3000 men. In 1776, the rebel Maryland regiments were well clothed and accoutered; but many of the others were ill clothed and ill armed; and none equal in discipline to the King's troops. In 1776, as to the force necessary for quelling the rebellion, I never heard such a great number of troops wished for, as were actually employed. In the late campaign, the troops did not carry much provision; but in the last war, they generally carried *ten*, sometimes *fourteen*, and on particular occasions *nineteen* days provisions. In New England and the middle colonies cattle very numerous; it would be difficult for the rebels to drive them all away; but the owners would be active in so doing or otherwise, according to the treatment they received from our army: If the cattle were overtaken in one place without the people being paid, you would probably find them scarce in another. When we landed first on Long island we found all the farms stocked, and most of the people living in their houses. In that country, where the people are so much and so warmly divided, it is less difficult to get intelligence than in another; but when we are anxious for information, it is natural to complain; I find Mr. Washington complained he could get no information in the country. In Jersey and Pennsylvania there are strong places; they are very extensive countries, the face very different in different parts;

Rebel army rejoice on a prospect of peace.

In 1776, rebels only 3000.

parts; where not cleared they are covered with wood; much of Jersey has been cleared, and about Philadelphia, the country is all farms as about London, their fences are post and rail, which are not very strong, but easily removed. The theatre of last war was a continued wood, early in the war we reckoned that country very strong, as the Indians and irregulars were most formidable in them. It appears now that order and discipline are not so useful anywhere as in woods; and a corps raised in America and disciplined by an acquaintance of mine, has shewn itself more superior to the rebels in the woods, than our best battalions are to theirs in the open field. One may go a great way and not see so strong a post as where Gen. Wolfe forced his landing near Quebec. Sir William Howe had a considerable share in forcing that post: but I fancy Gen Wolfe himself landed soon. I have already said that corps of ours are far superior to any of the rebel corps in the woods. In New England and the middle colonies there are many roads, but I dont apprehend that woods ever prevent an army marching in as many columns as they please. On a proclamation being issued for the inhabitants to take a declaration of loyalty, numbers came and signed addresses, commending our government, and abusing that of the rebels; these addresses were printed with the people's names at length. We soon left that country: and the rebels took up the signers and banished them, or sent them to the mines. In 1776 in the Jerseys I know of no steps taken to disarm the disaffected; or to arm the well affected, except such as enlisted. I know of no measures that year, to encourage the inhabitants to embody a militia against the rebels. There was much plundering, which lost us friends and gained us enemies. The commander gave repeated orders against it; yet plundering was very frequent. I always considered the great object of the war to be the regaining the people, and to accomplish this by proving to them we were their friends.

Some parties plundered Newtown on Long island. I had them tried; they were sentenced and punished; I sent to the town and desired I might pay the damage. The soldiers were acquainted with this, and never plundered any more. *Quest.* Did you give out the following order? "*Newtown, Long Island, Aug. 31st, 1776.* Brigade orders. Major Gen. Robertson responsible for the actions of those he commands, takes upon himself the expense of satisfying the people of the village, for the depredations committed upon them by part of the first brigade last evening. Without first doing this piece of justice, he could not have presumed to intercede for pardon to those, a Court Martial has condemned. He hopes for the future the troops will abstain from a crime, which disgraces even victory, and defeats the King's intentions to protect and reclaim his American subjects." *Ans.* Yes. The provincial troops in our armies are a pretty good body of men, usefully disciplined, and have always shown spirit enough. A recruit had 5 dollars, or 22 *sh.* 6 *d.* The Congress gave £.100 currency, or £. 56 : 5 :—Number of our provincials about 5 or 6000. Our success in the country depends on our having the people, whether as provincials, or militia, or as inhabitants armed in their own defence; every means taken to encourage them is good policy. Congress voted for 1777, 85 or 86

American
fences weakOur impru-
dence in
printing
addresses.Excellent
Brigade
orders.

battalions, 500 men each : I heard they never got half. Our force in 1777 was 52,815. of these 40,874 were under Sir William Howe. In August the troops with Sir William Howe were 15,834 fit for duty ; at New York with Gen. Clinton, 10,879 ; at Rhode Island. 3,453. It was a force that could beat any the rebels could bring against it. I have been always of that opinion. I am well acquainted with Hudson's river and the country on each side of it, I lived long in the neighbourhood of that river. By letters on the table, Gen. Gage, and those he consulted with, (that is Gens. Howe, Clinton and Burgoyne) on his leaving the command acquainted Lord Dartmouth, that they thought opening a communication between Canada and New York, by taking possession of the Hudson, the best of all plans ; that made me think the better of my own opinion on that subject. I am clear that the force of our whole army was equal to have possessed the North river. I conversed with many officers on the subject of the expedition to Philadelphia by Chesapeake bay. Many of them feared Gen. Burgoyne's army would be lost if not supported. I wrote myself to a gentleman in the House, (Sir William Howe) that if Gen. Burgoyne extricated himself from the difficulties that he was surrounded with, future ages would have little occasion to talk of Hannibal. Gen. Howe's voyage to the southward was a diversion, but could not be the most powerful ; a movement to Albany would have been a much more powerful diversion. Had a corps been sent by sea to alarm New England, it would have kept their militia at home. At that time I was going to America with 1700 men, if the winds had carried us to that coast, I thought that such an appearance, and burning a few barns, would have brought back the New England army. As an instance, when a large body of rebels were marching to support fort Washington, a fleet of Dutch transports sailed from the Hook, on which the rebels were afraid for Philadelphia, and these troops were countermanded. If a communication by the North river had been established with Canada, we certainly could have raised provincial corps along the river ; I think the inhabitants favourably disposed ; and the loyalists might have been armed instead of the rebels ; many would have taken arms for the King ; last war we got all our provisions in that country, except pork. The Highlands in our possession, Hudson's river would have afforded means of sending our army within 6 miles of Albany without much interruption.

Examined by other Members. My employment led me to be informed of the resources of the country in different parts of it, and of the nature of those resources. Hudson's river actually divides the northern from the southern provinces ; the northern produce cattle which are wanted in the southern, and they again wheat which is wanted in the northern ; our possessing that river would almost cut off all communication between them. It is a great object, and would greatly distress them. Last war our army passed from New York to Albany, 170 miles, in two days, by means of that river. Near Albany bodies of Indians fired on us. I know that a ship loaded sails from London bridge to within 6 miles of Albany. A frigate may go within 30 or 40 miles of Albany. The road is generally close to the river side, and no where above 5 or 6 miles distant,

Possessing
the Hudson
first proposed
by Howe
&c.

An army
can go from
New York
to Albany
in two days.

tant. The command of water and a fleet, must give forces a decisive advantage. Any army may be transported with great ease from one side to the other in any part of it. If I could give any information to the House on the possessing Hudson's river, and the lakes George and Champlain, *it might be useful to the rebels.* *Quest.* How do you imagine the rebels would hear it? *Ans.* They have heard so much I imagine they would hear that. *Quest.* Do you think the rebels have a friend in this House? *Ans.* *I hope not.* This is not a place to consider whether it is a practicable measure to establish and maintain a general military command in America. The loyal people dare not appear without protection. Our plans should be agreeable to our force; and we should not make detachments where they are subject to be cut off.

Examined by Sir William Howe. Since the rebellion began I have been with the army, but I have seen prisoners and persons from the rebel country. As to communication with the country, if I had any, this would not be a place to tell it in. A man, who I think the most knowing of any in the country, assured me before the rebellion began, that the principle of independence was hardly known, and that he only knew one man of that opinion. There might be rejoicings in the rebel army on the act of independency, and possibly *by order*, but I don't take a *feu de joye* to be a proof of people's inclinations. As quarter-master general, the quartering troops in private families, was a trying point for people's tempers, and gave me occasion to observe that the people were very loyal: that they had a reverence and affection for this country, and were more jealous of each other than of Britons; and all my information since has confirmed me, that the wish for independence was not general. Rebel officers informed me that in all at New York and Long island they were 16,000, (in summer 1776); end of 1776, the army with Washington on the Delaware, only 3000. In the conversation almost of every day and every meal, among the officers, of the force necessary for quelling the rebellion, it was said an officer (Lord Amherst) had refused the command; and to do it with a good grace, had demanded 20,000 men; that demand was thought to be rather extravagant. *Quest.* Can you name any general officer you conversed with on that subject, after Gen. Gage left America? *Ans.* *After that a wish would have been unnecessary, because the troops came.* The army that came from Halifax to Staten island might be 6000 men, rank and file. I gave Sir William Howe my reasons against landing on Long island at that time; because the rebels were intrenched and in force on Long island; we had no carriages; the soldiers must have carried every thing we wanted; and every day an army from Europe was expected. The ten days provisions carried by the soldiers last war was generally flour and pork; they carried it in a pack on their backs; *there are many gentlemen present who have often carried such packs.* *Quest.* Did they carry ten days provision when they expected to meet an enemy? *Ans.* *Very often;* our army against fort Pitt marched 4 or 500 miles in that manner; ten days provision was the common quantity they carried. *Quest.* Do you know the weight of ten days provisions? *Ans.* Yes, 10lb. and 40 ounces. We found a great number of cattle on Long island; when they were taken by the

Affection of the Americans to Britain.

Last war the army carried 10 days provisions 4 or 500 miles on their backs.

Jersey a
cleared and
practicable
country.

On carry-
ing an ar-
my to Al-
bany.

general's orders, I dare say he directed payment, but many were taken he could know nothing of. The inhabitants might be frightened out of Utrecht for any thing I know; but I found numbers in Gravesend and Flat bush. I never heard Gen. Howe discouraged bringing intelligence. I consider every country I go through with a military eye; a good deal of Jersey is cleared land; the parts near the coasts and the roads are very practicable; sometimes a strong place: but it is 3 or 400 miles in extent. The inland is mountainous. On the North river the road through the Highlands, for about 12 miles is very strong; the rest from New York to Albany not remarkably so; the country is a good deal settled; I do not remember any considerable rivers; the road I have said is only 5 or 6 miles from the river; with a fleet transporting our superior army, carriages, artillery and stores, we might turn, harafs, and have great advantages over an army who had no such conveniencies. *Quest.* Would you have advised the army going by water and not by land up Hudson's river? *Ans.* Certainly by water, and by land when you pleased. *Quest.* Would you advise an army to be landed in the face of an enemy? *Ans.* With our fleet we may go to Albany in two days; but it would take the rebels twelve; so we might land out of their reach whenever we pleased. We always carried 100 men in an Albany sloop of 70 tons. We must first have driven the enemy from the Highlands. If the rebels had attempted to unite their northern and southern armies, the force they could have brought together, would have been far inferior to our two separate armies. The transport of provision for such numbers is beyond the rebel powers. Washington's army, I believe, was troops mostly from southern provinces; he would not have brought the same number to Hudson's river, as the country could not have found subsistence for them; he had not provisions and magazines on that route. Washington's mode of supply was very precarious; sometimes he had not 48 hours provisions. The 10th and 15th of July 1777, I fancy he was at Morris town. *Quest.* Can artillery march through woods in columns? *Ans.* There must be a road made for artillery. *Quest.* Mark out any part of the country where the army in different columns could march, and keep up a communication with each other? *Ans.* Wherever there is not a pass or a single bridge to go over. *Quest.* Dont you think woods an impediment to marching in columns? *Ans.* If an army, marching towards the enemy, wanted to form soon, it would march in as many columns as it could, though in a wood. *Quest.* Were the male inhabitants found in their dwellings where the army marched or were they deserted? *Ans.* If it was heard the people who staid in their houses had been ill-treated, the others would probably be deserted. In Utrecht, Gravesend and Flat bush, I know the disposition of the inhabitants; I found them in the places I went to; if any ran away, it was through fear, not disaffection; I know it was Gen. Howe's wish to protect them. *Quest.* What addresses did you allude to, when you said the names were printed at length to them, which occasioned many to be taken up and condemned to the mines? *Ans.* The addresses were from part of New York province to the governor, and were printed in the York paper, a day or two before we left that part of the country.

June 9th. Examined by several Members. I was in Philadelphia 14 days in 1778 till the town was evacuated; in 1777, hearing the rebels meant to attack Gen Clinton, I went to join him in the Jerseys. I had many occasions of conversing with persons resident under the rebels; I was at Boston; I commanded at New York, and no body came in without my questioning them; I took every opportunity, the subject was interesting. I never heard the rebels deserted in corps; but that their militia refused to be drafted, and the rebels brought troops and forced them. A great number of persons, on the defeat of the rebels in Long island declared for government. *Quest.* In what numbers. *Ans.* In New York about 11,000. *Quest.* Was not New York in possession of his Majesty's troops? *Ans.* Yes, we could not else have taken their numbers. *Quest.* Could any magistrate of his Majesty command in Philadelphia, after the army was withdrawn? *Ans.* Surely not. *Quest.* Where was d'Estaing's fleet when we were preparing to abandon Philadelphia? *Ans.* In the western ocean. Soon after we got to New York it was seen off Sandy hook; it seemed to raise the spirits of the navy; the sailors at New York applied to have the honour of going on board Lord Howe's fleet to fight the enemy; I never heard any officer say he should have gone out to fight the enemy, when they lay off Sandy hook. The provincials under Sir Henry Clinton might be 4, 5, or 6000 men; do not think them powerful enough to keep our posts in America, without the assistance of the King's troops; wherever there is a fort, they would make a good defence; but a mixed body creates emulation, and makes the best garrison. *Quest. from Mr. Burke.* How are the Provincial corps composed; are they mostly Americans, or emigrants from various nations in Europe? *Ans.* Some corps mostly natives; the greatest number such as can be got; many may be emigrants; our force similar to the rebels in that circumstance; *Gen. Lee informed me that half the rebel continental army were from Ireland.* As to invading New England, I meant to alarm the coast, rather than distress it; I should have burnt the house that would have made the greatest blaze, and done the least mischief; flew, not force, was wanted for that service; many places offer where I could have effected my purposes, without endangering my retreat. *Quest.* Where were these places? [*This being deemed an improper question, it was negatived.*] *Quest.* Did you think yourself authorized to land on this service, without orders from the ministry or your superior officers in America? *Ans.* I never burnt a house in my life; I have often prevented it; but at that time it would have answered a great end; and as often as I have it in my power to annoy the enemy with effect, I will take the rest upon myself. *Q.* Did the ministers ever consult you on the American operations? *A.* When I had the honour of talking to the Secretary of State, I said that where a minister employed a general in whom he had confidence, he would give him all the force and intelligence he could, and leave him to pursue such plan as would be suggested by circumstances. The minister said I was right; and that he authorized the general to follow his own plans.

The causes of the rebellion are better known to others than to me. The one-third ill-affected became stronger by their arms, and kept

How to
have dis-
lodged the
rebels at
Quibbleton.

kept the others in subjection. It was the general wish not to be taxed. As to the alternative of a separation from Britain or submitting to taxation, *that* involves questions of state, to which I am not competent. The last commissioners made it clear to the world that France made its treaty with Congress, *after* the favourable resolutions of this government were known. When Washington was near Quibbletown or Morris town, his magazines were slender: had our army been posted between him and his provision country, he must have moved; there is a road from Mills town or Hillsborough to the Delaware; had our army taken that route, Washington could not have annoyed them without quitting his strong position, which would have tended to bring on an action. The Delaware with pontoons may be passed at many places within ten miles of Trenton. Our army had pontoons. I told Gen. Harvey that in that woody country, pontoons were easier made there than carried out. Our army then 17,015 men; rebel army some said 8, 9 and some 10,000 men; from Hillsborough to Trenton 22 or 23 miles; from Trenton to Philadelphia 30 miles. I dont know the road from Elk; but I know the road from Trenton well; after passing the Delaware there is a wood of 4 or 5 miles, then the river Neshaminy to pass, the rest of the ground plain and practicable. I know a number of advantages that would have arisen from going up the North river; the advantages from going southward I cannot say. When we evacuated Boston in 1776, great quantities of linen and woollen merchandizes were left behind: the rebels were in great want of those articles; they might have been removed with the army; we took with us all the vessels at the wharfs, that were fit for sea and left the rest; at that time I think Gen. Howe would have done wrong to have gone to New York, the voyage to Halifax was not so long; and at Rhode island we probably should have found no provisions. At Brooklyn, Aug. 27th 1776, a ridge of heights separated us from the rebels; the rebels had possession of these heights; it would have been difficult to have forced them; Gen. Howe by a night march pushed in between these heights and the rebel lines; by this movement we got 2000 prisoners; our troops were going to storm the lines, when Gen. Howe ordered them back. We have since heard these lines were weakly manned, and had only 300 men in them; Putnam having detached all the rest of his 7000 men to the heights; none of us knew this at that time; I did not think storming a proper measure. The rebels fired cannon at us; I dont know how many they had. *Quest.* Did the rebels carry off their heavy cannon; or did they as is said in the gazette, leave them all in their works? [*Gen. Howe and his friends objected to this question.*] At 7 in the morning, I was informed the rebels had evacuated their lines; I dare say it was known earlier at head quarters; their rear guard embarked between 8 and 9; I was ordered to march about 8; distance from the lines to the ferry a mile and a half. *Q.* Had our troops marched at 6 o'clock, might not the rebel rear been cut off? *A.* From our camp to the place where the rebels embarked could not be above an hour's march. *Q.* Could any of the rear guard have embarked and escaped in the face of our troops? *A.* The place of embarkation was disadvantageous to the rebels; it is commanded by heights. If the intelligence had been known at 4 o'clock.

Battle of
Brooklyn.

[*Mon-*

[Montresor proves that it was known at 4 o'clock.] there was time enough to come up with them. *Quest.* Do you not think it was an object at that time to have destroyed as many of the rebel army as possible? *Ans.* At all times. When the rebels abandoned fort Lee they left a good deal of baggage; they halted at Newark 2 or 3 days, and had much baggage and stores at Brunswick; from Newark to Brunswick 26 miles; from Staten island ferry and Amboy to Brunswick about 6 miles; from the ferry at the other end of Staten island to Elizabeth town one mile; Elizabeth town lies on the direct road from Newark to Brunswick; I have often heard that a sufficient corps of troops might have been sent to Brunswick or Elizabeth town to cut them off; even the rebels have published it; they said it would have been a fatal blow to them; the rebels were about 3000, and 2000 of ours might have been sufficient, that number will always beat 3000 of theirs, *Q.* Could 2000 men have been spared? *Ans.* The 4 or 5000 men for Rhode island were still at New York under Gen. Clinton; the 1st brigade (of 4 regiments, his own) were also there; and 7 or 800 men on Staten island.

Might have cut off the rebels in the Jerseys.

June 10th. Examined by several Members. I dont know any men less subject to error than those who conducted last war in America; but I shall never commend any body's conduct in the lump. I have heard mistakes imputed to Gen. Wolfe, and even to Cæsar at the battle of Pharsalia; but examination did them both honour. I served under Gen. Wolfe at Louisbourg, but I never heard him say he was blundering day after day, and must blunder some time longer before he could render any essential service to his country; but this I believe, that errors teach people wisdom. Of the rivers that fall into Hudson's on the eastern side, I said Croton's was not fordable but that I knew of no other but what was fordable; that the Fishkill was almost every where fordable; I have walked over the country about Schuylers patent, and do not even remember the name of the Great Wappinger; rivers near great mountains are subject to torrents; but I know of none that after rains are 100 feet deep as the question supposes. *Q.* Have you not said a ship might go from London bridge within 6 miles of Albany? *Ans.* Yes. *Quest.* What do you mean by a ship? *Ans.* A three-masted vessel! *Quest.* Have you not said that vessels of force may go within 30 or 40 miles of Albany? *Ans.* Yes; and on enquiry have found I have done the river wrong; they can go nearer to Albany. *Quest.* What do you mean by a ship of force? *Ans.* A frigate; any that draws 17 feet water. *Quest.* How near can such a frigate go? *Ans.* Higher up than I spoke of; I was blamed for saying she could not go higher. *Quest.* Who blamed you? *A.* Gentlemen who have lived on that river, and have a partiality for it. *Q.* Did you never hear there are sands and shoals a good many miles below Albany, that make the navigation precarious? *A.* There are two called overslaws; one 12 miles, the other 6 below Albany: the ship I spoke of gets over the first, and takes out part of her cargo before she passes the second. *Quest.* What size are Albany sloops? *Ans.* Seventy tons. *Quest.* Did you never hear of such sloops being a-ground in the summer months? *A.* Bad pilotage if they are. *Q.* Does wood form the only strength of a country? *A.* No;

The North or Hudson's described.

Road to
Philadel-
phia thro'
Jersey not
strong.

The histo-
ry of the
war will
show WHO
WAS TO
BLAME.

A. No ; a country may be strong without wood. *Q.* Is the country from Elizabeth town to Trenton in the Jerseys a strong country ? *A.* The terms *strong* and *weak*, when applied to any country, if it is not compared with other countries as a standard, are *vague terms*. *Q.* Is that country not a strong country for military purposes ? *A.* I know countries stronger, and countries not so strong ; I dont know any particular strength in that route. *Q.* Had Gen. Howe consulted you on the practicability of that route, the rebels being in force in that part, what would you have answered ? *A.* I should have drawn a sketch of the country, pointed out the strong and weak parts of it, and formed a plan how best to avoid any difficulties, and I do not remember any that were impracticable ; for the space of ground as many difficulties might be met with in going to Suffex. *Q.* Did you think some short time before the rebellion, that a *grain of prudence* in the British councils would have prevented that rebellion ? *A.* A military man is not a proper judge of the motives of the King's councils ; I cannot accuse the King's councils with the want of a *grain of prudence*. *Q.* Did you never hold that language ? *A.* *I hope not ; if I did, I did very wrong*. *Q.* Did you hold that language at home or abroad ? *A.* I never said I held such language. *Q.* Did you or not hold it ? *A.* I cannot answer that my words have been discreet on every occasion ; if they have not been so, *I dont come here to confess it*. *Q.* You have said the force in 1776 was adequate to the object of the war ; what were the objects of the war ? *A.* To enable the loyal subjects to shake off the tyranny of the rebels, and return to the King's government. *Q.* Were these objects attained ? *A.* I am sorry to say they were not. *Q.* Whose fault was it ? *A.* I dont pretend to say that. *Q.* *Was no body to blame* ? *A.* *I cant say that neither*. *Q.* Who was to blame ? *A.* *It may be known from a history of the war, and the politics of the country*. *Q.* Was Sir William Howe to blame ? *A.* I am glad to say, I believe Gen Howe never took a measure he did not think for the best ; *when I did not approve of his measures, I dis-trusted my own judgment, and believed I was unacquainted with his motives* ; but I can praise or blame no man's conduct in the lump ; *as far as my capacity extends, I am ready to praise or blame any part of his conduct*. *Q.* Was you in any offensive operation except at Long Island and New York ? *A.* I dont remember I was ; *but give me leave to say, I never omitted an opportunity of being in any other*. *Q.* Did you think the force in 1776 adequate to the subduing the Americans ? *A.* I think the force we had, with the persuasions and other advantages we had to make use of, adequate to enabling the good Americans to subdue the bad ones, adequate to subduing the rebellion. *Q.* Did the ministers never consult an officer of your rank, who had been 24 years in that country, as quarter master general, and general officer ? *A.* I dont remember conversing with a minister above an hour in my life ; I related the greatest part of my conversation with the minister yesterday ; they trusted so much to Gen Howe's experience they needed no advice from me. *Q.* Was our force in 1777 adequate to the subduing the rebellion ? *A.* That is according to the plan that might be adopted ; *it was certainly equal to some plan* ; it was equal to beat any rebel army ; and the choice of situation depended on us. *Q.* From your

your knowledge of the country, was the war likely to be a war of battles or a war of posts? *A.* Even that depends on the way we directed our course. *Q.* Was our force in 1778 adequate? *A.* The arrival of the French fleet prevented our carrying on many offensive operations. *Q.* Is our force for 1779 adequate? *A.* I hope in time it will prove so; but subduing the rebellion depends more on our management than our force; I am not sanguine enough to say that I see where it will end; I hope it will end successfully for us; I hope we may gain the people, by convincing them we dont mean to forsake them; by convincing them we are their friends; and consider a great part of them as ours;—that would be an agreeable way of ending the rebellion:—but to end it by conquest, and to keep that country by arms only, would be burdensome.

Examined by Sir William Howe. I really dont remember the number of cannon taken in the enemy's lines at Brooklyn. I believe Sir William Howe promoted the officers he thought best of. I think arms were given to some inhabitants on Long island and Chester county that were not in the provincial corps. If arms had been given to people throughout the whole country we passed through, many might have made an ill use of them. The place where I first saw the effect of plundering was on Long island, next on York island; I have heard in other places a good deal of plundering was committed. *Q.* Will you explain the degree of plundering within your own knowledge on Long and York island? *A.* When I first landed I found in all the farms poultry and cows, and the farms stocked; when I passed sometime afterwards I found nothing alive; these were some reasons appeared publicly to me; I saw some men hanged for plundering; and I have heard that after Washington took the Hessians at Trenton he restored to the inhabitants 21 waggon loads of plunder, he found among their baggage. I have said Sir William Howe forbid plundering. I believe the Hessians looked on America as an enemy's country; it was natural for them who did not know the people, to think them enemies; *people better informed, too much adopted the notion.* Some officers in Europe would not permit plundering even in an enemies country. I dare say Sir William Howe took the means that occurred to him to prevent it. *Q.* Will you explain what officers you meant, when you said, some-officers perhaps did not take care to prevent it? *A.* The reflection was general; I did not allude to any particular. *Q.* Do you know any particular instance where the orders you allude to were disobeyed? *A.* As often as plundering was committed the order was disobeyed. *Question repeated?* *A.* I can give no other answer. *Q.* Can you say that any officers did not do their duty in preventing plundering, agreeably to the general's orders? *A.* I have no particular accusation against any officer. Sir William Howe took a great deal of pains to raise provincial corps. In 1777 I heard from people who could best inform me, that the rebels did not get half the men they voted. Our army at New York was 37,512, at Halifax 1768, at Florida 1594, in all 40,874, these were the totals, including sick; the returns making the number under Sir William Howe 29,478 are those fit for duty only, inclusive of provincials, but exclusive of Halifax and Florida; this return is dated August 1st, 1777. *Q.* How do you make out 40,874; Plundering stated.
P having Desired to accuse individuals.

having stated 15,834 under Sir William Howe, 10,189 under Gen. Clinton, 3,455 at Rhode island, 1760 at Halifax, 1594 at Florida?

A. The one return includes all the sick. *Q.* Do you suppose 8042 were sick at one time, or half of them? *A.* There were sick and

Army under Howe 32,832 fit for duty.

prisoners with the rebels; one is the general return and is 40,874; the other of 32,832 is the major of brigade's return of men fit for duty. *Q.* Did you ever bear that in August 1777, there were 40,000 men victualled, exclusive of the followers of the army?

A. I really cannot say from my own knowledge; but if I was to speak from my own belief, the victualling returns in America would surpass that number, in that part of America where the troops were under Sir William Howe's command. *Q.* You have said that force was equal to the object of the war, as it could beat any force the rebels could produce against it; had you any other reason for that assertion?

A. With a force equal to beat any the rebels could bring against it, with the other advantages I have named, and many I have not named, I think the force adequate. *Q.* What are those advantages you have not named? *A.* One great

Great advantages of Gen. Howe over the rebels.

one was a fleet ready to transport us to such scenes as we chose, with more union and promptitude than the enemy could travel; magazines at our command; every thing necessary that this country could afford

as well as if we had been near our magazines:—these are among the number of advantages:—I need not trouble the House with any more. *Q.* What force could the rebels bring against us where Sir William Howe commanded? *A.* From good authority I never heard they exceeded 16,000 in one place. *Q.* Had Sir William Howe at any one time a larger number than 16,000? *A.* Yes;

when he left Jersey 17,045 men; and the armies at New York were then all at his disposal, and within his reach; he embarked for the southward with 15,000 men, and left with Sir Henry Clinton 10,189. The returns of the 17,000, I had from Major Smith, a major of brigade, and from Major Wemyss, a very exact and intelligent officer. *Q.* How could you in 1777, have disposed of Sir William Howe's force for the possession of Hudson's river?

Gen. Robertson's plan for acting on the North or Hudson's river.

A. After being in possession of the Highlands, I would have embarked the army and gone up the river; New York in that situation would have been secure; a part of the force left with Sir Henry Clinton would then have been at liberty to threaten the coast of New England: I apprehend those two moves would have rendered Gen. Burgoyne secure, and have saved his army; and a junction with Gen. Burgoyne would then have given us possession of all the advantages the North river affords. *Q.* Do you know the force of the rebel army at that time in the Jerseys and province of New York? *A.* I have heard Washington's force was 8, 9, or 10,000 men; and the troops Mr. Gates took the command of 2700. Washington was then in his strong camp near Morris town. *Q.* Do you know what corps of rebels Gen. Sullivan commanded? *A.* I could not be exact in that. *Q.* Do you know what force Putnam had in the Highlands? *A.* After Sir William Howe failed to the southward, Putnam detached two brigades to Gates's army; I have heard he had but few after it. *Q.* Can you under these circumstances be a judge of the defence the enemy could have made in the Highlands? *A.* I have supposed the Highlands in our possession. I would

would

would not have embarked the army for Albany while the rebels were in possession of the Highlands. Q. Then you have *no opinion* to give of the difficulty of getting possession of the Highlands? A. The Highlands *being taken afterwards*, may give us an idea of the force *necessary to take them at that time*; we know what force took them afterwards: had Sir William Howe's plan been fixed to go up the North river, he would probably have taken them earlier in the spring, when they were much weaker. Q. What force had Sir Henry Clinton when he took them? A. *Between two and three thousand men.* Q. What force had the enemy? A. *Three or four hundred men perhaps; but their forts were fully manned.* Q. Suppose the rebels 15,000 men at the beginning of the campaign, would the Highlands have been easily taken? A. I have said that I suppose they would have been taken earlier in the spring, when they were less fortified, than when Sir Henry Clinton took them. Q. Had fort Montgomery a ditch to it? A. Our people found a difficulty in getting through the abbatties; but I never heard of any in getting into the fort when they came near it; our officers found the abbatties very fresh; the defences had been a good deal improved since the spring; from New York to fort Montgomery is 47 or 48 miles.

When I wrote to a Member of this House (Gen. Howe himself) of Gen. Burgoyne's danger, we had had no unfavourable accounts from him; the conclusion I drew was not from any misfortune, but from the situation his army was in; his communication cut off; the rebels being round him, and encreasing every day. Two such movements as I have already described; that is going up the North river, and making a detachment of 2 or 3000 men to the coast of New England, would have prevented the growth of the rebel army; even any appearance on that coast would have kept numbers of their militia at home; a landing, not a possession would have been my aim; as to sea force, I would only have wished for as much as would have protected me against the rebel privateers, and furnished me with boats to land with, and I should have been glad of 16 or 20 flat bottomed boats. The appearance of a fleet creates an alarm; the fear natural to the human mind that every great mischief will fall on yourself, would have operated on the different villages, and called back the militia to their defence. Q. Do you esteem every part of the country equally assailable? A. It is not all equally difficult. Q. How would you establish a communication between Albany and New York? A. A moment's consideration makes me see the impropriety of answering that question; I can only say, I believe that country very favourable to us. Q. Do you know any instance of the people's taking up arms in support of the King's authority? A. People will not take up arms where they do not expect a lasting support. I would not desire them till they could be regularly armed and lastingly supported; possession of the North river and the easy assistance they could receive from New York, might put them in that situation, and then I might expect great numbers to appear for the King's cause and their own. By possession of the North river, our army could have assisted them more readily than Washington's could have annoyed them; and if in such a contest, an action could have been brought on, our army possessed of a fleet would have had decisive advantages. One year I remem-

And for alarming the coast of N. England.

ber the river was never shut ; most years the Albany floops are laid up from the middle of November to the 10th of March ; but the inhabitants are numerous, and if armed could oppose a rebel force which could not be great in winter, when troops can't keep the field ; or for the first year we might with great convenience to the troops quarter numbers of them among the inhabitants.

Q. How many pontoons would be necessary to cross the Delaware at Corriell's ferry or Trenton ? *A.* I neither know the exact breadth of the river, nor the length of the pontoons. I should think the river 7 or 800 yards wide ; I have seen in America bridges made over rivers in that way, not with regular pontoons ; we fastened them together, and fixed them with weights ; so that wag-gons went over them very easily. *Q.* Do you know what number of pontoons would be necessary for a river 7 or 800 yards wide ?

A. The science of making bridges has not lately fallen under my consideration ; but if I am allowed to retire, I will bring an account in a few minutes. *Q.* Must there not be a great apparatus for carrying pontoons, and a great quantity of cordage necessary for making a long bridge ?

On Bridges
and passing
the Dela-
ware.

A. So much that I would rather try to make most of them with materials found on the spot. *Q.* How long do you think a bridge of rafts 700 yards long would be in making ?

A. The people of that country are very dexterous at their axes ; woods grow on the side of the river ; beams of houses might be used ; the country supplies such materials, that in 8 or 10 days such a bridge might be made over the Delaware ; I think Cæsar's bridge over the Rhine cost him but ten days. It would be very difficult to make such a bridge with an enemy opposing you, but the course of the river is long, and it is not without example that more difficult rivers have been passed in that situation. *Q.* Upon rafts ?

A. Upon rafts or pontoons, or such means as they have been able to acquire ; the Rhine, the Rhone, and the Danube have been passed in that manner, with the enemy on the opposite side. The possession of cannon and the higher banks give advantages in passing rivers, that the instances I had in my eye were without. *Q.* What sort of cannon, what calibre do you allude to as necessary to pass a river 700 yards wide. *A.* Twelve pounders, nay even six pounders would throw the shot the distance I have mentioned. *Q.* Are you acquainted with the shore of the Delaware about Corriell's ferry ?

A. I have passed there ; and have come down the sides of the river. I believe it is irregular and woody on the Jersey side ; there are few ferries, because there are many stones, which would favour the rafts I speak of ; but I am far from suggesting it as an easy measure. *Q.* Did you ever hear there was a corps of rebels under Sullivan between Sir William Howe's army and the Delaware at the same time we lay at Middlebush ?

A. Yes I have heard so.

When I was marching towards Brooklyn ferry, and came near the rebel lines, I received orders to march to Hellgate, and oppose Gen. Lee who was said to be landed there. Capt. Balfour told me at 7 o'clock the rebels had quitted their lines ; I immediately got my brigade under arms ; sent notice I was ready ; waited for orders to march, and received them about 8 o'clock. I marched within 120 or 130 yards of the enemy's lines : I knew the ground perfectly

ly well; I could not judge of the strength of the lines; I imagined the general called back the troops for the same reason. I understood the grenadiers under Col. Stuart were moving on when they were called back; and that Gen. Vaughan sent to know if he should go on and attack the lines, and Gen. Howe ordered him to retire.

G. Vaughan ordered to retire from the rebel lines.

Questions from the Committee. A great many cannon shot flew over us, they were ill pointed; some men were killed and wounded by small arms. Q. Do you think if the rebel lines had been forced at that time, all the rebel corps might have been taken or destroyed? A. All that were on Long Island.

Examined by Sir William Howe. I think Lord Cornwallis arrived at fort Lee 18th November. I dont know Gen. Vaughan was detached to Newbridge in pursuit. I understood the rebels passed Hackinsack bridge and then halted some time. I dont know how Lord Cornwallis was employed from the 19th to the 24th. It was very rainy weather; there must have been difficulty in getting up artillery and baggage to Lord Cornwallis's corps at fort Lee. There may be bye roads from Newark to Brunswick without going by Elizabeth town, but they cannot be very wide of Elizabeth town, as the mountains come down within a few miles of it; Elizabeth town is in the direct road from Newark to Brunswick. Many rebel stores were reported to be at Brunswick; I do not know of what they consisted; probably provisions; my information was not only from rebel officers, but from gentlemen who passed through Brunswick. Gen. Clinton's detachment was then at New York; the opportunity of taking Rhode island could not be lost, as the passage is open all the winter; and the navigation to it not very dangerous in any month: Sir James Wallace in the Experiment of 50 guns came through that passage in August 1778. Even if Gen. Clinton had been sent without line of battle ships, I know no impropriety in it; two frigates would have been sufficient to cover our transports. We derived much advantage from being properly covered by line of battle ships in all our landings and embarkations; but I have seen landings made less regularly but effectually; at Louisbourg we made an effectual landing; most of the men were landed by the transports, we had no flat bottomed boats; at Rhode island frigates might have covered the landing; ships can come very near the land; the water is like a mill pond; besides had two deckers been thought necessary, they might have gone without side of Long island, and the transports and frigates within side. I think the men might have been landed without them, even if they had been opposed. Q. Had Sir William Howe detached 2000 men from New York to Jersey, would there have been a favourable prospect of cutting off Washington's army? A. The dates and distances will give an answer to that question better than any thing I can say. I know the 1st brigade marched into New York before the rebels passed Newark. Q. Would it have been prudent to have sent 2000 men without artillery or provisions? A. To intercept a flying enemy, one would not have wished for any artillery, but what was very light. Q. Was not Lord Cornwallis's corps sufficient for following that flying enemy? A. Sufficient for following it! If I understood people's wish, it was that it should be

On cutting off the rebel retreat; & landing at Rhode Ill.

The dates & distances when compared, will prove the rebels might have been cut off.

inter-

intercepted. The rebels boasted they made many stands. The accounts I had, made Washington 3000 men. Q. Supposing Washington had 5000, would not 2000 men landed either at Elizabethtown or Amboy been greatly committed? A. It would not be right for 2000 to have engaged 5000; but perhaps 2000 men might have seized posts; the country is supposed to be strong, that might have stopped the rebels, and given Lord Cornwallis time to have come up; if we had taken possession of Brunswick, we would have had a river to defend us: I answer this merely as Sir William Howe has been pleased to ask me, I do not propose it as an expedient. Q. Who had the management of removing the goods from Boston? A. There was a man appointed for the purpose, he began to collect the goods, but it was not executed in any degree.

Gen. Howe forbid shipping off the goods from Boston.

June 14th. Examined by Sir William Howe. Q. Was you not employed by Sir William particularly in the management of removing the goods? A. I had the honour of conversing with Sir William Howe on that subject, and of carrying his directions to Mr. Brush, who had a commission for that purpose; I thought it a matter of consequence; I gave him what assistance I could; he carried it in some part into execution; he made a faint attempt to execute it; but was forbid before he made any great progress. Q. Was not a considerable quantity of merchandize shipped off? A. Some; but a small proportion of the whole. Q. Were we not in great want of shipping? A. We wanted shipping a great deal. Q. Could more have been removed than was done? A. I think if the holds of the vessels had been well stowed, the goods might have been carried without interfering with the transport of troops, inhabitants, or military stores. I saw a great many ships said to be loaded that appeared light. I was informed they were not well stowed. I told Sir William Howe I thought it of great consequence that the merchandize should be carried off. I thought the stores should have been either carried away or destroyed. I know not what orders the admiral gave; but I know there was a good deal of shipping left; which though not immediately fit for sea, was easily made fit. Q. Were not all the shipping and naval stores destroyed or rendered useless? A. I think not. Q. If Gen. Burgoyne's army had come by sea to New York. would it have been better calculated for getting possession of the Hudson? A. I think not; the route he was directed to pursue was the most effectual. Q. Was his force sufficient for penetrating to Albany? A. I should have thought so; and if Gen. Howe's object was to go up the North river and join Gen. Burgoyne, I was, and am now of opinion, that his force was sufficient for that object. Q. What was the assistance that might have been expected from the inhabitants? A. The assistance every government derives from the people being of their side; the advantages are so numerous, that I cannot enumerate them. Q. What did you mean by saying that Sir William Howe had the choice of situation? A. he could have attacked what part of the country he pleased, and would have had the choice of situation, in preference to the enemy that followed him. Q. Is it then your opinion that the offensive army leads the way in the field, and the defensive army follows? A. I will explain myself by an example; had Sir William Howe gone up the North river, he would have had the choice

Shipping and naval stores abandoned by Gen. Howe.

choice of situation in preference to Mr. Washington, who was to follow him. Q. Would Mr. Washington have permitted Sir William Howe to march through the Highlands without opposing him? A. I never had an idea of marching to Albany; I have *so often gone* there with an army by water. I have said before, it was necessary to possess the Highlands. Q. Would Gen. Washington have suffered Sir William Howe to get possession of the Highlands *quietly*? A. Had Sir William Howe's plan been to go up the North river, he would have taken the Highlands in the spring, or whilst Mr. Washington was cooped up in his strong camp in Jersey. Q. Do you suppose if Sir William Howe had marched to the Highlands, whilst Mr. Washington was in his camp at Middlebrook, that he would have remained there, and let Sir William Howe take the Highlands *quietly*? A. Washington in quitting his strong camp would have put himself in a worse situation, and might possibly have given us an opportunity of engaging him at less disadvantage. I have been assured by the officers who took the rebel forts in the Highlands, that they were not so strong in the spring as when Sir Henry Clinton stormed them. If Sir William Howe, when he was before Washington's camp with a superior army in June 1777, had detached from his army as great a reinforcement to Sir Henry Clinton, as I brought him in the fall from England, (only 1700 men) Sir Henry would have then done what he afterwards did late in the season.

Gen. Howe asks if he could have taken the Highlands *QUIETLY*.

Q. Do you know if the picquets moved as soon as there was certain notice of the rebels having evacuated their lines at Brooklyn? A. I know I was not ordered to move till a great while *after* they had evacuated their lines. The lines were destroyed before I saw them; I did not see that spot till a fortnight after.

Examined by other Members. I have already said I approved the plan for opening a communication with Canada, by seizing possession of Hudson's river. I have read Sir William Howe's letter October 9th 1775 laying down that as a primary object; Gen. Burgoyne's coming to Ticonderoga was very advantageous; there could not be a better opportunity of carrying that plan into execution; the Highland forts taken, we had easy access by water to support them from New York; after that, nothing could have prevented our army going within 12 miles of Albany. I have seen the tide rise 3 or 4 feet at Albany; I have gone from New York to Albany in about 20 hours: the distance is 170 miles. The southerly wind prevails on the river all fine weather; there are but two winds on it; it is either up or down. When the Rose and Phoenix passed New York up the North river, the rebel cannon from the space they were spread over, and from their fire, seemed about 200; the two ships lost very few men, not above 4 or 5. The North river is straight, all but at the Highlands, so that ships going up cannot be opposed by batteries a head. Sir Henry Clinton after taking the Highland forts began to fortify them: but a good part of his force being ordered to Philadelphia, he thought it prudent for the defence of New York to abandon the Highlands. The decline of our interest in America may be imputed to the capture of Gen. Burgoyne's army, to the French alliance, and to other causes which I cannot describe. Q. Had Sir William Howe

Gen. Robertson has gone to Albany in 20 hours.

Gen. Howe prevents Gen. Clinton from keeping the Highlands.

operated

Howe on the North river would have saved Burgoyne.

operated with his force on the North river after hearing of the taking of Ticonderoga, instead of going to sea, and going by the Chesapeake to Philadelphia, do you think that Gen. Burgoyne's army would have been made prisoners? *A.* I should think they would not have been made prisoners; the officers of the army and the principal inhabitants were of my opinion on that subject. *Q.* As Gen. Howe recommended fortifying an island near Boston in two letters previously to evacuating that town, do you know what circumstances prevented its being carried into execution? *A.* I do not know. *Q.* Was not the consequence of not forming some protection for the ships of war that were left, the loss of many of our victuallers, transports, and store ships, and the capture of many of our troops? *A.* It appeared Capt. Banks was driven out of the bay, as the enemy could annoy him from what place on land they pleased; had we been possessed of the most proper island, probably Capt. Banks could have continued; the misfortunes alluded to happened in consequence of our having no ships of war there.

As to the returns of the army, I spoke with some exactness; the troops with Sir William Howe at New York and its dependencies and Rhode island, were 29,478; the sick, prisoners with the rebels, and men on duty, amounted to 5933; Wemyss's corps the Queen's rangers, and 2d battalion of Skinners, amounting to 500 men not included in this return; if the sick, prisoners, and men on duty of 12 Hessian regiments, and the prisoners of Rhall's brigade, none of whom are in this return, amounted to 1599; the garrisons of Halifax and Florida being 3362; these added together, the two returns agree, and shew the army under Sir William Howe was 40,874 men.

Q. On what did you form your calculation of the river Delaware being 700 yards broad at or about Trenton? *A.* The House desired me to speak what my memory suggested; but afraid of misleading the House, I have since made enquiry, and find that no part of the river above Trenton exceeds 400 yards in breadth.

As to people in America suffering for their faithful attachment to this country, I have known more instances, than in that of any other country I have read of.

I am acquainted with King's ferry on the North river; I should think Washington could not pass that ferry, we in possession of the eastern shore; our men of war may lie in that passage with great facility; I think it is between two and three miles broad. If Washington could pass, Gen. Howe with a fair wind could come down in 24 hours; when the wind is contrary, Albany sloops get about 18 miles in a tide; southerly winds on that river make fine weather, northerly winds bring foul weather. I think any army on shipboard in that river, possesses great advantages over another on either of the banks; had Gen. Howe gone up to Albany, and Washington crossed at King's ferry, I should not have apprehended any danger of being cut off. *Q.* Would you have wished to have got Gen. Washington in that situation? *A.* I have said an army in that situation would have great advantages over one on the shore.

Gen. Howe could come from Albany to New-York in 5 days against the wind.

When our fleet failed for Rhode island, I thought Lord Howe would beat d'Estaing, and most people were of my opinion.

Q. How

Q. How many people do you think were to be found under the protection of his Majesty's arms at New York in 1776 that could have given a minute and exact description of Frog's neck? A. It is very near New York, every body there knew it; as many knew Frog's neck there, as would know Hampstead here. Every body knew Frog's neck.

Q. How many that knew Hudson's river, the country in Jersey and round New York? A. When people stir from home, these are the places they go over; if they know any country at all it is that.—As to the inhabitants being acquainted with the face of the country, their great traffic is buying land; I suppose there are more surveyors of land there than in any other part of the world:—as to communicating information: there is a great deal of zeal in that country; nobody is indifferent; and the people are great newsmongers. Q. By whom was the person who was employed to bring away the stores from Boston forbid to proceed? A. Sir William Howe directed all good subjects to bring in their goods, and they should be taken care of by this Mr. Brush; notice was also given that those who did not bring them in, would have them taken away; that invoices and receipts should be given them; and that however affected, they should get their goods again at the next post: some progress was made in this; but the people clamoured and refused invoices: upon these difficulties occurring, Sir William Howe bid me tell Mr. Brush to desist: these goods were a great advantage to the rebels.

Q. Would 11,000 men been sufficient to keep Washington's army at Middlebrook in check? A. I imagine 11,000 of our troops could beat any army Washington had. I have said before, that if Gen. Howe had only taken 11,000 men into the Jerseys, Gen. Clinton in the mean time might have taken the Highlands. As to my opportunities of information, from my situation I conversed with every body that came in; I made it my business to enquire of every body who I thought could inform me of the disposition of the people; I had many opportunities from conversation, from letters, and latterly great numbers who had lived among the rebels came in, their information was generally addressed to me. I introduced these gentlemen to the King's Commissioners. *I dare not name them, otherwise their names would gain respect and belief from this House.* The Commissioners expressed theirs, and had the same good opinion of the veracity and importance of the informers.

In 1776, Gen. Read the rebel adjutant general said, that the report of a treaty with Lord and Gen. Howe had like to have disbanded their army; and that it obliged Washington to issue the public order that there was to be no treaty. This he did to persuade the people that the King had no gracious intentions towards them, and that hopes of a treaty were vain. I never supposed the Congress ever was, or will be, desirous of entering into a treaty; when I say the people, I mean the gross of the people. The addresses for which the people were sent to the mines came from West Chester, New Rochelle, White Plains, and the borders of the North river, I dont include New York island; they were presented to the governor of New York; printed by Mr. Rivington; but by whose order I do not know; I commanded in New York; but I knew nothing of the publication. Possessed of the Highlands, I know nothing to interrupt an open communication up Hudson's river;

On report of peace, rebel army like to have disbanded.

G. Vaughan the rebels under Putnam, with a superior army and artillery, could not interrupt Gen. Vaughan, who went up and burnt *Æsopus*, and made frequent landings on that side of the river. The river forms a crook in the Highlands, and all the rest is straight; the lands very high on each side, makes the sides look near, I should guess it 11 or 1200 yards across; but in distances on water it is impossible to be exact; the high banks often becalm vessels; close to them there is no anchorage; the tide runs very strong; I have passed through there against the wind; were the enemy on either side with artillery, an army whose motions are quicker on board of ship, if they found an advantage in landing might land; if not, they would not approach the enemy's batteries without a fair wind to carry them past. The inhabitants of the provinces in 1777 and 1778 were not able to defend themselves against the rebels without our assistance; but I have proofs of their being very ready to arm; I got 10 companies of inhabitants in New York to purchase uniforms and embody themselves, without a farthing expence to government. About Philadelphia the country is a plain; a few miles distant it is hilly, but not mountainous. Last war our whole army penetrating the country through woods, carried often 10 days provisions; scouting parties carried 14 or 19 days provisions; when they were closely engaged they laid them down; on 10 lb. flour, and 40 oz. pork, for 10 days provisions, I have seen armies live and thrive for Months together. *Q. Without other provisions?* *A. Yes, without any other provisions, at Crown Point, we fed on flour and pork in the proportion I speak of.* *Q. Were they on a march at that time?* *A. They had marched, and did march, and were doing hard work.*

Army last war carried 19 days provisions.

I have often vindicated that acquaintance of mine who demanded 20,000 men. Gen. Howe advised posts to be taken on the North river, the best time for that operation was when Gen. Burgoyne was at the other end of it. I was not consulted on the Canada expedition. *Q. Whether you found the accounts given by the Americans both here and abroad, of the state of the rebels, were uninfluenced by situation and circumstances affecting the security of their own property?* *A. All people may be blinded by their interest, it sometimes deceives them, and sometimes leads them to deceive others.* *Q. If you had commanded the British army, would you have risked any operation of consequence on such authorities only?* *A. There are a number of people in America, on whose authority I would risk any thing. When I consider that question, I dont consider what country a man is of; my confidence is personal, not local.* *Q. Have you any property in that part of America under the rebels?* *A. My land is all wood, and never brought me a shilling: some trifles are owing me in America. I shall not be paid the sooner or the later for any thing I have said to this Committee: all the people in America do not owe me £. 1500.*

Excellent reply respecting confidence.

Examined by Sir William Howe. *Q. You have said the gross of the people were desirous to treat; did they make any offers to the first Commissioners?* *A. The gross of the people cannot make offers; they would be hanged if they did.* *Q. Where had the rebels a superior army when Gen. Vaughan burnt *Æsopus*?* *A. With Putnam on the banks of the Hudson. The officers under Gen. Vaughan saw that army.* *Q. You have said that Sir William Howe sent*

sent

ſent home a plan for going up the North river. do you know that the circumſtances of the war varied very much in America? *A.* Yes; Curious but the North river and its advantages remained. *Q.* On Gen. Burgoyne's taking Ticonderoga, was that a good reaſon for Sir William Howe going up the North river when no conſiderable army appeared to oppoſe Gen. Burgoyne's progreſs to Albany? *A.* If Sir William Howe's intelligence led him to believe that Gen. Burgoyne was not to be oppoſed by a conſiderable army, *I am ſorry his intelligence was not verified.* *Q.* Had we taken the forts in the Highlands in ſpring 1777, could we have kept them without keeping an army there? *A.* Yes, if we had kept a good gariſon in them. *Q.* Was there time to fortify any iſland when the army was coming away from Boſton? *A.* Yes; when we were in Nantasket road we could have taken our own time.

JOSEPH GALLOWAY, ESQUIRE.

A Lawyer, 48 years of age, and late one of the American Congreſſs.

Examined by Lord George Germain.

I Came over to the royal army Dec. 1776; at firſt not a fifth of the people thought of independence; ſome had independence in view as early as 1754; theſe men made a ſtalking horſe of the lawyers in the time of the ſtamp act, and of the ſmugglers when the tea act paſſed, to ſound the trumpet in oppoſition to government; nay not one tenth had independence in view. The Congreſs prevailed on a ſmall part of the people to take up arms, then they diſarmed all who were againſt independence. The clamour of the people to treat, obliged Congreſs to ſend three Commiſſioners to meet Lord and Gen. Howe. Not a fifth part of the Americans from choice have ſupported the preſent rebellion. The laſt Delegates from Pennsylvania to the Congreſs, and all the officers of that rebel ſtate, were choſen by leſs than 200 voters, tho' there are 30,000 at leaſt. One of the province of New York Delegates for 1774 was choſen by one vote only*; and he was received by Congreſs, and ſat in that aſſembly. From the exceſſive tyranny of the preſent rulers of America, from the diſtreſſes of the war, from the loſs of trade, from an averſion to French connections, which the people in America fear will end in a loſs of their liberties civil and religious, from their old attachment to the Mother Country, and I believe an earneſt deſire to be reunited to it, more than four fifths of the Americans would prefer an union with Great Britain to independence. Many at firſt deluded by the Congreſs and its adherents have felt every degree of diſtreſs; from thoſe feelings they now reaſon, and would prefer their former happy ſituation to their preſent miſery. The Americans would be diſtreſſed if they thought an opinion prevailed at home that they were in general hoſtile to Great Britain.

Not a tenth of America for independence.

Q₂

The

* Only two perſons were at the meeting for King's County, Mr. Simon Boerum and his friend; Mr. Simon Boerum appointed his friend Clerk, and then the Clerk appointed Mr. Simon Boerum a Delegate to the Congreſs.

The Congress have not found it easy to recruit their armies; they have used every method that art or force could suggest. They have drafted their militia; some have been driven into the field by the bayonet; for substitutes and recruits from 40*l.* to 100*l.* has been given; they manumitted every servant who entered. These were the methods by which the rebel armies were chiefly raised, since the people were convinced the Congress meant to establish independence. When Gen. Howe landed on Long island, the best information I could get made Washington's army 20,000; these were more militia than continental troops. After the success of the British arms on Long island, New York, White Plains, and fort Independence, Washington's army diminished rapidly. The rebel army when Washington crossed the Delaware, and Sir William Howe marched to Trenton, was not more than 3300 men. They were panic struck and deserted in great numbers. I was at that time in Pennsylvania, many who fled passed by my house, I conversed with them, and they appeared to me in the extremest panic. When Sir William Howe was at Trenton, the people of Pennsylvania were disposed to submit, a very few of the most violent excepted; very few of the militia would turn out; they expected the British army in Philadelphia at that time; the rebel Congress and all their officers fled in a panic from Philadelphia; before they fled, two out of three gentlemen informed me that they were deputed by a number of respectable inhabitants to wait on Congress and inform them, that if Gen. Howe passed the Delaware they would implore his protection. The Congress answered they could not blame them, for they could no longer protect them.† I had good opportunities of knowing the state of the middle colonies, viz. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, the Delaware counties, and Virginia. Gentlemen of fortune and integrity informed me, that the panic extended through all those parts, and few hoped of supporting independence. Had Sir William Howe pursued Washington across the Delaware, I verily believe Congress would not have been able to raise 5000 men at the opening next campaign; every gentleman I conversed with in Pennsylvania was of the same opinion. The defeating the Hessians at Trenton had a mischievous effect on the British service; it removed the panic, enabled the Congress to return to Philadelphia, revived the spirits of the disaffected, induced many of the militia to turn out; and contributed greatly to raising the rebel army next campaign. Yet Washington in the winter at Morris town had not 6000 men, and the compulsory measures formerly mentioned were used. The British army did not find difficulty in procuring provisions when on the banks of the Delaware; I drew up invitations to the country people and in a little time a considerable magazine was formed at Burdettown; but the taking of Trenton obliged the troops to leave that post. Had Sir William Howe wintered at Philadelphia, the country was full of provisions; in 1777 when the British army was there, and Washington had four times the troops he had

Flight of
the rebel
Congress.

Provisions
plenty in
Pennsylvania.

† Several gentlemen now in London know the Congress lost all fortitude, declared they were ruined, and in the greatest distress weeped at their folly,

had at Trenton, such of the inhabitants, army, and navy, as chose to eat fresh provisions were supplied by the country from without our lines. For 1777 the Congress voted 88 battalions, 750 men each, in all 66,000 men, but they did not bring into the field 16,000, the men were not to be had; in Canada, at Boston by sickness, killed in battle, prisoners, and by deaths in their hospitals southward of New York, upon good enquiry, they lost nearly 40,000* men. Not a moiety of their army volunteers. By account kept 2300 deserters came in to our army at Philadelphia, and there might be 7 or 800 more. In all at least 3000 came in. Perhaps half as many more deserted into the country to their friends. Of those who came in, the names and places of nativity were taken down; one half of them were Irish, scarce a fourth Americans, the other fourth English or Scotch. The provincials in the British army when disciplined are very good troops; a recruit had five hard dollars. [22*sh.* and 6*d.*] Congress for their recruits gave twenty paper dollars, besides eight more to the person who procured a recruit. Paper dollars are now from fifteen or twenty for one. † I have known from 40*l.* to 100*l.* continental money given for a substitute. ‡ I have been informed 6 or 7000 provincials are now serving in our army. We embodied a militia in Long island; but none in the Jerseys nor in Philadelphia, I numbered the males and females by the desire of Sir William Howe, in Philadelphia and its suburbs 4481 males between 18 and 60 years of age; part were quakers; but I know no reason why the others might not have been induced to take up arms for the defence of the city. I disarmed the disaffected in Philadelphia by orders from Sir William Howe. The well affected inhabitants had not, in general, arms put into their hands. I procured arms for 80 or 90 who came in from the country, and another body from the Jerseys had arms given them. In North Carolina by the rebel account 1600 men§ took up arms in support of government but were defeated by the rebels. In the peninsula between Chesapeake and Delaware 2000 took up arms. In the same place on another occasion several hundreds. In Monmouth county in the Jerseys about a hundred. Above Albany some districts took up arms and prevented the rebel part joining Gen. Gates, declaring if they did they would join Gen. Burgoyne. Cecil county in Maryland where Gen. Howe landed much disaffected. About the head of the Elk numbers deserted their houses and carried off their effects, but not all; after advancing 8 or 10 miles, not 10 or 15 houses at most were deserted on the march to Philadelphia, at least 70 miles. The inhabitants shewed every mark of pleasure at the arrival of the troops. Fourteen days provision were said

Rebel lost
40,000 men

Inhabitants
rise against
Congress.

* *The rebels during the rebellion have lost in battle and by sickness in their naval and military service nearly 100,000; reckoned a fifth of the able bodied whites in America.*

† *When our army entered a province, rebel paper was in a manner annihilated, the people ventured openly to refuse it.*

‡ *Two hundred pounds have been given for a substitute.*

§ *Some had guns, the rest only clubs.*

Country
would not
supply the
rebel army.

§ said to be landed. The army left Pencadder September 8th, the first provisions received from the fleet in the Delaware was on October 3d. During that time the army was supplied with large quantities of provisions by the inhabitants, and took a magazine of flour at Valley Forge, which I understood was destroyed. The army lay at Philadelphia 9 or 10 months; inhabitants 25,000; these with the army and navy did not want fresh provisions of all kinds. Part of that time Washington was at Valley Forge in great distress for want of provisions; deserters said they were several days at half allowance; some said they had furloughs to go in quest of provisions. Washington's supplies in great part were brought from Virginia and North Carolina up the Chesapeake bay, landed at Elk and carried in waggons to Valley Forge. The inhabitants adjoining were averse to Congress and did not supply him. Gen. Howe in some measure relied on me for intelligence. I sent to my friends on the Susquehannah and the Delaware. I sent out many spies. The intelligence must have been good, whilst Washington complained of want of intelligence, and said he was in an enemy's country. Persons came to me from all quarters of the middle colonies, Washington wanted flour, bread, grain, and forage. He issued a proclamation ordering the farmers to thresh out their grain. It was not obeyed. He sent and took the grain without paying for it. He got few carriages but what he took by force. The people broke their wheels and disabled their waggons. The deserters in 1777 came in nearly naked, except the Virginians and a few from the northward. Some without shoes, very few with whole breeches and stockings. Washington seized a quantity of cloth in Bucks county for his army, but some of our American light horse and refugees took it and brought it to Philadelphia. Washington's army very sickly, the principal physician told me for want of salt to their provisions, cloaths, and good appointments, at one time not less than ten hospitals. At Valley Forge end of February and beginning of March [1778] he had not 4000 effective men, this from officers of his own army, occasioned by sickness and desertion. A much greater army than 15,000 might subsist in a march through the middle colonies, unless lately much altered; they are colonies of provisions; plenty of cattle, hogs, Indian corn, wheat, rye, oats, and barley. The army and its attendants 20,000, fed by the country in the march from Elk to Philadelphia. General inclination of the middle colonies in spring 1778 to give up their new rulers and unite with this country. Gentlemen from almost all the counties in the peninsula below, and from Philadelphia county, Bucks, Lancaster, Chester, Cumberland, and some of the Jersey counties, sent me assurances, that as soon as Washington was driven over the Susquehannah or Delaware, if supplied with arms, they had no doubt of restoring the several districts to the peace of the crown. I do not say I gave these facts to Sir William Howe, but I did to Sir Henry Clinton.

Loyal offers
to desert the
rebel Con-
gress.

When Sir William Howe arrived off the Delaware, no obstruction
to

§ Army landed August 25th, but did not march till September 8th. Most of these provisions must have been expended.

to landing below the chevaux de frize, unless the water guard may be so deemed; no regular force in Pennsylvania at that time; the distance between the bite of Newcastle and the road from Elk head to Philadelphia 7 or 8 miles; Washington then in the Jerseys; he did not pass the Delaware till about the 10th or 12th of August, and thro' Philadelphia about the 23d.

From a conversation with Lord Howe I suspected Gen. Howe intended going round by Chesapeak. I saw the difficulties; I put them in writing; Capt. Montresor approved of them, and undertook to deliver them to the general. In substance they were, the distance from Sandy hook to Elk; the prevalence of southerly winds at that time of the year; as a motive to prefer the Delaware, I mentioned the distance from Newcastle to Lancaster where Washington had his magazines was nearly the same as from the head of the Elk, the country more open and roads better; that supposing these magazines his object, going up the Delaware would cover his design, as the enemy would naturally conclude Philadelphia was his object and not the magazines. About 8 or 10 days after, Sir William Howe asked me if my objections rested on the difficulties of the Chesapeake navigation. I said they did not.

The evacuation of Philadelphia struck the inhabitants with great dismay and distress.

Mr. Schoemaker told me that Sir William Howe had advised him to go over to Washington and make his peace. At the request of the magistrates, I waited upon Sir William Howe, and he gave us the same advice, and told us to apply to Sir Henry Clinton for a flag to go out. After consultation we unanimously agreed not to follow it.

Gen. Howe advises the Magistrates of Philadelphia to join the rebels.

I communicated the whole to Col. Innes, he was alarmed that we should be advised to go over to the enemy; he went to Sir Henry Clinton, who said he could not grant a flag on such an occasion; that the game was not up; that the war was not over; that it would still be vigorously carried on; and desired us not to entertain a thought of going over to the enemy. If the magistrates had gone over to the rebels it would have had every pernicious effect. The people would have believed what the rebels industriously propagated, that the contest was given up, and that America was to be evacuated. They would, or at least great numbers of them would have taken the oaths to the rebel states, and become their perfect subjects.

I attended the army from Brunswick to Trenton in 1776; the army marched early, and arrived at Princetown at 4 afternoon. Washington's main body then at Trenton, part at Princetown. Washington left Princetown an hour before the British army arrived. Our army marched next morning between 8 and 9 o'clock, and arrived at Trenton at 3 afternoon. Washington's force about 3300; this from returns made to Washington the day before he passed the Delaware. Had Sir William Howe marched from Princetown at 4 o'clock morning, as he did from Brunswick, or at 3 o'clock as he did from Philadelphia to White marsh, he would have been at Trenton 4 or 5 hours sooner. Washington's last boat had not reached the opposite shore when the British van arrived at Trenton.

A rapid march would have cut off the rebels.

Examined by several Members. No difficulties appeared to me to prevent the British army passing the Delaware December 1776; Wash-

Plenty of materials for passing the Delaware.

Washington's force was small: that river about Trenton from 3 to 400 yards wide; the ground high, and perfectly commands the opposite side far beyond cannon shot. I know of no difficulty except want of boats or pontoons. I enquired about Trenton for materials to construct pontoons, boats, or rafts. I found 48,000 feet of boards, a quantity of iron, and there was timber enough about Trenton for that purpose. There were two boats would carry from 50 to 60 men each.

A proclamation was issued by Sir William Howe in the Jerseys, offering pardon to all such as took the oath of allegiance, and promising to protect their persons and properties. Many, by far too many, were plundered by the British and Hessian troops, whilst they had in their custody these written protections. Friends to government and the disaffected often shared the same fate. The people came to me in tears complaining they had been plundered of every thing, even the pot to boil their victuals. Mr. Sharp of New York, a friend to government, was plundered of many thousands of Madeira wine. This was settled. The rebels made many affidavits of our plundering, which they circulated over all America.

Q. Do you know any roads leading round Washington's camp at Middlebrook on the north, by which Sir William Howe might have passed round between him, the Delaware, and his magazines?

A. I never passed the road from Brunswick to Middlebrook.*

When the army was at Middlebrook Washington's artillery magazine was at Norrington, 15 miles from Philadelphia; his magazines of provisions at Lancaster, Manheim, Carlisle, Lebanon; and I believe some at Reading. Washington might have remained in the Jerseys, though Gen. Howe crossed the Delaware, had he been determined to abide the consequences that might have attended the loss of his magazines. † Pontoons were built at New York for crossing the Delaware, and a number of flat boats prepared; these were carried to Brunswick and left there. The Delaware is fordable in a great variety of places; in June, July, August, September, October, the passage is occasionally interrupted by heavy rains; when the rain ceases, the freshes generally subside in 4 or 5 days. I cannot tell whether the rain we had at Hillsborough made it unfordable or not.

Delaware fordable in summer.

I was

* The chart of New Jersey will show that there is a road from Brunswick to Boundbrook, and thence to Easton; and it is known there are many roads leading round Washington's camp on the right and left, by which Sir William Howe might have passed to the Delaware. Sir William Howe could not be ignorant of these facts, as the surveyor of the district in which Washington was encamped, was at that time in the British army.

† Had Washington remained in the Jerseys, and permitted Gen. Howe to pass the Delaware, his magazines must have been lost; and all Pennsylvania must have submitted. He would either have fought in the Jerseys, or passed the Delaware to defend the objects on which the existence of his army materially depended: for these he fought at Brandywine in August; and for these he must have fought in New Jersey or Pennsylvania in June, or lost them.

I was refused a pardon as unnecessary. [*Mr. Galloway's plan of accomodation which he proposed in Congress, was, that the government should be administered by a President General appointed by the King, and a Grand Council chosen by the different Assemblies once in three years. No more need be said of it, as he does not propose it as a perfect plan, nor altogether as a plan of his judgment.*]

I did sign the American association to prevent Congress taking more violent measures, I have never read it since I signed it, I liked it so little. I am ready to answer all questions tho' they may tend to criminate myself, if the Committee approve of it. I sat in the Committee of Grievances. The violent party in Congress sent me a halter and a letter threatening me with death if I did not make use of it. The Congress entered their resolutions as unanimous, though sometimes one third of the members present voted against the question. In Congress I opposed every violent measure. Of the ten resolutions considered by the Congress as their Bill of Rights, I opposed the 1st and 4th; 2d and 3d I dont recollect; the 5th and 6th I did not; the 7th I do not recollect; the 8th I must have opposed; I was of a contrary opinion to the 9th and I believe opposed it; as to the 10th I do not recollect. Mr. Duane and I opposed approving the opposition entered into by the Massachusetts Bay.

Congress
send him a
halter.

In Pennsylvania the people took up arms with great reluctance; there are near 30,000 souls in Philadelphia, but the militia was never above 15 or 1600 men; Bucks county short of that number; not a greater proportion in Chester county; three of the oldest first settled counties. In Pennsylvania Sir William Howe had I think a very strong army considering the force in opposition to him. The enemy at Brandywine were not more than 15,000 men, officers and all the army attendants included, save about 1000 militia for whom they could not get arms.

The people in west Jersey had been deserted, it is not natural to think that people of property will join an army merely passing thro' the country, without some protection left with them. The army occupied Philadelphia 26th of September 1777, and left it I think June 18th 1778. Washington possessed the country without the British lines, if the people had risen he could easily have suppressed them, as the well affected had been disarmed before. Could Sir William Howe have remained a month at Elk or about Newcastle, the counties from Elk to the Capes, about 200 miles, would in my opinion have risen in arms. I understood from Mr. Robinson, a gentleman of the first weight and consequence in these counties, who came to Sir William Howe at New York, that if he was provided with arms and a few men, that he would land on the Peninsula, and in course of the fleet going round to Chesapeak, he would engage to raise men enough to disarm the rebels in that quarter and meet Sir William Howe at the head of the Elk. He often regretted that he had not been put on shore. I kept a journal of material transactions from leaving my family to entering Philadelphia. I kept none of the proceedings of Congress. I held the office of superintendant at the request of Gen. Howe. My life was attained by an act of the rebel States, and my estate not short of £. 40,000

Important
offers not
improved
by G. Howe

sterling confiscated, I receive a very small pittance from government compared with what I have sacrificed.

A severe
question by
Ld. Howe.

Q. [By Lord Howe.] Did not you advise every one of your friends, who you thought could remain in safety with the rebels, to stay in Philadelphia, and were not two persons who followed your advice afterwards put to death?

Denied by
Mr. Gallo-
way.

A. There was not a person who had taken an active part, to my knowledge, but I advised to come away with the British army. As to Roberts and Carlisle the persons alluded to, the first never consulted me; Carlisle I positively advised to quit the city, because I knew he would not be safe.

R E M A R K S

On the general scope of the Evidence given on the American Enquiry.

G. Howe's
evidences
called to
vindicate
him.

SIR William and Lord Howe summoned as evidences, Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis, Major Gen. Grey, Capt. Sir Andrew Hammond of the navy, Mr. Montresor formerly engineer in chief in America, Capt. Mackenzie, and Lieut. Col. Sir George Osborne. These officers were called to vindicate the conduct of the late commanders in chief, while in America, from the charges that had been brought against them, both in, and out of Parliament. It was therefore not to be expected, that they who were so strongly attached to, and in the confidence of Sir William and the noble Lord, would designedly let any thing escape them, that might tend to throw even the shadow of blame on any part of their conduct: the intent for which they were called, was to exculpate the general and noble lord, and by no means to criminate them. Keeping this, their intention, in view, we ought not to be surpris'd, when we find an evidence, who declared against giving opinions, always deviating into them, either through mistake or design, whenever he could introduce an encomium on the general or admiral; and when any questions were put, which might have a different tendency, always replying, these were matters of opinion, or related to private conferences, consultations, or communications, or were letters included under some one or other of these denominations, all which, were points, upon which he should be silent. On this it may be remarked, that if an evidence is to say only what he pleases, truth can never be come at.

Others, perhaps foreseeing the inconveniences of such a restriction upon themselves, gave their evidence a wider scope, and vindicated or applauded every measure of the late commanders; though when repeatedly and pointedly interrogated, we had frequently occasion to lament that they laboured under, that deplorable misfortune, an extremely defective memory.

Refuse to
answer
questions of
opinion, yet
give many
voluntary
opinions.

As this was, perhaps, the first time a noble earl had occasion to speak before such a numerous assembly, the candid will naturally make all proper allowances for the want of that self-possession, which is also necessary for preserving order and precision, either in giving a detail of facts or opinions. When, therefore, his lordship, in his prefatory speech, gives such a warm opinion in favour of Gen. Howe's character and operations, and in the same moment declares

positive-

positively against giving any opinion at all, we must infer, that his lordship did not mean to contradict himself, but was betrayed into this inconsistency by an over anxiety to acquit himself properly, and befriend the general, who had summoned him to the bar. This is not the only specimen of contradiction that is exhibited in the course of this evidence; various other instances of voluntary or accidental deviation from his own peremptory declaration occur in his lordship's examination. *Mary opinions* are given, and also matters of *bearsay*, *apprehension*, *report*, *supposition*, and *belief*. For example; a *high opinion* in favour of the Hessians; "I have the *biggest opinion* of those brave troops." A *decided opinion* against the unfortunate Rhall; "the *imprudence* of that officer occasioned the misfortune." A *propbetical opinion* relatively to the future valour of the Hessians; "these troops *I dare say* ever will behave with the greatest courage." A *bearsay*; "I recollect *hearing* 2000 men reinforced Washington." A *negative* and an *affirmative apprehension*; "I do not *apprehend* the enemy's rear were in any danger from our troops that day; I *apprehend* the enemy's main army did march to oppose us." A *report*; "it was *reported* the enemy had 6 or 8000 men on Long island." A *supposition*; "it was *supposed* the enemy's principal strength was on York island." A *belief*; "I *believe* the found was about 1000 or 1200 yards in breadth." And *beside* all these, his lordship even favoured the Committee *with other people's opinions*. Such as the *reverential opinion* of the soldiers for Lord Howe; "that noble lord's character cannot be *more revered* by the seamen, than it is by the soldiers of the American army." And towards the close of his examination, the *high opinion* the army had of Gen. Howe; "Sir William Howe was *highly esteemed* by the officers and soldiers of his army." In this manner, though the avowed substance of this evidence was to be matter of fact solely, were the Committee, by some strange fatality, indulged with *opinion*, *report*, *bearsay*, *belief*, *supposition*, and *prophecy*.—So weak is memory:—So frail our nature.

And even reports, hearsays, & prophecys.

The opinions of Gen. Howe's evidences of the face of the country, and of the unanimity of the inhabitants, against returning to their allegiance, when contrasted with those of Gen. Robertson and Mr. Galloway, will not have much weight. Earl Cornwallis was about two years in America; Gen. Grey not 18 months. But Gen. Robertson was 24 years in that country, and Mr. Galloway was born in it, lived 48 years in it, and had acted in several distinguished capacities in it. These gentlemen prove to us that the country is not remarkably strong, that by far the greatest part of the inhabitants are strongly and affectionately attached to the British government, and are burning with impatience for our assistance, to enable them to shake off the tyrannical yoke of the Congress.

G. Howe's evidences 2 years, Gen. Robertson 24, & Mr. Galloway 48 years in America.

But ministry it seems must create a country for some gentlemen to make war in. There must be no trees, no morasses, no mountains, nor even a hillock, but such as a modern hero might bestride: none of your great rivers, nothing but purling streams, such as Gulliver might — step over: and a remonstrance must be sent to the skies against all showers of rain, that such noble warriors may exhibit their sublime manœuvres in a dry skin. All military knowledge

must

must be annihilated in this new system. Your gallant attacks and desperate resistances must not only be banished from military practice, but even expunged memory itself. Fair weather and sunshine must smile on all their operations; and as they march, joyful spring attending must spread around them her velvet green. Every thing must be conducted by gradual approach or retreat; none of your breathless marches;—all minuet movement;—a graceful opera the model of every campaign, with a *Mischianza* farce to close their dazzling glories. To be serious:—not a foldier but knows that the advantages and disadvantages of a country in respect to military operations are in a great part reciprocal to both armies; that an inaccessible post is generally as difficult to get out of, as it is to attack; that its very nature makes it difficult to retreat from, and easy to blockade. If therefore Washington's camps at Quibbleton, White marsh, and Valley forge, were inaccessible to assailants, as some gentlemen have said, why was he not blocked up? The position of the Saxons in their very strong camp at Pirna, and their surrender, is a case in point.

Advantages & disadvantages of the country reciprocal.

Gen. Robertson displayed in his examination, the knowledge of an experienced officer, and in general the openness of a veteran soldier. His evidence shews an intimate acquaintance with the human mind, and is fraught with acute reply, solid observation, and undeniable fact. When asked his opinion of Gen Howe, he replied, "I cannot praise or blame any man's conduct in the lump; but as far as my capacity extends, I am ready to praise or blame any part of his conduct." And when pressed to declare who was to blame for the national disgrace in America? he answered with equal candour and delicacy, "it may be known from a history of the war, and the politics of the country." Many of his replies blunted and abashed the most hardened effrontery: when Col. Barre pushed him with a most indecent pertinacity and presumption, to answer a question altogether respecting himself, and which no wise related to the business before the House, he answered with equal candour and spirit, "I cannot answer that my words have been discreet on every occasion, but if they have not been so, I do not come here to confess it." He seemed to favour Gen. Howe, when that general's conduct and his queries, and those of his friends, did not much entitle him to it; particularly on not attacking the lines at Brooklyn, and when Sir William Howe asked, "Is it then your opinion that the offensive army leads the way in the field, and the defensive army follows?" Here from the answer he did give, he shewed he could have said more; he had a strong example of fact to give, instead of putting himself to the trouble of supposing an example. It was this: Sir William Howe went to Pennsylvania with his offensive army and Washington followed him with his defensive one. Then follow a train of questions which shew great brilliancy of thought in Sir William. "Would Washington have permitted Sir William Howe to march through the Highlands without opposing him? Would he have suffered Sir William Howe to take the Highlands quietly?" Very few men would have thought of asking such questions. Sir Wm. Howe should have enticed Washington to the banks of the north river, or any river, against another, which

G. Robertson's excellent replies.

which has the assistance of a naval force. Gen. Clinton this very year has given us his opinion on this subject: he informs us, he carried his army up the North river, "in hopes of being able to betray Washington into an engagement for the possession of Stony point; possibly Washington suspected my view, and declined adventuring any measure, which might bring on an action in a country unfavourable to him." A writer of genius has very justly remarked, that during the examination, the true relation between Sir, William Howe and Gen. Robertson, resembled, that of a sniveling school-boy who presumed to catechise his master. Gen. Robertson's evidence, and that of Mr. Galloway's were of so convictive and decisive a nature, and the other evidences to be examined being expected to be no less so, occasioned Gen. Howe to deem it prudent to absent himself; which his friends gladly took the advantage of, as a reason for breaking up the enquiry. This prevented the examination of the other evidences on the part of administration. But, imperfect as the enquiry was left, indubitable evidence appeared, ON WHOM to fix the failure of success in America. The late commanders in chief and opposition, though they had so vociferously clamoured for the enquiry, grew heartily sick of it, when they found it took this turn; and from their hurry to break it up, we may reasonably suppose, they were very happy when they got rid of it.

Gen. Clinton's opinion of acting on the North river

OBSERVATIONS *on the* EVIDENCE,

With the Events arranged in the order of Time.

TO render the evidence more clear and distinct, it may not be improper to state the different opinions of the evidences on some of the grand points, and to present them according to the order of time, to give the reader a distinct, regular and connected view of the respective events.

The enquiry commences with Gen. Howe's retreat from Boston in March 1776, being the first movement worthy of notice made by him, from the time of his succeeding Gen. Gage in the chief command.

When Boston was evacuated, great quantities of linens and woollens were left behind, though our army wanted these merchandises, and the rebels were in much distress for them. A Mr. Brush had a commission for shipping off all such goods as might be useful to the rebels. Gen. Robertson whom Sir William Howe employed to superintend this business, put Mr. Brush in the proper way of collecting and granting receipts for such goods. These goods were to be placed again in the hands of the proper owners when the army should arrive at Halifax: the intention of collecting and shipping them off, being only to prevent them falling into the hands of the rebels. After a very small proportion of these goods had been sent on board the vessels, the proprietors of the goods, who knew the distress the rebels were in for linens and woollens, and who hoped for high prices from them, not to mention their attachment to their countrymen in rebellion, clamoured against the execution of these orders. and refused to make out invoices. Upon this

Merchandise left to the rebels.

this clamour Sir William Howe, either disturbed or perplexed at the difficulty, gave Gen. Robertson directions to *order* Mr. Brush to desist; by which means these goods came into the possession of the rebels, and were a very great relief and advantage to them. Here was a most glaring proof of indolence or incapacity! The merchants in Boston attached to their countrymen and their rebellious cause, clamour for liberty to remain behind in Boston, and to retain their goods, on purpose to supply the rebels, who are in great want of them; and Sir William Howe, the King's general, humbly submits to their rebellious impudence; he either would not or could not think, even for a single moment; he was incapable of obviating the most trifling difficulty; or habits of indolence and pleasure were not to be intruded upon or shaken off. Another officer, if only blessed with but a small degree of common sense or common spirit, instead of sinking into inaction on these interested clamours, would have more vigorously enforced his orders, and have taken especial care to have seen them effectually executed; and if the transports were insufficient for stowing them, which was by no means the case, the men of war might have been used;—nay the goods of our enemies had better have been destroyed by us, than foolishly and tamely left in their possession. There were *naval stores* as well as merchandise left to the rebels, beside a whole fleet of trading vessels at the wharfs. It is in vain to say we damaged the ships left behind; the whole of the naval stores and vessels, if not carried off, as they ought to have been, should at least have been burned. It is in vain to say, that circumstance would have endangered the town; for granting that the town was abandoned by capitulation, yet the naval stores and vessels were not included, and the vessels, after the stores had been put on board, might have been hauled from the wharfs, to a distant part of the harbour, and burned with the greatest ease and safety; both to the town and our own shipping; for the harbour is at least 9 or 10 miles in length, and half that in breadth. The vessels left behind were equipped by the rebels as privateers, and swarmed on the seas that summer. Our West India merchants will not soon forget the immense losses they suffered through this misconduct.

Naval stores
and shipping
left to the
rebels.

Blocking
up Boston
harbour his
own plan,
yet not done

Gen. Howe himself in two letters, in the first dated October 9th 1775, “ proposed, if it should be judged expedient, to entrench a small force in the neighbourhood of Nantasket road, for the purpose of blockading the port of Boston;” and in the other, dated Nov. 26, 1775, he repeated, “ for the blockade of the harbour, if such a measure is judged expedient, I would propose entrenching a battalion at a place where ships of war can securely winter, it being better situated for the object required than Castle William.” These are the general's own proposals to the minister; yet he deserted Boston, regardless of the bad consequences that must follow from leaving the harbour open; by which neglect we lost many victuallers, transports, and storeships, and near 1000 men, most of them soldiers; our transports even fighting through the rebel privateers to get into the harbour, believing the place in our possession. The commander in chief had it in memory from the 9th October, to the latter end of the March following, a period of at least *five months*, yet could not find time to entrench a single batta-

batta-

battalion. This obviates his hinted at defence of want of provisions: he had time enough, and also provisions, during these five months; he does indeed but hint at it; he knew he durst not rest upon it. Never was there a more wretched question, than that of his, "was there any time to fortify any island?" or any answer more conclusive than Gen. Robertson's, "when we were in Nan-tasket road we could have taken our own time. From the date of his first letter, he had five months before his retreat, and as much time after it as he might think proper to take, to execute this design of entrenching a battalion; the work only of a few hours; but say it was the work of a month to do it, and to put the men under cover, why was it not done?"

The battle on Long island in August 1776 is the next capital object. The reasons given by the engineer Mr. Montrefor, for not assaulting the rebel lines instantly after the defeat of their army, seem to convey rather a charge against the general and himself, than an apology. They had no proper apparatus for an assault, no artillery, no fascines, no axes, no scaling ladders. And pray whose neglect was all this owing to? Did not the general know the rebels had entrenchments behind them? Did not he expect to beat them, when he marched to attack them on the heights? He had been two months in sight of these lines; why then was not the apparatus ready? and did not many articles wanted of the apparatus belong to Mr. Montrefor's own department? But to pass over this enormous neglect; could not our victorious army, who saw the fugitive rebels scramble over their own ditch and lines, as easily follow them? No doubt of it. But here the general interferes, and tells us, in his own letter, that it required repeated orders from him to prevail on them to desist; for had he permitted them to go on, it was his opinion they would have carried the redoubt. Lord Cornwallis says, that the principal strength of the rebels was known *then* to be on York island; and that their defeated army on Long island was reported to be 6 or 8000 men. Now of these 3300 had been killed or taken in the action, as the general's letter says, so that only 4000 beaten panic struck fugitives remained to defend lines, at least one mile and an half in extent, against a victorious army of near 20,000 men. But Gen. Howe would not risk an attack; as he was sure of the lines by regular approaches. To be sure lines of turf, and such a redoubt as the mud pye (rebel redoubt so called) were more valuable conquests singly, than if the capture or destruction of the whole rebel army had been joined to them. Mr. Montrefor also says, that he gave the alarm of the rebel evacuation at 4 o'clock the morning of the 30th, and that the piquets marched in 25 minutes after; yet Gen. Robertson was not ordered to march till about 8 o'clock, an interval of 4 hours. If the piquets did march at 25 minutes past 4 o'clock, they must have been halted *by order*, for Gen. Robertson says, and every man who has seen the ground knows, that the distance from our camp to where the rebels embarked, could not be above an hour's march; yet the very rear guard of the rebels embarked between 8 and 9 o'clock without any disturbance, but what their own terror gave them, though Mr. Montrefor says our piquets marched at 25 minutes past 4. These piquets if they did march without being halted,

Montrefors evidence rather a charge than an apology.

In pursuit, our piquets push on 2 & 1-half miles in 4 hours.

ed, must have pushed on with great alacrity indeed, when they took full four hours to march at most between two and three miles; for those most advanced, as the general's letter informs us, arrived just time enough to fire some shot at the last of the rebel boats then crossing the ferry to New York.

The delay occasioned by the shameful blunder of landing on Frog's neck, and the stay of the army on that island, Gen. Howe's witnesses do not attempt to vindicate; and from Gen. Robertson's evidence it appears, that Frog's neck was as well known to the people of New York, as Hampstead is to the people of London.

As Lord Cornwallis would not explain Gen. Howe's motives for declining to attack the rebels October 28th at White plains, we must be content with what he chuses to give us, that is, the general declined it out of *political motives*. Just so he assures us there were *solid reasons* against attempting the passage of the Delaware in 1777; but neither does his lordship explain these solid reasons; so the Committee and the public are left to their own conjectures on these points.

Gen. Robertson establishes the practicability of intercepting Washington in his retreat from fort Lee to Brunswick in 1776, but allowing the rebels had retreated by their right to the mountains, they would have lost all their baggage, stores, and magazines at Brunswick, which would have been a fatal blow to them.

Id. Corn-
wallis's
pursuit.

Lord Cornwallis says, that on the road to Brunswick the rebel Col. Griffin met him, "and he was unwilling Griffin should see "his troops as they were so few." The rebels were 3300 scared beaten fugitives, but his lordship had with him all the British grenadiers, all the British light infantry, three battalions of Hessian grenadiers, the 33d and 42d regiments, the Hessian yagers, and 16th light dragoons; and if his lordship had recollected perhaps the battalions of the guards; these were the flower of our troops, and if complete would have been double the number of the rebels; but say one third were wanting, still they were more numerous, or if half were wanting, still they were equal, and besides, victorious and well appointed troops. His lordship had therefore no good grounds for this shyness; for at the lowest computation he had a number equal to the enemy; unless his lordship supposed, that a body of our best veterans were inferior to an equal number of rebel runaways.—Then follows our pursuit of the rebels through the rest of the Jerseys in December 1776. Lord Cornwallis says justly, "that the enemy's rear "guard Dec. 8th, when retreating and passing the Delaware, were in no danger from our troops." How could they be in danger?—Lord Cornwallis arrived the 1st at Brunswick, the day the rebels left it, and there Gen. Howe's orders stopped him 6 days; and on the 8th he arrived, like our piquets at Brooklyn, just time enough to see the last of the rebel boats crossing the Delaware. Gen. Howe has given us a warm encomium on the ability and conduct of the pursuit from fort Lee to Trenton. Granting the whole of this march to be what the general makes it, more than 80 miles,—where is the wonder, in troops marching that space, from Nov. 18th, to Dec. 9th, just 21 days?—4 miles a day is rapid marching truly! The general ardour of the soldiers, and the ability of the officers on this and all other occasions, no good subject will call in question. But we

have

have the greatest reason to demand of their general, Why was this ardour and this ability restrained? Why were 13 days loitered a-^{Within} way in the march from fort Lee to Brunfwick? Why the 6 days an hour's halt at Brunfwick? Why that suspicious stop at 4 in the afternoon ^{march of} on the 7th at Princetown, till 9 in the morning of the 8th, ^{the fugi-} when Washington had only left it an hour before? And on the 8th, ^{tives, yet} why that languid pursuit of 12 miles in 7 hours, which permitted ^{stops 17} the shattered remnant of the rebels finally to escape him? ^{hours.}

Gen. Robertson's and Mr. Galloway's evidence shew, that there were a sufficiency of materials for constructing pontoons, boats, or rafts to pass the Delaware, but no such attempt was made.

The panic among the rebels at this juncture; is proved by a concurrence of circumstances; the flight of the rebel Congress from Philadelphia, and their bursting into tears shewed their despair and humiliation; Mr. Galloway crossed from the rebel side of the Delaware, and joined the King's army; other loyal inhabitants came in as Lord Cornwallis proves, 3 or 400 a day, for 10 days at least, which make 3 or 4000 men in that short space; and no doubt more would have come in, had not the disaster at Trenton just then happened, which gave new hopes to rebellion.

This was the happy moment for passing the Delaware, when the Congress with the wreck of their fugitive troops, were flying into Maryland, and when the panic of our arms extended even through Virginia. The banks on our side the river were much higher than those on the rebel side; our cannon would have scoured the opposite shore, the river no where about Trenton being more than 400 yards wide; there were plenty of materials for constructing boats, pontoons, or rafts; but the two boats might have sufficed, for whilst the enemy were amused by feints in various places, the two boats, each carrying 50 or 60 men, might in the space of a few hours, or in the night, have thrown over a body of troops sufficient to face Washington's fugitives, had they dared to stand battle. Let us now see how another general acted, when he had a much more dangerous passage to force. Gustavus Adolphus, when he carried the Swedish arms into the heart of Germany, constructed a bridge for passing the Lech of such materials as he could find on the spot; that is, he pulled down the neighbouring villages, farm houses, and gentlemen's seats, for large timber; he completed this bridge in two days, and the third passed the Lech, in the face, and under the fire of the batteries of the imperial army entrenched on the opposite side, commanded by the veteran Tilly:—Tilly, who had been victorious in 36 pitched battles, who bore in his own person the marks of 50 campaigns, and who poured an incessant fire from 70 pieces of cannon, saw, a bridge constructed under that fire, and the Swedish army pass the river, clear a morass knee deep, and in spite of all his efforts, and his formidable entrenchments, defeat his army, though it was equal in force, and superior in heavy artillery;—his army too a veteran one, which had been victorious, and hardened in blood for a course of 15 years. It is granted that the Lech is not so broad as the Delaware—But was there not also a difference between Tilly and his veterans who *opposed* Gustavus, and the rebel Washington and his crew who *led* from Howe? The strength of Gustavus and Tilly was equal as to number; Howe was six times stronger than the rebels. But

Gallant example in passing river.

Gustavus was a general ; Howe was brave, but not a general ; it is in vain to look for his parallel ; he sets all comparison at defiance.

An evidence has produced a new charge against the memory of Col. Rhall, and a new vindication of Gen. Howe, respecting our disgrace at Trenton. Gen. Howe in his letter makes no mention of Rhall's disobedience in not erecting redoubts to cover his post, and yet nothing could be more natural or more proper than for him to mention it ; instead of that, he imputes the defeat to Rhall's marching out and attacking the enemy. In America this disobedience of Rhall's must have been kept very secret ; we never heard it even whispered there ; nor even that Count Donop, now also dead, who is said to have delivered the general's orders to Rhall, and who was equally near, and as much exposed to the enemy, had so much as orders to erect redoubts to cover his own post. The want of redoubts was one cause, but the chief cause of the defeat at Trenton, was, placing a body of troops in that important post, whose discipline had been previously ruined by habits of plunder ; for when the rebels attacked and took them prisoners, they were occupied, not in defending themselves, but in loading their waggons with their booty. It is a well known military maxim, that a plundering army never can be a good army.

True cause
of Trenton
defeat.

In 1777 the campaign opened with the month of June spent in a sham retreat to draw Washington from Quibbleton, and when that miscarried, in making a real one, abandoning the whole province of the Jerseys. When our commander was at Hillsborough in that province, he was only 22 miles from the Delaware, but he chose to attract the attention of all mankind by an unexpected manœuvre, going a sea voyage, and many a land march, and spending near three months, to come at a river, which at Hillsborough he was only one day's march from. Here we shall not dwell upon the ruin of the Canada army, and the confederacy of France and Spain, both of which were the consequences of his never to be forgotten Chesapeak voyage. He could not on this occasion pretend want of pontoons or boats ; for these he had ; but he did not intend to use them. Even Washington had shewn him four times in less than a month how to cross the Delaware in the preceding December ; the first time, that rebel had our army six times his number on his rear, yet he retreated over it with impunity ; the second time, about a fortnight after, he recrossed it, with not more than 3000 men, in the face of our cantonments, and defeated us at Trenton ; then passed it a third time with his prisoners in triumph, still unmolested ; and on finding our greatly superior army under such indifferent command, he crossed it a fourth time, and braved us with a handful of men all winter and spring in the Jerseys. But now when the campaign had opened, our general disdained to follow rebel examples, though his army was double the number of Washington at Quibbleton, and though he had little need of his pontoons and boats, the Delaware being fordable in a great variety of places in June, July, August, September, and October, as Mr. Galloway's evidence informs us. It seems he was now determined on a sea voyage, to give the troops an airing during the sultry summer months. According to Lord Cornwallis, our commander had *solid reasons* for not attempting the passage of the Delaware ; but what these

Washington in three weeks shews Howe four times how to cross the Delaware.

these solid reasons were, we are ever to remain ignorant of, as his lordship has wisely thought proper to keep them a secret, which perhaps is the best method of preserving their solidity; for if he should discover them, we very probably might find them frivolous and unsatisfactory. Washington's post at Quibbleton, in the opinion of his lordship and Gen. Grey was too strong to be attacked; but Gen. Robertson gives us a more officer like opinion, when he tells us, that if our army had taken post between Washington and his provision country, the rebel general must have moved, which would have tended to bring on an action. This, not entering into our commander's head, he retreated through the Jerseys, and put his whole army on shipboard.

When Gen. Howe in spring, and beginning of summer 1777, was looking at Washington in his camp at Quibbleton, Gen. Robertson is of opinion that the forts on the North river might have been taken with more ease, than when Sir Henry Clinton took them in the fall of the year; as early in the spring and summer they were not so well fortified. He is also of opinion, that if Gen. Howe, when he sailed to Chesapeake, had left 3000 men to have alarmed the coast of New England, their militia would have been kept at home, and Gen. Burgoyne saved. This our commander could have done, and yet have had a superior army to Washington; he would have had at least 11,000 men, which was his own allotment for his Pennsylvania army; and Washington had but 10,000 in arms at Brandywine. In doing this too, he would have obeyed his Majesty's orders sent him March 3d, 1777, and received by him on the 8th of May, at least a month before he opened the campaign. But it appears that nothing was to be done that would save the Canada army. It would be superfluous to repeat here what has been so clearly pointed out in Gen. Robertson's evidence, relating to the propriety of acting on the North river, in preference to the absurd voyage to Chesapeake. The intelligent reader, when he peruses Gen. Grey's contrary opinion, will not fail to recollect, that Gen. Grey never saw but the mouth of the North river about New York island; and that Gen. Robertson *has often* passed both up and down it with large armies. And another reflection must always occur on every difference of opinion between Gen. Howe's evidences and Gen. Robertson, that these evidences were at most about 2 years in the country, but that Gen. Robertson had acted there in various important military capacities for 24 years.

G. Robertson obviates all Howe's evidence.

Gen. Howe in his letter dated October 9th, proposed to the minister the plan for opening a communication with Canada, as the first thing to be done. "I would propose 20 battalions to compose the division for New York, which would be near 12,000 men; this corps to be employed in opening a communication with Canada in the first instance, leaving 5 battalions for the defence of New York." And in a subsequent part of the same letter he mentions it again as the primary object, which once obtained, both the Canada army and his own, might operate, as circumstances might require, against New England. "The accomplishment of the primary object, for opening the communication, being obtained by the two armies, and secured by proper posts, in which the reduction of the rebels in the province of New York must in some

“measure be included; these corps might take separate routes into the province of Massachusetts as circumstances may arise.” Yet no sooner does the happy time arrive for accomplishing of this primary object, than he hastens to desert the very spot on which he should have acted, and though he had received a letter from Gen. Burgoyne that the northern operations were begun, and even advice of the taking of Ticonderoga, before he sailed on his frantic voyage, and though he had 15,000 men on board of transports at the mouth of the North river, and had first planned the operations for possessing it, yet to the astonishment and deep regret of every body, he turned his back upon it, and sailed off to the southward:—With what justice did the execrations of every good subject follow him? Then after beating the ocean for eight days, he writes a letter to Sir Henry Clinton, as if he had just recollected for the first time, that an army was coming from Canada. “It is not possible for me to say when I may be able to send you reinforcements; but I beg you will be assured, that I shall not fail to do it, as soon as expedient; in the mean while, *if you can make any diversion in favour of Gen. Burgoyne’s approaching Albany, with security to King’s bridge, I NEED NOT POINT OUT THE UTILITY OF SUCH A MEASURE.*” If he did not mean this as an insolent piece of mockery, it displays a deficiency of memory beyond example, or must have originated from a cause more dreadful than either. He had but eight days before at the head of 15,000 men, run away from this business himself; yet from the ocean, writes back to Clinton, he need not point out to him THE UTILITY of a diversion in favour of Burgoyne; and writes this too, after having stripped him of the power of doing it.

Gen. Howe writes to G. Clinton to act in favour of G. Burgoyne, after stripping him of the power.

But where did he go himself?—To regale for 5 weeks at sea during the heat of the dog days; to see his soldiers beat the enemy, but not to permit a pursuit; to lavish the lives of his men and officers in ill planned attacks; to take a defenceless town from which he never chose to stir a day’s march; and there to be blocked up, together with his whole army, by a wretched enemy, not a third of his force.—Abandoning the Canada army to perish for want of a co-operation, and by that disaster drawing down upon his ill fated country a powerful combination of new enemies, and sinking her—into an abyss of shame and misfortune.

As this desertion of his, lost us the northern army, and is the source of our present mortifying and critical situation, we should now wish to quit the humiliating detail, but the sake of uniformity forces us to proceed, to the close of his operations. Having thus put our misfortunes in the train of completion, and opened upon us all the floodgates of disgrace, he peeped into the mouth of the Delaware, 30th of July, where hearing of a formidable water force of two or three frigates, and a score or two of galleys and row boats, with a great gun in each, and that Washington was posted at Wilmington to oppose him, though in fact, the rebel general and his whole army were at least 80 miles distant from that place, and who did not even reach Philadelphia, little more than half way, till August 23d, full four and twenty days after this supernatural intelligence had advanced him to Wilmington; our gallant commander turned his stern to the Delaware (as did his lordship with his whole

whole fleet of men of war, frigates, and transports) and made off for Chesapeak, that he might land quietly and at his ease, which he certainly did, after something more than four weeks struggle with adverse winds, and those very winds would in less than four days have carried him as high up the Delaware as Newcastle, within 36 miles of Philadelphia, at which town, by his own round about way, he did not arrive till between two and three months, from the time of his embarkation at New York; and by landing at Newcastle too he would have been within 7 or 8 miles of his favourite road by the Elk, if he had then chosen to get into it. But let us grant for a moment, that Washington was at Wilmington, and that his being there, was the occasion of the noble brothers carrying the army round to Chesapeak, according to Sir Andrew Hammond's evidence; to what a grand discovery does this concession lead! The general took a month to sail round to Chesapeak, and to land at Elk river. And what is the distance from Wilmington, where Sir Andrew places Washington, to the Elk river? Pray reader observe,—that from Wilmington to Elk river, is just 23 miles! so the noble brothers made a month's voyage to avoid landing in the face of Washington, whilst he had only 23 miles to march in that month, if he should choose to oppose them. Well might a noble lord say he did not to this hour understand the southern voyage by Chesapeak; and that he had evidence to prove Sir Andrew Hammond's information chimerical; for Washington was in the Jerseys when this Gentleman had placed him at Wilmington. Mr. Galloway's evidence has settled this point. Had our commander landed in the Delaware, he would have had a constant communication with, and assistance from the ships of war, from which he totally precluded himself, by sailing round to Chesapeak, and marching across the country to Philadelphia. At that time too, Mud island had only 130 men in it, and Billingsport only 90, both militia, there being no continental troops in Pennsylvania, nor were the floating batteries manned, nor the lower chevaux de frize fixed in the river. There is no doubt this comes from a gentleman then in Pennsylvania, though it is not in evidence. Thus, besides obtaining an easy conquest from the weakness of the rebel defences, and advancing our operations some months, we should have saved the ships of war burned at Mud island, and the brave Donop and near 400 Hessians; we should have taken that island early in August, at a most trifling loss, instead of meeting with repeated defeats, and having the communication between the army and fleet cut off till the middle of November.

Howe fails a month to avoid Washington, who has only 23 miles to march in that time.

We should here offer a military criticism on the Brandywine manoeuvres, so celebrated by some of the evidences; but we have no intention to lessen the merits, real or supposed, of that successful action; it may be sufficient to observe, that our commander was under the necessity of fighting or retreating. But here the old question recurs,—why was there no pursuit?

The next action of any consequence is, what has been generally called the surprize at German town. An evidence, the only one examined on that point, declared, that Gen. Howe gave him information the day before, that he would be attacked next morning at day-break. Yet this does not clear up the point; but rather involves

volves it in farther obscurity ; for the same officer declined to answer the question, Whether the army, or any part of it, was surprized on that day ? We never heard in America, that the army had been apprized the day before that action, that they would be attacked next morning ; but all the circumstances of the action would lead us to a supposition, that it was surprized. The 2d battalion of light infantry under Lieut. Col. Maitland, supported by the 40th regiment under Lieut. Col. Musgrave, by the general's own letter, " sustained the enemy's attack *for a considerable time*, till they " were overpowered by numbers and forced to retreat, at which " time Lieut. Col. Musgrave threw himself into a stone house, " with 6 companies of the 40th, and gallantly defended it, till the " army came to his relief." Now if there was no surprize, would the rebels have had a *considerable time* to overpower these two battalions ? Would not Lord Cornwallis instead of " being *early* apprized at Philadelphia of the enemy's approach," have been apprized the evening before, and have been *then* ordered up ; instead of being apprized *early*, as it would appear, after the attack had commenced, and forced to bring up the grenadiers upon the run from Philadelphia, just 8 miles distant ? Does not this sending 8 miles to Philadelphia, and Lord Cornwallis's arrival " just as the enemy were " forced out of the village," in all 16 miles, imply, that the action lasted more than an hour and a half ? If the general had information, before sunset, the day preceding this attack, would it not have been more prudent to have brought up the squadron of light dragoons, and the grenadiers, in the cool of the evening of *that day*, than to have waited till the attack began, and then bringing them up out of breath with running 8 miles ? Will any person say that Lieut. Cols. Maitland and Musgrave, (than whom perhaps two better officers are not to be found, either in our army, or in any other army,) had advice of this attack the evening before, and allowed themselves to be surprized ? It would be no compliment to the general officers who commanded the several corps, to say, that they had also been apprized the evening before of this attack, and that they had been so deficient in point of duty, as to permit the enemy to advance, and engage *a considerable time*, and overpower two battalions of our best troops, and enter our encampment in the very center of it, and nearly cut our army in two, before they could put their men under arms ? Whereas, if they had been informed the evening before, they would, most assuredly, have had their several brigades under arms all night, ready to repulse the enemy the moment of their appearance, and would not have permitted them to engage in a considerable combat for a length of time, to overpower part of the army, and to penetrate into our very quarters ? Another wonderful circumstance in this business, is, that the rebels marched 16 miles, from Shippack creek, to make this attack, which one would have imagined must have fatigued them much more than our troops, who were attacked in their encampment, without having marched at all ; and yet from the general's letter, " such was the expedition with which they fled" that our men were not able to overtake them. The rebels, it seems, after a march of 16 miles, were more alert to retreat, than our troops, who had not marched one mile were to pursue. On the whole, if this was not a surprize, it is

The battle of Germantown a surprize.

a very incomprehensible affair, and must remain one of the many *arcana*, in which the general conduct of the American war is involved.

The next capital event, in the order of time, is the attack of Red Bank. Lord Cornwallis says, "that Col. Donop desired him to represent to the general that he thought he had not been sufficiently considered, that he had had no separate command, and, consequently, had had no opportunity of distinguishing himself." In answer, the general said he would take the first opportunity of giving him a suitable separate command. And an opportunity he did take. The general had seen Redbank fortified before his face, but did not think proper to attack it, till the rebels had completed their works. Lieut. Col. Sterling at the head of two regiments drove the rebels from Billingsport, Oct. 1st. Lord Cornwallis tells us, "that the Lieut. Colonel could not proceed to Redbank for want of a reinforcement." Gen. Grey says, "troops could not be spared to occupy Redbank, and if they could have been spared, they would have been exposed to the fire of the rebel galleys and other vessels, and that Donop's troops, when attacking it, suffered greatly from the fire of the galleys." Capt. Montefor says, "that if we had possessed the east bank of the Delaware above Billingsport, we could have destroyed the rebel shipping above that post." This last is the fact: had we raised a battery on Redbank, the rebel galleys instead of annoying it, could not have lain near it with any degree of safety; so that instead of our troops being exposed by being in possession of Redbank, they absolutely would have commanded the rebel water force, which we could then have easily destroyed, and Mud Island which cost us so much time and two men of war must have fallen instantly, as the rebels then could not have relieved it with fresh men every six hours, which the possession of Redbank *alone* enabled them to do. Of the 5000 men posted at Philadelphia and Wilmington, some hundreds might easily have been spared to occupy it, and had they covered themselves with works as the rebels did, Washington's whole army could not have taken it. But the dæmon of misfortune and folly presided in our councils. It has been positively asserted in America, and since that at home, that Lieut. Col. Sterling would have taken possession of Redbank, but was not permitted. We, it appears, could afford to lose near 400 men in attacking it when fortified; but could not afford a man to take possession of it when we could have done it without loss; for the rebels did not occupy it till after they were driven from Billingsport. Having thus stated our previous misconduct, let us consider the orders and attack, which is indeed a melancholy consideration. Donop's orders were verbal, they were delivered by Lord Cornwallis, and we must take them according to his lordship's recollection, "that Sir William Howe by no means wished Col. Donop to sacrifice the troops; that if the place could not be easily carried, to give notice, and reinforcements and artillery should be sent him; but that if it could be carried easily, the general wished him to *brusquer l'affaire*. It is evident that arguing solely from these orders, as given to us, by those who could have no interest in exculpating Donop. that the general meant he should attempt the place

Folly in not occupying Redbank before the rebels.

Donop sacrificed.

place by a coup de main ; sending him without artillery implied it. All military men know that a German can hardly be forced to move a foot without artillery, even when he has no certainty of meeting an enemy. To send a German then, without artillery, to assault an enemy strongly posted, and covered with intrenchments, has been thought by many a committing him to death, and equivalent to the cruelty of telling him so, before he marched. The gallant Donop was unfortunately circumstanced. He had thought the general had neglected him, and had conveyed that idea to the general ; could a brave man in this predicament, cavil at his orders ? Certainly not, and preserve his character. Could he first solicit a command, and then dispute with his commander on the manner of conducting it ? After being detached without artillery, and with a *sufficient hint* to attempt the place by a brisk attack, a brave man had no choice left him. Any delay on his part might have been construed into timidity. Therefore he marched, did his duty, and fell. Even rebels respected his memory, and interred him with military honours. But, who was he that sent him without artillery on this desperate undertaking ? A commander, who had called off a victorious army from much less respectable works, which a routed enemy had shewn him the way over ; but there battering cannon was to be waited for, and a weak, extended line to be approached with all the formalities of a regular siege.* Whereas Donop had to attack, a compact post, covered with double entrenchments, defended by half his own numbers, the approaches to which were flanked by the fire of *that formidable rebel water force* ; the *very idea* of which, three months before, had deterred the commander and his brother, with their whole fleet and army, *from even entering the Delaware*.

In this attack Donop should have had artillery, as all the army knew, that Redbank, and the rebel galleys, and floating batteries afforded each other a mutual protection ; at this time our ships could not act against Redbank and the water guard, as the chevaux de frize prevented them from coming so high up.

Howe instead of reinforcing Clinton, weakens him.

Much about this time Sir Henry Clinton had stormed the rebel forts in the Highlands, having been reinforced by 1700 men from England. When Gen. Howe heard of this reinforcement, he immediately wrote for the troops to be sent to him at Philadelphia ; on receiving this order, Sir Henry Clinton was under the necessity of abandoning the Highland forts ; and the troops sailed for Philadelphia early in November. Thus instead of reinforcing Gen. Clinton, as he had given him hopes, the commander in chief withdrew from him the reinforcement which had come from England. It is true, that in the next month, December, Gen. Howe sent the 71st and the regiment of Mirbach to New York, which was of no further service than encreasing the garrison there ; for the Canada army had been fought down and taken prisoners, and the Highlands

* *The rebel lines on Long island Mr. Montresor has said were one mile and an half in extent, other writers have called them three miles ; Mr. Montresor reckons from Wallabout bay to the head of the Morass on the right ; the others, it is supposed, reckon from Redhook to Wallabout bay.*

lands had been deserted, when Gen. Howe called off the above-mentioned reinforcement to Philadelphia.

Our commander himself seemed to think, that his disgraceful and ruinous operations had completed the ruin of the British interest in America; or if he had not done it, it seemed as if he wished to complete it. For previously to his embarkation for England, he advised Mr. Galloway, and the magistrates of Philadelphia, *to go over to, and submit to the rebels.*—Here language fails us to express our detestation! Had this man not been the favourite of opposition,—How would these emphatical words—Treason! Traitor! Punishment! Public Justice! been echoed through the kingdom.

Opposition
clamours if
Gen. Howe
had not
been their
favourite.

On hearing the examination of Gen. Robertson and Mr. Galloway, opposition found they could not pervert the enquiry to an attack on ministry, with any hopes of success; they found themselves entangled in their own factious web; in vain they implored aid of ministry to extricate them; it would have been impolitic indeed for ministers to have interfered. The friends of the general and admiral therefore moved to dissolve the Committee, which they had clamoured so much to obtain, and it was dissolved accordingly. Whilst this was going on, ministry were silent, they sat viewing the confusion and perplexity of their opponents with the coldest indifference, only the noble lord at the head of the American department, though the whole of their malignity had been directed against him, in pity, shook his head.

ENQUIRY or REMARKS On Gen. Howe's Speech, Conduct, and Letters.

THE general says, “his only view is to justify himself—that many severe censures have been thrown out against him, and ministers have been silent—that when he was calumniated, he should have been vindicated by the noble lord.” Let me ask the honourable general, who were the calumniators? where were the censures past? there has been no charge brought against him in Parliament; and he expressly says, “that his conduct has been approved of, and that the minister conveyed that approbation.” Whatever were his deserts, he cannot complain of want of support from administration. The papers before the House are replete with the most flattering marks of attention from the noble lord at the head of the American department; he not only conveys the approbation of the sovereign, but is himself lavish of praise and personal civility. Did not the King honour him with a red ribbon unasked; and can any thing be more strongly marked than the attention that has ever been paid to his recommendations? almost all his aid de camps, who were captains at the beginning of the campaign 1776, are now lieutenant colonels, and many of them have been promoted by the King, without his even asking it. He expressed his wish for particular officers to be sent out to serve upon the staff; they were all sent as he desired. He wanted to have Mr. M^cKenzie his secretary appointed paymaster to the provincial forces, a very lucrative office; it was done. In short, every thing was done that could be done to keep him in good humour.

Flattering
attentions
to keep him
in good hu-
mour.

His conduct
universally
condemned.

But says he, "I have been severely censured, and ministers have been silent." Does he allude to anonymous publications? he surely could not expect the ministers to vindicate his character against such attacks as these! the noble lord might as well expect the same favour from the general. He could not be so weak as to suppose that ministers could stop the mouth of calumny, or influence the public opinion! they would undoubtedly be very glad to be able to exercise such a power; it might be often very convenient for them; but the misfortune is, that in this land of liberty, people will speak their sentiments in spite of ministers, or any body else. It is true, the general's conduct has been censured—severely censured, or rather universally condemned. It has not been in news papers alone, and anonymous publications that he has been attacked, but his inactivity and his blunders, have been subjects of general conversation: people of all ranks and descriptions have spoken their minds freely upon the matter, and have testified their disapprobation and uneasiness without reserve. But are ministers to be blamed for this! If the general thinks that a vote of the House of Commons will whiten him, and convince the world that he is a great commander, he does very right to move for a parliamentary enquiry. Indeed it is the only chance he has left, poor as it is, of rescuing his character, as an officer, from total perdition. Conscious as he must be that his conduct in America will not bear the strict examination of a military enquiry, and encouraged by the flattering success that others in his situation have met with, I am not surpris'd that he has chosen the safer method of laying his case before a good natured and indulgent House of Commons, rather than demanding a court martial, when he found himself "censured" and "calumniated." For though the sentence of a military court, and that only could acquit him in the eyes of military people, yet as members of Parliament are, *ex officio*, competent judges of military operations, as well as of all other matters whether political or professional, he might think that their approbation might stand in lieu of a regular acquittal, and then there would be no risk; for if he did not succeed, he could always impute it to the undue influence of a wicked and corrupt administration, and his character would not be at all the worse for his having failed. Opposition would always be ready to receive him with open arms, and the merit of having rendered abortive the plans of the present ministry, however well they might have been contrived for the public good, could not fail to entitle him to a high seat among those worthy characters who stile themselves patriots, and the guardians of the liberties of this country.

His charges
disingenuous.

We shall endeavour to answer all Sir Wm. Howe's charges against administration, and prove that they are disingenuous and ill founded. He says, "his orders should have been clear"—not whispers across the Atlantic; "not so ambiguously expressed, that they might always be explained away." He complains of wanting the confidence and support of his superiors—the want of a plan from home, &c. yet at the same time acknowledges, "that his own plans and measures met with such approbation from the minister, that he could justify himself under it if he thought proper." Is it not a strong proof of confidence in a general, when unhampered by

by instructions, and uncontrouled by any superior power, he is left entirely at liberty to follow his own plans, and prosecute a war according to his own ideas? and was it ever before a matter of serious complaint against a minister, that he did not furnish military plans in detail to a commander in chief; especially when every plan proposed by the general was sure to meet with approbation? The secretary of state, in his letter dated October 22, 1776, expressly says, "his Majesty does not intend that the general should in his plans of operation be confined to any particular province: his choice of situation must in that respect be governed by his own judgment." How many times in the course of a few months did Sir William Howe alter his plan for the campaign of 1777? between the months of November and April, no less than four, essentially different from each other, were proposed, and yet by the general's own account, each of them in its turn was approved of. The minister in his letter of the 3d of March says, "I am now commanded to acquaint you, that the King entirely approves of your deviation from the plan which you formerly suggested." And again, May 18th, "As you must from your situation and military skill, be a competent judge of the propriety of every plan, his Majesty does not hesitate to approve the alterations which you propose." Indeed the nature of the American service requires that the general should be at liberty to vary his plan of operations, according to the varying circumstances of the war; and to any, who will take the trouble to cast his eye over the American correspondence, it will plainly appear, that the most ample and generous confidence was placed in Sir William Howe, from the time he came to the chief command till he asked leave to return to this country.—He was not only supported with the whole weight of government, but was indulged in all his wishes both for himself and his friends.—Unasked favours and honours were heaped upon him with the most liberal hand—and he was entrusted with every power both civil and military, that could add weight and dignity to his situation, or claim respect from those about him, and from the world.

Generous confidence placed in him.

But though he was left thus entirely at liberty to act as he thought proper, and as exigences might require, yet he was by no means ignorant of the ideas of administration respecting the future operations of the war. The minister did very often take the liberty of humbly proposing his plans, though he never presumed so far as to give any positive orders in consequence of them. Indeed sometimes the King went so far as to suggest his ideas, and his royal will and pleasure has been signified by the secretary of state. I confess that this in any other service would be construed an order, but I hope the general will not complain of it as such, as he never thought proper in any one instance to pay the least attention to it, any more than to the plans suggested by the minister. Sir William Howe and his noble brother have the entire merit of every military plan that was executed during his command, not excepting the famous one of the voyage round the capes of Virginia and up Chesapeake bay, which brought on the loss of Burgoyne's army, the present war with France, and every subsequent evil that has arisen from them to this country.

Has lost Burgoyne and raised a new war.

The general in his speech complains of the minister for having sent him a copy of his letter to Sir Guy Carleton (containing the arrangements for the Canada expedition) without any instructions whatever to himself. I am astonished that an officer could hazard a charge so unmilitary. Could any instructions be necessary when the copy of the secretary of state's dispatch made him perfectly acquainted with every circumstance relating to the northern army? Does not the letter say, that Sir Guy Carleton was to "detach Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne with direction to proceed with all possible expedition to join (him) Gen. Howe, and to put himself under his command?" That "with a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected?" And in another place, "I shall write to Sir William Howe from hence by the first packet; but you will nevertheless endeavour to give him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also direct Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne, and Lieut. Col. St. Leger, to neglect no opportunity of doing the same, that they may receive instructions from Sir William Howe." Surely no order could have been framed that, in the eyes of a military man, could appear more binding upon the general, than the copy of this letter to Sir Guy Carleton? it made a part of a general plan, from which he could not deviate, without *hazarding* or *devoting* an expedition, whose movements he had not time to countermand, and whose operations he knew were begun. The moment these troops crossed the lakes, they became a part of his army, and their subsequent misfortunes, if they arose from the want of support and co-operation, are as much to be laid to his charge, as the surprize and defeat of the Hessians, which he left exposed and unsupported at Trenton.

Turns ac-
cuser.

Gen. Howe, in the beginning of his speech expressly declared, he only meant to "justify himself;" yet we afterwards find him turned the accuser, and obliquely charging administration with crimes of the most serious nature—that of hiding from Parliament the true state of our affairs in America, and promising success, when they knew there was no reason to expect it. This ground Mr. Fox took up after him, and with his usual virulence charged ministers directly with having "treacherously and traiterously deceived this country." He said they had declared to the House of Commons, "that they had reason to expect a successful campaign, when they knew, and when they had it in their pockets under the general's own hand, that nothing was to be expected."

The general's words were not so pointed as those of Mr. Fox, nor did they convey a charge so directly; yet their meaning is the same. They were as follow: "The noble lord said he learned from his intelligence the difficulties the rebels were under in raising troops, that he hoped I should be able to get a sufficient force in Pennsylvania for the defence of that province; and he still hoped that this campaign would be the last. So that in spite of my positive assurances from the spot, the minister's delusive hopes and conjectures were to influence him in opposition to my certain knowledge.

However delusive the minister's hopes and conjectures may have been, his intelligence does not appear to have been materially different

ferent from that of the general, notwithstanding this round assertion to the contrary.—Let us hear what the general's letters say upon this subject—those very letters which Mr. Fox charges the minister with having had in his pocket when he told the House he had reason to expect a successful campaign. April 2d, 1777, he writes from New York, that “it is his opinion the rebels will not be able to raise their army voted last autumn, &c.” And again, “I have reason to expect in case of success in Pennsylvania, there will be found a considerable part of the inhabitants who may be embodied as militia, and some as provincial troops, for the interior defence of the province, which must be a great aid in the further progress of the war.” And in the same letter he says, “still I think it probable that by the latter end of the campaign, we shall be in possession of the provinces of New York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania.” In his letter of the 20th December 1776, the general tells the minister, that, “the opinions of people were much changed in Pennsylvania, and their minds in general, from the late progress of the army, disposed to peace; in which sentiment they would be confirmed by our getting possession of Philadelphia.”—And he says in his speech, “In the mean time from all the intelligence I received, the reduction of Pennsylvania appeared very practicable, though I should have but an army of 19,000 men.

His ill
founded
promises.

I will not insist upon the fact, that the rebels did actually find difficulties in raising troops, but will, for the sake of the argument, suppose the minister ignorant of what every body else knew; nor will I lay any stress upon the great abilities of the general, nor his activity and “impatience to begin the campaign,” which are mentioned by the minister in his letter of the 18th May, and are given as reasons for his hoping for a successful campaign. I will confine myself simply to the information contained in the general's letters, and will then leave it to the world to judge, whether the minister's assertion is not justified in the most ample manner, even upon this ground. The noble lord told the House, “that he had reason to expect a successful campaign.” The general writes to the noble lord, “that by the latter end of the campaign he expects to be in possession of the provinces of New York, Jerseys, and Pennsylvania:” 'tis true he adds, “that this in some measure must depend upon the successes of the northern army.” In his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, inclosed in the letter to the minister of the 2d of April, Gen. Howe writes, “that the possession of Ticonderoga would naturally be the first object of the northern army;” and recommended “the securing Albany and the adjacent country” as the second. “The further progress of this corps,” says he, “depending so much upon the enemy's movements, cannot be foreseen at this distance of time, still I flatter myself, and have reason to expect the friends of government in that part of the country, will be found so numerous, and so ready to give every aid and assistance in their power, that it will prove no difficult task to reduce the more rebellious parts of the province.” The 16th of July the general writes, “the enemy's movements taking this turn,” (viz. Washington marching to the defence of Pennsylvania) “I apprehend Gen. Burgoyne will meet with little interrup-

Minister
justified
from
Howe's
own let-
ters.

tion

And Burgoyne's.

tion, otherwise than the difficulties he must encounter in transporting stores and provisions for the supply of his army." But let us see how far the minister's hopes were authorized by his intelligence from that quarter. Gen. Burgoyne, in his letter dated Skenesborough, July 11th, 1777, says, "your lordship will pardon me, if I lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured to propose, in my original project for the campaign, to make a real effort, instead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, instead of my right, I should have little doubt of subduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion originated. If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I still hope this plan may be adopted from Albany."

The deceivers turn accusers.

Who would not have imagined from these accounts that the rebellion was at an end? Who would have hesitated at promising a successful campaign? It is true, our expectations were deceived, our hopes were most cruelly disappointed; but shall the authors of our misfortunes, those very men who flattered us with the hope of brilliant success from operations they themselves planned, and who afterwards by their delays and blunders wasted the campaign and sacrificed our armies, be allowed to call those hopes delusive, and charge the minister with deceiving Parliament, when they themselves have been the only deceivers.

Howe astonished at the force sent him.

Was the force sent out from this country equal to the objects of the American war? The noble lord at the head of the American department being asked in the House of Commons, soon after he came into office, what force he thought would be sufficient to reduce the revolted colonies? replied, "that the measures of the force should be the wishes of the general." This truly is a generous method of estimating force for military operations. And we find that Gen. Howe's wishes were not only gratified in this respect, but the force that was sent out in the spring of 1776, so far exceeded his most sanguine expectations, that he appears to have been surprised to a degree of astonishment at the amazing efforts that had been made. What he thought of the preparations, and of the minister, under whose immediate direction they were made, will best appear, by his own letter, dated Halifax, 8th June, 1776, where he says, "I cannot take leave of your lordship without expressing my utter amazement at the decisive and masterly strokes for carrying such extensive plans into immediate execution, as have been effected since your lordship has assumed the conduct of this war, which is already most happily experienced by those who have the honour of serving here under your auspices. That you may finally receive the acknowledgements of a grateful country, the lasting glory which such services merit; and that I may in some degree contribute to the completion of measures so vigorously concerted, is the fervent wish of your lordship's, &c. W. HOWE." In his letter of the 2d of April 1777, the general acknowledges that the force of 1776 was adequate to its object. It would be therefore preposterous in me to adduce a single argument to prove it. I will, however, beg leave just to state the following facts, that Gen. Howe's army in 1776, exceeded 30,000 regular, effective troops, exclusive of those left at Halifax, and of the northern

thern army, and that Washington's army did not amount to more than 16,000 men.

By what means such an army, so well appointed, served by so large a train of artillery, and attended by so numerous a fleet, could fail of success against a divided people, destitute of officers, soldiers, magazines, fortified towns, ships of war, or any apparent resources, will be the subject of my enquiry. I follow the general in not entering into the policy or justice of the war, nor shall I dwell upon the wanton unparalleled sacrifice of our bravest troops on Bunker's hill, but will take up his conduct where he thought proper to do it in his speech, viz. at the time of his receiving orders from the Secretary of State for evacuating Boston, and before I follow him to the southward will shew—that by his not quitting Boston when he was ordered to do it, and it might have been effected without any disgrace, the army remained thro' the winter cooped up in a most ignominious situation, suffering for want of necessaries, exposed to insult, and were neither the objects of terror, or cause of distress to the rebels;—that by abandoning that post when he had wrote to government that he should not, and by declaring that Boston was tenable and then suffering the rebels to drive him from it with marks of disgrace, he did his utmost to depress the spirits of the troops and to raise those of the rebels;—that tho' the invincible fortitude of British troops prevented the first, the latter had its full effect; the defection from Great Britain was greatly increased, and the rebels excited to exertions that otherwise they would never have attempted.—That by not blockading the harbour, as the general himself had recommended, in case Boston should be evacuated, and leaving that as well as the other sea ports on the coast in every respect open and accommodated to their naval efforts, the rebels not only supplied themselves with military stores from our own store-ships, and captured great numbers of our troops, but were enabled to collect such a marine as to make depredations on our trade in every part of the world, which for some time was the sole support of the rebellion: and that by going northward, 600 miles further from the intended scene of action, instead of going southward as he had been directed, the spring and summer were wasted away. Washington had four or five months leisure to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to draw the whole force of the continent to the spot where he knew our main army was destined. So that finally, with an army so decidedly superior to the enemy, the general did little more in that campaign than provide winter quarters for the troops. But these wretched manœuvres, unequalled but by the wretched excuses made for them, shall now be the subject of consideration.

Having now fully obviated the charges which the general thought proper to institute against the minister, I will consider Sir William Howe's vindication of his own conduct. "The order (says he) for evacuating Boston came too late for me to execute it when I received it. I did execute it on the 17th of March, and in a manner, I trust, that was free from disgrace." It is only necessary to consider what those orders were, and the time and manner in which they were executed, to decide on this part of the general's conduct. In the beginning of November 1775, Gen. Howe received

Train of
G. Howe's
conduct.

His wretched manœuvres and wretched excuses.

Boston evacuation.

ceived a letter from the Earl of Dartmouth, wherein, after referring to a former letter which had suggested the advantages of the army's being removed to New York, and the hazard of continuing at Boston through the winter, his Lordship writes, "The intelligence and information of every day since have shewn more clearly both the one and the other, and the situation of the troops cooped up in a town, exposed to insult and annoyance, if not surprize, from more places than one, deprived of the comforts and necessaries of life, wasting away by disease and desertion faster than we can recruit, and no longer the objects of terror or cause of distress to the rebels, is truly alarming, and demands the most serious consideration; and I am commanded by the King to say, that if no alteration for the better should have happened before this letter reaches you, or any unexpected advantages of carrying on the war, on the side of New England, should have opened themselves, it seems not only adviseable but necessary to abandon Boston before the winter, &c.—and to remove with the troops either to New York, or some other place to the southward, where a squadron of the King's ships may not only lie, but carry on operations with security during the winter." Here is an explicit, practicable order, framed on the real situation of affairs in America, by conforming to which, great evils were to be avoided, and advantages of equal magnitude to be obtained. Had the general, immediately on receiving it, gone to New York, he might have effected in 1775 nearly, if not quite as much, as he did in 1776 with 30,000 troops. There was nothing to oppose his army, which then consisted of 9000 effective men. Staten island and Long island would have received him with open arms, and New York, by his own confession, was then in his power. The army would not only have been relieved from the pressure of an ignominious and distressing blockade, have abounded with fresh provisions, and been able to carry on operations during the winter, but what was of still greater moment, the early possession of New York would have left the immense armament that was sent to America in 1776, at liberty to act on the extensive scale for which it was calculated, and to which it was adequate, and a total suppression of the rebellion have been the necessary consequence.

Various conjectures on his conduct.

But whether it is to be imputed to incapacity, to an utter inability to combine circumstances, to balance probable events, and to improve situations and conjunctures, to the fordid views of those who principally composed his cabinet council: to his own love of ease, and reluctance he felt at abandoning the routine of pleasure that had been established at Boston for the winter; or to his being wedded to a system of politics that favoured the rebellion, I do not pretend to say, but certain it is, Gen. Howe so conducted as to suffer all the evil pointed out in his lordship's letter, with accumulated ignominy and disgrace, as well as to lose every advantage that had been suggested. The general did not think proper to obey the Secretary of State's order, and assigned for the reason of his disobedience, that he had not sufficient shipping to effect the removal at one embarkation, and going at two would be hazardous. True it is that the tonnage of the shipping then at Boston fell short of the quantity usually allowed for long voyages; there was,

how-

however, a sufficiency for a short one; for in the March following, when the evacuation took place, there was still less shipping in the harbour, owing to more vessels, having, within that period, been sent to Carolina, Georgia, Nova Scotia, the West Indies, and to Europe than had arrived; notwithstanding which, enough were found to transport the army which had been reinforced in the mean time, together with 1100 loyal inhabitants, at one embarkation, besides near 50 sail of vessels left at the wharfs, for the use of the rebels, many of which were soon converted into privateers, and decorated with the thirteen stripes. These are facts, and I adduce them as unequivocal proof of the insufficiency of the reasons, given by Sir William, for his continuing in Boston during the winter. And I allow him credit for saying nothing in the House of Commons, of a want of transports, and retting his defence for disobeying the order solely only on its late arrival. But unfortunately for him this ground is equally untenable with that which he abandoned; for the northerly winds, which he tells us in the same letter prevail at that season, are extremely favourable for a movement southward.

His written
excuse re-
futed.

His verbal
excuse re-
futed.

The crushing the privateering business in its bud was another object worthy the attention of a general. In November 1775, the assembly of Massachusetts passed an act for granting letters of marque and reprisal, and constituting a court of admiralty for the condemnation of British ships. The destruction of those nests of pirates, the sea ports, where the evil originated, might have been very easily effected, and would have rendered the most essential service to the British empire, as it would have prevented the depredations on our unsuspecting trade, and have cut off the only resources that for a long time enabled the rebels to carry on the war. But this was never once in contemplation. To judge from his letters, Sir William intended neither the one nor the other; but after solacing himself at Boston during the winter, to have gone, at his own leisure, in a pleasant season of the year—to some other place.

To quiet the minds of administration, the general wrote he was not under “the least apprehension of any attack from the rebels by surprize or otherwise; on the contrary, that it was to be wished that they would attempt so rash a step;” requested instructions respecting the effects at Boston; and proposed that whenever the troops should be withdrawn, a battalion should be entrenched at a place where ships could winter in safety, for blockading the harbour. Government acquiesced in the reasons he had given, and the assurances he had made, and not doubting but their general might be found at Boston in the spring, sent a large force to that place, and expected him to put a very different face on the war there before he left it. But in this, as in every other instance, in which any confidence had been placed in our hero, they were to be disappointed.

His written
bravado.

The rebels having cannonaded and bombarded the town from Roxburgh and Phipps Farm, three nights successively, in the beginning of March, with very little effect however, unless it was the amusing and diverting the attention of the garrison from the main object, took post on the commanding heights of Dorchester neck. Here, as at Bunker's hill, the works were in great forwardness

Rebels oc-
cupy Dor-
chester.

when discovered; with this difference, however, that these were more extensive, had strong abbaties round them, and were so situated as not to admit of the choice of ground for attacking them as the others did. The general tells us they must have employed 12,000 men in their construction; we may therefore reasonably conclude, that they would have been defended by an equal number. A detachment of 2400 only were ordered to dislodge the rebels, and were embarked in transports to fall down the harbour to Castle William, from whence the descent was to be made. The intervention of a violent storm of wind and rain prevented the attack, and providentially saved those devoted troops; and the very next day, without any material change of circumstances having taken place, (for the storm that had prevented the debarkation of the troops had stopt the progress of the works) the enterprize was abandoned, and to the utter astonishment of all who were not in the general's councils, orders issued for evacuating Boston.

The favourite engineer neglected it.

Now, I beg leave to ask Sir William Howe whether Boston was tenable or not? he had indeed staked his reputation as a general on the affirmative. If it was not, how could he or his favourite engineer overlook this post? Could they suppose that the rebels, who before winter had made regular approaches to the foot of this hill, would fail as soon as the season opened to occupy the top of it? why were no precautions taken to prevent it? why was not a post established there as at Bunker's hill? or if Boston was tenable as the general had pledged himself, and I confess I have not the least doubt of, why in God's name was it so shamefully abandoned? why were the army and the loyalists obliged to combat war, pestilence, and famine through the winter at Boston, only to be hurried from it in the spring? or why was the town finally evacuated with circumstances so dispiriting to the troops, and so encouraging to the rebels? All the cannon at Charlestown, the greatest part of those on the lines at the neck, two 13-inch mortars, and other ordnance, amounting in the whole to (serviceable and unserviceable) 100 pieces, great quantities of military stores, and even provisions, fell into the hands of the rebels. And as though something was still wanting to swell their triumph and make it complete, a convention was entered into with the rebels, with Gen. Howe's knowledge and approbation, that the town should not be injured, in case they would suffer the troops to embark without interruption. The agreement was religiously kept; as the last division of troops embarked at the long wharf, a flag was hoisted on the steeple of a church, and Washington entered the town with drums beating, music playing, colours flying, and in all the pride and exultation of victory.

100 cannon &c. abandoned.

However forcible the reasons for evacuating Boston before the winter had been, those for not doing it at this time were equally strong. The season had moderated, several victuallers had arrived, and the circumstances of the garrison were rendered happy to what they had been. The being compelled, or what was equally as bad, the appearance of being compelled to surrender that long contested town, indeed the only one in the thirteen confederated provinces, that the crown was in possession of, could not fail of producing the worst effects on the minds of the colonists. Besides, it must

recess-

"necessarily counteract the plans, and derange the measures of administration.

Had the general only entrenched a battalion on George's island, as he had purposed, this with a man of war, would have been mutual securities to each other, and would have prevented our transports, victuallers, and storeships from running and even fighting their way directly into their enemies port. As this was neglected, a man of war that was left behind, was soon compelled to quit her station, and there was at least an equal chance of so great a part of our fleet being caught in the snare, as even to have prevented a campaign.—Fortune was once more our friend, and warded off so great a calamity; so many ships however, by this means fell into the hands of the rebels, as to supply them with ordnance, a complete assortment of military stores, and camp equipage, and several thousand suits of regimentals; articles which were absolutely necessary for them to take the field, and which at that time they could have had by no other means. Besides, near 1000 of our best troops were made prisoners.

Store ships and 1000 men lost.

Had the general gone southward as he was directed, the consequences would not have been so bad; but in defiance of orders, advice, and even common sense, he sailed to the opposite point of the compass, and carried the army to the northern extremity of the continent, 600 miles directly from the intended scene of action. Want of provision has been suggested as an excuse for this extraordinary step; but a moment's reflection will convince us of its insufficiency; for Nova Scotia as the general tells us in his letter, had been stripped of its provisions the preceding winter; and the victuallers, on which his sole dependence was placed, were all destined for Boston: these could as well have followed him south as north; and besides Rhode island, Staten island, and Long island, abounded with provisions. The only reason the general himself thought proper to give for this mysterious conduct was, that the transports were crowded, and the stores disordered. This might with propriety have been urged as a motive for not going against a place, where an enemy was in force to oppose him; but surely it is not a sufficient reason for his not going to places where there was no enemy, nor possibly could be any before his arrival, viz. Staten island, Long island, or even Rhode island. It could not be pretended that a reinforcement was necessary, for he finally left Halifax, and took possession of Staten island with less force than that which he sailed with from Boston. By this delay all the spring and summer, were wasted away on our part; the rebels were at liberty to fortify New York and its dependencies, and to collect all the force of the continent to that spot where they knew our arms would be directed; the dislodgment of which force occupied our whole army the remainder of the campaign.

Sails 600 miles out of his way.

Upon a review of Gen. Howe's conduct at the northward, I don't know which part of his generalship to admire most; his unnecessary assault of the rebel works at Bunker's hill, whereby three quarters of the assailants were killed and wounded—or after this experience, his ordering 2400 troops to dislodge 12,000 rebels still more strongly posted on the heights of Dorchester neck; his neglecting to evacuate Boston in the fall, under pretence of his not

Review of his conduct.

having sufficient shipping, and yet doing it in the spring with more troops and fewer ships; his assuring the ministry that Boston was tenable, and inducing them to send a reinforcement there, and before its arrival suffering himself to be driven from it at the head of 9000 British troops; his proposing, in case the troops should be withdrawn from Boston, to entrench a battalion at the entrance of the harbour to blockade it, and afterwards leaving it open to ensnare the unsuspecting ships that were bound there; his going to Halifax when he had been ordered to New York, or his saying in his speech, that going northward in the spring was executing the Secretary of State's orders, which was to go southward before the winter.

It has been the singular fortune of this general to efface former mistakes by subsequent blunders of greater magnitude: his northern misconduct was in this increasing ratio; and the whole is forgot when Long island, York, White Plains, Trenton, Quibbletown, Saratoga and Chesapeak are mentioned. Even resentment gives place to pity at his suffering himself to be burlesqued by the Mischianza, in honour of his leaving America unconquered, and the rebellion stronger than he found it.

Left rebellion stronger than he found it.

R E M A R K S

On Sir Andrew Snape Hammond's Evidence, by a Sea Officer on the Chesapeak Voyage.

READING the other day in the papers, the examination of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond in the House of Commons, relative to the expedition of the Chesapeak bay; I could not help observing a certain partiality in the evidence.—Though I have a high opinion of the worthy Knight's abilities as a sea officer, yet the vulgar proverb of *Ask my brethren if I am a rogue*, struck me most forcibly. Can it be supposed, that one whom the noble Lord has raised to the highest pinnacle of honour he could, would not applaud his conduct? if *he* is admitted on one side, why not call *some* who have felt his implacable resentment on the other side, by way of a balance? or to proceed in the fairest way, call in those who are *above prejudice*, several of whom were present on the expedition, and they are the only people to give the honourable House the most satisfaction.

From whom to obtain fair evidence.

I could have wished to have heard the opinion of the truly heroic Sir James Wallace on this expedition, and several others I could point out, but 'tis too late. 'Tis well known in the navy, that Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, in preference to older officers, had the command of the fleet at Philadelphia all the winter. Before this he was Lord Howe's oracle! It was he that advised him, very sagaciously, not to attempt landing in the Delaware; he says the rebels might have come down with their galleys, and annoyed our landing;—he likewise observes that they were *only three weeks* longer on the passage to Chesapeak.—The first supposition is impossible, provided the fleet were properly disposed of, and the detention by the different places was *full two months*. I must now observe that I had the honour to belong to the navy on that expedition

tion, and beg to ask a few questions, and give a plain narrative of some facts just as they fell out. Did not Capt. Lindsay, in his Majesty's frigate the Pearl, chase the whole force of the rebels from the Capes of Delaware to very near Reedy island? Did not the Roebuck, Sir Andrew's own ship, and Liverpool, when attacked by the gallies, though one was astern, oblige them to desist? Did not the Roebuck, Camilla, Liverpool. and Pearl, keep the advanced post for a month at Billingsport, both before the Eagle arrived, and for some time after, when the whole formidable rebel navy, with fire-ships, rafts, &c. were there, and the several attempts made with fire-rafts, &c. all proved abortive, and only obliged the ships to cut once? The rebel army were then partly on the Jersey shore, and the Eagle at Chester, 19 miles above Newcastle.—As we had with us four sail of the line, two 50 gun ships, six or seven frigates, besides gallies, armed vessels, tenders, &c. could not the frigates advance three miles above Newcastle, and the army land under cover of the large ships and other vessels, any of which could go within pistol shot of the town, or any parts contiguous to it?—Or if it was found necessary, some of the large ships might have advanced, and left the rest to cover. Round Newcastle is a fine level country. Here the army would have been within 40 miles of Philadelphia, I don't say three weeks, but two months sooner, than when they begun to march at the head of the Elk, which is more than three times the distance. We were three weeks on the passage to Elk, and detained there near a month longer before the army was ready to march; in the course of which, by death, sickness, seamen and soldiers taken straggling, and desertion, &c. we were fifteen hundred at least less to do duty, than when at the Delaware.

Danger in the Delaware retorted.

Could have saved two months and 1500 men.

We sailed from New York the latter end of July, were off the Delaware in one week, and before we left Chesapeak, 'twas the latter end of September; from thence to Delaware again we were twelve days, in such weather, that the fleet was separated; one transport foundered, and many of the small armed vessels were in danger of being lost. I would then wish to leave to any impartial judges, whether the expedition did honour to the two great officers or credit to the nation. As the detention of the army, for near a month after the landing in Elk river, may excite curiosity in some, and raise wonder in others, I shall endeavour to give a short account of that politic business. The transports, with the small men of war, anchored about ten miles below the head of the river Elk; and in about an hour and half after they anchored, the whole of the troops were on shore. The stores, provisions, &c. were not landed here, but for weighty reasons, ordered up in the small vessels to the head of the river; a very shoal and intricate passage. I should have supposed, provided every thing necessary had been landed where the troops were at first, that a week, or ten days at most, might have completed the army for their march. As a proof that I cannot be very much out in my judgment, I must beg leave to remark, that Sir Henry Clinton, after marching across the Jerseys, from the time he began at the heights of Navesink till every matter was completed, was only a week; but we were not in such haste! for after the flat boats had carried up tents, tent-poles,

Army detained a month.

poles, heavy baggage, &c. they were advantageously employed another week in bringing them down again. The commanding officer by this time having settled within himself that no heavy baggage should proceed with the army. As it was ten miles from the transports to the head of the river, these amusing orders and counter orders, must of course take up some time in the executing.

When the fleet arrived in the Delaware, the Roebuck, Pearl, Camilla, and Liverpool were advanced as far up as Billingsport, a strong post, which the rebels had evacuated on the approach of our troops; and as they brought down some artillery in the night, and fired on our ships, to favour an attempt made by their fire-rafts, it was not only thought, but found very necessary to secure a post here. Some marines with a detachment of the 71st regiment were accordingly sent.

Redbank
fortified be-
fore Howe's
face.

The rebels did not evacuate this post without some better view, for they were now seen to be very busy throwing up works on a place called Redbank, a high, steep place; which not only commanded, and secured a communication with Mud island, but protected their shipping, and entirely secured them from any attack we could have made. The general might have seen this every day himself; for it took them some time before they completed it. He was told of it, but it availed nothing! he was determined they should finish it before he would attack it!—and they did; for the brave Count Donop, with 2000 Hessians attempted it, and near 400 soldiers were killed and wounded.—This was not the only loss we sustained, for Capt Reynolds who was then lying at Billingsport, perceiving the attack, and fearing the rebel galleys might annoy our troops, weighed immediately, and endeavoured to get as near as possible to the fort and galleys to divert their attention from the attack, but unfortunately got on shore. The Merlin floop of war also shared the same fate; a cannonading began between the Augusta, Roebuck, and the Mud Fort, which lasted pretty briskly, for near two hours. The next morning it was renewed, but the Augusta was not only too far from the fort, but lay in a very disagreeable situation; about eleven o'clock she took fire by the accident of her own wads, and as the lower deck guns were loaded, and going off every minute, it was impossible for the boats to go along-side; however, every thing was done that could be done to save the people; many who could not swim perished, and all the poor men that were wounded, were blown up in her. There were missing above 100 of her crew;—may we not ask with propriety, if the post had been secured in a proper time, if we should not only have saved many lives, but have taken Mud island with very little trouble, as it entirely commanded it, and likewise saved the trouble of often risking the flat boats with provisions under the guns of Mud Fort in the night, to keep the army from starving; as they never were above five or six days provisions before hand, till the Mud Fort was reduced, which was six weeks? The rest of the proceedings for the reduction of the island are well known.

Two men of
war burnt.

CONDUCT of the WAR in the MIDDLE COLONIES.

Description of the Seat of War in the Middle Colonies, and the practicability of the Country in respect to military Operations

THAT part of the middle colonies, the scene of the late military operations, cannot, with the least propriety, be termed, Face of the country. a country uncommonly strong, much less impracticable. The operations were chiefly carried on between the mountains and the sea coast. In that part, the hills when compared with those of this country, are neither high nor difficult of access; there are few of them, which, either on one side or the other, do not afford an easy ascent. Very unlike this country, where numerous hedges, high dykes and other strong fences, many of which form bulwarks, for a time, proof even against cannon; in that country neither hedges nor dykes are to be found: the fences are only posts at 10 feet distance, in general with 4 or 5 cross rails about a foot asunder. The country, thick settled and populous, is interspersed with open fields, intermediate woods, and large plantations, every farmer living on his own plantation, not in villages. The woods are tall trees growing at different and considerable distances, without any underwood, and are easily scoured with cannon or musquetry. This is a true description of that part of Jersey and Pennsylvania where the war has been carried on. The words strong and impracticable ought to be erased from every dictionary, to prevent their being used hereafter, as an apology for military indolence and misconduct, and for men who have sacrificed to party and faction their own honour, the glory of their sovereign, and the dignity and welfare of the nation.

Conduct of the war in the Middle Colonies.

The troops sent to America were 52,815 men. Of these 40,874 Comparative state of the King's army and that of the rebels. were under Gen. Howe. A force so great, and so well appointed, that Sir William Howe in his letter June 8th, 1776, could not avoid expressing his utter astonishment at an exertion so decisive and masterly. In 1776 the rebel force did not amount to 18,000 men, militia included. The British troops were veterans, commanded by experienced officers; the rebels raw and undisciplined, mostly commanded by tradesmen and ploughmen: the first had the best appointments, even to superabundance; the other the worst, and even a deficiency of necessaries: the one had the ablest surgeons and physicians, and were healthy and high spirited; the other were neglected in their health, cloathing, and pay, were sickly, and constantly murmuring and dissatisfied: such is the comparative difference between the force sent to suppress, and that which supported the rebellion. The cause of our failure, with a force so much superior to the enemy, though enveloped in misrepresentation, on this side the Atlantic, is no secret in America. There friends and foes unite in declaring, that it has been owing to our commander in chief, who shewed neither wisdom in his plans, nor vigour in his operations. He never began his operations till the middle of June. Part of that month, and the whole of April and May, when the season

G. Howe's reasons for not opening the campaign re-futed.

season is moderate, and most proper for action, and the roads are good, were wantonly wasted; though a variety of the most cogent motives pointed to an early and vigorous campaign. In these months the rebel army was in its weakest state; diminished by incessant fatigue, desertion, and sickness; *as the general tells us in his letter, March 5th, 1778*; and those who remained were almost naked, half starved, and destitute of supplies. As the rebel recruits were chiefly procured in April and May, they never could join their army before June. And it was apparent, that as soon as the operations however indolent, of the British army began, that the spirits of the rebellious funk, so as totally to obstruct the recruiting service. But in vain did these inviting circumstances press the general to the field. He preferred the pleasures of indolence and dissipation to his duty; foolishly resting his vindication on an apology, equally groundless and unmilitary; his army could not move "until the green forage was to be found on the ground." Had this been fact, the green forage is always sufficiently grown by the middle of May. But waving this argument, *he knew*, that dry forage was more hearty food for his horses than green; that the same forage which sustained them in their quarters might have been carried with the army; that the country was full of dry forage of every kind; that he had always obtained it when wanted, whether in the field or in his quarters; *see his own letter, January 17th, 1778*, "Lord Cornwallis procures from the country, forage sufficient for the winter consumption;" and consequently that he could not fail in procuring it in any month in the year.

His assertions of the general disaffection of the people refuted.

Though he saw gentlemen of influence and fortune constantly coming over to him; though he saw repeated attempts made by bodies of men to form themselves in arms to assist him; though he knew many inhabitants were fined, imprisoned, and even put to death for their loyalty; though he knew thousands had refused to swear allegiance to the rebels, or to abjure their sovereign; *see his letters June 8th, and December 20th, 1776*; yet contrary to these proofs, he and some of his officers, have affected to believe, and have declared, that the people were almost unanimously disaffected to the Crown. In Jersey he took no step to embody the friends of government, who were anxious to be employed in disarming the disaffected, and to defend the province when the army should proceed to other operations. In Philadelphia, where a militia might have been formed, with the assistance of a thousand regulars and a few ships, sufficient to defend it against any force that could be brought against it, whilst the British army was operating against the main body of the rebels, there was the same unpardonable neglect, although he remained in that city near 9 months. No extensive country was ever yet reduced and retained without the assistance of its inhabitants. It has been the policy of every successful conqueror who entered an extensive country, to gain a knowledge of the prejudices, resentments, and attachments of the people, and to gain the parties disaffected to the power in opposition by every means that reason and policy could suggest. But his conduct was a perfect contrast. The major part of the inhabitants were well affected to his measures, and many were desirous to assist in his operations; but he took no advantage of these important circumstances

stances. His proclamations never invited them to take up arms in behalf of the Crown; he only enjoined them to remain quiet, which had the effect of a prohibition, because a strict obedience was the only condition on which he promised his Majesty's protection. Thousands came in on his proclamation that promised protection, and took the oath of allegiance; but the Royal faith, pledged for their safety, was shamefully violated. The loyal, but unhappy people, instead of the protection they were promised, were plundered by the soldiery; their wives and daughters polluted; friends and foes indiscriminately met with the same barbarous treatment. The rebels turned these enormities to their own benefit. Affidavits of plunder and rapes were printed in all their papers; the British soldiers were represented as a race more inhuman than savages. By these means the force of the rebels was increased, and the interest of Britain weakened.

Loyalists
ill-treated.

Suffering the soldiers to commit outrages was a dangerous relaxation of discipline. It rendered them avaricious and disobedient. To this cause only, can be imputed the loss of Trenton, and the train of heavy misfortunes that attended it. Rhall though he had notice of the enemy's approach could not form his men. They, more attentive to their plunder than their duty, were deaf to all orders; they were surrounded and taken when busied in putting to their horses and loading their waggons.

Every circumstance forbade his voyage to the southward, until the northern army had joined him. He knew the strength and numbers of the northern army, and the difficulties it had to encounter;—a country covered with mountains and strong defiles; the collected force of New York province and the four eastern colonies to meet; these by far the most disaffected; their militia more numerous, more easily collected, and better trained than any other in America. Yet he went to the southward, hundreds of miles from Albany, into a country the best affected to government, of course the least capable of resistance, with an army double Burgoyne's, which put it out of his power to support or relieve that army, with which it was intended he should co-operate. If near 20,000 men, assisted by a fleet, were necessary in Pennsylvania, a country which he acknowledges to be in general well affected, he certainly knew, that an army one third of that number, were not sufficient to oppose the united force of the five most disaffected of all the revolted colonies; and consequently that it was his duty to co-operate with, and support it. He did not even leave a corps to make a diversion in its favour on the coasts of New England, though Lord G. Germain's letter March 3d 1777, recommended it in the strongest terms. A body of 2000 men would, in a great measure, have prevented the militia in that part from joining Gates, and beyond all doubt would have enabled Gen. Burgoyne to have opposed with success the force he had to encounter.

Burgoyne
lost by
Howe de-
serting him

But if we even suppose the expedition to Pennsylvania was an eligible measure, why not according to his first plan march through the Jerseys, and send the fleet up the Delaware? There was nothing to prevent it. pontoons were built, and flat bottomed boats prepared and put on carriages to pass the Delaware. That river is fordable in many places from June to October, with very little

inter.

interruption from rains. Why was so high spirited an army taken from the fight of an enemy of not half its force ; and exposed to the dangers of the ocean, to go 600 miles by water, to a place not 60 miles distant from him by land, and at a season of the year, when he knew the south west winds, would, in all probability, oppose every mile of his passage ? And why, after he had experienced the opposition of the trade wind, did he obstinately persist in his circuitous course, when he knew, or ought to have known, that neither a sufficient provision of water or food had been made for his cavalry ?

Howe lets Washington escape when within an hour's march of him.

I shall not dwell upon the blunders of his general plans, but hasten to remarks on their execution, which will shew, they were founded in ignorance or folly, or something worse. Such was the superior force and spirit of the British army, it met with no difficulty in defeating the enemy in every battle ; and yet in them all, the enemy was suffered to escape without pursuit. The rebels were new raised and undisciplined, and after being defeated, a vigorous pursuit could not have failed to have destroyed, or totally dispersed them. At Brunswick in December 1776, the destruction of the bridge over the Rariton, saved the rebels only a few hours ; the Rariton is fordable at that place on every recess of the tide ; their further security was owing to the orders received by Lord Cornwallis to halt. At Brunswick the British army halted near a week. Washington's army, 3000 men, lay at Princetown 17 miles, and Trenton 29 miles distant, with all their heavy cannon and baggage. Some of Washington's own officers censured his folly to his face, in remaining a week so near the superior force of the British, with a large river in his rear to cross. Gen. Weedon wrote to a friend at Brunswick, " that Gen. Howe had had a mortgage on their army for some time, but had not yet foreclosed it." But Washington on this, and on every other occasion, relied on the indolent progress of the British commander, On the 7th of December the British army left Brunswick at four in the morning, and about 4 in the afternoon arrived at Princetown. Washington in person, with Stirling's brigade, left that place not one hour before its arrival. At 12 at night he began to embark his heavy baggage and artillery, and did not finish passing his army over till 5 in the afternoon. Never was there a fairer opportunity of gaining a final victory. The British general, by a forced march of 3 or 4000 men, might have overtaken and destroyed the small remains of the rebel force, with all their baggage and artillery. But he despised a conduct so unfair and ungenerous against a defeated enemy. He waited at Princetown 17 hours, marched at 9 in the morning of the 8th, and arrived at Trenton at 4 in the afternoon, when the last rebel boat crossed the river ; thus he took 7 hours to march 12 short miles, calculating with great accuracy, the exact time necessary for his enemy to escape. At this time the panic had extended from the rebel military, to all the civil departments. The governor, council, assembly, and magistracy of New Jersey had deserted that province. The rebel state in Philadelphia had dispersed ; and the Congress themselves, giving up all as lost, fled into Maryland. Gen. Mifflin and others attempted in vain to raise the militia of Pennsylvania. A deputation from the city of Philadelphia had

waited

waited on Congress before their flight, and informed them, they intended to implore the King's protection, to which the Congress did not object. All the middle colonies were ready to submit; the loyalists from principle, and the rebels from an opinion that the British troops were invincible. The rebellion would have been effectually suppressed by crossing the Delaware. Every one expected it. Boats, pontoons, or rafts, might have been built in a few days, and the Delaware crossed in a variety of places; the country was full of provisions, which the inhabitants were ready to supply; the British troops might have enjoyed more comfortable quarters at Lancaster, Reading, or Philadelphia, than at New York or in the Jerseys; but without the least apparent necessity or reason, this great opportunity of crushing rebellion was neglected.

Howe could have crossed the Delaware.

He shewed no more military judgment in forming his winter cantonments, than he had shewn vigour in pursuing his enemy. He scattered them from Burlington to New York, a space of 90 miles. The frontier posts were committed to foreigners, ignorant of the language of the country. The commander at Trenton was brave, but totally unfit for his station. He was obstinate, passionate, and incessantly intoxicated with strong liquors. The other at Bordentown was equally brave, and a good soldier, but unacquainted with the people of the country and their character, and of course liable to be deceived in his intelligence. These posts, with only the Delaware between them and the enemy, were the weakest in number of the whole line, without a single redoubt or entrenchment to defend them in case of an attack. Col. Rhall at Trenton had only 1200 Hessians; and Col. Donop at Bordentown, White Horse, and Burlington, only 2000. In this weak state the frontier posts, the posts of most danger, were left by the commander in chief, whilst the other posts were made stronger and stronger, as they receded from the enemy, and consequently as their danger decreased. The post at Princetown was under a brigadier general; those at Brunswick and Amboy under two major generals; that at New York under the commander in chief.

Washington knowing the extent and defenceless state of the British cantonments, meditated an assault on Trenton to recover the spirits of his troops, and to take off the terror impressed upon them by repeated defeats. To draw Col. Donop from Bordentown, and prevent his supporting Rhall, he sent 450 militia, many of them boys, picked up in Philadelphia, Gloucester, and Salem counties, to Mount Holly, not to fight, but to fly, as soon as they had misled Donop. The plan succeeded, Donop marched against this insignificant rebel party, with his whole corps, 80 left at Bordentown excepted, down to Mount Holly, 12 miles from his own post, and 18 from Trenton, the post he ought to have been at hand to support. The rebels dispersed on his approach, yet instead of returning to support Rhall, he loitered two days about Burlington without an enemy to oppose. Washington saw the moment of success, crossed the Delaware with 2800 men, and assaulted Trenton. Rhall was unprepared, though he had repeated information of the enemy's design, and had repulsed their advanced guard the evening before. In vain he attempted to form his men; they were deaf to orders, attentive only to loading their waggons, in order to fly.

Donop outwitted by Washington.

Rholl was killed, and near 1000 of his men taken prisoners. As the rebel general, though successful, dreaded the approach of Gen. Leslie from Princetown, and Col. Donop from Mount Holly, he fled in haste again over the Delaware. He had no thoughts of taking up quarters in Jersey, not doubting, from the great superiority of the British, that the important posts on the Delaware would be re-occupied, and strongly fortified. Common sense pointed out this opinion to Washington; but nothing was done by the British commander that common sense pointed out: his policy was too deep for common understandings. Instead of the two nearest corps marching to regain what was so foolishly lost, Col. Donop abandoned his post, and retreated to Gen. Leslie at Princetown. These when united, though much superior to Washington, and no enemy to molest them, waited till Gen. Grant joined them from Brunswick. This timid conduct invited Washington. After waiting 8 days, and finding no attempt to repossess the banks of the Delaware, he crossed it again, and marched to Trenton with 4000 men. Lord Cornwallis had now arrived at Princetown from New York; he marched against Washington with the corps of Grant, Leslie and Donop, a force greatly superior to the rebel general, and came up with him at Trenton in the evening, intending to attack in the morning; but Washington sensible of his inferiority, lighted up his fires about midnight, and retreated to the heights of Morris town. This he did with such precipitation, that he left a fourth part of his army, and part of his cannon and baggage behind, which were posted a mile from his camp. These men in the morning searched in vain for their main body, and on finding themselves deserted, fled in small parties to Burlington. The rebel general in his retreat met the 17th and 55th regiments, the first was commanded by Col. Mawhood; this gallant officer with his single regiment, beat back the van of the enemy, cut his way through their army, and joined Gen. Leslie. Washington proceeded to Morris town; and the British troops returned to Brunswick, giving up the entire province of West Jersey.

Washington abandons a 4th part of his army.

There was something so inexplicable in all these transactions, that men of sense were amazed at their unparalleled absurdity. They could not on any principle of reason account for the injudicious cantonment of the troops; for the leaving so small a force in the frontier posts; for the neglecting to fortify these posts nearest the enemy and most in danger; for the placing the British, and the troops in the greatest numbers farthest from the enemy; for the not retaking the posts on the banks of the Delaware, as these posts covered the whole province of Jersey, the river forming an excellent barrier against the enemy; and finally, for not disarming the disaffected, and inviting the loyal to assist in the defence of the colony.

Howe's bad conduct in abandoning the Jerseys inexplicable

It was incomprehensible to them that a British commander, at the head of 30,000 veteran and victorious troops, should suffer an army of undisciplined rebels, not a sixth part of his own numbers, to remain in a province so lately in his firm possession; much less to compel him to abandon that province. When the friends of government reflected on the pernicious consequences that must naturally attend those gross mistakes, they were struck with grief and despair:

—they

—they saw that such mistakes would revive the almost extinguished spirit of rebellion.

Washington saw that during the winter his situation required enterprise, *that* would keep his men in action, and raise their spirits, whilst it harassed the British army. Though his numbers were truly contemptible, he always took post near the British army, he was incessantly insulting, surprising, and cutting off their pickets and out posts. No inclemency of weather, no difficulty deterred him. Amboy, Bonumtown, and Brunswick were in a manner besieged. In the opinion of many able officers, far more men were cut off, than would have been lost in an attack on Washington's whole force; which at this time was less than 4000 undisciplined troops, and might have been defeated and dispersed without any difficulty, by a fifth part of the British army. Such was the policy of the rebel chief, while that of the British general formed a perfect contrast to it. Destitute of every idea of military enterprise, he suffered his inferior enemy, for 6 months, to remain within 25 miles of his head quarters without molestation, and continually to insult and distress him with impunity.

Contrast between Howe and Washington.

From December 1776, to the middle of June 1777, the British troops were in this disagreeable situation. The rebels made every exertion to recruit, but had little success; many of the militia when drafted, fled to places where they were not known; and when embodied, often deserted in whole companies. Until June, Washington had not 8000, militia included; the rebels could never collect their force till the middle of that month. This should have dictated an early campaign to the British commander, but he did not open it till the 12th of June. On that day he assembled his troops at Brunswick; Washington was on a hill above Quibbleton, 9 miles from Brunswick, on the north side of the Rariton, with less than 6000 undisciplined and badly appointed troops, with a corps under Sullivan of 2000 men at Princetown. His camp was neither inaccessible nor fortified; it was strong and defensible in front, being guarded by the Rariton, and the hill steep and difficult of access; but on his rear towards the mountains, and on his right towards the Delaware, not at all impracticable. There were wide and good roads around it, leading from Brunswick on both sides of the river. The British commander marched in two columns to Middlebush and Hillsborough, two villages lying in the low level country, perfectly overlooked by Washington, on the south side of the Rariton, keeping that river, not then fordable, between him and the enemy. He took only provisions for a few days from Brunswick. The pontoons and flat boats were left at Brunswick; and the fleet lay ready at Staten island to receive the army. From these circumstances, or knowing by some other means, that Sir William Howe did not intend to cross the Delaware, and that he was not anxious to bring on an action, Washington remained at his ease, insulting and harassing the British pickets.

Washington's position at Quibbleton described.

On the approach of the British, Sullivan fled from Princetown in a panic to the Delaware. and began to embark his men; but he was stopped by an order from Washington, and took post at Flemington. From the 14th to the 19th, both armies remained in these positions, during which the British general, to leave some monu-

ment

A great proof of Sir W. Howe's wisdom.

ment of his *wisdom* and *military skill* behind him, erected three large redoubts, which he left undemolished, to be fortified by the enemy. The affairs of the rebels were low and critical at this time. Gates had not 5000, nor Washington 8000 men including militia. Gen. Burgoyne was approaching from the north, and Sir William Howe had 17,000 men in the field, in the face of his contemptible enemy. Gen. Howe might have had 24,000 men to attack Washington's camp had he chose it, and yet have left 5478 men to defend New-York, having at that time 29,478 effectives under his command. Assaulting Washington's camp, or cutting off his supplies, or if he had escaped, a vigorous pursuit after him, must have had the most favourable consequences. Washington must have been cut off from his magazines to the westward of Philadelphia; the rebel posts on the North river must have fallen; and our northern army must have been saved. Gen. Howe returned to Brunswick June 19th, and to Amboy the 22d, suffering the rear of his healthy, spirited, and superior army, to be insulted by the rebels, and on the 30th, he passed his army over to Staten island.—Such manœuvres surpass all military skill; nay all human understanding. Why did he make such expensive preparations for crossing the Delaware, and yet not cross it? Why did he post himself on the south side of the Rariton, which put it out of his power to attack the enemy? Why did he not march round either on the north or south side, and attack that enemy in rear? or Why did he not with his vastly superior army, cut off his supplies and starve him? or cross the Delaware and cut off all his magazines and resources? Washington fought for these magazines in September, and would have fought for them in June, or lost them. Philadelphia was then altogether defenceless both by land and water; and there were no rebel troops to defend the magazines in Pennsylvania.—But the British general was too honourable to take rebels at such disadvantages.

Now comes the Chesapeak voyage, the source of all our misfortunes!

His motives for this fatal expedition, are a mystery, and likely to remain so. He perfectly well knew the delays and difficulties he should meet with in his voyage; Mr. Galloway forewarned him of them, *see his evidence*. Yet he pursued it, though it presumptuously superseded the plan that had the approbation of his sovereign.

He embarked the troops July 5th. The troops remained pent up in the unhealthy holds of vessels, in the hottest season of the year, until the 23d, without the least apparent cause. That day he sailed from the Hook, but meeting the south west winds, as had been foretold, he did not arrive off the capes of Delaware till the 30th. Here, had he been inclined to render his southern voyage as little injurious as possible, he would have sailed up the Delaware; for the wind was fair at south west. Washington was still in New Jersey, believing it impossible he could desert the northern army. Mud island and Billingsport had only 210 militia in them both; there were no regular continental troops in Pennsylvania, except a few recruiting parties; the floating batteries were not manned, nor the lower chevaux de frize placed in the river; the chain was not finished; the passage from the capes to Philadelphia was open; Redbank was neither fortified nor occupied; in short, there was nothing

State of the rebel defences in Delaware, July 30, 1777.

nothing to oppose the taking of Mud island, the rebel water guard, and the city of Philadelphia. The Congress and the rebel state were ready to fly a second time. But all these favourable circumstances were lost upon the British general. He rather chose, yet longer, to combat the uncertainties of the ocean, than to surprize the rebels who were unprepared to receive him. He therefore proceeded round to Elk, where he arrived the 23d of August.

Perhaps he now thought he had carried his military farce too far. His infantry and cavalry had been near two months pent up in vessels, feeding on salt provisions only, in a southern climate, in the hottest months of the year, his horses feeding on pease, and on a short allowance of water, many of them dead, and the rest utterly unfit for service.

The horses ruined by Chesapeake voyage.

The army landed the 25th, but could not move, the horses were either dead or wanted time to recruit. They did not march from Pencadder till September 8th, and passing thro' Newark, Hockefson, and New Garden, arrived the 10th at Kennet square. Washington on the 8th had marched from Wilmington to Chad's ford, and taken a strong post on the heights of Brandywine, on the east side, 6 miles from Kennet square.

The British general to arrive on this spot, had wasted idly and wantonly 12 weeks; he had left his enemy, who was in his fight at Hillsborough to combat the elements, to go in the nearest course 600 miles, and in the course of his traverse failing more than 2000, to meet that enemy again, posted on stronger ground, and with double their former force. Washington had now 16,000 men, the rebels had obtained this number by universally circulating that Sir William Howe had left America, and that the recruits were only wanted, to drive the remnant of the British at New York from the Continent. This, though false, had the intended effect, Gen. Howe's going to sea for so many weeks, giving it the semblance of truth. The British left marched round by the forks of Brandywine to attack the right of the rebel army, and Gen. Knyphausen with the British right passed the Brandywine to attack them in front. The rebels were totally routed. They fled in scattered parties to Philadelphia, Lancaster, and Reading; and Washington with a corps he was able to keep together, fled to Chester with his cannon and baggage. Here he remained till next morning, within 8 miles of the British, and then marched by Derby to Philadelphia; many of his scattered troops never joined him. Here he staid 3 days to collect some of his men, and recruit from his magazines, the stores he had lost in battle. On the third day he marched up the north side of the Schuylkill, crossed at Swede's ford, and passed to the Lancaster road. During this time the British general as usual remained with arms folded, and in careless indolence for five days on the field of battle. When the left column of the British had turned Washington's right flank, his whole army was hemmed in: Gen. Knyphausen and the Brandywine in front: Sir William Howe and Lord Cornwallis on his right: the Delaware on his rear: and Christiana river on his left. He was obliged to retreat 23 miles by Chester to Philadelphia; when the British lay within 18 miles of it. Had Gen. Howe detached Knyphausen's column in pursuit early next morning, Washington might with ease have been intercepted, either

Gen. Howe might have cut off Washington.

either at the heights of Crum Creek 9 miles, at Derby 14, or at Philadelphia 18 miles from the British camp; or the Schuylkill might have been passed at Gray's ferry, only 70 yards over, and Philadelphia with the rebel magazines taken; if Gen. Howe had not wisely left his pontoons at New York as useless. Any of these movements must have destroyed the rebel army.

Washington now advanced by the Lancaster road; the British general meditated a second battle; the rebel vanguard was defeated. But what is human resolution! How easily is it diverted from its purpose! *A fall of rain* prevented the intended attack. Some men thought the rain was a circumstance in favour of disciplined troops, who would take more care of their ammunition than undisciplined men. The British general thought otherwise. His troops were called from the attack; and the enemy escaped, but lost all their great and small ammunition. September 26th, Lord Cornwallis entered Philadelphia; the Congress fled to York, and the rebel state to Lancaster. His entry was truly triumphant. The Roman citizens never received a victorious general with greater acclamations, than the loyal citizens of Philadelphia did his lordship.

Loyalty of Philadelphia.

Mud island fort and the rebel water guard now became the objects of attack; as they cut off the communication between the army and the fleet, now in the Delaware, having come round from Chesapeake. To prevent an attack on Mud island by batteries on shore, the rebels had cut the dykes of Province and Blackeys islands and let in the water. It was necessary to repair the dykes, and stop out the water before batteries could be erected. A gentleman of influence offered to effect these repairs in a few days. This was pointed out to the commander in chief, but from a motive unknown to this day, they were not permitted to be made. The men working in water and soft mud laboured in vain. The work they did in the reflux of the tide, the influx washed away; a month was shamefully wasted, and no progress made. Whilst this contest between the general and tide was going on, Lieut. Col. Sterling took possession of Billingsport, and seeing the necessity of taking post at Redbank, desired permission to occupy it, but it was not granted him. When the rebels possessed Billingsport, Redbank was of no consequence to them; but when Billingsport was lost, Redbank became of the greatest importance. It was now the only key to Mud island fort; the only spot from which that fort could be reinforced, relieved, or supplied; without possessing it, they could not protect their water guard, which could lie in no part of the river, but under the cannon of this post. Lieut. Col. Sterling saw this, but his representation had no effect. The rebels improved upon our neglect, and instantly fortified it. Washington gave 100*l.* bounty to every rebel soldier who served in Mud island fort; the preserving it was of the utmost importance to him; as it cut off the communication between the British fleet and army. The rebels in it were relieved every 6 hours from Redbank; it held out six weeks, from our blunders in not occupying Redbank, and from not allowing the dykes of Province and Blackeys islands to be repaired.

Lt. C. Sterling prevented from occupying Redbank.

A gloom appeared in the countenances of the best officers. The general himself at last was alarmed, and detached Col. Donop to attack Redbank, now strongly fortified and defended by 800 men.

But

But let us take the general's own account of the attack ; " October 25th 1777, Col. Donop made the best disposition, and led on the troops in the most gallant manner to the assault. They carried an extensive outwork, from whence the enemy were driven into an interior entrenchment, which could not be forced without ladders, being 8 or 9 feet high, with a parapet boarded and fraised. The detachment in moving up, and returning from the attack were much galled by the enemies gallsies and floating batteries." Had Lieut. Col. Sterling been permitted to occupy Redbank, Donop and near 400 men would have been saved, Mud island must have been taken, and the rebel water guard destroyed, with but a trifling loss.

Description of Redbank fortification

After this repulse, the general was forced to apply for that assistance he had so lately rejected. Lord Cornwallis sent for the gentleman who had offered to repair the dykes. This he cheerfully complied with, and though the breaches were now double the size, the repairs were completed in six days. The batteries were then erected with ease, and opened November 10th, and Mud island fort taken possession of by the British the 15th, six weeks after their arrival at Philadelphia.

The general's own account seems to justify what the rebels have called the surprize at German town ; he says, " at 3 in the morning the 4th of October, the patrols discovered the enemy's approach, and upon the communication of this intelligence, the army was immediately ordered under arms." If the general received other previous intelligence, he has not as usual mentioned it in his letter ; by his own account it seems as if he had not received any such intelligence, otherwise he could not have been so insensible to the safety of his army, as not to order it under arms till the approach of the rebels.

When the British retired to winter quarters in Philadelphia, Washington approached nearer them, to White Marsh. He encamped on a hill ; a valley and sandy run in front ; to the south and east an abbattis of trees, their top branches pointed and lying outwards. The ground was strong and difficult of approach on these sides. But on his rear on the north and north west, the approach easy and unfortified. December 4th, Sir William marched as if to attack Washington. He defeated two bodies of rebels of 1000 men each. He made some movements on the enemy's front, right and left ; but none on their rear, where they were vulnerable without difficulty. By the same movement he would have cut off Washington from his baggage and provisions, which lay five miles distant. Washington dreaded this and was prepared for flight. But the British general returned to Philadelphia on the 8th, highly censured by all, who knew the ground on which Washington was encamped, and the variety of excellent roads that led round to his rear ; it was even well known that Washington's army was in the greatest confusion and fright, and night and day prepared to fly. After this fortunate deliverance, Washington took up his winter quarters at Valley Forge. With immense labour he raised wooden huts, covered with straw and earth ; which formed very uncomfortable quarters. On the east and south an entrenchment was made ; the ditch 6 feet wide and 3 in depth : the mound not 4 feet high,

Position at White marsh ; might have beat Washington.

Position at Valley Forge. very narrow and might have been easily beat down by cannon. Two redoubts were also begun, but never compleated. The Schuylkill was on his left, with a bridge across. His rear mostly covered by an impassible precipice, formed by Valley Creek, having only a narrow passage near the Schuylkill. On the right, his camp accessible with some difficulty. But the approach on his front was on ground nearly on a level with his camp. His head quarters 20 miles from Philadelphia.

It is difficult to give an adequate description of his misery in this situation. His army was destitute of almost every necessary of cloathing, nay almost naked; and very often on short allowance of provisions; an extreme mortality raged in his hospitals, and none of the most proper medecines to relieve them. There were perpetual desertions of parties from him of 10 to 50 at a time. In three months he had not 4000 men, who were by no means to be termed effectives. In this infirm and dangerous state he continued from December to May; during all which time the British in great health and spirits lay inactive in Philadelphia: permitting the rebels to distress the royal inhabitants on every side of the British lines, destroying mills, seizing grain, horses and cattle; and imprisoning, whipping, branding, and killing the unhappy, but loyal people, who at every risk were daily supplying the army, navy, and inhabitants within the British lines, with all the necessaries and luxuries of the country. Every military man, and every man of common sense, who knew the force of the two armies, and the feeble state of the rebels, expected to see Washington's camp stormed or besieged, particularly in March, April and May, when the severity of winter was gone, knowing that to attack it was easy and a business of little risk. Washington often had not 3 days provision in his camp, and at times not enough for one day. On his left the Schuylkill impassible but over the bridge; on his rear lay Valley Creek with the precipice and narrow pass; on his front and on his right he could be approached on equal terms. The situation of his camp favoured the British either in storming or besieging him. Posting 2000 men, on a commanding ground near the bridge, on the north side of the Schuylkill, rendered his escape on the left impossible; 2000 men posted on a like ground opposite the narrow pass, effectually prevented a retreat by his rear; and 5 or 6000 men placed on the front and right of his camp, deprived him of flight on those sides. The positions were such, that if any of the corps were attacked, they could have been instantly supported. Under such propitious circumstances, what mortal could doubt of success! But neither the distresses of the loyalists, the millions he was wasting, the prospect of glory, nor the duty he owed his King and country, could prevail on the British commander to quit the delusive pleasures of the long room and pharo table.

Might have beat or blocked up Washington at Valley Forge.

British and Rebel Force in 1776.

Dates.	British Troops.	Rebel Troops.	Superiority of Brit. Troops.
August - -	24,000	16,000	8000
November - -	26,900	4500	22,400
December - -	27,700	3300	24,400

British

British and Rebel Force in 1777.

Dates	British Troops.	Rebel Troops.	Superiority of Brit. Troops.
March - -	27,000	4,500	22,500
June, July -	30,000	8000	22,000
September -	30,000	16,000	14,000
December - -	30,000	10,500	19,500

British and Rebel Force in 1778.

February, March	29,500 British.	{ 6000 Washington in Pennsylv. 2500 Gates in Connecticut.	
Superiority of British Troops	—	—	21,000

LORD HOWE'S NEGOTIATIONS.

And Naval Conduct.

IT has been said that his lordship's friends solicited, and we are sure his lordship accepted the naval command in America. The terms of accommodation were adjusted according to his lordship's own ideas of right, and of what in his opinion, the Americans ought with gratitude to embrace. The minds of the people, and even of the army, were so favourably disposed to negotiation and peace, that Washington's troops on the very report of a treaty had nearly disbanded; to prevent which, and to persuade them the King had no gracious intentions towards them, and to keep them fixed in rebellion, Washington gave it out in public orders to the army, that there was no treaty in agitation, though he had just sent Lord and Gen. Howe's proposals to Congress. Yet the earnest wishes of the people for an accommodation, forced the rebel Congress to send a deputation to confer with Lord Howe on his powers to redress their grievances. On the return of these deputies, the Congress to destroy even the idea of a peace, published, "that Lord Howe's Commission contained no other authority of importance, than that of granting pardons, with such exceptions as the King's Commissioners should think proper to make, and to declare America, or any part of it, to be, in the King's peace, upon submission." These falsehoods were universally published and circulated under the name and authority of the Congress, to impress upon the minds of the people another set of falsehoods, by the frequent repetition of which, they, together with the opposition in England, had already deluded the people into rebellion. These were, "that government never intended to redress American grievances; that they were determined to tax the colonists without their consent; and that they had in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states." Declarations of Congress, July and September 1776.

Americans in general anxious for peace, and their army ready to disband.

Lord Howe, though it was his duty to expose and refute the insidious falsity of these declarations of Congress, allowed them to prevail without contradiction; by which bad policy the deceptions that Britain was averse to accommodation, and was resolved to enslave the colonies, obtained general belief in America.

Ld. Howe equivocal & obscure to the loyal, but explicit to rebels.

His proclamations confirmed, instead of refuting the rebel declarations. His first contained only a hint of his "power to grant pardons, and to restore the colonies to the peace of the king." And the second, only signified his desire "to confer with his Majesty's well affected subjects; that his Majesty was disposed to direct a revision of his royal instructions; and to concur in a revival of all acts by which his subjects may think themselves aggrieved." These proclamations of his lordship's, scarcely offered to the mind one certain or precise idea; they were composed of nothing but hints and intimations; and as has been truly said, they rather confirmed all those falsehoods, so assiduously propagated by the Congress, than refuted them. His lordship's propositions should have been clear, open, decisive and direct; and not given to an impatient people in drawing columns of uncertain, hesitating, creeping phrases, expressed, as they had been conceived, in doubt and confusion. The awkward and reserved glimpses that he gave them of redress, appeared to the warm, agitated minds of the colonists, the ambiguous and suspicious language of treachery and deceit. His lordship no doubt meant well; but there was not a man in the world more unfit for a negotiator.

Yet his lordship thought proper to be more open, communicative and direct to the rebel Congress, if we ought to give credit to his private message sent by Gen. Sullivan; "that he and his brother had *full powers* to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America, upon terms advantageous to both; and that the obtaining those terms had detained him two months in England." It has been well remarked on these passages, that to the rebels, who were resolved to reject all proposals with contempt, he was *explicit*, but to the well affected, (that is two thirds of the Americans) who wished to embrace them with cordiality, he was *equivocal* and *obscure*.

On Destroying the Rebel Resources by Sea.

Neglected to block up the rebel ports.

No rebel harbour between Boston and Charlestown could have resisted a tenth a part of his fleet, yet naval expeditions against them never were attempted. Even the port of Philadelphia for 14 months after his arrival in America was only defended by a half finished battery of 7 ordinary guns. The ports of Egg harbour within one day's sail of his head quarters; Sinepuxent, Matchapungo, and Rock inlet within two days sail; and the ports in Chesapeake and Albemarle sound were totally defenceless; yet there the rebel naval force and trade remained undisturbed. Some frigates were sent to the mouth of the Delaware, but were only once seen so high up as Reedy island, their proper station. Others were sent off the Chesapeake and South Carolina to cruise for rich tobacco and indigo ships, but every thing else was thought unworthy of notice. These cruisers were in a great measure unsuccessful; the rebels waited favourable opportunities; the high gales that blew our frigates off the coast, opened a passage for the rebel trade.

Albemarle sound not being blocked up, North Carolina was supplied with salt, the country abounds in hogs, and the rebel commissaries laid up magazines of salt provisions at Suffolk. From Suffolk they were carried thro' the mouth of the Nansemond, and up
the

the Cheapeake to the head of the Elk, and from thence in waggons to Valley Forge. These supplies just saved Washington's army from famine. All these circumstances were pointed out to the British general, and of course we may presume were known to the admiral. The method of preventing this supply was also pointed out. A single frigate at the mouth of Nansemond, another at the Tangier islands, with 2 small armed vessels up James river, would have stopped the navigable part of the transportation, and the carriage by land was impracticable, being 400 miles; for waggons and horses are scarce in that country, and the roads in winter impassable. Notwithstanding all this information, no frigates were sent to the Tangiers or Nansemond, and by this neglect Washington's army was saved from ruin.

Rebel army how supplied.

If his lordship had taken advice, and properly blockaded the rebel ports, American produce could not have been transported to Europe, nor could supplies have been carried from Europe to enable the Americans to continue their unnatural rebellion: and had his lordship, when his fleet was superior, attacked Count d'Estaign in the summer 1778, when the French fleet was disabled and within a few hours sail of Sandy Hook, that commander would not at this time have been supporting the rebellion in our southern colonies, and in all probability Spain would have been deterred from joining in the confederacy against us.

The substance of the two last articles is chiefly taken from Letters to a Nobleman, and a letter to Lord Howe: Those who wish to see the whole are referred to these pamphlets.

ÆMILIUS SCAURUS

On the Expedition from Canada, and Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne's Evidence. Addressed to Gen. Burgoyne.

WHEN you received the command of the northern expedition, the public expectation was raised to the highest pitch, by your magnificent harangues in the senate, and your liberal promises of active and extensive operation in the field. The ministry were as sanguine as the mob, and rejoiced beyond measure, that they had at last found an opportunity of employing a confidential general, not only unconnected with opposition, but zealous in the cause of the supremacy of the British legislature. But it was not sufficient that our expectations should be raised; the fears of the enemy were to be increased in the same proportion. To produce this effect, a proclamation was published at Ticonderoga, which out thundered all your great guns, numerous and noisy as they were. You there assumed the form of an offended Jupiter. Vengeance and death were in your right hand—peace and forgiveness in your left. The time seemed to be come, when rebellion was to be swept from the face of the earth, by the irresistible vigour of your outstretched arm, attended as it was to be in its awful progress, by the blessing of providence on the one side, and the savages of Canada on the other. This proclamation, though mighty sublime, was looked upon by the illiterate Americans as mighty ob-
High national expectation from Gen. Burgoyne.
scure.

Proclamation & surrender contrasted.

scure. You thought proper therefore, a few months afterwards, to elucidate it by a very clear commentary, written at Saratoga. The public admired the happy variety of style that distinguished those two performances. They concluded you to be a very good author, but recollected, with surprize, that they had once dreamed you was a great general. This illusion, though vanished from their minds, seems still to keep possession of yours: for though we are now groaning under the weight of those misfortunes which your defeat has brought upon us, you are not contented, Sir, with escaping the indignation of your country, you boldly step forward in the Senate, and insist upon your claim to its applause. I think in prudence you should have delayed this claim a little time longer. English ears are not yet sufficiently prepared for it. Allow a few more precedents to be established, and then you may make it with safety and success: for with an administration of cowards, and an opposition of bullies, disappointment and disgrace will soon become the best titles to approbation and reward.

You, Sir, took the earliest measures to obtain the patronage of the latter of those respectable bodies; for the moment you surrendered your arms to the rebels, you resolved to sacrifice your principles to the opposition. The sacrifice met with the most propitious acceptance, for it came accompanied with the worst tidings this country ever heard. You had done a deed, that secured even the forgiveness of Col. Barre, for all your past offences. In reading the convention at Saratoga, he forgot that you had once been a stickler for the honour of a British foldier.

Who should bear the blame of his misfortunes.

This step being taken, the next consideration was to determine who should bear the blame of those misfortunes, which, you was resolved should not be imputed to you. Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and the American secretary, presented themselves at first, as the parties among whom it would be proper to divide the whole. All your letters shew, that, for a time, you attributed your want of success entirely to the failure of that co-operation which you expected from Gen. Howe's army. This was the language you held to the minister, to your army, and even to Sir William Howe himself. You spoke it in the most clear and unambiguous manner in your message to Sir Henry Clinton, by Capt. Campbell, when you declared that "you would not have given up your communication with Ticonderoga, had you not expected a co-operating army at Albany." Now, had you not given up your communication with Ticonderoga, it is clear you could never have been forced to surrender your army. The whole of your misfortune then, if we may believe yourself, was entirely owing to Gen. Howe's failure in the expected co-operation.

First Howe.

Strong as this ground of defence may at first sight appear, you were obliged, for prudential reasons, totally to desert it, and abandon every advantage you could derive from it. Sir William Howe had now left the King's standard to its own fortune in America, and had returned to look for laurels under the banners of opposition. He was of a weight and standing in the corps, which you, though a hopeful recruit, could not possibly pretend to rival: it was therefore necessary to give up every idea of criminating him, before you could procure the concurrence of the whole party in defending you.

With

With regard to Sir Guy Carleton, it had been given out by your friends that he had been greatly deficient in making the necessary preparations for the commencement of your campaign, and shamefully dilatory in forwarding to you the supplies and assistance that were afterwards to come from that province. Unfortunately he too was connected with a part of the opposition, in such a manner as made it necessary to suppress this charge, for the same reasons that induced you to keep back that against Sir William Howe. There now remained nothing to lay the blame upon, but your orders from the secretary of state. Those hopeless orders therefore are now to be censured for every thing you did, and every thing that you omitted to do—for you marches and your halts—for lying by while you had a prospect of success, and advancing when you had none—and finally, for that strangest of all strange ideas, that when you could proceed no farther, it was better to surrender than attempt to retreat.

Then Carleton.

Last the American secretary.

The first charge against you in the conduct of your unfortunate expedition, is the carrying with you a quantity of artillery so totally incompatible with that celerity of movement, on which your success entirely depended. It was necessary indeed to carry a train to Ticonderoga, equal to the reduction of the very strong works we expected to meet with there. So far you could have justified yourself even without the example of Sir Guy Carleton; but farther, you in vain endeavoured to procure his opinion in your favour. You, and your learned friend Capt. Money, have informed the Committee, that artillery kills men at a distance, and that it makes a greater impression on the enemy's defences, than mere musquetry can effect. Indeed!—It did not require the testimony of Moses and the prophets, much less that of two men from Saratoga, to convince the most incredulous senator of the truth of this allegation. But you should have recollected, Sir, that the very carriage of this artillery created afterwards the necessity of employing it. The army was pinned down to attend its motions, and the enormous delays occasioned, in a great degree, by the slowness of its progress, gave full time to the rebels to recover from their first panic, and to collect again that army which had been completely dispersed. Whereas, had you advanced rapidly without encumbrance or delay, you would neither have found men to oppose, nor works to interrupt your progress through the country. In point of fact, what works did this artillery of yours ever get the better of? After passing Ticonderoga, you met with but one fortified camp of the enemy, and all your hoisted artillery never enabled you to advance a single foot beyond it.

Artillery.

But it was not sufficient to embarrass yourself with every encumbrance that could retard the progress of an army; it was necessary, in order to complete your plan, to adopt such a route as would add to every difficulty, and augment every delay. Instead of the straight and common passage by the way of lake George, which it never would have occurred to any other officer to have departed from, you thought proper, at the expence of much time, and incredible labour, to cut a road through a piece of ground the most difficult and impracticable that perhaps all America afforded. You seemed to be convinced, that to the generality of mankind this measure

Route.

measure would appear altogether inexplicable, and were therefore pleased to communicate to us your motives for a movement so extremely eccentric. You were apprehensive, it seems, in the first place, that the retrograde motion of the army from Skeensborough to Ticonderoga, would abate the panic of the enemy, and at the same time have a bad effect upon the spirits of our own troops. Your philosophy seems of a piece with your generalship. It must be in some new system that you have discovered, that a man is most terrified when it is least possible to overtake him, and a soldier led out of his road in pursuit of an enemy, will feel himself dejected or depressed, if he returns into it after the pursuit is over. Gen. Frazer's corps made this retrograde motion from Huberton, and yet I profess the grenadiers and light infantry never betrayed the smallest symptom of the truth of this strange theory of yours: but you are further pleased to express your opinion, that had you gone by the lake, the enemy would have delayed you greatly by making a stand at fort George; and in this opinion all your witnesses are pleased to concur. Now let us state the premises from which this conclusion is drawn.

The rebels had fled from Ticonderoga, where they had collected all the force it was possible for them to assemble—where they had works of a most amazing strength, and had made every preparation for a long and vigorous defence. You, therefore, suppose that those very rebels, panic struck, beaten and dispersed as they were, would make a stand at fort George, where they had no strength, no defence, nor any preparation that indicated an intention of a moment's resistance. Besides the total absurdity of such a supposition, you know perfectly well that in point of fact there was not the smallest foundation for it; for on the 11th of July you write to Lord George Germain, in your private letter, that the enemy, so far from preparing to make a stand at Fort George, were even then labouring to remove their magazines from thence and from fort Edward. Yet, in direct contradiction to this, you and your friends now seriously assure the Committee, that you expected to find the rebels in force at the first of those places, and that your march by Skeensborough was occasioned chiefly by that expectation.

Army halts
a month,
when the
rebels are
weak.

At last, Sir, when the season was half spent, you arrived at the banks of the Hudson's river, where you thought proper to make a dead halt of one entire month. If Mr. Gates himself had directed your operations, he could not possibly have planned measures more favourable to his own views. The flight from Ticonderoga had made such an impression on the spirits of the rebels, that it was impossible immediately to collect an army, or to inspire them with that confidence which is necessary to ensure success; but it was certain that in time that impression would wear off, unless it were continued or renewed by the rapid movements of the King's troops. When, instead of such movements, they saw those troops wasting days, weeks, and months, without making the smallest progress, it is no wonder that they at last got an army to assemble—it is rather surprising that they were without one so long. I wish your friend Col. Kingston, in some of his confidential communications with Mr. Gates, had obtained a return of the rebel force not only on the 7th of October, but during the whole months of August and September. If
it

It had answered your purpose, I make no doubt but it would have been procured and produced. But it would have appeared too clearly from thence that during the whole of the first month, and the greatest part of the second, they had no force that could enter into competition with yours, and that nothing but your monstrous delays, joined to the misfortune at Bennington, created that formidable army which appeared against you in the month of October.

But your excuse for those delays is the want of provisions; and to account for this want, the roads from lake George are said to have been out of repair. This is one of the blessed consequences of the March by the way of Skeensborough. Had the army come by lake George, they would of course have repaired the roads as they came along. But you contrived just to double both the fatigue and the delay; for they had first one road to make from Skeensborough, and then they had another to open and repair from fort George. In the whole of the evidence you have produced, the method is, to state a necessity for every one of your measures, contriving to sink this trifling circumstance, that, *that necessity* invariably originated from some previous blunder or omission of your own. The delay in this case you prove to have been unavoidable, forgetting to inform us that it became so, only by the unaccountable whim of departing from the route which any other man would have taken.

I come now to the unhappy affair at Bennington, which being the commencement, and in a great measure, the cause of all your misfortunes, it will be necessary to state at some length. Your army, far from being too numerous, you say was not even adequate to the enterprise you were sent upon. It is therefore perfectly clear, that you could not afford to risk detachments from it, for the execution of any collateral purpose whatever. But supposing an object had presented itself, of sufficient magnitude to justify a deviation from this rule, the detachment employed should either have been strong enough to maintain itself against any opposition that it could be expected to meet, or it should have had orders to retreat the moment it was threatened with an attack. Instead of proceeding on this clear military principle, you sent out 600 of your worst troops, at a distance from your army, into the heart of the enemy's country, and ordered them to keep their ground at all events;—even though the whole country should rise against them. A detachment thus circumstanced was not only hazarded; it was clearly and infallibly devoted; for the enemy must have wanted common sense, if they did not reduce its destruction to an absolute certainty. When you communicated your intention to Gen. Frazer, he expressed his most positive disapprobation, not only of sending Germans, but of sending such a detachment of any troops, for any purpose whatever. He thought the point of so great consequence, that he did not confine himself merely to a verbal disapprobation;—he remonstrated against the measure in writing, and predicted the fatal consequences which it might be expected to produce. This you know to be true. It was the common report of the camp, that this freedom of his displeas'd you so much, that you declar'd with some warmth, that “ you should learn for the future to

G. Frazer against the Bennington expedition.

Improper
troops em-
ployed.

“be more peremptory, and less communicative.” Certain it is that you disregarded his remonstrances, and proceeded to execute this very strange plan in an equally strange manner. Had you fought through all the various descriptions of men who then received the King’s pay, you could not possibly have found a corps so totally unfit for this kind of service as Reidesfel’s dragoons. Besides that heaviness and slowness which they possessed in common with other Brunswick regiments, they were loaded with accoutrements which rendered them additionally clumsy. Their very hats and swords weighed more than the whole equipment of one of our soldiers. Yet these poor devils did you pitch upon for a flying expedition through the woods, for the sagacious purpose of mounting them on horses, in a country where cavalry could not be used.

Baum.

The command of this expedition was given to Col. Baum, a brave man and good officer in his way, but just as much qualified for this sort of service as an Indian chief would be for the command of an army in Flanders. He neither had, nor could be expected to have, an idea of the nature of American warfare; he did not even understand a syllable of the language of the people whose affections you sent him to try. The event was just what might be expected from such a plan. The country people finding so small a detachment at so great a distance from the army, flocked in from all quarters to surround it, while poor Baum, totally ignorant of the country, the people, and the language, hardly knew whether they were assembling as friends or foes. He however dispatched intelligence of this rising to you, and you now perceived the consequences with which your deep laid scheme was about to be attended. The only possible chance of retrieving the blunder, and preventing the detachment from being cut off, was to send forward the lightest and most expeditious troops in your army, who by mere dint of quick marching might perhaps arrive before the enemy should find it expedient to commence their attack.

Breyman.

But you seem positively to have abjured the guidance of reason throughout the whole of this transaction. For you, a second time made choice of the Germans, who possessed no one qualification that such a duty required. Did you really believe, Sir, that they would march to Bennington in a shorter time than any equal number of British troops in your army? did you not know, on the contrary, that the worst British regiment in the service, would with ease march two miles for their one? was not the choice of them then a voluntary and a wanton sacrifice of the detachment which you pretended to send them to relieve? the Germans proceeded exactly as every man in the camp knew and expected they would. They halted ten times an hour to dress their ranks, which were liable to be broken at every step in such a road as they had to march by. You knew this to be their constant practice, and therefore had no reason to be astonished at it on this occasion. The consequence was, that they arrived just time enough to be attacked by the victorious rebels, flushed with their conquest over the unfortunate Baum. Col. Breyman made a gallant stand, notwithstanding the advantages the rebels had got by occupying the hills, at the foot of which he was obliged to march. At last both parties seemed tired of the conflict; — for they both retreated at the same instant, the Germans leaving behind

behind them their cannon, which the rebels did not take possession of till four days after the engagement.

Thus ended this unfortunate affair, which almost instantaneously darkened the prospect of the whole campaign. We lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, little less than 1000 men. The Indians began immediately to desert. The loyalists were disheartened, while the rebels were elated beyond measure, and totally forgot the terror with which you had at first inspired them. They even conceived the most contemptible opinion of your talents as an officer, and filled their papers with the most satirical reflections on your orders to Col. Baum, which they said betrayed a want of military skill, that one of their militia colonels would have been ashamed to discover. To all this, what do you and your friends answer? why, that it was entirely the fault of the Germans, who did not march so fast as you expected they would have done. Good God! Sir, do you and your witnesses mean to trifle with the common sense of mankind? We all blame the Germans, but must we therefore acquit you, who, with an absurdity bordering on madness, pitched upon those very Germans, in preference to all the other troops of your army? that would be to make your crime the instrument of your justification.

New mode of justification.

REFLECTIONS

On Gen. Burgoyne's Conduct since his return to England.

NOTWITHSTANDING the disgrace and misfortune which the nation suffered, in losing the army under the command of Gen. Burgoyne, the public in general continued to entertain a high opinion of that officer's integrity and talents. The ruin of his army was justly imputed to the want of a co-operation. But to the infinite surprize and regret of those, who are properly speaking his only real friends, his conduct at home has been little else than a tissue of imprudencies.

High character of G. Burgoyne; but his conduct at home a tissue of imprudencies.

His refusal to join his captive army cannot be justified. The presence of a beloved and respected commander, would certainly have contributed to the consolation of that army, and might have retained many in their duty, who have been seduced by rebel arts. Supposing his health not very robust, it could sustain no great shock from residing in comfortable quarters, though in an enemy's country. All the northern part of America is much healthier than England, the air being purer and drier.

His complaint of being denied access to the King, is not distinguished for its propriety or decorum, nor does it correspond with that sensibility and delicacy of mind, which were always thought to constitute a great part of his character. He ought not to have expected admission to his Majesty, till after the decision of a court martial, and a court martial could not with any propriety determine on his conduct, whilst he remained a prisoner under the convention.—But had admittance been granted him,—How humiliating for him the scene! He had parted with his Majesty in the

high hope of conquest, and he returned to him—but alas! let us save sensibility—from the repetition of misfortune.

On his first interview with the secretary of state, the facts, observations, and opinions, respecting his late important trust, became the first and natural objects of discussion. The hint of absence from Court till after an enquiry, being a secondary, a personal, and unpleasing business, the noble lord naturally and delicately deferred it to the close of the conversation, in short deferred it to the last moment.

All his charges against ministers refuted

His charge of being insidiously drawn into very confidential communications, relatively to the very important objects of his late command, only displays the bitterness of his spirit, in converting an act of duty in the minister, and an act of duty in himself, into an odious charge against the minister. It was the duty of the minister, not only to lead him to these communications, but it was his duty voluntarily to give them in the most unreserved manner.

His charge, that he saw a systematical design of vilifying and disgracing every officer whom the ministry had ever employed by sea or land, and that the ruin of officers forms almost the whole of their military system, ought not perhaps to be termed Malevolent, as it partakes more of the Frantic. The charge has not the semblance of common sense to support it. His assertion, instead of being fact, is the very reverse. The ruin of ministers, on the contrary, seems to have been the sole end and intent of some generals; whose oblique and sinister operations, convey to the mind no other idea than that of the most drivelling folly, or abandoned treachery. The misconduct of generals, through the kindness of opposition, is for the most part visited upon ministers. Military offenders, who have disgraced, and almost ruined the nation, have been rewarded with unmerited honours, instead of receiving merited punishment. Ministers so far from inclining to ruin every officer, heartily and sincerely pray for their constant success; and never did ministers so exert the national strength to render officers successful: Their own power, not to mention the interest of the nation, almost exists on the success of officers;—to say then, that the ruin of officers forms the military system of the ministers, is a charge contradictory to common sense. Such a charge almost amounts to a proof of a total deprivation of judgment.

Insulted only by the friends of his confederate Sir W. Howe.

In regard to Gen. Burgoyne himself, ministers and their friends have treated him, and spoken of him, with unexampled liberality of sentiment.—But Mr. Rigby the sworn friend of his courted confederate Sir William Howe, has been the only person who has treated him with illiberal severity. And it is true, that Mr. Rigby's conduct has been more censured by the friends of their country, than by opposition. This gentleman, while he loaded the unfortunate commander publicly with the most aggravated charges, strenuously opposed the examination of his evidence before the Committee. This was staining him with dishonour, and at the same instant telling him, he should have no opportunity of wiping it off. Such conduct decides a man's character for ever.

Gen. Burgoyne's case is indeed truly pitiable. He has thrown up his commissions, rather than go and comfort his brave companions, captives under a convention of his own making: he has deserted

ferted the true ground of his defence, the want of a co-operation : he has clung to the very man who abandoned him to destruction ; whose friends still spurn him ; and who are the only persons who have cruelly attacked him.—His forming a connection with this man who had ruined him and his army, was certainly the most fatal action, for his own character, that passion misguided by folly could commit.—Yet the public, more just to him than he has been to himself, equally with himself regret his misfortunes, and still more, they pity him, for those political imprudencies at home, of which he appears, at present, to have no due sense.—Never was a respectable character so irremediably self devoted.

Has self devoted his own character.

S T R I C T U R E S

On Sir William Howe's MISCHIANZA or TRIUMPH, upon leaving America unconquered. With his Character printed under the patronage of the American Congress, in order to shew how far the King's enemies think his General deserving of Public Honours. This Writer strongly recommends MATTER of FACT and the LETTER from NEW YORK, dated May 17th, (see pages 34 and 38, &c.) as excellent Letters, which should be read by every good Englishman who wishes to understand the reasons of our failure in America.

IF Sir William Howe had thought fit quietly to resign his command, and been content to enjoy in privacy the fortune he had acquired, till the nation had in some measure digested the disgraces and losses we had suffered under his command in America ; or till the dangers and calamities, which, in consequence of them, threaten us here at home, were passed over ;—he might not then perhaps have been disturbed in his retirement.

A triumph preposterous after personal disgrace & defeat.

But at a time when the British empire in America is sunk, and when thousands and thousands of good subjects in both countries are ruined by its fall ; at a time, when, with the loss of our colonies, the empire here in Britain itself is shaken and endangered ; at such a time of public calamity, when every good Englishman was trembling for the commonwealth ; at such a time of distress, for a general to take to himself ovations and triumphs greater than the Duke of Marlborough, or any English commander ever thought of ; to suffer himself to be crowned with laurels, and to have triumphal arches erected to his honour ; is such an insult offered to our understandings, as cannot but raise in the mind of every man of sense, the highest degree of astonishment and indignation.

Could a commander in chief, in a war of so much importance, after the nation had been put to the expence of so many millions to no purpose ; and when so many thousands of good subjects are ruined by the miscarriage of it ;—could he think, that we should lose all sense of the public calamities, because he expresses no feelings for them ? Did he think we should imagine America was still ours, because he shewed no shame, but had a triumph made for him upon the loss of it ? Or that a three years series of perpetual disgraces would not be seen through all his ovations and triumphal arches ? How much soever it may be in a general's power to represent his

No sense of public calamity, or personal shame.

army

army as *greater or less*, to suit any *present occasion*, yet one thing at least is certain, that Gen. Howe was furnished with a force abundantly sufficient to have quelled the rebellion. Both friends and foes agree in this, that from the year 1776, he never met Mr. Washington but with an army superior in number, as well as in goodness, to that of the enemy which was opposed to him: yet in the course of three campaigns, he never thought proper to fight Mr. Washington but once; and then did not chuse to pursue the victory which his troops had gained for him. Either, therefore, the British troops must have been the greatest of all poltroons, who were unable to contend with an inferior number of raw-raised, half-clothed, half-armed American militia;—or else there must have been an extreme deficiency in our generalship. Whichever of these may have been the case, what ground can either of them afford for a triumph? Or upon what foundation could a general, who had seen the British arms endure innumerable discharges under his command; who had suffered himself to be ingloriously driven out of Boston; and who after having been beaten at Trenton and Prince town, was still more ingloriously driven out of the Jerseys; whose troops, by bravely beating in the rebel out-posts, had often pointed out to him the way to victory, while he never chose to follow it; but invariably allowed the Americans to march unmolested and unpursued; who had suffered himself to be surprized at German town, and had seen his army thereby brought to the brink of destruction, from which it was rescued by the single bravery and good-conduct of Lieut. Col. Mifflin; who had been baffled and defeated in all his attempts, and out-generaled even by a man that was none; and who now, after three years command, found himself much less able to suppress the rebellion, than he was the day he landed on Staten island?—Upon what pretence, I say, could this gentleman suffer himself to be crowned with laurels which he never won? Or encourage the dedicating a triumphal arch with plumes and military trophies to his honour, without his having once had the honour of a conquest.

Crowned
with laurels
never won.

When to very extraordinary a method has been taken, to persuade us of the high estimation, in which he is held for his military abilities, it is a piece of justice due to the public, to produce the opinion which even the rebels entertain of him; to very different from that which has been given by his flatterers and dependants. It is a letter addressed to him in the American Crisis; a work which some have given to Dr. Franklin. It is known to be written under the patronage of Congress, and under the instruction of their capital and best informed leaders.

THE AMERICAN CRISIS,

Addressed to Gen. Sir William Howe. By the Author of Common Sense.

Congress
character of
Sir William
Howe.

“ That a man, whose soul is absorbed in the low traffic of vulgar vice, is incapable of moving in any superior region, is clearly shown in you by the event of every campaign;—your military exploits have been without plan, object, or decision. Can it be possible that you or your employers can suppose the possession of Philadelphia to be any ways equal to the expence or the expectations

“ rations of the nation which supports you? What advantages
 “ does England derive from any atchievment of yours? If the
 “ principal events of the three campaigns be attended to, the ba-
 “ lance will appear strongly against you at the close of each ;
 “ but the last, in point of importance to us hath exceeded the for-
 “ mer two. At the close of the campaign in seventy-five you were
 “ obliged to retreat from Boston. In the summer, seventy-six, you
 “ appeared with a numerous fleet and army in the harbour of
 “ New York. *By what miracle the Continent was preserved in that*
 “ *season of danger, is a subject of admiration.* If, instead of wasting
 “ your time against Long Island, you had run up the North river,
 “ and landed any where above New York, the consequence must
 “ have been, that either you would have compelled Gen. Wash-
 “ ington to fight you with very unequal numbers, or he must have
 “ suddenly evacuated the city, with the loss of nearly all the
 “ stores of the army, or have surrendered for want of provisions ;
 “ the situation of the place naturally producing one or the other
 “ of these events.

Wonder at
 their own
 preserva-
 tion.

“ You let slip the very opportunity which seemed to put con-
 “ quest in your power. Through the whole of that campaign you
 “ had nearly double the forces which Gen. Washington immedi-
 “ ately commanded. The utmost hope of America in the year
 “ seventy-six reached no higher than that she might not then be
 “ conquered. She had no expectation of defeating you in the cam-
 “ paign. You had then greatly the advantage of her ; you were
 “ formidable ; your military knowledge was *supposed to be complete* ;
 “ your fleets and forces arrived without any accident ; you had
 “ nothing to do but to begin, and your chance lay in the first vi-
 “ gorous onset. America was young and unskilled. She was ob-
 “ liged to trust her defence to time and practice ; and hath, by
 “ mere dint of perseverance, maintained her cause and brought
 “ her enemy to a condition, in which she is now capable of meeting
 “ him on any ground.

“ Let me ask, Sir, what great exploits have you performed?
 “ Through all the variety of changes and opportunities, which this
 “ war hath produced, I know of no one action of yours that can
 “ be styled masterly. You have moved in and out, backward and
 “ forward, round and round, as if valour consisted in a military
 “ jig. The history and figure of your movements would be truly
 “ ridiculous, could they be justly delineated. They resemble the
 “ labours of a puppy pursuing his tail ; the end is still at the
 “ same distance, and all the turnings round must be done over a-
 “ gain. † Some weeks after this you likewise planned an attack on
 “ Gen. Washington, while at White Marsh ; you marched out with
 “ infi-

Sarcastic
 remarks on
 his move-
 ments.

† I do not adopt this language of contempt ; but if his panegyrist had not told us, could it have been thought possible, that this gentleman, a month after this publication, should have had a Fame spangled with stars, stuck up on the top of his triumphal arch, blowing from her trumpet in letters of light : Tes lauriers sont immortels. And not content with this earth's being filled with the sound of his fame, she was even pow-
 dered with stars, to tell us that it reached up to the heavens.

Retreats before Washington to hide among women.

“ infinite parade ; but on finding him preparing to attack you, the next morning you prudently cut about, and retreated to Philadelphia with all the precipitation of a man conquered in imagination. Immediately after the battle of German town, the probability of Burgoyne’s defeat gave a new policy to the affairs in Pennsylvania ; and it was judged most consistent with the general safety of America to wait the issue of the northern campaign. Slow and sure is found work. The news of that victory arrived in our camp the 18th of October, and no sooner did the shout of joy and the report of the 3 cannon reach your ears, than you resolved upon a retreat, and the next day, that is on the 19th, withdrew your drooping army into Philadelphia. This movement was evidently dictated by fear, and carried with it a positive confession that you dreaded a second attack. It was hiding yourself among women * and children, and sleeping away the choicest part of a campaign in expensive inactivity. An army in a city, can never be a conquering army, The situation admits only of defence. It is mere shelter ; and every military power in Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated.

“ The time when you made this retreat, was the very time you ought to have fought a battle, in order to put yourself in a condition of recovering in Pennsylvania what you had lost at Saratoga ; and the reason why you did not, must be either prudence or c——e ; the former supposes your inability, and the latter needs no explanation.”

A romantic triumph after 3 years disgraces & defeats.

Such are the sentiments which the Americans entertain of this gentleman, and so great the contempt they express of him. What would have been said of the Duke of Marlborough’s vanity, if, after 40,000 enemies killed and taken at the battle of Blenheim, he had encouraged his officers and dependants to dedicate to him a triumphal arch, and had employed even the enemies standards taken in battle, in forming an avenue for himself and fellow conquerors to have walked through ? What then are we to think of a beaten general’s debasing the King’s ensigns (for he had none of his enemies) by planting all the colours of the army in a grand avenue 300 feet in length, lined with the King troops, between two triumphal arches, for himself and his brother to march along in pompous procession, followed by a numerous train of attendants, with seven silken knights of the blended rose, and seven more of the burning mountain, and their fourteen Turkey dressed damsels, to an area of 150 yards square, lined also with the King’s troops, for the exhibition of a tilt and tournament, or mock fight of old chivalry, in honour of this triumphant hero ; and all this sea and land ovation

* Should the reader ask, what it was that the general at last did among them ? his panegyrist here has told us, “ He bounces off with his bombs and burning hearts, set upon the pillars of his triumphal arch, which, at the proper time of the show, burst out in a shower of squibs and crackers, and other fire-works, to the delectable amazement of Miss Craig, Miss Chew, Miss Redman, and all the other misses, dressed out as the fair damsels of the blended rose, and of the burning mountain, for this farce of knight-errantry.”

tion made; not in consequence of an uninterrupted succession of victories, like those of the Duke of Marlborough; nor after the conquest of Canada by a Wolfe, a Townshend, and an Amherst; or, after the much more valuable conquest of all the French provinces and possessions in India, under the *wise* and *active* Gen. Coote; but after thirteen provinces wretchedly lost, and a three years series of ruinous disgraces and defeats.

REVIEW OF THE WAR.

IT is a singular and convincing proof of the weak and distracted Effrontery of public delinquents state of our councils, and of the power of the reigning factions, when notorious public delinquents, who have entailed upon us an enormous additional debt, who have loaded us with national dishonour, who have plunged us into a French and Spanish war, not only escape with impunity, but are heard with patient submission in the senate, declaim on their own merits, and arraign that country for ill-treatment, which they, by their base and miserable conduct have undone. Such tameness in us, is the last and most wretched stage of national humiliation: In them, to ruin a people, and call for their praise, is the highest pitch of daring insult and hardened malignity. But to leave the crowd of delinquents to the consolations and flatteries of opposition, Sir William Howe shall be my object.

This man, who has brought a name formerly honoured into contempt, wantonly sacrificed a thousand of our bravest men at Bunker's hill, by despising the situation of the enemy, and rejecting the simplest and easiest of all manœuvres, that of landing on their left from Mytic river, and taking post on the heights above their rear, which would have given us their whole army to a man.

By neglecting to occupy the heights of Dorchester, which he had constantly before his eyes for ten months, and which he knew from the first * the rebels intended to possess, he was forced to fly with ignominy from Boston; purchasing a quiet retreat by a secret capitulation, never having the candour to own his obligation to the negociator of his safety, but all along disingenuously attempting to impose upon the world, *that his fine military disposition had enchanted the rebels.*

From this place he fled with all the precipitation of a man com- Secret history of Boston evacuation. pletely discomfited, abandoning an hundred pieces of cannon and mortars, great quantities of military stores, and even provisions, and such a vast assortment of linens and woollens, as lasted the New England rebels, who were in great distress for them, no less than two years; together with a fleet of vessels of various denominations which were all fitted out against us next summer, and scouring the Western Ocean, nearly ruined for that year, our whole West India Trade. He was repeatedly urged and intreated to issue orders for transporting the linens and woollens to Halifax; there they might have been restored to the proper owners, but it was to no purpose; fullen, indolent

A a

* Gen. Gage also had information of this in May 1775, at the same time with their intention of occupying Bunker's hill.

dolent and diffipated, he was incapable of doing any business or of surmounting any difficulty. The same motives or want of motives prevented his leaving a garrison on George's island near Nantasket road, though a proposal of his own to the Minister. A battalion on that island, which is very defensible, would, with a ship of war, have completely secured Boston harbour. But for want of the protection that such a garrison could have given to a man of war, and received from her, the rebels soon forced Capt. Banks to leave the road, in consequence of which, most of our store ships from Europe and the West Indies with near 1000 men in transports, ran directly into Boston harbour, and were taken.

Howe wishes to be attacked; is attacked & flies; and receives mortifying dispatches in his flight

Orders were sent in summer and fall 1775 to evacuate Boston, Ministry being ashamed of the inglorious situation of troops so cooped up, exposed to insult, want, and surprize; and no longer either objects of terror, or cause of distress to the rebels. These orders our commander rejected. The prospect of six months total idleness, was too great a happiness for a sluggish mind to relinquish. In reply, he sent home the following bravado: "that it were to be wished the rebels would hazard so rash an attempt as to attack him. But they did make the attempt, and he sunk under it, without a single effort or struggle on his part to make head against them. If his mind had not been of a most impenetrable or callous texture how dreadfully mortified must he have felt, when just as he had commenced his flight, and not yet out of sight of the spires of Boston, a ship of war from England hailed him, and gave him the minister's dispatches, applauding his reasons for *not leaving* Boston, and justifying his resolution of remaining there, as *an evacuation* would have been a very unadvisable measure. Thus he fled with those praises in his pocket, which had been lavished upon him only on the supposition, that he still kept firm in his post. There are few minds but would have felt this stroke for life.

Though he knew the necessity of remaining in Boston on account of his expected reinforcements, and to keep up an alarm to prevent the rebels from reinforcing their army before Quebec, yet he went to shut himself up on the inhospitable coast of Nova Scotia, eight days sail out of his road, instead of going to New York, which at last he thought proper to do three months after. Immediately on our deserting Boston the rebels detached a large reinforcement to their army in Canada. As to Quebec, he had left it to its fate, or rather apparently signified it to the rebels; on the 10th of October, while solacing himself at Boston, Gen. Carleton's letters beseeching succours arrived, with intelligence he had not 100 soldiers under his command. Our great man, so wise, so active, and zealous, in consultation with Admiral Graves determined a battalion of marines should be sent: in three days the transports were ready to take them on board: but at that instant Admiral Graves receiving a new light, thought fit to declare, that to send transports up the St. Lawrence was unadvisable and impracticable. People wondered from whence the admiral had received this sudden illumination, as he had been quite of another opinion three days before. Then our general undertook the business; but he came to a quicker decision; doing in one day what Graves had taken three to do; that is, coming to a determination to send them, and a determination

tion not to send them. Sending troops would have been doing something, therefore it went no further than an idea, as we were always better pleased when doing nothing. After all this preparation and exertion of wisdom, the vessel from Quebec was sent back *express* the 13th of October in the evening, to let Gen. Carleton know, that it was the decided opinion of Gen. Howe and Admiral Graves, that it was impracticable for vessels with *troops* on board to get up the river St. Lawrence; but that vessels with *expresses* without any troops certainly might.

Curious opinions for and against reinforcing Quebec.

In his passage from Halifax to New York, he might have destroyed every thing that could float in all the rebel harbours, and yet have landed when he did, August 22d, on Long island. By frequent landings on the coast, he would have weakened Washington's army at New York, by the withdrawing of the New England men. Had this been done, the privateers that in the summer commanded the seas, would have been destroyed in embryo.

It is now necessary to bring forward Lord Howe, touching his negotiations. The body of the people of America were loyal to the King, and affectionate to the mother country. These original and habitual dispositions prevailed over two thirds of the people, when Lord and Gen. Howe met as Commissioners at Staten island. Men of genius and address, would soon have brought most of the provinces on our side. But the Howes for want of qualities to gain, or abilities to negotiate, confirmed all our enemies, and lost us most of our friends. At first, even Washington's army shewed a joy at the prospect of reuniting with Britain, and the people of the provinces were praying for our appearance, and preparing to receive us with open arms; but before the campaign 1776 ended, our four manners, our want of capacity, and even of civility, an universal and indiscriminating scene of plunder, produced the most fatal effects; our enemies were rendered more inveterate, and our friends dreaded the approach of soldiers more than of rebels. This arose from the contracted conduct of Gens. Howe and Washington. Our army plundered. Washington retook 20 waggons loads at Trenton, and restored the whole to the proper owners without regard to their political creeds. It should be remarked, however, in justice to Sir William Howe, that he forbid plundering in orders, but he could not conceal his illiberal hatred to the American name; and officers and men continued a practice, which was thought no ways disagreeable to the commander in chief. But for this, plundering might have been prevented in the other parts of the army as well as in the first brigade. Such conduct in our two brothers was rather the effect of weakness than of vice: they had in common the sullen family gloom: in one thing they differed: Sir William hated business, and never did any; my Lord loved business, dwelt upon it, and never could leave or end it. Their different passions and desires were equally destructive to us; all of which, joined to their injudicious, weak, and disgraceful operations, proved the ruin of the war. Their uniform character through life has been, and is to this day, haughty, morose, hard hearted and inflexible; in general a composition of pride and personal courage, though this last phrase ought to be expunged for insensibility; on their first appointment, they were considered as the Horatii

Original disposition of the Americans.

The real characters of Lord and Gen. Howe

of the English state, but now a melancholy reverse of sentiment is felt; they are looked upon as our undoers, rather than our favours.

The most sanguine wishers on the side of government, never even hoped for half the force to end the rebellion that the present American minister employed. Gen. Amherst's demand of 20,000 men, had been considered as an extravagancy, and only made to answer the purpose of a refusal. Gen. Howe had 40,870 effective men under his command. Let us see what use he made of them.

Interesting particulars of battle of Brooklyn.

When he landed on Long island, he neglected to seize the heights above Flat Bush; the rebels knew their importance, and took possession of them at 3 in the afternoon, which he might have done at 10 in the morning. This neglect might have been fatal to him. He had nearly been induced to attack where he must have failed. But the enemy had their neglects too. Washington's order for securing the Jamaica road was not obeyed. Gen. Howe by a night march occupied that pass; and unperceived by the enemy, got between their army on the heights and their lines. The rebels fled in the utmost disorder. Sullivan owned, that when he saw himself surrounded, he desired his men to shift for themselves. This they did with great expedition; and our troops were following the rebel fugitives into their lines, when they were with the utmost difficulty called back by the repeated orders of Gen. Howe. Exclusive of the rebels who were routed, there were only 300 men with Putnam in their lines. There is not the least doubt but our soldiers would have carried them by storm; and in consequence, all the enemy's army on Long island, consisting of 7000 men, must have been killed or taken. Gen. Robertson, in evidence, though he could not deny these facts, yet palliated the measure, by saying, he imagined Gen. Howe could not know these circumstances, and that it was his opinion at the time that Gen. Howe did right in calling back the troops; but the matter is not what an officer so delicately circumstanced as Gen. Robertson was, might think proper to say in order to excuse Gen. Howe. Would a great officer, or even any officer, weighing what he might get and what he might lose, have recalled his troops from lines, which he himself was confident they would, had they been permitted, have stormed with success?

Without a single movement we lay 3 days in the face of these lines with 18,000 men eager for battle, and allowed the enemy to ferry themselves over to New York with all their baggage, though their place of embarkation was only a mile and a half from our camp. Lord Howe was equally supine; he lay almost within sight of the ferry, with the most numerous fleet ever seen in that part of the world, as if he had been sent to cover, rather than to cut off their retreat. Had the two brothers most earnestly desired that the rebel army should escape, it was impossible for them to have acted more properly for the effecting of such a purpose.

Rebel retreat might have been cut off.

Though our commander was now in possession of the heights that commanded Governor's island, he suffered fifteen hundred rebels to go off without the least disturbance. They retired in such fright that they abandoned their cannon; but two days after, finding we did not take possession, they returned and carried them off to New York. Our chief now composed himself for more than a fortnight,
only

only amusing himself in erecting a battery against a gentleman's house on York island, endeavouring to frighten the rebels with the noise of his cannon, but without doing them any harm. During this time he should have gone up the East river, or rather embarked at Whitestown just adjoining his encampment, and cut off the rebel retreat by King's bridge, while his lordship with his parade fleet, should have occupied the North and East rivers; these plain and simple movements would have given us all Washington's army, and all the rebel ringleaders almost without firing a gun; for they must have surrendered soon for want of provisions. In this case too, we should have saved the 500 men lost before fort Washington.

But as we never were to be in the right, after giving the rebels 17 days to run away from New York, we crossed the ferry with the most pompous parade to take possession of it. Had we been *wife* and *active*, we might even now have cut off the retreat of the rebels by King's bridge, but four weeks were spent at Haerlem, and the opportunity lost, the rebels at last having discovered their dangerous situation. After so much delay, negligence, and blindness, we were at last to do, when all opportunity was gone, what we ought to have done six weeks before. Our infallible Hero, above all good advice, and taking his own way, landed on Frog's neck, October 12th, without ever thinking beforehand it was necessary to reconnoitre the ground. The enemy having no intention to dispute this paltry slip of land with him, broke down the bridge that joined it to the main, and looked at him from their intrenchments on the opposite side with no little satisfaction: they had shut him out from the continent; he was now fairly blocked up on the land side. In this odd situation he had neither candour nor sense enough to confess his blunder, and then endeavour to remedy it. But spent another week cooped up on this pleasant spot, trying to convince the army that he was certainly in the right. With their situation before their eyes, and a full conviction of the folly that brought them there, all their respect for their commander could not make them swallow this absurdity. Heaven knows when he would have moved, had not the ridicule and murmurs of the army overcome for once his obstinacy, and sent him to sea again. Now indeed he landed near New Rochelle, the place he should originally have debarked at.

Ridiculous
situation of
Frog's neck

It has been justly observed, that in following our Hero's progress, our astonishment suffers no rest. Indolence and folly directed all our movements. In ten days we hardly march ten miles, though it was supposed the rebels were retreating. On the 28th, however, we find them waiting for us on the Bronx. Two regiments attack a detached corps of the enemy, and gain a material post. Another general would have pushed his good fortune, having an army superior in number, superior in discipline, in every point of equipment, and more than all these, victorious, against a beaten, disheartened, flying enemy. But we had done *active service* enough for one day. Next day, as at the heights of Dorchester last year, the enemy's lines *appeared* much strengthened, therefore the attack was deferred till we were reinforced. Our reinforcement joined us the 30th. Now we were to attack the next day, but it happening to rain in the night and morning, this was sufficient excuse for putting it off

By repeated
delay the
enemy e-
scapes.

a third time, though the day proved fair; and then the day after that, November 1st, to our *great surprise*, the enemy were run away. They left a rear guard within two miles of us to cover their retreat. This corps we did not think proper to attack. Here again the rebels were saved from absolute destruction. We had a corps on their right flank, besides, on that flank their retreat was cut off by the North river, only two miles distant, where some of our ships and galleys lay, and they had Croton river in their rear, only four miles distant, which Gen. Howe's own friends have proved not fordable. It is true there is a bridge over Croton river, but our left was almost as near it as the rear of the rebel right, and they durst not attempt to pass it in our presence. It was beyond the power of nature to have saved them, had they been attacked. A corps upon their left flank would have prevented them taking the Connecticut road; they were then hemmed in between our superior army, the North river, and Croton river; and their total ruin was certain and infallible, had we only attacked them. We neither attacked nor pursued them. Such conduct will never put an end to any rebellion.

We now returned or retreated to York island and stormed fort Washington, in which the rebels had left upwards of 2000 men. It cost us 500. If our operations had been directed with any degree of judgment, we should have had this conquest, with Washington and all his rebels, at much less expence.

Clergyman
murdered,
and a loyal
people a-
bandoned.

By our march back, or retreat, we abandoned all that part of the province of New York beyond Kingsbridge. The rebels whom we had not thought worth pursuing, now pursued us, and ravaged the Chester counties, where we had been joyfully received, murdering the clergyman of Rye, for having been assiduous in strengthening the loyal principles of the inhabitants. In this respect our conduct has been constant and uniform, in urging our well wishers in America to public declarations of loyalty, and then abandoning them to persecution and death.

We should have intercepted the shattered remnant of the rebel army, by pushing a detachment over to Elizabeth town or Amboy: our not doing it could only arise from ignorance, indolence, or a dread that the rebellion would be too short. And again Lord Cornwallis's halt at Brunswick, for want of orders, when in sight of these same wretched fugitives, little more than 2000 men, whilst he had with him the reserve of our army, the very flower of our troops, nearly double the rebel strength, is a strong instance of a deficiency somewhere, and another decisive opportunity rejected. Through indolence of manœuvre our hero did not come up till six days after the enemy's escape. For some days he looked at them across the Delaware, and on December the 14th put his troops into winter quarters in an extended line of cantonment of near 100 miles, in open villages, without a single work to cover them. The pleasures of New York now attracted us; and in 12 days we were defeated at Trenton. But the mind cannot dwell on this shameful transaction; Rhall has been blamed because he is dead; and perhaps, the brave Donop has been cited as a proof of the charge, because he too is dead.

Dead Donop
cited as a
proof a-
gainst dead
Rhall

The defeat at Trenton and Princetown broke up our cantonments, and lost us the whole Jerseys except three villages. During the remainder

mainder of the winter our foraging parties were attacked and shot down wherever they presented themselves; and those petty, disgraceful conflicts, lost us more men than a general engagement. Our commander paid us one visit, and was in great danger of being killed or taken prisoner; he had a very hard ride for his escape. This winter Gen. Vaughan, a very gallant officer, and remarkable for his strong and pointed sayings, being asked his opinion on the ensuing campaign, replied with great promptitude and consciousness, "I am for the most vigorous measures: I am not for nursing a rebellion." I believe his opinion was never again asked, and he has been left to amuse himself the best way he can at New York.

In the spring and summer it is impossible for the mind of man to conceive the gloom and resentment of the army, on the retreat from the Jerseys, and the shipping them to the southward: nothing but being present and seeing the countenances of the soldiers, could give an impression adequate to the scene; or paint the astonishment and despair that reigned in New York, when it was found, that the North river was deserted, and Burgoyne's army abandoned to its fate. All the former opportunities lost through indolence, or rejected through design, appeared innocent when compared with this fatal movement. The ruinous and dreadful consequences were instantly foreseen and foretold: and despondence or execration filled every mouth.

Despondence and execration on deserting Burgoyne.

Had there been no Canada army to desert or to sacrifice, the voyage to the southward could only originate from the most profound ignorance or imbecility.

To run away from, and consequently to ruin the people who had submitted in the Jerseys, as he had formerly served those of the Chester counties, could have no other effect than that of fixing on our standards the character of destructive idiotism, or treachery: to fly before Washington was depressing the spirit of our own troops, and giving a triumph to the enemy: and to fly from the scene where he ought to have acted, and with a land army undertake a six weeks voyage in the very heart of the campaign, was certainly an absurdity even too extravagant for a fairy tale: above all, to go to Philadelphia, which every corporal could have told him would be putting his army in fetters.—His conduct has verified this opinion.—He never dared to move a day's march from it.—It was a cord about his neck.

Army in fetters at Philadelphia.

As to the Brandywine manœuvres so much idolized by his partizans, any boy at a military academy can repeat them from Saxe's Reveries; and from the same source can add to them, "That not to prosecute a victory, and pursue your enemy to the utmost in your power, is founded on a false principle: that 10,000 men in pursuit, are sufficient to overthrow 100,000 in retreat: that no manœuvres can fail but those that take up time and give respite to the enemy: that a regular retreat is impracticable, unless a conqueror is guilty of remissness; but that generals avoid these decisive opportunities, from an unwillingness to put an end to the war." It is a known truth, people present at the engagement rode to Philadelphia that very night; that the rebel congress were then assembled in that town; and that a spirited march of a detachment from the division of our army that passed Chad's ford, and

Count Saxe's opinion of remiss generals.

were not fatigued as that part which marched on our left, might have surpris'd the whole rebel conclave; at least, would have gain'd possession of all the rebel magazines. Instead of a movement so very plain and rational, the whole army hardly moved at all, for even our most forward detachment was 15 days in reaching Philadelphia. Whereas had a detachment the night of the battle been pushed forward to Philadelphia; and the army, or another strong detachment moved briskly in pursuit of the fugitive rebels, their army for that year would have been undone. So far from this happening, we suffer'd another blockade in Philadelphia all winter, by a ragged contemptible enemy not half our force. Our Hero has a passion for being blockaded. In 1775 we were blockaded in Boston: in 1776 in New York, and three Jersey villages: in 1777 in Philadelphia.

At Germantown, Washington was forced to seek him in his own camp: we were completely surpris'd. He, it is said, was not to be seen: he was deeply engag'd somewhere, or with somebody: he was not to be disturb'd: and if Gen. Grant had not forced his way to him, he would have known nothing of the battle but by report: yet he could tell his bravest men, the British light infantry, who had been fought down by the whole rebel army, with that harsh insensibility so characteristic in him, "that they ought to have remained in their post, and been cut to pieces on the spot." In this affair we lost our baggage, and had not the gallant Musgrave thrown himself into a stone house, which was very strong, 'tis likely our active hero might have been surpris'd in bed.

G. Howe's
harsh
speech.

Such dreadful conduct could operate in no other manner than it did: that is, in bringing destruction upon England, and a load of disgrace upon himself. On the 18th of October, the rebel cannon announced the ruin of Burgoyne: appalled, and conscience struck, and perhaps trembling for himself, instant orders were given to retreat, and he led us back to hide his head in Philadelphia. There, after three days tumult of mind, he wrote his letter of resignation; finding THAT, the only resource left him to parry his sacrifice of Burgoyne; to extricate himself from the unmilitary position in which he had involv'd himself; and to ward off from himself, if possible, under a quarrel with the ministry, all blame of the ignominy and ruin he had brought on his country.

Hears of
Burgoyne's
ruin, re-
treats, and
resigns.

Our im-
mense los-
ses, and pa-
tient stu-
pidity.

The consequences of this man's unaccountably weak and wretched conduct are, thirty thousand brave men destroy'd, thirty millions of money expended, thirteen provinces lost, and a war with the whole House of Bourbon. If such misconduct is to pass without censure or punishment, there must be a radical weakness, either in the constitution of the state, or in the minds of the people, and the total dissolution of this empire must be fast approaching; for the people who sit in patient stupidity, and see themselves become the victims of ignorance or treachery, cannot, and do not deserve to exist as a nation.

CONCLUSION.

C O N C L U S I O N .

ON the most candid and strict investigation, it is apparent, that the major part of the Americans were against any breach with the mother country, and that sentiments favourable to a reconciliation and return to allegiance now possess many, who lately were active adherents of rebellion. The oppressions and cruelties of the rebel Congress, and the comparison the inhabitants of the provinces draw, between their present convulsed and wretched condition, and their former peaceful and happy state, have wrought this change in their opinions. Indeed there is the greatest reason to believe, that no rebellion would have arisen, but for the strong and repeated encouragement, the malecontents received, from a traiterous opposition in this kingdom.—An opposition infected with the black ambition of doing evil, like the outcast and fallen angels in Milton, and of endeavouring, where they cannot command, at least, to destroy; and whose fatal intentions have been nearly completed, by the ruinous and languid operations of our armies, under men, who had been closely connected with them. Need we wonder then, that such commanders should again embody themselves under such politicians? Certainly we ought not. The alliance is strictly in character. In fact, we have every reason to lament, that a certain general did not act that great man, his Nottingham correspondent wished him to act, and refuse to go against *this people* in rebellion. The withes of some men amongst us, who are the inveterate enemies of our happy constitution, of church and state, are clearly demonstrated in the letter from Nottingham. Well might the general say, that the men at Nottingham were deceived in supposing, there were not many peaceable and loyal subjects in America; and that the insurgents were few in comparison of the whole people. We confess, however, that now, he pretends to be of a different opinion; but that does not affect the truth of the case; which the most recent accounts from America, and the evidence before the House of Commons have firmly established. No wonder the general was filled with astonishment at the rancour and malice of some men; for it must inspire every true friend to his country with horror, when he reflects, that a set of men exist in it, who wish the fall of every officer that combats for the constitutional authority of the state. However, as the operations in America have turned out, we need not be filled with astonishment, that the general was highly complimented on his accepting the command in America, by those who were averse to the measures of government; nor need we be filled with astonishment at his entreating his correspondent to suspend his judgment, until **THE EVENT** should prove him unworthy of his support.

Our internal enemies, opposition, and those who are the rebel confederates, having only just failed of ruining us in war, by lending us, or endeavouring to impose upon us, generals and admirals, being now terrified at the rising spirit of the nation, the vigorous preparations for war, and the sight of a military force amounting nearly to half a million, are now attempting to circumvent us by negotiation, that they may effect by art and treachery,

Opposition
the chief
cause of A-
merican re-
bellion.

The ru-
inous opera-
tions in A-
merica give
pleasure at
Nottinga-
ham.

Our enemies terrified at our preparations, want to circumvent us by a truce.

that destruction, which they have just failed of bringing upon us by war. Their insidious and treacherous proposals are, a five or a ten years truce with the rebels. This would be equivalent to giving them independency at once. The proposition is perhaps more distinguished for its effrontery than art. To grant the rebellious colonies such a truce, or any truce, would be to enable them to recover from their present condition, to recover their dread and immense losses. It would give them time to procure all the supplies they are now in such distress for; to recruit their armies, and to settle their revolted state on such a firm foundation, that no power perhaps of the mother country could shake it. On our side, during the truce, our army and navy must be reduced; thus we are stripped of every power of resistance, and at its expiration, must ignominiously accede and crouch to whatever terms cruel and insolent rebels, and haughty and inveterate foes think proper to dictate.

Such are the intentions of our internal and external enemies, who by insidious negotiations resolve to divest us of our strength, and then take advantage of our folly; sensible that the natural spirit of Englishmen is not to be deadened whilst they have arms in their hands, or that they will tamely resign themselves up an easy and an helpless prey. The true means to obtain a lasting, beneficial and glorious peace, rest solely on a vigorous prosecution of the war.

To rid the Americans of their Congress & army, the way to lasting peace.

At present, what hopes ought we to have of honourable accommodation;—we, who during the whole course of the rebellion, till within these few days, have been alternately beaten, baffled and betrayed. It is admitted that the enemy may be terrified at the vigour of our preparations; but do not let us tie up our hands; let us fight while we negotiate; let the immense force we have raised be properly exerted; and let us rid the loyal and suffering Americans of the tyranny of the rebel Congress and their army. Now we know the number and extent of our foes; now we know the treacherous designs the mask of patriotism covers; and now, since we have felt and suffered for our errors and our weakness, let us reap the fruits of our present experience and of our present strength.

T H E E N D.

