

ON COLONIAL INTERCOURSE.

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BY

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OF THE INNER TEMPLE.

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COLONIAL INTERCOURSE.

No. I.

THE commercial intercourse between the United States and British Colonies in America is, it seems, again become the subject of negotiation. It was hoped, and believed, that this question had, by the act of 1825*, and the order in council, which followed it in July 1826, been permanently settled; not indeed upon the best terms to be desired, but perhaps upon the best to be obtained; and in which all parties interested, the colonists in the West Indies and North America, the ship owners and British merchants, acquiesced, and have since been exerting themselves to make the most of the conditions established. For it is with the regulations of commerce, as with the rules of property, scarcely of more consequence that the law be wise, than that it be certain and permanent.

Such a state of things however has been by no

* Stat. 6 Geo. IV, cap. 73.

means equally agreeable to the Americans. They immediately, in 1826, attempted to open negotiations for a change. Fortunately there happened at that time to be in the foreign department a statesman, who, whatever might have been his other errors, was at least exempt from any misunderstanding of American questions, or of the policy and character of their government. His answer to Mr. Gallatin upon that occasion is much and deservedly celebrated, and gave the highest satisfaction to all interested in colonial affairs, particularly for one sentence, most important to the present question, an express declaration, that, “*after what had passed on the subject of colonial intercourse, the British government cannot consent to enter into any renewed negotiations upon the intercourse between the United States and the British colonies, so long as the pretensions recorded in the act of 1823, and there applied to British colonies alone, remain part of the law of the United States*.*” This document, published by government, seemed designed to communicate their final resolutions, not only to the United States, but also to the subjects of Great Britain, by whom it was hailed as an additional assurance, that they were not mistaken in trusting to the faith of the late act and order, (which had become a part and supplement of the same law), and in understanding

* Letter from Mr. Canning to Mr. Gallatin, dated 11th of Sept. 1826.

the new colonial system as settled and permanent. But the then foreign secretary did not rest there; and, as if he thought such an assurance not sufficiently strong, he added also, that “ *the British government owes to the spirit of frankness, which it wishes to cultivate in all its relations with the United States, to declare, that, after having been compelled to apply to any country the interdict prescribed by the act of 1825, the British government cannot hold itself bound to remove the interdict as a matter of course, whenever it may happen to suit the convenience of the foreign government, to reconsider the measures, by which the application of that interdict was occasioned*.*” Now, unless this was merely an empty threat, intended to irritate a foreign power by the unnecessary denial of what could never have been implied, it was intended as a warning to that power, and it operated, by publication, as an assurance to us, that government would constantly adhere to the new law, and exclude the Americans from the colonial trade, even though they should repeal their acts, and ask to accept of the conditions, on which that trade was offered to them, and which they had refused. What measure, what rule of commercial intercourse, unfettered by foreign treaties, and disclaiming the idea of such arrangement, and depending

* Same Letter.

upon internal legislation alone, was ever before instituted with such promises, such pledges, of constancy and permanence?

Yet, in 1827, the Americans, finding Mr. Canning dead, again renewed their proposal to negotiate upon this question. But it was in vain, that they had lowered no less the nature of their demands, than their tone and manner of urging them. It was in vain, that they offered unequivocally to repeal their pretensions and laws, and to accept of the very terms they had formerly disdained. The proposal was courteously declined by Lord Dudley; who again referred them to the letter of Mr. Canning, above cited, as for the final decision of the British cabinet. In the same letter his lordship reiterates the principle the British government had adopted, and in which the Americans have acquiesced, to regulate colonial intercourse by legislation, and not by treaty; and rejects the proposal, then urged by Mr. Gallatin, and now by Mr. M'Lane, to adjust by any negotiation the terms of our laws on colonial trade.—“*If*,” says he, “*the terms of colonial intercourse are to be adjusted by mutual laws, but those laws themselves are to be founded on informal agreements previously entered into between the governments, it is manifest that a course of proceeding is pursued, which fully ensures, neither the certainty and notoriety of international convention, nor the facility and indepen-*

dence of domestic legislation.*" And he concludes by declaring, that the resolution of his Majesty's government is founded upon considerations, general in their nature, and conclusive.

A third time, in the year 1829, do the indefatigable Americans renew the same request, with offers possibly still more specious, and manner more conciliating. For truly the profits of the West India trade are too rich a portion to be lost by one or a second refusal. And, however unsuccessful, these repeated applications have at least the effect of alarming our ship-owners and colonists, disquieting the present investment of their capital and industry, and embarrassing all their efforts to extend the trade : so much has the result of former treaties taught them to abhor the very rumour of any negotiation with the United States. The Americans are right ; they understand their own interest ; we cannot complain that they pursue it. We are not astonished, that no repulse should prevent their again proposing to be admitted to the West Indies. The subject of complaint, of astonishment, of despair, to all who cherish colonial interests, is, that their proposal is now listened to ;—that, after all which has passed, the offer to negotiate, having been twice rejected, is, upon the third time of asking, accepted ;—that negotiations are about to be begun, are

* Letter from Lord Dudley to Mr. Gallatin, dated 1st of Oct. 1827.

to be hastened we fear with such impatience, that though the ultimate effect is what none here can foresee, ministers apparently are to hear of when too late to be remedied, rather than wait till the colonists can represent.

And yet the circumstances, under which government had intimated that they would still adhere to the new act and order, even though the Americans repealed their law of 1823, are unchanged, are far more favourable to such an adherence; and stranger still, the American law of 1823, and the pretensions it asserts, till the repeal of which, and for the repeal of which, government declared they would not enter into any negotiation, are unrepealed, nay, are reinforced by acts interdicting the entrance into American ports, and departure therefrom, of any British colonial vessel. Nor is this mentioned merely to show the inconstancy of our government, and the indignity of entering into the present negotiations; but it operates at the same time as a great grievance to the North American colonists, and a most unmerited surprise. For it having being understood and published by both governments, that the trade was to be regulated by mutual legislation; and ours having declared, that the first and preliminary step must be the repeal, on their part, of their act of 1823, and that there should previously be no underhand negotiation; the colonists have naturally been looking only to the acts of the American government,

and have been embarking in this trade with the greater security, as they saw, that even if any change were made, the mode prescribed would interpose so much time, as to enable them to have their representations heard, and if unsuccessfully, enable them in some measure, to extricate themselves, and prevent the distress arising from those sudden and extreme changes, by which they have formerly suffered so often and so much.

What the temptation is, what irresistible allure-ment the Americans have invented, to bring government to this sudden revolution, and to parley with them about conceding rights of trade, upon which all negociation has been so repeatedly declined, cannot indeed be exactly known; but from the publicity of the Republican government may be safely conjectured: and our present purpose is to discuss the probable nature of such inducements, and estimate the importance to the British dominions of the West India trade under the existing system, and the consequence of conceding that trade to the United States. But first it would be well to review our colonial intercourse with that country at former periods, and note the changes made, and their results hitherto. For the alteration now proposed is not one of those beautiful theories of free trade, which, no nation before having been so absurd as to apply, or apply by beginning at the wrong end, cannot be

contradicted by past experience ; but in this case, it is by observing how unhappily this trade has been sported with heretofore ; and how much the negligence of government has already cost us, how much their facility and concessions, their inconstancy, their sudden and violent changes of policy ; it is by considering these, that we can best judge, what we have to gain or lose, by preserving the colonial intercourse upon its present footing, or again surrendering that source of wealth and maritime power, to the most aspiring of our rivals.

No. II.

The terms of our colonial intercourse with the United States, have from either policy or necessity, been at times so various and contradictory, that we have at least had the benefit of ample experience ; and may now, by studying former regulations, and comparing the statistical returns which every change has produced, most easily and clearly understand, what is the value of the West India trade, what its most profitable footing, and what the character of the invitation, now so earnestly pressed upon us, to share it with a foreign power. And, to begin with the beginning, let us go back to the year 1783, for our mistakes in colonial in-

tercourse are dated from that, the most unfortunate and humiliating period in British history.

Whatever were the advantages, which the United States gained by their separation from Great Britain, there were also certain inconveniences, which, if not fully equal, less was owing to the natural consequences of their independence, than to the extraordinary concessions, of territory and fisheries, which attended it, and of commercial advantages, which followed. For while on the one hand, they had gained a free trade with all the world, on the other, they had lost a protected trade with the British Empire. And not only did the British Empire afford them the best and cheapest supply of all their wants, but the surest, the nearest, and generally, indeed, the only market for their produce ; of which produce also, scarce an article could be sold in the United Kingdom, without the protecting duties they could not hope to see continued ; and from the ports of every colony and dependency they found themselves excluded, by the then inexorable rule of the empire, the laws of navigation. Had this state of things been continued, or been ever enforced, if it be too much to say, the revolted provinces would have soon become weary of their free trade and independence, it may at least be asserted, that the loyal colonies which remained, would have so rapidly advanced in wealth and population, as to have succeeded to almost the whole colonial trade, which

the United States had forfeited ; and would have received and retained within our own dominions, that stream of gold from the West Indies, which was diverted to their more fortunate rivals. The West India trade at that time gave employment to above 115,000 tons, and 9,700 seamen, for supplies of wood and provisions ; the annual importations of which amounted to above 700,000*l.*, and the freights were computed at 245,000*l.* more *. This, before the war, had been almost entirely in the hands of the revolted Americans, who now finding they had been seven years fighting for its loss, became, at the peace, scarcely less clamorous to retain the privileges of colonists, than they had before been impatient of the restraints. In which clamours they were joined by the West Indians. These having of old an established correspondence with the now United States, were anxious to return to the usual course of trade. Supplies from the North American colonies and mother country they knew must be dearer, and said could never be sufficient. And the administration of that period, being disposed to conciliate the Americans, and satisfy the West India interest, on the one hand, and unwilling, on the other, to abandon altogether the laws of navigation, adopted a middle course. In 1783, an act of parliament was passed, and, agreeably to its provisions, his

* Report of the Lords of Trade, 1791.

Majesty's proclamation issued, allowing the importation, into the colonies and islands in America, in British ships, of all such articles, the produce or manufacture of the United States, except fish and salted provisions, as might have been imported therefrom before their independence*.

There was one thing fortunate enough in this measure, that the importation was restricted to British ships; one thing most unfortunate, that the produce of the United States was admitted free of duty, and the trade of the northern colonies left without protection. Notwithstanding, that trade still continued and increased; thanks to the fertility of the lands and waters, and the industry of the people in those provinces; and thanks to what still remained of the laws of navigation, the trade continued and increased. Before the American war, their exports to the West Indies employed but 1,240 tons; the average of the years 1787, 1788, and 1789, gives an amount of 16,331 tons annually, being an advance of more than 1,300 per cent., in thirteen years; and their tonnage to Great Britain, during the same period, had risen from 11,219 to 61,858 tons†. Indeed, throughout the history of this question, the prosperity of the trade between the North American colonies and the West Indies seems intimately connected with that of both to the mother

* Stat. 23 Geo. III, cap. 29.

† Report of the Lords of Trade, 1791.

country; for during the same period, the tonnage between these islands and Great Britain had advanced from 80,482 to 133,736 tons annually; and a corresponding increase had also been made in our exports to both the islands and the colonies*.

But in 1789, that protection for colonial productions in West India ports, which our own government had so imprudently taken away, was for a little while supplied, by the over-cupidity of the Americans. These seem always to have considered the West India trade as theirs of right, founded upon the situation and mutual wants of both countries, which they apparently interpret to be the law of nature and of nations; and to them it appeared an injury, that leaving our own colonists without protection, our vessels came to save their produce from perishing upon their hands. They demanded the carriage of it also for their own shipping; and they obtained it; and by singular means. While the people of this country were heavily taxing themselves, to enable the Americans to find here a market for their staple productions, the Americans bravely quartered nearly half the expenditure of their government upon British manufactures and colonial produce; the new Congress imposing, in the years 1789 and 1790, duties of from seven to ten per cent. upon

* Report of the Lords of Trade, 1791.

such articles from foreign countries. To this the first American tariff, they added at the same time their discriminating duties on foreign tonnage, 10 per cent. upon the above duties paid by American ships, and further 2s. per ton. Taking the average value and bulk of the cargoes there imported, these discriminating duties on foreign ships are computed to have been equal to about 1*l.* 12s. per ton*. No competition could stand this. Foreign flags disappeared from their waters; American shipping advanced, in five years' time, from 127,329 tons to 525,649; and British tonnage to their ports declined during the same period, from 216,914 tons, to 27,097 †.

It is marvellous with what patience this was undergone by Great Britain. Forbearance and conciliation were the principles upon which government seems to have slumbered for seven years; when startled apparently at finding the American commercial navy become second only to our own, some show of retaliation was offered. The Lords of Trade had indeed, in 1791, drawn up a Report, full of useful information and sound policy, which concluded with a very dignified demonstration of countervailing measures, and pledged their advice to his Majesty, *never to make the West India trade even a subject of nego-*

* Anderson's Canada

† Seybert's Statistics. Pitkin's ditto.

ciation. The retaliation was never executed ; the pledge violated within three years.

In 1794 was signed the first commercial treaty with the United States. By this we ceded to that people, first, the trade to the West Indies ; limited, however, to vessels of 70 tons, and to the direct voyage, (to secure which latter stipulation, the Americans renounced the exportation of sugar, molasses, coffee, and cotton, to all foreign countries from their own). Secondly, we ceded also the trade to the East Indies ; and this without any equivalent. Thirdly, the trade with the North American colonies, by inland transportation ; without any equivalent. Equivalents, indeed, they assure us, are to be found in the nature of the trade itself to the East and West Indies ; in the former because they give us gold for produce ; and in the latter perhaps because they give us produce for gold. And with regard to the inland trade with the northern colonies, they drew us up such an article, and trimmed the treaty so fairly, that it really looked very like reciprocity. For after providing, for themselves that all articles, not prohibited, might be admitted into those colonies from the United States, *on the same terms as such articles from Europe*, they added, that, “*in like manner,*” all articles not prohibited might be admitted into the United States from the colonies, *on the same terms as such articles in their Atlantic ports*

by American ships: which, being interpreted, means, that their articles should be admitted, as articles from the mother country, *duty free*; ours should pay a duty of ten per cent.; and this the High Contracting Parties call “*in like manner*.”

So many and great concessions, offered in one treaty, made the Americans fastidious. The inland colonial trade they graciously accepted; taking care, however, to give such instructions to their custom-house officers, as introduced some small modification; for while they charged their duties in the Atlantic ports, by adding 10 per cent. to the invoice price; on the same articles, by inland transportation from the colonies, they added 52 per cent.; and always “*in like manner**.” The East India trade, also, they condescended to accept. But the admission to the West Indies, limited to vessels of 70 tons, they disdained and rejected; not because the concession was not then worth the equivalent, or that vessels of larger burthen were required for that intercourse, or that their vessels and cargoes were not, in every other respect, placed on the same terms as British; but because they trusted to our imprudence for better terms. Of better, indeed, they were already in possession.

For the war of the French revolution breaking out in 1793, the trade of the North American colonies to the West Indies, in addition to the competition with American produce, already too une-

* Anderson's Canada. American State Papers.

qual, began to labour under all the risks and burthens, of capture and convoy. The latter was sufficiently rare; the former by no means unfrequent. Prices in the West Indies were consequently unequal, and at times much advanced; and the planters took these occasions to persuade their Governors to open the islands, by proclamation, to American ships, with produce duty free, as in a case of necessity. It was contrary to all law, contrary to all policy, contrary to the faith and promise of every act of trade, contrary to the oath of every colonial governor; there was no such necessity; there was nothing, to justify it, except an act of indemnity, first passed in April 1794*, and after renewed annually. It is evident that no such necessity existed, because the islands had been sufficiently supplied before, during the first American war, and were abundantly supplied after, during the second, though deprived of all intercourse with the United States. While that intercourse therefore was open to British ships, supplies, though at times dearer, could never be inadequate to the whole yearly demand.

These measures of government, in the year 1794, brought sudden distress and despair upon the North American colonies; whose West India trade was thus rendered ruinous, fisheries worthless, and whose whole population so impoverished and

* Stat. 34 Geo. IV, cap. 35.

disheartened, that many of the loyalists, who had there taken refuge since the year 1783, and whose best hope of support depended on the West India trade, were now driven to abandon a dominion for which they had hitherto spared no sacrifice; and convinced that there was some great mistake either in their own conduct, or the mother country's, and that it was easier to alter theirs than hers, many returned back to the United States, there to obtain, in the intercourse with British islands, advantages which were denied to British colonies*. But, more, these measures also deprived the maritime strength of Great Britain of 100,000 tons of shipping, and 8,000 seamen, and British ship-owners of nearly 1,000,000*l.* of freights annually, and transferred the whole to a Power, which, in less than twenty years, defied us to a maritime war. For all which, that we might not be without some equivalent from the United States, in friendly feeling at least, they passed us, in that same year 1794, the second American tariff; increasing the duties, upon our manufactures, between 50 and 100 per cent. above the tariff of the year 1790; upon coffee and sugar, 25 and 30 per cent.; and upon rum, their principal import from the West Indies, the charge was raised from 5*d.* per gallon to 2*s.* 1*d.* While the discriminating duty of 10 per cent. in addition upon foreign ships, being con-

* Acheson on the Conduct of the United States.

tinued, the difference in favour of America (according to the average bulk and value of their imports above mentioned), now amounted to 3*l.* per ton *.

Seven years did Government take to reflect upon the first American tariff, and three years upon the second; till having at length fully matured their plans, and collected their energies for retaliation, in 1797, a bill of countervailing measures was enacted †. A tonnage duty of 2*s.* per ton was laid upon American ships in the ports of the United Kingdom, and 10 per cent. upon the duties of the cargo more than in British ships. This was verbally the same measure of discrimination, in favour of our tonnage, that their laws made in favour of American; but the bulk and value of cargoes outward, and the duties charged thereon in the United States, were so exceedingly disproportioned to those of the cargoes inward to the United Kingdom, that a more unequal and fallacious rule was never disguised under the same or similar expressions. For while the discriminating duties upon British ships in the United States, according to the average of their imports, amounted to 3*l.* 2*s.* per ton, the British duties on American ships in the United Kingdom, (for no duties were levied in the West Indies), amounted on the like average to only 3*s.* 9*d.*, leav-

* Anderson's Canada.

† Stat. 37 Geo. III, cap. 97.

ing a difference in favour of the Americans of 2*l.* 18*s.* 3*d.* per ton*. This difference, equal to about half the freight, secured to the Americans the carriage of all our exports to that country, and consequently enabled them to bring hither our imports thence, at far cheaper rates than could be afforded by British ships. Such was the tardy retaliation of our Government. Yet, as if even this were over-severe, it was tempered by continuing, to several staples of American export, the protection against those of other foreign countries, allowed in and since the year 1783, and receiving them as colonial without certificate of origin†.

With these measures both governments seemed to rest satisfied, till 1806; excepting that, on our part, in 1798, a discrimination was made in favour of American indigo and cotton, by duties nearly one half less than if imported from other countries, and one-third less than from our own colonies‡; and in 1802 further and heavy discriminating duties were laid in favour of American wood§; and except also that, on their part, the United States, rejecting the proposals in that year made by act of parliament||, to equalize all duties in both countries, imposed in 1804 an additional light duty of 2*s.* 2*d.* per ton on foreign shipping, from which their own was exempt; and made some fur-

* Anderson's Canada.

† Stat. 37 Geo. III, cap. 97.

‡ Stat. 38 Geo. III, cap. 76.

§ Stat. 42 Geo. III, cap. 43.

|| Stat. 42 Geo. III, cap. 27.

ther addition to the duties of importation in foreign ships. The British shipowners, however, appear to have rallied after the act of 1797, and renewed their efforts to compete with the Americans for the carrying trade; and, favoured by the peace of 1802, British tonnage to their ports had risen to 108,800 tons, upon an average of three years previous to 1804; but after the measures of that year, the amount, on the average of the three succeeding, fell to 59,828 tons, and continued to decrease till the war. The whole American tonnage in foreign trade, upon the same average, increased from 811,843 to 1,018,726 tons, being only 400,000 less than the whole of Great Britain*. The bounty given to American cotton in 1798 was followed by results no less important. That article, which the Americans first began to cultivate in the year 1790, and which for the next ten years was too inconsiderable to be distinguished in their exports from cotton of foreign growth, was brought by them to this country, in 1802, to the amount of 107,494 bales; which quantity, in 1807, had increased to 171,267, and became in value three-fourths of their whole exports to the United Kingdom; the quantity from all other countries declining in exact proportion, between the same years 1802 and 1807, from 173,889 bales to 111,400†. American manufactures, in the

* Seybert. Moreau's Statistical Tables.

† Seybert.

mean time, received such an impulse by the protection of their tariff, as to form among their exports an item of 300,000*l.*, and the yearly value of their whole manufactures was computed in 1810 to be more than 44,000,000*l.*

Such are some of the more general results of our commercial policy with the United States, during the period above taken; and such the difference between protecting home produce and navigation, and giving privileges to foreign. In this manner did we impoverish, did we depopulate our colonies, dismantle our ships, drive away our seamen and fishermen, and make ourselves dependent for cotton, to build up the trade and shipping of a people, who never had any other principle in their tariffs, upon our manufactures and colonial produce, than gradually to exclude every thing they could themselves supply, and admit what they could not, upon such charges as leave the least possible profit to their production.

No. III.

We are not to envy the Americans whatever increase of wealth and power result fairly from their own industry and situation; but whatever is made at our expense, and through our imprudence, cannot be too jealously regarded. Of this description have been almost all their profits in colonial intercourse; a review of which should not be re-

garded as an old song. The readmission of American ships into the West Indies, a question of millions, is again under discussion, and possibly resolved upon; for acts of parliament are omnipotent, and with ministers in American negotiations all things are possible. Some of the general results of former arrangements with the United States have been stated; it remains to show more particularly the effect upon colonial intercourse.

For a period of fourteen years, from 1793 to 1807, did the Americans enrich themselves with a mere monopoly of the West India trade. Their exports to our islands were seldom less than 1,200,000*l.* yearly; they once reached the amount of 2,182,357*l.**; and may be taken at an average of 1,400,000*l.*; and their imports at 1,000,000*l.*: the difference was paid in specie, or bills upon England. In addition to this, the freights were nearly all their own; and such was the proportion of bulk to value in their exports, that the price of freight is computed to be about equal to the worth of the cargo†. The amount of their tonnage thus employed, on the average of three years, taken from near the middle of this period, was 131,123 tons‡; requiring, perhaps, 8000 seamen, and bringing yearly back in gold to the owners 1,400,000*l.* more. The illicit trade also, of which no certain estimate can be made, is known to have added greatly to

* Pitkin. Seybert.

† Id.

‡ Pitkin.

their profits. And besides, as their ships were permitted to take back salt from Turk's Island*, and to clear out for the French and Spanish colonies, whence they carried sugar and other produce to the United States, they earned a second freight by the return voyage. And as this enabled them to re-export foreign sugars so cheaply, it was, in fact, by underselling the Canadians in the West Indies, that the Americans undersold the West Indians in foreign Europe.

Nor were the advantages, which the Americans now possessed over our colonists, limited to the length of voyage (shorter by nearly one-half), and the rate of insurance (which upon British bottoms had, since the war, risen to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.), and the wages of seamen (which with neutrals were much less), but, as if these were too few, another and still stranger was added. While British ships and British subjects were compelled to pay a duty, varying in the different islands, from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 per cent. upon their cargoes; the Americans were exempted from this burthen, and admitted free of every duty†. Annex to all this the bounty, of nearly 20s. a ton, which the United States then gave to their fisheries‡; and the wonder is, not that the trade of our northern colonies declined, and the inhabitants became impoverished, but that trade and country both were not abandoned. It is a fact, that their

* 28 Geo. III, cap. 6. 44 Geo. III, cap. 101.

† Atcheson.

‡ Seybert.

best fishermen were driven over to the United States, and their fish, their flour, and their lumber, were actually transported thither, thence to be carried, in American bottoms, to the British West Indies *.

The effect of these measures upon British and American navigation, in the colonial trade, is shown in the following table :—

Dates.	British Tonnage to the West Indies.		American Tonnage to the West Indies.
	From the U. States to the West Indies.	From the N. American Colonies to the West Indies.	
1772. The Americans being <i>admitted</i> as Colonists †	926	1,240	TONS. 107,739
1789. The Americans <i>excluded</i> as aliens ‡	67,533	16,331	—
1793. The Americans still <i>excluded</i> §	86,010	24,900	—
1804. The Americans having been <i>admitted</i> from 1793 	7,629	11,906	131,123

A decrease after 93 of British Shipping of 91,375 tons, and increase in American of 131,123.

British navigation to, both the West Indies and North American colonies, and to the United States, decreased from the same date of 1793.

* Anderson. Atcheson.

† Report of the Lords of Trade.

§ Atcheson.

‡ Id.

|| Id. ; Pitkin.

British Tonnage from the United Kingdom to *	1792.	1796.	Decrease.
			Tons.
The N. American Colonies	55,367	30,172	25,195
The West Indies	143,642	104,050	39,592
The United States.....	50,968	2,153	43,815
			113,602
Add the decrease in the West India Trade.....			91,375
Total			204,977

This decrease may indeed be partly imputed to other events, but seems mainly owing to the measures before stated.

If we take 1,400,000*l.* as the average value of the American supplies during this period; and take the freights they earned, as their writers compute, to be equal in value to these supplies; the sum 2,800,000*l.* multiplied by the number of years, fourteen, gives an amount of 39,200,000*l.*, which we paid the Americans, for freight and produce, instead of producing and carrying for ourselves. For, that we might have carried these articles for ourselves, is certain, because we did carry them, both before and after this period, under circumstances less favourable; and had not colonial articles been put out of protection in 1783, it is very probable, that nearly the whole of

* Moreau.

these supplies might have been produced within, or at least procured from, our own possessions. Because, the whole quantity of fish required by the West Indies, on the average of the three last years, ending in 1807, was 456,221 cwts., and the northern colonies produced 817,351 cwts., and the mother country exported to the West Indies 94,486 cwts. The flour and bread, &c. required upon the same average yearly, was equal to 1,271,140 bushels of wheat; and Canada, which, in 1775, had exported 400,000 bushels, in 1802, exported 1,010,033, besides 28,301 bushels of flour, being little less than the whole required. And the whole lumber required by the West Indies, on the same average, was equal to 117,740 loads, and the export of that article from the British North American provinces amounted, in 1806, to 95,975, and was capable of being increased many fold, and was actually increased within four years after to 311,114*. Beef, pork, and other provisions might have been supplied from the United Kingdom. The only articles, therefore, which it may be doubted they were able to produce sufficiently, were staves and live stock, of which abundance might have been procured from the United States, through the northern colonies, and carried in British bottoms.

But the West Indian bought his supplies cheaper?

* Anderson.

No, far dearer than in 1793. *But that was owing to other causes: he still bought cheaper than he could have done from British carriers?* Even this admits dispute, but let it be granted. The West Indian then gained, and the ship-owner and colonist suffered. How shall we compare the profit and loss? The latter has been ascertained. For the former then, how much cheaper did the West Indian buy? Suppose 25 per cent., which, upon his annual purchases of the Americans, equals 700,000*l.* This, therefore, is to be set off against the loss of 2,800,000*l.* Now if a person pay twenty-eight out of one pocket, and receive seven into the other, is he upon the whole a gainer or a loser?

Even the advantage, to the West Indian, of buying cheaper, was much lessened by the circuitous mode of payment, and a greater share of the benefit devolved upon the hostile and rival colonies of France and Spain. For, though we were buying 2,800,000*l.* annually of the American, the American bought of us but about 1,100,000*l.*; and though the American sold four times more to our islands than the French, he bought of the French four times more than of ours*. To this last result, however, it must be confessed, the state of our own laws in good part contributed; since, while we were lavishing the

* Pitkin. Seybert.

carriage of West India imports, employing 130,000 tons, upon foreigners; the exports were most tenaciously restricted to British ships, (as if exacting a bond from the Americans to land their cargo in the United States would not have prevented the continuance of their voyage to Europe); which exports being of so much lesser bulk, the carriage was comparatively of little consequence; and the United States, on their part, with very unequal sagacity, had so ordered their discriminating duties, that the difference between importing sugar thither in a British ship and an American should be equal to half the freight*. In point of fact, however, the West Indians were never more distressed than when this intercourse with the United States was greatest and most favoured. At its commencement the profits of their estates were as high as 12 per cent.; but, before its termination in 1806, had fallen to three and two; though from 1783 to 1790, when the American vessels were excluded, they averaged about ten†. This reduction, to whatever cause imputed, whether the increase of duties in the home market, or the neutral carriage of enemy's sugar to the foreign, proves at least, that such a direct intercourse with the United States is no specific for West Indian embarrassments, (for which, indeed, there is no effectual relief but a reduction of duties

* Proceedings of the Harrisburg convention.

† Evidence in the Parliamentary Inquiry, 1806.

on their produce in the United Kingdom); and that conclusion is further demonstrated, by a statement of the prices they actually paid for their supplies before this intercourse began and at its close.

Supplies.*	Average of Three Years, from 1792 to 1794.	Average of Three Years, ending with 1806.
Flour, per cwt.	16s. 4d.	34s.
Red Oak Staves, per 1000...	8l. to 15l.	22l. to 30l.
White ditto, ditto	9l. to 22l.	28l. to 32l.

The commerce carried on by American vessels between the hostile islands and Europe, (which, by underselling our sugars in the foreign markets, was perhaps, after our duties, the great cause of the depression of West Indian interests, and which was mainly promoted by admitting Americans to our islands), had now gone to such an extent, that Great Britain began at length, in 1805, to exert her maritime right and power to intercept their direct voyage. This was a great loss to the United States, who always considering every loss an injury, retaliated by an act, in 1806, prohibiting the importation of a very large description of manu-

* Evidence in the Parliamentary Inquiry, 1806.

factures from the United Kingdom*. In the same year the American intercourse bill was carried through parliament, giving the sanction of law to measures, which hitherto were no less illegal than impolitic; after which did our ministers, without requiring, or without obtaining, a repeal of the American prohibition, sit down to negotiate a second commercial treaty with that country. In this negotiation, ministers seem to have been withheld from conceding the West India trade, only by the fear, which the debate on the American intercourse bill had taught them, of the unpopularity of the measure; and expressed their regret, that the 12th article of the treaty of 1794, which admitted their vessels under 70 tons, had not been accepted by the Americans, as it would have removed prejudices here, and prepared the way for the more complete admission of the United States into that trade†.

As this treaty was not ratified by that government, it needs no further remark; except for the inequality of that condition, in which ministers (not for the first time nor for the last) placed themselves, by signing an instrument, which was a treaty obligatory on their part, and but a project unauthorized on the part of the American commissioners. These—the treaty being rejected by their president—attempted to renew negotiations

* American State Papers.

† American State Papers.

upon the basis (as their custom is) of retaining every thing that treaty granted, and obtaining something more. But a change of ministry had taken place, and they fortunately came into collision with a statesman who was better acquainted with their policy and measures. The correspondence of Mr. Canning with the American envoy, at this period, asserted the dignity and real interest of Great Britain, and at the same time showed up the conduct of the United States with such wit and energy, as to be neither dull to an indifferent, nor humiliating to an interested reader. Rare qualities both, in communications with America!

No. IV.

To this ruinous system of colonial intercourse, above described, the American Government itself, in 1807, put a sudden and effectual stop. The disputes upon neutral rights had risen to a crisis: Great Britain refused to abdicate the advantages of her supremacy at sea, which the enemy's conduct made it necessary to exert: and the United States, making virtually, if not expressly, a common cause

* American State Papers.

with France, laid their embargo. A second time did British ships and colonies receive, from the hostile measures of that Government, the protection they had expected in vain from the laws of the mother country.

It is the pride of the Americans to have enlightened the world with many new lessons and experiments in political economy, of which a permanent embargo upon their own shipping is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whatever motive induced that people to lay violent hands on their own revenues and commerce, and inflict upon themselves all the evils of a war, without a chance of its successes; whether it was the idea of impoverishing Great Britain, or of starving the West Indies; the results were by no means such, that we either had reason to be dissatisfied then with their policy, or in future to deprecate its renewal.

From this date, a new era began in colonial intercourse. Within the three years following the American restrictions, the exports of the North American colonies to the West Indies were more than doubled; their tonnage thither more than doubled; their exports to Great Britain more than doubled; the tonnage so employed trebled; their importation of West India produce doubled; their importations from the United Kingdom doubled; and the importation and tonnage from the United Kingdom to the West Indies increased nearly a

fourth. Other causes indeed may have contributed to some of these effects, but they all relate to colonial trade, and the exclusion of the Americans is the principal.

As no valuation of the exports, from the Northern Colonies to the West Indies, is given in official returns, it is not easy, though very desirable, to measure their amount by money. But, if we may take their freights to be, on the average, equal to the value of the cargo, as is believed ; and their imports to be generally equal to their exports, as appears to be the fact ; and the freights, upon the average, to have been about 7*l.* a ton, which, until 1815, they were certainly worth ; we can by these means give a valuation sufficiently accurate, and which, however prices have altered since the peace, will yet, like the official value of our customs, express quantities in money, and enable us to compare the trade of different years, and measure its increase or decline. The following table, then, will best show the result of the American restrictions.

Exports from,	Average of 1804, 5, 6, the Americans being <i>admit- ted</i> into the West Indies.	Average of 1808, 9, 10, the Ame- ricans being <i>excluded</i> .	Increase.
	£.	£.	£.
British North American Colonies to the West Indies *	119,665	250,572	130,907
British North American Colonies to the United Kingdom †	333,702	796,832	463,130
British North American Colonies to the South of Europe ‡	65,114	72,989	7,875
West Indies to the British North American Colo- nies ‡	119,665	250,572	130,907
West Indies to the United Kingdom 	7,739,139	8,246,529	507,390
United Kingdom to the West Indies ¶	4,282,660	5,264,679	982,019
United Kingdom to the British North American Colonies **	957,447	1,572,577	615,130
	13,617,392	16,454,750	2,837,358

Now, as our whole trade to Europe, upon the average of the same years, greatly increased, and our whole trade to all parts of America collectively (although considerably decreasing with the United

* Computed from the Tonnage.

† Official Returns.

‡ Computed from the Tonnage.

|| Official Returns.

¶ Id.

** Id.

States) increased also*, if we deduct the diminution of exports from the West Indies to the United States about 438,545*l.*, the remainder 2,298,813*l.* is, perhaps, the measure of the addition made to British commerce. And even if it be insisted, that the decrease of our exports to the United States should also be deducted, though owing to causes unconnected with our colonial intercourse with them, it will still be found, that the increase of colonial trade made up, not only for all decrease between the West Indies and the United States, but also for the decrease between the United States and Great Britain, and exceeded the loss on both, by half a million.

Exports from,	Average of 1804, 5, 6.	Average of 1808, 9, 10.	Decrease.
	£.	£.	£.
West Indies to the United States †	1,028,250	489,705	538,545
Great Britain to the United States ‡.....	7,386,104	5,664,329	1,721,775
Total decrease.....			2,260,320
Deducting decrease from increase, as above .			2,837,358
Remains net increase			£.577,038

* Moreau.

† For want of better information, we have taken the West India Trade to the United States, upon the average of 1802, 1803, 1804, for the first period ; and have, for the second, computed the exports at 5-7ths of the imports, the proportion they seem usually to have borne.

‡ Moreau.

And this is exclusive of the increase of our fisheries on the banks and shores; exclusive of the coasting trade of the North American Colonies; exclusive of the trade of the West Indies to other foreign countries; in all of which the increase was important, but of which no accurate account is at hand; and exclusive also of the increase of freights, which are of more importance than all together, and of which some estimate can be formed from the following table.

British Tonnage from,	Average of 1804, 5, 6, Americans <i>admitted.</i>	Average of 1808, 9, 10, Americans <i>excluded.</i>	De- crease.	In- creas e.
North American Colonies to the West Indies * ...	17,075	35,796		18,721
North American Colonies to Great Britain †	51,709	66,824		15,115
North American Colonies to South of Europe ‡ ...	9,302	10,427		1,125
Great Britain to the West Indies §	183,885	235,045		51,160
Whole British tonnage to the United States 	69,752	52,881	16,871	
			16,871	86,121
				16,871
			Net Increase	69,250

* Official Returns.

† Moreau.

‡ Official Returns.

§ Moreau.

|| Seybert.

Taking the value of these freights at the average of 7*l.* a ton*, they amount to 484,750*l.* to be added to the increase above given, and make a sum total of 1,061,788*l.*

A similar improvement occurred in the coasting trade of the colonies, as may be collected from the following statement of their registered tonnage †.

	1806. Americans <i>admitted.</i>	1810. Americans <i>excluded.</i>	Increase.
Registered tonnage in the West Indies.....	111,857	131,303	19,446
Registered tonnage in the British North American Colonies	71,943	84,080	12,137
Tons.....	183,800	215,383	31,583

The importation of West India produce in the northern provinces increased at the same time, as follows ‡.

	Average of 1804, 5, 6, Americans <i>admitted.</i>	Average of 1808, 9, 10, Americans <i>excluded.</i>	Increase.
Sugars lbs.	1,596,062	3,227,877	1,631,815
Molasses gals.	215,129	329,743	114,614
Coffee lbs.	73,286	553,332	480,046
Rum gals.	782,450	1,198,783	416,333

Anderson. † Moreau. ‡ Parliamentary Returns.

Some part of these importations may have found their way into the United States, but to no great amount perhaps, for the increase to Newfoundland was as great as to any other colony. The conclusions which the last table tends to establish, and which we shall after find means to confirm, are, that the Canadian provinces not only import from the British West Indies far more than the United States, in proportion to either their population or exports; but even in point of quantity, nearly, if not fully, as much; and further that such importations, into the North American Colonies, depend upon their exportations to the West Indies; for the colonies cannot buy of any but the West Indies, nor of them, unless they will buy of the colonies.

This, the result of their commercial restrictions, was not witnessed by the Americans with much complacency; and in 1812, they resolved to prosecute their complaints, or settle their differences with us, by war. The opportunity seemed favourable for wresting from Great Britain her provinces in North America, the value of which to us, and the detriment to them, recent events had taught their Government, but not ours; and the conquest of which, they foresaw, would in future negotiations, add no little weight to their claims and arguments, for sharing the West India trade. It proved, however, a bad speculation; not from any lack of mismanagement on the part of our Government, who very diligently verified the obser-

vation of Madison, when reluctantly consenting to the war, "*we know nothing about it: we shall make a thousand blunders, but Great Britain will make more.*" And she never made a greater, than when a bankrupt Government, defeated in every attempt beyond its own frontier, ejected from its capital, despised by the people its subjects (or, if they please, its masters), without an army, without credit, without commerce, was saved from dissolution, by such a treaty as that of Ghent. The ways of statesmen resemble those of Providence, whose place they supply, in darkness and mystery, at least, if less in beneficence. Here, however, the American publications* revealed a most egregious piece of diplomacy, "*quo proposito, nemo erat, qui in ipso dolore risum posset continere.*" As a set-off to the British demand, of an intermediate boundary for the Indian tribes in the West, and such a settlement of our confines in the north-east, as should leave the connection of our provinces uninterrupted and undisputed, the Americans preferred, a claim for spoliations before the war and *during the war*, and a *definition of blockade*, now become merely an abstract question of national law. Of the British demands, one was afterwards as tamely abandoned as it had been positively repeated at first for a *sine qua non*; the other was left just as it stood before; and as

* American State Papers.

neither of the American claims appear in the treaty, it would seem, that we, for their spoliations during the war, relinquished them the Indians to spoil ever afterwards; and they, for our north-eastern boundary, gave us up a definition.

A Treaty of Commerce followed, in 1815; the third with the United States, and the least exceptionable. For the first time, the navigation of both countries was placed upon equal terms, in the ports of either; and though the concession of the East India trade, which had now become habitual and almost a matter of course, was renewed; with regard to the West India trade, the treaty stipulated *that each nation was to remain in the complete possession of its own rights*. This was all British subjects had to desire; for the complete possession of our rights was, to have the whole trade to ourselves; the complete possession of the Americans, to have none.

The United States being thus left to the complete possession of their own rights, the West India trade continued, till 1822, as it had been from 1807, in its legitimate channel; the reward of British industry, and extension of British power. Certain ports indeed were, in the course of this period, opened for certain articles, with various rules and changes, little important to the present subject; except what were called the free ports of Halifax, St. John's, and Bermuda, through which, after 1818, the American trade was principally

conducted. But, before tracing the commercial measures of either country subsequent to the war, let us first compute the gains and losses to British trade and navigation from 1810 till the peace in 1815. During almost the whole of this time, all commercial intercourse between the British dominions and the United States was interdicted, either by their acts of non-intercourse, or by the war; and during the last year (1814), their whole coast was strictly blockaded. Yet, on comparing this last year with the average above given of three years ending in 1810, the exports of the northern colonies to the West Indies are found to have continued increasing, by more than one-third; the tonnage employed thereby, one-third; their tonnage and exports to the south of Europe more than doubled; their registered tonnage advanced from 84,000 to 115,000 tons; their imports from Great Britain increased nearly threefold; and a considerable addition was made to the tonnage employed by their exports thither: although these provinces were at that time the seat of war, their produce, in good part, required to support the navy and army, their ships sometimes captured by American privateers, and the inhabitants frequently called off from their labours, and never unsuccessfully, to drive the enemy beyond their borders. The increase in this and in the West Indian branch of colonial trade and navigation, may, by the measure before mentioned, be stated thus.

Exports from,	Average of 1808, 1809, and 1810.	The Year 1814.	Decrease.	Increase.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
North American Colonies to the West Indies*.....	250,572	349,006		118,434
North American Colonies to the United Kingdom †	796,832	322,899	473,933	—
North American Colonies to the South of Europe ‡	72,989	200,543		127,554
United Kingdom to the North American Colonies § ...	1,572,577	4,093,062		2,520,485
United Kingdom to the West Indies †	5,264,679	6,315,073		1,050,394
West Indies to the United Kingdom †	8,246,529	8,496,850		250,321
West Indies to the North American Colonies **	250,572	349,006		98,434
£.	16,454,750	20,126,439	473,933	4,165,622
				473,933
				£.3,691,689

British Tonnage from ††	1810.	1814.	Increase.
North American Colonies to the West Indies	35,796	49,858	14,062
North American Colonies to the United Kingdom .	66,824	81,939	15,115
North American Colonies to the South of Europe...	10,427	28,649	18,222
U. Kingdom to the W. Indies	235,045	286,206	51,161
	348,092	446,652	98,560

Average value, at 7*l.* per ton £.689,920 ††.

* Computed from the Tonnage.

† Computed from the Tonnage.

** Computed from the Tonnage

†† Anderson.

† Official Returns.

§ Official Returns.

†† Official Returns; Moreau.

Such was the gain to Great Britain from colonial trade during the war with the United States. What was the loss of our American trade ?

	Average of 1808, 9, 10.	Year 1814.	Decrease.
Exports from Great Britain to the United States *...	£. 5,664,329	£. 7,303	£. 5,657,026
Ditto from the West Indies to the United States †...	489,705		489,705
Whole British tonnage to the United States ‡.....	52,881	568	—
Total decrease.....			6,146,731
Add decrease of 52,313 tons, at 7 <i>l.</i> per ton			366,191
			6,512,922
Add decrease before stated, 1806 to 1810...			2,360,320
Total			£.8,873,242

This was the loss of British trade and navigation to the United States, on comparing the years of its extreme prosperity and of its total interruption by war and blockade. What did the increase of colonial trade and navigation towards repairing this loss ?

* Moreau.

† Ante.

‡ Seybert.

The increase from 1810 to 1814, we have seen, was —

In Trade	£3,691,689	
Freights	689,920	£.
		4,381,609
Add increase from 1806 to 1810 :		
In Trade.....	2,837,358	
Freights	484,750	
		3,322,108
Total increase of Colonial Trade and Navigation	7,703,717	
Decrease of American.....	8,873,242	
Nett decrease...	£1,169,525	

So nearly was the total interruption of our commerce with the United States compensated, by the mere increase of colonial trade ; and even this balance might be further reduced, if not equalled, were any exact account at hand of the increase of trade, at this time, between the West Indies and foreign ports.

It may be remarked, in passing, that the commerce and navigation of the United States were, during the same period, reduced from 22,909,412*l.* exports, to 1,558,674*l.*, and from 929,421 tons of American shipping in foreign trade, to 59,626*. So utterly impotent is that power to distress us by hostilities ; so destructive to their commerce is our enmity with them ; and both owing to colonial trade and colonial possessions.

* Seybert.

The West Indian islands, the while, were far from suffering. It has been already shown that their exports, that is, their produce, to Great Britain and the colonies, had increased nearly 1,000,000*l.*; and as men do not continue, much less extend, the cultivation of their estates, for so long a period at a loss, the presumption is, that they yielded a better profit.

How much the exportation of West India produce to the Canadian provinces was augmented, during the same period, may be better seen in the table subjoined.

	1810.	1814.	Decrease.	Increase.
Sugar lbs.	3,227,877	8,176,722		4,948,845
Molasses..... galls.	329,743	530,298		200,555
Coffee lbs.	553,332	284,536	268,796	—
Rum galls.	1,198,783	1,919,251		720,468

Here, therefore, we have had before us an extreme case of the total suspension of colonial intercourse with the United States, and have seen by the result, that the measures of that people to depress colonial trade, can injure none but themselves; nor have they any other means of wresting it from us, but some imprudent negotiation, or some impolitic act of Parliament: means to which the Americans immediately had the good sense to resort, and in 1822, the good fortune to succeed.

No. V.

The treaties of 1814 and 1815 being obtained, the Americans lost no time in recommencing their commercial hostilities, which we met in the same spirit, as from 1783 to 1807. First, in 1816, they made the third general revision of their tariff, raising their duties upon manufactures and West India produce, by from 30 to 100 per cent. above their former rates; the internal duties upon their own manufactures and distilled spirits expiring about the same time. Next, in 1817, their tonnage duties, which during the war had been increased to 8*s.* 8*d.* upon foreign vessels, were reduced upon other foreign ships to 6*s.* 6*d.*, and raised to 10*s.* 10*d.* upon such as should come from British colonial ports, to which the United States were not admitted *.

In 1818, they closed their ports against our vessels arriving from, or even touching at, any such colonial port; and further, they prohibited British ships, though entering their ports from the United Kingdom, to clear out for any colonial port, from which American ships were excluded: a measure without example since colonies were planted, and most contrary to the treaty of 1815, in spirit at least, if not the letter. By this they reduced the whole British tonnage to their ports,

* Seybert.

from 177,575 (the average of the three years preceding) to 45,557 tons, the average of the three succeeding years*.

In 1820, they closed their ports against our vessels arriving from, or touching at, any colonial port whatever in America, *even those to which American vessels were admitted*. Further, they prohibited the produce of any one colony to be imported, even in American vessels, from ports in any other colony. And, further, they prohibited British vessels, though entering the United States from Great Britain under the treaty of 1815, to clear out to any colonial port whatever in America, *even to those to which American vessels were admitted*†: a still grosser abuse, if not infraction, of that treaty, and no less contrary to all terms of reciprocity, or even amity, between nations.

It would have been easy for Great Britain to have devised some similar perversion of the treaty; and honour to her ministers that they did not. But shame to them, who in the midst of these inimical acts of the United States, could set their hands to another convention, “*quæ et risus hominum et querelas moveret*.” The fisheries of British America, which train and support more seamen than any other branch of commerce, except the trade in timber; which may give food to half

* Watterston’s and Van Zandt’s Statistics of the United States.

† Tazewall’s Review of the Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

Christendom for one-fourth of the year; which have been mines of silver and gold to us, more lucrative than any in either hemisphere; the rights of taking and curing fish, on the waters and shores of Newfoundland and the Labrador, together with liberty of entering any other parts of our coast for smuggling (which the treaty calls "*getting wood and water*"), were in 1818, conceded (the treaty says, "*for ever*,") to the Americans, without equivalent! unless our assigning as limits the most valuable parts, or their giving up claims to all the rest, can be called an equivalent; claims to which they had as little pretension, as their President to the crown of Great Britain. And this treaty of gratuity and concession was negotiated with profound secrecy, no notice given, no inquiry made; and more, after our commissioners at Ghent had expressly refused to include it in that negotiation, and denounced to the United States, that it would not be granted without equivalent. How much this liberality has cost us, or been worth to the Americans, no sufficient means of ascertaining are at hand; but some conjecture may be formed from the following facts. The amount of their tonnage employed in fisheries has increased nearly one half, since the signing of that treaty; the average till then, from the peace, having been 51,110: since that treaty till 1826, it had risen to 74,862 tons annually; and since 1826, has increased still further. These not only

furnish food to a great part of their own population, whose consumption of fish is immense, but leave a surplus for exportation yearly, varying from the value of 300,000*l.* to 700,000*l.* A late Quebec paper gives the subjoined statement of the proportion in which they have divided with us the Labrador fishery, during the present year.

	Vessels.	Men.	Fish.	Oil.
			Cwt.	Hhds.
British.....	608	9,110	673,000	6,730
American.	1,500	15,000	1,100,000	11,000
Total.....	2,108	24,110	1,773,000	17,730

Net value on the coast.

Fish.....	£ 1,002,000
Oil.....	95,000
Seal skins and furs.....	7,000
	£ 1,114,000

Such were the commercial measures of the United States, and such the only retaliation on our part, till 1822. Let us see what was the condition of the colonial trade during this interval.

“The greater part of that period,” says a Report of the American congress, “an annual trade of 11,000,000 of dollars (2,474,000*l.*), one half produced, and the other half consumed in the United States,—employing 100,000 tons of shipping, with five or six thousand seamen, and forming an aggregate freight or profit of 2,000,000 of

dollars (450,000*l.*), was carried on by British navigation." From which it appears, first, that the colonial exports to the United States now equalled the imports, which had generally been far otherwise, when carried in American bottoms; next, that these exports amounted to 1,237,000*l.*, which before had as rarely happened; 3dly, that after paying the heavy exactions of their tariff and discriminating duties, there still remained to British navigation a net surplus of freight of nearly half a million per annum. During the three next years, 1819, 1820, and 1821, this trade, in American articles to the West Indies, was principally conducted through the free ports of Bermuda and the northern colonies; the United States having, by the acts of 1818 and 1820, above stated, interdicted the direct voyage. A change, which did us little injury, and them much. For the short freight which we thus lost, and they gained by bringing their articles to the free ports, was but about 10*s.* a ton, and less than the discriminating duties imposed by them on colonial vessels; and their exports to our islands and colonies decreased from 1,700,000*l.*, in the year 1817, to 511,909*l.* in 1821, without increasing to the foreign islands*. Consequently American prices were much depressed; and whatever was added to the cost of their articles by this circuitous

* Watterston and Van Zandt's Statistics of the United States.

voyage, and not compensated by saving the tonnage duty, was by no means all paid by the West Indian consumer, but partly and principally out of the diminished profits of the producer; and the residue operated as a salutary protection for colonial corn and wood; which, since 1783, had received no encouragement in the West Indies, except from the hostile acts of the United States, and except always, to the honour of the island be it mentioned, some small duties which of late Jamaica had voluntarily laid, to protect and encourage fellow subjects in British North America. Indeed colonial intercourse with the United States had never before been on so advantageous a footing. The supplies of provisions and wood exported from the United Kingdom to the West Indies amounted, on the average of 1819, 1820 and 1821, to 582,918*l*. * The inter-colonial trade from the Canadian provinces had again nearly doubled since 1814, and now employed, on the average of 1820 and 1821, 78,262 tons †, whose freights and cargoes, according to the measure before assumed, must have been equal to 1,643,502*l*., and the registered tonnage in these provinces again advanced from 115,000 to 148,729 tons ‡.

Great exertions to extend their production of West India supplies were made among them, as well by public bounties as by private adventures;

* Parliamentary Returns. † Official Returns. ‡ Moreau.

large investments made in mills for the manufacture of boards and flour; and reasonable hopes entertained, that in a few years colonial articles would be as generally substituted for American in the West India market, as the freights had already been transferred from American to British shipping. All which advantages, in possession and prospect, were suddenly destroyed, by another revolution in the measures and policy of the imperial government. Without any notice given, any inquiry made, any adequate cause assigned, any deficiency in the West India supplies alleged, the islands were suddenly thrown open to American ships by act of parliament in 1822*, and American articles admitted under duties not amounting, *ad valorem*, to one-fifth of the duties imposed by the Americans on West Indian produce, and utterly insufficient to protect British and colonial industry. What was the consequence? The exportation of such supplies, from the United Kingdom to the West Indies, declined from the amount above given of 582,918*l.*, to 314,866*l.*†, the amount in 1823—a decrease of nearly one-half; and the trade from the Canadian provinces sunk, in still greater proportion, from 78,262 tons, to 36,082‡, the number cleared outwards in 1825. Applying the rule before used to measure the value of their freights and cargoes, the whole decrease, of Bri-

* Stat. 4 Geo. IV, cap. 44.

† Parliamentary Returns.

‡ Official Returns.

tish trade and navigation, appears to have been no less than 1,152,832*l.* annually ; and this, excluding the freights of the articles, from the United Kingdom, and from Bermuda, and from the foreign islands. This, so freely thrown away on our part, the Americans made haste to gather up. In two years they got 100,000 tons of shipping into the direct trade with the British islands, besides the 75,000 in the trade to the northern colonies ; and their exports to the islands and colonies doubled, from 511,909*l.*, the amount in 1821, to 1,057,309*l.* in 1826 ; while their imports thence that year were only 620,632*l.*, and the British shipping employed in the whole intercourse was but 18,228 tons, the American amounting to 175,923*.

With which state of things ministers seemed so content, that in 1825 they offered to make it perpetual, and with great additional advantages to the United States. What these offers were, and why they failed, and what the consequences, shall next be discussed. Here, however, it may be remarked, that the Americans revised their tariff, for the fourth time, in 1824, increasing their duties upon our manufactures, and principally upon woollens, about 30 per cent. ; and in 1828, the fifth American tariff again raised their duties, upon woollens by from 50 to 80 per cent., and on rum about 30,

* Watterston and Van Zandt.

above all former duties. The rate *ad valorem* of their duties on woollens is now 50 per cent., on pig iron 50 per cent., on bar iron upwards of 100 per cent.; and upon West India produce, on sugar, about 14s. 6d. per cwt., being more than 70 per cent.; 24s. per cwt. equal to 40 per cent. on coffee; 5d. per gallon, being 30 per cent. on molasses; on salt 200 per cent. and, what is of most importance, on rum 3s. 8d. per gallon, more than cent. per cent., and equal to a prohibition.

Our means of information are so limited, that we have been able to give but a very inadequate idea, either of the value to us of the West India trade till 1822, or of its loss after, by the transference to the Americans. The amount, of capital put without return, and of industry paralysed, by a change so sudden and extreme, and the effects upon private property and contracts, are things not easily collected or estimated, though known to be great, and of which accounts of imports and exports afford an imperfect conception. But it seems, with the body politic as the human body, that there is in the nature of things a healing power, which accommodates itself to circumstances, and bears up against, and partly remedies, most of the evils, which error or incaution inflict. Shocks there are however, whose repetition is the worst of calamities; and such will the measure of 1822 prove, if renewed in 1830. The admission of

American ships into the West Indies would now be attended with far greater injury, than any hitherto suffered ; for reasons we shall give.

No. VI.

“There are three things which cannot be satisfied, and four which say not it is enough,” as the wisdom of the olden time instructs us ; and the advances of the new world seem likely to produce a fifth. This shall be better understood, by summing up the climax of American demands in negotiating and legislating on colonial intercourse, from the first of our concessions, to the last of their attempts. It was a great object for them, at the beginning, to have even their articles admitted into the British islands. This was granted by the act of 1783. Next, they required admission for their vessels under 70 tons, and offered, as an equivalent, no less than to give up all exportation of colonial produce to foreign countries from their own. It was granted by the treaty of 1794. Then they refuse all equivalent, and are offered admission for vessels of one deck (by the negotiations in 1817*). After, they reject this limitation to vessels of one deck, and ask admission for vessels

* Tazewell's Review of the Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

of the same description as British, to the same ports, and with the same articles. This, too, is complied with (by the negotiations in 1818*). All which being obtained, the Americans further demand, that whatever articles are admitted to any one port, shall be admitted to all ; refusing, at the same time, to receive from all ports, whatever articles they receive from any ; and demand also, that their articles shall be charged with no higher duties, than if imported from any other country. Their envoy was very properly directed, in communicating these last demands, to read, at the same time, to the British minister, a lecture upon plain dealing, and state “ *that it is far better, for the harmony of two nations, to avoid any bargain in which either party, after agreeing to it, shall have, by the experience of its effects, the sentiment of having been overreached brought home to its councils†.*”

Here the negotiation seems to have given place to legislation, and the same game continued. The act of 1822‡, opened free ports in the West Indies to American vessels, exclusive of other nations, free of all discriminating duties on tonnage or goods, for the importation of their principal staples, wood and corn, under very low duties,

* Tazewell’s Review of the Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

† Letter of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush, May 1819.

‡ Stat. 4 Geo. IV, cap. 44.

together with the liberty of exportation, in all respects the same as in British ships.

At about the same time (May, 1822), in anticipation of the above act of parliament, and in similar terms, an act of congress was passed*, giving the president power to open their ports to British vessels from the colonies, so as to confer upon such vessels "*like privileges*" to those conferred by Great Britain upon American. Accordingly, when the British act came into operation, the president, by his proclamation, opened their ports. Here follows a rare piece of dealing, for which, between individuals, no epithet would be thought too severe. As the British act imposed no tonnage or discriminating duty on American vessels, and the American act offered British vessels the "*like privileges*," the conclusion of course was, that their tonnage and discriminating duties on our vessels had also ceased. The president's proclamation† said nothing to the contrary, though it enumerated other restrictions. But, after allowing three weeks to intervene, just enough for this proclamation to reach the islands and colonies, and for the adventures it invited to commerce, instructions are sent to the American customs, to exact the tonnage duty of 6*s.* 6*d.* a ton, and the discriminating duties of 10 per cent. upon all such vessels as should arrive‡.

* Act, 6th May, 1822.

† 24th August, 1822.

‡ Tazewell.

It has been said, that they, who often deceive others, must practise, either different means, or upon different persons. Erroneously; there are who require neither; but have been able three times to overreach the same government by the same equivocation. First, upon "*like manner*" in the treaty of 1794 (explained in our second number): secondly, upon "*like articles*" in the treaty of 1815; contrary to which, their tariff immediately charged above 100 per cent. more duties on British bar iron than on Baltic, because the former being rolled, and the latter hammered, into bars, the *articles* were no longer *like**: thirdly, in 1822, upon "*like privileges*." For it was in vain that we invoked both their act of 1815, which had proposed and promised to all the world the mutual abolition of all discriminating duties, and the late act of 1822, which had offered our ships "*like privileges*" to those we gave theirs: the president said, the privileges were as *like* as *like* could be; he had not sufficient proof that our discriminating duties were removed; nor sufficient power to remove those of the United States; besides, our act was partial, was restricted, and was temporary†. It was seen that the British government was come around, and determined to bring them to the uttermost point. Communications were imme-

* Papers relating to the American Tariff.

† Correspondence between Mr. Adams and Mr. Stratford Canning.

diately made, “*that further measures would be indispensable on both sides to obtain a result satisfactory to either:*” meaning, that further concessions must be made. What these concessions were to be, was prescribed by their act of 1823*. By this, upon proof that no other or higher duties of tonnage, &c. upon American vessels, or upon the goods imported therein, are exacted in colonial ports, than upon British vessels, or the like goods imported “*from elsewhere,*” the president was authorized to issue his proclamation, declaring that no other or higher duties of tonnage, &c. shall be levied upon British vessels coming from the colonial ports, and the goods imported therein, than upon American vessels, and the goods therein. The word “*elsewhere,*” in this act, was naturally supposed at first to mean *from any foreign country*, but was afterwards explained to imply from any other country whatsoever, *British or foreign*. By this equivocal dissyllable (for the effect of this word, says a Report of the American Congress, “*was discussed and well understood, and it was inserted because the most apt and expressive to meet the case:*” the discussion of which shows that the equivocation was remarked, its insertion, that it was preferred :)—but by this most apt and expressive word, that government was found to have demanded, 1st, That our discriminating duties upon tonnage

* Act of Congress of 1st of March, 1823.

should be removed ; (it was notorious that no such duties existed) ; 2d, That their manufactures should be admitted into the colonies on the same terms as the manufactures from the mother country ; 3d, That their produce should be admitted into each colony upon the same terms as the produce of another colony ; that is, that their provisions and lumber should be admitted into the West Indies on the same terms as those of the North American colonies, and that their sugars and rum should be admitted into the North American colonies, upon the same terms as those of the West Indies. In consideration of all which they too would remove their discriminating duties ; but would not remove their prohibition upon British ships arriving from the United Kingdom to clear out for colonial ports ; and would not remove their duties on colonial produce, which the tariff of 1816 had made almost prohibitory. Yet, after these demands, so extravagant, so arrogant, as to be hardly understood, had been explained ; after seeing the colonial trade, and British shipping, so reduced, as before shown, and the Americans supplanting both by the freights and cargoes of 100,000 tons ; while the 20,000 tons of British vessels, thus ensnared into the United States, were forced to pay nearly the whole profits of their voyage into the American treasury ; yet, not even then, could the British Government be brought to put a stop to this unequal intercourse, nor to any

measures of retaliation, except one, the feeblest of all, and most fallacious. An order in council* directed a tonnage duty of 4*s.* 4*d.* a ton to be levied upon American vessels, and 10 per cent. upon the duties on their cargoes, more than the duties paid by British vessels. Here, by following verbally the American rate of duties, we were caught a second time in the same trap, which had exposed us to so much loss and derision, after the year 1798: for our duties upon American articles were so light, and the articles so bulky, that this discrimination made a very trifling and unavailing difference in our favour; while the duties they levied upon West India produce were so high, and their amount upon a cargo so great, that the 10 per cent. addition was more than the whole freight, and amounted to a prohibition of importation in British ships†. Thus the West India merchant, in sending his ship to the United States for a cargo of their produce, was obliged to employ an American vessel to carry thither his sugar and rum for payment, while his own made the same voyage in ballast. Besides all this, not even was the tonnage duty, imposed by the order in council, equal to the American charges upon our tonnage, by a third. The British ships from the colonies were then paying upon their tonnage, in American ports, 4*s.* 1*d.* tonnage, 2*s.* 2*d.* light, and about 3*d.* a ton

* Order of 21st July, 1823.

† Proceedings of the Harrisburg Convention.

pilotage; all discriminating charges, from which American bottoms were exempt, and which amounted to 6*s.* 6*d.* a ton. To counteract which 4*s.* 4*d.* seems on our part to have been computed the just equivalent; for American vessels in colonial ports were subjected to no other discriminating charge.

To suffer things to remain in this state was sufficiently ruinous, yet in 1824 such another concession was invented, as would have made colonial and shipping interests still more desperate. For, to induce the Americans to repeal their discriminating duties, and their restrictions on the circuitous voyage, an offer was that year made to permit them to export on equal terms with ourselves, from the colonies to all foreign countries whatsoever. If the importance of the trade between the West Indies and foreign countries is considered, one can hardly believe it was fully understood, either what might be lost by us, or gained by the Americans, when such a proposal was offered, and was rejected. Events however proved, that the Americans at least knew what they were about; for, in 1825, ministers advanced a step further, and a most important one. By an act that year*, not only was the above privilege of trading between British colonies and all foreign countries granted, but in addition, ministers almost sub-

* Stat. 6 Geo. IV, cap. 73.

scribed to the American demands of 1823, all extravagant and unequal as they were. For by this act (which added largely to the articles of import), American manufactures were admitted into all the colonies and islands, not exactly upon the same terms as those of the mother country, but under a very low protecting duty, at the highest not equal to the amount of the costs and charges, at which the manufactures of the mother country could be there imported; and, in many cases, not equal to the amount of such costs and charges *by one half*; nor equal to one half the duty imposed upon British manufactures in American ports; and their produce was admitted into the West Indies under low protecting duties, in favour of the mother country and her North American colonies, equally insufficient to cover the difference of freight by the shorter voyage, and the other advantages enjoyed by the United States.

What madness or folly possessed the Americans that they hesitated at this offer? Did the mere phantom of a schedule and duties impose on their penetration; or what further concessions had they to hope or desire? They since accuse the obscurity of our law. Unjustly: ministers had translated their demands into the act of parliament, not indeed to the letter, but so faithfully to the spirit, that they should have recognised their own measures in a different shape. Yet there was a singu-

lar clause in that act, which discovered that ministers had still something more to concede, or had as yet no certain policy to pursue. They were empowered to give, by an order in council, any country the whole privileges the act conferred, and dispense with all the conditions it exacted. This seemed precisely suited to the United States. Here was an *arriere-pensée*, a something further, they knew not what, or knew not how worthless, to be wrung forth. The congress met. The act and offers of Great Britain were laid before them. An attempt was made by the moderate party to repeal their act of 1823, and remove their discriminating duties, and accept of the colonial trade; but it was outvoted. The offer was rejected. The congress held out for something more.

For once, they were mistaken. For once, did the Americans speculate upon the facility and concession of our government, and fail. Knowing as they are, in the value of every question, the time when, and the men with whom they negotiate, for once, they seem to have overrated the patience, or indifference, or liberality, of a British minister. An order in council at length came forth*, not to offer further concessions, but to revoke those already granted. After having suffered the West Indies to be open to them for four years,

* Order of July, 1826.

on terms most unequal, and ruinous to British trade and shipping, the ports were finally closed. The Americans were astonished. At first they tried high and angry letters. “ *If the President does not require a revocation of that part of the order of council, which prohibits the admission of vessels of the United States, as a preliminary to all negotiation on this subject*, it is because, faithful to the desire which he anxiously entertains of preserving the harmony and amity between the two countries, he will not follow the unfriendly example which has been exhibited by the British government*.” So cheap, so easy, had the concessions of that government become, that the American president takes credit to himself for so far moderating his indignation, as not to require for a preliminary to negotiation, what would have been scarce less disgraceful than injurious to the British empire. This lofty tone was afterwards lowered to a much humbler key. They offered, in 1827, to allow British ships from the United Kingdom arriving in their ports, to clear out for our own colonies†; which was an injury even to have denied, and the small importance of which they probably had now ascertained. But all negotiation upon the subject was, for a second time, declined. For the third time, they are now, in 1829, asking to renew it; being shrewdly disposed to turn to

* Letter of Mr. Clay, 28th of September, 1826.

† Letter of Mr. Gallatin, 4th of June, 1827.

some account the present theories of free trade, while the public and government are in the humour. And ministers, it is said, are hesitating. After having exhausted all means, just and unjust, to force open the islands, are the United States now to effect it by mere importunity, or some trifling concession? For a little repentance, for a moment's humility, a few words of peace and good will, are they now to be let into the West Indies, as they were let into the fisheries? as though we had never before seen Tartuffe always biding his time to start up and exclaim,

“ C'est à vous d'en sortir, vous, qui parlez en maître,
La maison m'appartient, je le ferai connoître.”

No. VII.

It has been shown, that, during the three and thirty years preceding 1827, the admission of Americans into the West India trade has invariably transferred to them millions of British wealth, which their exclusion has as invariably recovered. But since 1827, the date of their last exclusion, one would imagine the result to have been different, or government could not so soon be tempted to abandon a measure, which was lately pronounced deliberate and conclusive. What then has been the condition of the trade for the last two years?

We shall not complain, that, even if the present system were merely an experiment, the time for trial, in so important a measure, has been but brief; nor will we further compare the impatience, which now barely waits the result of two years, with that long-suffering and abundant tenderness, which tolerated the admission of American ships on terms so unequal for four. Although that very admission, followed by the frightful decline of every British trade, and the loss of 50 per cent. in shipping, has so depressed and exhausted the North American colonies, that there never was an unfairer time, for judging of their enterprize and resources to supply the West Indies, than the years 1827 and 1828. Notwithstanding, on comparing 1828, the year after the Americans were excluded, with 1825, the year before, the tonnage from these colonies to the West Indies has increased by nearly 150 per cent., from 36,082 to 90,703 tons*; their exports thither have increased in some articles from three to sevenfold; and their imports thence, in sugar, molasses, and coffee, nearly threefold†; and upon the whole the increase of both exports and imports has probably been in proportion to the increase of tonnage. At the same time the export of such supplies (corn, rice, and wood) from the United Kingdom has advanced about 50 per cent., and the British ton-

* Official Returns.

† Id.

nage between the foreign islands and our own above 300 per cent., from 36,399 to 109,063 tons*; and the registered tonnage of both our islands and colonies has increased from 214,375 tons, in 1825, to 279,362 tons, in 1828†. According to the measure hitherto used for expressing the amount of the intercolonial trade and navigation in money, and which, though prices have fallen, is still the best and only means of comparing different years, the increase of 1828 above 1825 is equal to 1,146,141*l.*, and the whole trade between the islands and North American colonies for that year worth 1,904,763*l.* The real value, however, measured by present prices is less. Let us add the value of the supplies sent from the United Kingdom in 1828, equal to 345,159*l.* exclusive of freights; and take the navigation between the foreign islands and our own to have earned 25*s.* a ton; and we shall find the whole value of the British trade, in West India supplies of food and wood, to be now no less than 2,387,375*l.*

Here then is given a sufficient reason for the assertion before made, that the readmission of the Americans would now be attended with greater evils than any before experienced; because the amount of British capital and industry now invested in the trade is so much greater, than at any

* Official Returns.

† Parliamentary Abstracts.

former time, that the annual return amounts to nearly two millions and a half; being more than even in 1821, the year of its highest prosperity heretofore. Now, as the duties of the act, 4th Geo. IV, under which the Americans were admitted in 1822, were the same as those of 6th Geo. IV, by which, since 1825, this trade is regulated, and under which the Americans are to trade if admitted, in 1830, it follows, that the result of their admission, in 1830, will be in the same ratio as in 1822, *viz.* a decline of British trade equal to 50 per cent.: the amount of which decline will, of course, be greater now than in 1822, in proportion as the amount of that trade is now greater. But there are reasons for thinking, that even the ratio also of this decline will increase no less than its amount. First, because the list of articles admissible now is far larger than in 1822, and comprehends all kinds of manufactures, with few and unimportant prohibitions (except of salted provisions and fish); and, as the Americans can undersell us in almost all the coarser and ruder fabrics of cotton, leather, wood, paper, and some others*, they will not only supplant the exportation of food and lumber, &c. (the article to which alone we have been confining our attention), but begin to interfere with the manufactures of the United Kingdom. Secondly, because the Ame-

* Proceedings of the Harrisburg Convention.

ricans, by their new canals, and other vast improvements in internal communication, have brought into their ports and markets, the produce of much greater, richer, and cheaper territories, than supplied West India exports heretofore, and consequently will be more enabled to drive the British producer and carrier out of the islands, and engross the trade more entirely to themselves. Thirdly, greater exertions than ever have been made of late in the Canadian provinces, upon the faith or encouragement of the present system, to increase their production, and facilitate the transportation of West India supplies; and large sums expended in undertakings, public and private, the return and result of which have not yet come in, but which will speedily be perceived, or perhaps for ever foreclosed, accordingly as government adhere to, or change, existing regulations. Among such works, of a public nature, may be mentioned the canals*, nothing inferior in use and enterprise to those of the United States; as La Chine, constructed at an expense of 115,000*l.*; the Granville, at 115,000*l.*; the Rideau, at 500,000*l.*; the Welland, at 200,000*l.*; the Shubenacadie, at 90,000*l.* All which sums either are already, or soon to be, expended, and the works either finished, or under contract to be shortly opened; and others, as the Richlieu and the Bay

* Mac Taggart's Canada. Captain Hall's ditto.

of Verte, scarcely less important, are about to be begun. It is not pretended that all these have been made solely for commercial intercourse, or intercourse with the West Indies; but it is asserted, that the West India trade is that, to which they will give the greatest benefit, and from which derive a great proportion of their profits. The Americans, by first opening their canals, have had the start of our colonists, and been able to ship their most inland productions from Atlantic ports, some years before the produce of Upper Canada could be got down to Quebec; but this, apparently, is not enough, unless they can also persuade our government to cut off the best market, for which that produce is destined, just as the first ship has descended the locks from Lake Erie to Ontario. It would be long to compute the amount of private enterprises undertaken upon the encouragement of the existing system, and not yet productive of return, as mills, wharfs, ships, &c.; (though we cannot forbear to mention, that in the single port of St. Andrew's were built, in the year 1828, for the West India trade, twelve vessels, measuring 2,240 tons; and the tonnage thence to the West Indies seems to have nearly doubled in the present year, as the returns give 4,251 tons outwards to the West Indies and Newfoundland, in the quarter ending 10th of October, 1828, and, in the corresponding quarter of 1829, 7,710 tons): but such particulars are unnecessary, since, in a

country, whose whole industry is engaged in agriculture, fisheries, or the forest, the labours and property of every individual have an immediate operation and dependence upon the West India market. Every individual, therefore, has an interest, and a most valuable one, vested in the permanence of the present law; and the readmission of the Americans is an evil, which will be felt not only by every shipowner and merchant, but will search out every husbandman, penetrate into every hut in the forest, and enter the shallop of every fisherman around the shores.

So far we have set forth the circumstances from which may be collected, what we have heretofore lost by suffering the Americans to intercept the West India trade, what gained by reclaiming it for ourselves, and how much more than ever we shall probably lose now, by again transferring it to the United States. It remains to examine the reasons in favour of this concession usually offered by the Americans, and by those among us, if any such there be, who hold the same opinions: in doing which, some further statistics shall be given, to confirm what has already been advanced.

That the West Indians are not so well supplied when the Americans are excluded.—Subjoined is a comparison of the amount of these supplies in 1825, the year before the Americans lost the trade, with 1828, the year after. It will be seen, that, in some articles, the West Indies have had far more;

in some the same quantity; and in some rather less. Of beef, pork, and fish, there is no question; the last, however, have been particularly abundant and cheap. In flour there is an increase. In corn and bread a deficiency to no great extent; and which was probably supplied in some measure by the increased importation of potatoes, and other vegetable food, from the North American colonies. In lumber of every kind the supply in 1828 has been greatly increased; and particularly in staves, the most difficult article to procure, the quantity nearly doubled.

TOTAL IMPORTS INTO THE WEST INDIES.

	1825. <i>Americans admitted.</i>	1828. <i>Americans excluded.</i>	Decrease.	Increase.
Staves, No.....	9,839,328	16,773,992		6,934,664
Flour, brls.....	202,737	206,653		3,916
Corn, bushels....	383,832	351,832	32,000	
Bread, cwt.....	70,411	16,591	53,820	
Rice, cwt.....	41,614	39,822	1,792	
Boards, feet.....	20,733,608	23,602,837		2,869,229
Hoops, No.....	7,919,225	8,446,483		527,258
Shingles, No.....	15,448,603	19,166,227		3,717,624

Upon the whole therefore it is clear, that the islands have been quite as well, or rather better, supplied since the last exclusion of American shipping.

That the West Indians must have American supplies.—But they need not have American carriers. This objection eludes half the question, and the more important half. The freight is equal in value to the cargo, and supports nearly 12,000 seamen. Nor will it long be true that they must have American supplies. Within a short time the whole may be produced from our own colonies (unless again paralysed by readmitting the Americans), as we shall presently find means to prove.

That American articles are still imported through the neutral or foreign islands.—An evil; but one which cannot be remedied by admitting those articles directly in American ships; and which may be removed by perseverance in the present system. The increase of the trade through the foreign islands in 1828, seems, according to an account before us, to have been but from one-half to three-fifths of the decrease in the direct American trade since 1825. Some portion of the imports from the North American colonies is also of American origin; but the main concern is, that through the colonies seven-eighths of the freight are ours, and, even through the islands, one-third; the conclusion therefore seems, that the former course ought to be encouraged, rather than the latter. Yet, strange to say, the converse of this is preferred. For, by suffering the tonnage duty to continue upon American vessels to the northern free ports (which duty, while colonial ships were admitted by the

Americans, operated as some protection, but after they were excluded, only as a tax), a bounty is given to the trade through the foreign islands equal in most articles to 4s. 4d. a ton. This keeps up the trade through that channel; gives the Americans the long freights; and deprives perhaps some 30,000 tons of British shipping of yearly employment. Would, that they, who are suffering from this burthen, might, without presumption, have said to those, who continue it, either remove this duty, or give us one reason why you will not.

That in each of these cases the freight from the foreign islands to ours, and from the United States to the North American colonies, is all added to the cost of the article, and paid by the West Indian consumer.—No more, than the additional duties, by the late American tariffs, upon British manufactures (of which nearly the same quantity continues to be imported), are all paid by the American consumer. The loss is in both instances divided, between the advanced price to the consumer, and the diminished profit to the producer; and in both instances it is the diminished profit of the producer, that has made up nearly all the difference. Wood and corn are the staples of the United States, which are produced with such ease and abundance, that they might supply many countries, but for which they can find a market in scarcely any, except the West Indies. When, therefore, our islands, which open receive a good part, about a fourth, of all their ex-

port in these articles, are closed; and when the 100,000 tons, employed in the carriage, are thrown out of employment; it is clear that, other circumstances equal, the price both of the article and of the freight must decline. Then, compute the difference of selling in the small and glutted market of St. Thomas, and searching among our islands for the dearest (as the Americans were permitted to do till 1827); and include the competition of our own colonies, and of other countries, now embarking largely in the trade; and there can be no doubt, that the Americans sell for much less in the circuitous trade, than they did or would in a direct. In point of fact, as we are informed, American freights to the foreign islands have fallen to 2*l.* per ton, although in 1825 their freights to our islands were about 3*l.* The present freight from the United States (New York) to the northern colonies is 8*s.* 8*d.* a ton, one half of which is the *politic* tonnage duty just mentioned. The freights now earned by British ships in the trade are, from the foreign islands to our own, from 20*s.* to 30*s.*—say 25*s.* per ton; from the North American colonies 50*s.* and 70*s.*—say 3*l.* It is clear, therefore, that in the former voyage, by adding 5*s.* to the freight, we divide the whole amount with the Americans in the proportion of 5 to 8; and in the latter we add 8*s.* 8*d.* a ton to the freight, and divide with them in the proportion of about 14 to 2, or, excluding the tonnage duty, about 14 to 1; upon the whole therefore,

after deducting the addition, we save 20s. a ton in the one case, and 2*l.* 11*s.* 4*d.* in the other. It may be, that by endeavouring to give too exact an idea of these savings on freights, we lose something in accuracy of what we gain in precision. But the error, if any, cannot be of such a degree as to alter the question. These figures, we are confident, represent the real character of each voyage, and are not far from the actual prices.

That prices are higher in the West Indies since American ships were excluded. That the price of flour and corn may have advanced is easily conceived, as the quantity supplied in 1828 is less than in 1825. The cause of this however must be sought in other reasons, than the exclusion of American vessels; for, as the duty upon flour in the direct trade of 1825 was 5*s.* per barrel, and the duty now charged through the warehousing ports is but 1*s.*, and the freight from the United States to those ports but 2*s.* 2*d.* (one half of which is the tonnage duty), it follows of course, that, even taking the expense of transhipment to be equal to 6*d.* more, American flour may now be imported into the West Indies at a cheaper rate, than in 1825. With regard to other articles, it is difficult to conceive how the price can be higher than in 1825, since we have seen that the supply has been far more abundant, unless there has been a great increase of demand, that is to say, of crops and production. Now, it will hardly be pre-

tended, that the fertility of the soil, or the benignity of the season, or the extent of cultivation, depend on the admission of American vessels ; or, if they do, still the argument is against it ; for, since their exclusion, production seems to have increased. The fact is, we believe, that the crop of 1825 was a great deal ~~more~~^{less} abundant, than that of 1828 ; for certainly there were 13,841 hogsheads of sugar sent to London from Jamaica in the latter year more than in the former ; and the whole value of imports from the West Indies into the United Kingdom was more by 1,565,000*l*.*

This advance of price, therefore, is owing to the increase of the crop. And as the amount of the crop cannot well be ascertained till September, the price of the succeeding months is, for staves at least, the fair criterion of the year. Now in the list of prices before us for these two years, though in the other months, when the quotations were perhaps in some measure nominal, the difference was greater ; yet from September to December inclusively, the price of white oak staves, the most valuable article, appears to have been only about five per cent. higher in 1828 ; though in red oak the advance was certainly much greater. Shingles also, upon the average of the whole year, notwithstanding the great increase of supply, have been considerably dearer ; but white pine boards, the

* Official Returns

article most largely consumed, have, on the average of the whole year, remained within about 10 per cent. of the same prices as in 1825. Pitch pine boards, indeed, have risen most of all ; but it is an article of which little is required, nor is that little indispensable ; for though the Canadas do not produce it, they have abundance of the red pine, which is next to the pitch pine in point of durability ; and durability is the only advantage.

In the table below will be found a comparison of prices, in Jamaica, for the years 1825, 1828 and 1829 ; the two former derived from unquestionable authority ; the last extracted from a colonial journal *.

	1825.	1828.	1829.
Flour per barrel	54s.	90s.	52s.
W. O. Staves per thousand.	19l.to22l.10s.	20l. to 22l. 10s.	13l. 10s.
R. O. Staves per thousand.	11l.to13l.10s.	17l. to 19l.	11l. 1s.
W. P. Boards per thousand feet... ..	10l.	11l.	
Shingles per thousand.....	3l. to 4l.	4l. to 6l.	3l. 5s.

It is however no part of our case that prices have not risen in the West Indies ; considering the in-

* Halifax (N. S.) Journal, 14th Dec. 1829. The same paper quotes the prices in Demerara as still lower ; flour 39s. ; R. O. staves 6l. 10s. ; lumber 6l. 10s. Demerara produces staves in abundance from its own forests.

crease of the crop in 1828, the surprise is that they were not higher in that year; and they seem to have since declined. It is not asserted that the islands can be supplied with British articles, as cheaply as American, at present. Our case is, that abundant supplies may be now brought from British possessions in British ships; that thus articles of British production are now gradually, and will soon be entirely, substituted for foreign; that they will afterwards become as cheap; and that in the mean time the advance of price, besides producing so important a result, is not equal to the saving in freights.

No. VIII.

There are other assertions, commonly made respecting the West India trade, which require examination.

That if the Americans be admitted, they will buy and take away large quantities of West India produce. They will not probably take away more than the amount of their freights and produce brought, for they never yet took so much. And as whatever is exchanged for American freights and produce, cannot be exchanged for British and colonial; and as the Canadas have nothing but like produce to give in return; whatever is gained by West India exports to the United States, is lost in the exports

to the British colonies. Now that course of trade, which diffuses the comforts of life among our own subjects, ought certainly to be preferred to that, which ships them to foreigners. But it is a fact, and one which of itself should be sufficient to settle the present question, that the Americans would not, did not, in 1825, when admitted to take away sugars, &c. in their own ships, buy or take so much, as the British North American colonies now take.

Exported from the British West Indies to the United States,
in 1825 *.

Sugar.	Rum.	Molasses.
Lbs.	Gallons.	Gallons.
2,727,872	819,916	2,104,044

Exported to the British North American Colonies, in 1827 †.

Sugar.	Rum.	Molasses.
Lbs.	Gallons.	Gallons.
11,936,612	2,318,432	935,212

The following tables will also establish the position, that the West India exports to, as well as

* Official Returns.

† Accounts published in the colonial journals, which however include the quantity imported from the United Kingdom, but comprise part only of the importations into New Brunswick, and none into Prince Edward's Island.

imports from the Northern colonies, increase and decline, in proportion as the Americans are permitted, or forbidden, to intercept and supplant the trade.

Imported into the British West Indies from the British North American Colonies.

	1793 *. Americans excluded.	1797 *. Americans admitted.	1806 *. Americans still admitt.	1828 †. Americans excluded.
Corn, bushels. .	171	847	2,578	45,495
Flour, bushels..	1,656	1,589	1,176	38,046
Boards, feet	3,618,200	511,390	811,315	18,739,063
Shingles, No....	2,929,150	464,200	295,225	11,558,111
Staves, No.....	151,060	41,350	327,336	6,942,048

Exported from the British West Indies to the British North American Colonies.

	1806 †. Americans admitted.	1814 †. Americans excluded.	1825 †. Americans admitted.	1828 §. Americans excluded.
Sugar, lbs.....	1,805,490	8,176,722	5,876,976	15,129,832
Rum, galls.....	888,706	1,919,251	1,901,779	2,077,209
Molasses, galls.	163,107	530,298	548,348	1,070,395
Coffee, lbs	66,375	284,536	84,607	307,584

As the Canadas can neither produce these arti-

* Edwards' West Indies. † Official Returns.

‡ Official Returns.

§ Colonial Journals and Official Returns, inclusive of the importations from the United Kingdom.

cles themselves, nor buy them elsewhere, nor pay for them, but in their corn, wood, &c. ; is it meet to prefer dealing with a foreign power, which has loaded such importations with duties almost prohibitory, which can itself produce sugar at $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ a pound, and which is rivalling us in almost every industry, and in none faster than West India produce ?

That the Americans, if admitted, will in return give us permission to make the circuitous voyage from the United Kingdom to their ports, and thence to the West Indies. — This they offered in 1827, and were refused. The importance which has been attached to that circuitous voyage, both by them and us, is greatly beyond its real value. Its origin was owing to the heavy duties imposed in the United States on British ships from colonial ports, with which duties ships entering from the United Kingdom, and departing for the West Indies, could not be charged, by the treaty of 1815, while that treaty was observed. Yet not even the enormous saving of about 8s. 6d. a ton, could make that voyage sufficiently profitable for many ships to pursue. What the exact number was cannot easily be ascertained ; it has been stated in some American print at about ten ships annually. Certain we may be that it could not have exceeded 20,000 tons ; because the number of vessels departing from Great Britain to the United States, till 1819, exceeded the number entering inwards,

by about that amount ; and the number entering inwards from the West Indies exceeded the number outwards, by nearly the same ; and the decrease of tonnage outwards to the United States, after 1818, was also of about the same quantity. These, though conclusive evidences that the circuitous tonnage could not have been more, are none that it was ever so much ; since the two first differences still continue with no great variation, and the last has been recovered, though the circuitous voyage has from that year (1818) been constantly interdicted. But the Americans also had their circuitous voyage, and their double freights in the West India intercourse, which it is of far more importance for them to regain ; for, as the best market in the West Indies is just at the time, when their ships are going down from the northward for cotton to Great Britain, no ballast can be more convenient, than a cargo of wood and corn to Jamaica ; from whence they are carried around by the current to the Mississippi, and, there taking in the cotton, undersell and supplant our ships in either trade. Yet, whatever were the advantages of the circuitous voyage to British ships from the United Kingdom, they do not depend upon, nor need be purchased of, the United States ; for they are still enjoyed now, and probably to an equal amount, through our own colonies : for, as we are informed, the ships pursuing that course through the port of St. Andrew's

alone amounted in 1827 to 6,000 tons. And this is a far more profitable voyage, for the distance is shortened, and all the charges and disbursements in foreign ports saved.

That if the Americans will at last consent to put the ships of both countries on equal terms, we shall be able to compete with them in the carrying trade. — Difference of circumstances makes as great a discrimination, as difference of duties. The Americans build, and navigate, their vessels cheaper. Insurance with them is lower. Their ship-owners are not like ours, a separate class, but are themselves the merchants, and often indeed the manufacturer; which is to them in lieu of the highest protection; since it is never sufficient for the British ship to offer at a lower freight, without also showing how the American could, in the mean time, be more profitably employed. British ships must pay a commission in the American ports, which their ships, being generally consigned to the master (who is often the owner), seldom pay in our islands. Their circuitous voyage, before described, is so profitable, it must ever enable them to undersell us; for almost any freight is better for their ships from the northward, (and it is in the north, and near to our own colonies, that most of their shipping is owned,) than going down to the Gulph of Mexico in ballast, to look for cotton. In the carrying trade between the United Kingdom and the United States, in which the ships of

both countries have been placed on equal duties, the Americans get employment for 194,135 tons annually, upon the average of three years ending with 1827, and the British ship-owners for only 54,124 * ; though before the duties were equalized the latter employed in that trade above 100,000 tons. For these reasons we think that our ship-owners would not be able to compete with the Americans, in carrying between the West Indies and the United States, even though the duties should be made equal upon the ships of both countries. But, if these reasons were not sufficient, why should the Americans, who, we have seen, contribute little or nothing to increase the trade, be admitted by us, for the sake of dividing the carriage with them equally? Why prefer the chance of obtaining half, to the certain possession of the whole?

That the Canadian provinces are incapable of supplying the West Indies.—This objection misstates, or mistakes, the question; which is, first, and principally, one of navigation and carriage; and, secondly, of trade and production. In point of economy, the freights of West India supplies are nearly equal to the value of the cargo; and besides, in point of policy, they support 12,000 seamen. The fact also, in this objection, is no less mis-stated or mistaken; unless it is to be un-

* Watterston.

derstood only as asserting, that the Canadian provinces, though capable, have never yet been able, to supply the West Indies; which indeed would be, a very good reason for continuing to their produce an adequate protection, but a singular ground for withdrawing it. That those provinces are capable of producing West India supplies to any amount, and within a few years sufficient for the demand, no one, who has seen or read any thing of the country, can doubt. Even the limited and inconclusive assertion, that they never have yet produced and exported sufficient, must not pass without argument; for in the same manner it was formerly asserted, that they could not supply the West Indies with fish, and the Americans were allowed to carry thither half the quantity consumed, until it was shown that the British North American provinces actually exported double the amount required in British West India islands. Let the same course be adopted here, in corn and wood; it cannot lead us far from the same result.

The quantity of these articles imported into the West Indies, during the years 1825 and 1828; has been before stated. We may take the average of those years to represent the whole amount demanded for the supply of all those plantations. From which if the exports thither, upon the same average, from the United Kingdom be deducted,

the remainder will show how much is required from the Canadian provinces.

Articles.	Amount of the annual Importations into the West Indies.	Amount supplied from the United Kingdom.	Amount required from the North American Colonies.
Flour, Bread, &c. equal to bushels of wheat.....	803,418	84,458	718,960
Other Corn, bushels	367,832	150,728	117,104
Boards, feet	22,168,222	327,497	21,840,725
Hoops, No.....	8,182,854	7,480,033	702,821
Shingles, No.....	17,307,415	42,500	17,264,915
Staves, No.....	13,306,660	861,255	12,545,405

To prove that the British North American colonies have ever been able to furnish supplies to the amount, which thus appears to be required, our means of information are so limited, that we have not the returns from all the colonies for any one year. The most perfect in our possession are for the year 1827; and where returns of that year are wanting, those of 1828 are substituted; yet the whole is deficient of any account whatever from Prince Edward's Island, and comprises only part of New Brunswick; being far from a complete statement of the exports from all the Canadas. What proportion these returns bear to the whole West India demand will be seen by the following table.

Articles.	Amount required for the W. Indies from the N. American Colonies.	Amount exported from the N. American Colonies to all parts*.	Deficiency.	Excess.
Wheat, bushels	718,960	779,749		60,789
Other Corn, b.	117,104	97,716	19,488	—
Boards, feet...	21,840,725	78,146,761		56,306,036
Shingles, No..	17,264,915	11,699,282	5,565,633	—
Hoops, No. ...	702,821	348,000	354,821	—
Staves, No. ...	12,545,405	14,898,060		2,341,295

With such exceptions, which are as nothing to the decision of the whole question, the colonies have actually exported more than the average demand in the West Indies requires.

That a great part of these exports from the northern colonies come from the United States. — Considering the proportion of bulk to value in these exports, this, if true, is neither any great objection, nor if great, can it be remedied by admitting those articles directly in American ships. It is the freight, it is the carrying trade, that is mainly to be regarded; the origin of the articles is nothing to the British ship which transports it. Freight is to these articles, what manufacture is to raw

* Colonial journals. An error occurred in the former publication (in the Morning Herald), in consequence of supposing the *minot* of corn in Canada, to be equal to the *minot* of Paris. It is here computed at one-ninth more than the Winchester bushel.

materials. An evil however it unquestionably is, that West India supplies should be bought of others any longer, than till they can be produced within our own dominions; but it is an evil which is daily decreasing, and at present is greatly over-rated. What proportion of the colonial exports, in the table above given, was of American origin, we have no exact means of stating, as none of the returns in our possession make that distinction, except those of St. Andrew's and Quebec. But in the others, by assuming the whole amount exported to be of American origin, in those articles of which an equal quantity was imported from the United States, and in those of which less was imported by deducting so much, we shall be able to ascertain the utmost amount of American articles that could have been mingled with the colonial exports.

	Exported from the North American Colonies.	Of American Production.	Of British Colonial Pro- duction.
Flour, wheat, & bread, equal to bushels of wheat	779,749	160,000	619,749
Other corn, bushels....	97,716	34,503	63,202
Boards, feet *	78,146,761	297,200	77,859,561
Shingles, No.....	11,699,282	1,351,500	10,347,782
Hoops, No.....	348,000		348,000
Staves, No.*	14,898,060	4,736,721	10,161,339

* The Quebec returns contain no account of the importation

Having thus ascertained what part of these exports from the colonies was of American, what of British production, let us now compare the latter (the former being deducted), with the whole imports required by the West Indies to be supplied from the North American colonies.

	Required for the West In- dies.	Exported from the North Ameri- can colonies, of British pro- duction.	Deficiency.	Excess.
Wheat, bushels	718,960	619,749	99,211	56,018,836
Other Corn, bushels.....	117,104	63,202	53,902	
Boards, feet...	21,840,725	77,859,561		
Shingles, No..	17,264,915	10,347,782	6,917,133	
Hoops, No. ...	702,821	348,000	354,821	
Staves, No. ...	12,545,405	10,161,339	2,384,066	

The deficiency is inconsiderable, and in such supplies as the colonies can easily and speedily make up ; and in the article which furnishes most of the freights, there is a large excess.

In these tables, beef, pork, and fish, are not inserted, because British supplies of them are so

: boards and staves from the United States. The amount probably is not great, nor very material in the present statement. Because, in staves, the Canadian being about one-third larger than the American, so much ought, in a fair comparison, to be added to the number exported from Quebec : and in boards, the export of British production, from the lower ports alone, is nearly double the demand in the West Indies.

abundant, that foreign are prohibited ; nor rice, because sufficient is now sent from the United Kingdom ; nor cattle, because principally procured from South America.

It appears therefore, that nearly all West India supplies may, even now, be procured from British possessions, and carried in British ships ; and that the whole may soon be entirely of British origin and production ; for the Canadas are not only abundantly capable of supplying whatever is not procured from the mother country, but have already, with unimportant exceptions, exported more, and have even produced nearly as much. If the word *soon* appear to any too indefinite, it may, we think, be limited to two or three years. The opening of the Welland Canal will bring down, it is asserted, 100,000 barrels of flour to the St. Lawrence, in 1830. And when the other canals are finished, if it be any objection that some places in the colonies import American corn, that evil will have ceased. The partial accounts of exports, from Quebec and Halifax, in 1829, which have just reached us, show a great increase, in other articles of wood, and in staves, of more than 3,000,000.

That the prices of corn and staves in the Canadas are far higher than in the United States. (Letter in the *Morning Journal*, Jan. 5, 1830). For which cause, if the latter be admitted, they are sure to divert the trade to themselves ; but the difference of prices is less than generally supposed.

The Harrisburg Convention in 1827, state the

price of wheat at Montreal to be, on an average, the same as at New York, 3s. 11d. per bushel. The wheat in Ohio, they quote as 2s. 2d. In Upper Canada it is as cheap. Staves in New York may be taken as generally worth, white oak from 8*l.* to 9*l.* per thousand, red oak 4*l.* to 5*l.* The price in Montreal is about the same. The same articles in Halifax are about 9*l.* to 10*l.* white oak, red 5*l.* to 7*l.* per thousand. In Upper Canada, whose staves and flour are now sent by the Erie Canal to New York, white oak staves may be procured at from 3*l.* 10s. to 4*l.* 10s. the thousand; from the price of which, and of flour in that colony, some idea may be formed of the difference which the Canadian canals, when opened, are likely to make in the Quebec market, and in the West Indies. The assertions, sometimes that red oak, sometimes that white, is not found in the British colonies, deserve the same respect as would be paid to a statement, that neither coffee nor the sugar cane are grown in Jamaica.

That the St. Lawrence is locked up by ice for six months of the year. (Letter in the *Morning Journal*, 5th January, 1830.) For six, read five; and know, that this has not prevented a ship's leaving Quebec in November last, on her third voyage in one season to the United Kingdom. But the principal demand in the West Indies is not in winter, when the St. Lawrence is frozen; and, if it were, the lower ports are then open, and

the trade always uninterrupted. Besides, is it not the part of a good government, if any of its dominions labour under difficulties of situation or climate, rather to counteract these by the operation of its laws, than to make the existence of such disadvantages a reason for adding others? It is not the ice of the St. Lawrence which has obstructed the trade to the West Indies; it is, that an intermediate people, having got the start in wealth and production, have too long been permitted to intercept the trade between the British islands and colonies, and attract to themselves the specie of both.

No. IX.

OUR examination of the objections to the present system of colonial intercourse is here resumed and closed.

That by admitting the Americans they may be induced to lower their duties on colonial produce. That their duties will not be lowered may be said with equal ease, and more probability: for neither were the additional duties of 1816 laid in consequence of the exclusion of American ships; nor, if they were, were they lowered by their tariff of 1824, after American ships were readmitted; nor, if they should be lowered now, will any great increase of importations from the West Indies be

probably the consequence. For, with regard to sugar, the long monopoly enjoyed since 1816 by Louisiana, and now also by Florida, by means of the prohibitory duties of that year, is such, that in 1826 they produced 50,000,000 lbs., nearly half of the whole consumption of the United States. The Harrisburgh convention, held in 1827 for the protection of American manufactures, stated the duties levied upon sugar to be "*prohibitory, and its cultivation a monopoly*;" and that "if the whole sugar consumed in the United States was of domestic production (*as it soon will be at the present duty upon the foreign article*)" &c. We may therefore rest assured, that, if they are now willing to reduce those duties a little, it is because their own production is so far advanced as not to require such protection: a supposition something confirmed by a statement, lately given in the morning papers, of the sugars exported to the United States from Cuba. Of above 400,000 cases which that island exported, about 14,000 only (equal, perhaps, to 23,000,000 lbs.) went to the United States; although Cuba has to pay them about 1,500,000*l.* annually for imports, and exported thither, in 1827, 44,000,000 lbs. of sugar. The papers of the same Harrisburgh convention inform us, that there are in Louisiana 250,000 acres fitted for the cultivation of sugar. That the whole consumption of the United States is 120,000,000 lbs. That the 250,000 acres can produce 250,000,000 of pounds of sugar. That

the molasses alone pays the expense of cultivation, and leaves the sugar net profit. At such a rate of production, the present duties alone are equal to a bounty of above 8*l.* per acre upon its cultivation. Late American journals state the crop in 1828 at 80,000 hogsheads, and that had not the crop of 1829 been so injured by rain and frost it would have amounted to 120,000. This is about equal to their whole consumption.

With regard to rum, the most desirable article for the West Indian to export, the prohibitory duties of the United States have long ago done what the duties upon sugar must have nearly accomplished. In 1810 there were 14,191 distilleries in that country, whose annual production was 25,704,892 gallons of spirits*; and, in 1827, the papers of the same Harrisburg Convention inform us, that “It is thought that more than 40,000,000 gallons are distilled in the United States, *which is probably enough.*” Enough in all conscience; for, taking their population at 11,000,000, and the adult males at one-fourth, there will be about a pint every three days for each adult male; and there are, probably, as many of that description who will not drink this allowance, as of others who will.

Such being the condition of the United States, with respect to the most important of West India productions, (for of coffee their importation from

* Seybert.

our islands has ever been inconsiderable, compared with that from the French and Spanish; and its cultivation is now also increasing in their southern states under a protecting duty of $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ a pound); let the West Indians then consider, whether, the probability of finding a good market among the Americans is worth the loss of that already found in the Canadas: whether, though they may thus buy flour cheaper, they must not buy specie dearer, and sell produce for less; whether, it can ultimately answer their interest, to drive the northern colonists to distil whiskey from corn, and extract sugar from trees or beet-root, or procure both from the United States.

That, by giving the Americans the West India trade, they may be induced to lower their tariff upon British manufactures.—Another gratuitous supposition, which no American minister can promise, nor even their president foretel. Because, though the parties for and against the measure are nearly equal, they are, as usual in such case, very violent; and it is among the evils of a popular government to make no account of the minority, but carry and persist in the most important and disputable policy, upon the barest majority of voices. That the tariff has proved an impolitic act, and injured all other classes without much benefiting the manufacturers, we do not doubt; but that it will therefore be repealed, is by no means as certain; and, whether it will or not,

depends nothing upon the present question of colonial intercourse, whichever way decided: partly, for that the tariff has been ever opposed, in vain, by all who could be now benefited from opening the West Indies, the agricultural and shipping interests; and partly, that the tariff is founded, we fear, in deeper motives than those of any interest, the pride and malice of those who passed it. This, like their embargo, non-intercourse, and war, seems to be one of those measures, from the observation of which Talleyrand first drew the remark, that “*nations are not ruled according to enlightened views of their own interest, but according to the passions of their rulers;*” of which, whoever will read that strange compound of bombast, malignity, and intelligence, the Address of the Harrisburg Convention, shall be more convinced. If however it be true, that they now find some parts of their tariff have been carried a little too far, and are willing to sell such to us for a consideration; let it be well examined, whether it can ever prove a profitable business to hire people to buy of us, or to pay, by exchanging the colonial for foreign trade. Why must we ever meet the inimical acts of the United States with only concession? Why not look to their exports, and see if we may not better retaliate? We shall find in that table, that of their whole produce exported to all parts of the world, one-half is sent to British ports and consumers; and that there is scarcely an

article of all, which might not have been produced within the British dominions, equal in quantity, quality, and price, had a timely protection been given, which it is not yet too late to impose. Nine-tenths of their exports to the United Kingdom consist of cotton and tobacco, of which the former might in time be procured from India, the latter to a great extent from Canada. The export of tobacco from the United States to the British dominions, on the average of three years ending with 1827, was*,

	Hgds.
To the United Kingdom	26,281
Other British Ports	6,320
Total	32,601

Yet the only protection, which government can afford to colonial tobacco, is but *3d.* a pound; and even that is so imposed as to produce an inverse effect. For as no distinction is made between stemmed tobacco and unstemmed, and as the American comes in the former state, paying *3s.* a pound, the Canadian in the latter paying *2s. 9d.* our duties in fact give the United States a protection against our own colonies, equal to the difference of weight, perhaps one third, or *9d.* a pound, and against our own manufacturers, equal to the labour of stemming. A demonstration of counter-

* Watterston.

vailing measures is much more likely to bring the Americans to terms, than the sacrifice of the inter-colonial trade. Certainly, they are no less unequal to contend with a power, whose dominions are so vast and various as Great Britain, in commercial hostilities, than they proved in a maritime war; but partial success, in either case, is told with such vaunting on their part, and surprise on ours, that the contempt, so idly entertained before, seems now succeeded by as idle a fear.

That it is the selfish legislation of other nations which has driven the Americans to their tariffs. (*President's Message*, 1829). Nothing can be more truly enviable, than the character of the American government, in an American state paper. It may be a reproach to a country, that it prefers its own interest to another's; but we appeal to the statute book of both governments, whether it be one Great Britain has merited from the United States. Until 1808, for twenty-five years, their articles were received into the United Kingdom, under duties of protection against other foreigners, in most cases, and in some, against our own colonies; while they raised half of their whole revenues by duties on British productions, till 1807, and then excluded them altogether. And it is remarkable, that the laws of either government, enacting measures so different, alleged reasons as contrary in the preambles; the American tariff beginning,

“whereas it is necessary for the encouragement of manufactures, that duties be laid ;”* and the British statute declaring the protection given, to be, *“in order to encourage and promote the trade of the United States to this kingdom†.”* Even now, when the Americans have carried their duties upon British manufactures to such an extreme, as to have produced loud complaints and even threats of disobedience among themselves, they sell more of their home productions to British consumers, than to all other foreign nations together. The whole exports of native origin from the United States, on the average of three years ending with 1827, were‡,

To the British dominions	£.7,138,620
All other countries	6,270,541
	13,419,161

Their whole tonnage upon the same average was §—

	Tons.
To the British dominions	361,696
All other countries	602,944
	964,640

And the British dominions are as little incapable of producing every article of those exports, as British ships of carrying. The consumption of

* Act of Congress, July 4, 1789.

† Stat. 37 Geb. III, cap. 97.

‡ Watterston. § Id.

British articles in the United States bears a far different proportion to the whole exports from the British dominions ; and the amount of British tonnage employed by all the trade to that country is upon the same average, but 74,138 tons*. Surely, with these facts before them, the American government would never have carried so far their voluntary hostilities against the trade of Great Britain, unless they had learned to apply to her commercial power, that maxim, which the French have found no longer applicable to her conduct in war, "*plus a craindre par ce qu'elle peut, que par ce qu'elle fait.*"

That the Americans may re-establish a non-intercourse with the whole British colonies. (Report to Congress in 1827). They will probably first consider the results of their former non-intercourse, and inquire, whether there be any thing in the present condition of those colonies to render a measure, which proved not only harmless to us but advantageous in 1807, more formidable in 1830. They will first look to the Canadian canals, and find there new means of communication and supply opened, already sufficiently promising, without such further encouragement. There is no probability that the United States will enact a measure, which, if injurious to any but themselves, could never be enforced. Such threats, like the

* Watterston.

assertion in the same Report, that *the Canadas cannot increase their supply of articles for the West Indies*, are addressed to distant ears, and deceive not any on that side of the water. Within a few years, neither the West Indian nor Canadian provinces will want any thing they cannot procure from the mother country and each other. That the Americans may again open their ports to British ships from the West Indies, is much more to be apprehended, than any extension of the non-intercourse.

That the trade ought to flow in its natural channel. — If by natural channel be meant any but the most profitable, we dissent; if the most profitable be intended, we appeal to statistical returns, whether the present course be not such. Imagine the West Indian, the ship-owner, and Canadian, to be one and the same person; would it not be more profitable for him to saw his own wood in Canada, and use his own ship to transport it, than leave his ship, mill, seamen, and sawyers idle, and hire others to do their work? And can it make any difference to the commonweal and government, whether these be one person or several? Unless, perhaps, the Americans will do this work for nothing, or, what is no less improbable, the ship-owner can find some better.

That the capital and industry invested in the present system may be transferred to some other employment.—To what other? And how transferred? If a ship could be turned into a cotton-

mill, and fishermen and seamen to spinners, we might inquire whether more were wanted. But you can make nothing but a wreck or hulk of the one, and beggars or convicts of the others.

That it must be more profitable to buy at the cheaper market.—But that which is cheaper to the individual may be dearer to the community; and profit or loss is not determined by the balance of one partner, but the general account of the whole concern.

That commerce ought to flow in that channel to which individual enterprise may direct it. (*President's message of 1829.*)—Even the metaphor, on which the argument runs, is unjust, for it may suit individual enterprize to divert the stream from that channel, on which the mills of others ought by law to be turned. If commerce be like a watercourse, or if there be any argument, in applying to trade, terms peculiar to a river, we might as well say, that it ought to flow in that channel, which is most beneficial to all, whose fortunes are staked on the use of the stream, and whose lives on the defence of its banks. The application of this rule seems to be very different in different conditions. When a people, who have not yet removed the native forests out of sight from any one eminence in their country, so frame their laws of trade, as to divert their industry from agriculture, the most useful of occupations, to manufactures, only made profitable by excessive duties, which, by reducing their foreign commerce, diminish the demand for

articles of their easiest and most general production ; they must upon the whole be the losers, if foreign countries retaliate, immediately, and eventually, if they do not ; because they have preferred the less to the more beneficial employment. But to a people, whose objects of industry are so few, or population so great, whose resources so limited or so burthened with taxation, that production is in every department greatly beyond the demand, a system of exclusion is very different ; for here a less profitable employment is not preferred to a better, but new introduced, or the old extended. In such a state, to leave the direction of foreign trade to the enterprize of individuals, is like leaving to the enterprize of individuals the payment of taxes ; is giving to such individuals all the benefits of any empire, and leaving its burthens to their option. The exclusion of British manufactures from the United States, is therefore, we think, impolitic ; unless it be pretended, that in a country where the wages of every labourer are so high, employment cannot otherwise be found. The exclusion of American ships from the West Indies is necessary, unless it be shown what other employment the ship-owners can find, and what better the Canadians.

That the present system is robbing Peter to pay Paul. (Letter in the *Morning Journal*, 5th Jan. 1830.)—If to repeat a vulgar adage be any argument, it would be enough to reply that “exchange is no robbery ;” and no exchange can be fairer

than that between our Canadian and West Indian dominions. Or if this be robbery, Paul has always been no less robbed to pay Peter, for the West Indians have ever had a monopoly of the Canadian market, and sell in it more than they can in the American. Paul and Peter, then, being subjects of the same master, had better assist each other by the mutual exchange of their labours, than communicate their gifts to any Simon Magus, though he offer money instead of demanding.

That unless the West Indians buy of the cheapest carriers, they will produce and export less to the United Kingdom. — The value of the whole imports from the West Indies into the United Kingdom, in 1825, was 7,932,000*l.*, and in 1828 9,497,000*l.*

That a good understanding with America is desirable. — Certainly, and a good understanding of our own interests also ; and both are perfectly compatible. There is nothing unfriendly in refusing that country the West India trade, no more than their refusing us the coasting. We wish well to the Americans, but they must not quarrel with us for preferring ourselves and our colonies. Nor is the present system intended to injure them, nor should the comparisons here made be thought to imply such wishes ; but their situation and circumstances are such, that it is against their competition, that we are in most need of protection.

That the present system is not a free trade. —

Let us not be deceived by names, nor leave induction for theory, but examine returns, and compare results, and judge, whether the present be not a more profitable trade, than the change proposed. Or, if principles are required, what is the use and object of any trade, but to distribute the necessaries of life to all, and its comforts and conveniences to the greatest possible number,—of whom, but British subjects, for they should be the sole or chief care of the British government? Now if this object can be better answered, by suffering the West Indian to exchange labour and produce with the Americans, rather than with the Canadians, so let it be.

After considering all the circumstances and effects of the present system of colonial intercourse, the real state of the question seems to be this. Great Britain, having within the tropics colonies, which produce sugar, rum, and coffee, and require corn, fish, and wood; and having in the northern latitudes of America colonies, which produce corn, fish, and wood, and require sugar, rum, and coffee; and having, for the transport of these articles, more than sufficient ships and seamen, upon whose support also her power mainly depends; is deliberating, whether she shall continue so to regulate her laws of trade, that those two divisions of her empire, by exchanging the products of each other, may satisfy the

wants of both, and at the same time promote the maritime wealth and power of the whole ; or whether she shall make in those laws such an alteration, as may induce those dependencies, more or less, to prefer foreign ships, and supply themselves from a foreign country, lying between the two, and producing all the articles required by both, and requiring few or none produced by either. The faith of the imperial government is, in a manner, pledged to make no such change ; not merely because the present system was instituted with all the solemnities of a permanent law, but because also, ministers declared it, publicly to that foreign power, to be founded upon considerations general in their nature and conclusive, which no concessions must expect to alter, and for altering which all negotiation was declined. And if these assurances had been less solemn and repeated, or if their purport and effect has been misunderstood, the character of the imperial government, for resolution and constancy, is no less concerned, and its interest in the confidence of distant subjects no less at stake. For after the many and sudden and extreme changes of former years, the last hopes of those most implicated have been fastened on the permanence of the present regulations ; and if these too are again reversed, the immediate loss will be scarcely more injurious, than the uncertainty, which must follow, and the despondency, and mistrust of every future measure.

Upon reviewing our colonial policy for the last

seven and forty years, enough seems to have been done for experiment, enough already suffered from vacillation, enough from concession. In almost every arrangement with the Americans, some important interest has been sacrificed or neglected; which is not to be imputed to any invidious comparison of British ministers with theirs, but to the apparent fact, that nothing is made of more consequence in the United States, than negotiations with Great Britain, nothing of less in Great Britain, than negotiations with the United States. The statistical returns, which former changes have produced, present nothing to encourage that now proposed. On the contrary, we may compute the millions, which were probably lost by a measure, the recurrence to which, now has not even the pretext of necessity, heretofore its sole excuse. Upon considering the present state of the northern colonies, and the amount to which they have already carried the West India trade, and the efforts made among them further to extend it; it is clear, that injurious as the consequences of such a measure have hitherto been, they would now prove more destructive than ever. The sole disadvantage of the present system appears to be, that the West Indian pays something more for his supplies; an inconvenience which must daily diminish, because the demand is nearly stationary, and the supply fast increasing; and which, now the Mediterranean seas of Canada are about to be connected with the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic, will within

a few years have disappeared. It is in those colonies, that the West Indian already finds the best market, after that of the United Kingdom, particularly for his rum, molasses, and coarser sugars, which it is so economical to make, and so difficult to dispose of elsewhere; and that market, as the population increases, and means of communication are improved, cannot fail to be most rapidly extended. The shipping interest, of all perhaps the most important and the most depressed, are the while acquiring employment, which may be carried to the amount of 200,000 tons, and at the same time keeping embodied a corps of some 12,000 maritime militia upon that frontier, which, if not the most exposed, is perhaps the most threatened. It is in the West Indies, that the Canadians find the best market, after that of the United Kingdom, for the exuberant productions of their lands and waters. To them no commerce can be more necessary, none, in which the return is so immediate, and the profit so universally diffused. Every individual contributes and receives something of the articles mutually exchanged. Their imports are the most agreeable and useful of luxuries, which their habits and climate have made the very necessities of life, but which they cannot produce themselves. Their exports are such as require the smallest outlay, the rudest labour, the least risk, and are the sole objects of industry which those colonies afford.

In fine, therefore, the conclusion to be drawn

from the preceding reasons and statements seems to be, that the terms, upon which our colonial intercourse is now settled, are more profitable, than any which have before existed; and more profitable, than any the Americans can now offer. Brief and unfavourable as the time, since the present system was instituted, has been, the results produced are all that was desired, and more than expected. The prospect for the future offers every inducement to persevere, and gives further assurances of constancy and permanence to a policy, which above any other seems most adapted to secure the wealth, the affection, and integrity, of all provinces in the British empire.

The question has been here treated as one purely of economy, and the arguments limited to a strict deduction from facts; the larger views of general policy being left to those, whose ability to judge is greater, and whose judgment more important. And however bestowed the labour of compiling these statistics, its motive has been more derived from feeling than interest, and more from conviction than either. It is for government to decide, and for good subjects to obey, and endeavour to make the best of whatever may be the result.

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