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THE  
**HISTORICAL REGISTER**

OF THE  
**UNITED STATES.**

**PART II**  
FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR IN 1812,  
TO JANUARY 1, 1814.

EDITED BY  
***T. H. PALMER.***

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# ANNALS OF AMERICA.

## CHAPTER I.

§ 1. Introduction. § 2. Expedition of general Hull. § 3. March through the Indian country. § 4. Invasion of Canada. § 5. Reconnoitering on the Thames. § 6. Attack on the British advanced posts. § 7. Fall of Michilliackinac. § 8. Policy of Britain and America towards the Indias. § 9. Skirmishing. § 10. American supplies intercepted. § 11. Battle of Maguago. § 12. Canada evacuated. § 13. Detroit summone. § 14. Surrender of the army. § 15. Massacre at Chicago.

§ 1. **DURING** the last thirty years the United States has been increasing in population and wealth in a ratio unparalleled in history. With that period, its numbers have been more than doubled, while its forests have been rapidly changing into cultivated fields, and flourishing towns and villages rising, as if by magic, in the midst of the wilderness. These blessings, however, have not been entirely unalloyed. The rapid increase of wealth has introduced luxury, with its accompanying evils, and has, especially in the larger cities, considerably sullied our republican simplicity of manners. Our extensive commerce, too, has embroiled us with several of the European powers, and finally involved us in war; while the thirst for speculation which it has excited in almost every class, has undoubtedly had a demoralizing tendency, though not perhaps in the degree attributed to it by some politicians, who have placed solely to that account the want of public spirit and nationality, which has been charged to his country. The present war, whatever other evils it may have introduced, has certainly checked this evil. It has raised the character of the nation in the eyes of foreign powers, and erected an altar of national glory on which all local prejudices have been sacrificed, and politicians of every party have joined hand in hand to celebrate the triumphs of our country.

In commencing his work, we have chosen the declaration of war against Great Britain as a point from whence to set out. Historical events in general are so closely connected, that it is difficult to give a clear account of any particular period, without



extending the view considerably backward. This, however, is hardly necessary on the present occasion, as our intention is rather to present a digested statement of passing events, than to enter into historical discussions of their causes, and as we intend to publish, by way of introduction, a digest of state papers and of the proceedings of congress, from the establishment of the constitution, which will present an authentic view both of the foreign and domestic transactions of America, up to the present time.

A formal declaration of war against Great Britain, was passed by congress on the 18th of June, 1812\*, which was proclaimed by the president on the following day. At this time the whole naval force of the United States amounted only to seven frigates, and a few sloops of war and other small vessels. The

This year will form a memorable era in history, as the commencement of two wars, which seem destined to effect an important revolution in the world, to oppose limits to powers hitherto deemed invincible, and which threatened to reduce Christendom into two mighty empires.

France and England have waged a war nearly without intermission for twenty years, during which the former has been gradually enlarging its power by land, and the latter by sea, until at length the whole continent of Europe seemed to be prostrate at the foot of the one, while the rest of the other, that the ocean was her domain, and that not a sail but by permission spread, seemed true, almost without a hyperbole.

Though possessing boundless power on one element, however, both nations have been comparatively harmless on the other, and therefore neither has been able to make any serious impression on its adversary. In this state of things it would seem as if, inflated with the pride of power, and unable to vent their fury on each other, they had with one consent laid down the usual modes of warfare, and entered on a contest of rapacity and injustice toward all other powers. Decrees and orders have followed in rapid succession, and friendly neutrals have been oppressed and plundered without mercy.

While both parties have thus pursued the same track, each has lavished the most opprobrious epithets on the conduct of the other. The most plausible pretexts, however, have not been wanting for their own justification. The oppressor of the continent is fighting for the liberty of the seas, and the glorious object of the conflagration of Copenhagen, and the tyrant of the ocean, is the emancipation of Europe from the chains of its despot. It is with the utmost regret that both have been forced, through just and necessary retaliation, in a war waged, not for their individual glory, nor through the lust of power, but for the liberties of the world, to depart from the rules of civilized warfare, and to plunder indiscriminately friends and foes.

It is certainly a remarkable coincidence, that the Russia and American wars should have broken out within a few days of each other, and that nearly at the same moment Bonaparte should be threatening to plant his victorious eagles on the walls of St. Petersburg, and Great Britain boasting that she would sweep every American cock-boat from the ocean, little suspecting that, in a few short months, the invincible legions of France would be nearly annihilated by a herd of "barbarous Cossacs," and the British ensign be repeatedly struck to the "fir-built" frigates of a despicable foe.—It is sincerely to be hoped that both nations, and the world in general, will profit by the important lessons of this eventful year.

land forces were next to nothing. An army of 35,000 men, it is true, were authorized by congress, and the president was empowered to call out 100,000 militia; but the latter species of force, though strong in defensive operation, in offensive is perhaps worse than nothing, and in a free country like this, where a comfortable subsistence is so readily procured, the embodying of a large regular force is far from being the work of a day. Besides, some time is necessary to change the habits of men from civil to military; men brought up to ease and indolence cannot at once execute the duties and meet the perils of war. Considerable difficulties were experienced likewise in finding officers fitted for command. Many of the revolutionary characters were dead, and those who survived were almost too old for active service. In this state of things, can it be a subject of wonder that the raw forces of the United States, headed by officers who had never seen service, and accompanied by rash militia, without subordination, should experience some disasters in the commencement of their career? These disasters, however, have thrown no disgrace on the American name. On the contrary, the conduct of the American armies has reflected honour on their country, and all their reverses have been occasioned either by the rashness of undisciplined bravery, or by the misconduct or inexperience of their leaders.

From the disadvantages under which the army has laboured, the little navy of America has been entirely free. The previous embarrassments of commerce rendered it easy for our naval officers to supply themselves with a sufficient number of seamen, and with men too who had all their lives been engaged in similar pursuits, and under the most rigorous discipline; for we apprehend that but little difference exists as to discipline and general habits between a merchantman and a ship of war. With these circumstances in view, then, while we rejoice over the brilliant exploits of our naval heroes, let us not doubt but that the American army, when it has overcome the difficulties which have arisen from the long peace with which the United States has been blessed, and from the very nature of its free political institutions, will shew what can be achieved by freemen by land as well as by sea.

§ 2. At the time of the declaration of war, general Hull, governor of the territory of Michigan, was on his march through the Indian country in the state of Ohio, with an army of about 2000 men, destined for Detroit. In the preceding month of April the governor of Ohio had been ordered by the president to call out 1200 militia. This requisition was principally filled by volunteers, who rendezvoused at Dayton on the 29th of

April, and were shortly after placed under the command of general Hull. In the beginning of June the detachment advanced to Urbanna, where, on the tenth, they were joined by the 4th regiment of United States infantry. The following day they commenced their march through the wilderness.

§ 3. From Urbanna to the rapids of the Miami of the Lakes, the country belongs to the Indians, and is entirely destitute of roads. From the rapids to Detroit, along Lake Erie and Detroit river, are various settlements, principally of French Canadians. By the treaty of Greenville, concluded by general Wayne with the Indians in 1795, a number of tracts, generally six miles square, were ceded to the United States, which form chains of posts joining the lakes with the Ohio by the course of the navigable rivers and the portages connecting them. By the treaty a free passage both by land and water was to be allowed to the people of the United States, along these chains of posts. Forts or block-houses have been erected and garrisoned in most of these ceded tracts since the declaration of war, but at the time that the country was traversed by general Hull's detachment, no civilized being was to be seen between Urbanna and the rapids, a distance of at least 120 miles.

Towards the end of June the army arrived at the rapids, where a beautiful and romantic country suddenly opened to their view, enlivened by the signs of cultivation, and by the dwellings of their countrymen. Here a beam of joy animated every countenance, and gave fresh energy and fortitude to those who had undergone with difficulty the fatigues of a march at once gloomy and oppressive. On men who had just emerged from a dreary wilderness, unincumbered by a single hut reared by the hand of civilization, occupied by nought but Indians and beasts of prey, the change of scenery had a wonderful effect.

After stopping here one day for refreshment, the army recommenced their march, having previously loaded a small schooner with the hospital stores and officers' baggage, which was dispatched to Detroit by water, under a guard of a lieutenant and thirty men. Before they reached Detroit the army were informed of the capture of the schooner, and of the declaration of war. On the morning of the 5th of July, they arrived at Spring Wells, opposite Sandwich, within a few miles of Detroit, where they encamped.

§ 4. As general Hull had received, before his taking command of the army, discretionary powers to act offensively in case of war, the invasion of Canada was now determined on, and the utmost diligence was used in preparation for that event. The arms of the troops were repaired, a part of the ordnance

found in the fort at Detroit was mounted, and every exertion was used by the officers to impress on the minds of the soldiery the necessity of strict discipline and obedience to orders.

On the 12th of July the army crossed into Canada, with the exception of a small part of one company of militia, that refused to pass the river. They encamped at Sandwich, a little below Detroit, where a proclamation was issued by general Hull. The inhabitants fled in the utmost consternation on the approach of the army, but on receiving the proclamation, many of them returned to their homes.

§ 5. On the 14th a company of militia and a rifle corps, under colonel M<sup>c</sup>Arthur, were detached to reconnoitre the country. They penetrated to M<sup>c</sup>Gregor's mills, upon the river La Tranche, or Thames, a short distance from the field of battle where the British army was captured fifteen months afterwards by general Harrison. On the 17th, they returned to camp, having collected a great quantity of provisions, and a number of blankets, besides a considerable quantity of ammunition and other military stores.

That part of Upper Canada traversed by the detachment is described by one of the volunteers that composed it as extremely fertile and beautiful. The fields of wheat and Indian corn were remarkably fine; but as every male capable of bearing arms had been drafted for the defence of the province, vast quantities of the wheat remained ungathered.

§ 6. On the 16th, another reconnoitering party of 280 men, under colonel Cass, was despatched in an opposite direction, towards Fort Malden, where the British and Indians had concentrated their forces.

Malden, or Amherstburgh, is situated near the junction of Detroit river with lake Erie, about thirteen miles south from the camp of general Hull at Sandwich. The road lies along the river, and crosses two creeks, and the river Aux Canards, the latter about four miles from Malden. Cass's detachment found the British advanced posts in possession of a bridge over the Aux Canards. After examining their position, the colonel posted a company of riflemen near the bridge, and forded the river about five miles above with the remainder of his force, with the intention of surprising the British post. For that purpose the riflemen were instructed to commence firing, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, as soon as they should perceive their companions on the opposite side of the river. Unfortunately, however, being entirely destitute of guides, the detachment marched too near the bank of the river, and found their progress checked by a creek, which obliged them to make

a circuit of two or three miles. This gave the enemy time to make their arrangements, and prepare for their defence. On being attacked, however, they retreated to Malden, and left the bridge in possession of the detachment; but as colonel Cass had received no orders to keep possession of any post, but had been sent merely to reconnoitre, this bridge, which formed the principal obstruction between the American camp and Malden, was abandoned, and the detachment returned to camp.

§ 7. Meanwhile the main body of the Americans remained inactive at Sandwich. Not a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable for the attack of Malden; nor was it until the 7th of August that two 24 pounders and three howitzers were prepared. Previous to that day, however, a great change had taken place in the prospects of the Americans. The news of the surprise and capture of the island and fort of Michillimackinac\* by a combined force of British and Indians, which took place on the 17th of July, reached the army on the 28th. The surrender of this post is stated by general Hull to have "opened the northern hive of Indians," and to have induced those who had hitherto been friendly to pass over to the British.

§ 8. The policy observed by the British and American governments towards the Indians is of a diametrically opposite complexion. The American government is doing every thing in its power to civilize those unfortunate tribes who live within their limits, and to introduce among them the practice of agriculture and the mechanic arts, with a view to wean them from the hunter state, a state which is becoming daily more precarious and unprofitable from the increase of the population of the country, and which renders them extremely dangerous neighbours. The policy of the British, on the contrary, is to keep them in their hunter state, by which they not only supply a lucrative branch of trade, but furnish a powerful weapon in war. It is not to be wondered at, then, that the Indians, who delight in warfare, and all of whose habits are averse from the pursuits of civilized life, should cling to the British, and should view the Americans, from their rapid increase of population and strength, with jealousy and dislike. From this cause Canada has ever been a thorn in the side of the United States. While in possession of the French, by whom it was originally

\* Michillimackinac, or Makina, is a small island situated in the entrance of the strait between lakes Huron and Michigan. The fort is the most northern military post in the United States. Here a great fair was annually held, previous to the war, which was principally frequented by the Indian traders and the merchants of Montreal, for the purpose of exchanging the peltries of the uncivilized regions for the manufactures of Great Britain.

settled, the most powerful efforts were made by the British and provincial troops to gain possession of the country.

In the French war of 1756, after three wholly disastrous campaigns, and one of mingled disaster and success, the Americans, assisted by powerful British aid, at last succeeded in uniting Canada to the British dominions, and thereby restoring peace to their harassed frontiers. The same complaints against the possessors of Canada for exciting the Indians to hostility were urged in those days, that are now repeated against their successors the British, and by none was the use of this weapon more reprobated than by those who now employ it. Such is the different lights in which a subject appears when it operates for or against us!

By the fall of Michillimackinac, the junction of the Indians, and the reinforcements, both of militia and regulars, which the inactivity of the Americans enabled the British to collect for the defence of Malden, it soon became evident that no effective measures towards the reduction of Canada could be undertaken by this army.

§ 9. Several skirmishes happened between reconnoitering parties of the Americans and the Indian and British advanced posts towards the end of July and in the beginning of August, in which both sides claimed the victory. Most of these skirmishes took place near the river Aux Canards. By these parties it was discovered that the bridge over that river had been taken up by the British, except the sleepers; that a battery was erected at one end of it; and that the Queen Charlotte, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the Detroit river, at the mouth of the Aux Canards, about a mile from the bridge, with a gun-boat cruizing round her.

§ 10. In the mean time the Indians had crossed the Detroit, and cut off the communication of the American army with the state of Ohio, on which they depended for their supplies. As a small reinforcement of volunteers, with a quantity of provisions for the army, was daily expected by this route, a corps of 200 men was detached on the 4th of August to open the communication. This detachment fell into an ambuscade which was formed by the Indians at Brownstown, where they were totally defeated, and returned to camp without effecting the object of their expedition. About the same time an express arrived from general Hall, the American commander on the Niagara frontier, stating that there was no prospect of a co-operation from that quarter.

It being indispensably necessary to open the communication with Ohio, general Hull resolved to suspend the operations

against Malden, and to concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit. Unwilling, however, to abandon the inhabitants of Upper Canada, many of whom had accepted his protection under the proclamation, he established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little above Sandwich, where he left a garrison of 300 men. The remainder of the army recrossed the river, and encamped at Detroit, on the evening of the 7th and the morning of the 8th of August.

§ 11. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, 600 men were immediately detached under lieutenant-colonel Miller. This detachment consisted principally of the regular troops, and a corps of artilleryists, with one six pounder and a howitzer, a small body of cavalry, and detachments from the Ohio and Michigan volunteers. They marched from Detroit on the evening of the 8th of August, and on the 9th, about 4 P. M. the van guard was fired upon by an extensive line of British and Indians, at the lower part of Maguago, about 14 miles from Detroit. The van guard maintained their position in a most gallant manner, under a very heavy fire, until the line was formed, when the whole, excepting the rear guard, was brought into action. The enemy were formed behind a temporary breast-work of logs, the Indians extending in a thick wood on their left. The Americans advanced till within a small distance of the enemy, where they made a general discharge, and then proceeded with charged bayonets. The enemy maintained their position till forced at the point of the bayonet, when they commenced a retreat. They were pursued in the most vigorous manner, about two miles, when the pursuit was discontinued on account of the fatigue of the troops, the approach of evening, and the necessity of returning to take care of the wounded. The Indians in this battle were under the command of Tecumseh, and are said to have fought with great obstinacy.

The British regulars and volunteers in this action are stated in general Hull's despatch to have amounted to 400, with a larger number of Indians: the Americans were 600 in number. The American loss was 18 killed, and 64 wounded: the loss of the British was not ascertained. Four of their regulars were made prisoners, who stated that the commander, major Muir, and two subalterns, were wounded, and that 15 were killed and wounded of the 41st regiment; and as the militia and volunteers were in the severest part of the action, their loss must have been much greater. About 40 Indians were found dead on the field; and Tecumseh, their leader, was slightly wounded; the number of wounded Indians was not ascertained.

Nothing, however, but honour was gained by this victory. The communication was opened no farther than the points of their bayonets extended; and the necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably necessary. Boats had been sent from Detroit to transport the wounded thither by water; but the attempt was found impracticable. The boats being descried from Malden, the Hunter and Queen Charlotte were despatched in pursuit, and they were forced to convey the wounded from the boats into the woods, and there leave them until waggons could be procured from Detroit.

§ 12. It was now determined entirely to abandon Canada, and accordingly the fort at Sandwich was evacuated and destroyed.

Suspicious of treachery in the general, which had begun to arise immediately after the return of the army to Detroit, had now become very prevalent among the troops. A letter was written to governor Meigs of Ohio, by five of the principal officers, begging him instantly to make every effort to open the communication, and informing him of their fears and suspicions.

§ 13. On the 14th of August, another attempt was made to penetrate to the river Raisin, where it was understood the detachment from Ohio had arrived with the provisions. Colonels M'Arthur and Cass selected 400 of the most effective men, and set off by an upper route through the woods. The same day the British began to erect batteries opposite Detroit.

On the 15th, general Brock despatched two officers, with a flag of truce, from Sandwich, which had previously been taken possession of by the British, requiring the surrender of Fort Detroit to the arms of his Britannic majesty, and threatening that the Indians would be beyond his controul the moment the contest commenced. General Hull, in his answer, replied, that he was ready to meet any force which might be at his disposal, and any consequences which might result from his exertion of it. On the return of the flag of truce, the British commenced a fire upon Detroit from their batteries, which was vigorously returned from the American fort. The British continued to fire and throw shells till 10 o'clock that night, and at break of day the firing was renewed on both sides.

§ 14. During the night the ships of war had moved up the river, nearly as high as Detroit, and the British and Indians landed under cover of their guns, and were advancing towards the fort, when general Hull ordered a white flag to be hoisted, and the firing to be discontinued. The firing from the oppo-



site side was immediately stopt, and a parley was held, when articles of capitulation were agreed upon, by which fort Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, with all the public stores, arms, and every thing else of a public nature, were surrendered to the British. The militia and volunteers were to be permitted to go home, on condition of not serving again till exchanged. The detachment with the provisions at the river Raisin, and that under colonel M'Arthur, which had been sent to meet it, were included in the surrender. It was stipulated that private persons and property of every description should be respected.

Shortly after this capitulation took place, colonel M'Arthur's detachment returned to Detroit, their attempt to penetrate to the river Raisin having proved equally unsuccessful with the former ones. When they arrived within a mile of that place, they learnt its surrender, on which a council was held, when it was determined to send an officer to the fort with a flag of truce. In the evening he returned with two British officers, who informed them that they were prisoners of war. The detachment then marched to Detroit, where they stacked their arms on the citadel.

The day following the surrender of the army, a British officer arrived at the river Raisin, and delivered to captain Brush, the commander of the detachment from Ohio, copies of the capitulation, and of a letter from colonel M'Arthur, stating that his force was included in the surrender. At first these papers were considered forgeries, and the officer and his party were put into confinement; but their truth being confirmed by several soldiers who had made their escape from the garrison at Detroit, a council of the officers was held to consider what was proper to be done. This council decided that general Hull had no right to capitulate for them, and that they were not bound by his acts; and they accordingly concluded instantly to return to Ohio, and to carry with them all the public property that was possible. It was determined, however, that it would be improper to destroy those public stores that could not be carried off, as there were a number of American families who had taken refuge in the fort, and some soldiers, who were too sick to be removed, had to be left behind. It was likewise conceived, that the destruction of the stores might induce the enemy to deal more rigidly with the garrison at Detroit. These resolutions of the council were immediately carried into effect, and the detachment returned to the settlements.

Twenty-five pieces of iron, and 8 of brass ordnance fell into the hands of the British at Detroit; several of the latter being pieces which had been surrendered by Burgoyne on the same

day, 35 years before, viz. the 16th of August, 1777. Twenty-five hundred muskets and rifles, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, likewise fell into their hands.

The reasons stated by general Hull for this unfortunate surrender, were, the great inferiority of his force to that of the enemy, joined to the numerous band of Indians, who were daily increasing in number; the hazardous situation in which the detachment under colonels M'Arthur and Cass was placed; and the impossibility of furnishing his army with the necessary supplies of provisions, military stores, clothing, and comforts for the sick, on pack horses, through a wilderness of 200 miles, filled with hostile savages. The contest, he observes, could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. "A large portion," continues he, "of the brave and gallant officers and men I commanded, would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation."

§ 15. The disasters accompanying this expedition did not end here. On the change of prospects in general Hull's army in Canada, a messenger was despatched to Chicago, or fort Dearborn, situated near the south-west corner of lake Michigan, with orders to captain Heald, to evacuate that post, and proceed with his command, which consisted of 66 men, to Detroit, leaving it to his discretion to dispose of the public property as he thought proper. The neighbouring Indians, hearing that the goods in the factory were to be given to them, crowded into the fort from all quarters. On the 13th of August, captain Wells arrived from fort Wayne, with 30 Miamies, whom he had brought by request of general Hull, for the purpose of escorting the garrison to Detroit. The following day all the goods in the factory store were delivered to the Indians. The surplus arms and ammunition, however, and the spirituous liquors, were destroyed, lest the Indians should make a bad use of them if put into their possession.

On the 15th the garrison commenced their march for Detroit, a part of the Miamies being detached in front, and the remainder in the rear, as guards, under the direction of captain Wells. Their course lay along the beach of lake Michigan, the lake on their left, and a high sand bank on their right, distant about 100 yards. They had not proceeded two miles before they were fired on by the Indians from behind the bank, and an action immediately commenced; but the Miamies giving the garrison no assistance, in fifteen minutes thirty-eight soldiers, two women,

which have been borne to their worth by the unflattering tongue of those who have suffered by their enterprize\*.

§ 2. A few days previous to the declaration of war the frigates United States and Congress, and the brig Argus, received orders to rendezvous off Sandy Hook. On their arrival there on the 21st of June, they were joined by the brig Hornet and the President, from New York, and the same day commodore Rodgers, who commanded the squadron, having received official intelligence of the declaration of war, they put to sea in search of a British convoy which had sailed from Jamaica in the preceding month. The following night information was received of the convoy from an American brig, which had passed them four days before, and the squadron crowded sail in pursuit.

\* We are favoured with the following anecdote by a gentleman who was present when the circumstance related took place, he having been captured by the British squadron in a merchant vessel which sailed from England before the knowledge of the war.

In July, 1812, the privateer Dolphin, captain Endicot, of Salem, was captured by a British squadron under commodore Broke, and the captain and crew were put on board the Eolus, lord James Townshend. Endicot, during the short space of time that had elapsed from the declaration of war to his capture, had taken fifteen vessels, and by his enterprize, activity, and courage, had excited a considerable degree of asperity against him in the minds of the officers of the squadron, who had almost daily heard of his exploits. On the arrival of the crew on board the Eolus, they were treated with much haughtiness, and suffered some indignities. Captain Endicot, in particular, was treated with such haughty reserve, that for several days not a word was exchanged with him.

This treatment, however, was but of short duration. On board the Dolphin the British found more of their own countrymen prisoners than there were men in the privateer, and on examining them, they were equally surprised and mortified to hear the conduct of the Americans spoken of in the highest terms of approbation, to find that every thing had been done to render their situation comfortable, and that all on board had shared equally in every luxury that the vessel afforded. It was also discovered, that in a former cruize Endicot had captured off Nova Scotia a vessel in which there was an old woman passenger, who had \$ 800 in cash on board, and who appeared in great distress at the prospect of losing her property. Endicot had with difficulty soothed her, as she could hardly be persuaded that her little all was not irrecoverably gone. The crew, on hearing of the woman's fears, unanimously declared that not a cent of it should be touched. In the warmth of her gratitude for this liberality, she made the circumstance publicly known through the newspapers on her arrival in the United States.

The British officers, ashamed now of their past conduct, and mortified at being outdone in magnanimity by a privateersman, changed their conduct towards Endicot, and invited him to mess in the gun-room, where his frank, manly behaviour quickly secured him their highest respect. In speaking of privateers, he remarked to the British officers, that they were under the same regulations as national vessels, and that American privateering naturally differed from that of other nations, as it was generally considered in the United States as a national mode of carrying on the war, and hastening peace, by operating on the enemy in her most vulnerable point.

§ 3. Next morning, however, their course was altered by the appearance of the British frigate *Belvidera*, to which they immediately gave chase. The pursuit continued from six in the morning until past four in the afternoon, when the commodore's ship, the *President*, having got within gun-shot, commenced a fire with the bow chase guns, at the spars and rigging of the *Belvidera*, in hopes of crippling the one or the other so far as to enable them to get along side. The *Belvidera* returned the fire of the *President* with her stern guns, and the firing was kept up without intermission for about ten minutes, when one of the *President's* chase guns burst, by which unfortunate accident sixteen men were killed and wounded; among the wounded was commodore Rodgers, who had his leg fractured. By the bursting of the gun, and the explosion of the passing box, from which it was served with powder, both the main and fore-castle decks were so much shattered as to prevent the use of a chase gun on that side for some time. Orders were therefore given to veer the ship, and a broadside was fired, in the hope of disabling the spars of the enemy. This, however, did not succeed; but considerable damage was done to the rigging and the stern. The utmost exertion was now used on board the *President*, by wetting the sails, &c. to gain ground of her opponent, but without success. A constant firing was kept up on both sides, the *President* at times giving broadsides, until about seven o'clock, when the *Belvidera*, having cut away her anchors, started a number of water casks, and thrown overboard her boats and every thing that could be spared, began to gain ground, and to get out of the reach of the *President's* shot. The chase, however, was continued with all the sail our squadron could set, until about half past eleven, when it was given up as hopeless. Considerable injury was done to both vessels in this action. One of the first shots fired by the *President* killed one man and wounded six; the captain was severely wounded in the thigh by the breaking of the breeching of a carronade. On board the *President* there were three killed and nineteen wounded, the greater part by the bursting of the gun.

The squadron now resumed their course in pursuit of the convoy from Jamaica, but did not receive further intelligence of it until the 29th of June, when an American schooner was spoken on the western edge of the banks of Newfoundland, that had passed them two days before. On the 1st of July they fell in with quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, &c. which indicated that the convoy were not far distant. On the 9th they captured the British privateer *Dolphin*, which had passed the convoy the preceding evening. The pursuit was continued,

but without success, until the 13th, the squadron being then within eighteen or twenty hours sail of the British channel.

From this they steered for the island of Madeira, and thence passing the Azores stood for Newfoundland, and from the latter place by the way of Cape Sable to Boston, where they arrived on the 31st of August.

During a great part of this cruize the weather was such as to obscure every distant object: for several days the fog was so thick as to prevent the vessels of the squadron from seeing each other, even at cable's length asunder; in consequence of which, although they chased every vessel they saw, and brought to every thing they chased, with the exception of four vessels, they made only seven captures and one recapture. The cruize, however, was not barren of benefit to the country, as the knowledge of the squadron's being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing a large amount of American property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice. The vessels that escaped were, the *Belvidera*, another British frigate, by night, and two American privateers.

§ 4. The *Constitution* frigate, under the command of captain Hull, had received orders to join the squadron, and for that purpose sailed from Annapolis on the 5th of July. On the 17th, off Egg Harbour, four ships, apparently of war, were discovered from the mast-head to the northward, and in shore of the *Constitution*, and, in the belief that it was the American squadron waiting her arrival, all sail was made in chase of them. At four in the afternoon another ship was seen from the mast-head, to the north-east, standing for the *Constitution* with all sail set, the wind at this time being very light, which course she continued till sun-set, but was still too far off to distinguish signals. At ten in the evening, being then within six or eight miles of the strange sail, the private signal was made by the *Constitution*, and kept up nearly an hour; it not being answered, it was concluded that she and the ships in shore were enemy's vessels. Captain Hull immediately laid his vessel in the same course with the others, having determined to lie off till day-light to see what they were.

Next morning, about day-light, two frigates were seen from the *Constitution*, under her lee, one frigate four or five miles, and a line of battle ship, a frigate, a brig, and a schooner ten or twelve miles directly astern, all in chase, and coming up fast, they having a fine breeze, and it being nearly calm where the *Constitution* was. After sunrise, finding there was but little chance for escape, being then within five miles of three heavy

frigates, the Constitution was cleared for action, and two guns were run out at the cabin windows, and two at the ports on the quarter deck. At eight, four of the ships were nearly within gun-shot, some of them having six or eight boats ahead towing, with all their oars and sweeps out.

In this perilous situation, a new expedient was determined on, which was the happy means of saving the vessel. Being in only twenty-four fathoms water, boats were sent out ahead with anchors, and the ship warped up to them, by which they soon began to get ahead of the enemy. They, however, adopted the same plan, and all the boats from the furthest ships were sent to assist those nearest. For two days and nights were they chased by the squadron, sometimes with light winds, at others warping and towing in a calm, seldom much beyond gun-shot distance. On the morning of the 20th only three of the squadron could be seen from the mast-head, the nearest about 12 miles distant, directly astern. Having now a light breeze, all hands were employed in wetting the sails from the royals down, and the enemy was soon left far behind. The Constitution, not being able to find the United States squadron, now bore away for Boston, where she shortly after arrived.

§ 5. On the 2d of September the Constitution again put to sea, and on the 19th a vessel was discovered and chased, which at half-past 3, P. M. was made out to be a frigate. The ship was immediately cleared for action, and the chase, which proved to be the Guerriere, backed her main top-sail, waiting for her to come down. As soon as the Constitution was ready she bore down, with the intention of immediately coming to close action; but, on approaching within gun-shot, the Guerriere gave a broadside, and filled away and wore, giving a broadside on the other tack, but without effect, her shot falling short. Both vessels continued to manœuvre for three quarters of an hour, the Guerriere for the purpose of gaining a raking position, the Constitution for the purpose of closing and avoiding being raked. At last they closed and kept up a heavy fire for sixteen minutes, when the mizen-mast of the Guerriere fell overboard, and brought the ship up in the wind, which enabled the Constitution to take a raking position, and to sweep her enemy's deck by her grape-shot and musquetry. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for fifteen minutes longer, when, by the falling of the Guerriere's main and fore-mast, she became an unmanageable wreck. On seeing this the Constitution ceased firing, but shortly after, perceiving the colours still flying, she took a raking position within pistol shot, when they were immediately hauled down.

Early next morning a sail was discovered, and all was got ready for action, but she shortly after stood off again. At daylight the lieutenant on board the prize hailed the Constitution, and informed that she was in a sinking condition, and had four feet water in her hold. Accordingly the prisoners were removed, and at 3 P. M. she was set on fire, and shortly after blew up.

Captain Hull in his official letter states, that all his crew fought with the utmost bravery; from the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seaman, not a look of fear was seen. They all went into action giving three cheers, and requesting to be laid close along-side of the enemy. Their humanity was equal to their bravery. Captain Dacres, in his official letter, confesses their conduct to have been "that of a brave enemy; the greatest care being taken to prevent the men losing the slightest article, and the greatest attention being paid to the wounded."

On board the Constitution there were seven killed and seven wounded; on board the Guerriere, fifteen were killed, and sixty-three wounded, and twenty-four missing; the latter were stated by one of the officers to be away in prizes.

The Constitution rated 44 guns and carried 56; her complement of men is 450. The Guerriere rated 38 guns and carried 49, the odd gun shifting, which makes it equal to two; she had on board about 300 men.

§ 6. Meantime the other vessels of our little navy were not idle. The Essex sailed from New York on the 3d of July, and shortly after fell in with a fleet of transports, under convoy of a frigate and two bomb ketches, from Jamaica for Halifax, with troops. The Essex kept at a distance until night, when she cut off a brig with 150 soldiers on board, which was ransomed for a bill of exchange on London for 14,000 dollars. The men were disarmed, an exchange receipt taken for them, and they severally took an oath not to serve till exchanged. Captain Porter, in his letter to the secretary of the navy, lamented that he had not with him a sloop of war, that the ships of the convoy might have been kept in play while he engaged the frigate. "Had this been the case," says he, "instead of taking only 200 prisoners, I have not a doubt that we should have made prisoners of the whole of the troops, as well as the frigate's and transports' crews, which would have exceeded 2000 men."

The following day the Essex captured the brig Lamprey from Jamaica. Intelligence was received from her that the Thetis frigate, with specie and a large convoy for England, was to have sailed about the 26th of June, and that several running

ships were on the departure. Every exertion was therefore made to get off St. Augustine in time to fall in with them, but without effect, as fresh gales prevailed from the south-west, which increased until the 19th of July, when, by the violence of the tempest, they were compelled to run before the wind.

On the 13th of August, the *Essex* captured the *Alert* sloop of war, after an action of eight minutes. The *Alert*, which was said to have been sent out for the purpose of taking the *Hornet*, ran down on the weather quarter of the *Essex*, and gave three cheers, at the commencement of the action. When she struck her colours she had only three men wounded, but she had seven feet water in her hold, and was much cut to pieces. The *Essex* received not the slightest injury.

Being much embarrassed with his prisoners, who amounted, including those of the *Alert*, to 500, captain Porter concluded an arrangement with the captain of the *Alert*, for despatching that vessel as a cartel to carry the prisoners to a British port. Her guns were accordingly thrown overboard, and she was entrusted to the command of a lieutenant of the *Essex*, with orders to proceed to St. John's, Newfoundland. The commander of the British naval forces at that place, in a letter to the American secretary of the navy, strongly protests against this practice of immediately despatching captured vessels as cartels; "nevertheless, as a proof of respect for the liberality with which the captain of the *Essex* has acted, in more than one instance, towards the British subjects who have fallen into his hands," and through a desire to fulfil the engagements entered into by a British officer, he consented to the proposed exchange. The *Alert* is now in the American service.

On the afternoon of the 30th of August, a British frigate was perceived standing for the *Essex* under a press of sail. Porter was instantly prepared for action, and stood towards the frigate, and at the approach of night a light was hoisted for the purpose of preventing a separation. At nine a signal was made by the enemy, consisting of two flashes and one blue light, apparently about four miles distant. The *Essex* continued to stand for the point where the signal was seen until midnight, when, not getting sight of the enemy, she was hove to until daylight, on the presumption that the other had done the same, or at least would keep in the neighbourhood; but to the surprise and mortification of all on board, in the morning the coast was clear.

On the 4th of September, off the tail of St. George's bank, two ships of war were discovered to the southward, and a brig to the northward, the latter in chase of an American merchant-



man. The *Essex* gave chase to the brig, which attempted to pass her and join the other two, but was prevented, and compelled to stand to the north. She, however, escaped, the wind being light, by means of her sweeps. On the *Essex* showing her colours to the American vessel, the vessels to the southward fired signal guns, and made all sail in chase of her, and by 4 P. M. had gained her wake, and were coming up very fast. Calculating on escaping by some manœuvre in the night, captain Porter hoisted American colours, and fired a gun to windward. The ships still continued to gain on him, and the largest being considerably to windward of the other, and only five miles astern, captain Porter determined to heave about as soon as it grew dark, and, in the event of not being able to pass him, to fire a broadside and lay him on board, a resolution that was received with three cheers when proposed to the crew. At 20 minutes past seven she was accordingly hove about, but saw no more of the enemy; a circumstance which seems the more extraordinary, as a pistol was fired by accident on board the *Essex*, at the moment when she must have been at the shortest distance from them. On the 7th of September the *Essex* arrived in the Delaware.

§ 7. On the 8th of October the *President* frigate, in company with the *United States*, *Congress*, and *Argus*, sailed from Boston on a cruize. On the 13th the *United States* and *Argus* parted company with the squadron in a gale of wind. On the 15th the *President* and *Congress* captured the British Packet *Swallow*, having on board specie to the amount of nearly 200,000 dollars. On the 31st they captured a south sea ship, loaded with oil, one of two ships under convoy of the *Galatea* frigate, to which they gave chase, but lost her in a fog. During the remainder of this cruize they saw no other British vessel except the frigate *Nymph*, which escaped in the night. On the 31st of December they arrived at Boston, having been as far to the east as longitude 22°, and to the south as latitude 17° N., whence they ran down the trade wind to 50° W., and on their return to the north passed within 120 miles of Bermuda.

§ 8. The *Argus*, after parting from the squadron, proceeded to the coast of Brazil, sailed along the north coast from cape St. Roque to Surinam, thence to the windward of the West Indies, and thence in every direction between the Bermudas, Halifax, and the continent. After being out 96 days she arrived at New York, having made five prizes, valued at 200,000 dollars. During her cruize, she fell in with a British squadron, consisting of six sail, two of which were of the line, one of them

a remarkably fast sailer. The favour of the moon enabling them to chase by night as well as by day, the chase was continued for three days, without intermission, and under various circumstances, but by unremitting exertions the *Argus* was enabled to elude the pursuit. Pressed on all sides by the number of the enemy, and the baffling and unsettled state of the weather, she was at one time within musket shot of a 74, and at another nearly surrounded. While in this perilous situation she actually captured and manned one of her prizes.

§ 9. The United States was still more fortunate. On the 25th of October, off the Western islands, about two weeks after being separated from the squadron, she fell in with and captured, after an action of an hour and a half, the British frigate *Macedonian*, of the same class and strength with the *Guerriere*. The *Macedonian*, being to windward, had the advantage of choosing her distance, which was so great that for the first half hour the United States could not use her carronades, and at no time were they within musket or grape shot. To this circumstance, and a heavy swell which prevailed, is ascribed the great length of the action. In this contest, the superiority of the American gunnery was strikingly obvious. On board the *Macedonian* there were 36 killed and 68 wounded; she also lost her mizen mast, fore and main-top-masts, and main yard, and was much cut up in her hull. On board the United States there were only five killed and seven wounded; the damage sustained by the ship was not so much as to render her return to port necessary.

The United States arrived off New London with her prize on the 4th of December, and thence proceeded through the sound for New York.

An equal degree of liberality was displayed by commodore Decatur, as on a former occasion by captain Hull. All the property of the officers and men on board the *Macedonian* was given up; that claimed by captain Carden included a band of music and several casks of wine, which were valued at \$800, and paid for by the commodore.

While on this subject, we cannot forbear to mention an instance of generosity that occurred on this occasion among the common seamen. In the action with the *Macedonian* one of the carpenter's crew was killed, and left three children at the mercy of the world and of a worthless mother, who had abandoned them. On the arrival of the two frigates at New York, their grandfather went on board the United States to claim the property and wages of his son, when an enquiry into the circumstances of the family took place, and a plan was agreed upon by

the seamen for the relief of the orphans, by which § 800 were instantly collected for their maintenance and education, to be placed in the hands of suitable trustees for the purpose.

§ 10. But of all the victories which have been achieved by single vessels, perhaps the most brilliant is that which it has now become our most pleasing task to record. At the time of the declaration of war, the *Wasp* sloop of war, commanded by captain Jacob Jones, was on her passage from Europe, whither she had carried despatches to our ministers in England and France. She arrived in the Delaware a few weeks after that event, and sailed again on a cruize on the 13th of October. On the 16th she experienced a heavy gale, in which she lost her jib-boom and two men. On the evening of the following day, about eleven o'clock, in a clear moon-light evening, being then in the track of vessels passing from Bermuda to Halifax, she found herself near five strange sail, steering eastward. "As some of them seemed to be ships of war, it was thought better to get farther from them. The *Wasp*, therefore, hauled her wind, and having reached a few miles to windward, so as to escape or fight as the occasion might require, followed the strange sail through the night. At day-break on Sunday morning, captain Jones found that they were six large merchant ships, under convoy of a sloop of war, which proved to be the *Frolic*, captain Whinyates, from Honduras to England, with a convoy, strongly armed and manned, having all forty or fifty men, and two of them mounting sixteen guns each. He determined, however, to attack them, and, as there was a heavy swell of the sea, and the weather boisterous, got down his top-gallant yards, close reefed the top-sails, and prepared for action. About 11 o'clock the *Frolic* showed Spanish colours; and the *Wasp* immediately displayed the American ensign and pendant. At 32 minutes past 11, the *Wasp* came down to windward, on her larboard side, within about sixty yards, and hailed. The enemy hauled down the Spanish colours, hoisted the British ensign, and opened a fire of cannon and musketry—this the *Wasp* instantly returned; and, coming near to the enemy, the action became close and without intermission. In four or five minutes the main-top-mast of the *Wasp* was shot away, and falling down with the main-top-sail yard across the larboard fore and fore-top-sail braces, rendered her head yards unmanageable during the rest of the action. In two or three minutes more her gaff and mizen-top-gallant-mast were shot away. Still she continued a close and constant fire. The sea was so rough that the muzzles of the *Wasp's* guns were frequently in the water. The Americans, therefore, fired as the ship's side was going down, so that their shot went either on the enemy's deck or below it, while the

English fired as the vessel rose, and thus her balls chiefly touched the rigging, or were thrown away. The Wasp now shot ahead of the Frolic, raked her, and then resumed her position on her larboard bow. Her fire was now obviously attended with such success, and that of the Frolic so slackened, that captain Jones did not wish to board her, lest the roughness of the sea might endanger both vessels; but, in the course of a few minutes more, every brace of the Wasp was shot away, and her rigging so much torn to pieces, that he was afraid that his masts, being unsupported, would go by the board, and the Frolic be able to escape. He thought, therefore, the best chance of securing her was to board, and decide the contest at once. With this view he wore ship, and running down upon the enemy, the vessels struck each other; the Wasp's side rubbing along the Frolic's bow, so that her jib-boom came in between the main and mizen rigging of the Wasp, directly over the heads of captain Jones and the first lieutenant, Mr. Biddle, who were, at that moment, standing together near the captain. The Frolic lay so fair for raking that they decided not to board until they had given a closing broadside. Whilst they were loading for this, so near were the two vessels, that the rammers of the Wasp were pushed against the Frolic's sides, and two of her guns went through the bow ports of the Frolic, and swept the whole length of her deck. At this moment Jack Lang\*, a seaman of the Wasp, a gallant fellow, who had been once impressed by a British man of war, jumped on a gun with his cutlass, and was springing on board the Frolic; captain Jones wishing to fire again before boarding, called him down; but his impetuosity could not be restrained, and he was already on the bowsprit of the Frolic; when, seeing the ardour and enthusiasm of the Wasp's crew, lieutenant Biddle mounted on the hammock cloth to board. At this signal the crew followed, but lieutenant Biddle's feet got entangled in the rigging of the enemy's bowsprit, and midshipman Baker, in his ardour to get on board, laying hold of his coat, he fell back on the Wasp's deck. He sprang up, and as the next swell of the sea brought the Frolic nearer, he got on the bowsprit, where Lang and another seaman were already. He passed them on the forecastle, and was surprised at seeing not a single man alive on the Frolic's deck, except the seaman at the wheel and three officers. The deck was slippery with blood, and strewed with the bodies of the dead. As he went forward, the captain of the Frolic, with two other officers,

\* "John Lang is a native of New Brunswick in New Jersey. We mention, with great pleasure, the name of this brave American seaman, as a proof, that conspicuous valour is confined to no rank in the naval service.

who were standing on the quarter-deck, threw down their swords, and made an inclination of their bodies, denoting that they had surrendered. At this moment the colours were still flying, as probably none of the seamen of the Frolic would dare to go into the rigging for fear of the musquetry of the Wasp. Lieutenant Biddle, therefore, jumped into the rigging himself, and hauled down the British ensign, and possession was taken of the Frolic, in forty-three minutes after the first fire. She was in a shocking condition; the birth-deck particularly was crowded with dead and wounded, and dying; there being but a small proportion of the Frolic's crew who had escaped. Captain Jones instantly sent on board his surgeon's mate, and all the blankets of the Frolic were brought from her slop-room for the comfort of the wounded. To increase this confusion, both the Frolic's masts soon fell, covering the dead and every thing on deck, and she lay a complete wreck.

“ It now appeared that the Frolic mounted sixteen thirty-two pound carronades, four twelve pounders on the main-deck, and two twelve pound carronades. She was, therefore, superior to the Wasp, by exactly four twelve pounders. The number of men on board, as stated by the officers of the Frolic, was one hundred and ten—the number of seamen on board the Wasp was one hundred and two; but it could not be ascertained whether in this one hundred and ten were included marines and officers, for the Wasp had, beside her one hundred and two men, officers and marines, making the whole crew about one hundred and thirty-five. What is however decisive, as to their comparative force, is, that the officers of the Frolic acknowledged that they had as many men as they knew what to do with, and in fact the Wasp could have spared fifteen men. There was, therefore, on the most favourable view, at least an equality of men, and an inequality of four guns. The disparity of loss was much greater. The exact number of killed and wounded on board the Frolic could not be precisely determined; but from the observations of our officers, and the declarations of those of the Frolic, the number could not have been less than about thirty killed, including two officers, and of the wounded between forty and fifty; the captain and second lieutenant being of the number. The Wasp had five men killed and five slightly wounded.

“ All hands were now employed in clearing the deck, burying the dead, and taking care of the wounded, when captain Jones sent orders to lieutenant Biddle to proceed to Charleston, or any southern port of the United States; and as there was a suspicious sail to windward, the Wasp would continue her cruize.

The ships then parted. The suspicious sail was now coming down very fast. At first it was supposed that she was one of the convoy, who had all fled during the engagement, and the ship cleared for action; but the enemy, as she advanced, proved to be a seventy-four—the Poitiers, captain Beresford. She fired a shot over the Frolic; passed her; overtook the Wasp, the disabled state of whose rigging prevented her from escaping; and then returned to the Frolic, who could, of course, make no resistance. The Wasp and Frolic were carried into Bermuda.

“It is not the least praise due to captain Jones, that his account of this gallant action is perfectly modest and unostentatious. On his own share in the capture it is unnecessary to add any thing. ‘The courage and exertions of the officers and crew,’ he observes, ‘fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle’s active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rodgers and Booth and Mr. Rapp, showed, by the incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight, and every other officer, acted with a courage and promptitude highly honourable. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement; and though too weak to be at his division, remained upon deck, and showed by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.’\*”

§ 11. Meanwhile the utmost exertions were used on the lakes, in order to retrieve the disasters occasioned by the surrender of the force under general Hull. When that event took place, there was only one vessel of war owned by government on these waters, the brig Oneida, of 16 guns, on lake Ontario, commanded by lieutenant Woolsey. In the beginning of October, commodore Chauncey arrived at Sackett’s Harbour with a body of seamen, for the purpose of taking the command, and several schooners which had been employed as traders on the lake were instantly purchased and fitted out as vessels of war, and lieutenant Elliot was despatched to lake Erie to make arrangements there for building a naval force superior to that of the enemy. Elliot had not been many days at Black Rock, before an opportunity offered for a display of the most determined courage.

\* Port Folio.

§ 12. On the morning of the 8th of October, two armed British vessels, the brig *Detroit*, late the United States brig *Adams*, and the brig *Caledonia*, came down the lake from Malden, and anchored under the guns of fort Erie, which is situated nearly opposite, and within a few miles of Black Rock, on the Niagara, near where it leaves the lake. Elliot instantly determined to make an attack, and if possible get possession of them; and accordingly despatched an express to hasten the arrival of some sailors who were hourly expected. The sailors arrived about 12 o'clock, 50 in number. Though wearied with a march of 500 miles, they were only allowed till midnight to refresh themselves, when, being reinforced by 50 of the regular land forces, they put off from the mouth of Buffalo creek in two boats, with lieutenant Elliot at their head. Having rowed into the lake above the vessels, they drifted down with the current, till they were hailed by a centinel on board one of them, when they instantly sprang to their oars, and, closing in upon the vessels, they jumped on board, drove the British below, and in ten minutes from their getting along side, the prisoners were all secured, the topsails sheeted home, and the vessels under way. Unfortunately the wind was not sufficiently strong to carry them up against a strong current into the lake, and both ran aground. The *Caledonia*, however, was beached under the protection of one of the batteries at Black Rock, but the *Detroit* lay near the head of an island in the middle of Niagara river, exposed to the batteries and flying artillery of the enemy. The Americans returned their fire from the *Detroit*; but finding they could not bring the guns to bear with advantage, the prisoners were all got on shore, and the brig was deserted. In the course of the day several unsuccessful attempts were made by the British to board and destroy the military stores in the *Detroit*; but a considerable portion of them was secured by the Americans, after which she was set on fire and abandoned.

The *Caledonia* belonged to the N. W. Company, and was loaded with peltry, which was estimated at 150,000 dollars. The *Detroit* was a government vessel, which was captured at Detroit. She was laden with military stores, and had on board sixty men and thirty American prisoners. She mounted six guns. The *Caledonia* mounted two guns, and she had 12 men, and 10 prisoners on board. The loss of the Americans in this gallant exploit was only two killed and four wounded.

§ 13. The force stationed on the Niagara frontier consisted of about 5000 men, of whom the majority were militia, under the command of general Van Rensselaer. The ardour of the troops having been very much excited by the successful issue of

the enterprize of lieutenant Elliot, an invasion of Canada was determined on, and accordingly, on the morning of the 13th of October, the troops at fort Niagara and Grand Niagara, having been marched to Lewistown the preceding evening, the soldiers began to embark at the dawn of day, under cover of a battery mounting two 18 pounders and two sixes.

To accomplish their landing on the opposite shore, they had only 12 boats, each capable of conveying 20 men. The movement being soon discovered by the enemy, a brisk fire of musquetry was poured from the whole line of the Canada shore, aided by three batteries. In the face of this tremendous fire the first landing was effected by only 100 men, who were formed in a masterly manner by colonel Van Rensselaer, and soon succeeded in gaining the heights, and reinforcements arriving, the forts were stormed, and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction. Having received a reinforcement of several hundred Indians, however, the British shortly after recommenced a furious attack upon our troops, but they were quickly repulsed, and driven at the point of the bayonet.

At this interesting crisis, when the victory was already achieved by a handful of troops, the ardour of the militia, most of whom were still on the American side, suddenly abated. Either dismayed by the yells of the Indians, or by the appearance of reinforcements which were seen marching from fort George, they began to raise constitutional objections against crossing the lines, and at last absolutely refused to embark. Finding it impracticable to obtain the necessary reinforcements, the general ordered a retreat; but unfortunately the boats were dispersed, and many of the boatmen had fled, panic struck. This little band of heroes were consequently abandoned to their fate, and after a severe conflict with a very unequal force, they were under the necessity of surrendering. The loss of the Americans in this battle is variously stated, but is believed not to have exceeded 1000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of whom perhaps more than one-half were regulars. The loss of the enemy is not known, but must have been considerable, as they were twice repulsed and driven down the heights. General Brock, who commanded, was killed, and his aid-de-camp mortally wounded.

§ 14. General Van Rensselaer shortly after this affair resigned his command, which devolved on general Smyth, who, towards the end of November, projected another expedition, which was to have sailed from Buffaloe, at the head of the Niagara river. This expedition failed from the same cause which



brought about the disaster at Queenstown, the refusal of the militia to cross the lines.

Preparatory to the intended invasion, two parties were sent over, the one for the purpose of capturing a guard and destroying a bridge, below fort Erie, the other to spike the cannon in the enemy's batteries and some light artillery in the neighbourhood. The first party made some prisoners, but failed to destroy the bridge. The second, after rendering unserviceable the light artillery, separated by some misapprehension, and a part of them returned with the boats, leaving behind four officers, and 60 men. This small body, however, advanced to the batteries, attacked and took two of them in succession, spiked the cannon, and took a number of prisoners. They then retreated down the Niagara, where they found two boats, on board of which thirty of the privates, three officers, and all the prisoners embarked, leaving behind a captain and 30 men, who were captured by the British before the boats could return.

Meanwhile, as soon as day began to appear, all the troops in the neighbourhood were marched to the place of embarkation. A part of the detachment which had passed to the opposite shore having now returned and excited apprehensions for the residue, about 350 men under colonel Winder put off in boats for their relief, and a part of this force had landed, when a superior force with a piece of artillery appeared. A retreat was then ordered, which was effected with a loss of six killed and twenty-two wounded.

The general embarkation now commenced; but there not being a greater number of boats than would hold 1500 men, a council of officers was held, at which it was determined, that as positive orders had been received not to cross with less than 3000 men, it was inexpedient to make the attempt until a sufficient number of boats could be procured for the whole number to embark at once; dependence being still placed on the volunteering of the militia, it was thought that the actual number of volunteers could not be determined without an embarkation. The boats were accordingly moved a short distance up the river, and the troops disembarked.

An additional number of boats being procured, another embarkation took place on the morning of the first of December, but still no attempt was made to cross. After remaining in the boats a few hours, the troops were ordered to be withdrawn, and huts to be built for their winter-quarters.

Nothing could exceed the mortification of the troops on this occasion, nor indeed the disgust felt generally throughout the country. Proclamations had been issued by general

Smyth a short time previous, in which reflections had been cast on the conductors of the former enterprises against Canada, and the "men of New York" had been called on to join the army for a few weeks, and acquire glory and renown under his banners. A number of volunteers had been collected by this invitation, some of whom had come a considerable distance. Their mortification may easily be conceived!

General Smyth, in his official report, relies, for his justification, on the positive orders that he had received not to cross without 3000 men at once, and states that considerably less than 2000 was the extent of the force which could be depended upon. If this were the case, Smyth was certainly fully justified in declining the invasion; but it is to be lamented that measures for ascertaining the strength of the army could not have been adopted without such a waste of public patriotism, and such a degradation of the military character. Perhaps the public mind was never so much distracted, nor public confidence so much shaken as on this occasion.

### CHAPTER III.

§ 1. Military ardour of the western states. § 2. Fort Wayne relieved. § 3. Indian expeditions. § 4. March through the wilderness to Fort Defiance. § 5. Failure of Tupper's projected expedition. § 6. Expedition to the rapids of the Miami. § 7. Second expedition thither. § 8. Siege of Fort Harrison. § 9. Relief of that post. § 10. Expedition against the Peoria towns. § 11. Destruction of the Indian towns on the Wabash. § 12. Destruction of the Indian towns on the Mississinewa. § 13. Expedition against the Florida Indians.

§ 1. THE intelligence of the surrender of the army at Detroit, and of the exposure thereby of an extensive frontier to the ravages of Indian warfare, excited the most lively sensibility throughout the western country. The army destined for the relief and reinforcement of general Hull, had been ordered to rendezvous under general Harrison at Louisville and Red Banks early in August, and on the receipt of the intelligence of the capitulation, volunteers poured in so fast from all parts of Kentucky and Ohio, that it became more necessary to repress than to excite the ardour of the citizens, and vast numbers were discharged, and with difficulty prevailed on to return to their homes.

§ 2. The first operations of Harrison were directed to the relief of the frontier posts. He arrived at Piqua on the 2d of September with about 2500 men, whence, after completing his arrangements and receiving his military stores, he marched on the 5th for Fort Wayne, a post situated at the confluence of the rivers St. Mary and St. Joseph, which after their junction assume the name of the Miami of the Lake. This post had been for some time invested by hostile Indians, but, on hearing of the approach of Harrison they precipitately retreated, and the army arrived at the fort, without opposition, on the 12th of September.

§ 3. Not being able immediately to move on towards Detroit, on account of the want of proper supplies, Harrison determined to employ the intermediate time in breaking up the towns of the hostile Indian tribes. For this purpose two expeditions were organized, one of which was destined against the Miami towns, situated upon the Wabash, a little below its confluence with the Tippecanoe river, the other against the Potawatamic villages, which stand on a river called St. Joseph, which falls into lake Michigan. Both of these detachments were successful. Nine villages were burnt, and all the corn cut up and destroyed, in order that the want of provisions might force the Indians to leave that part of the country.

A few days after the return of the troops from those expeditions, general Winchester arrived at Fort Wayne with additional reinforcements. Winchester had been originally destined to the command of this army by the president; Harrison, who was governor of the Indiana territory, had merely been appointed a major-general by brevet by the governor of Kentucky, and by him placed in the command pro tempore, on account of the urgency of the occasion. On the arrival of Winchester, Harrison accordingly relinquished the command, and set out for his own territory with a body of mounted men, for the purpose of breaking up the Indian settlements in that quarter. He had not proceeded far, however, before he received, by express, a commission from the president, constituting him commander in chief of the north-western army, general Winchester to act as second in command. These counteracting measures are said to have been owing to the ignorance of the president, at the time of Winchester's appointment, of the brevet appointment of Harrison, and to the general expression of confidence in the latter by the Kentuckians having reached the seat of government shortly after. Fortunately the measure created neither jealousy nor dislike on either side.

General Harrison arrived at Fort Wayne, and resumed the command on the 23d of September. The day previous to his arrival general Winchester had marched for Fort Defiance with 2000 men, consisting of four hundred regulars, a brigade of Kentucky militia, and a troop of horse.

§ 4. In this part of the country, one of the greatest difficulties which an army has to surmount, is that which arises from the difficulty of transporting provisions and stores. At all seasons the route is wet and miry. The country, though somewhat level, is broken by innumerable little runs, which are generally dry, except during or immediately after a heavy rain, when they are frequently impassable until the subsiding of the water, which is generally from twelve to twenty-four hours. Another of the difficulties of transportation arises from the nature of the soil, which being generally a rich loam, free from stones and gravel, in many places a horse will mire for miles full leg deep every step.

To avoid the inconveniences and dangers of delay in traversing this wilderness, each soldier was furnished with provisions for six days, and general Harrison proceeded to Fort St. Mary's, in order to forward a detachment with supplies by the Au Glaise river, which affords a water conveyance for a considerable part of the way. This detachment was placed under the command of colonel Jennings.

The army being now in the centre of a country which presented every facility for the Indian mode of warfare, the utmost vigilance was necessary to prevent a surprise. The troops were formed into three divisions, viz. right and left wings and centre. Near the centre was the baggage, with a strong guard in front and rear. The wings marched about 60 or 100 yards distant from the centre. The front guard, which was generally about 300 strong, marched far enough in advance for their rear to be even with the front baggage guard, and were preceded by a company of spies, 40 in number, who were generally one or two miles in advance. The rear of the spies was covered by the horse.

So great were the obstructions occasioned by the underbrush, &c. on this march, that the army never advanced more than from six to ten miles a-day. They generally halted about three o'clock to lay out and fortify their encampment, which was done by forming round it a breastwork of logs and brush, of four or five feet in height. As soon as it was dark, small fires were kindled at the mouth of each tent, and large fires on the outside, about twenty paces from the breastwork.

On the 24th of September, being the third day of the march, the first trail was discovered; the number of Indians was supposed, however, to be only twelve or fifteen. They were pursued by the horse for six or eight miles, when, being pressed, they scattered, which rendered further pursuit impracticable. The following day, ensign Legett, of the regulars, and four volunteers, solicited and obtained permission to push on to Fort Defiance, then 25 miles distant, to discover the strength and situation of the enemy. These gallant youths, however, had too little experience of the Indian mode of warfare to conduct with success an enterprize so hazardous. They fell the same evening, being shot, tomahawked, and scalped, in the most barbarous manner, and in that condition were found by the spies on the 26th, about six miles in advance of the encampment for the night.

Early on the 27th the spies were sent out to bury the dead, supported by about 40 of the troop of horse. They had not advanced far before the flankers discovered a body of Indians in ambuscade, on each side of a small Indian trail, on which they supposed the spies would march. Ballard, the commander, however, aware of the Indian stratagems, had placed his men in two divisions, and marched one on each side of the trail. Finding their plan frustrated, the Indians left the ambuscade, and made for an elevation a short distance ahead. While forming on this elevation they were fired on by the spies, which they instantly returned, accompanied by a loud and terrific yell. The cavalry were then ordered to advance to the charge; but the Indians on their approach raised the retreat yell, and precipitately fled to the swamps and thickets. The pursuit was continued for two or three miles; the nature of the country, however, rendered it impossible to act with effect. In this skirmish only one American was wounded slightly in the ankle. The Indians were supposed to have suffered more severely, as several trails of blood were discernible. After interring the remains of their unfortunate brethren, the detachment returned and took their usual station in front of the army.

On the 28th, shortly after forming the line of march, four Indians were discovered and fired on by the spies, but without effect. A general engagement being now expected to take place, the order of battle was formed; but no enemy appearing, the line of march was recommenced, and the advanced part of the horse was ordered to push forward to ascertain whether or not a strong force of the enemy was at hand. In a short time a fresh trail of Indians was discovered. These indications of

the near approach to the enemy determined the general to cross the river as soon as possible, and accordingly, a tolerable ford being discovered by the troopers, the army passed over and encamped on the opposite shore. Here a fresh trail was perceived nearly equal to the one made by the army, which was supposed to be the trail made by Jennings' detachment, a supposition which was hailed with joy by the soldiers, whose provisions were now exhausted. Their joy, however, was but of short duration. A party of horse, who had been despatched down the trail, reported on their return, that it had been made by a large force of the enemy, whose encampment they had discovered about three miles below, two miles above Fort Defiance, with fires burning, war poles erected, and the bloody flag displayed.

Late on the night of the 29th, an express arrived from Jennings' regiment, stating that they were encamped on the Au Glaize, 40 miles above Fort Defiance, where Jennings had been ordered to erect a block-house. While engaged on this duty he had ascertained by his spies that Fort Defiance was in possession of the British and Indians, and he had therefore thought it imprudent to proceed further without reinforcements.

Early on the morning of the 30th, captain Garrard and 30 of his troopers were ordered to proceed with all possible despatch to Jennings' block-house, to escort a brigade of pack horses with provisions for the relief of the starving army. The detachment reached the block-house in the course of the following day, and, after resting a few hours, again set off as an escort to the provisions. They rejoined the army on the evening of the 2d of October, drenched with 36 hours incessant rain. This was a joyful evening to the soldiers. Provisions were now plenty, and the escort was accompanied by their beloved general Harrison, who resumed the command. During the absence of the detachment, the army had taken possession of Fort Defiance, the British and Indians having retreated down the river.

§ 5. On the 4th of October, general Harrison, having left at Fort Defiance the force which constituted the left wing of the army, under general Winchester, returned to the settlements to organize and bring up the centre and right wing. On the day of his departure, he ordered general Tupper, with the mounted troops under his command, consisting of nearly 1000 men, to proceed on an expedition to the Rapids. This expedition was never carried into effect. Its failure arose partly from the undisciplined state of the troops which had been selected for the enterprize, and partly from a disagreement which took place between their commander and general Winchester, who com-

manded at Fort Defiance\*. The inefficiency of raw militia was perhaps never more strikingly displayed than on this occasion.

General Tupper, after returning with his mounted volunteers to Urbanna, was despatched with the centre of the north-western army, consisting of a regiment of regulars, and the Ohio volunteers and militia, to Fort M<sup>c</sup>Arthur. The right wing, consisting of a brigade of Pennsylvania, and a brigade of Virginia militia, were stationed at Sandusky.

§ 6. Shortly after his arrival at Fort M<sup>c</sup>Arthur, general Tupper organized another expedition for the purpose of proceeding to the Rapids of the Miami. He left the fort on the 10th, with a force consisting of upwards of 600 men, the soldiers carrying provisions in their knapsacks for five days. On the evening of the 13th, being then about 13 miles from the rapids, an officer was despatched to examine the situation of the enemy, by whom it was ascertained that the British and Indians still occupied the settlements and fort at the rapids, and that the boats and vessels lay a little below.

In consequence of this information the detachment halted until sunset, when they proceeded to a ford about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles above the rapids, whence scouts were again detached to observe more particularly the situation and force of the enemy. The necessary information being soon received, the troops were ordered to cross the river, in order to attack the enemy at the dawn of day. Unfortunately, however, it was impracticable for the troops to cross. Every expedient that could be devised was unavailing, and a number of men who were swept down the rapids were with difficulty saved, with the loss of their muskets and ammunition.

In the morning, convinced that he was unable to get at the enemy, general Tupper ordered the spies to endeavour to decoy them over; and they accordingly proceeded down and discovered themselves. The stratagem, however, proved unsuccessful; for though a few Indians crossed the river, they were too cautious to be drawn within the lines. The main body was then marched down the Miami, opposite to the encampment of the enemy. They appeared in considerable disorder as the advanced guard opened from the woods. The British, who were in the vessels and boats, immediately slipped their cables and proceeded down the river. The Indian women were seen running off on the road leading to Detroit; the men commenced a fire at the detachment from their muskets and a four-pounder.

\* For Tupper's report of the causes of the failure of this expedition, and the proceedings of the court of enquiry on his conduct, see p. 134 of the Official Documents in this volume.

General Tupper having observed a number of mounted Indians proceeding up the river, and fearful of the camp being surprised, ordered the detachment to return. When within about a mile of the encampment, some of the soldiers, pressed probably by hunger, the provisions being now entirely exhausted, fired upon a drove of hogs, contrary to orders, and pursued them nearly half a mile; others left the ranks, and entered a field to gather corn. At this moment a body of mounted Indians came upon them, killed four men, and then commenced an attack on the rear of the right flank. The column being instantly thrown back, commenced a brisk fire, which caused the Indians to give ground; but they quickly rallied, and passing along the van-guard, made a violent charge upon the rear of the left column. This column was also thrown briskly back, and every attempt made to break the lines being resisted, in 20 minutes the Indians were driven from the field. Conceiving, however, that the charge of the mounted men was merely intended to throw the troops into disorder to make room for an attack of the foot, general Tupper ordered the right column to move up into marching order, lest that attack should be made on the right flank. This column had scarcely regained their position, when information was received that the Indians were crossing the river in considerable numbers. Tupper immediately ordered the left column to resume their marching order, and proceeded to the head of the right column, where he found that a number of Indians had crossed on horse-back, that some were still in the middle of the river, and about 200 on the opposite bank. A battalion was immediately ordered to advance and dislodge them. This attack was successful. The Indians were forced to retire, and several of them were shot from their horses while crossing the river.

The horses rode by the Indians in this attack are stated to have been much superior to those they had been accustomed to use. They were high and active; they were also supplied with pistols and holsters. A number of Indians were shot from their horses; but they were with great dexterity thrown on again, and carried off the field. Split Log led on several of the charges at the commencement of the attack, mounted on a well trained white horse, from which he sometimes fired, and at other times leaped from him behind a tree. It was supposed that he was wounded in the action, as another warrior rode the same horse in some of the last charges.

After the retreat of the Indians the detachment were compelled to return with all speed to Fort M'Arthur, as their provi-



sions were consumed, and they had to march 40 miles before there was a possibility of supply.

§ 7. On the 13th of December, general Tupper conducted another detachment to the rapids, consisting of between 1500 and 2000 men. On the east side of the Miami, a few miles above the rapids, a body of the enemy was discovered, consisting of 300 British regulars and 600 or 700 Indians. Having ascertained the position of the enemy, Tupper ordered a small detachment to advance and commence an attack, and then to retreat. This stratagem succeeded. The enemy pursued with impetuosity until they were nearly surrounded, and on being charged, were repulsed on all quarters with considerable slaughter, and put to flight. Fourteen or fifteen of the British, and seventy or eighty Indians, were left on the field. Many were likewise killed in swimming across the river, into which they precipitately plunged, that being their only means of escape.

§ 8. While these operations were carried on on the borders of lake Erie, several expeditions were set on foot against the Indian settlements in the Indiana and Illinois territories. A portion of the Kentucky volunteers, under general Hopkins, and a corps of Kentucky rangers, commanded by colonel Russel, were particularly destined for this service. This force having met at Vincennes, it was agreed that Hopkins should first proceed to the relief of Fort Harrison, a post higher up the Wabash, which was at that time invested by the Indians, and should then proceed to the Peoria Indian towns on the river Illinois, where he was to be met by the rangers under Russell. Another detachment, under captain Craig, was to join them at the same place. This last detachment was to march up the Illinois river.

Captain Taylor, the commander at Fort Harrison, having received information of the approach of the hostile Indians a short time before they made their appearance, had used every precaution that the smallness of his garrison would admit of. The first hostile symptoms appeared on the evening of the 3d of September, when two young men, who had been employed a short distance from the fort, were shot and scalped, and were found in that condition the next morning by a small party that had been sent out to seek them. This circumstance caused them to redouble their vigilance, and the officers of the guard were directed to walk the round all night, in order if possible to prevent any surprize.

About 11 o'clock on the evening of the 4th, the garrison being alarmed by the firing of one of the centinels, every man instantly flew to his post. In a few minutes the cry of fire added

to the alarm ; when it was discovered that the lower block-house, in which had been deposited the property of the contractor, had been fired by the Indians. Such was the darkness of the night, that although the upper part of the building was occupied by a corporal's guard as an alarm post, yet the Indians succeeded in firing it undiscovered, and unfortunately, a few minutes after the discovery of the fire, it communicated to a quantity of whiskey that had been deposited there, and immediately ascended to the roof, baffling every effort that was made to extinguish it. As the block-house adjoined the barracks, which constituted part of the fortifications, most of the men gave themselves up for lost ; and indeed the raging of the fire, the yells of the Indians, and the cries of the women and children (who had taken refuge in the fort), were sufficient to appal the stoutest heart. Happily, the presence of mind of the commander never forsook him. He instantly stationed a part of his men on the roof of the barracks, with orders to tear off that part adjoining the block-house, while the remainder kept up a constant fire on the Indians from another block-house and two bastions. The roof was torn off under a shower of bullets from without, by which, however, only one man was killed and two wounded.

By this success the soldiers were inspired with firmness, and now used such exertions, that before day they had not only extinguished the fire, but raised a breast-work five or six feet high in the gap occasioned by the burning of the block-house, although the Indians continued to pour in a heavy fire of ball and showers of arrows during the whole time the attack lasted (which was seven hours), in every part of the parade.

On the first appearance of the fire, two of the soldiers had, in despair, jumped the pickets. One of them returned about an hour before day, and, running up towards the gate, begged for God's sake that it might be opened. On suspicion that this was an Indian stratagem, he was fired at. He then ran to the other bastion, where, his voice being known, he was directed to lie down till day-light behind an empty barrel that happened to be outside of the pickets. This poor fellow was shockingly wounded, and his companion cut to pieces by the Indians.

After keeping up a constant fire till six in the morning, which after day light was returned with considerable effect by the garrison, the Indians retreated out of reach of the guns. They then drove together all the horses and hogs in the neighbourhood, and shot them in sight of their owners. The whole of the horned cattle they succeeded in carrying off.

In this attack the Americans had but three killed, and three wounded, including the two that jumped the pickets. The In-

dian loss was supposed to be considerable, but as they always carry off both their dead and wounded, the amount could not be ascertained. At the moment of the attack there were only fifteen effective men in the garrison, the others being either sick or convalescent.

§ 9. The Indians, disheartened by this failure, made no further attempt on the fort, but the garrison still remained in a perilous situation, as the greater part of their provisions had been destroyed by the fire, and the loss of their stock prevented future supplies. Captain Taylor therefore attempted to send, by night, two men in a canoe down the river to Vincennes, to make known his situation, but they were forced to return, the river being found too well guarded. The Indians had made a fire on the bank of the river, a short distance below the garrison, which gave them an opportunity of seeing any craft that might attempt to pass, with a canoe ready below to intercept it. A more fortunate attempt was made by land, and the garrison was immediately after relieved by the force under general Hopkins, consisting of nearly 4000 men.

§ 10. After the relief of Fort Harrison, Hopkins began his preparations for his expedition against the Peoria towns. They commenced their march on the morning of the 15th of October, and continued it for four days in a direction nearly north. But here again the spirit of insubordination began to show itself. The general states in his official despatch, that having ordered a halt in the afternoon of the 4th day, in a fine piece of grass, for the purpose of refreshing the horses, he was addressed by one of his majors, in the most rude and dictatorial manner, requiring him instantly to resume his march, or his battalion would break from the army and return. Of the reply of the general to this modest request we are not informed. Next evening, however, an event took place, which seems to have spread the spirit of discontent through the whole detachment. A violent gust of wind having arisen about sun-set, just as the troops had encamped, the Indians set fire to the prairie all around them, which drove furiously on the camp. They succeeded, however, in protecting themselves by firing the grass around the encampment.

Next morning, in consequence of the discontent that prevailed, the general called a council of his officers, to whom he stated his apprehensions, the expectations of the country, and the disgrace attending the failure of the expedition; and, on the other hand, the exhausted state of the horses, and the want of provisions. He then requested the commandants of each regiment to convene the whole of the officers belonging to it, and to take

fully the sense of the army on the measures to be pursued ; adding, that if 500 volunteers turned out he would put himself at their head, and proceed in quest of the Indian towns, and the rest of the army might return to Fort Harrison. In less than an hour the report was made almost unanimously to return. In vain did the general request that he might dictate the course for that day only. His authority was now at an end ; and all the efforts of the officers were necessary to restore order in the ranks, and to conduct the retreat without danger from the surrounding though unseen foe.

Though this expedition returned almost without obtaining the sight of an enemy, yet it was not altogether unproductive of benefit. The Indians of the neighbouring towns, hearing of its approach, had marched the greater part of their warriors to meet it, leaving their villages in a defenceless condition. In this state they were found by colonel Russell, who had marched upon them in the expectation of meeting with Hopkins' army, and his detachment attacked and defeated those who had been left behind. Having driven them into a swamp, through which the rangers pursued them for three miles, up to their waists in mud and water, he returned and burnt their towns, and destroyed their corn. The number of warriors who advanced to meet Hopkins from those towns is stated to have amounted to 700 ; Russell's force consisted of not more than 400 men. A considerable number of Indians were killed in this attack. On the part of the Americans there were only four wounded, none of them mortally.

Craig's force was still smaller than that under Russell ; it is stated to have consisted of not more than 80 men. With this small body he marched up the Illinois river, twenty miles above the town destroyed by Russell. Here he attacked an Indian settlement, which he totally destroyed, with all the improvements, and took 42 prisoners, one of them an Englishman, and a large collection of furs. He returned with his prisoners and booty, without the loss of a man.

§ 11. In the month of November another Indian expedition was undertaken by general Hopkins, with about 1250 men. This was directed against the towns on the Wabash, where the battle of Tippecanoe had been fought about twelve months before. Having left Fort Harrison on the 11th, accompanied with boats for the transportation of provisions, forage, and military stores, Hopkins arrived at the Prophet's town on the 19th, without interruption. Early in the morning of that day, 300 men were detached to surprise the Winebago town, on Ponce Passu creek, a short distance below the Prophet's. Having sur-

rounded it about the break of day, they were surprised to find it evacuated. The party, accordingly, after destroying it, rejoined the main body at the Prophet's town.

For three days Hopkins' detachment was employed in achieving the complete destruction of the Prophet's town, and the large Kickapoo village adjoining, the former consisting of 40 and the latter of 160 cabins and huts. They likewise destroyed all their cultivated fields, fences, &c. and constructed works for the defence of the boats and of the encampment.

On the 21st a reconnoitering party were attacked by a body of Indians, and one of their number killed. The following day 60 horsemen were despatched to bury their comrade, and gain a better knowledge of the ground, but they unfortunately fell into an ambuscade, in which 18 of the party were killed, wounded, or missing. This party, on their return, brought information of a large assemblage of the enemy, who, encouraged by the strength of their camp, appeared to be waiting an attack.—Every preparation was accordingly made to march early next morning, to engage the enemy. A violent fall of snow, however, prevented the movement on the 23d; and the camp was found abandoned on the following day. The position which the Indians had thus abandoned is spoken of as having been remarkably strong. The Ponce Passu, a deep rapid creek, was in their rear, running in a semicircle; in front was a bluff, 100 feet high, almost perpendicular, and only to be penetrated by three steep ravines.

On the return of the troops to camp, the river was found so full of ice, as to alarm them for the return of the boats. Hopkins had intended to have spent one week more in endeavouring to find the Indian camps; but the shoeless, shirtless state of the troops, now clad in the remnants of their summer dress; a river full of ice; the hills covered with snow; and, above all, the uncertainty of finding an enemy; all these circumstances determined him to return. They accordingly set out on the 25th, and in a few days arrived at Fort Harrison, having completed a march of upwards of 100 miles into the Indian country, which is totally devoid of roads, and destroyed three of their principal towns, in the space of less than twenty days.

The last Indian expedition of which mention is made, in this quarter, is one which was commanded by colonel Campbell, consisting of 600 men, which marched from Greenville (Ohio) against the towns on the Mississinewa, a branch of the Wabash.

§ 12. On the 17th of December, after marching all night, Campbell arrived at one of the towns about day-break, which he instantly attacked, and the Indians were driven across the Mississinewa river, with the loss of 7 killed and 37 prisoners. Only

one American was killed and one wounded in this skirmish.— After securing the prisoners, a part of the detachment was despatched down the river, who returned the same day, having burned three villages without resistance. They then encamped on the ground where the first village stood.

The following morning, a little before day-light, the camp was attacked by a body of Indians, supposed to be about 300. They commenced their attack on the right, with a horrid yell. After a desperate conflict of about three quarters of an hour, a charge was made by the cavalry, which forced the Indians to retreat, leaving 40 killed on the field. In this affair the Americans had eight killed, and twenty-five or thirty wounded.

Another attack was anticipated, as information was received that Tecumseh, with four or five hundred warriors, was only fifteen miles from the scene of action; but reinforcements shortly after arriving from Greenville, they effected their retreat without molestation.

§ 13. A small body of Georgia volunteers had been collected early in August, for an expedition against the Indians on our southern border, where considerable depredations had been committed. Several unforeseen circumstances, however, prevented its being carried into effect, until the 24th of September, when the detachment, consisting of only 117 men, with twelve horses, marched from St. John's, under the command of colonel Newnan, against the Lotchaway towns in East Florida. This small force carried with them only four days' provisions.

The detachment left St. John's in the evening, marching in Indian file, with a small party in front and in rear, the openness of the country rendering it unnecessary to employ men on the right and left. The encampment at nights, there being three companies, was in the form of a triangle, with the baggage in the centre; the men lying with their clothes on, their feet pointing outward, and their firelocks in their arms. In case of an attack, the officers were instructed to bring up their companies upon the right and left of the company fronting the enemy, and to follow the Indian mode of fighting until ordered to charge.

In case of meeting the enemy on the march, the first company, which consisted of riflemen, was instructed to file off to the right, the centre company to advance and form to the front in single rank, and the company in the rear to file off to the left: the whole then to advance in the form of a crescent, and endeavour to encircle the enemy.

On the morning of the fourth day, when within a few miles of the Indian towns, the party in advance discovered a body of Indians marching along the path meeting them. The compa-

nies were immediately ordered to advance according to the previous instructions, which appeared exactly suited to the situation in which the enemy was found, and Newnan placed himself at the head of the centre company. The Indians were now seen falling back and making preparations for battle, by unslinging their packs, trimming their rifles, and forming; and the Americans continued to advance, taking advantage of the trees in their progress, until within musket-shot of the enemy, when many of the Indians began to fire. The charge being now ordered, the enemy were forced precipitately to retire, and take refuge in a swamp. Unfortunately the riflemen, in filing to the right, inadvertently took too great a circuit, by which means a small swamp was interposed between them and the Indians, which rendered the victory less decisive than it would have been had the whole charged together before the Indians dispersed. The action, including the skirmishing on the flanks, lasted two hours and a half, the Indians having frequently attempted to outflank and get in the rear of the detachment, but were always repulsed, by the companies extending to the right and left. The detachment had one killed and nine wounded in this affair. The loss of the Indians was more considerable. Among the killed was their king Payne.

The Americans remained on the ground to watch the motions of the Indians, who were now seen near the swamp, painting themselves, and in consultation, which indicated an intention of renewing the combat. Accordingly half an hour before sun-set, having obtained a considerable reinforcement of negroes and Indians from their towns, they commenced the most horrid yells, imitating the cries and noise of almost every animal of the forest, their chiefs advancing in front in a stooping serpentine manner, and making the most wild and frantic gestures, until they approached within two hundred yards, when they commenced firing. The soldiers remained perfectly still and steady behind logs and trees, until the enemy had approached somewhat nearer, when a brisk and well directed fire soon drove them back to their original ground. The action lasted until eight o'clock, when the enemy were completely repulsed. Two men were killed and one wounded; the enemy carried off several of their men before it was dark—after which all firing was at the spot from whence the flash arose. After thus fighting all day, the detachment had to work throughout the whole of the night, and by day-light had completed a tolerable breast-work of logs and earth, with port-holes.

As soon as it was dark, one of the officers was despatched to St. John's for reinforcements and provisions, and six of the men

took the liberty to accompany him, taking with them some of the best horses.

For two days succeeding the battle, nothing was seen nor heard of the enemy ; but on the evening of the third day they commenced firing at their works at long distance, and renewed it every day for five or six days, but without effect.

Seven or eight days having elapsed since the express had left them, hunger was staring them in the face, and they were now reduced to the necessity of eating one of the horses ; they had no surgeon to dress the wounded, and apprehensions were entertained that the enemy would receive reinforcements from Augustine, or the Makasukie Indians. Expecting relief, however, every hour, Newnan was unwilling to leave the breast-work while a horse was left to eat ; but one of the captains declared that he was determined to set off with his company ; and many of the men, giving up all hopes of relief, talked of deserting in the night rather than perish or fall a sacrifice to the merciless negroes and Indians, whom they were taught to believe would surround them in great numbers in a few days.

In this trying situation, the few remaining horses being shot down, and the number of sick daily increasing, Newnan reluctantly assented to leave the works, and directed the litters to be prepared to carry the wounded. About nine in the evening they commenced their distressing march, carrying five wounded men in litters, and supporting two or three more ; and had not proceeded more than eight miles, when the men became perfectly exhausted from hunger and fatigue, and were unable to carry the wounded any farther.

This hasty retreat was peculiarly unfortunate ; for they had not left the breast-work more than two hours when twenty-five horsemen with provisions, arrived to their relief, on a different road from the one they had taken, but, finding the place deserted, they returned to St. John's, two men that had been despatched on the path the horsemen came, by some means or other missing them. They again constructed a plan of defence, and a sergeant-major with one private was despatched to Picalata, to learn what had occasioned the delay of the supplies.

Here once more the spirit of insubordination began to display itself, and at three o'clock in the afternoon, Newnan was compelled again to order the march. They had scarcely marched five miles, however, before the front of the detachment discovered the heads of several Indians on both sides of the path, from among some pine trees that had been laid prostrate by a hurricane ; at the same instant, the enemy fired upon the advanced party, and shot down four of them, one of whom died on the



spot, and two survived but a few days. The moment the firing was heard, the detachment was ordered to charge, and the Indians were completely defeated in 15 minutes, many dropping their guns, and all running off without attempting to rally. Four of them were left dead on the field. The detachment lay on the battle ground all night, and next day marched five miles, when they again threw up breast-works between two ponds, living upon gophers, alligators, and palmetto stocks, until the arrival of the provisions and horses, when they were enabled to proceed to St. John's. The number of Indians in the first engagement was from 75 to 100. In the second engagement their number (including negroes, who are their best soldiers) was double that of the Americans; and in the third engagement there appeared to be 50, which was nearly equal to their force, after deducting the sick and wounded. The number of killed and wounded among the Indians must have been at least fifty.

Another expedition of volunteers was sent against those Indians from the state of Tennessee in the month of February, 1813, by whom they were defeated in three engagements, and 38 killed, a number wounded, and seven taken prisoners. The detachment then burnt their settlements to the number of 386 houses, destroyed several thousand bushels of corn, and took 400 horses, and about the same number of cattle. The Indians entirely disappeared before the detachment left the settlement. In the three engagements the Americans lost only one killed and seven wounded.

We have never seen the real value of the militia, and at the same time their total inadequacy in their present state, more strikingly exemplified than in the official narratives of those Indian expeditions. The *materiel*, the stamina of the militia, cannot be surpassed; but as to all other military requisites they are totally worthless. When we see them encountering fatigue, cold, and hunger, without a murmur, and displaying in battle the most undaunted bravery and resolution, we cannot but lament that all those valuable qualities should be rendered of none effect by the total want of subordination and discipline, without which zeal, numbers, and courage avail nothing.

It rests with the national legislature to apply the remedy to this evil. The constitution has clothed them with the power, and it is to be hoped they will no longer refuse to make use of it. The system ought either to be abolished altogether, as a most extravagant waste of time or money, or it ought to be made (and it is surely capable of being made so) a powerful and certain means of national defence, by a proper system of national instruction.

## CHAPTER IV.

§ 1. The Bonne Citoyenne challenged. § 2. Capture and destruction of the Java. § 3. Capture and destruction of the Peacock. § 4. Cruise of the Chesapeake. § 5. Captured by the Shannon. § 6. Capture of the Argus. § 7. Capture of the Boxer. § 8. Cruise of the President and Congress. § 9. Cruise of the Essex. § 10. Loss of national vessels. § 11. American privateers. § 12. The Rolla. § 13. The Comet. § 14. The General Armstrong. § 15. The Decatur.

§ 1. ON the arrival of the Constitution frigate at Boston, after the capture of the Guerriere, captain Hull received permission to remain on shore for the settlement of his affairs, and commodore Bainbridge was appointed to command in his room. After undergoing the necessary repairs, she sailed on a cruise to the East Indies, towards the end of October, accompanied by the Hornet sloop of war, commanded by captain Lawrence; but in running down the coast of the Brazils, they found the Bonne Citoyenne, a British ship of war, loaded with specie, lying in the port of St. Salvador. The Bonne Citoyenne was a larger vessel, and had a greater force both in guns and men than the Hornet; but so eager was captain Lawrence to engage her, that he sent, through the American consul at St. Salvador, a challenge to her commander, captain Greene, pledging his honour that neither the Constitution, nor any other American vessel, should interfere. This pledge was confirmed by commodore Bainbridge, who, to show his sincerity, left the Hornet before St. Salvador, and sailed on another cruise. The commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, however, did not see fit to accept of the challenge, but suffered himself to be blockaded by the Hornet.

§ 2. ON the 29th of December, a few days after leaving St. Salvador, about ten leagues from the coast of Brazil, at nine in the morning, Bainbridge discovered two strange sail, one of which stood in for the land, the other off shore towards the Constitution. At half past eleven, the private signal for the day being made, and not answered, it was concluded she was an enemy. The American ensign was hoisted at twelve, and shortly after the enemy hoisted her colours. About half past one, the vessel being perceived to be a British frigate, Bainbridge tacked ship, and stood towards her, when she immediately bore down with the intention of raking, which was avoid-

ed by wearing. At two, the enemy being then within a half a mile of the Constitution, and to windward, and having hauled down her colours except the union, Bainbridge ordered a gun to be fired ahead of her to make her show her colours, which was followed by a broadside ; on which the enemy hoisted her colours, and immediately returned the fire.

A general action now commenced with round and grape-shot, the British frigate keeping at a much greater distance than the commodore wished, but he could not bring her to closer action without exposing his ship to being raked. A number of manœuvres were now made by both vessels to obtain a raking position, during which the wheel of the Constitution was shot entirely away. Bainbridge now determined to close with the enemy, notwithstanding the danger of being raked, and accordingly set the fore and mainsail, and luffed up close to her.

About 4 o'clock, the fire of the enemy being completely silenced, and her colours in the main rigging being down, it was supposed she had struck, and the Constitution shot ahead to repair the rigging, leaving the enemy a complete wreck. It was shortly after, however, discovered that the colours were still flying ; and accordingly, after repairing some of the damage, the Constitution took a position across the enemy's bows, in order to rake her, but this she prudently avoided by striking her flag.

Bainbridge now sent his first lieutenant on board the prize, which proved to be the Java, a frigate of the same rate as the Guerriere and Macedonian, but with a much larger complement of men, having had upwards of 400 on board at the commencement of the action, 100 of them being supernumeraries intended for the British ships of war in the East Indies. There was also on board lieutenant-general Hislop, appointed to the command of Bombay, major Walker and captain Wood of his staff, and captain Marshall, master and commander in the British navy, going to the East Indies to take command of a sloop of war there. The commander was captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer, who was mortally wounded in the action.

The action lasted an hour and fifty-five minutes, in which time the Java was completely dismasted, not having a spar of any kind standing. She had been fitted out in the most complete manner, and had copper on board for a 74 and two brigs building at Bombay ; but the great distance from our coast, and the disabled state of the vessel, forbidding every idea of attempting to take her to the United States, after removing the prisoners and their baggage, she was set on fire, and soon after blew up.

The loss on board the *Constitution* was 9 killed and 25 wounded. The loss on board the *Java* could not be exactly ascertained, as the officers were extremely cautious in speaking of the number of her crew. Commodore Bainbridge states it at 60 killed and 101 wounded certainly; by a letter written on board the *Constitution* by one of the officers of the *Java*, and accidentally found, the number was stated to be 60 killed and 170 wounded.

After blowing up the *Java*, Bainbridge returned to St. Salvador, where he landed all the prisoners on their parole, to the number of 361, exclusive of nine Portuguese seamen, who were liberated and given up to the governor of St. Salvador, and three passengers, private characters, whom the commodore did not consider prisoners of war.

On account of the destruction of the boats of both vessels in the action, nothing was taken from on board the *Java* except the prisoners and their baggage, the whole of which was given up to them. Among other valuable articles given up was a chest of plate, which had been presented to general Hislop by the colony of Demarara. Commodore Bainbridge received the public acknowledgments of the governor of St. Salvador, as well as of his prisoners, for the kind treatment and beneficence which he displayed on this occasion.

The *Constitution* again left St. Salvador on the 6th of January, and arrived at Boston about the middle of February.

§ 3. Meanwhile the *Hornet* blockaded the *Bonne Citoyenne*, until the 24th of January, when the *Montague*, a 74 gun ship, hove in sight and chased her into the harbour; but night coming on, she wore and stood out to the southward. Knowing that she had left Rio Janeiro for the express purpose of relieving the *Bonne Citoyenne* and the packet which Lawrence had also blockaded for 14 days, and obliged her to send her mail to Rio Janeiro in a Portuguese smack, he judged it most prudent to shift his cruising ground, and accordingly shaped his course towards Pernambuco. On the 4th of February he captured the English brig *Resolution*, of 10 guns, laden with provisions and about \$23,000 in specie; but as she sailed dull, and he could not spare hands to man her, he took out the money and crew, and set her on fire. He then ran down the coast for Moranham, and cruised there a short time, and thence ran off Surinam. After cruising off that coast from the 15th to the 22d of February, without meeting a vessel, he stood for Demarara. Next morning he discovered a brig to leeward, which he chased so near the shore that he was obliged to haul off for want of a pilot. Previous to giving up the chase, however, he discovered a vessel at anchor

without the bar of Demarara river, with the English colours flying, apparently a brig of war. In beating around Carabona bank, in order to get at her, at half past three in the afternoon, he discovered another sail on his weather quarter, edging down for him. At 20 minutes past 4 she hoisted English colours, when she was discovered to be a large man of war brig. The Hornet was immediately cleared for action, and kept close to the wind, in order, if possible, to get the weather gauge. At 5 minutes past 10, finding he could weather the enemy, Lawrence hoisted American colours, tacked, and shortly after exchanged broadsides with the British ship, within half pistol shot. Observing the enemy in the act of wearing, Lawrence now bore up, received his starboard broadside, ran him close on board on the starboard quarter, and kept up such a heavy and well directed fire, that in less than 15 minutes the British struck their colours, and hoisted an ensign, union down, from their fore rigging, as a signal of distress.

Lieutenant Shubrick\* was immediately sent on board the prize, which proved to be the British brig Peacock, commanded by captain William Peake, who fell in the latter part of the action. Shubrick, on getting on board, found that a number of her crew were killed and wounded, and that she was sinking fast, being literally cut to pieces, and having six feet water in her hold. Both vessels were immediately brought to anchor, and the Hornet's boats despatched to bring off the wounded; but although her guns were thrown overboard, the shot holes that could be got at plugged, and every exertion made by pumping and bailing to keep her afloat until the prisoners could be removed, all proved ineffectual, and she sunk in five and a half fathoms water, carrying down 13 of her crew, and three sailors belonging to the Hornet, who were nobly risking their lives for the safety of the vanquished foe. A lieutenant and other officers and men of the Hornet employed in removing the prisoners, with difficulty saved themselves, by jumping into a boat that was lying on her booms as she went down. Four of the 13 of the crew of the Peacock, mentioned as being in her when she went down, were so fortunate as to gain the fore-top, and were afterwards taken off by the boats. Previous to her going down, four of her men took to her stern boat, that had been much damaged during the action, and it is hoped reached the shore in safety; but from the heavy sea running at the time, the shattered state of the boat, and the difficulty of landing on the coast, it is more than probable that they were lost.

\* Lieutenant Shubrick has had the good fortune to be in the actions with the *Guerriere*, *Java*, and *Peacock*.

The exact number of killed on board the *Peacock* could not be ascertained from her officers. Captain Peake and four men were found dead on board by the Americans; the master, one midshipman, carpenter, captain's clerk, and 29 seamen were wounded, most of them severely, three of whom died of their wounds after being removed. On board the *Hornet* there was only one killed and two wounded by the enemy, but two men were severely burnt by the explosion of a cartridge during the action, one of whom survived but a few days. Her rigging and sails were much cut, a shot passed through the fore mast, and the bowsprit was slightly injured; her hull received little or no damage.

The *Peacock* was deservedly styled one of the finest vessels of her class in the British navy. Her tonnage was supposed to be about equal to that of the *Hornet*. Her beam was greater by five inches; but her extreme length not so great by four feet. She mounted sixteen 24 pound carronades, two long nines, one twelve pound carronade on her top-gallant fore-castle as a shifting gun, and one four or six-pounder, and two swivels mounted aft. Her crew consisted of 134 men, four of whom were absent in a prize.

During the engagement, the *L'Espiegle*, the brig that Lawrence had been endeavouring to reach before the *Peacock* appeared, which mounted 16 thirty-two pound carronades, and two long nines, lay about six miles distant, and could plainly see the whole of the action. Apprehensions were entertained, that she would beat out to the assistance of her consort, and therefore such exertions were made in repairing damages, that by nine o'clock the boats were stowed away, a new set of sails bent, and the ship completely ready for action. She, however, declined coming out, and at two in the morning the *Hornet* got under way.

The morning after the action, Lawrence found that he had 277 souls on board, and therefore, as his own crew had been on two-thirds allowance of provisions for some time, and his supply of water was but scant, he determined to make the best of his way to the United States. He arrived at Holmes' Hole on the 19th of March, and a few days after proceeded down the sound to New York.

The kindness and hospitality shown by captain Lawrence and his officers to his unfortunate prisoners, was such as to penetrate them with the most lively gratitude, which the officers expressed shortly after their arrival by a public letter of thanks. "So much," say they, "was done to alleviate the distressing and uncomfortable situation in which we were placed when received on

board the sloop you command, that we cannot better express our feelings than by saying, 'We ceased to consider ourselves prisoners;' and every thing that friendship could dictate was adopted by you and the officers of the *Hornet*, to remedy the inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property and clothes by the sudden sinking of the *Peacock*."

Nor was the crew of the *Hornet* a whit behind their superiors in that noble generosity which ever accompanies true bravery. As the sailors of the *Peacock* had lost every thing except what they had on their backs when she went down, our American tars united to relieve them, and made every English sailor a present of two shirts, a blue jacket, and a pair of trowsers.

§ 4. The frigate *Chesapeake*, commanded by captain Evans, sailed from Boston about the middle of November on a cruize. From Boston she run down by Madeira, the Canary, and Cape de Verd Islands; thence to the equator, between longitude 25° and 15° W., where she cruized six weeks. She then sailed along the coast of South America, and passed within fifteen leagues of Surinam. Thence she passed though the windward islands to the coast of the United States near the capes of Virginia, and thence along the coast to Boston, where she arrived on the 10th of April, after a cruize of 115 days. During this cruize she took an American brig, sailing under an English license, and three British vessels, one of which she burnt after taking out the crew and cargo. On the first of January, off the Western Islands, she discovered two large sail bearing down on her, apparently ships of war, and lay to until near enough to ascertain that they were a 74 and a frigate, when she made all sail and escaped. Off the capes of Virginia, about ten days before her arrival, she gave chase to a sloop of war, and continued chasing for two days, when it escaped in the night.

§ 5. The *Chesapeake* continued in Boston harbour until the first of June, the day of her unfortunate rencontre with the *Shannon*. Captain Lawrence, of the *Hornet*, had a short time previous been appointed to command the *Chesapeake*, and hardly had he arrived at Boston, when the *Shannon*, commanded by captain Broke, appeared off the harbour, with the avowed purpose of seeking a combat with her.

"Stung with the repeated disasters of the British frigates, this officer resolved to make an effort to retrieve them; and when he deemed his ship perfectly prepared for that purpose, sent a formal challenge to captain Lawrence.

"'As the *Chesapeake*,' his letter began, 'appears now ready for sea, I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shan-

non with her, ship to ship, to try the fortune of our respective flags. To an officer of your character, it requires some apology for proceeding to further particulars. Be assured, sir, that it is not from any doubt I entertain of your wishing to close with my proposal, but merely to provide an answer to any objection that might be made, and very reasonably, upon the chance of our receiving unfair support.' After observing that commodore Rodgers had not accepted several verbal challenges which he had given, captain Broke then proceeds to state very minutely the force of the Shannon, and offers to send all British ships out of reach, so that they might have a fair combat, at any place within a certain range along the coast of New England which he specified; if more agreeable, he offers to sail together, and to warn the Chesapeake, by means of private signals, of the approach of British ships of war, till they reach some solitary spot—or to sail with a flag of truce to any place out of the reach of British aid, so that the flag should be hauled down when it was deemed fair to begin hostilities. 'I entreat you, sir,' he concludes, 'not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the Chesapeake, or that I depend only upon your personal ambition for your acceding to this invitation. We have both nobler motives. You will feel it as a compliment, if I say that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful service I can render to my country; and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in even combats, that your little navy can now hope to console your country for the loss of that trade it can no longer protect.'

"The style of this letter, with the exception of the puerile bravado about commodore Rodgers, is frank and manly; and if the force of the Shannon were correctly stated, would be such a challenge as might well be sent from a brave seaman to a gallant adversary. We, however, are but too well satisfied, that captain Broke studiously underrated the number of his guns and crew; or that, after his challenge, he must have received additions to both. That the Shannon had more guns than the number stated by her commander, we learn from the testimony of the surviving officers of the Chesapeake; who also assert, that she had three hundred and seventy-six men; that she had an officer and sixteen men from the Belle Poule; and that the hats of some of her seamen were marked 'Tenedos.' Such as it was, however, this letter, most unfortunately, never reached captain Lawrence. If he had received it; if he had been thus warned to prepare his ship; if he had had an opportunity of selecting his officers, and disciplining his crew;



if, in short, he had been able to place the Chesapeake on any thing like equal terms with the Shannon, the combat might have been more bloody—there might have been such an engagement as has not yet been seen between single ships on the ocean; though we cannot suffer ourselves to doubt the result of it. But he knew nothing of this challenge—he saw only the Shannon riding before him in defiance; he remembered the spirit with which he himself overawed a superior, and he could not brook for a moment, that an enemy, which seemed to be his equal, should insult his flag. Although, therefore, the Chesapeake was comparatively an inferior ship—although his first lieutenant was sick on shore—although three of his lieutenants had recently left her; and, of the four who remained, two were only midshipmen, acting as lieutenants—although part of his crew were new hands, and all of them had lost some of their discipline by staying in port—yet, as he would have gone to sea in that situation had no enemy appeared, he felt himself bound not to delay sailing on that account, and throwing himself, therefore, on his courage and his fortune, he determined at once to attack the enemy. It was on the morning of the 1st of June, 1813, that the Chesapeake sailed out of the harbour of Boston to meet the Shannon. As soon as she got under weigh, captain Lawrence called the crew together, and having hoisted the white flag, with the motto of ‘free trade and sailors’ rights,’ made a short address. His speech, however, was received with no enthusiasm—on the contrary, signs of dissatisfaction were evident; particularly from a boatswain’s mate, a Portuguese, who seemed to be at the head of the malecontents; and complaints were muttered, that they had not yet received their prize-money. Such expressions, at the eve of an action, were but ill-bodings of the result of it; but captain Lawrence, ignorant as he was of the characters of his sailors, and unwilling at such a moment to damp their spirits by harshness, preserved his accustomed calmness, and had prize-checks, at once, given by the purser to those who had not received them. Whilst this scene was passing, the Shannon, observing the Chesapeake coming out, bore away. The Chesapeake followed her till four o’clock in the afternoon, when she hauled up and fired a gun, on which the Shannon hove to. They manœuvred for some time, till, at about a quarter before six, they approached within pistol shot and exchanged broadsides.

“These broadsides were both bloody; but the fire of the Shannon was most fortunate in the destruction of officers. The fourth lieutenant, Mr. Ballard, was mortally wounded—the sailing-master was killed, and captain Lawrence received a mus-

ket ball in his leg, which caused great pain, and profuse bleeding, but he leaned on the companion way, and continued to order and to animate his crew. A second, and a third broadside was exchanged, with evident advantage on the part of the Chesapeake; but, unfortunately, among those now wounded on board of her was the first lieutenant, Mr. Ludlow, who was carried below—three men were successively shot from the helm, in about twelve minutes from the commencement of the action; and, as the hands were shifting, a shot disabled her foresail, so that she would no longer answer her helm, and her anchor caught in one of the after ports of the Shannon, which enabled the latter to rake her upper deck. As soon as Lawrence perceived that she was falling to leeward, and that by the Shannon's filling she would fall on board, he called his boarders, and was giving orders about the foresail, when he received a musket ball in his body. The bugleman, who should have called the boarders, did not do his duty; and, at this moment commodore Broke, whose ship had suffered so much that he was preparing to repel boarding, perceiving, from this accident, how the deck of the Chesapeake was swept, jumped on board with about twenty men. They would have been instantly repelled; but the captain, the first lieutenant, the sailing-master, the boatswain, the lieutenant of marines, the only acting lieutenant on the spar-deck, were all killed or disabled. At the call of the boarders, lieutenant Cox ran on deck, but just in time to receive his falling commander, and bear him below. Lieutenant Budd, the second lieutenant, led up the boarders, but only fifteen or twenty would follow him, and with these he defended the ship till he was wounded and disabled. Lieutenant Ludlow, wounded as he was, hurried upon deck, where he soon he received a mortal cut from a sabre. The marines who were engaged fought with desperate courage; but they were few in number; too many of them having followed the Portuguese boatswain's mate, who exclaimed, it is said, as he skulked below, 'so much for not paying men their prize-money.' Meanwhile the Shannon threw on board sixty additional men, who soon succeeded in overpowering the seamen of the Chesapeake, who had now no officers to lead or rally them, and took possession of the ship; which was not, however, surrendered by any signal of submission, but became the enemy's only because they were able to overwhelm all who were in a condition to resist.

"As captain Lawrence was carried below, he perceived the melancholy condition of the Chesapeake, but cried out, 'Don't surrender the ship.' He was taken down into the ward-room, and, as he lay in excruciating pain, perceiving that the noise

above had ceased, he ordered the surgeon to go on deck, and tell the officers to fight on to the last, and never strike the colours. 'They shall wave,' said he, 'while I live.' But it was too late to resist or struggle longer; the enemy had already possession of the ship. As captain Lawrence's wounds would not allow of his removal, he continued in the ward-room, surrounded by his wounded officers, and, after lingering in great pain for four days, during which his sufferings were too acute to permit him to speak, or, perhaps, to think of the sad events he had just witnessed, or do more than ask for what his situation required, he died on the 5th of June. His body was wrapped in the colours of the Chesapeake, and laid on the quarter deck, until they arrived at Halifax, where he was buried with the highest military and naval honours; the British officers forgetting in their admiration of his character, that he had been but lately their enemy. His pall was supported by the oldest captains in the navy then at Halifax, and no demonstration of respectful attention was omitted to honour the remains of a brave, but unfortunate stranger.

"In this sanguinary engagement the Chesapeake lost her commander and forty-seven men killed, and ninety-seven wounded, of whom fourteen afterwards died. Among these were lieutenant Ludlow, first lieutenant of the ship, and lieutenant Ballard, the fourth lieutenant, both excellent officers.

"On the part of the Shannon, captain Broke was dangerously wounded, though he has since recovered; the first lieutenant, the purser, captain's clerk, and twenty-three seamen killed, and fifty-seven persons wounded, besides captain Broke.

"The capture of the Chesapeake is to be ascribed wholly to the extraordinary loss of officers (a loss without any precedent, as far as we can recollect, in naval history); and to her falling accidentally on board the Shannon. During the three broadsides, while the officers of the Chesapeake were living, and she was kept clear of the enemy, the superiority was manifestly with the Americans. The Chesapeake had received scarcely any damage, while the Shannon had several shot between wind and water, and could with difficulty be kept afloat during the succeeding night. It was only when accident threw the Chesapeake on board the Shannon, when her officers were unable to lead on the boarders, that captain Broke himself, contrary, we believe, to the regulations of the British navy, left his own ship, and was able, by superior numbers, to overpower the distracted crew of the Chesapeake.

"We have heard many accounts, which we are very reluctantly compelled to believe, of improper conduct by the British

after the capture, and of brutal violence offered to the crew of the Chesapeake. As, however, some allowances are due to the exasperated passions of the moment, something too to the confusion of a bloody and doubtful struggle, we are unwilling to prolong the remembrance of imputations which may be disproved, and perhaps have been exaggerated.

“ But we should wrong the memory of captain Lawrence, we should be unjust to the officers of the American navy, with whose glory all the aspiring ambition of the country is so closely blended, if we omitted any opportunity of giving the last and fairest lustre to their fame, by contrasting their conduct with that of the enemy, or if we forbore, from any misplaced delicacy towards our adversaries, to report circumstances connected with the fate of the Chesapeake, which throw a broad and dazzling light on the generous magnanimity of our countrymen.”

Our readers cannot have failed to observe the liberality which was extended to the officers and crews of the *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, and the still more striking instance of the *Peacock*. “ When the Chesapeake was taken by the *Shannon*, the key of captain Lawrence’s store-room was demanded of the purser. It was given; but the purser observed at the same time, that in the captures of the *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, the most scrupulous regard was paid to the private property of the British officers; that captain Lawrence had laid in stores for a long cruize; and that the value of them would be a great object to his widow and family, for whose use he was desirous, if possible, of preserving them. This request was not merely declined; it was haughtily and superciliously refused.

“ However we may mourn the sufferings of that day, the loss of the Chesapeake has not, in our estimation, varied the relative standing of the marine of the two countries; nor does it abate, in the slightest degree, any of the loftiness of our naval pretensions. The contest was wholly unequal in ships, in guns, in crews, in officers, in every thing.

“ The *Shannon* was a better ship; she had not upon her the curse of that ill-omined name, the Chesapeake. The *Shannon* was a stronger ship; she mounted twenty-eight eighteen pounders on the main deck, twenty-two thirty-two pound carronades, and two long brass nines or twelves, on the spar-deck, and a large carronade amidships, *in all fifty-two guns*, besides this last heavy carronade; while the Chesapeake mounted twenty-eight eighteen pounders on the main deck, and twenty thirty-two pound carronades, and one eighteen pounder, chase gun, on the spar-deck, *in all forty-nine guns*.

“The Shannon had a better crew. Besides her complement, she had seamen from two other ships. That crew, too, had been long at sea; long in the ship; were known; were tried; and as commodore Broke sent a challenge, were, of course, men on whom, if they were not picked for the occasion, he knew he could confide. The Chesapeake had, on the contrary, in part, a new crew, unknown to their officers, not yet knowing their places or the ship. The ship had not been more than a few hours at sea, and the landsmen and the landswomen had been dismissed from her on the very day of the engagement. The officers, too, although we should be the last to detract from their merits, and although the manner in which they fought their ship does them the highest honour, the officers were young and few in number, and had as yet hardly any opportunity of disciplining or knowing their seamen; yet, under all these disadvantages, the great damage sustained by the Shannon, and the great loss of her crew, all which took place before the boarding, warrant completely the opinion, that, but for the accidental loss of officers, the victory would have been with the Chesapeake\*.”

§ 6. The brig *Argus*, commanded by lieutenant Allen, sailed from New York about the middle of May, having on board Mr. Crawford, our minister for France. She arrived at L’Orient on the 12th of June, and shortly after sailed on a cruize.

On the 14th of August, being then in St. George’s channel, where she had made a number of captures, she was discovered by the Pelican sloop of war, which had been despatched in search of her. As soon as Allen discovered the Pelican he shortened sail, and the two vessels got alongside about half past five in the morning, when an action commenced, which was kept up with spirit on both sides for three quarters of an hour, when, lieutenant Allen being mortally wounded, and nearly forty others killed and wounded on board the *Argus*, she struck her flag. On board the Pelican there were only two killed and five wounded.

As the American account of this action has not yet been received, owing probably to the death of the commander, and as the British account is unusually barren, we are not able to state any of the particulars. That the Pelican was much superior in force, however, there is little room to doubt. She is rated at two guns more than the *Argus*; and it is stated, in a London paper, that in the year 1797, she beat off a French 44 gun frigate, after an action of two hours. There is a circumstance mentioned in a Cork paper, too, which is totally kept out of

\* Port Folio.

view in the official account, and which, if true, takes away all the honour of the victory, small as it is, from the enemy. "As the action closed," says the Cork paper, "his majesty's ship Leonidas, captain Seymour, fell in with them." In Steele's List, the Leonidas is rated as a 38 gun frigate. That a sloop of war should surrender to a vessel of superior force, when a 38 gun frigate was close aboard of them, is a circumstance surely not to be wondered at.

A few days after the action, lieutenant Allen died of his wounds, and was buried at Plymouth with the honours of war.

Previous to her capture, the Argus had taken 19 vessels, most of them in St. George's Channel.

In recording the loss of the Chesapeake and Argus we have had to lament the still greater loss of their gallant commanders. We have now to record an event, at the remembrance of which tears for our loss mingle with exultations for our success.

§ 7. On the first of September, the United States brig Enterprize, commanded by lieutenant William Burrows, sailed from Portsmouth on a cruize. On the morning of the 3d, Burrows discovered a schooner, which was chased into Portland harbour, where the Enterprize was brought to anchor. Having received information of several privateers being off Manhagan, he weighed anchor and swept out the following morning, and stood for that place. Next day a large brig of war was discovered, to which chase was immediately given. The enemy fired several guns, and stood for the Enterprize, with four ensigns hoisted. After manœuvring and reconnoitering for some time, for the purpose of discovering the force of the enemy, Burrows, about three in the afternoon, shortened sail, tacked, and ran down, with the intention of bringing her to close action. At 20 minutes after three the firing commenced from both vessels, within half pistol shot. The action continued for about a quarter of an hour, when the Enterprize ranged ahead of the enemy, rounded to, and raked her. Shortly after the main-top-mast and top-sail yard of the enemy came down. The foresail of the Enterprize was then set, and she took a position on the starboard bow of the enemy, and continued to rake her, until, about 40 minutes after the commencement of the action, the enemy ceased firing, and cried for quarters: their colours being nailed to the masts, could not be hauled down.

The prize proved to be the British brig Boxer, of 14 guns. The number of her crew could not be ascertained, but 64 prisoners were taken, including 17 wounded. Captain Hull, in a letter to commodore Bainbridge, describing the state of the Boxer when brought into port, says that there was every rea-

son to believe that there were 100 men on board. On board the *Enterprize* there was only one killed and thirteen wounded, two of whom died of their wounds.

Lieutenant Burrows fell in the commencement of the action; he, however, refused to be carried below, but, raising his head, requested that the flag might never be struck. When the sword of the vanquished enemy was presented to the dying conqueror, he clasped his hands and said, "I am satisfied; I die contented;" and then, and not till then, would he consent to be carried below, where every attention was paid to save his life, but in vain. A few hours after the victory he breathed his last.— Captain Blythe, the commander of the *Boxer*, also fell in the commencement of the action, having received a cannon shot through the body. His remains, in company with those of Burrows, were brought to Portland, where the two commanders were interred, side by side, with military honours.

The *Boxer* was so much damaged in her sails, rigging, spars, hull, &c. as to render it difficult to carry her into port. The *Enterprize* received but trifling injury. On an examination of the prize, she was adjudged wholly to the captors, agreeably to law, as a vessel of superior force.

§ 8. On the 23d of April, the *President* frigate, commanded by commodore Rodgers, sailed from Boston. On the 30th he took his departure from *President road*, in company with the *Congress*, commanded by captain Smith. On the 3d of May, while in chase of a British brig of war, near the shoal of *George's Bank*, they passed to windward of three sail, two of which, from their appearance, and from information previously received, were supposed to be the *La Hogue*, 74, the *Nymph* frigate, and a merchant brig. After getting clear of *George's Bank* they continued along east southwardly, in the direction of the southern edge of the *Gulf Stream*, until the 8th of May, when the *President* parted company with the *Congress*, the latter being in chase of a vessel, which proved to be an American merchantman. After parting company, Rodgers shaped his course, as near as the wind would permit, to intercept the enemy's *West India* commerce passing to the southward of the *Grand Bank*. Not meeting with any thing in this direction except American vessels from *Lisbon* and *Cadiz*, he next pursued a route to the northward, so as to cross the tracks of the *West India*, *Halifax*, *Quebec*, and *St. John's* trade. Not meeting any thing in this route, however, after reaching the latitude of  $38^{\circ}$  N., he steered to the S. E. towards the *Azores*, off which, in different directions, he continued until the 6th of June, without meeting a single en-

emy's vessel. At this time, falling in with an American ship bound to Cadiz, and receiving information that she had, four days before, passed an enemy's convoy from the West Indies, bound to England, Rodgers crowded sail to the N. E., and, although disappointed in falling in with the convoy, nevertheless made four captures, between the 9th and 13th of June.

Being now in the latitude of  $46^{\circ}$  N., and longitude  $28^{\circ}$  W., Rodgers shaped a course that afforded a prospect of falling in with vessels bound to Newfoundland from St. George's Channel, by the way of Cape Clear, as well as others that might pass north about to the northward of Ireland; to his astonishment however, in all this route, he did not meet with a single vessel, until he made the Shetland Islands, and even off there nothing but Danish vessels, trading to England, under British licences. A considerable portion of their provisions and water being now expended, it became necessary to replenish these, previous to determining what course to pursue next; accordingly, for this purpose, they put into North Bergen on the 27th June; but were not able to obtain any thing but water, there being an unusual scarcity of bread in every part of Norway, and at the time not more in Bergen than a bare sufficiency for its inhabitants for four or five weeks. After replenishing his water, Rodgers stretched over towards the Orkney islands, and thence towards the North Cape, for the purpose of intercepting a convoy of twenty-five or thirty sail, which it was said would leave Archangel about the middle of July, under the protection of two brigs or two sloops of war. In this object, however, he was disappointed by a line of battle ship and frigate making their appearance off the North Cape on the 19th of July, just as he was in momentary expectation of meeting the convoy. On discovering the ships of war, Rodgers stood towards them to ascertain their character, when he hauled by the wind on the opposite tack to avoid them; but, owing to faint, variable winds, calms, and entire day-light, the sun in that latitude, at that season, appearing at midnight several degrees above the horizon, they were enabled to continue the chase upwards of eighty hours; during which time, owing to different changes of the wind, they were brought quite as near as was desirable.

Disappointed in meeting with the convoy, Rodgers now steered to gain the direction of the trade passing out of and into the Irish channel. In this position, between the 25th of July and 2d of August, he made three captures, when, finding that the enemy had a superior force in that vicinity, he made a circuit round Ireland, and then steered for the banks of Newfoundland, near which he made two more captures, and by the latter one



learned that a 74 and a frigate were on the eastern part of the bank, only a few miles to the westward ; he, however, did not fall in with them.

On the 23d of September, to the southward of Nantucket shoals, Rodgers fell in with and captured, in a very singular manner, the British schooner *Highflyer*, tender to admiral Warren. On approaching the schooner she hoisted a private signal, which was answered by the President, by a signal which fortunately proved to be the British one for that day, on seeing which the *Highflyer* immediately bore up, and was boarded by one of the officers of the President in a British uniform. By this stratagem commodore Rodgers gained possession of the British private signals, and admiral Warren's instructions, by which was discovered the number of British squadrons on the American coast, with their force and relative positions.—He was thus enabled to avoid them, and on the 26th of September arrived safely at Newport, Rhode-Island.

During the cruise, the President captured twelve British vessels, three of which were ransomed and despatched to England as cartels, with 216 prisoners on parole. The British government, however, refused to sanction the terms of exchange entered into and signed by their officers, assigning as the reason, that "such transactions are inconsistent with the established understanding between the two countries." The President, on her arrival, had fifty-five prisoners on board.

The Congress, after parting with the President, continued her cruise until the 12th of December, when she arrived at Portsmouth, N. H. She captured two British brigs of ten guns each, one of which was destroyed, and the other, after being dismantled, was given up to the prisoners, who were discharged on parole, and furnished with provisions, &c., sufficient to carry them to the West Indies. She likewise captured a British ship laden with wine and potatoes, which was destroyed after the greater part of her cargo was taken out.

After parting with the President, the Congress ran to the southward ; and, crossing the equator, put into Seara, on the Brazil coast. After watering, she beat against a strong wind and current, up to Fernando de Noronha, where she again watered ; and then proceeded to the eastward, in hopes to fall in with some Indiamen. She cruised as far as 18° W. from 6° S. to 6° N. under easy sail, made the Island of St. Pauls ; but until her return to Fernando de Noronha, which was nearly three months, never saw a vessel. She then returned to Seara, where she took in a quantity of cassada, jerked beef, &c. and ran under two reefed topsails to latitude 44° N., passing near Ha-

lifax, where she captured a brig, who informed them of Boston being blockaded by a superior force. She accordingly made for Portsmouth, where she arrived, with her crew, 410 men, in perfect health, having lost but four on the cruise. When the men commenced on the jerked beef and cassada, it did not agree with them, and about fifty were sick—but they soon recovered. The Congress is in perfect order, and will want no repairs. She had on board about 30 prisoners on her arrival.

§ 9. The Essex frigate sailed from the capes of the Delaware on the 25th of October, 1812, on a cruise to the Pacific ocean, and has not yet returned. Letters, however, dated July 2, 1813, were received at the navy department about the middle of December following, from her commander, captain Porter, at which time he was cruising off the western coast of South America, with a fleet of nine armed vessels under his command, eight of which were British letters of marque, which he had captured and fitted out. The first of these vessels, which was a ship of two guns and twenty-one men, was captured on the 29th of April. Two others were then in sight, close together, about seven miles distant from the Essex; the one mounting ten guns, 6 and 9 pounders; the other six 18 pounders, four swivels, and six long blunderbusses, mounted on swivels. The wind being light and variable, and confiding greatly in the bravery and enterprise of his officers and men, and apprehensive of their escape, from the prevalence of fogs in that climate, Porter directed the boats of the Essex to be armed and manned, and divided into two divisions. Suitable signals were established, and each boat had her particular station pointed out for the attack, and every other previous arrangement was made to prevent confusion.

The boats, 7 in number, rowed off in admirable order. Guns were fired from the enemy to terrify them; they rowed up however, undismayed, under the muzzles of their guns, and took their stations for attacking the first ship, and no sooner was the American flag displayed, as the signal for boarding, and the intention discovered by the enemy, than their colours were struck without a shot being fired. They then left a crew on board the prize, and took their stations for attacking the other vessel, when her flag was also struck, on the first call to surrender. Thus were two fine British ships, each pierced for twenty guns, worth near half a million of dollars, mounting between them 16 guns, and manned with 55 men, well supplied with ammunition and small arms, surrendered, without the slightest resistance, to seven small open boats, with fifty men, armed only with muskets, pistols, boarding axes, and cutlasses.

On the 26th of March, previous to the capture of any of the letters of marque, Porter fell in with the Peruvian corsair ship *Nereyda*, mounting 15 guns, which had, a few days before, captured two American whale ships, the crews of which, amounting in number to 24 men, were then detained prisoners on board. As they could assign no other motive for the capture, than that they were the allies of Great Britain, and, as such, should capture all American vessels they could fall in with, Porter, to prevent in future such vexatious proceedings, threw all her armament into the sea, liberated the Americans, and dismissed the *Nereyda*. He then proceeded with all possible dispatch for Lima, to intercept one of the detained vessels, which had parted with the *Nereyda* only three days before, and was so fortunate as to arrive there and re-capture her on the 5th of April, at the moment she was entering the port.

Captain Porter describes his crew as enjoying remarkably good health and spirits, no symptoms of scurvy having appeared, although they had been at sea for eight months, with the exception of 23 days. The *Essex* is in prime order, with abundant supplies, and two of her consorts are fitted out with 20 guns each, and well manned. He mentions that British letters of marque are numerous in those seas, and that the American whalers had derived much benefit from his cruize.

§ 10. Since the commencement of the war the United States have lost the following vessels, viz.

The frigate *Chesapeake*, rated 36 and mounting 44 guns.

The *Wasp* sloop of war, rated 16 and mounting 18 guns.

The brig *Argus* of 16 guns.

The schooners *Nautilus*, *Vixen*, and *Viper*, of 12 guns each.

The captures of the three former have already been mentioned. Of the schooners, the first was captured by a British squadron, the two latter by British frigates rating 32 guns each. A few days after the capture of the *Vixen* by the *Southampton*, under sir James Lucas Yeo, both vessels were lost on a reef of rocks near Little Windward or Conception Island. As soon as the vessel struck, the crew of the British frigate became quite unmanageable, and every soul on board would have been lost but for the exertions of their prisoners. The conduct of the American seamen, both at the time of the ship's striking, and afterwards on the uninhabited island on which they saved themselves, was such as to induce sir James to assemble them before his own crew, and thank them publicly for their services. They were taken from this island by a brig from New Providence,

whither Yeo had dispatched a boat to make known their situation.

§ 11. The bravery and enterprize of American seamen have not been less conspicuous on board our privateers than in the national vessels. We shall here present an account of a few of the most conspicuous actions that have taken place.

§ 12. In no one action fought during the present war, has there been more courage and gallantry displayed than in the attack made by the privateer *Rolla* on the British ship *Rio Nueva*. The *Rolla* originally carried four twelve pound carronades in her waist, and one double fortified twelve, mounted on a pivot. In a gale of wind off *Madeira*, the 4 twelve pounders were obliged to be thrown overboard, and only one gun remained: with this, however, on the 14th of December, 1812, the *Rolla* attacked the *Rio Nueva*, mounting 18 guns, and 30 men, and took her after an action of twenty-five minutes. During the action, the men on board the *Rolla*, animated by the courage and conduct of captain Dooley and his officers, evinced a fixed determination to take the enemy or perish. When the ship struck, the *Rolla* had ranged up within pistol shot, and was preparing to board.

§ 13. The privateer schooner *Comet*, captain Thomas Boyle, sailed from Cape Henry, on the 25th of November, 1812, on a cruize to the coast of South America. On the 12th of December, at one in the afternoon, she discovered four sail standing out of *Pernambuco*, and lay by to give them an opportunity of getting off shore, in order to cut them off. At three, they being then about six leagues from the land, she bore up and made all sail in chase of them; and at six, having discovered one of them to be a very large man of war brig, all hands were called to quarters, the guns loaded with round and grape shot, the deck cleared, and all got ready for action. At seven, being then close to the chase, the *Comet* hoisted her colours, and sheered up to the man of war, which had hoisted Portuguese colours. The Portuguese then sent his boat on board the *Comet*, the officer of which informed captain Boyle, that the brig was a Portuguese national vessel, mounting 20 thirty-two pounders, and 165 men, and that the three others were English vessels under his protection, which he would not suffer to be molested; he also mentioned that the English vessels were armed and very strong. Boyle having shown him his commission, answered, that the brig had no right to protect English vessels on the high seas, and that he was determined to capture those vessels if he could; that he should be sorry if any thing disagreeable took place, but if it did he would not be the aggressor; but that he should cer-

tainly resist any attempt to prevent his capturing the vessels. The officer having now returned on board the brig, Boyle hailed her, and distinctly stated his intention of immediately attacking the convoy, which consisted of a ship of 14 guns, and two brigs of 10 guns each, the whole force, including the Portuguese, being 54 guns.

Boyle accordingly made sail for the English vessels, which were close together, and about half past eight, the moon shining clear, he hailed the ship, ordering them to back the main top-sails. Little or no answer being given, Boyle, having quick way at the time, shot a little ahead, saying he should be along side again in a few minutes, when, if his orders were not obeyed, a broadside would be poured into him. After a few minutes he tacked, the man of war close after him. He then ran alongside the ship, one of the brigs being close to her, and opened his broadside upon them both, all the vessels at this time carrying a crowd of canvass. From his superior sailing Boyle was frequently obliged to tack, by which he would have received considerable advantage, had he not been closely followed by the man of war, which now opened a heavy fire upon him, which was returned by the Comet. Having now the whole force to contend with, Boyle kept as close as possible to the English vessels, which frequently separated to give the man of war an opportunity of giving a broadside. The Comet continued the action, sometimes pouring her broadsides into the merchantmen, at others into the man of war, until eleven o'clock, when the ship surrendered, being all cut to pieces, and rendered unmanageable, and directly after one of the brigs, which was also very much disabled. A boat was now despatched to take possession of the brig, but it was forced to return, being prevented from passing by the fire of the man of war, one of whose broadsides almost succeeded in sinking it. The Comet now directed the whole of her fire at the Portuguese, who soon sheered off, and was followed for a short distance by the Comet, which then returned, and made the third merchantman surrender, she also being cut to pieces.

Boyle now took possession of the Bowes, the brig that had first surrendered. He also spoke the ship, and ordered the captain to follow him, who answered, that his ship was in a sinking condition, having many shot holes between wind and water, and not a rope but what was cut away; but that he would, if possible, follow his orders, for his own safety. As soon as the Bowes was taken possession of, she received a passing broadside from the Portuguese. The moon having now set, it became very dark and squally, and the Comet was sepa-

rated from all the vessels except the man of war, with whom for half an hour longer she continued occasionally to exchange broadsides. At day-light, however, the vessels being found to be still in the neighbourhood, the Comet wore close to her prize. The man of war then stood down for them; on perceiving which Boyle immediately hove about, and stood for him, when he also tacked, and made signals for the convoy to make the first port. The two merchantmen accordingly put before the wind, accompanied by the Portuguese, by whose assistance and their own exertions they succeeded with the utmost difficulty in regaining the harbour of Pernambuco, leaving the Bowes in possession of the Comet.

On the 11th of March, 1813, the General Armstrong, a privateer schooner, while cruising off the mouth of Surinam river, discovered a sail, which was supposed to be a British letter of marque, and immediately bore down on her, with the intention of giving her two broadsides and then boarding. After giving her one broadside, and wearing and giving another, to their surprise they found they were alongside of a frigate, pierced for 14 guns on the main deck, 6 on the quarter-deck, and 4 on the fore-castle. The wind being light, the privateer lay for about ten minutes like a log in the water. During that time, however, they shot away the frigate's fore-top sail tie, his mizen gaff haulyards, which brought his colours down, and his mizen and main stay, when, thinking she had struck, they ceased firing; but being soon undeceived, they recommenced the action. The frigate lay for a few minutes apparently unmanageable, but soon getting way, opened such a heavy fire as would soon have sunk the schooner, had she not succeeded in making her escape by the assistance of her sweeps. In this action, which continued for 45 minutes, the privateer had 6 men killed and 16 wounded. All the haulyards of her head sails were shot away, the fore mast and bowsprit one quarter cut through, all the fore and main shrouds but one cut away, both mainstays and running rigging cut to pieces, a great number of shot through the sails, and several between wind and water, which caused the vessel to leak, and a number in the hull. While they were getting away from the frigate, she kept up a well directed fire for the foremast and gaff of the schooner, but without effect.

§ 15. On the 5th of August, 1813, the privateer Decatur, being on a cruise, discovered a ship and a schooner, the first of which proved to be the British packet Princess Charlotte, the other the British vessel of war, the Dominica. She immediately stood towards them, and soon found herself abreast of the schooner. Both vessels continued to manœuvre for two or three

hours, the *Dominica* endeavouring to escape, and the *Decatur* to board, during which time several broadsides were fired by the former, and a number of shot from the large gun of the latter. The *Decatur* at last succeeded in boarding the *Dominica*, a number of the men passing into her stern from the bowsprit. The fire from the artillery and musketry was now terrible, being well supported on both sides. The *Dominica*, however, not being able to disengage herself, dropped alongside of the *Decatur*, and in this position was boarded by her whole crew. Fire-arms now became useless, the crews fighting hand to hand with cutlasses, and throwing cold shot; when, the captain and principal officers of the *Dominica* being killed, and her deck covered with dead and wounded, the British colours were hauled down by the conquerors.

During the combat, which lasted an hour, the *Princess Charlotte* remained a silent spectator of the scene, and as soon as it was over, she tacked about and stood to the southward. She had sailed from *St. Thomas*, bound to England, under convoy, to a certain latitude, of the *Dominica*.

The *Decatur* was armed with 6 twelve pound carronades, and 1 eighteen pounder on a pivot, with 103 men. Her loss in the action was three killed and sixteen wounded, one of whom afterwards died. The *Dominica* had 12 twelve pound carronades, two long sixes, one brass four pounder, and one thirty-two pound carronade on a pivot, with 83 men. She had 13 killed and 47 wounded, 5 of whom afterwards died of their wounds. Perhaps this engagement has been the most bloody, and the loss in killed and wounded on the part of the enemy, in proportion to the number engaged, perhaps the greatest, of any action to be found in the records of naval warfare. The surviving officers of the *Dominica* attribute the loss of their vessel to the superior skill of the *Decatur's* crew in the use of musketry, and the masterly manœuvring of that vessel, by which their carriage guns were rendered nearly useless. The captain was a young man of not more than 25 years of age; he had been wounded early in the action by two musket balls in the left arm, but he fought till the last moment, refusing to surrender his vessel, although he was urged by the few survivors of his crew to do so; declaring his determination not to survive her loss.

The *Decatur* arrived at *Charleston* on the 20th of August with her prize. The surviving officers of the *Dominica* spoke in the highest terms of approbation of the humanity and attention displayed towards them by the officers and crew of the *Decatur*.

## CHAPTER V.

§ 1. Battle near the River Raisin. § 2. Battle of Frenchtown. § 3. Massacre of the prisoners. § 4. Fort Meigs constructed. § 5. Siege of Fort Meigs. § 6. Skirmishing on the St. Lawrence. § 7. Capture of Ogdensburg. § 8. Capture of York. § 9. Capture of Fort George. § 10. Generals Chandler and Winder made prisoners. § 11. Capture of Boerstler's detachment. § 12. Attack on Sackett's Harbour. § 13. Sodus burnt. § 14. Second attempt on Sackett's Harbour. § 15. Attack on Black Rock. § 16. Siege of Lower Sandusky.

§ 1. TOWARDS the beginning of January, general Tupper having in a manner paved the way by his expeditions\*, general Winchester proceeded down the Miami from Fort Defiance to the Rapids, with the force under his command. On his arrival there, he was strongly urged by the inhabitants of Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, to protect them from the violence and outrage of the horde of savages by whom they were surrounded, and to whose brutalities they were daily exposed. Yielding to the call of humanity, Winchester, on the 17th of January, by the unanimous advice of his officers, but, it appears, without consulting general Harrison, detached a body of about 750 men, under general Lewis, to their relief.

On the following day, when within three miles of Frenchtown, information was received that a body of British and Indians were encamped at that place, and that they had received notice of their approach. The troops were accordingly arranged and directed to prepare for action, and then proceeded within a quarter of a mile of the enemy, who immediately commenced a fire with a howitzer, from which, however, no injury was received. The line of battle being instantly formed, the whole detachment was ordered to advance across the river on the ice; in which they succeeded, though it was in many places extremely slippery. The left wing and centre were then ordered to possess themselves of the houses and picketing about which the enemy had collected, and where they had placed their cannon. This order was executed in a few minutes. Both battalions advanced amidst an incessant shower of bullets, and succeeded in dislodging the enemy, neither the picketing nor the fencing over which they had to pass checking their progress.

\* See Chapter III.



The right wing fell in with the enemy at a considerable distance to the right, and pursued them a mile to the woods, where they made a stand with their howitzer and small arms, covered by a chain of enclosed lots and a group of houses, with a thick brushy wood full of fallen timber in their rear. Lewis now ordered the left and centre to possess themselves of the wood on the left, and to move up towards the main body of the enemy as fast as practicable, in order to divert their attention from the right. At the moment that the left and centre commenced their fire, the right advanced, and the enemy being soon driven from the fences and houses, both parties entered the wood together. The fight now became close, and extremely hot on the right wing, the enemy concentrating their forces on that side, in order to force the line. They were, however, still obliged to retreat, although slowly, the Americans being much fatigued, and were driven, on the whole, not less than two miles, every foot of the way under a continual charge.

The battle lasted from three in the afternoon till dark, when the detachment was drawn off in good order, and encamped at the place which the enemy had first occupied.

The force of the enemy in this affair has never been exactly ascertained; but from the best information, there were 80 to 100 British and 400 Indians. The number of their killed and wounded is likewise unknown, as they were enabled to carry off all but those left on the field where the battle commenced, which was about fifteen; but from the blood, the trails of bodies dragged off, and the reports of the people who lived near the place, the slaughter must have been great. One Indian and two of the Canadian militia were taken prisoners. A quantity of public stores was also taken. The loss of the Americans was twelve killed and fifty-five wounded.

On the 20th, general Winchester joined the detachment, with a reinforcement of 250 men.

§ 2. Meanwhile colonel Proctor, who commanded at Detroit, hearing of the approach of the Americans, advanced to meet them with a body of 1500 Indians and British, 300 of whom were regulars. On the night of the 21st he discovered the American detachment, and early next morning commenced an attack on their lines. The attack commenced at 6 in the morning, by a heavy fire of musquetry, assisted by six field pieces. The main body of the Americans were stationed within pickets on the left; a smaller force, unprotected, occupied the right, who gallantly sustained the shock for a quarter of an hour, when they began to give ground for the purpose of forming in a situation more favourable for their fire, and less exposed to that of

the enemy. At this moment Winchester arrived at the place of conflict, his quarters having been at the distance of three or four hundred yards from the camp, and his attention was immediately directed to rally the retreating party. This retreat, however, being discovered by the enemy, the whole Indian force, together with a portion of the militia, bore down upon them with redoubled violence, and by the superiority of their numbers, and the severity of their fire, prevented their forming. After a short conflict, in which they suffered severely, all that survived were made prisoners.

The left, who were stationed within the pickets, maintained their ground for several hours, and repulsed the British regulars, in three successive charges, with great slaughter. About 11 o'clock, however, Winchester was brought in as a prisoner to this part of the field, and perceiving that resistance was in vain, and influenced by the threat of their being abandoned to savage fury unless they instantly surrendered, he acceded to a capitulation, and sent a flag to the pickets to inform them they were prisoners.

General Harrison was at Lower Sandusky, when he received the intelligence of Lewis having advanced to the river Raisin, and fearing that he might be overpowered, he immediately set out for the Rapids, which he found that Winchester had just left with the reinforcement. When the news of Winchester's disaster reached Harrison, he was about three miles above the Rapids, with 360 men. He immediately ordered them to prepare to march, and set out with his staff to overtake a detachment of 300 men that had set out that morning for the river Raisin. He soon overtook them; but before the troops that he had left came up, it was ascertained that the defeat was complete, and it was the unanimous opinion of the officers that the detachment should return. A hundred and seventy of the most active men, however, were sent forward, with directions to proceed as far as possible to assist those who were fortunate enough to escape. These, however, were but few: the snow was so deep that the fugitives were entirely exhausted in running a few miles; those that did get off effected it by turning down to the lake, and secreting themselves. There were not more than 40 or 50 that got a mile from the scene of action, and the greater part even of these were overtaken.

§ 3. Though the resistance on the part of the Americans was put an end to by the capitulation concluded by Winchester, we regret to say, that the most tragical events of this disastrous day are still to be recorded, events which affix an indelible stain on the arms of the British. After the battle the British returned

to Malden with their prisoners, except about 50 or 60 wounded, who were not able to march. A few of the Indians remained behind, who, being joined next morning by about 50 more from Malden, immediately commenced a massacre of the wounded Americans, and afterwards set fire to the houses in which they had been left, and consumed their remains. The same day the Indians massacred a number of their prisoners who had not been wounded, whose remains they would not suffer to be interred, but left them above ground, where they were torn to pieces and devoured by hogs. These horrid outrages are but too well substantiated, not only by the inhabitants of Frenchtown, but by some of the officers who had the good fortune to escape, by being purchased from the savages. Great indignities were likewise inflicted on a surgeon and his two companions, who, a few days after the battle, had been despatched by Harrison with a flag of truce, to attend to the wounded. One of them was killed by the Indians, and the others robbed of the money with which they had been entrusted by the general, for the relief of the most pressing wants of the wounded. After suffering many indignities, not only from the Indians but from the British, under the flimsy pretext of their using the flag only as a cover\*, they were at length set at liberty at Montreal, whither they had been carried and imprisoned.

§ 4. On the 23d of January, the day after the surrender of Winchester, Harrison retreated to Carryng river, about midway between Sandusky and the Miami. In the following month he again advanced to the Rapids, where he constructed a fort, which, in honour of the governor of Ohio, was named Fort Meigs. This fort contains about nine acres of ground, nearly in an octagon form. At each corner is a strong block-house, with cannon planted so as to rake each line, and command every elevated point near the fort. Between the block-houses are strong picketings fifteen feet in height, against which a breast-work of clay is thrown up on both sides, and in addition to this, several long batteries were erected, which were well supplied with cannon.

The term of service of a large portion of the militia in Harrison's army having expired, 1200 men were called out by the governor of Kentucky, and despatched under general Green Clay to supply their place. They left Cincinnati, their place of ren-

\* General Harrison, in his official dispatch, states, that the surgeon was furnished with a letter addressed to any British officer he might meet, describing the character in which he went, and the object for which he was sent, an open letter to general Winchester, and written instructions to himself, all of which he was directed to show to the first officer he met with.

dezzvous, in the beginning of April, and arrived near Fort Meigs on the 4th of May, which they learnt was besieged by a large force of British and Indians, under general Proctor.

§ 5. Proctor had set out for Fort Meigs with 1000 British and 1200 Indians, about the middle of April, with the expectation of capturing it before the arrival of Harrison's reinforcements and supplies, but, owing to incessant and heavy rains, he was not able to open his batteries before the first of May. A brisk firing was kept up on both sides until the fifth, when a small party of general Clay's detachment arrived, with information of the rest being close at hand. Orders were immediately despatched to Clay, to proceed down the river in his boats, to land 800 men on the left bank of the river, who should immediately attack the enemy's batteries, and spike their cannon, and the remainder on the right bank, who would be aided by a sortie of the garrison. The plan was successfully executed, the cannon were spiked, but unfortunately, instead of returning across the river to the fort, they pursued the flying enemy to the woods, where they were surrounded, and the greatest portion taken prisoners. A great part of the baggage was also taken in the boats by the Indians.

Notwithstanding the unfortunate issue of this affair, however, Fort Meigs was relieved. Proctor, being deserted by the Indians, whom their chiefs could not prevent returning to their villages, as is their custom after any battle of consequence, with their prisoners and plunder, made a precipitate retreat on the 9th of May, having previously secured their ordnance on board a sloop.

§ 6. No event of consequence took place on the New York frontier during the winter. The opposing armies being divided by a barrier of ice, not sufficiently strong to allow of the transportation of artillery, peace was only disturbed by a few petty incursions, which each party justified by the plea of retaliation.

On the 6th of February, captain Forsythe, the commanding officer at Ogdensburg, on the St. Lawrence, received information that several men who had deserted from the opposite shore, on the ice, had been taken on the American side by a party of British, and carried off and confined in the jail at Brockville.

In consequence of this intrusion, as it was deemed, Forsythe the same evening crossed over with about 200 militia and riflemen, for the purpose of retaking the prisoners, and capturing the military stores at Brockville. On approaching the Canada shore, a flanking company was detached above, and another below the town, to secure all the passes, to prevent information being communicated to the country. Before the main force

reached the shore they were fired at by the centinels, but, instead of returning it, they rushed through the main street to the jail, which was instantly carried, the prisoners liberated, and then the magazine was secured. The troops in the town were completely surprised. One major, three captains, three lieutenants, one surgeon's mate, and forty-two privates, together with their arms, besides 130 rifles and musquets captured by the British at Detroit, and several casks of powder and fixed ammunition, were secured and brought off. Perfect order was observed by the officers and men, scrupulous respect paid to private property, and no injury was done to any individual. Although a severe fire was kept up from the houses as the Americans advanced to the jail, there were none killed, and but one wounded.

The following evening a party of 46 Indians, headed by a British officer, crossed over from Prescott, a village in Canada, a mile and a half above Ogdensburg, for the purpose of capturing a picket guard of nine men, belonging to Forsythe's company. They succeeded in taking the centinel on post, and then attacked the guard, but were repulsed by their steady bravery, aided by their advantageous position. The succeeding evening 15 or 20 American volunteers again crossed, and took a lieutenant and two men, together with 15 or 20 stand of arms.

§ 7. On the morning of the 22d of February, the British crossed over in considerable force, and succeeded in capturing Ogdensburg. Forsythe, with a force of less than half that of the British, effected his retreat to Black Lake in a masterly manner. Considerable alarm for the safety of Sackett's Harbour was excited by this event, and immediate measures were taken for reinforcing it. No attempts were made, however, at further conquest; the British shortly after retired across the St. Lawrence.

The ice having disappeared on Lake Ontario about the middle of April, the look-out boat Growler sailed from Sackett's Harbour on the 19th to reconnoitre the lake, and immediate preparations were made for an embarkation of troops for the invasion of Canada. The troops, to the number of 1700, under the command of general Dearborn, were embarked by the 23d, but the weather proving stormy, the fleet did not sail till the 25th.

§ 8. On the morning of the 27th they arrived off York, the capital of Upper Canada, and the fleet having taken a position to the south and westward of the principal fort, and as near the shore as possible, the debarkation of the troops commenced about 8, and was completed about 10 in the forenoon. The

place fixed on for landing was a clear field, the scite of the old French fort Tarento, but the wind blowing heavy from the eastward, the boats fell to leeward, by which they were exposed to a galling fire from the enemy, who had taken a position in a thick wood, near where the troops were obliged to land. This circumstance likewise prevented the fleet from covering the landing. The cool intrepidity of the officers and men, however, overcame every obstacle.

The riflemen under Forsythe first landed, under a heavy fire from the enemy, who had collected all their force at this point, consisting of 700 regulars and militia, and 100 Indians, commanded by general Sheaffe in person. The contest was sharp and severe for about half an hour, when about 700 or 800 of the Americans having landed, commanded by general Pike, and the remainder of the troops pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works, leaving a number of killed and wounded on the field. As soon as the troops were landed, the schooners were directed to take a position near the forts, in order that the attack upon them by the army and navy might be simultaneous.

Pike, having formed the troops on the ground originally intended for their landing, advanced to the batteries, which now opened their fire, which was returned from the schooners, that had beat up to a position within 600 yards of the principal fort. The troops were led in the most gallant manner by general Pike, who carried two redoubts, and was approaching the principal work, when the enemy, having previously laid a train, blew up his magazine, by which a great number of the troops were killed and wounded, and, among the former, the ever-to-be-lamented general Pike.—When the fall of Pike was made known to general Dearborn, he landed and took the command of the troops.

As soon as the magazine was blown up, the British set fire to their naval stores and a ship on the stocks; and then the regulars, with Sheaffe at their head, made a precipitate retreat from the town. By two in the afternoon the American flag was substituted for the British, and by four the troops were in peaceable possession of York, a capitulation having been agreed on with the militia commanding officer, by which the town, stores, and nearly 300 militia were surrendered.

The total American loss in killed on this occasion was

|                  |    |
|------------------|----|
| In battle        | 14 |
| By the explosion | 38 |
|                  | —  |
|                  | 52 |

main body at Beaver Dam, who then broke up and retreated along the mountains towards the head of lake Ontario. The same evening Fort Erie was taken possession of by a party from the opposite shore, and Lewis, finding that the enemy had made their escape, returned to Fort George.

§ 10. Dearborn, still in hopes of being able to cut off the retreat of the enemy, on the 1st of June detached general Winder with his brigade, and one regiment from Boyd's brigade, along the lake shore. On the 3d general Chandler followed with the remainder of Boyd's brigade. The British general, however, anticipated the blow, by attacking the American army before day on the morning of the 6th. Unfortunately, although the American loss was but small, and the enemy, whose force was very inferior, driven from the field, yet both the generals Chandler and Winder were taken prisoners. In this attack the Americans lost two generals and several other officers, but a greater number of prisoners were lost by the enemy.

Dearborn received the intelligence of this affair late in the same evening, and immediately dispatched general Lewis to take the command of the troops. He arrived and took the command in the afternoon of the 7th. The British likewise despatched a messenger to sir James Yeo, who was off York with the British fleet, with orders to co-operate in the attack on the Americans. Lewis found the army encamped at the Forty Mile creek, on a plain of about a mile in width, ten miles in the rear of the ground where it had been attacked, its right flank resting on the lake, and its left on a creek which skirts the base of a perpendicular mountain of a considerable height.

Lewis had scarcely arrived at the camp before the hostile fleet hove in sight. It did not approach near enough before dark, however, to enable them to ascertain with certainty whether it was Yeo's or Chauncey's squadron. In this state of uncertainty, the army lay on their arms all night, and at break of day struck their tents, when the hostile fleet was discovered abreast of them, about a mile from the shore. About 6, it being a dead calm, the enemy towed in shore a large schooner, which on her approach, opened her fire on the boats which the army had employed for the transportation of their baggage and camp equipage, which then lay on the beach. As soon as her object was perceived, four pieces of artillery were sent down to the shore, and captain Totten of the engineers was ordered to construct a furnace for heating shot, which was prepared and in operation in less than 30 minutes, and the schooner was soon compelled to retire.

A party of Indians now made their appearance on the brow of the mountain (which being perfectly bald, exhibited them to view), and commenced a fire on the camp. They were quickly dislodged, however by a small party under the command of lieutenant Eldridge. The Americans lost not a man by the attacks of the fleet and Indians.

Sir James L. Yeo now sent on shore an officer with a flag, demanding a surrender of the army, it being invested with savages in its rear, a fleet in its front, and a powerful army on its flank. To this demand general Lewis only answered that "the message was too ridiculous to merit a reply."

Between 7 and 8 o'clock the four waggons that were with the army were loaded with the sick, and with ammunition; the camp equipage and baggage was put in the boats, and 700 men were detached to proceed in them for their protection. By some irregularity, however, the boats, induced probably by the stillness of the morning, put off before the detachment reached the shore, and they had not proceeded above three miles, when a breeze sprung up, which enabled an armed schooner to overhaul them. Some of the boats, however, kept on and escaped; the others were run to the shore and deserted, twelve of which were lost, principally loaded with baggage. At 10 o'clock the army was put in motion, and reached Fort George with the loss only of a few stragglers, who were picked up by the militia and Indians.

Shortly after this affair the American troops concentrated at Fort George, having evacuated Fort Erie, and the remainder of the Niagara frontier.

§ 11. On the evening of the 23d of June, Dearborn despatched lieutenant-colonel Berstler, with 570 men, to Beaver Dam, a few miles beyond Queenstown, to attack and disperse a body of the enemy, who had collected there for the purpose of procuring provisions and harrassing those of the inhabitants who were considered friendly to the United States. The force of the enemy was understood to be about 80 regulars, 150 or 200 militia, and from 50 to 60 Indians.

About 8 next morning, when within about two miles of Beaver Dam, Berstler was attacked from an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods. He then retired into a clear field, whence he immediately despatched an express for a reinforcement, stating that he would maintain his position till it arrived. Three hundred men were instantly marched to his relief. They were, however, too late; for, on arriving at Queenstown they received authentic intelligence of the



surrender of the whole detachment, and accordingly returned to camp.

The British account of this affair states that the detachment to which Bærstler surrendered was but small, the Indians being the only force actually engaged ; but that his position was surrounded by woods, which he was led to believe was occupied by a superior force.

§ 12. While the American army was thus employed at Fort George, several enterprises were undertaken by the British. On the night of the 27th of May a force of upwards of 1000 men, under sir George Prevost, were embarked at Kingston on board the British squadron, and in open boats, and immediately sailed for Sackett's Harbour. Next morning they were observed by lieutenant Chauncey, who commanded the small naval force remaining there, the principal part of the American squadron being engaged at Fort George, and he immediately sailed into the harbour firing alarm guns. The alarm being immediately communicated, guns were likewise fired from the alarm posts, in order to bring in the militia, and instant measures taken to resist the attack.

No attempt, however, was made to land on the 28th, the attention of the enemy being drawn off, at the moment when all was prepared for landing, by the appearance of a fleet of American barges passing from Oswego for Sackett's Harbour. The barges of the enemy were immediately despatched to cut them off, and succeeded in taking 12 ; the troops, however, had previously succeeded in landing and gaining the woods, and came into Sackett's Harbour the same evening. The remaining seven boats outsailed the enemy's barges, and got safe into port. It is presumed that the landing was now put off till next morning, under the expectation of cutting off more barges, as the fleet hauled their wind and stood into South Bay, and the armed barges were despatched, apparently in order to waylay them.

During the night a considerable militia force came in, and were stationed on the water side, near Horse Island, on which was placed a small body of Albany volunteers. The moment it was light, the enemy's squadron was perceived in line between Stony Point and Horse Island, and shortly after troops were landed on the latter, from thirty-three large boats, under cover of their gun-boats.

General Brown, who commanded the post, had directed that the volunteers should retreat across the neck which joins Horse Island to the main land, in case of the enemy landing there, which they accordingly did, and joined the militia under his command, amounting to between four and five hundred men.—

The enemy, having landed and passed to the main land, were marching to the town, when they received the fire of the volunteers and militia, which somewhat checked their progress. Unfortunately, however, the militia, totally unacquainted with military discipline, after giving the first fire, rose from their cover and fled to the woods. The handful of volunteers, thus losing their support, were likewise forced to retreat, but being joined by a few regulars from the town, succeeded in rallying a portion of the militia, and, by the aid of the fire from the fort, soon forced the enemy to withdraw to their ships. Unfortunately, the officer who was entrusted with the care of the navy barracks and store-houses, who had been instructed to fire them in case of the enemy proving victorious, mistaking the flight of the militia for a complete repulse, set them on fire, and they were totally consumed.

The American loss in this attack was twenty-one killed and eighty-four wounded, of the volunteers and regulars, and twenty-six missing. Of the militia there were twenty-five killed, wounded, and missing. Of the enemy, twenty-nine were found dead in the field, and twenty-two wounded, and thirty-five were made prisoners; in addition, many were killed in the boats while effecting their landing; a number were likewise carried off the field by the enemy, previous to the commencement of his retreat. In the British official account their loss is stated as follows, viz. : Killed forty-eight, wounded one hundred and ninety-five, wounded and missing, sixteen.

Commodore Chauncey returned to Sackett's Harbour on the 1st of June, from Fort George, where he was compelled to remain for near two months, until the new vessel, the General Pike, was ready for sea, as the enemy's fleet was now considerably superior in force.

§ 13. Meanwhile the British lorded it over the lake. On the 16th of June their fleet appeared off the village of Sodus, where a quantity of provisions was deposited. The militia of the neighbourhood were instantly called to arms, and the following day arrived in considerable force. In the mean while, the enemy having disappeared, the provisions were removed from the warehouses on the water's edge to a small distance in the edge of the woods, and on the 19th the militia were discharged, excepting a small number as a guard. Before evening of the same day, however, the fleet again appeared. The alarm was instantly given, and expresses sent after the discharged militia, who immediately returned, but not in time to save the place.—The enemy having landed, and finding that the greater part of the provisions had been removed, set fire to all the valuable

buildings in the place, which were consumed with their contents.

The next day the fleet appeared off Fort Oswego, and made several attempts to land troops, but each time returned on seeing the American troops ready to meet them on the shore.

§ 14. Another attempt was made on Sackett's Harbour on the night of the 2d of July, by a considerable force in open boats, headed by sir James Yeo. This scheme being discovered by a deserter, commodore Chauncey as soon as possible got under way to intercept their retreat. The British, however, discovered the desertion, and decamped some time before the commodore could reach their place of landing.

§ 15. On the morning of the 11th of July, 250 British regulars crossed the Niagara river, and landed a little below Black Rock. On moving towards that place, they were discovered by about 200 militia, who instantly fled. The enemy then set fire to the barracks, block-houses, &c. spiked several pieces of cannon, and took a quantity of flour and salt, and four small field pieces. While engaged in getting off the property, they were attacked by a force of 100 regulars, 130 militia and volunteers, and 20 or 30 Indians, who had come down from Buffaloe, who poured in upon them a successful fire, by which a considerable number were killed, nine of whom were left dead on the shore, besides a captain mortally wounded. Fifteen prisoners also were taken. They succeeded, however, in carrying off the property. The loss of the Americans was one killed and three wounded, two of whom afterwards died.

§ 16. Nor were the British inactive upon Lake Erie. After their retreat from Fort Meigs in the beginning of May, several threatening movements were made from the lake at Fort Meigs, Lower Sandusky, Cleveland, and Erie. No serious attempt was made, however, on any of these posts, until the first of August, when a combined force of the enemy, amounting to at least 500 regulars and seven or eight hundred Indians, under the immediate command of general Proctor, made its appearance before Lower Sandusky. As soon as the general had made such a disposition of his troops as would cut off the retreat of the garrison, he sent colonel Elliot, accompanied by major Chambers, with a flag, to demand the surrender of the fort, stating that he was anxious to spare the effusion of blood, which he should probably not have in his power to do, should he be reduced to the necessity of taking the place by storm.

The commander of the fort was major Croghan, a youth of 21 years of age. His answer was, that he was determined to defend the place to the last extremity, and that no

force, however large, should induce him to surrender it. So soon as the flag returned, a brisk fire was opened upon the fort, from the gun-boats in the river, and from a five and a half inch howitzer on shore, which was kept up with little intermission throughout the night.

At an early hour the next morning, three sixes, which had been placed during the night within 250 yards of the pickets, began to play, but with little effect. About 4 in the afternoon, discovering that the fire from all the guns was concentrated against the north-western angle of the fort, Croghan became confident that the object was to make a breach, and attempt to storm the works at that point. He therefore ordered out as many men as could be employed for the purpose of strengthening that part, which was so effectually secured by means of bags of flour, sand, &c. that the picketing suffered little or no injury; notwithstanding which, about 500 of the enemy, having formed in close column, advanced to assault the works at the expected point, at the same time making two feints on other parts of the fort. The column which advanced against the north-western angle, consisting of about 350 men, was so completely enveloped in smoke, as not to be discovered until it had approached within 18 or 20 paces of the lines; but the men, being all at their posts and ready to receive it, commenced so heavy and galling a fire as to throw the column a little into confusion; being quickly rallied, however, it advanced to the outer works, and began to leap into the ditch. At that moment a fire of grape was opened from a six-pounder, which had been previously arranged so as to rake in that direction, which, together with the musketry, threw them into such confusion, that they were compelled to retire precipitately to the woods.

During the assault, which lasted about half an hour, an incessant fire was kept up by the enemy's artillery, which consisted of five sixes and a howitzer, but without effect.

Before the attack was ended, the soldiers in the garrison supplied the wounded enemy in the ditch with water, by throwing over full canteens.

The whole number of men in the garrison was not more than 160. Their loss during the siege was 1 killed and seven wounded slightly. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must have exceeded 150; one lieutenant-colonel, a lieutenant, and 50 rank and file were found in and about the ditch, dead or wounded. Those of the remainder who were not able to escape were taken off during the night by the Indians.

About 3 in the morning the enemy sailed down the river, leaving behind them a boat containing clothing and considera-

ble military stores. Seventy stand of arms, and several brace of pistols, were afterwards collected near the works.

A few days after the assault, Proctor despatched a surgeon with a flag of truce, to assist in the care of the wounded, and with a request that such of the prisoners as were in a condition to be removed might be permitted to return to Malden, on *his* parole of honour that they should not serve until exchanged.

Harrison, in his reply, stated, that on his arrival at Fort Sandusky on the morning of the 3d, he found that major Croghan, conformably to those principles which are held sacred in the American army, had caused all the care to be taken of the wounded prisoners that his situation would permit; that his hospital surgeon was particularly charged to attend to them, and he was warranted in the belief that every thing which surgical skill could give was afforded. They have been liberally furnished too, he added, with every article necessary in their situation which the hospital stores could supply. Having referred to his government for orders respecting the disposition of the prisoners, he could not with propriety comply with the request for an immediate exchange. But he assures him, that as far as it depends upon him, the course of treatment which has been commenced towards them while in his possession would be continued.

It is impossible here to avoid contrasting the conduct of Proctor and Harrison, in two exactly parallel cases, the care of the wounded, and treatment of the surgeon sent for their relief after the battles of Frenchtown and Sandusky. In the one case the surgeon is treated with politeness, and only sent back because his aid is unnecessary, and the wounded are supplied with water by the garrison, even whilst the attack is carried on. The opposite conduct need not be repeated here. It has made too deep an impression to be so soon effaced.

## CHAPTER VI.

§ 1. Norfolk threatened by a British squadron. § 2. Bombardment of Lewistown. § 3. Capture of the Dolphin, &c. § 4. Action between the Fox and Adeline. § 5. Annapolis and Baltimore threatened. § 6. Burning of the villages of Havre-de-Grace, &c. § 7. Attack on Craney Island. § 8. Outrages at Hampton. § 9. Decatur's squadron driven into New London. § 10. Attempt to blow up the Ramilies. § 11. Explosion of a torpedo.

§ 1. ON the 26th of December, 1812, an order in council was issued by the British government, declaring the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays in a state of blockade, and on the 20th of March all the ports south of Rhode Island were included. During the winter, intelligence had been repeatedly received by American prisoners from Bermuda, of the arrival of a British squadron at that place, well stored with bombs and Congreve rockets, and with a considerable body of troops on board, for the purpose of destroying some of our southern cities. The alarm, then, that was excited at Norfolk may be easily conceived, when intelligence was received of the approach of this squadron, which on the 4th of February was perceived in the Chesapeake, standing towards Hampton Roads, to the number of two 74's, three frigates, a brig, and a schooner. The frigate Constellation had come down the bay, and anchored in Hampton Roads the day before, and on the arrival of the first news of the near approach of the hostile squadron, it being then ebb-tide, was fast aground at Willoughby spit. Fortunately, however, the flood made, and the ship was afloat, before the enemy hove in sight. She was immediately brought up Elizabeth river to Norfolk, and anchored between the two forts.

Every exertion was now made for the defence of the place, by calling out the militia, &c. ; the recruits at the barracks were brought down to the fort, and the gun-boats stationed in the most favourable position to resist the expected attack. No attempt, however, was made upon the town. The squadron confined its operations to the capturing and destroying the bay craft, and forming an effectual blockade of the waters of the Chesapeake.

§ 2. About the same time a British squadron entered the Delaware bay, which consisted of the Poictiers, 74, the frigate Belvidera, and several small vessels, and for some weeks were

employed in fixing buoys, intercepting and capturing the outward and inward bound vessels, and burning the bay craft. On the 16th of March, sir J. P. Beresford, the commander of the squadron, transmitted a letter to Lewistown, a small fishing town near the mouth of the bay, addressed to the first magistrate, requesting him to send twenty live bullocks, with a proportionate quantity of vegetables and hay, on board the *Poictiers*, for the use of the squadron, which should be immediately paid for at the Philadelphia prices. The request was accompanied with a threat, that, in case of a refusal, he should burn the town.

This demand was positively, though politely, refused, as "a compliance would be an immediate violation of the laws, and an eternal stigma on the nation." To which Beresford answered, "that the demand he had made was, in his opinion, neither ungenerous, nor wanting in that magnanimity which one nation ought to observe to another with which it is at war. It is in my power," continues he, "to destroy your town, and the request I have made upon it, as the price of its security, is neither distressing nor unusual. I must, therefore, persist, and whatever sufferings may fall upon the inhabitants of Lewis, must be attributed to yourselves, by not complying with a request so easily acquiesced in."

Nothing further passed on the subject, till the 6th of April, when they renewed the demand, and fired several 32 pound shot into the town, previous to sending the flag on shore, to show that they were serious in their threats. In Beresford's letter on this occasion, he urges that no dishonour can be attached to complying with his demand, in consideration of his superior force. "I must, therefore," continues he, "consider your refusal to supply the squadron as most cruel on your part to the inhabitants. I grieve for the distress the women and children are reduced to by your conduct, and earnestly desire they may be instantly removed." To this letter merely a verbal reply was returned, that the commander, colonel Davis, was a gallant man, and had already taken care of the ladies. On the return of the flag, a cannonade was commenced from four launches with 24 and 18 pounders; two sloops, with 32 pounders and a mortar; a pilot boat, with six pounders; and a schooner with 12 twelve pounders, covered by the frigate *Belvidera*.

The town, being seated on a considerable eminence, sustained little or no injury; the rockets passing over, and the bombs falling short. The fire from an eighteen pounder on shore, which was supplied by shot thrown by the enemy, silenced one of their most dangerous gun-boats. Above 600 shot were fired at

the place, a great part of which was afterwards dug by the boys out of the sand, viz. 40 of 32lb., 96 of 18lb., 156 of 12's and 9's, with a large quantity of 6's and grape, besides shells and remains of rockets. Not a man was killed on the side of the Americans during this attack.

On the forenoon of the following day, a number of small boats approached the shore, apparently with the intention of landing; but, being gallantly met by the militia on the beach, they were recalled by a signal from the squadron.

§ 3. In the Chesapeake, the principal part of the squadron began to move up the bay about the beginning of April. On the 3d they anchored off the mouth of the Rappahannock, for the purpose of attacking the *Dolphin*, a privateer schooner of 10 guns, and three letters of marque bound for France, which had taken shelter in the river on the approach of the squadron.

Their tenders and launches, to the number of 17, being manned and sent up the river, a furious attack was made on the vessels, which unfortunately lay becalmed. Two of the letters of marque were speedily taken, they making but a slight resistance; the third was run ashore, and most of her crew escaped. The *Dolphin* bore the brunt of the action. The whole force of the enemy was soon directed to her, and she gallantly sustained the contest for two hours, when, at last, they succeeded in boarding her. Even then, however, she did not strike. The fight continued for some time on deck, until, overpowered by numbers, the Americans were forced to submit, the enemy having previously pulled down the colours.

§ 4. A few days previous to this affair, a most unfortunate action took place here between the American privateer *Fox* and the United States schooner *Adeline* and two gun-boats. The schooner and gun-boats were proceeding down the bay, under the command of lieutenant Sinclair, and at midnight made a harbour under Gwinn's island, near the mouth of the Rappahannock. After having anchored in a line across the channel, Sinclair was hailed by the *Fox*, and each taking the other to be an enemy, and consequently refusing to send a boat on board, Sinclair fired a musket ahead of the privateer, which she instantly returned with a broadside.

The schooner and gun-boats then opened their fire, and in fifteen minutes silenced the privateer. Being hailed, however, to know if she had struck, she renewed the action without answering, and in fifteen minutes more was again silenced. On being a second time hailed, she once more opened her fire, which she continued for half an hour, and then cut her cable, and escaped up the bay. On board the *Fox* the captain and five men were



badly wounded, she had one shot in her hull, and her sails &c. were very much cut. The damage on board the schooner, which bore the brunt of the action, was but small, only one man severely wounded, and the rigging a little cut.

§ 5. The hostile squadron continuing to stand up the bay, on the 9th of April they reached Annapolis, and on the 16th appeared off the mouth of the Patapsco, twelve or fourteen miles from Baltimore. Both Annapolis and Baltimore were threatened with an attack, but nothing was attempted, the enemy carefully keeping their vessels at a safe distance from the guns of the forts.

§ 6. But though the fortified towns escaped the vengeance which had so long been threatened, it was not the case with the unprotected villages, which skirt the rivers that fall into the head of the bay. Four of these were laid in ashes by admiral Cockburn, who gallantly led the barges which ascended the rivers for this purpose. These plundering and burning expeditions will long render his name famous in the neighbourhood of the Chesapeake bay.

Having sufficiently signalized their prowess by the burning of Frenchtown, Havre-de-Grace\*, Georgetown, and Fredericktown, and the farm-houses, mills, &c. adjoining, the squadron returned down the bay, destroying the oyster-boats, wood-shallops, and other river craft in their progress, and showing themselves, but at a convenient distance, at every fortification near the bay.

§ 7. The squadron, after returning down the bay, resumed their station in Hampton Roads, with the view of attacking Norfolk. Early on the morning of the 22d of June, they landed a large body of troops, from the accounts of deserters about 2500, on the west side of Elizabeth river, and marched them up towards Craney Island, the passage to which from the main land, is fordable at low water. Forty-five or fifty boats full of men, were then sent to effect a landing on the north side of the island, with whom the force on the main land was directed to co-operate. The whole force on the island at the time of the attack was 487, riflemen, infantry, and artillery, and 150 seamen and marines, forty-three of whom were on the sick list.—With this handful of men was the landing of the enemy successfully opposed, and they were forced to retreat to their ships, with the loss of several boats by the fire of the artillery.

\* The burning and plundering of Havre-de-Grace is perhaps the most signal of Cockburn's exploits. The houses being apart, had to be separately set on fire; and the labour bestowed in injuring the church must have been very considerable, every pane of glass in the building having been broken by stones and brickbats.

§ 8. Foiled in their meditated attack on Norfolk by this repulse at the mouth of the harbour, the British again turned their attention to the easier task of laying waste unprotected villages, and that of Hampton, which lay nearly opposite, naturally presented itself. Here they landed a body of 2500 men, with but little opposition, there being only a small detachment of militia encamped near the town, who were soon forced to retreat under a heavy fire of artillery, musketry, and Congreve rockets. The British now took possession of the village; and here a horrid scene of barbarity ensued, which was characterized by plunder, devastation, murder, and rape. The British troops shortly after retreated to their ships, when a correspondence took place by means of flags between general Taylor, the commandant at Norfolk, and sir Sidney Beckwith, quarter-master-general of the British forces, on the subject of these excesses. Sir Sidney attempted to justify them on the ground of inhumanity in some of the American troops on Craney island, whom he charged with having waded into the river, and shot at their unresisting and yielding foe, who clung to the wreck of a boat which had been sunk by the fire of their guns. This imputation was promptly repelled, and a board of officers was immediately appointed to investigate the charge. From the evidence adduced it appeared, that in the action at Craney island, two of the enemy's boats in front of their line were sunk by the fire of the batteries; the soldiers and sailors who were in those boats were consequently afloat and in danger of drowning, and being in front of the boats that were uninjured, guns were necessarily fired in the direction of the men in the water, but with no intention whatever to do them further harm; but, on the contrary, orders were given to prevent this, by ceasing to fire grape, and only to fire round shot; it also was substantiated that one of the enemy who had apparently surrendered, advanced towards the shore, about one hundred yards, when he suddenly turned to his right and endeavoured to make his escape to a body of the enemy who had landed above the island, and who were then in view; then and not till then was he fired upon to bring him back, which had the desired effect, and he was taken unhurt to the island. It further appeared, that the American troops exerted themselves in acts of hospitality and kindness to the unresisting and yielding foe.

But even if this charge had been founded on fact, it could not have justified the measures adopted by the British. The facts should surely have been first clearly ascertained and redress demanded, before any retaliation was resorted to, especially a retaliation so extravagant in its measure, applying not to the

perpetrators of the alleged offence, nor to their comrades, but to the unresisting, innocent, and helpless.

During the remainder of the summer hostile demonstrations were made by the British squadron in various points on the waters of the Chesapeake, particularly at Washington, Annapolis, and Baltimore, in which, if the aim of the enemy was merely to harass, they were certainly eminently successful. A part of the Chesapeake squadron, under admiral Cockburn, likewise appeared off Ocracock bar, North Carolina, where their barges destroyed two privateers, and landed a number of men at Portsmouth and Ocracock, who committed a number of wanton depredations.

§ 9. The British squadron off New York confined themselves to keeping up a strict blockade. The American frigates *United States* and *Macedonian*, and the sloop of war *Hornet*, sailed from New York on a cruize in the beginning of May. Finding, however, that a much superior force lay off the Hook, they put back, and on the 25th, passed through Hell-gate, with the intention of putting to sea through the sound. This intention was frustrated by the superior force of the enemy in that quarter, by which they were several times driven back, and on the first of June they were chased into New London by two 74's and a frigate, which immediately anchored off that place, and in a few days were joined by the force that had been blockading off the Hook. As the movements of the British indicated an intention of attacking New London, prompt measures were taken for its defence. Six hundred militia were called out, and to insure the safety of his squadron, commodore Decatur landed a number of his guns, which were mounted in a battery, and the vessels, thus lightened, proceeded up the river, where they were secure from any attempt of the larger vessels of the enemy.

New London is situated on the river Thames, about 7 miles from Long Island sound, and can be approached by ships of any draught of water. The channel, however, is narrow, and completely commanded by the surrounding heights, which were so strongly fortified, as to deter the squadron from any hostile attempt. They contented themselves, therefore, with keeping up a blockade, which still exists, and making a few predatory excursions on Long Island and the neighbouring continent.

An act was passed by congress in the winter of 1812-13, to encourage the destruction of the enemy's blockading vessels, by a bounty of half the value of the vessel destroyed, if effected by any other means than by the armed or commissioned vessels of the United States, in consequence of which several abortive at-

tempts were made. The two most remarkable were those against the *Ramilies*, off New London, and against the *Plantagenet*, off Cape Henry, at the mouth of the Chesapeake bay.

§ 10. The attempt on the *Ramilies* was made on the 25th of June. The schooner *Eagle* was loaded at New York with a number of flour barrels filled with gunpowder, in one of which was fixed a gun-lock, with a string to the trigger made fast to the bottom of the vessel. Over these were placed a few barrels of damaged flour. Thus prepared, she threw herself in the way of the boats of the blockading squadron off New London, and on their coming up to take possession of her, the crew took to their boat, and made their escape. It was expected that the schooner would be taken along-side of the *Ramilies* to unload; but the wind and tide being against them, and night coming on, it was determined to unload as much of the flour in the boats as could conveniently be done. When they came to the barrel of powder in which the gun-lock was placed, and hooked the tackle to hoist it on deck, it sprung the trigger, and blew up the schooner and all on board and around her, and in a few seconds not a vestige of them was to be seen.

The attempt on the *Plantagenet* was made in the month of July, by means of a torpedo. On the night of the 18th, Mr. Mix, of the United States navy, accompanied by two persons who volunteered for the purpose, proceeded from Norfolk down to the *Plantagenet*, in a large open boat, and from previous observations found no difficulty in ascertaining her position. When Mix had got to within 40 fathom of her, he dropped the torpedo over, in the very instant of doing which he was hailed by one of the enemy's guard boats. The machine was speedily taken into the boat again, and he made his way off in safety. On the night of the 19th he made another attempt, and was again discovered ere he could accomplish his purpose. On the night of the 20th he succeeded in getting within 15 yards of the ship's bow, and directly under her jib-boom. There he continued making his preparations for 15 minutes, when a centinel from the fore-castle hailed "boat ahoy!" and he had once more to decamp. The centinel not being answered, fired his musket, which was followed by a rapid discharge of small arms. Blue lights were made to find out the boat, but failed; they then threw rockets in different directions, which illuminated the water for a considerable width as far as they were thrown, and succeeded in discovering the position of the nocturnal visitor; when the ship commenced a rapid fire of heavy guns, slipped her cables, and made some sail, while her boats were despatched in pursuit.—The daring intruders, however, escaped un-

hurt.—The visit was repeated on the nights of the 21st, 22d, and 23d, without success, as the ship, having taken the alarm, changed her position every night. On the night of the 24th, however, Mr. Mix succeeded in finding her out, and having taken his position within 100 yards distance, in a direction with her larboard bow, he dropped the fatal machine into the water just as the sentinel was crying *all's well*. It was swept along with the tide, and would have completely effected its errand, it is said, had it not exploded a few seconds too soon. The scene was awfully sublime. It was like the concussion of an earthquake, attended with a sound louder and more terrific than the heaviest peal of thunder. A pyramid of water 50 feet in circumference was thrown up to the height of 30 or 40 feet; its appearance was a vivid red, tinged at the sides with a beautiful purple. On ascending to its greatest height, it burst at the top with a tremendous explosion, and fell in torrents on the deck of the ship, which rolled into the yawning chasm below, and had nearly upset.—Impervious darkness again prevailed. The light occasioned by the explosion, though fleeting, enabled Mr. Mix and his companions to discover that the forechannel of the ship was blown off, and a boat which lay alongside with several men in her, was thrown up in the dreadful convulsion of the waters. Terrible, indeed, must have been the panic of the ship's crew, from the noise and confusion which appeared to our adventurers to prevail on board; and they are certain that nearly the whole ship's crew hastily betook themselves to the boats.

## CHAPTER VII.

§ 1. Cruises on lake Erie. § 2. Capture of the British squadron. § 3. Evacuation of Malden and Detroit. § 4. Capture of the British army. § 5. Moderation of the conquerors. § 6. Expedition to the Peoria lake. § 7. Inactivity of the army at Fort George. § 8. Chauncey's cruises on lake Ontario. § 9. Engagement with the Royal George under Kingston batteries. § 10. Engagement with Yeo's squadron. § 11. Yeo chased round the lake. § 12. Chauncey's second engagement with Yeo. § 13. Capture of the British transports.

§ 1. MEANWHILE the utmost exertions were used by captain Perry, to increase the naval armament on lake Erie. Two twenty gun brigs were launched at Erie, the American port on the lake, about the middle of June, and shortly after Perry arrived there from Black Rock with the *Caledonia*, and the small schooners. The brigs being now equipped and manned, Perry, on the 4th of August, sailed as commodore of the squadron, and succeeded in getting them over the bar at the mouth of the harbour, in the face of the British squadron, who fortunately made no attack, which might have been attended with serious consequences, as the water on the bar being but five feet deep, the large vessels had to be buoyed over. The following day Perry sailed in quest of the enemy, but returned on the 8th without meeting him. He was again about to sail on the same day, when he received intelligence of captain Elliot's arrival at Cataragus with a reinforcement of sailors, on which the cruize was delayed, and a vessel immediately despatched to bring them on.

On the arrival of the reinforcement, Perry again sailed on the 12th, and on the 15th arrived at Sandusky bay, where the army under general Harrison lay encamped. Thence he cruised off Malden, where the British squadron were anchored under the guns of the fort. The appearance of the American squadron is said to have created great alarm on shore; the women and children ran shrieking about the place, expecting an immediate attack. The enemy, however, not being prepared or disposed to give battle, though strongly urged thereto by the Indians, Perry returned to Sandusky.

§ 2. At sunrise on the morning of the 10th of September, the squadron of the enemy was discovered from Put-in-Bay, where

Perry lay at anchor with the squadron under his command. He immediately got under weigh and stood for him, with a light wind at south-west. At 10 o'clock the wind hauled to the south-east, which brought the American squadron to windward, on which Perry hoisted his union jack, having for a motto the dying words of captain Lawrence, "Don't give up the ship," which was received with repeated cheerings by the officers and crews. The line was now formed, and they bore up for the enemy, but, owing to the lightness of the wind, did not approach within long shot until 15 minutes before 12, when the enemy commenced firing on the Lawrence, the commodore's ship, which was considerably ahead of the others. The firing was received for ten minutes before it was returned, an advantage which the enemy derived from the superior length of their guns, and the lightness of the wind, which allowed Perry to approach them but slowly. Without waiting for his other vessels, however, Perry gallantly kept on his course, receiving the whole fire of the enemy, until, gaining a nearer position, he opened his fire.

Finding the fire of the enemy on the Lawrence very destructive, from the length of their guns, and its being mostly directed at that vessel, Perry again made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bow-line, however, being soon shot away, the Lawrence became unmanageable, and in this situation sustained the fire of the British squadron for two hours within cannon distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and the greater part of the crew either killed or wounded.

At this critical moment, when the enemy must have counted the victory certain, Perry formed the bold resolution of shifting his flag. The wind fortunately sprung up, which enabled captain Elliot to bring his vessel, the Niagara, into close action, and Perry immediately went on board of her, under the broadsides and discharges of small arms of the enemy, two of whose vessels were within musket shot, and a third one nearer. As soon as Perry got on board, captain Elliot, anticipating his wish, volunteered to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action.

At this moment the commodore, to his unspeakable pain, saw the flag of the Lawrence pulled down. The event was, however, unavoidable. All her guns were dismantled, and scarcely a man on board unhurt. In this situation, to have continued to make a show of resistance, would have been a wanton sacrifice of the remains of her brave crew. The enemy, however, was

not able to take possession of her, and subsequent circumstances soon permitted her flag again to be hoisted\*.

At 45 minutes past two the signal was made for close action, and the Niagara being very little injured, Perry determined to break the enemy's line. He accordingly bore up, and passing ahead of their two ships and a brig, gave them a raking fire from his starboard guns, and from the larboard side to a large-schooner and a sloop, at half pistol-shot distance. The smaller vessels now got within grape and cannister distance by the aid of their sweeps, and so well directed a fire was kept up, that the whole British squadron, consisting of two ships, two brigs, a schooner, and a sloop, was forced to surrender, the schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.

This engagement lasted about three hours, and never was victory more decisive and complete. The captured squadron had more numerous crews, and exceeded the American squadron both in number of guns and weight of metal. The prisoners taken were more in number than their conquerors.

The loss on both sides was very severe. That of the Americans was principally on board the Lawrence, where few indeed escaped unhurt; among those few were the commodore and his brother, a midshipman on board the same vessel. The number of the enemy's killed and wounded was not ascertained. It must, however, have been very great, their vessels being literally cut to pieces. Commodore Barclay, the commander of the British squadron, was twice carried below on account of his wounds. He had seen much service, having been desperately wounded in the battle of Trafalgar, and afterwards losing an arm in another engagement with the French. Two Indian chiefs had been stationed in the tops of the Detroit, the British commodore's ship, to shoot down the American officers; but, when the action became warm, so panic struck were they with the terrors of the scene, and the strange perils that surrounded them, that they fled precipitately to the hold of the ship, where they were found after the battle in a state of utter consternation. The bodies of several other Indians are said to have been found next day on the shore of the lake, supposed to have been killed during the engagement, and thrown overboard.

Great as had been the public rejoicings on the former victories of the American navy, they were little to what took place on

\* Some of our wiseacre fault-finders have had the folly to represent the rehoisting of the flag of the Lawrence as an unjustifiable act, forgetful that it could not be for the purpose of joining in the action, as not a single gun remained mounted. The circumstances which enabled her to hoist her flag were undoubtedly the capture of the whole of the hostile fleet.



this occasion. The triumph was so complete, and the consequences certain to result from it so important, that it could not fail to excite the most unbounded joy in every bosom, which spontaneously expressed itself every where by illuminations and other public rejoicings, in which all parties, forgetful of their political feuds, vied with each other in paying honours to the young hero and his noble compatriots.

In this action commodore Perry showed himself to be a true American tar, not only by his presence of mind and dauntless valour in the hour of danger, but by his modesty, gallantry, and humanity amidst the triumphs of victory. The utmost care was taken not only of the sick and wounded of his own squadron, but of that of the conquered; and commodore Barclay declared, that "the conduct of Perry towards the captive officers and men was sufficient, of itself, to immortalize him."

§ 3. As soon as the prisoners and wounded were landed, the fleet was employed in concentrating general Harrison's army, by transporting them from Portage river and Fort Meigs to Put-in-bay. This duty was completed about the 20th of September, and on the 22d about 1200 of the troops were landed by Perry on a small island about four leagues from Malden. On the following day they were again embarked, and landed in the afternoon a small distance below Malden, and in an hour after Harrison took possession of the town of Amherstburg, without opposition, general Proctor having previously burnt Fort Malden, the navy-yard, barracks, and public store-houses, and then retreated to Sandwich. Being followed by Harrison, he retired to a strong position on the right bank of the river Thames, near Moravian Town, about 80 miles from Detroit, leaving the Michigan territory in the possession of the Americans.

§ 4. On the 2d of October general Harrison left Sandwich in pursuit of Proctor, with about 140 regulars, colonel Johnson's mounted regiment, and the Kentucky volunteers under the venerable governor Shelby, amounting, in the whole, to near 3500 men. Harrison was accompanied by commodore Perry, who volunteered as his aid-de-camp.

The army reached the river Thames, which falls into lake St. Clair, twenty-five miles above Detroit, the same evening, and next morning crossed by a bridge, which Proctor had neglected to destroy. Harrison put himself at the head of the mounted regiment, and pushed forward, in order, if possible, to save the bridges over three branches of the Thames, which ran between him and the British army. At the first of these they captured a lieutenant of dragoons and eleven privates, who had been despatched by Proctor to destroy it; and the second having been

but imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army passed over and encamped, on the evening of the 3d of October.

The baggage had thus far been brought in boats accompanied by gun-boats, to protect it, and if necessary to cover the passage of the army across the rivers; but the river above being narrow, with high woody banks, it became necessary to leave the baggage under a guard, and to trust to the bravery of the troops to effect a passage across the remaining stream. Next morning, about eight miles above their encampment, the army arrived at the third unfordable branch of the Thames, where they found that the bridge over its mouth, as well as one a mile above, had been taken up by the Indians. Here several hundred of the Indians attempted to dispute the passage of the troops, but the fire from two six-pounders soon drove them off, and in about two hours the bridge was repaired and the troops crossed, just in time to extinguish a house that had been set on fire containing a considerable number of muskets, which were fortunately saved. At the first farm above the bridge was found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, and here intelligence was received that they were but a few miles ahead.

The army halted for the night about four miles above the bridge, where they found two other vessels and a large distillery filled with ordnance and other valuable stores to an immense amount, in flames. It was impossible to extinguish the fire, but two mounted twenty-four pounders were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes. Early on the morning of the 5th the troops were again put in motion, and in the afternoon the officer commanding the advance sent to inform general Harrison that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across the line of march.

Between the two armies, the road passed through an unclear-ed beech forest, pretty clear of underwood, near the banks of the river, parallel to which, at the distance of two or three hundred yards, extended a swamp several miles in length. Across this strip of land the British were drawn up, their left resting on the river, supported by artillery, their right on the swamp, covered by the Indians.

The American troops were now formed in order of battle. General Trotter's brigade formed the front line, his right upon the road, and his left upon the swamp, with general Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, formed *en potence*\*, upon his

\* Troops are ranged *en potente* by breaking a straight line, and throwing a certain proportion of it either forward or backward, from the right or left, according to circumstances, for the purpose of securing that line.—*Duane's Military Dictionary*.

left. General King's brigade formed a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's; and Chiles' brigade a corps of reserve in the rear. Trotter's, King's, and Chiles' brigades formed the command of major-general Henry. Each brigade averaged nearly 500 men. The crotchet formed by Desha's division was occupied by Shelby, the governor of Kentucky, a veteran of sixty-six years of age, who had distinguished himself in the revolutionary war at King's Mountain. The regular troops, who now amounted only to 120 men, occupied in columns of sections of four the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery, and ten or twelve friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. Harrison had directed Johnson's mounted infantry to form in two lines opposite to the enemy, and, when the infantry advanced, to take ground to the left, and, forming upon that flank, to endeavour to turn the right of the Indians. It was perceived, however, that it would be impracticable for them to do any thing on horseback in that quarter, owing to the thickness of the woods and swampiness of the ground. A measure altogether novel was therefore determined on, which was crowned with the most signal success.—The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. A charge was determined on, and accordingly the regiment was drawn up in close column, with its right at the distance of fifty yards from the road, that it might in some measure be protected by the trees from the artillery, and the left upon the swamp.

The army moved on in this order but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line, and were instantly ordered to charge. The horses in the front of the column recoiled from the fire; but, on receiving a second fire, the column got into motion, and immediately, at full speed, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute the contest was over in front. The British officers, seeing no hope of reducing their disordered ranks to order, the mounted infantry wheeling upon them, and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. Only three of the Americans were wounded in this charge.

Upon the American left, however, the contest with the Indians was more severe. Colonel Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect. The Indians still further to the left advanced, and fell in with the front line of infantry, near its junction with the division *en potence*, and for a moment made an impression upon it. Governor Shelby, however, who,

as already stated, was stationed near this point, brought up a regiment to its support. The enemy now received a severe fire in front, and a part of the mounted men having gained their rear, they immediately retreated with precipitation.

§ 5. The moment had now arrived which was to prove whether the stigma which had been thrown on our Kentucky brethren was founded on truth or falsehood ; when it was to be seen whether they were “ a ferocious and mortal foe, using the same mode of warfare\*” with the allies of Britain. The troops who had now completely in their power the army under whose eyes had been acted the tragedy of the river Raisin, and that which was acted on the Miami after the defeat of colonel Dudley, were almost exclusively composed of Kentuckians, of men who had lost their brothers or friends in those shocking scenes. Nor were even the instruments of vengeance wanting. They were accompanied by the savages, that had perpetrated those deeds, who had just been suing for mercy, and would gladly have shown their claims to it, by re-acting upon the Thames the bloody scenes of the river Raisin. But how did they avail themselves of the opportunity which now presented ? Did they turn the tide of horrible warfare which had deluged their borders in the blood of wounded prisoners, and of helpless age and infancy, upon the heads of its abettors ? No : to their honour and to the honour of their country be it spoken, they did not. The moment they were in their power all injuries were magnanimously forgotten, and the prisoners received the most honourable and delicate treatment from the hands of those whom they had stigmatised as savages, the employment of whom justified the use of the Indians.

Of the British troops, 12 were killed and 22 wounded in this action, and six hundred and one regulars were taken prisoners. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by 40 dragoons and a number of mounted Indians. The Indians suffered the greatest loss. Thirty-three were found dead on the ground, besides numbers who were killed in the retreat. On the day of the action six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two twenty-four pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, which were expected to be saved. Of the brass pieces, three were trophies of the revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull. The number of small arms captured by the Americans, or destroyed by the enemy, must have exceeded

\* General Brock's proclamation, for which see page 33 of *Official Documents*.

5000; most of them had been taken by the British at Detroit, the river Raisin, and the Miami. The loss of the Americans was seven killed and twenty-two wounded, five of whom have since died.

The American troops certainly deserved great praise for their conduct in this action; for, although they considerably outnumbered the British, it must be recollected that they were only militia, and that the British had chosen a position that effectually secured their flanks, and which it was impossible for the Americans to turn, or to present a line more extended than that of the enemy.

As soon as Harrison took possession of Amherstburg and Sandwich, and re-occupied the territory of Michigan, several of the Indian tribes submitted and brought in hostages for their good behaviour, and while he was in pursuit of the British, five more tribes followed their example, and brought hostages to Detroit. They were received by general M'Arthur, whom Harrison had left in the command of that place, and it was agreed that hostilities should cease for the present, on condition that they should "take hold of the same tomahawk with the Americans, and strike all who are, or may be, enemies to the United States, whether British or Indians."

The army returned to Detroit shortly after the battle, where they embarked on board the fleet for Buffaloe, in order to join the army under general Wilkinson.

§ 6. About the middle of September an expedition was sent from St. Louis, on the Mississippi, against the Indian settlements on the Peoria lake on the river Illinois. It consisted of about 300 regulars of the 1st regiment of United States infantry, with a considerable body of rangers and mounted militia, under the command of brigadier-general Howard. The regulars ascended the Illinois in boats; the mounted troops proceeded up the Mississippi in two divisions, one on each side of the river, for a considerable distance, and then crossed the country to the Peoria lake. The different detachments had not proceeded far before it was discovered that the enemy were descending the Illinois to ravage the frontier; and a skirmish took place between a party of Indians and the detachment on the east side of the Mississippi, who, however, soon drove them before them. On the evening of the 28th of September, the two detachments that had marched up the Mississippi, and thence across to the Illinois, arrived within a few miles of the old village, and three men were sent forward to discover whether the regulars had arrived. During the night lieutenant-colonel Nicholson, who commanded the regulars, descended the Illinois to the encamp-

ment, and reported their arrival at Peoria, where they had commenced building a fort. He had been attacked by the Indians the day previous; but the enemy were soon dispersed by a well-directed discharge of musketry, with the aid of a six-pounder from two unfinished block-houses. In this attack none of the men were killed, and only one wounded.—It was evident that the assailants suffered considerably, but to what extent could not be ascertained.

On the 29th the mounted troops arrived at Peoria, and as soon as provisions could be drawn, were marched up the Illinois to the villages at the head of the lake, which was the direction in which the enemy appeared to have retired from Peoria. The villages, being found deserted, were destroyed, and the troops returned to Peoria, where they remained till the garrison was put in a state of defence. Two detachments were then sent in pursuit of the enemy, one of which ascended the Illinois above the mouth of the Vermillion river to the Rapids, and within 17 miles of Chicago, on lake Michigan. The other penetrated the country northwardly to within about 45 miles of Rock river. The latter discovered several encampments, which appeared to have been deserted about the time of the army's arrival at Peoria, but neither of them were able to come up with the enemy.

The mounted troops remained at Peoria from the 2d to the 15th of October, during which time they were actively engaged, together with the United States infantry, in erecting Fort Clarke, which stands at the lower end of the Peoria lake, completely commanding the Illinois river. This fort is one of the strongest in the western country, and highly important to the safety of the Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri territories.

The mounted troops moved from Peoria for the settlements on the 15th, leaving the regulars to garrison the fort. They pursued generally a south course till the 21st, when they arrived at Camp Russell, where the mounted militia were discharged, and the rangers sent across the country to Vincennes on the Wabash, where they safely arrived shortly after.

§ 7. After the capture of Børstler's detachment, the army at Fort George remained inactive, with the exception of a few trifling skirmishes and attacks on out-posts, for the remainder of the summer. Two circumstances are supposed to have caused this inactivity. The first was the constant indisposition of general Dearborn, which prevented him from taking any active part, and which continued till the 15th of July, when he received orders to retire from the command of the army, until his health should be re-established, and until further orders, the command devolving on brigadier-general Boyd. But the

principal cause of the inactivity of this army is presumed to have been, the danger and indeed impracticability of undertaking great military movements before Chauncey had obtained the complete command of Lake Ontario. Before this was achieved the army would always be liable to be surrounded, and to have its supplies cut off, and could not expect to be successful even with a force considerably superior to that of the enemy. The disaster at Detroit had taught a salutary lesson on this subject.

§ 8. Every exertion was accordingly made by commodore Chauncey for the attainment of this important object. After the capture of Fort George, however, commodore sir James Yeo, who commanded the British squadron, having added considerably to his force both of vessels and sailors, obliged Chauncey to remain in port until the new vessel the General Pike could be got ready, which was not completed until the middle of July. Before we enter upon the trial of skill which now ensued between Chauncey and Yeo, it may not be improper to take a view of his previous operations.

Commodore Chauncey arrived at Sackett's Harbour on the 6th of October, 1812, as commander of the United States forces on the lakes, at which time the only American vessel on these waters was the brig Oneida, of 18 guns. He immediately purchased six merchant vessels, schooners, which were fitted out as gun-boats. His whole squadron mounted 40 guns of different calibres, with 450 men, including mariners. The British force on Lake Ontario consisted at this time of the ship Royal George, of 26 guns and 260 men, ship Earl Moira, 18 guns and 200 men, and the schooners Prince Regent, 18 guns and 250 men, Duke of Gloucester, 14 guns and 80 men, Toronto, 14 guns and 80 men, Governor Simcoe, 12 guns and 70 men, and Seneca, 4 guns and 40 men, making a grand total of 108 guns and 890 men. Chauncey's squadron, especially the schooners, were poor vessels and dull sailers, but his men were much superior, a great part of the enemy's sailors at this time being Canadians.

§ 9. On the 8th of November Chauncey sailed in the Oneida with his six schooners, in pursuit of the enemy, and on the same day fell in with the Royal George, which he chased into the bay of Quant, where he lost sight of her in the night. Next morning he again discovered her in Kingston channel, and immediately gave chase, and followed her into the harbour of Kingston, where he engaged her and the batteries for an hour and three quarters. Chauncey had made up his mind to board her notwithstanding she was protected by the batteries; but the wind blowing directly in, the pilots refused to take

charge of the vessels, and it was therefore deemed imprudent to make the attempt at this time. He accordingly hauled off and beat up, under a heavy fire from the enemy, to Four-mile point, where the squadron anchored. During the night it blew heavy, with squalls from the westward, and there being every appearance of a gale of wind, the pilot became alarmed, and Chauncey thought it most prudent to get into a place of more safety, and therefore reluctantly deferred renewing the attack until a more favourable opportunity.

The signal was made to weigh at 7 next morning, and the squadron beat out of a very narrow channel, under a heavy press of sail, to the open lake. At 10 they fell in with the Governor Simcoe, which escaped into Kingston harbour by running over a reef of rocks, under a heavy fire from three of the schooners, during which all her people ran below. It now coming on to blow very heavy, Chauncey bore up for Sackett's Harbour, and on his way thither captured two schooners, one of which was burnt, after taking out her sails and rigging.

The Oneida, in this affair, had one man killed, and three slightly wounded, and a few shot through her sails. The schooners lost no men by the enemy's fire, and received but little injury in their hulls and sails. One of their guns, however burst early in the action, which wounded her commander badly, and a midshipmen and three men slightly. The Royal George received considerable injury in her hull and in men, as the gun-vessels, with their long thirty-two pounders, were seen to strike her almost every shot, and it was observed that she was reinforced with men three different times during the action.

On the 12th Chauncey learnt that the Earl Moira was off the False Ducks, and immediately put off in a snow storm, in the hope of cutting her off from Kingston. In this he was disappointed, as she escaped into the harbour. A vessel under her convoy, however, was captured, in which was captain Brock, brother to the general. Chauncey now blockaded Kingston until the 7th of December, when he returned to Sackett's Harbour, being no longer able to keep the lake on account of the ice. During the winter the ship Madison, of 24 guns, was launched and fitted out.

The capture of York and Fort George have already been noticed in the fifth chapter of this volume. After these events nothing of importance occurred until the end of July, Chauncey being unable to keep the lake, owing to several new vessels being fitted out by the British, and the arrival of sir James Yeo, with a large body of seamen, to take command of the British squadron on Lake Ontario. It may be proper to mention,



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however, that the brig *Duke of Gloucester* was captured at York, and on the 18th of June lieutenant Chauncey, in the new schooner *Lady of the Lake*, captured, on the 16th of June, the schooner *Lady Murray*, laden with provisions and ammunition, and sixteen officers and privates, besides the seamen.

About the middle of July, the *General Pike* being ready to sail, which brought the two squadrons nearly to a state of equality, Chauncey sailed from Sackett's Harbour, and, stretching over for the enemy's shore, thence stood up the lake. He arrived off Niagara on the 27th. Here he was informed by general Boyd, that the enemy had a considerable deposit of provisions and stores at Burlington Bay, which he determined to attempt to destroy, and for that purpose embarked a small number of regulars. At six o'clock on the morning of the 28th, the fleet proceeded for the head of the lake, but, owing to light winds and calms, did not arrive there before the evening of the 29th. Two parties were immediately sent on shore, who surprised and took some of the inhabitants, from whom it was learned, that the enemy had received considerable reinforcements, and that his force in regulars was from six to eight hundred men. The troops, marines, and a few sailors were, however, landed next morning, but, on reconnoitering the enemy's position, he was found posted on a peninsula of very high ground, strongly entrenched, and his camp defended by about eight pieces of cannon. In this situation it was not thought advisable to attack him with a force scarcely half his numbers, and without artillery; more especially as they were deficient in boats, not having a sufficient number to cross the bay with all the troops at the same time. They accordingly re-embarked in the course of the afternoon, and in the evening weighed and stood for York, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 31st. The schooners ran into the inner harbour, where the marines and troops were landed without opposition. Several hundred barrels of flour and provisions were found in the public storehouse, together with five pieces of cannon, eleven boats, and a quantity of shot, shells, and other stores, all of which were either destroyed or brought away. Next morning, after burning the barracks and public storehouses, the men were re-embarked, and the fleet sailed for Niagara, where it arrived on the 3d of August.

§ 10. At day-light of the 7th, the enemy's fleet being discovered to windward, distant about five or six miles, Chauncey weighed and stood towards them. The whole of this and the next day was spent by the two squadrons in manœuvring to gain a favourable position, in which Chauncey was much baffled by

the dull sailing of his schooners, two of which were lost in a squall in the night, and every soul on board perished except sixteen. In the evening of the 8th, it being very squally, with the appearance of its continuing so during the night, Chauncey ran in towards Niagara, and anchored outside of the bar.

The following morning (August 9th), Chauncey again weighed and stood towards the enemy, when a trial of nautical skill once more commenced between the two commanders, each entertaining too respectful an opinion of the other's force to come to an engagement without having the advantage of the wind. In the course of the day the wind frequently veered, which instantly changed the characters of the pursuers and the pursued. At length, towards midnight, Yeo, whose vessels sailed much better in squadron than those of Chauncey, succeeded in cutting off two of the American heavy-sailing schooners, which, added to Chauncey's loss in the squall, gave Yeo a considerable superiority of force over his opponent. Chauncey, therefore, ordered two of his dullest sailing vessels to run into Niagara, and stood with the rest of his squadron towards Sackett's Harbour, where he arrived on the 13th.

§ 11. Having victualled his squadron, which was reinforced with a new schooner, Chauncey shortly after sailed on a cruise, and on the 7th of September, at day-light, while lying in Niagara river, discovered the enemy's fleet close in with the shore. The signal was instantly made to weigh, and the fleet stood out of the river after him. Yeo immediately made all sail to the northward, and Chauncey pursued for four days, but was prevented from closing with him by the heavy sailing of his schooners. On the fourth day, while off Genesee river, Chauncey was favoured with a breeze, while Yeo lay becalmed until his opponent got within about three quarters of a mile of him, when he took the breeze. The squadrons now had a running fight for three hours and a half, when the British got out of gun-shot by their superior sailing. The next morning Yeo ran into Amherst bay, having been chased for five days without intermission. Amherst bay was so little known to the American pilots, and said to be so full of shoals, that they were not willing to take in the fleet; Chauncey, therefore, stationed his vessels off Duck island, with the intention of blockading the enemy, and preventing them from getting out upon the lake.

In the running fight which took place on the 11th, the British sustained considerable injury both in men and vessels. On board the American fleet not a man was hurt, and the vessels suffered no injury of any importance.

Chauncey continued his blockade until the 17th of September, when, the wind blowing heavy from the westward, and the enemy having run into Kingston, he left his station for Sackett's Harbour, where he arrived the same night. Next morning at day-light he again sailed, and on the 19th saw the enemy's fleet near the False Ducks, but took no notice of him, as he wished him to follow up the lake. The squadron arrived in Niagara river on the 24th.

§ 12. On the 26th, it was reported to Chauncey that the enemy's fleet was in York, when he immediately despatched the *Lady of the Lake* to ascertain the fact. She returned in the evening with the information that the enemy was in York bay. The squadron immediately weighed anchor, but, owing to a strong head wind, was not able to get out of the river till the evening of the 27th. Owing to the extreme darkness of the night a part of the squadron got separated, and did not join till next morning at eight, when the *General Pike*, *Madison*, and *Sylph* each took a schooner in tow, and made all sail for York, and soon after discovering the enemy's fleet under way in York bay, the squadron shaped their course for them, and prepared for action.

Yeo, perceiving that Chauncey intended to engage him in his position, tacked and stood out of the bay, with the wind at east. Chauncey formed the line and ran down for his centre, and when he approached within about three miles of him, Yeo made all sail to the southward. Chauncey's squadron then wore in succession, and stood on the same tack with him, edging down gradually in order to close; and about twelve o'clock, Yeo, finding he must either risk an action, or suffer his two rear vessels to be cut off, tacked his squadron in succession, beginning at the van, hoisted his colours, and commenced a well-directed fire at the *Pike*, for the purpose of covering his rear, and attacking the rear of his opponent as he passed to leeward. Chauncey perceived his intention, and therefore, as soon as the *Wolfe*, the enemy's leading ship, passed the centre, and got abeam of the American squadron, he bore up in succession, preserving the line, for the centre of the British squadron. This manœuvre of Chauncey's not only covered his rear, but threw the enemy into confusion, and caused him immediately to bear away. Chauncey had now, however, closed so near as to bring his guns to bear with effect, and in twenty minutes the main and mizen top-mast and main yard of the *Wolfe* were shot away. Yeo immediately put before the wind, and set all sail upon his fore-mast; Chauncey made the signal for the fleet to make all sail; but the enemy, by keeping dead before the wind, which brought all

the sail upon one mast, and prevented his feeling the loss of his main and mizen topmast, was enabled to outsail most of Chauncey's squadron. The chase was continued till near three o'clock, during the whole of which the Pike, with the Asp in tow, was within point-blank shot of the enemy, and sustained the whole of his fire. Captain Crane in the Madison, and lieutenant Brown in the Oneida, used every exertion to close with the enemy; but the Madison having a heavy schooner in tow, and the Oneida sailing very dull before the wind, prevented those officers from closing near enough to do any execution with their carronades. The Governor Tompkins kept in her station, until her fore-mast was so badly wounded as to oblige her to shorten sail.

Commodore Chauncey now reluctantly relinquished the pursuit. The reasons which induced this determination are thus stated in his letter to the secretary of the navy: "At the time I gave up the chase, this ship was making so much water, that it required all our pumps to keep her free (owing to our receiving several shot so much below the water edge, that we could not plug the holes from the outside); the Governor Tompkins with her fore-mast gone; and the squadron within about six miles of the head of the lake, it blowing a gale of wind from east, and increasing, with a heavy sea on, and every appearance of the equinox. I considered that if I chased the enemy to his anchorage at the head of the lake, I should be obliged to anchor also; and although we might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was, that we should go on shore also—he amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies; and after the gale abated, if he could succeed in getting off one or two vessels out of the two fleets, it would give him as completely the command of the lake as if he had twenty vessels. Moreover, he was covered at his anchorage by a part of his army, and several small batteries thrown up for the purpose. Therefore, if we could have rode out the gale, we should have been cut up by their shot from the shore: under all these circumstances, and taking into view the consequences resulting from the loss of our superiority on the lakes at this time, I without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then presenting itself, of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my country."

The loss sustained by the Pike, the commodore's ship, was considerable, owing to her being so long exposed to the fire of the whole of the enemy's fleet; but her most serious loss was occasioned by the bursting of one of her guns, which killed and wounded twenty-two men, and tore up the top-gallant fore-castle, which rendered the gun upon that deck useless. Four other



guns were cracked in the muzzle, which rendered their use extremely doubtful. Her main-top-gallant-mast was shot away in the early part of the action, and the bow-sprit, fore and main-mast wounded, rigging and sails much cut up, and a number of shot in her hull, several of which were between wind and water, and twenty-seven men killed and wounded, including those by the bursting of the gun. The Madison received a few shot, but no person was hurt on board. The Governor Tompkins lost her fore-mast, and the Oneida had her main-top-mast badly wounded.

During the chase, one or two of the enemy's small vessels were completely within Chauncey's power, but in the eagerness of his pursuit of the larger, he passed them unattacked, by which means they finally escaped.

Meanwhile general Wilkinson had arrived at Fort George, in order to take the command of the army. About the same time the secretary at war arrived at Sackett's Harbour, in order to be more conveniently situated for superintending military operations.

The wind still continuing unfavourable for an attack on the British squadron at the head of the lake, Chauncey ran off Niagara for the purpose of communicating with Wilkinson, to ascertain when he meant to move with the army to Sackett's Harbour. It was the general's opinion, that the public service would be best promoted by his watching the enemy's squadron, or, if possible, preventing its return to Kingston, while he moved with the army down the lake. Chauncey, therefore, having taken part of the troops on board his squadron, the remainder proceeding in boats to Sackett's Harbour, immediately proceeded in quest of the enemy. The following morning, October 2d, he discovered the British squadron standing towards him, and made all sail in chase; but as soon as the fleets approached so near as plainly to discern each other, Yeo put about, and stood towards the head of the lake. The chase continued until the 4th, little progress being made against the current, from the lightness or variableness of the wind, the British, however, evidently gaining ground of the American squadron. The morning of the 4th proving hazy, nothing could be seen of the enemy, and about noon it fell calm, when Chauncey ordered the Lady of the Lake to sweep up to Burlington bay, which was not far distant, to ascertain whether or not the squadron was there. In the evening she returned with information that the fleet was gone, there being nothing in the bay but two gun-boats.

§ 13. It was now evident that Yeo, availing himself of the darkness of the preceding night, had either run for Kingston, or down the lake for the purpose of intercepting the flotilla with the army. Chauncey, therefore, immediately made all sail, and shaped his course for the Ducks, with a view of intercepting him, or his prizes, if he should have made any. The wind blowing a strong gale from the northward and westward, the fleet made a great run, and at three in the afternoon of the 5th, discovered seven sail near the False Ducks, to which, presuming they were the enemy's fleet, they instantly gave chase. In about an hour, however, they were discovered to be sloops and schooners, and were perceived to be separating on different tacks, on which the Sylph and the Lady of the Lake were dispatched after one part, and Chauncey in the Pike pursued the others. About five o'clock the enemy, finding that the Pike was fast gaining on him, took the people out of one of his gun vessels which sailed worse than the rest, and set her on fire. This, however, availed them but little, for, at sun-down, three of their vessels were forced to strike to the Pike, and soon after the Sylph captured another. A fifth ran into the Ducks, but the Sylph, which was left to watch her, took possession of her early next morning. A small schooner was the only vessel that escaped, owing to the darkness of the night.

The captured vessels were found to be gun-vessels, with troops from the head of the lake, but last from York, bound to Kingston. Two of them were the Julia and Growler, which Chauncey had lost in the action of the 9th of August. The prisoners taken amounted to nearly 300, principally belonging to the De Watteville, a German regiment. From them it was learnt that the British fleet, in the action of the 28th of September, at the head of the lake, was very much cut up in their hulls and spars, and had a great many killed and wounded, particularly on board of the Wolfe and Royal George.

## CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1. Movements on lake Champlain. § 2. General Hampton invades Canada. § 3. Wilkinson moves down the St. Lawrence. § 4. Battle of Williamsburgh. § 5. Hampton declines a junction. § 6. The army moves into winter-quarters. § 7. Evacuation of Fort George. § 8. Fort Niagara taken by storm. § 9. The Niagara frontier laid waste.

§ 1. In addition to the army in Ohio, and that on the Niagara frontier, a considerable body of troops was collected in the summer of 1812, upon lake Champlain; a number of vessels also were built to gain the command of those waters. In the campaign of that year, however, no important movement was made in this quarter. Towards the end of May, 1813, several of the British gun-boats having crossed the lines, for the purpose of capturing the craft upon the lake, two of the American armed sloops, the Eagle and Growler, sailed from Plattsburg on the 2d of June for their protection. They arrived within about a mile of the lines about dark, where they cast anchor for the night. Next morning, about day-break, they discovered three British gun-boats, to which they gave chase, but the wind being south, they unfortunately ran so far into the narrow channel that they found it difficult to return, and the Eagle, not being sufficiently strong for her weight of metal, became unmanageable, and at last went down; the water, however, being shoal, the crew were saved. The Growler, unwilling to abandon her companion, continued to fight until after the Eagle sunk, when she was compelled to strike to superior force. The enemy had five gun-boats in the action, besides a considerable force in musquetry on both sides of the channel, which was so narrow as to place the sloops within their reach from both shores. An official account of this affair has not been published, but it is stated, on the authority of the enemy, that they had two killed, the Americans only one, but a considerable number of the latter were wounded. The British afterwards succeeded in raising the Eagle.

The loss of the sloops giving the British the superiority on the lake, on the 30th of July a considerable force crossed the lines in forty-four barges, protected by the Growler and Eagle, three row-gallies, and a gun-boat, under the command of colonel Murray. The following day they appeared off Plattsburg,

and a flag of truce was sent into the town to demand its surrender, with the assurance, that if no resistance was made, private property should be respected. There being no troops in the place, of course there was no resistance, and the enemy landed and burnt the public buildings, consisting of a blockhouse, barracks, arsenal, &c. when they again embarked.

On the 2d of August the enemy appeared off Burlington, on the other side of the lake, where the American army was stationed under general Hampton, and opened their fire from two sloops and a galley, which was returned from a battery in front of the town, the fire from which soon compelled them to make off. Several gun-boats and sloops lay under the battery, but were unable to pursue the enemy, having suffered severely in a gale a few days previous.

§ 2. In the month of October, Hampton's army crossed the lake, and proceeded towards the Canada lines, which they crossed about the 20th or 21st. The army moved in two divisions, one on each side of the Chateaugay river, and on two different days drove in the British pickets, one of which they succeeded in capturing. Every precaution had been taken by the enemy to intercept the progress of the army. The roads were filled with trees, which had been previously felled in every direction; the bridges were destroyed, and the houses burnt or pulled down. Notwithstanding these impediments, however, they continued slowly to advance till the 26th, when the advanced guard was attacked on both sides of the river by a body of regulars, voltigeurs, and Indians, posted in strong positions in a wood, flanked by the river and impassable swamps. The attack was several times renewed, and the enemy always driven behind their works. On the 27th one of the divisions forded the river, and the whole army returned within the American lines to Four Corners. The British claimed great merit from the splendid victory, as they call it, which they assert was achieved by a force of only 300 men, against Hampton's whole army, which consisted of 3000 or 3500. From their own statement, however, it would appear that their force was much larger than they represent it. They state it to have consisted of

“Captains Levesque and Debartzch, with their flank companies of the 5th battalion incorporated militia, together with about 200 of the Beauharnois division.”

“Lieutenant-colonel De Salaberry, with his voltigeurs, and captain Ferguson's light company of the Canadian regiment.”

Besides these are mentioned, in the course of the action,

“A large body of Indians under captain Lamothe.”

“Lieutenant-colonel M'Donnell, of the Glengary light infantry, with a part of his light brigade.”

These forces do not include the reinforcements which are stated to have arrived the following day. And yet we are gravely told, that, "though it may appear incredible, the whole force engaged on our side did not exceed 300 men\*."

But even allowing their force to be as small as it is here represented, it by no means follows, either that a victory was gained, or that Hampton's measures were baffled. It does not appear that it was the intention of the American general to push on by this route to Montreal, for the reduction of which his small force was utterly incompetent, independent of the natural impediments which this part of the country presented to an invading army. There is no reason to doubt, indeed, that this movement was merely intended as a demonstration, to divert and distract the attention of the enemy from the movements on the St. Lawrence, and this end being completely attained, it was not the general's intention to risk the loss of any part, however small, of his army, by an attempt to force a position so strong as the British represent this to have been.

§ 3. General Wilkinson having transported his army in safety from Fort George to Sacket's Harbour, in the beginning of October, in a few days they were again moved to Grenadier Island, with the intention of immediately proceeding down the St. Lawrence against Montreal. Considerable delay, however, took place, owing to the uncommon severity of the weather, and it was not until the 3d of November that he was enabled to move. On the evening of the 6th he reached Ogdensburg, whence he wrote to general Hampton at Four Corners (where he had established his head-quarters after his return from Canada), ordering him to form a junction with him on the St. Lawrence, and recommending St. Regis as the most suitable place, where he expected to be on the 9th. "On the subject of provisions," continues Wilkinson, "I wish I could give a favourable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about fifteen days, and our meat at twenty. On speaking on this subject to the secretary of war, he informed me ample magazines were laid up on lake Champlain, and therefore I must request of you to order forward two or three month's supply by the safest route, in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity."

\* The statement here alluded to is not the official account. It is a detailed account, apparently written by an officer who was present at the affair.

A short distance above Ogdensburg, on the opposite side of the St. Lawrence, stands Prescott, a fortified post commanding the river. The lateness of the season not admitting of delay, Wilkinson determined to pass it in the night, in place of stopping to reduce it. This was effected on the night of the 6th, without other loss than two privates killed and three wounded. In the course of the 8th the cavalry was crossed from the American to the Canada shore, and a detachment of the infantry was landed, to prevent the enemy, who had previously lined the shore with musquetry, from harassing the boats in their passage down the river. A considerable body of the enemy from Kingston also, in concert with a heavy galley and a few gun-boats, hung on the rear of the Americans, and considerably retarded their progress.

On the morning of the 10th, general Brown advanced down the river, for the purpose of clearing its banks, as a rapid, eight miles long, was expected to be passed in the course of the day, in the passage of which, without this precaution, the army would be much exposed. About noon, the army was apprized by the report of artillery, that Brown was engaged some distance below, and about the same time the enemy were observed in their rear. Their galley and gun-boats having approached the flotilla, and opened their fire, Wilkinson ordered a battery of eighteen pounders to be planted, the shot from which soon compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties.

§ 4. The day was now so far spent, that the pilots did not dare to enter the rapid, and therefore the flotilla fell down about two miles, and came to for the night. Early next morning every thing was ready to move, but it was still deemed imprudent to commit the flotilla to the rapid until the result of general Brown's affair should be ascertained. At half past 10, an officer arrived with information that Brown had forced the enemy to retire, and that he would reach the foot of the rapid early in the day. Orders were now given for the flotilla to sail; but at this moment the enemy's gun-boats appeared and began to fire, and information was received from general Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column, on which Wilkinson sent him orders to attack them. This report was soon contradicted; but their gun-boats continued to annoy the flotilla, and such a variety of reports of the movements and counter-movements of the troops on shore was brought to Wilkinson, as convinced him of their determination to hazard an attack, when it could be done to advantage. He therefore resolved to anticipate them; and directions were accordingly sent to general Boyd to throw the detachments under his command into three columns, to march

upon the enemy, outflank them if possible, and take their artillery. The force under Boyd consisted of detachments from the first, third, and fourth brigades, which were formed agreeably to orders, and placed respectively under colonel Coles, general Covington, and general Swartwout. A report was now brought to Boyd from the rear guard, that a body of about 200 British and Indians had advanced into the woods that skirted his rear. General Swartwout, with the fourth brigade, was immediately ordered to dislodge them; general Covington, with the third brigade, being at the same time directed to be within supporting distance. General Swartwout dashed into the woods, and with the 21st infantry (a part of his brigade), after a short skirmish, drove them back to the position of their main body. Here he was joined by general Covington. The enemy had judiciously chosen his ground among the deep ravines which every where intersected the extensive plain, and discharged a heavy and galling fire upon the advanced columns of the Americans. No opposition or obstacle, however, checked their ardour. The enemy retired for more than a mile before their resolute and repeated charges. During this time, the detachment of the first brigade under colonel Coles, whose greater distance from the scene of action retarded its arrival, rapidly entered the field. Being directed to attack the enemy's left flank, this movement was promptly and bravely executed, amid a shower of musquetry and sharpnel shells. The fight now became more stationary, until the brigade first engaged, having expended all their ammunition, were directed to retire to a more defensible position, to wait for a re-supply. This movement so disconnected the line, as to render it expedient for the first brigade likewise to retire.

The artillery, excepting two pieces attached to the rear division (which, from the nature of the ground, and the circuitous route they had to take, were likewise much retarded in their arrival), did not reach the ground until the line, for want of ammunition, had already begun to fall back. When they were arranged, their fire was sure and destructive. When the artillery was finally directed to retire, having to cross a deep, and, excepting in one place, to artillery, impassable ravine, one piece was unfortunately lost, by the fall of its gallant commander, lieutenant Smith, and most of his men.

The whole line was now re-formed on the borders of those woods from which the enemy had first been driven; when, night coming on, and the storm returning, Boyd, conceiving the object in view, which was to beat back the enemy that would retard the junction with the main body below, to have been ac-

complished, directed the troops to return to the ground near the flotilla; which movement was executed in good order, and without molestation from the enemy.

As the American force in this action, which took place in the neighbourhood of Williamsburgh, consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats, it is impossible to say with accuracy what was the number on the field; but it was supposed to be about 1600 or 1700 men. The force of the enemy was estimated at from 1200 to 2000, exclusive of militia. The British say their force did not exceed 800 rank and file, in which statement the militia and Indians are probably not included. The Americans had 102 killed, and 237 wounded, among the latter general Covington, mortally. The British state their loss at 22 killed, 147 wounded, and 12 missing. Both parties claim the victory in this battle: the British, because they captured a piece of cannon, and because the Americans retired from the battle ground; the Americans, because their object was fully attained, that of beating back the enemy, who was harassing them in their progress down the river. The British account states that they took upwards of 100 prisoners, of which no mention is made by the Americans.

At the time of this action general Wilkinson was confined to his bed, and emaciated almost to a skeleton, a disease with which he was assailed on the 2d of September, on his journey to Fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on him ever since.

The Americans having resumed their position on the banks of the St. Lawrence, the infantry, being much fatigued, were re-embarked, and proceeded down the river, without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun-boats, while the dragoons, with five pieces of light artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation. The next morning the flotilla passed safely down the rapids, and joined general Brown, at Barnhart's, near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait their arrival.

§ 5. At Barnhart's Wilkinson confidently expected to have heard of Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore, but, immediately on his halting, colonel Atkinson waited on him with a letter from that officer, in which, to the surprise and mortification of Wilkinson, Hampton declined the junction, and informed him that he was marching towards lake Champlain, by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. The reason assigned by Hampton for this measure, was the smallness of



Wilkinson's stock of provisions, and the impossibility, from the difficulty of transportation at this season, of his bringing more than each man could have carried on his back. "When I reflected," says Hampton, "that in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, when all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburg to Coghawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the junction at St. Regis. The way is in many places blockaded and abated, and the road impracticable for wheel carriages during winter—but by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed that the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance. My troops and other means will be described to you by colonel Atkinson. Besides the rawness and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject I must refer you to colonel Atkinson. With these means—what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt—with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign."

§ 6. Hampton's letter was immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of the general officers and the colonel commanding the elite, the chief engineer, and the adjutant-general, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters." This opinion was acquiesced in by Wilkinson, not, he states, from the want of provisions, because they could, in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy, but because the loss of the division under general Hampton weakened his force too sensibly to justify the attempt.

The army remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing the enemy, and then crossed over and went into winter quarters at French Mills, near St. Regis, on the borders of Lower Canada.

§ 7. Meanwhile general Harrison, having embarked at De-

troit, with those of his troops whose term of service had not expired, or who were not considered necessary for the defence of the country he had overrun, arrived at Buffalo towards the end of October, and immediately proceeded to Fort George. General Wilkinson having previously gone down the lake, and the fleet not having arrived for the transportation of Harrison's troops, arrangements were made by him and general M'Clure, whom he found in the command of Fort George, for an expedition against Burlington Heights, at the head of lake Ontario. Before the completion of these arrangements, however, commodore Chauncey arrived with orders immediately to bring down Harrison's troops for the defence of Sackett's Harbour. Commodore Chauncey was extremely pressing for the troops immediately to embark, stating that the navigation with small vessels was very dangerous at this season, and that should the troops not get down before the lake was frozen, the safety of the fleet at the harbour might be seriously endangered. The general therefore reluctantly relinquished the expedition, further delay in proceeding down the lake being considered impracticable. The troops were embarked about the middle of November, and shortly after arrived in safety at Sackett's Harbour.

After the departure of general Harrison, the force at Fort George, under general M'Clure, consisted almost exclusively of militia and volunteers, whose term of service was on the point of expiring. The contemplated expedition against Burlington Heights was once more undertaken, but the roads were found cut up in such a manner, and so obstructed by timber, that it was found impracticable to transport the artillery, and accordingly it was abandoned.

The abandonment of this expedition excited much dissatisfaction at Fort George, especially among the volunteers, many of whom had made considerable sacrifices to join the army, in the hope of being usefully and actively employed. Their term of service now expiring, M'Clure used every effort to engage them to remain for one or two months longer, but in vain. He was left on the 10th of December with not more than sixty effective regulars to garrison Fort George. A council of officers was then held, who were unanimously of opinion that the fort should be immediately evacuated, the advance of the enemy, who by some means had obtained information of the state of the place, being within eight miles. Orders were accordingly given to transport all the arms, ammunition, and public stores of every description across the river, which was principally effect-

ed, though the enemy approached so rapidly that ten of the soldiers were made prisoners. The fort was blown up, and the town of Newark, a handsome little place of about 200 houses, situated a mile below the fort, was laid in ashes. "This act," general M'Clure declares, "as distressing to the inhabitants as to my feelings, was by an order of the secretary at war." "The inhabitants had twelve hours notice to remove their effects, and such as chose to come across the river were provided with all the necessaries of life." The only reason that we have seen assigned for this outrage is by no means satisfactory: "that the enemy might not have it in their power to quarter with their Indian allies in the village, and maraud and murder our citizens," and we are much pleased to see that the act is almost universally disapproved of.

§ 8. On the 19th of December, about 4 in the morning, the British crossed the river, a few miles above Fort Niagara, and succeeded in taking the place by storm about an hour before day-break. The fort appears to have been completely surprised. The men were nearly all asleep in their tents, when the enemy rushed in, and commenced a dreadful slaughter. Such as escaped the fury of the first onset, retired to the old mess-house, where they kept up a fire on the enemy, until a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender. The disaster is attributed, and with but too much appearance of probability, to gross neglect or treasonable connivance on the part of the commanding officer of the fort, who is stated to have been absent at the time it took place, notwithstanding the attack was expected, as appears from the general orders issued by M'Clure a few days previous.

§ 9. After the capture of the fort, the British, with a large body of Indians, proceeded up the river as far as Lewistown, and, having driven off a detachment of militia stationed at Lewistown Heights, burnt that village and those of Youngstown and Manchester, and the Indian Tuscarora village. A number of the inoffensive inhabitants are said to have been butchered by the savages. On the 30th another detachment of the British and Indians crossed the Niagara, near Black Rock. They were met by the militia under general Hall; but, overpowered by numbers, and the discipline of the enemy, the militia soon gave way and fled on every side, and every attempt to rally them was ineffectual. The enemy then set fire to Black Rock, when they proceeded to Buffalo, which they likewise laid in ashes, thus completing the desolation of the whole of the Niagara frontier, as a retaliation for the burning of Newark.

Serious apprehensions were entertained for the safety of the fleet at Erie ; the enemy, however, did not attempt to penetrate further at the moment, and a sufficient force was soon collected for its defence, which will remain during the winter.

## CHAPTER IX.

§ 1. Events on the southern frontier. § 2. Seizure of Mobile. § 3. War with the Creek Indians. § 4. Capture of Fort Mims. § 5. Battle of Tallushatches. § 6. Battle of Talledega. § 7. Destruction of the Hillabee towns. § 8. Battle of Autossee. § 9. Expedition to the Tallapoosie river. § 10. Prospects of peace. § 11. Retaliation. § 12. Correspondence on the employment of the Indians.

§ 1. WHILE active operations were thus carried on, on the north and north-western frontier of the United States, the calamities of war began to extend to the southern portion. In the summer of 1813 the Creek nation commenced hostilities by an attack on Fort Mims, a post upon the Tensaw river. Before we enter on a narrative of the events of this war, however, it will be proper to notice another important event which took place in this quarter, in the month of April; namely, the surrender of Mobile to the arms of the United States.

§ 2. By the treaty of St. Ildefonso, concluded on the 1st of October, 1800, between France and Spain, the latter, in consideration of certain stipulations in favour of the duke of Parma, ceded to the French republic "the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states." By a treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th of April, 1803, France ceded to the United States, the territory she had acquired by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, "as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French republic." In virtue of the above-mentioned treaties, the United States claimed, as the southern portion of Louisiana, all the country lying between the Sabine and Perdido rivers. The Spanish government, however, resisted this claim, and contended that its eastern boundary was the river Mississippi, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain. This country has accordingly been the subject of negotiation for several years, between the American and Spanish governments, the latter still holding possession of the country. This negotiation was put an end to by the troubles which took place in old Spain, in 1807; and a revolution breaking out in Florida,

the United States, on the ground that Spain could no longer hold possession of the country, and that her rights would be jeopardized or lost, by suffering it to pass into the hands of a third party (the revolutionists), on whom they could have no claim, took possession of the whole of the disputed country, in 1812, except the post of Mobile, a small fortified town of about 400 inhabitants, situated on the west side of Mobile bay, which continued to be held by a Spanish garrison until the 15th of April, 1813, when it was summoned to surrender to the arms of the United States, under general Wilkinson, which was immediately done without the slightest opposition.

§ 3. The country of the Creek Indians, with whom the United States is now at war, is situated in the western part of the state of Georgia, and the eastern part of the Mississippi territory, between the Oakmulgee and Tombigbee rivers, and extends from the Cherokee country, which borders on Tennessee, to Florida. In the course of the last summer, several families were murdered, near the mouth of the Ohio river, by a party of Indians passing from the great lakes to the Upper Creeks. The principal chiefs of the nation, on the application of the United States' agent, determined to punish the murderers by putting them to death, and a party of warriors was appointed to execute their determination. This was no sooner done, than the resentment of the friends of the murderers broke out in acts of open violence against all who had been in any way concerned in causing the murderers to be put to death, and a civil war was the consequence. It appears, however, that this circumstance only produced a premature disclosure of their object, as it has since been ascertained that most of the Upper Creeks had previously determined to take part with the northern Indians in their war with the United States.

About the middle of July, the secretary at war wrote to the governor of Georgia, and at the same time transmitted a copy of his letter to the governor of Tennessee, stating, that information through various channels had reached the general government, of the hostility of a portion of the Creek nation, and of the necessity of breaking it down by some prompt and vigorous measures; and suggested the propriety of embodying a portion of the Georgia militia, who should either act separately against the enemy, or in concert with another corps of militia, drawn from Tennessee. This letter was received by governor Mitchell in the end of July, when he immediately took measures for calling out fifteen hundred of the Georgia militia, who were soon after marched to the Oak-

mulgee river. Their number was subsequently enlarged to a full brigade.

Meanwhile appearances became every day more threatening. The friendly Indians were forced to leave their towns and retreat towards the white settlements, and fortify themselves against the attacks of the war party. The latter proceeded in great numbers to the south, where it is asserted they were supplied by the Spanish governor of Pensacola with arms and ammunition. At last, upon the 30th of August, they commenced hostilities against the United States, by an attack upon Mim's fort, on the Tensaw, a branch of the Mobile river, in the Mississippi territory, commanded by major Beasley.

§ 4. Information had been received about a week previous, that a large number of Indians were approaching with hostile intentions, but the attack was wholly unexpected at the moment it occurred, which was about eleven in the forenoon. The whole garrison, however, was immediately under arms. The front gate being open, the enemy ran in great numbers to possess themselves of it, and in the contest for it many fell on both sides. Soon, however, the action became general, the enemy fighting on all sides in the open field, and as near the stockade as they could get. The port-holes were taken and retaken several times. A block-house was contended for by captain Jack, at the head of his riflemen, for the space of an hour after the enemy were in possession of part of it; when they finally succeeded in driving his company into a house in the fort, and, having stopped many of the port-holes with the ends of rails, possessed themselves of the walls. The troops made a most gallant defence from the houses, but the enemy having set fire to the roofs, and the attempt to extinguish it proving unsuccessful, the few who now remained alive attempted a retreat, having previously thrown into the flames many of the guns of the dead. Few, however, succeeded in escaping. Major Beasley fell gallantly fighting at the head of his command, near the gate, at the commencement of the action. The other officers fell nobly doing their duty; the non-commissioned officers and soldiers behaved equally well.

The loss of the Americans was great: sixty-five, including officers and men, of the Mississippi territory volunteers, and twenty-seven volunteer militia, were killed. Many respectable citizens, with numerous families, who had abandoned their farms, and fled to the fort for security, were also killed, or burnt in the houses into which they fled. A de-

tachment which was sent from cantonment Mount Vernon, on the 21st of September, to collect the bones of their countrymen, collected, and consigned to the earth, 247 persons, including men, women, and children. The detachment likewise searched the woods for bodies, where they found at least 100 dead Indians, who were covered with rails, brush, &c. These Indians had been interred with their war-dresses and implements, by which they were recognized.

On the receipt of the disastrous intelligence of the destruction of major Beasley's garrison, preparations were immediately made for collecting a large force of Tennessee militia, and providing supplies for those of Georgia, which had already assembled. The Tennessee militia were marched in two divisions, under the orders of major-generals Jackson and Cocke.

§ 5. On the 2d of November, major-general Jackson dispatched brigadier-general Coffee from the camp at Ten-Islands, with 900 men, consisting of cavalry and mounted riflemen, on an expedition against the Tallushatches towns, where a considerable force of the Creeks was concentrated. Coffee arrived within a mile and a half of the town on the morning of the 3d, where he divided his force into two divisions, and directed them to march so as completely to encircle the town, which was effected in a masterly manner. When they arrived within about half a mile of the towns, the enemy began to prepare for action, which was announced by the beating of their drums, mingled with savage yells. About an hour after sun-rise the action was brought on by two companies, who had gone within the circle of alignment, for the purpose of drawing the enemy out from their buildings. As soon as the two companies exhibited their front in view of the town, and gave a few scattering shot, the enemy formed and made a violent charge upon them, on which they gave way, and were followed by the Indians, until they reached the main body, who immediately opened a general fire, and then charged. The Indians now, in their turn, retreated firing, until they got around and in their buildings, when they made a most determined resistance, fighting to the very last moment, as long as they could stand or sit, not one shrinking or complaining; not one asking for quarter. Every warrior in the town was killed, and all the women and children were taken prisoners, except a few who were unintentionally slain, in consequence of the men flying to the houses and mixing with their families, and at the same time refusing quarter.



The number found killed of the enemy was 186, and a number of others were killed in the woods, who were not found. The number of women and children taken was eighty-four. Of the Americans, five were killed, and forty-one wounded, the greater part slightly, none mortally; two of the killed were with arrows, which appeared to form a principal part of the arms of the Indians on this occasion, every man having a bow, with a bundle of arrows, which he used after the first fire with his gun, until a leisure time for loading offered.

Coffee bestows much praise on his men, for their deliberation and firmness. "Notwithstanding our numbers," says he, "were far superior to that of the enemy, it was a circumstance to us unknown, and from the parade of the enemy we had every reason to suppose them our equals in number; but there appeared no visible traces of alarm in any; on the contrary, all appeared cool and determined; and, no doubt, when they face a foe of their own, or of superior number, they will show the same courage as on this occasion."

The following day general Coffee returned with his detachment to the camp.

§ 6. Late on the evening of the 7th a friendly Indian arrived at the camp, who brought intelligence that the enemy had arrived in great numbers at Talledega, about thirty miles below the camp, where one hundred and sixty men of the friendly Creeks had erected a fort, the more effectually to resist the efforts of the hostile party, and where they were now stationed with their wives and children. The messenger represented that, unless speedy relief could be obtained from the army, the fort would certainly be taken. General Jackson immediately gave orders for taking up the line of march, with twelve hundred infantry and eight hundred cavalry and mounted riflemen, leaving behind the sick, the wounded, and the baggage, with a sufficient force for their protection. By twelve o'clock that night the army was in motion, and commenced crossing the river opposite the encampment, which was effected in a few hours, and on the night of the 8th the army was encamped within six miles of the enemy. At eleven that night a soldier and two Indians, who had been sent forward to reconnoitre, returned with the intelligence that the enemy were encamped within a quarter of a mile of the fort; but they had not been able to approach near enough to ascertain either their number or precise situation. At midnight the adjutant-general was ordered to pre-

pare the line of march, and by four o'clock the army was in motion.

The infantry marched in three columns; the cavalry and mounted riflemen were in the rear, with flankers on each wing. The advance consisted of a company of artillery with muskets, and two companies of riflemen. A company of spies marched four hundred yards in front of the whole, to bring on the engagement. Having arrived within a mile of the enemy at seven o'clock, two hundred and fifty of the cavalry and mounted riflemen were placed in the rear of the centre, as a *corps de reserve*, and the remainder were ordered to advance on the right and left of the infantry, and, after having encircled the enemy, by uniting the fronts of their columns, and keeping their rear connected with the infantry, to face and press inwards towards the centre, so as to leave the enemy no possibility of escape. The infantry were ordered to advance by heads of companies, general Hall's brigade occupying the right, and general Roberts's the left.

About eight o'clock the advance, having arrived within eighty yards of the enemy, who were concealed in a thick shrubbery which covered the margin of a rivulet, received from them a heavy fire, which they immediately returned, and then charged and dislodged them from their position. The advance now fell back, as they had been previously ordered, to the centre. On the approach of the enemy, three of the militia companies, having given one fire, commenced a retreat, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of their officers. To fill the vacancy occasioned by this retreat, Jackson immediately ordered up a regiment of volunteers; but finding the advance of the enemy too rapid to admit of their arrival in time, the reserve was ordered to dismount and meet them. This order was executed with great promptitude and gallantry, and the retreating militia, seeing the spirited stand made by the reserve, immediately rallied, and recovered their position, pouring in upon the enemy a most destructive fire. The engagement now became general; and in fifteen minutes the Indians were seen flying in every direction. On the left they were met and repulsed by the mounted riflemen; but on the right it unfortunately happened that too great a space had been left between the cavalry and infantry, by which numbers escaped. They were pursued, however, for three miles to the mountains with great slaughter.

The force of the enemy was represented by themselves at a thousand and eighty, two hundred and ninety-nine of whom were left dead on the ground, and a great many were killed

in their flight. It is believed that very few escaped without a wound. The American loss was fifteen killed and eighty wounded.

§ 7. On the 11th of November, general Cocke, who commanded the other division of the Tennessee militia, ordered brigadier-general White, with a detachment of mounted infantry and cavalry, to proceed from Fort Armstrong, where this division was stationed, on an expedition against the Hilibee towns of the hostile Creeks on the Tallapoosie river. This expedition was completely successful. They penetrated one hundred miles into the enemy's country, and burned four of their villages, three of which they found deserted. Previous to their arrival at the fourth, they learned that a party of the hostile Creeks were assembled there. Having marched the whole of the night of the 17th, they surrounded and completely surprised the town at day-light of the morning of the 18th, and of the whole party, which consisted of three hundred and sixteen, not one escaped, sixty being killed and the remainder made prisoners. The detachment now returned to camp, where they arrived on the 23d, having lost not one drop of blood in this enterprise. The country through which they marched was exceedingly rough and hilly, and they had to pass several narrow defiles, where it was necessary to use the utmost precaution. The troops and horses, likewise, had to be subsisted, in a great degree, on such supplies as could be procured in the enemy's country, which rendered their march more tardy than it would otherwise have been.

The Georgia militia, though embodied before those of Tennessee, were not able, from the want of military supplies, to proceed to active operations till the end of November. Brigadier-general Stewart had been originally destined for the command, as the senior brigadier; but family considerations inducing him to decline its acceptance, brigadier-general Floyd was appointed in his room.

§ 8. Towards the end of November Floyd received information that numbers of the hostile Indians were assembled at Autossee, a town on the southern bank of the Tallapoosie river, about twenty miles above its junction with the Coosa. He immediately left his camp, which was situated on the west side of the Chatahouchee river, and proceeded against the enemy with nine hundred and fifty militia, and between three and four hundred of the friendly Creeks. On the evening of the 28th the detachment encamped within nine or ten miles of the place of destination, and having resumed their march about one next morning, at half past six they were formed for

action in front of the town. The detachment was formed in two columns, with a rifle company on each flank, and a company of artillery in front of the right column.

It was Floyd's intention to have completely surrounded the enemy, by resting the right wing of his force on Canleebee creek, at the mouth of which he was informed their town stood, and resting his left on the river bank below the town; but to his surprise, as the day dawned, he perceived a second town about 500 yards below that which he was preparing to attack. The plan, therefore, was instantly changed; three companies of infantry on the left were wheeled to the left *en echelon*\*, and advanced to the lower town, accompanied by a rifle company and two troops of light dragoons. The remainder of the force approached the upper town, and the battle soon became general. The Indians presented themselves at every point, and fought with desperate bravery; but the well-directed fire of the artillery and the bayonets of the infantry soon forced them to take refuge in the out-houses, thickets, and copses in the rear of the town. Many, it was supposed, secured themselves in caves, previously formed for this purpose in the high bluff of the river, which was thickly covered with reeds and brush-wood. It was intended that the friendly Indians should have crossed the river above the town, and been posted on the opposite shore during the action, to fire on such of the enemy as should attempt to escape, or to keep in check any reinforcements which might be attempted to be thrown in from the neighbouring towns. Owing to the difficulty of the ford, however, and the coldness of the weather and lateness of the hour, this arrangement failed, and their leaders were directed to cross Canleebee creek, and occupy that flank, to prevent escapes from the Tallisee town. Some time after the action commenced, the friendly Indians thronged in disorder in the rear of the militia, when the hostile tribes fell on the flanks of the detachment and fought with great intrepidity. By nine o'clock, however, the enemy was completely driven from the plains, and the houses of both towns were wrapped in flames.

It was impossible to determine the strength of the enemy, but from the information of some of the chiefs, which it is said could be relied on, there were assembled at Autossee warriors from eight towns for its defence, it being their belo-

\* A position in which each division follows the preceding one, like the steps of a ladder (*eehelle*), from which the word is derived. A position *en echelon* is convenient in removing from a direct to an oblique or diagonal line.—*Duane's Military Dictionary*.

ved ground, on which they proclaimed no white man could approach without inevitable destruction. Neither was it possible to ascertain their loss; but from the number which were lying scattered over the field, together with those destroyed in the towns, and those slain on the bank of the river, whom respectable officers affirmed they saw lying in heaps at the water's edge, where they had been precipitated by their surviving friends, their loss, in killed alone, must have been at least 200, among whom were the Autossee and Tallisee kings. The number of buildings burnt is supposed to be 400; some of them were of a superior order for the dwellings of savages, and filled with valuable articles. The Americans had eleven killed and fifty-four wounded, among the latter was general Floyd.

The detachment being now sixty miles from any depot of provisions, and their rations pretty nearly consumed, as soon as the dead and wounded were properly disposed of, the place was abandoned, and the troops commenced their march back to the camp on the Chatahouchee, a measure the more necessary as they were in the heart of an enemy's country, which in a few days could have poured from its numerous towns hosts of warriors. They arrived at the camp in safety, having marched 120 miles in seven days.

§ 9. On the 9th of December another detachment of the Georgia militia, consisting of about 530 men, under the command of general Adams, marched on an expedition against the Creek towns on the Tallapoosie river. Notwithstanding the precautions which they used to prevent the Indians from hearing of their approach, they found the villages deserted, and were unable to bring the enemy to action, though their yells were repeatedly heard on both sides of the river. Having burnt two of their villages, therefore, the detachment returned to camp.

§ 10. From the decisive nature of the victories which have been gained over the Creek Indians, a peace may soon be expected, as there can be little doubt that they sincerely repent having commenced hostilities. As an evidence of their returning disposition for peace, it is stated, that after the battle of Talledega, they liberated several of the friendly Indians whom they had made prisoners.

With Great Britain, too, some slight prospects have appeared of returning peace. Negotiations are about to be entered into, which may possibly produce that happy result. But whether the faint rays which have appeared in the eastern horizon are the precursors of the return of the glorious sun, or merely the

glimmerings of a delusive meteor, we confess ourselves unable to form a satisfactory conclusion. It is to be hoped, however, that the least effect produced will be the staying those vengeful measures that have been threatened, and which, if carried into effect, would have a tendency far to remove the reconciliation so ardently wished for by the moderate part of both countries, and engender a spirit of hostility which it might require ages to remove. It will be perceived that we allude to the retaliatory measures which have been threatened by the two governments.

§ 11. Twenty-three of the American soldiers who were made prisoners at the battle of Queenstown, in the autumn of 1812, were sent to England, where they were detained in rigorous confinement as British subjects. On this being made known to the government of the United States by the American commissary of prisoners at London, orders were issued to general Dearborn to place in close confinement a like number of British soldiers, to be kept as hostages for the safety and exchange of the American prisoners. This order was carried into execution by the imprisonment of twenty-three of the prisoners captured at Fort George, in May, 1813, of which general Dearborn apprised the governor of Canada in a letter dated the 31st of that month.

General Dearborn's letter was transmitted to the British government, who immediately instructed governor Prevost to state to the commander of the American forces, for the information of his government, that he was commanded "forthwith to put in close confinement forty-six American officers and non-commissioned officers, to be held as hostages for the safe keeping of the twenty-three British soldiers stated to have been put in close confinement by order of the American government.

"I have been directed at the same time to apprise you," continues Prevost, in a letter to general Wilkinson, "that if any of the said British soldiers shall suffer death by reason that any of the said soldiers of the United States now under confinement in England have been found guilty, and that the known law, not only of Great Britain, but of every independent state under similar circumstances, has been in consequence executed, that I have been further instructed to select out of the American officers and non-commissioned officers, whom I shall have put into confinement, as many as may double the number of the British soldiers who shall have been so unwarrantably put to death, and to cause such officers and non-commissioned officers to suffer death immediately. I have been

further instructed by his majesty's government to notify you, for the information of the government of the United States, that the commanders of his majesty's armies and fleets on the coasts of America, have received instructions to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, and villages belonging to the United States, and against the inhabitants thereof, if, after this communication shall have been made to you, and a reasonable time given for its being transmitted to the American government, that government shall unhappily not be deterred from putting to death any of the soldiers who now are or who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in the letter from major-general Dearborn."

General Wilkinson, in his answer to general Prevost's letter, states, that he should immediately transmit a copy of it to the executive of the United States. "I forbear," continued Wilkinson, "to animadvert on the acts of our superiors, whatever may be their tendency; but you must pardon me for taking exception to an expression in your letter. The government of the United States cannot be 'deterred,' by any considerations of life or death, of depredation or conflagration, from the faithful discharge of its duty to the American nation."

In a subsequent communication, general Wilkinson stated, that "the government of the United States, adhering unalterably to the principle and purpose declared in the communication of general Dearborn, on the subject of the twenty-three American soldiers, prisoners of war, sent to England to be tried as criminals; and the confinement of a like number of British soldiers, prisoners of war, selected to abide the fate of the former; in consequence of the step taken by the British government, as now communicated, ordered forty-six British officers in close confinement, and that they will not be discharged from their confinement, until it shall be known that the forty-six American officers and non-commissioned officers in question are no longer confined.

General Prevost, on the receipt of this letter, ordered all American officers, prisoners of war, without exception of rank, to be immediately placed in close confinement, as hostages for the forty-six British officers so confined, until the number of forty-six be completed, over and above those now in confinement.

When or where this system is to stop, it is impossible to say. It is to be hoped, however, that imprisonment will be the utmost extent to which it will be carried; and that the

negotiations about to commence, will at least have the effect of preventing the horrid scenes which are threatened, even should they fail in effecting a settlement of the other differences between the two countries.

§ 12. A very interesting correspondence, upon a somewhat similar subject, between general Harrison and the British general Vincent, has lately been published. After the capture of the British army, in the battle on the Thames, general Proctor sent a flag with a letter to general Harrison, requesting humane treatment for the prisoners in his possession, and the restoration of private property and papers. Harrison addressed his answer on the subject to general Vincent, as the senior officer.

“With respect to the subject of general Proctor’s letter,” says Harrison, “those which I have the honour to enclose you from the British officers, who were taken on the 5th ultimo, to their friends, and the report of Mr. Le Breton, will satisfy you that no indulgence which humanity could claim in their favour, or the usages of war sanction, has been withheld. The disposition of the property taken on the field of action or near it, was left to the commanding officer at Detroit. The instructions given to that gentleman, and the well known generosity of his character, will insure to the claimants the utmost justice and liberality in his decisions. In making this statement, I wish it however to be distinctly understood, that my conduct with regard to the prisoners and property taken, has been dictated solely by motives of humanity, and not by a belief that it could be claimed upon the score of reciprocity of treatment towards the American prisoners who have fallen into the hands of general Proctor. The unhappy description of persons who have escaped from the tomahawk of the savages in the employment of the British government, who fought under the immediate orders of that officer, have suffered all the indignities and deprivations which human nature is capable of supporting. There is no single instance that I have heard of, in which the property of the officers has been respected. But I am far from believing that the conduct of general Proctor has been thought an example worthy of imitation by the greater part of the British officers; and in the character of general Vincent, I have a pledge that he will unite his exertions with mine to soften as much as possible the fate of those whom the fortune of war may reciprocally place in our power.

“But, sir, there is another subject upon which I wish an explicit declaration. Will the Indians who still adhere to the



cause of his Britannic majesty, be suffered to continue that horrible species of warfare which they have heretofore practised against our troops, and those still more horrible depredations upon the peaceable inhabitants of our frontiers? I have sufficient evidence to show that even the latter have not always been perpetrated by small parties of vagrant Indians, acting at a distance from the British army. Some of the most atrocious instances have occurred under the eyes of the British commander and the head of the Indian department. I shall pass by the tragedy of the river Raisin, and that equally well known which was acted on the Miami river after the defeat of colonel Dudley—and select three other instances of savage barbarity committed under the auspices of general Proctor.—In the beginning of June, a small party of Indians, conducted by an Ottawa chief, who I believe is now with the British army under your command, left Malden in bark canoes, in which they coasted Lake Erie to the mouth of Portage river; the canoes were taken across the Portage to the Sandusky bay, over which the party proceeded to the mouth of Cold creek, and from thence by land to the settlements upon that river, where they captured three families, consisting of one man and twelve women and children. After taking the prisoners some distance, one of the women was discovered to be unable to keep up with them, in consequence of her advanced state of pregnancy. She was immediately tomahawked, stripped naked, her womb ripped open, and the child taken out. Three or four of the children were successively butchered as they discovered their inability to keep up with the party. Upon the arrival of the Indians at Malden, two or three of the prisoners were ransomed by colonel Elliott, and the others by the citizens of Detroit, where they remained until they were taken off by their friends upon the recovery of that place by our army. I have been informed that the savage chief received from colonel Elliott a *reprimand* for his cruelty.

“On the 29th or 30th of the same month, a large party of Indians were sent from Malden on a war expedition to Lower Sandusky. At a farm house near that place, they murdered the whole family, consisting of a man, his wife, son, and daughter.

“During the last attack upon Fort Meigs by general Proctor, a party headed by a Seneca, an intimate friend of Tecumseh's, was sent to endeavour to detach from our interest the Shawanese of Wapockanata. In their way thither they murdered several men, and one woman who was working in her cornfield.

“ I have selected, sir, the above from a long list of similar instances of barbarity, which the history of the last fifteen months could furnish; because they were perpetrated, if not in the view of the British commander, by parties who came immediately from his camp and returned to it—who even received their daily support from the king’s stores, who in fact (as the documents in my possession will show) form part of his army.

“ To retaliate then upon the subjects of the king would have been justifiable by the laws of war and the usages of the most civilized nations. To do so has been amply in my power. The tide of fortune has changed in our favour, and an extensive and flourishing province opened to our arms. The future conduct of the British officers will determine the correctness of mine in withholding it. If the savages should be again let loose upon our settlements, I shall with justice be accused of having sacrificed the interests and honour of my country, and the lives of our fellow-citizens, to feelings of false and mistaken humanity. You are a soldier, sir, and, as I sincerely believe, possess all the honourable sentiments which ought always to be found in men who follow the profession of arms. Use then, I pray you, your authority and influence to stop the dreadful effusion of innocent blood which proceeds from the employment of those savage monsters, whose aid (as must now be discovered) is so little to be depended upon when it is most wanted, and which can have so trifling an effect upon the issue of the war. The effect of their barbarities will not be confined to the present generation. Ages yet to come will feel the deep-rooted hatred and enmity which they must produce between the two nations.

“ I deprecate most sincerely the dreadful alternative which will be offered to me should they be continued, but I solemnly declare, that if the Indians that remain under the influence of the British government are suffered to commit any depredations upon the citizens within the district that is committed to my protection, I will remove the restrictions which have hitherto been imposed upon those who have offered their services to the United States, and direct them to carry on the war in their own way. I have never heard a single excuse for the employment of the savages by your government, unless we can credit the story of some British officer having dared to assert, that, ‘ as we employed the Kentuckians, you had a right to make use of the Indians.’ If such injurious sentiments have really prevailed, to the prejudice of a brave, well-informed, and virtuous people, it will be removed by the representations of your

officers who were lately taken upon the river Thames. They will inform you, sir, that so far from offering any violence to the persons of their prisoners, these savages would not permit a word to escape them which was calculated to wound or insult their feelings, and this too with the sufferings of their friends and relatives at the river Raisin and Miami, fresh upon their recollection.

“P. S. I pledge myself for the truth of the above statement in relation to the murders committed by the Indians.”

General Vincent, in reply, stated, that “the account given of the British officers, whom the fortune of war has lately placed at the disposal of the United States, is such, as cannot fail affording very consoling reflections to this army and their anxious friends.

“Though you must be sensible,” continues he, “that there are several points in your letter respecting which it is wholly beyond my power to afford you the satisfaction of an ‘explicit declaration,’ yet be assured, sir, I shall never feel the smallest degree of hesitation in joining you in any pledge, that it will ever be my anxious wish and endeavour to alleviate as much as possible the fate of those who may fall into my power by the chances of war.

“Believe me, sir, I deprecate as strongly as yourself the perpetration of acts of cruelty committed under any pretext; and shall lament equally with yourself that any state of things should produce them. No efforts of mine will be ever wanting to diminish the evils of a state of warfare, as far as may be consistent with the duties which are due to my king and country.

“The Indians when acting in conjunction with the troops under my command, have been invariably exhorted to mercy, and have never been deaf to my anxious entreaties on this interesting subject.

“I shall not fail to transmit the original of your letter to the lower province, for the consideration of his excellency the commander of the forces.”

# STATE PAPERS

AND

## OFFICIAL LETTERS.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH MANIFESTOES.

*Message of the President of the United States, recommending the Subject of War to the Consideration of Congress. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.*

I COMMUNICATE to congress certain documents, being a continuation of those heretofore laid before them, on the subject of our affairs with Great Britain.

Without going back beyond the renewal in 1803, of the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaid wrongs of inferior magnitude, the conduct of her government presents a series of acts, hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation.

British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels, in a situation where no laws can operate but the law of nations, and the laws of the country to which the vessels belong; and a self redress is assumed, which, if British subjects were wrongfully detained and alone concerned, is that substitution of force, for a resort to the responsible sovereign, which falls within the definition of war. Could the seizure of British subjects, in such cases, be regarded as within the exercise of a belligerent right, the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article of captured property to be adjudged, without a regular investigation before a competent tribunal, would imperiously demand the fairest trial, where the sacred rights of persons were at issue. In place of such trial, these rights are subjected to the will of every petty commander.

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The practice, hence, is so far from affecting British subjects alone, that under the pretexs of searching for these, thousands of American citizens under the safeguard of public law, and of their national flag, have been torn from their country, and from every thing dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation, and exposed under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren.

Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge if committed against herself, the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations; and that no proof might be wanting of their conciliatory dispositions, and no pretext left for a continuance of the practice, the British government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements, such as could not be rejected, if the recovery of British subjects were the real and sole object. The communication passed without effect.

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce. To the most insulting pretensions, they have added the most lawless proceedings in our very harbors; and have wantonly spilt American blood within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction. The principles and rules enforced by that nation when a neutral nation against armed vessels of belligerents hovering near her coasts and disturbing her commerce, are well known. When called on, nevertheless, by the United States, to punish the greater offences committed by her own vessels, her government has bestowed on their commanders additional marks of honour and confidence.

Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force, and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea; the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets; and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. In aggravation of these predatory measures, they have been considered as in force from the dates of their notification; a retrospective effect being thus added, as has been done in other important cases, to the unlawfulness of the course pursued. And to render the outrage the more signal, these mock blockades have been reiterated and enforced in the face of official communications

from the British government, declaring, as the true definition of a legal blockade, "that particular ports must be actually invested, and previous warning given to vessels bound to them, not to enter."

Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet of Great Britain resorted, at length, to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of orders in council; which has been moulded and managed as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers.

To our remonstrances against the complicated and transcendant injustice of this innovation, the first reply was, that the orders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain, as a necessary retaliation on decrees of her enemy, proclaiming a general blockade of the British isles, at a time when the naval force of that enemy dared not to issue from his own ports. She was reminded without effect, that her own prior blockades, unsupported by an adequate naval force actually applied and continued, were a bar to this plea: that executed edicts against millions of our property could not be retaliation on edicts, confessedly impossible to be executed: that retaliation, to be just, should fall on the party setting the guilty example, not on an innocent party, which was not even chargeable with an acquiescence in it.

When deprived of this flimsy veil for a prohibition of our trade with her enemy, by the repeal of his prohibition of our trade with Great Britain, her cabinet, instead of a corresponding repeal, or a practical discontinuance of its orders, formally avowed a determination to persist in them against the United States, until the markets of her enemy should be laid open to British products; thus asserting an obligation on a neutral power to require one belligerent to encourage, by its internal regulations, the trade of another belligerent; contradicting her own practice towards all nations, in peace as well as in war; and betraying the insincerity of those professions which inculcated a belief, that having resorted to her orders with regret, she was anxious to find an occasion for putting an end to them.

Abandoning, still more, all respect for the neutral rights of the United States and for its own consistency, the British government now demands, as pre-requisites to a repeal of its orders as they relate to the United States, that a formality should be observed in the repeal of the French decrees, no wise necessary to their termination, nor exemplified by British usage: and that the French repeal, besides including that

the belief, that the disavowal proceeded from a spirit of hostility to the commercial rights and prosperity of the United States. And it has since come into proof, that at the very moment when the public minister was holding the language of friendship, and inspiring confidence in the sincerity of the negotiation with which he was charged, a secret agent of his government was employed in intrigues having for their object a subversion of our government, and a dismemberment of our happy union.

In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare, just renewed by the savages, on one of our extensive frontiers; a warfare, which is known to spare neither age nor sex, and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons, without connecting their hostility with that influence, and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions, heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government.

Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities, which have been heaped on our country; and such the crisis which its unexampled forbearance and conciliatory efforts have not been able to avert. It might, at least have been expected, that an enlightened nation, if less urged by moral obligations, or invited by friendly dispositions on the part of the United States, would have found, in its true interest alone, a sufficient motive to respect their rights and their tranquillity on the high seas; that an enlarged policy would have favoured that free and general circulation of commerce in which the British nation is at all times interested, and which, in times of war, is the best alleviation of its calamities to herself as well as to other belligerents; and more especially, that the British cabinet would not, for the sake of a precarious and surreptitious intercourse with hostile markets, have persevered in a course of measures, which necessarily put at hazard the invaluable market of a great and growing country, disposed to cultivate the mutual advantages of an active commerce.

Other councils have prevailed. Our moderation and conciliation had no other effect than to encourage perseverance and to enlarge pretensions. We behold our seafaring citizens still the daily victims of lawless violence, committed on the great common and highway of nations, even within sight of the country which owes them protection. We behold our vessels, freighted with the products of our soil and industry, on re-

turning with the honest proceeds of them, wrested from their lawful destinations, confiscated by prize courts, no longer the organs of public law, but the instruments of arbitrary edicts; and their unfortunate crews dispersed and lost, or forced or inveigled in British ports into British fleets; whilst arguments are employed, in support of these aggressions, which have no foundation but in a principle, equally supporting a claim to regulate our external commerce in all cases whatsoever.

We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Great Britain.

Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations, and these accumulating wrongs; or, opposing force to force in defence of their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of events; avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contests or views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in an honourable re-establishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn question, which the constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the government. In recommending it to their early deliberations, I am happy in the assurance, that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.

Having presented this view of the relations of the United States with Great Britain, and of the solemn alternative growing out of them, I proceed to remark that the communications last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France will have shown, that since the revocation of her decrees, as they violated the neutral rights of the United States, her government has authorised illegal captures by its privateers and public ships; and that other outrages have been practised on our vessels and our citizens. It will have been seen, also, that no indemnity had been provided, or satisfactorily pledged, for the extensive spoliations, committed under the violent and retrospective orders of the French government against the property of our citizens, seized within the jurisdiction of France. I abstain, at this time, from recommending to the consideration of congress definitive measures with respect to that nation, in the expectation that the result of unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris and the French government, will speedily enable congress to decide, with great advantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honour of our country.

*Washington, June 1, 1812.*      JAMES MADISON.



*The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Message of the President of the United States of the first of June, 1812, report,*

That after the experience which the United States have had of the great injustice of the British government towards them, exemplified by so many acts of violence and oppression, it will be more difficult to justify to the impartial world their patient forbearance, than the measures to which it has become necessary to resort, to avenge the wrongs and vindicate the rights and honour of the nation. Your committee are happy to observe, on a dispassionate review of the conduct of the United States, that they see in it no cause for censure.

If a long forbearance under injuries ought ever to be considered a virtue in any nation, it is one which peculiarly becomes the United States. No people ever had stronger motives to cherish peace: none have ever cherished it with greater sincerity and zeal.

But the period has now arrived, when the United States must support their character and station among the nations of the earth, or submit to the most shameful degradation.—Forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. War on the one side, and peace on the other, is a situation as ruinous as it is disgraceful. The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice, of Great Britain, arrogating to herself the complete dominion of the ocean, and exercising over it an unbounded and lawless tyranny, have left to neutral nations an alternative only, between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them. Happily for the United States, their destiny, under the aid of Heaven, is in their own hands. The crisis is formidable only by their love of peace. As soon as it becomes a duty to relinquish that situation, danger disappears. They have suffered no wrongs, they have received no insults, however great, for which they cannot obtain redress.

More than seven years have elapsed since the commencement of this system of hostile aggression by the British government, on the rights and interest of the United States. The manner of its commencement was not less hostile, than the spirit with which it has been prosecuted. The United States have invariably done every thing in their power to preserve the relations of friendship with Great Britain. Of this disposition they gave a distinguished proof, at the moment when they were made the victims of an opposite policy. The wrongs of the last war had not been forgotten at the commencement of the present one. They warned us of dangers,

against which it was sought to provide. As early as the year 1804, the minister of the United States at London was instructed to invite the British government to enter into a negotiation on all the points on which a collision might arise between the two countries, in the course of the war, and to propose to it an arrangement of their claims on fair and reasonable conditions. The invitation was accepted. A negotiation had commenced and was depending, and nothing had occurred to excite a doubt that it would not terminate to the satisfaction of both the parties. It was at this time, and under these circumstances, that an attack was made by surprise, on an important branch of the American commerce, which affected every part of the United States, and involved many of their citizens in ruin.

The commerce, on which this attack was so unexpectedly made, was between the United States, and the colonies of France, Spain, and other enemies of Great Britain. A commerce just in itself; sanctioned by the example of Great Britain in regard to the trade with her own colonies; sanctioned by a solemn act between the two governments in the last war; and sanctioned by the practice of the British government in the present war, more than two years having then elapsed, without any interference with it.

The injustice of this attack could only be equalled by the absurdity of the pretext alleged for it. It was pretended by the British government, that in case of war, her enemy had no right to modify its colonial regulations, so as to mitigate the calamities of war to the inhabitants of its colonies. This pretension, peculiar to Great Britain, is utterly incompatible with the rights of its sovereignty in every independent state. If we recur to the well established and universally admitted law of nations, we shall find no sanction to it in that venerable code. The sovereignty of every state is co-extensive with its dominions, and cannot be arrogated, or curtailed in its rights, as to any part, except by conquest. Neutral nations have a right to trade to every port of either belligerent, which is not legally blockaded: and in all articles which are not contraband of war. Such is the absurdity of this pretension, that your committee are aware, especially after the able manner in which it has been heretofore refuted and exposed, that they would offer an insult to the understanding of the house, if they enlarged on it, and if any thing could add to the high sense of the injustice of the British government in the transaction, it would be the contrast which her conduct exhibits in regard to this trade, and in regard to a

similar trade by neutrals with her own colonies. It is known to the world, that Great Britain regulates her own trade, in war and in peace, at home, and in her colonies, as she finds for her interest—that in war she relaxes the restraints of her colonial system in favour of the colonies, and that it never was suggested that she had not a right to do it; or that a neutral in taking advantage of the relation violated a belligerent right of her enemy. But with Great Britain *every thing* is lawful. It is only in a trade with her enemies that the United States can do wrong. With them all trade is unlawful.

In the year 1793 an attack was made by the British government on the same branch of our neutral trade, which had nearly involved the two countries in war. That difference however was amicably accommodated. The pretension was withdrawn, and reparation made to the United States for the losses which they had suffered by it. It was fair to infer from that arrangement that the commerce was deemed by the British government lawful, and that it would not be again disturbed.

Had the British government been resolved to contest this trade with neutrals, it was due to the character of the British nation that the decision should be made known to the government of the United States. The existence of a negotiation which had been invited by our government, for the purpose of preventing differences by an amicable arrangement of their respective pretensions, gave a strong claim to the notification, while it afforded the fairest opportunity for it. But a very different policy animated the then cabinet of England. The liberal confidence and friendly overtures of the United States were taken advantage of to ensnare them. Steady to its purpose, and inflexibly hostile to this country, the British government calmly looked forward to the moment, when it might give the most deadly wound to our interests. A trade just in itself, which was secured by so many strong and sacred pledges, was considered safe. Our citizens, with their usual industry and enterprize, had embarked in it a vast proportion of shipping, and of their capital, which were at sea, under no other protection than the law of nations, and the confidence which they reposed in the justice and friendship of the British nation. At this period the unexpected blow was given. Many of our vessels were seized, carried into port, and condemned by a tribunal, which, while it professes to respect the law of nations, obeys the mandates of its own government. Hundreds of our vessels were driven from the ocean, and the trade itself in a great measure

suppressed. The effect produced by this attack on the lawful commerce of the United States was such as might have been expected from a virtuous, independent, and highly injured people. But one sentiment pervaded the whole American nation. No local interests were regarded; no sordid motives felt. Without looking to the parts which suffered most, the invasion of our rights was considered a common cause, and from one extremity of our union to the other, was heard the voice of an united people, calling on their government to avenge their wrongs, and vindicate the rights and honour of the country.

From this period the British government has gone on in a continued encroachment on the rights and interests of the United States, disregarding in its course, in many instances, obligations which have heretofore been held sacred by civilized nations.

In May, 1806, the whole coast of the continent from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, was declared to be in a state of blockade. By this act, the well established principles of the law of nations, principles which have served for ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the rights of belligerents and neutrals, were violated: by the law of nations, as recognized by Great Britain herself, no blockade is lawful, unless it be sustained by the application of an adequate force, and that an adequate force was applied to this blockade, in its full extent, ought not to be pretended. Whether Great Britain was able to maintain, legally, so extensive a blockade, considering the war in which she is engaged, requiring such extensive naval operations, is a question which it is not necessary at this time to examine. It is sufficient to be known, that such force was not applied, and this is evident from the terms of the blockade itself, by which, comparatively an inconsiderable portion of the coast only was declared to be in a state of *strict and rigorous blockade*. The objection to the measure is not diminished by that circumstance. If the force was not applied, the blockade was unlawful, from whatever cause the failure might proceed. The belligerent who institutes the blockade cannot absolve itself from the obligation to apply the force under any pretext whatever.—For a belligerent to relax a blockade, which it could not maintain, would be a refinement in injustice, not less insulting to the understanding than repugnant to the law of nations. To claim merit for the mitigation of an evil, which the party either had not the power or found it inconvenient to inflict, would be a new mode of encroaching on neutral rights.

Your committee think it just to remark that this act of the British government does not appear to have been adopted in the sense in which it has been since construed. On consideration of all the circumstances attending the measure, and particularly the character of the distinguished statesman who announced it, we are persuaded that it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended to lead to an accommodation of all differences between the United States and Great Britain. His death disappointed that hope, and the act has since become subservient to other purposes. It has been made by his successors a pretext for that vast system of usurpation, which has so long oppressed and harrassed our commerce.

The next act of the British government which claims our attention is the order of council of January 7, 1807, by which neutral powers are prohibited trading from one port to another of France or her allies, or any other country with which Great Britain might not freely trade. By this order the pretension of England, heretofore claimed by every other power, to prohibit neutrals disposing of parts of their cargoes at different ports of the same enemy, is revived, and with vast accumulation of injury. Every enemy, however great the number or distant from each other, is considered one, and the like trade even with powers at peace with England, who from motives of policy had excluded or restrained her commerce, was also prohibited. In this act the British government evidently disclaimed all regard for neutral rights. Aware that the measures authorized by it could find no pretext in any belligerent right, none was urged. To prohibit the sale of our produce, consisting of innocent articles, at any port of a belligerent not blockaded, to consider every belligerent as one, and subject neutrals to the same restraints with all, as if there was but one, were bold encroachments. But to restrain or in any manner interfere with our commerce with neutral nations with whom Great Britain was at peace, and against whom she had no justifiable cause of war, for the sole reason that they restrained or excluded from their ports her commerce, was utterly incompatible with the pacific relations subsisting between the two countries.

We proceed to bring into view the British orders in council of November 11th, 1807, which superceded every other order, and consummated that system of hostility on the commerce of the United States which has been since so steadily pursued. By this order all France and her allies, and every other country at war with Great Britain, or with which she

was not at war, from which the British flag was excluded, and all the colonies of her enemies, were subjected to the same restriction as if they were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner, and all trade in articles the produce and manufacture of the said countries and colonies, and the vessels engaged in it, were subject to capture and condemnation as lawful prize. To this order certain exceptions were made, which we forbear to notice, because they were not adopted from a regard to neutral rights, but were dictated by policy to promote the commerce of England, and, so far as they relate to neutral powers, were said to emanate from the clemency of the British government.

It would be superfluous in your committee to state, that by this order the British government declared direct and positive war against the United States. The dominion of the ocean was completely usurped by it, all commerce forbidden and every flag driven from it or subjected to capture and condemnation, which did not subserve the policy of the British government by paying it a tribute and sailing under its sanction. From this period the United States have incurred the heaviest losses and most mortifying humiliations. They have borne the calamities of war without retorting them on its authors.

So far your committee has presented to the view of the house the aggressions which have been committed under the authority of the British government on the commerce of the United States. We will now proceed to other wrongs which have been still more severely felt. Among these is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our revolution. Your committee cannot convey in adequate terms the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, our fellow-citizens are seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends, are taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens are wantonly snatched from their country and their families, deprived of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage, compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. Your committee need not remark, that while the prac-

tice is continued it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation. Every new case is a new proof of their degradation. Its continuance is the more unjustifiable, because the United States have repeatedly proposed to the British government an arrangement which would secure to it the controul of its own people. An exemption of the citizens of the United States from this degrading oppression and their flag from violation, is all that they have sought.

This lawless waste of our trade, and equally unlawful impressment of our seamen, have been much aggravated by the insults and indignities attending them. Under the pretext of blockading the harbours of France and her allies, British squadrons have been stationed on our own coast, to watch and annoy our own trade. To give effect to the blockade of European ports, the ports and harbours of the United States have been blockaded. In executing these orders of the British government, or in obeying the spirit which was known to animate it, the commanders of these squadrons have encroached on our jurisdiction, seized our vessels, and carried into effect impressments within our limits, and done other acts of great injustice, violence, and oppression. The United States have seen, with mingled indignation and surprise, that these acts, instead of procuring to the perpetrators the punishment due to unauthorized crimes, have not failed to recommend them to the favour of their government.

Whether the British government has contributed by active measures to excite against us the hostility of the savage tribes on our frontiers, your committee are not disposed to occupy much time in investigating. Certain indications of general notoriety may supply the place of authentic documents; though these have not been wanting to establish the fact in some instances. It is known that symptoms of British hostility towards the United States have never failed to produce corresponding symptoms among those tribes. It is also well known that on all such occasions, abundant supplies of the ordinary munitions of war have been afforded by the agents of British commercial companies, and even from British garrisons, wherewith they were enabled to commence that system of savage warfare on our frontiers, which has been at all times indiscriminate in its effect, on all ages, sexes, and conditions, and so revolting to humanity.

Your committee would be much gratified if they could close here the detail of British wrongs; but it is their duty to recite another act, of still greater malignity than any of

those which have been already brought to your view. The attempt to dismember our union and overthrow our excellent constitution, by a secret mission, the object of which was to foment discontents and excite insurrection against the constituted authorities and laws of the nation, as lately disclosed by the agent employed in it, affords full proof that there is no bound to the hostility of the British government towards the United States—no act, however unjustifiable, which it would not commit to accomplish their ruin. This attempt excites the greater horror from the consideration that it was made while the United States and Great Britain were at peace, and an amicable negotiation was depending between them for the accommodation of their differences through public ministers regularly authorised for the purpose.

The United States have beheld, with unexampled forbearance, this continued series of hostile encroachments on their rights and interests, in the hope, that, yielding to the force of friendly remonstrances, often repeated, the British government might adopt a more just policy towards them, but that hope no longer exists. They have also weighed impartially the reasons which have been urged by the British government in vindication of these encroachments, and found in them neither justification nor apology.

The British government has alleged, in vindication of the orders in council, that they were resorted to as a retaliation on France, for similar aggressions committed by her on our neutral trade with the British dominions. But how has this plea been supported? the dates of the British and French aggressions are well known to the world. Their origin and progress have been marked with too wide and destructive a waste of the property of our fellow citizens, to have been forgotten. The decree of Berlin of November 21st, 1806, was the first aggression of France in the present war. Eighteen months had then elapsed, after the attack made by Great Britain on our neutral trade, with the colonies of France and her allies, and six months from the date of the proclamation of May, 1806. Even on the 7th January, 1807, the date of the first British order in council, so short a term had elapsed, after the Berlin decree, that it was hardly possible, that the intelligence of it should have reached the United States. A retaliation which is to produce its effect, by operating on a neutral power, ought not to be resorted to, till the neutral had justified it by a culpable acquiescence in the unlawful act of the other belligerent. It ought to be delayed until after sufficient time had been allowed to the neutral to remonstrate



against the measure complained of, to receive an answer, and to act on it, which had not been done in the present instance ; and when the order of November 11th was issued, it is well known that a minister of France had declared to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that it was not intended that the decree of Berlin should apply to the United States. It is equally well known that no American vessel had then been condemned under it, or seizure been made, with which the British government was acquainted. The facts prove incontestibly, that the measures of France, however unjustifiable in themselves, were nothing more than a pretext for those of England. And of the insufficiency of that pretext, ample proof has already been afforded by the British government itself, and in the most impressive form. Although it was declared that the orders in council were retaliatory on France for her decrees, it was also declared, and in the orders themselves, that owing to the superiority of the British navy, by which the fleets of France and her allies were confined within their own ports, the French decrees were considered only as empty threats.

It is no justification of the wrongs of one power, that the like were committed by another : nor ought the fact, if true, to have been urged by either, as it could afford no proof of its love of justice, or its magnanimity, or even of its courage. It is more worthy the government of a great nation, to relieve than to assail the injured. Nor can a repetition of the wrongs by another power repair the violated rights, or wounded honour, of the injured party. An utter inability alone to resist, would justify a quiet surrender of our rights, and degrading submission to the will of others. To that condition the United States are not reduced, nor do they fear it. That they ever consented to discuss with either power the misconduct of the other, is a proof of their love of peace, of their moderation, and of the hope which they still indulged that friendly appeals to just and generous sentiments would not be made to them in vain. But the motive was mistaken, if their forbearance was imputed, either to the want of a just sensibility to their wrongs, or of a determination, if suitable redress was not obtained, to resent them.—The time has now arrived when this system of reasoning must cease. It would be insulting to repeat it. It would be degrading to bear it. The United States must act as an independent nation, and assert their *rights* and avenge their *wrongs*, according to their own estimate of them, with the party who commits them, holding it responsible for its own misdeeds unmitigated by those of another.

For the difference made between Great Britain and France, by the application of the non-importation act against England only, the motive has been already too often explained, and is too well known to require further illustration. In the commercial restrictions to which the United States resorted as an evidence of their sensibility, and a mild retaliation of their wrongs, they invariably placed both powers on the same footing, holding out to each, in respect to itself, the same accommodation, in case it accepted the condition offered, and in respect to the other the same restraint, if it refused. Had the British government confirmed the arrangement which was entered into with the British government in 1809, and France maintained her decrees, with France would the United States have had to resist, with the firmness belonging to their character, the continued violation of their rights. The committee do not hesitate to declare, that France has greatly injured the United States, and that satisfactory reparation has not yet been made for many of these injuries. But that is a concern which the United States will look to and settle for themselves. The high character of the American people is a sufficient pledge to the world, that they will not fail to settle it, on conditions which they have a right to claim.

More recently, the true policy of the British government towards the United States has been completely unfolded. It has been publicly declared by those in power, that the orders in council should not be repealed, until the French government had revoked all its internal restraints on the British commerce, and that the trade of the United States with France and her allies should be prohibited until Great Britain was also allowed to trade with them. By this declaration, it appears, that to satisfy the pretensions of the British government, the United States must join Great Britain in the war with France, and prosecute the war, until France should be subdued: for without her subjugation it were in vain to presume on such a concession. The hostility of the British government to these states has been still further disclosed. It has been made manifest that the United States are considered by it as the commercial rival of Great Britain, and that their prosperity and growth are incompatible with her welfare. When all these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is impossible for your committee to doubt the motives which have governed the British ministry in all its measures towards the United States since the year 1805. Equally is it impossible to doubt, longer, the course which the United States ought to pursue towards Great Britain.

From this view of the multiplied wrongs of the British government since the commencement of the present war, it must be evident to the *impartial world*, that the contest which is now forced on the United States is radically a contest for their sovereignty and independence. Your committee will not enlarge on any of the injuries, however great, which have had a transitory effect. They wish to call the attention of the house to those of a permanent nature only, which intrench so deeply on our most important rights, and wound so extensively and vitally our best interests, as could not fail to deprive the United States of the principal advantages of their revolution if submitted to. The controul of our commerce by Great Britain, in regulating at pleasure, and expelling it almost from the ocean; the oppressive manner in which these regulations have been carried into effect, by seizing and confiscating such of our vessels, with their cargoes, as were said to have violated her edicts, often without previous warning of their danger; the impressment of our citizens from on board our own vessels on the high seas, and elsewhere, and holding them in bondage until it suited the convenience of their oppressors to deliver them up, are encroachments of that high and dangerous tendency which could not fail to produce that pernicious effect, nor would those be the only consequences that would result from it. The British government might, for a while, be satisfied with the ascendancy thus gained over us, but its pretensions would soon encrease.

The proof, which so complete and disgraceful a submission to its authority would afford of our degeneracy, could not fail to inspire confidence that there was no limit to which its usurpations and our degradation might not be carried.

Your committee, believing that the freeborn sons of America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their fathers purchased at the price of so much blood and treasure, and seeing, in the measures adopted by Great Britain, a course commenced and persisted in, which might lead to a loss of national character and independence, feel no hesitation in advising resistance by force, in which the Americans of the present day will prove to the enemy and to the world, that we have not only inherited that liberty which our fathers gave us, but also the will and power to maintain it. Relying on the patriotism of the nation, and confidently trusting that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to battle in a righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success—your committee recommend an immediate appeal to ARMS.

*British Declaration.**London, January 10.*

The earnest endeavours of the prince regent to preserve the relations of peace and amity with the United States of America having unfortunately failed, his royal highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, deems it proper publicly to declare the causes and origin of the war in which the government of the United States has compelled him to engage.

No desire of conquest, or other ordinary motive of aggression, has been, or can be with any colour of reason in this case imputed to Great Britain: that her commercial interests were on the side of peace, if war could have been avoided, without the sacrifice of her maritime rights, or without an injurious submission to France, is a truth which the American government will not deny.

His royal highness does not however mean to rest on the favourable presumption to which he is entitled. He is prepared, by an exposition of the circumstances which have led to the present war, to show that Great Britain has throughout acted towards the United States of America with a spirit of amity, forbearance, and conciliation; and to demonstrate the inadmissible nature of those pretensions, which have at length unhappily involved the two countries in war.

It is well known to the world, that it has been the invariable object of the ruler of France to destroy the power and independence of the British empire, as the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

He first contemplated the possibility of assembling such a naval force in the channel, as, combined with a numerous flotilla, should enable him to disembark in England an army sufficient, in his conception, to subjugate this country; and through the conquest of Great Britain he hoped to realize his project of universal empire.

By the adoption of an enlarged and provident system of internal defence, and by the valour of his majesty's fleets and armies, this design was entirely frustrated; and the naval force of France, after the most signal defeats, was compelled to retire from the ocean.

An attempt was then made to effectuate the same purpose by other means; a system was brought forward, by which the ruler of France hoped to annihilate the commerce of Great Britain, to shake her public credit, and to destroy her revenue, to render useless her maritime superiority, and so to avail himself of his continental ascendancy, as to consti-

tute himself in a great measure the arbiter of the ocean, notwithstanding the destruction of his fleet.

With this view, by the decree of Berlin, followed by that of Milan, he declared the British territories to be in a state of blockade; and that all commerce or even correspondence with Great Britain was prohibited. He decreed that every vessel and cargo, which had entered or was found proceeding to a British port, or which under any circumstances had been visited by a British ship of war, should be lawful prize: he declared all British goods and produce wherever found, and however acquired, whether coming from the mother country, or from her colonies, subject to confiscation: he further declared to be denationalized the flag of all neutral ships that should be found offending against these his decrees; and he gave to this project of universal tyranny the name of the continental system.

For these attempts to ruin the commerce of Great Britain, by means subversive of the dearest rights of neutral nations, France endeavoured in vain to rest her justification upon the previous conduct of his majesty's government.

Under circumstances of unparalleled provocation, his majesty had abstained from any measure which the ordinary rules of the law of nations did not fully warrant. Never was the maritime superiority of a belligerent more complete and decided. Never was the opposite belligerent so formidably dangerous in his power and in his policy to the liberties of all other nations. France had already trampled so openly and systematically on the most sacred rights of neutral powers, as might well have justified the placing her out of the pale of civilized nations. Yet in this extreme case, Great Britain had so used her naval ascendancy, that her enemy could find no just cause of complaint; and in order to give to these lawless decrees the appearance of retaliation, the ruler of France was obliged to advance principles of maritime law unsanctioned by any other authority than his own arbitrary will.

The pretext for these decrees were, first, that Great Britain had exercised the rights of war against private persons, their ships and goods; as if the only object of legitimate hostility on the ocean were the public property of a state, or as if the edicts and the courts of France itself had not at all times enforced this right with peculiar rigour; secondly, that the British orders of blockade, instead of being confined to fortified towns, had, as France asserted, been unlawfully extended to commercial towns and ports, and to the mouths of rivers; and thirdly, that they had been applied to places,

and to coasts, which neither were, nor could be actually blockaded. The last of these charges is not founded upon fact; whilst the others, even by the admission of the American government, are utterly groundless in point of law.

Against these decrees, his majesty protested and appealed, he called upon the United States to assert their own rights, and to vindicate their independence, thus menaced and attacked; and as France had declared, that she would confiscate every vessel that should touch in Great Britain, or be visited by British ships of war, his majesty, having previously issued the order of January, 1807, as an act of mitigated retaliation, was at length compelled, by the persevering violence of the enemy, and the continued acquiescence of neutral powers, to revisit upon France, in a more effectual manner, the measure of her own injustice, by declaring, in an order in council, bearing date the 11th of November, 1807, that no neutral vessel should proceed to France, or to any of the countries to which, in obedience to the dictates of France, British commerce was excluded, without first touching at a port in Great Britain, or her dependencies. At the same time his majesty intimated his readiness to repeal the orders in council whenever France should rescind her decrees, and return to the accustomed principles of maritime warfare; and at a subsequent period, as a proof of his majesty's sincere desire to accommodate, as far as possible, his defensive measures to the convenience of neutral powers, the operation of the orders in council was, by an order issued in April, 1809, limited to a blockade of France, and of the countries subject to her immediate dominion.

Systems of violence, oppression, and tyranny, can never be suppressed, or even checked, if the power against which such injustice is exercised, be debarred from the right of full and adequate retaliation; or, if the measures of the retaliating power are to be considered as matter of just offence to neutral nations, whilst the measures of original aggression and violence are to be tolerated with indifference, submission, or complacency.

The government of the United States did not fail to remonstrate against the orders in council of Great Britain. Although they knew that these orders would be revoked if the decrees of France, which had occasioned them, were repealed; they resolved at the same moment to resist the conduct of both belligerents, instead of requiring France in the first instance to rescind her decrees. Applying most unjustly the same measure of resentment to the aggressor and to the

party aggrieved, they adopted measures of commercial resistance against both—a system of resistance, which, however varied in the successive acts of embargo, non-intercourse, or non-importation, was evidently unequal in its operation, and principally levelled against the superior commerce and maritime power of Great Britain.

The same partiality towards France was observable in their negotiations, as in their measures of alleged resistance.

Application was made to both belligerents for the revocation of their respective edicts, but the terms in which they were made were widely different.

Of France was required a revocation only of the Berlin and Milan decrees, although many other edicts, grossly violating the neutral commerce of the United States, had been promulgated by that power. No security was demanded, that the Berlin and Milan decrees, even if rescinded, should not under some other form be re-established; and a direct engagement was offered, that upon such revocation the American government would take part in the war against Great Britain, if she did not immediately rescind her orders. Whereas no corresponding engagement was offered to Great Britain, of whom it was required, not only that the orders in council should be repealed, but that no others of a similar nature should be issued, and that the blockade of May, 1806, should be abandoned. This blockade, established and enforced according to accustomed practice, had not been objected to by the United States at the time it was issued. Its provisions were on the contrary represented by the American minister, resident in London at the time, to have been so framed as to afford, in his judgment, a proof of the friendly disposition of the British government towards the United States.

Great Britain was thus called upon to abandon one of her most important maritime rights; by acknowledging the order of blockade in question to be one of the edicts which violated the commerce of the United States, although it had never been so considered in the previous negotiation; and although the president of the United States had recently consented to abrogate the non-intercourse act, on the sole condition of the orders in council being revoked; thereby distinctly admitting these orders to be the only edicts which fell within the contemplation of the law under which he acted.

A proposition so hostile to Great Britain could not but be proportionably encouraging to the pretensions of the enemy.

As by thus alleging that the blockade of May, 1806, was illegal, the American government virtually justified, so far as depended on them, the French decrees.

After this proposition had been made, the French minister of foreign affairs, if not in concert with government, at least in conformity with its views, in a despatch dated the 5th of August, 1810, and addressed to the American minister resident at Paris, stated that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, and that their operation would cease from the 1st day of November following, provided his majesty would revoke his orders in council, and renounce the new principles of blockade; or that the United States would cause their rights to be respected; meaning thereby that they would resist the retaliatory measures of Great Britain.

Although the repeal of the French decrees thus announced was evidently contingent, either on concessions to be made by Great Britain (concessions to which it was obvious Great Britain could never submit), or on measures to be adopted by the United States of America; the American president at once considered the repeal as absolute. Under that pretence the non-importation act was strictly enforced against Great Britain, whilst the ships of war and merchant ships of the enemy were received into the harbours of America.

The American government, assuming the repeal of the French decrees to be absolute and effectual, most unjustly required Great Britain, in conformity to her declarations, to revoke her orders in council. The British government denied that the repeal, which was announced in the letter of the French minister for foreign affairs, was such as ought to satisfy Great Britain; and in order to ascertain the true character of the measure adopted by France, the government of the United States was called upon to produce the instrument by which the alleged repeal of the French decrees had been effected. If these decrees were really revoked, such an instrument must exist, and no satisfactory reason could be given for withholding it.

At length, on the 21st of May, 1812, and not before, the American minister in London did produce a copy, or at least what purported to be a copy of such an instrument.

It professed to bear date on the 28th of April, 1811, long subsequent to the despatch of the French minister of foreign affairs of the 5th August, 1810, or even the day named therein, viz. the 1st of November following, when the operation of the French decrees was to cease. This instrument expressly declared that these French decrees were repealed in



consequence of the American legislature having, by their act of the 1st of March, 1811, provided, that British ships and merchandize should be excluded from the ports and harbours of the United States.

By this instrument, the only document produced by America as a repeal of the French decrees, it appears beyond a possibility of doubt or cavil, that the alleged repeal of the French decrees was conditional, as Great Britain had asserted; and not absolute or final, as had been maintained by America; that they were not repealed in conformity with a proposition simultaneously made to both belligerents, but that in consequence of a previous act on the part of the American government, they were repealed in favour of one belligerent to the prejudice of the other; that the American government having adopted measures restrictive upon the commerce of both belligerents, in consequence of the edicts issued by both, rescinded their measures as they affected that power which was the aggressor, whilst they put them in full operation against the party aggrieved; although the edicts of both powers continued in force; and, lastly, that they excluded the ships of war belonging to one belligerent, whilst they admitted into their ports and harbours the ships of war belonging to the other, in violation of one of the plainest and most essential duties of a neutral nation.

Although the instrument thus produced was by no means that general and unqualified revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, which Great Britain had continually demanded, and had a full right to claim; and although this instrument, under all the circumstances of its appearance at that moment for the first time, was open to the strongest suspicions of its authenticity; yet as the minister of the United States produced it, as purporting to be a copy of the instrument of revocation, the government of Great Britain, desirous of reverting, if possible, to the ancient and accustomed principles of maritime war, determined upon revoking conditionally the orders in council. Accordingly, in the month of June last, his royal highness the prince regent was pleased to declare in council, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, that the orders in council should be revoked as far as respected the ships and property of the United States from the first of August following. The revocation was to continue in force provided the government of the United States should, within a time to be limited, repeal their respective laws against British commerce. His majesty's minister in America was expressly ordered to declare to the government of the United

States, that "this measure had been adopted by the prince regent in the earnest wish and hope, either that the government of France, by further relaxations of its system, might render perseverance on the part of Great Britain in retaliatory measures unnecessary, or if this hope should prove delusive, that his majesty's government might be enabled, in the absence of all irritating and restrictive regulations on either side, to enter with the government of the United States into amicable explanations, for the purpose of ascertaining whether, if the necessity of retaliatory measures should unfortunately continue to operate, the particular measures to be acted upon by Great Britain could be rendered more acceptable to the American government, than those hitherto pursued."

In order to provide for the contingency of a declaration of war on the part of the United States previous to the arrival in America of the said order of revocation, instructions were sent to his majesty's minister plenipotentiary accredited to the United States (the execution of which instructions, in consequence of the discontinuance of Mr. Foster's functions, were at a subsequent period entrusted to admiral sir John Borlase Warren), directing him to propose a cessation of hostilities, should they have commenced: and further, to offer a simultaneous repeal of the orders in council on one side, and of the restrictive laws on British ships and commerce on the other.

They were also respectively empowered to acquaint the American government, in reply to any inquiries with respect to the blockade of May, 1806, whilst the British government must continue to maintain its legality, "that, in point of fact, this particular blockade had been discontinued for a length of time, having been merged in the general retaliatory blockade of the enemy's ports under the orders in council, and that his majesty's government had no intention of recurring to this, or any other of the blockades of the enemy's ports founded upon the ordinary and accustomed principles of maritime law, which were in force previous to the orders in council, without a new notice to neutral powers in the usual form."

The American government, before they received intimation of the course adopted by the British government, had in fact proceeded to the extreme measure of declaring war and issuing "letters of marque," notwithstanding they were previously in possession of the French minister of foreign affairs' letter of the 12th of March, 1812, promulgating anew the Berlin and Milan decrees, as fundamental laws of the French

empire, under the false and extravagant pretext that the monstrous principles therein contained were to be found in the treaty of Utrecht, and were therefore binding upon all states. From the penalties of this code no nation was to be exempt, which did not accept it, not only as the rule of its own conduct, but as a law, the observance of which it was also required to enforce upon Great Britain.

In a manifesto accompanying their declaration of hostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the orders in council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; some trivial in themselves, others which had been mutually adjusted, but none of them such as were ever before alleged by the American government to be grounds for war. As if to throw additional obstacles in the way of peace, the American congress at the same time passed a law, prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, of such a tenor, as deprived the executive government, according to the president's own construction of that act, of all power of restoring the relations of friendship and intercourse between the two states, so far at least as concerned their commercial intercourse, until congress should re-assemble.

The president of the United States has, it is true, since proposed to Great Britain an armistice; not however, on the admission that the cause of war hitherto relied on was removed; but on condition that Great Britain, as a preliminary step should do away a cause of war, now brought forward as such for the first time; namely, that he should abandon the exercise of the undoubted right of search, to take from American merchant vessels British seamen, the natural born subjects of his majesty; and this concession was required upon the mere assurance that laws would be enacted by the legislature of the United States, to prevent such seamen from entering into their service; but, independent of the objection to an exclusive reliance on a foreign state for the conservation of so vital an interest, no explanation was or could be afforded by the agent who was charged with this overture, either as to the main principles upon which such laws were to be founded, or as to the provisions which they should contain. This proposition having been objected to, a second proposal was made, again offering an armistice, provided the British government would secretly stipulate to renounce the exercise of this right in a treaty of peace. An immediate and formal abandonment of its exercise as preliminary to a cessation of hostilities, was not demanded; but his royal highness the prince regent was required, in the name and on the

behalf of his majesty, secretly to abandon what the former overture had proposed to him publicly to concede.

This most offensive proposition was also rejected, being accompanied, as the former had been, by other demands of the most exceptionable nature, and especially of indemnity for all American vessels detained and condemned under the orders in council, or under what were termed illegal blockades—a compliance with which demands, exclusive of all other objections, would have amounted to an absolute surrender of the rights on which those orders and blockades were founded. Had the American government been sincere in representing the orders in council as the only subject of difference between Great Britain and the United States calculated to lead to hostilities, it might have been expected, so soon as the revocation of those orders had been officially made known to them, that they would have spontaneously recalled their “letters of marque,” and manifested a disposition immediately to restore the relations of peace and amity between the two powers. But the conduct of the government of the United States by no means corresponded with such reasonable expectations. The order in council of 23d June being officially communicated to America, the government of the United States saw nothing in the repeal of the orders in council, which should of itself restore peace, unless Great Britain were prepared in the first instance substantially to relinquish the right of impressing her own seamen, when found on board American merchant ships. The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of his majesty’s naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a necessary preliminary to a cessation of hostilities. Negotiation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right; and also without any armistice being concluded; but Great Britain was required previously to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negotiate upon the basis of accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign state, as the sole equivalent for the exercise of a right, which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.

If America, by demanding the preliminary concession, intends to deny the validity of that right, in that denial Great

Britain cannot acquiesce ; nor will she give countenance to such a pretension, by acceding to its suspension, much less to its abandonment, as a basis on which to treat. If the American government has devised, or conceives it can devise, regulations which may safely be accepted by Great Britain, as a substitute for the exercise of the right in question, it is for them to bring forward such a plan for consideration. The British government has never attempted to exclude this question from amongst those on which the two states might have to negotiate : it has, on the contrary, uniformly professed its readiness to receive and discuss any proposition on this subject, coming from the American government : it has never asserted any exclusive right, as to the impressment of British seamen from American vessels, which it was not prepared to acknowledge as appertaining equally to the government of the United States, with respect to American seamen when found on board British merchant ships : but it cannot, by acceding to such a basis in the first instance, either assume or admit that to be practicable, which, when attempted on former occasions, has always been found to be attended with great difficulties ; such difficulties as the British commissioners in 1806 expressly declared, after an attentive consideration of the suggestions brought forward by the commissioners on the part of America, they were unable to surmount.

Whilst the proposition transmitted through the British admiral was pending in America, another communication on the subject of an armistice was unofficially made to the British government in this country. The agent, from whom this proposition was received, acknowledged that he did not consider that he had any authority himself to sign an agreement on the part of the government. It was obvious that any stipulations entered into, in consequence of this overture, would have been binding on the British government, whilst the government of the United States would have been free to refuse or accept them, according to the circumstances of the moment. This proposition was therefore necessarily declined.

After this exposition of the circumstances which preceded and which have followed the declaration of war by the United States, his royal highness the prince regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, feels himself called upon to declare the leading principles by which the conduct of Great Britain has been regulated in the transactions connected with these discussions.

His royal highness can never acknowledge any blockade whatsoever to be illegal which has been duly notified, and is supported by an adequate force, merely upon the ground of its extent, or because the ports or coasts blockaded are not at the same time invested by land. His royal highness can never admit that neutral trade with Great Britain can be constituted a public crime, the commission of which can expose the ships of any power whatever to be denationalized. His royal highness can never admit that Great Britain can be debarred of its rights of just and necessary retaliation, through the fear of eventually affecting the interest of a neutral. His royal highness can never admit that the exercise of the undoubted and hitherto undisputed right of searching neutral merchant vessels in time of war, for the impressment of British seamen, when found therein, can be deemed any violation of a neutral flag. Neither can he admit that the taking such seamen from on board such vessels can be considered by any neutral state as a hostile measure, or a justifiable cause of war.

There is no right more clearly established than the right which a sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey; it began with their birth, and can only terminate with their existence. If a similarity of language and manners may make the exercise of this right more liable to partial mistakes and occasional abuse, when practised towards vessels of the United States, the same circumstances make it also a right, with the exercise of which in regard to such vessels it is more difficult to dispense. But if to this practice of the United States, to harbour British seamen, be added their assumed right to transfer the allegiance of British subjects, and thus to cancel the jurisdiction of their legitimate sovereign, by acts of naturalization and certificates of citizenship, which they pretend to be as valid out of their own territory as within it, it is obvious that to abandon this ancient right of Great Britain, and to admit these several pretensions of the United States, would be to expose to danger the very foundation of our maritime strength.

Without entering minutely into the other topics, which have been brought forward by the government of the United States, it may be proper to remark, that whatever the declaration of the United States may have asserted, Great Britain never did demand, that they should force British manufac-

tures into France; and she formally declared her willingness entirely to forego, or modify, in concert with the United States, the system by which a commercial intercourse with the enemy had been allowed under the protection of licenses; provided the United States would act towards her, and towards France, with real impartiality. The government of America, if the differences between states are not interminable, has as little right to notice the affair of the Chesapeake. The aggression, in this instance, on the part of a British officer, was acknowledged, his conduct was disapproved, and a reparation was regularly tendered by Mr. Foster on the part of his majesty, and accepted by the government of the United States. It is not less unwarranted in its allusion to the mission of Mr. Henry; a mission undertaken without the authority, or even knowledge of his majesty's government, and which Mr. Foster was authorized formally and officially to disavow. The charge of exciting the Indians to offensive measures against the United States is equally void of foundation. Before the war began, a policy the most opposite had been uniformly pursued, and proof of this was tendered by Mr. Foster to the American government. Such are the causes of war which have been put forward by the government of the United States. But the real origin of the present contest will be found in that spirit which has long unhappily actuated the councils of the United States; their marked partiality in palliating and assisting the aggressive tyranny of France; their systematic endeavours to inflame their people against the defensive means of Great Britain; their ungenerous conduct towards Spain, the intimate ally of Great Britain; and their unworthy desertion of the cause of other neutral nations. It is through the prevalence of such councils that America has been associated in policy with France, and committed in war against Great Britain.

And under what conduct on the part of France has the government of the United States thus lent itself to the enemy? The contemptuous violation of the commercial treaty of the year 1800 between France and the United States; the treacherous seizure of all American vessels and cargoes in all harbours subject to the controul of the French arms; the tyrannical principles of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the confiscations under them; the subsequent condemnation under the Rambouillet decree, antedated or concealed to render it the more effectual; the French commercial regulations which render the traffic of the United States with France almost illusory; the burning of their merchant ships at sea,

long after the alleged repeal of the French decrees—all these acts of violence on the part of France produce from the government of the United States only such complaints as end in acquiescence and submission, or are accompanied by suggestions for enabling France to give the semblance of a legal form to her usurpations, by converting them into municipal regulations.

This disposition of the government of the United States, this complete subserviency to the ruler of France, this hostile temper towards Great Britain, are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French government. Against this course of conduct, the real cause of the present war, the prince regent solemnly protests. Whilst contending against France, in defence not only of the liberties of Great Britain, but of the world, his royal highness was entitled to look for a far different result. From their common origin—from their common interests—from their professed principles of freedom and independence, the United States were the last power, in which Great Britain could have expected to find a willing instrument and abettor of French tyranny. Disappointed in this his just expectation, the prince regent will still pursue the policy, which the British government has so long and invariably maintained, in repelling injustice, and in supporting the general rights of nations; and, under the favour of Providence, relying on the justice of his cause, and the tried loyalty and firmness of the British nation, his royal highness confidently looks forward to a successful issue to the contest, in which he has thus been compelled most reluctantly to engage.

*Westminster, January 9, 1813.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH PROCLAMATIONS ON THE  
INVASION OF CANADA.

*By William Hull, Brigadier-General and Commander of the  
North-Western Army of the United States,*

A PROCLAMATION.

Inhabitants of Canada! After thirty years of peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities of Great Britain have once more left them no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country, and the standard of the



Union now waves over the territory of Canada. To the peaceable unoffending inhabitant it brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies, not to make them. I come to protect, not to injure you.

Separated by an immense ocean and an extensive wilderness from Great Britain, you have no participation in her councils, no interest in her conduct—you have felt her tyranny, you have seen her injustice; but I do not ask you to avenge the one or to redress the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford every security consistent with their rights and your expectations. I tender you the invaluable blessings of civil, political, and religious liberty, and their necessary result, individual and general prosperity.—That liberty which gave decision to our councils, and energy to our conduct in a struggle for independence, and which conducted us safely and triumphantly through the stormy period of the revolution. That liberty which has raised us to an elevated rank among the nations of the world; and which afforded us a greater measure of peace and security, of wealth and improvement, than ever fell to the lot of any people.

In the name of my country, and by the authority of government, I promise you protection to your persons, property, and rights; remain at your homes; pursue your peaceful and customary avocations; raise not your hands against your brethren.—Many of your fathers fought for the freedom and independence we now enjoy. Being children, therefore, of the same family with us, and heirs to the same heritage, the arrival of an army of friends, must be hailed by you with a cordial welcome. You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the dignified station of freemen. Had I any doubt of eventual success, I might ask your assistance, but I do not. I come prepared for every contingency—I have a force that will look down all opposition, and that force is but the vanguard of a much greater? If, contrary to your own interests and the just expectations of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies, and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages are let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the tomahawk—the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by

the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner: instant destruction will be his lot. If the dictates of reason, duty, justice, and humanity, cannot prevent the employment of a force which respects no rights, and knows no wrong, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless system of retaliation. I doubt not your courage and firmness—I will not doubt your attachment to liberty. If you tender your services voluntarily, they will be accepted readily.—The United States offer you peace, liberty, and security—your choice lies between these and war—slavery and destruction. Choose then, but choose wisely; and may He who knows the justice of our cause, and who holds in his hand the fate of nations, guide you to a result the most compatible with your rights and interests, your peace and happiness.

WILLIAM HULL.

*Head quarters, Sandwich, July 12, 1812.*

By the general,

A. P. HULL, *capt. of the 13th U. S. regt.  
of infantry and aid-de-camp.*

PROCLAMATION.

The unprovoked declaration of war, by the United States of America, against the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and its dependencies, has been followed by the actual invasion of this province in a remote frontier of the western district, by a detachment of the armed force of the United States. The officer commanding that detachment has thought proper to invite his majesty's subjects not merely to a quiet and unresisting submission, but insults them with a call to seek voluntarily the protection of his government. Without condescending to repeat the illiberal epithets bestowed, in this appeal of the American commander to the people of Upper Canada, on the administration of his majesty, every inhabitant of the province is desired to seek the confutation of such indecent slander in the review of his own particular circumstances. Where is the Canadian subject who can truly affirm to himself that he has been injured by the government in his person, his liberty, or his property? Where is to be found, in any part of the world, a growth so rapid in wealth and prosperity as this colony exhibits? Settled, not thirty years, by a band of veterans exiled from their former possessions on account of their loyalty, not a descendant of these brave people is to be found, who, under the fostering liberality of their sovereign, has not acquired a property and

means of enjoyment superior to what were possessed by their ancestors.

This unequalled prosperity could not have been attained by the utmost liberality of the government or the persevering industry of the people, had not the maritime power of the mother country secured to its colonies a safe access to every market where the produce of their labour was in demand.

The unavoidable and immediate consequence of a separation from Great Britain must be the loss of this inestimable advantage; and what is offered you in exchange—to become a territory of the United States, and share with them that seclusion from the ocean, which the policy of their present government enforces—you are not even flattered with a participation of their boasted independence, and it is but too obvious that, once exchanged from the powerful protection of the United Kingdom, you must be re-annexed to the dominion of France, from which the provinces of Canada were wrested by the arms of Great Britain, at a vast expense of blood and treasure, from no other motive but to relieve her ungrateful children from the oppression of a cruel neighbour—this restitution of Canada to the empire of France was the stipulated reward for the aid afforded to the revolted colonies, now the United States—the debt is still due, and there can be no doubt but the pledge has been renewed as a consideration for commercial advantages, or rather for an expected relaxation in the tyranny of France over the commercial world. Are you prepared, inhabitants of Upper Canada, to become willing subjects or rather slaves to the despot who rules the nations of Europe with a rod of iron? If not, arise in a body, exert your energies, co-operate cordially with the king's regular forces, to repel the invader, and do not give cause to your children, when groaning under the oppression of a foreign master, to reproach you with having too easily parted with the richest inheritance of this earth—a participation in the name, character, and freedom of Britons.

The same spirit of justice, which will make every reasonable allowance for the unsuccessful efforts of zeal and loyalty, will not fail to punish the defalcation of principle; every Canadian freeholder is by deliberate choice bound by the most solemn oaths to defend the monarchy as well as his own property; to shrink from that engagement is a treason not to be forgiven; let no man suppose that if in this unexpected struggle his majesty's arms should be compelled to yield to an overwhelming force, the province will be eventually abandoned; the endeared relation of its first settlers, the

intrinsic value of its commerce, and the pretensions of its powerful rival to repossess the Canadas, are pledges that no peace will be established by the United States and Great Britain and Ireland, of which the restoration of these provinces does not make the most prominent condition.

Be not dismayed at the unjustifiable threat of the commander of the enemy's forces, to refuse quarter should an Indian appear in the ranks. The brave band of natives which inhabit this colony were, like his majesty's subjects, punished for their zeal and fidelity by the loss of their possessions in the late colonies, and rewarded by his majesty with lands of superior value in this province: the faith of the British government has never yet been violated; they feel that the soil they inherit is to them and their posterity protected from the base arts so frequently devised to overreach their simplicity. By what new principles are they to be prevented from defending their property? If their warfare, from being different to that of the white people, is more terrific to the enemy, let him retrace his steps—they seek him not—and cannot expect to find women and children in an invading army; but they are men, and have equal rights with other men to defend themselves and their property when invaded, more especially when they find in the enemy's camp, a ferocious and mortal foe using the same warfare which the American commander affects to reprobate.

This inconsistent and unjustifiable threat of refusing quarter for such a cause as being found in arms with a brother sufferer in defence of invaded rights, must be exercised with the certain assurance of retaliation, not only in the limited operations of war in this part of the king's dominions, but in every quarter of the globe: for the national character of Britain is not less distinguished for humanity than strict retributive justice, which will consider the execution of this inhuman threat as deliberate murder, for which every subject of the offending power must make expiation.

ISAAC BROCK, *Maj. Gen. and Pres.*

*Head Quarters, Fort George, 22d July, 1812.*

By order of his honour the president.

J. B. GLEGG, *Capt. A. D. C.*

GOD SAVE THE KING.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF  
MICHILLIMACKINAC.

*Detroit, 4th August, 1812.*

Sir, I take the earliest opportunity to acquaint your excellency of the surrender of the garrison of Michillimackinac, under my command, to his Britannic majesty's forces under the command of captain Charles Roberts, on the 17th ult. The particulars of which are as follow :

On the 16th, I was informed by the Indian interpreter, that he had discovered from an Indian that the several nations of Indians then at St. Joseph, (a British garrison, distant forty miles,) intended to make an immediate attack on Michillimackinac. I was inclined, from the coolness I had discovered in some of the principal chiefs of the Ottawa and Chippawa nations, who had but a few days before professed the greatest friendship for the United States, to place confidence in this report. I immediately called a meeting of the American gentlemen at that time on the island, in which it was thought proper to despatch a confidential person to St. Joseph to watch the motions of the Indians. Captain Daurman, of the militia, was thought the most suitable for this service. He embarked about sun-set and met the British forces within ten or fifteen miles of the island, by whom he was made prisoner, and put on his parole of honour. He was landed on the island at day break, with positive directions to give me no intelligence whatever. He was also instructed to take the inhabitants of the village indiscriminately to a place on the west side of the island, where their persons and property should be protected by a British guard; but should they go to the fort, they would be subject to a general massacre by the savages, which would be inevitable if the garrison fired a gun. This information I received from Dr. Day, who was passing through the village when every person was flying for refuge to the enemy. Immediately on being informed of the approach of the enemy, I placed ammunition, &c. on the block houses; ordered every gun charged, and made every preparation for action. About 9 o'clock I could discover that the enemy were in possession of the heights that commanded the fort, and one piece of their artillery directed to the most defenceless part of the garrison. The Indians at this time were to be seen in great numbers in the edge of the woods. At half past 11 o'clock the enemy sent in a flag of truce, demanding a surrender of the fort and island to his Britannic majesty's forces. This,

sir, was the first information I had of the declaration of war ; I, however, had anticipated it, and was as well prepared to meet such an event as I possibly could have been with the force under my command, amounting to fifty-seven effective men, including officers. Three American gentlemen, who were prisoners, were permitted to accompany the flag: from them I ascertained the strength of the enemy to be from nine hundred to one thousand strong, consisting of regular troops, Canadians, and savages ; that they had two pieces of artillery, and were provided with ladders and ropes for the purpose of scaling the works if necessary. After I had obtained this information, I consulted my officers and also the American gentlemen present, who were very intelligent men ; the result of which was, that it was impossible for the garrison to hold out against such a superior force. In this opinion I fully concurred, from conviction that it was the only measure that could prevent a general massacre. The fort and garrison were accordingly surrendered.

The enclosed papers exhibit copies of the correspondence between the officer commanding the British forces and myself, and of the articles of capitulation. This subject involved questions of a peculiar nature ; and I hope, sir, that my demands and protests will meet the approbation of my government. I cannot allow this opportunity to escape without expressing my obligation to Dr. Day, for the service he rendered me in conducting this correspondence.

In consequence of this unfortunãte affair, I beg leave, sir, to demand that a court of enquiry may be ordered to investigate all the facts connected with it ; and I do further request, that the court may be speedily directed to express their opinion on the merits of the case. I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. HANKS, *Lieutenant of Artillery.*

*His Excellency Gen. Hull, commanding the N. W. Army.*

P. S. The following particulars relative to the British force were obtained after the capitulation, from a source that admits of no doubt: Regular troops, 46, (including 4 officers), Canadian militia, 260. Total, 306.

Savages—Sioux, 56 ; Winnebagoes, 48 ; Tallesawains, 39 ; Chippawas and Ottawas, 572.

Savages, 715 ; Whites, 306. Total, 1021.

It may also be remarked, that one hundred and fifty Chippawas and Ottawas joined the British two days after the capitulation.

P. HANKS.

*Heights above Michillimackinack, 17th July, 1812.*

## CAPITULATION,

*Agreed upon between Captain Charles Roberts, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces on the one part, and Lieutenant Porter Hanks, commanding the forces of the United States, on the other part.*

1st, The fort of Michillimackinac shall immediately be surrendered to the British forces.

2d, The garrison shall march out with the honours of war, lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war; and shall be sent to the United States of America by his Britannic majesty, not to serve this war, until regularly exchanged: and for the due performance of this article, the officers pledge their word and honour.

3d, All the merchant vessels in the harbour, with their cargoes, shall be in possession of their respective owners.

4th, Private property shall be held sacred as far as it is in my power.

5th, All citizens of the United States, who shall not take the oath of allegiance to his Britannic majesty, shall depart with their property from the island in one month from the date hereof.

(Signed)

CHARLES ROBERTS,

*Capt. commanding the forces of his Britannic majesty.*

P. HANKS,

*Lieut. commanding the United States troops.*

Supplement to the articles of capitulation signed on the 17th July:

The captains and crews of the vessels Erie and Free-goodwill shall be included under the second article not to serve until regularly exchanged, for which the officers shall pledge their word and honour.

*Fort Michillimackinac, 17th July, 1812.*

CHARLES ROBERTS,

*Capt. commanding the forces of his Britanic majesty,*

GRANTED,

P. HANKS,

*Lieut. commanding the United States' forces.*

*Makina, July 18, 1812.*

Dear sir, I am happy to have it in my power to announce to you, that fort Makina capitulated to us on the 17th inst. at 11 o'clock, A. M. capt. Roberts at our head, with part of the 10th regiment, 5th battalion: Mr. Crawford had the command of the Canadians which consisted of about 200 men; Mr. Dickson, 113 Sioux, Forlavoins, and Winebagoes; my-

self about 280 men, Attawas and Chippawas; part of the Attawas of L'harb Cooche had not arrived. It was a fortunate circumstance that the fort capitulated without firing a single gun; had they not done so, I firmly believe not a soul of them would have been saved. My son, Charles Longlade, Augustine Nolin, and Michelle Cadotte, jun. have rendered me great service in keeping the Indians in order, and executing from time to time such commands as were delivered to me by the commanding officer. I never saw so determined a set of people as the Chippawas and Attawas were.

Since the capitulation they have not drank a single drop of liquor, nor even killed a fowl belonging to any person—a thing never known before; for they generally destroy every thing they meet with. I am, dear sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

JOHN ASKIN, Jun.

*Str. Keep. Dep.*

*The Hon. Col. W. Claus, &c. &c. Fort George.*

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ATTACK ON THE BRITISH ADVANCED POSTS AT THE  
RIVER AUX CANARDS.

*Copy of a letter from Col. Cass to Gen. Hull.*

*Sandwich, Upper Canada, July 17, 1812.*

Sir, in conformity with your instructions, I proceeded with a detachment of 280 men, to reconnoitre the enemy's advanced posts. We found them in possession of a bridge over the river Aux Canards, at the distance of four miles from Malden. After examining their position, I left one company of riflemen, to conceal themselves near the bridge, and upon our appearance on the opposite side of the river, to commence firing, in order to divert their attention, and to throw them into confusion. I then proceeded with the remainder of the force about five miles, to a ford over the river Aux Canards, and down on the southern bank of the river. About sunset we arrived within sight of the enemy. Being entirely destitute of guides, we marched too near the bank of the river, and found our progress checked by a creek, which was then impassable. We were then compelled to march up a mile, in order to effect a passage over the creek. This gave the enemy time to make their arrangements, and prepare for their defence. On coming down the creek we



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found them formed; they commenced a distant fire of musquetry. The riflemen of the detachment were formed upon the wings, and the two companies of infantry in the centre. The men moved on with great spirit and alacrity. After the first discharge the British retreated—we continued advancing. Three times they formed, and as often retreated. We drove them about half a mile, when it became so dark that we were obliged to relinquish the pursuit. Two privates in the 41st regiment were wounded and taken prisoners. We learn from deserters, that nine or ten were wounded, and some killed. We could gain no precise information of the number opposed to us. It consisted of a considerable detachment from the 41st regiment, some militia, and a body of Indians. The guard at the bridge consisted of 50 men. Our riflemen stationed on this side the river Aux Canards, discovered the enemy reinforcing them during the whole afternoon. There is no doubt but their number considerably exceeded ours. Lieutenant-col. Miller conducted in the most spirited and able manner. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the whole detachment.

Very respectfully, sir, I have the honour to be your obedient servant,

(Signed)           LEWIS CASS, *Col. 3d Reg. O. Vol.*  
*His excellency Brig. Gen. Hull.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE SURRENDER  
OF THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL HULL.

*Montreal, September 8, 1812.*

Sir, the inclosed despatch was prepared on my arrival at Fort George, and it was my intention to have forwarded it from that place by major Witherell, of the Michigan volunteers. I made application to the commanding officer at that post, and was refused; he stating that he was not authorised, and general Brock was then at York. We were immediately embarked for this place, and major Witherell obtained liberty at Kingston to go home on parole.

This is the first opportunity I have had to forward the despatches.

The fourth United States' regiment is destined for Quebec, with a part of the first. The whole consist of a little over three hundred.

Sir George Prevost, without any request on my part, has

offered to take my parole, and permit me to proceed to the states.

Lieutenant Anderson, of the eighth regiment, is the bearer of my despatches. He was formerly a lieutenant in the artillery, and resigned his commission on account of being appointed marshal of the territory of Michigan. During the campaign he has had a command in the artillery; and I recommend him to you as a valuable officer.

He is particularly acquainted with the state of things previous and at the time when the capitulation took place. He will be able to give you correct information on any points about which you may think proper to enquire. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM HULL.

*Hon. W. Eustis, Secretary of the Department of War.*

*Fort George, August 26, 1812.*

Sir, enclosed are the articles of capitulation by which the fort of Detroit has been surrendered to major-general Brock, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become prisoners of war. My situation at present forbids me from detailing the particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will, however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michillimackinac, almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamies and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior, west from beyond the Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every part of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined in open hostility, under the British standard, against the army I commanded, contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to remain neutral; even the Ottawa chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast number of chiefs who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-water, Split Log, &c. are considered the principals. This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the only communication which I had with my country. This communication had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, 200 miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army which I marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The

body of the lake being commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by gun boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water. On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on pack horses—all its operations were successful until its arrival at Detroit, and in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all opposition seemed to fall before it. One month it remained in possession of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions, detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the province, and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which appeared to be taking place—the militia from Amherstburg were daily deserting, and the whole country then under the controul of the army was asking for protection. The Indians generally, in the first instance, appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the contest. The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before that place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon to make a break in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was not.—The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was not until the 7th of August that two 24 pounders and three howitzers were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the enterprize. While the operations of the army were delayed by these preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of Michillimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had arrived at Amherstburg under the command of colonel Proctor. The desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by water, I received information of a very considerable force under the command of major Chambers, on the river Le Trench, with four field-pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently destined for Amherstburg; and in addition to this combination and increase of force, contrary to all my expectations, the Wabandots, Chippawas, Ottawas, Potawatamies, Munsees, Delawares, &c. with whom I had the most friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted the tomahawk and scalping knife. There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they

were sent to the river Huron, Brownstown, and Maguago to intercept my communication. To open this communication, I detached major Vanhorn of the Ohio volunteers with two hundred men to proceed as far as the river Raisin, under an expectation he would meet captain Brush with one hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity of provision for the army. An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown, and major Vanhorn's detachment defeated and returned to camp without effecting the object of the expedition.

In my letter of the 7th inst. you have the particulars of that transaction with a return of the killed and wounded. Under this sudden and unexpected change of things, and having received an express from general Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of any co-operation from that quarter, and the two senior officers of the artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to pass the Turkey river and river Aux Canards with the 24 pounders, and that they could not be transported by water, as the Queen Charlotte, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the mouth of the river Aux Canards; and as it appeared indispensably necessary to open the communication to the river Raisin and the Miami, I found myself compelled to suspend<sup>1</sup> the operation against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit. Fully intending, at that time, after the communication was opened, to re-cross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of three hundred men. On the evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th inst. the army, excepting the garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillerists, all under the command of major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river, and encamped at Detroit. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment of six hundred men, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Miller, was immediately ordered. For a particular account of the proceedings of this detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago, which reflects the highest honour on the American arms, I refer you to my letter of the 13th

August, inst., a duplicate of which is enclosed, marked G. Nothing however but honour was acquired by this victory; and it is a painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could only open the communication, as far as the points of their bayonets extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small detachment and the provisions, being still at the river Raisin, and in a situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th inst. in the evening, I permitted cols. M'Arthur and Cass to select from their regiment four hundred of their most effective men, and proceed an upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to captain Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the river Raisin to accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting on the defensive, becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching cols. M'Arthur and Cass on the 11th inst. evacuated and destroyed the fort on the opposite bank. On the 13th in the evening, general Brock arrived at Amherstburg about the hour colonels M'Arthur and Cass marched, of which at that time I had received no information. On the 15th I received a summons from him to surrender fort Detroit, of which the paper marked A. is a copy. My answer is marked B. At this time I had received no information from cols. M'Arthur and Cass. An express was immediately sent, strongly escorted, with orders for them to return. On the 15th, as soon as general Brock received my letters, his batteries opened upon the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the evening all the British ships of war came nearly as far up the river as Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At day-light on the 16th (at which time I had received no information from cols. M'Arthur and Cass, my expresses, sent the evening before, and in the night, having been prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians), the cannonade recommenced, and in a short time I received information, that the British army and Indians were landing below the Spring wells, under cover of their ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit did not exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops, and unaccustomed to a camp life; having performed a laborious march; having been engaged in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large

number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts necessary for their situation; are the general causes by which the strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled with women, children, and the old and decrepid people of the town and country; they were unsafe in the town, and it was entirely open and exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it, there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first instance, the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries; towards the close it was directed against the fort alone, and almost every shot and shell had their effect.

It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect the whole force in the fort; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any adequate force in the fort. There were landed at that time of the enemy a regular force of much more than that number, besides Indians. Considering this great inequality of force, I did not think it expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been attended with great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage, because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. In addition to this, colonels M'Arthur and Cass would have been in a most hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have dared to adopt it. I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and I take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then joined the British force were numerous beyond any former example. Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the necessary supplies of provisions, military stores, clothing, and comforts for the sick, on pack horses, through a wilderness of two hundred miles, filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds,



and deaths, could have supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern nations of Indians; but against the united strength of Upper Canada, whose population consists of more than twenty times the number contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the regular forces of the province, and the wealth and influence of the North-west and other trading establishments among the Indians, which have in their employment and under their entire controul more than two thousand white men. Before I close this despatch, it is a duty I owe my respectable associates in command, colonels M'Arthur, Findley, Cass, and lieutenant-colonel Miller, to express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner they have performed their respective duties. If aught has taken place during the campaign, which is honourable to the army, these officers are entitled to a large share of it. If the last act should be disapproved, no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise to express my obligation to general Taylor, who has performed the duty of quarter-master-general, for his great exertions in procuring every thing in his department which it was possible to furnish for the convenience of the army; likewise to brigade-major Jessup, for the correct and punctual manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally for their exertion, and the zeal they have manifested for the public interest. The death of Dr. Foster, soon after he arrived at Detroit, was a severe misfortune to the army; it was increased by the capture of the Chachaga packet, by which the medicine and hospital stores were lost. He was commencing the best arrangements in the department of which he was the principal, with the very small means he possessed. I was likewise deprived of the necessary services of captain Patridge by sickness, the only officer of the corps of engineers attached to the army. All the officers and men have gone to their respective homes, excepting the 4th United States' regiment, and a small part of the first, and captain Dyson's company of artillery. Captain Dyson's company was left at Amherstburg, and the others are with me prisoners; they amount to about three hundred and forty. I have only to solicit an investigation of my conduct as early as my situation and the state of things will admit; and to add the further request, that the government will not be unmindful of my associates in captivity, and of the families of those brave men who have fallen in the contest.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,  
 W. HULL, *Brig.-Gen.*  
*Hon W. Eustis, Secretary of the Department of War.*

*Copies of letters from Brigadier-General Hull to the Department of War, accompanying the preceding despatch.*

*Sandwich, August 7, 1812.*

Sir, on the 4th inst. major Vanhorn, of colonel Findley's regiment of Ohio Volunteers, was detached from this army, with the command of 200 men, principally riflemen, to proceed to the river Raisin, and further, if necessary, to meet and reinforce capt. Brush, of the state of Ohio, commanding a company of volunteers, and escorting provisions for this army. At Brownstown, a large body of Indians had formed an ambuscade, and the major's detachment received a heavy fire, at the distance of fifty yards from the enemy. The whole detachment retreated in disorder. Major Vanhorn made every exertion to form, and prevent the retreat, that was possible for a brave and gallant officer, but without success. By the return of killed and wounded, it will be perceived, that the loss of officers was uncommonly great. The efforts to rally their companies was the occasion of it. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM HULL.

*Hon. W. Eustis, Secretary of War.*

*Report of killed in Major Vanhorne's defeat.*

Captains Gilchrist, Ullery, M'Callough of the spies, Børstler severely wounded, and not expected to recover (since dead); lieutenant Pentz; ensigns Roby and Allison; 10 privates. Total 17.

Number of wounded, as yet unknown.

*Detroit, August 13, 1812.*

Sir, the main body of the army having re-crossed the river at Detroit, on the night and morning of the 8th inst. six hundred men were immediately detached under the command of lieutenant-colonel Miller, to open the communication to the river Raisin, and protect the provisions, which were under the escort of captain Brush. This detachment consisted of the 4th United States' regiment and two small detachments under the command of lieutenant Stansbury and ensign M'Labe, of the 1st regiment; detachments from the Ohio and Michigan volunteers, a corps of artillerists, with one six pounder and an howitzer, under the command of

lieutenant Eastman, and a part of captains Smith and Sloan's cavalry, commanded by captain Sloan of the Ohio volunteers. Lieutenant-colonel Miller marched from Detroit in the afternoon of the 8th instant, and on the 9th, about four o'clock, P. M., the van guard, commanded by captain Snelling of the 4th United States' regiment, was fired on by an extensive line of British troops and Indians at the lower part of Maguago, about fourteen miles from Detroit. At this time the main body was marching in two columns, and captain Snelling maintained his position in a most gallant manner, under a very heavy fire, until the line was formed and advanced to the ground he occupied, when the whole, excepting the rear guard, was brought into action. The enemy were formed behind a temporary breast-work of logs, the Indians extending in a thick wood on their left. Lieutenant-colonel Miller ordered his whole line to advance, and when within a small distance of the enemy made a general discharge, and proceeded with charged bayonets, when the whole British line and Indians commenced a retreat. They were pursued in a most vigorous manner about two miles, and the pursuit discontinued only on account of the fatigue of the troops, the approach of evening, and the necessity of returning to take care of the wounded. The judicious arrangements made by lieutenant-colonel Miller, and the gallant manner in which they were executed, justly entitle him to the highest honour. From the moment the line commenced the fire, it continually moved on, and the enemy maintained their position until forced at the point of the bayonet. The Indians on the left, under the command of Tecumseh, fought with great obstinacy, but were continually forced and compelled to retreat. The victory was complete in every part of the line, and the success would have been more brilliant had the cavalry charged the enemy on the retreat, when a most favourable opportunity presented. Although orders were given for the purpose, unfortunately they were not executed. Majors Vanhorn and Morrison, of the Ohio volunteers, were associated with lieutenant-colonel Miller, as field officers in this command, and were highly distinguished by their exertions in forming the line, and the firm and intrepid manner they led their respective commands to action.

Captain Baker of the 1st United States' regiment, captain Brevort of the second, and captain Hull of the 13th, my aide-camp, and lieutenant Whistler of the 1st, requested permission to join the detachment as volunteers. Lieutenant colonel Miller assigned commands to captain Baker and lieu-

tenant Whistler, and captains Brevort and Hull, at his request, attended his person, and aided him in the general arrangements. Lieutenant-colonel Miller has mentioned the conduct of these officers in terms of high approbation. In addition to the captains who have been named, lieutenant-colonel Miller has mentioned captains Burton and Fuller of the 4th regiment, captains Saunders and Brown of the Ohio volunteers, and captain Delandre of the Michigan volunteers, who were attached to his command, and distinguished by their valour. It is impossible for me in this communication to do justice to the officers and soldiers, who gained the victory which I have described. They have acquired high honour to themselves, and are justly entitled to the gratitude of their country.

Major Muir of the 41st regiment commanded the British in this action. The regulars and volunteers consisted of about four hundred, and a large number of Indians. Major Muir and two subalterns were wounded, one of them since dead. About forty Indians were found dead on the field, and Tecumseh their leader was slightly wounded. The number of wounded Indians who escaped has not been ascertained. Four of major Muir's detachment have been made prisoners, and fifteen of the 41st regiment killed and wounded. The militia and volunteers attached to his command were in the severest part of the action, and their loss must have been great—it has not yet been ascertained. I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant,

W. HULL,

*Brig.-Gen. commanding the N. W. Army.  
Hon. W. Eustis, Secretary of War.*

*Return of killed and wounded in the action fought near  
Maguago, August 9, 1812.*

4th United States' regiment—10 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and forty-five wounded; capt. Baker of the 1st regiment of infantry; lieutenant Larabee of the 4th; lieutenant Peters of the 4th; ensign Whistler of the 17th, doing duty in the 4th; lieutenant Silly, and an ensign, whose name has not been returned to me, were wounded.

In the Ohio and Michigan volunteers, 8 were killed and 13 wounded.

W. HULL.

[A.]

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Sandwich, August 15, 1812.*

The force at my disposal authorises me to require of you the immediate surrender of fort Detroit. It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware, that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond controul the moment the contest commences. You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honour. Lieut.-colonel M<sup>c</sup>Donnell and major Glegg are fully authorised to conclude any arrangement that may lead to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood. I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) **ISAAC BROCK, Maj.-Gen.**  
*His Excellency Brigadier-General Hull,*  
*commanding at Fort Detroit.*

[B.]

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Detroit, August 15, 1812.*

I have received your letter of this date. I have no other reply to make, than to inform you, that I am prepared to meet any force which may be at your disposal, and any consequences which may result from any exertion of it you may think proper to make.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform you that the flag of truce under the direction of captain Brown, proceeded contrary to the orders, and without the knowledge of col. Cass, who commanded the troops which attacked your pickets near the river Canard bridge.

I likewise take this opportunity to inform you that Cowie's house was set on fire contrary to my orders, and it did not take place till after the evacuation of the fort. From the best information I have been able to obtain on the subject, it was set on fire by some of the inhabitants on the other side of the river. I am, very respectfully, your excellency's most obedient servant,

(Signed) **W. HULL, Brig.-Gen.**  
*Commanding the N. W. Army of the U. S.*  
*His Excellency Major-General Brock, commanding his*  
*Britannic Majesty's Forces, Sandwich, Upper Canada.*

*Camp at Detroit, 16th August, 1812.*

Capitulation for the surrender of fort Detroit, entered into between major-general Brock, commanding his Britannic

majesty's forces on the one part, and brigadier-general Hull, commanding the north-western army of the United States on the other :

Art. I. Fort Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, will be immediately surrendered to the British forces, under the command of major-general Brock, and will be considered prisoners of war ; with the exception of such of the militia of the Michigan territory who have not joined the army.

II. All public stores, arms, and all public documents, including every thing else of a public nature, will be immediately given up.

III. Private persons and property of every description will be respected.

IV. His excellency brigadier-general Hull having expressed a desire that a detachment from the state of Ohio, on its way to join his army, as well as one sent from fort Detroit, under the command of col. M'Arthur, shall be included in the above capitulation, it is accordingly agreed to ; it is, however, to be understood, that such part of the Ohio militia as have not joined the army, will be permitted to return to their homes, on condition that they will not serve during the war. Their arms, however, will be delivered up if belonging to the public.

V. The garrison will march out at the hour of 12 o'clock this day, and the British forces will take immediate possession of the fort.

(Signed) J. M. M'DONNELL, *Lt.-Col.*  
*Militia, P. A. D. C.*

J. B. GLEGG, *Major, A. D. C.*

J. MILLER, *Lt.-Col. 5th U. S. Infantry.*

E. BRUSH, *Col. 1st Regt. Michigan Mil.*

Approved, W. HULL, *Brig.-Gen., commanding the*  
*N. W. Army.*

Approved, ISAAC BROCK, *Major-General.*

*An Article supplemental to the Articles of Capitulation concluded at Detroit, 16th August.*

It is agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Ohio militia and volunteers shall be permitted to proceed to their respective homes on this condition, that they are not to serve during the present war unless they are exchanged.

(Signed) W. HULL, *Brig.-Gen.*  
*Commanding N. W. Army U. S.*  
ISAAC BROCK, *Maj.-Gen.*

*An Article in addition to the Supplemental Article of Capitulation, concluded at Detroit, 16th August.*

It is further agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Michigan militia and volunteers, under the command of major Witherell, shall be placed on the same principles as the Ohio volunteers and militia are placed by the supplemental article of the 16th inst.

(Signed)

W. HULL, *Brig.-Gen.*  
*Commanding the N. W. Army U. S.*  
 ISAAC BROCK, *Maj.-Gen.*

*From the London Gazette Extraordinary.*

*Downing-Street, Oct. 6th, 1812.*

Captain Coore, aide-de-camp to lieutenant-general sir George Prevost, governor in chief of his majesty's provinces in North America, arrived this morning with despatches from the lieutenant-general, addressed to earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, of which the following is an extract and a copy.

*Montreal, August 26.*

My Lord, I feel the greatest satisfaction in transmitting to your lordship a letter which I have this day received by express from major-general Brock, announcing to me the surrender of fort Detroit, on the 16th instant, by brigadier-general Hull, with the army under his command, exceeding two thousand five hundred men, together with twenty-five pieces of ordnance.

In my despatches of the 17th and 24th instant, I had the honour of detailing to your lordship the operations which had taken place in Upper Canada, in consequence of the invasion of that province by the army of the United States. Brigadier-general Hull, having crossed the Detroit river on the 12th of last month, with two thousand three hundred men, consisting of regular cavalry and infantry, and militia, bringing with him several field-pieces; and having driven in the militia towards Amherstburg, first advanced to Sandwich, and afterwards approached Amherstburg, with a part of his army to the river Aux Canards, about five miles from the fort, where he was foiled in three attempts to cross that river, and suffered a considerable loss. The garrison of Amherstburg consisted at that time of a subaltern's detachment of the royal artillery, commanded by lieutenant Troughton; of a detachment of three hundred men of the forty-first regiment, under the command of captain Muir; and of about as many of the

militia; the whole under the command of lieutenant-colonel St. George, inspecting field officer of militia in the district.

General Brock, relying upon the strong assurances I had given him of a reinforcement, as prompt and as effectual as the circumstances under which I was placed, by this new war, would permit me to send, adopted the most vigorous measures for the safety of that part of the frontier which had been attacked. In these measures he was most opportunely aided by the fortunate surrender of fort Michillimackinac, which giving spirit and confidence to the Indian tribes in its neighbourhood, part of whom assisted in its capture, determined them to advance upon the rear and flanks of the American army, as soon as they heard that it had entered the province.

The certainty of the expected reinforcements and the weakness of the enemy on the Niagara frontier, had, in the mean time, induced general Brock to detach from the garrison of fort George, fifty men of the forty-first regiment under captain Chambers, into the interior of the country, for the purpose of collecting such of the Indians and militia as might be ready to join him, and of afterwards advancing upon the left flank of the enemy. Sixty men of the same regiment were also detached from the garrison to Amherstburg, and forty to Long Point, to collect the militia in that quarter. Having made these dispositions, and having previously sent forward colonel Proctor, of the forty-first regiment to Amherstburg—where he arrived and assumed the command on the 26th of last month—general Brock proceeded himself from York on the 5th instant for fort St. George and Long Point on lake Erie, which last place he left on the 8th following for Amherstburg, with forty rank and file of the forty-first regiment, and two hundred and sixty militia forces.

Whilst general Brock was thus hastening his preparations for the relief of Amherstburg, the prospects of the American army under general Hull were becoming every day more unfavourable, and their situation more critical. The intelligence of the fall of Michillimackinac had reached them, which they knew must expose them to an attack of the Indians in one quarter, at the same time that they were threatened in another by the force approaching under capt. Chambers. An Indian tribe of the Wyandots, whom they had in vain attempted to bribe, aided by a detachment of the 41st regiment from Amherstburg, had succeeded in cutting off their supplies on the opposite side of the river, and inter-



cepting their despatches, which described in very strong terms their apprehensions and despondency. The losses they had sustained in their different actions upon the Canard river, as well as those for protecting their supplies, together with the mode of warfare pursued by the Indians, had greatly discouraged and dispirited them, and had convinced general Hull how hopeless any attempt would be to storm fort Amherstburg, without great reinforcements and a battering train.

It was under these circumstances, at this critical period, when the enemy were beginning to consult their security by entrenching themselves, that general Brock entered Amherstburg with a reinforcement, which he was fortunately enabled to do on the 12th inst. without the smallest molestation, in consequence of our decided naval superiority on the lakes. To his active and intelligent mind the advantages which his enemy's situation afforded him over them, even with his very inferior force, become immediately apparent; and that he has not failed most effectually to avail himself of those favourable circumstances, your lordship will, I trust, be satisfied, from the letter which I have the honour of transmitting.

Having thus brought to your lordship's view, the different circumstances which have led to the successful termination of the campaign on the western frontier of Upper Canada, I cannot withhold from major-general Brock the tribute of applause so justly due to him for his distinguished conduct on this occasion, or omit to recommend him, through your lordship, to the favourable consideration of his royal highness the prince regent, for the great ability and judgment with which he has planned, and the promptitude, energy, and fortitude with which he has effected, the preservation of Upper Canada, with the sacrifice of so little British blood in accomplishing so important a service.

My aid-de-camp, captain Coore, will have the honour of delivering to your lordship this despatch; and as he is well qualified to give your lordship information respecting the military resources of this command, I shall beg leave to refer your lordship to him for farther particulars. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

GEORGE PREVOST.

*Head-Quarters, Montreal, Sept. 1, 1812.*

My Lord, since I had the honour of transmitting to your lordship my letter of the 26th ult. in charge of my aid-de-camp, captain Coore, I have received from major-general Brock a despatch, of which the enclosed is a copy, containing

the particulars of brigadier-general Hull's invasion of Upper Canada, which has terminated most gloriously to his majesty's arms, in that officer's defeat and surrender as a prisoner of war, with the whole of the north-western army, together with the fort Detroit, and 33 pieces of ordnance.

I forward this despatch express, in the expectation of its reaching captain Coore previously to his leaving Canada, which, with the colours of the 4th United States' regiment accompanying it, I trust that officer will have the honour of delivering to your lordship. I have the honour to be, &c.

GEORGE PREVOST.

*To the right honourable Earl Bathurst.*

*Head-Quarters, Detroit, August 7.*

Sir, I have had the honour of informing your excellency, that the enemy effected his passage across the Detroit river on the 12th ult. without opposition, and that after establishing himself at Sandwich, he had ravaged the country as far as the Moravia town. Some skirmishes occurred between the troops under lieutenant-colonel St. George and the enemy upon the river Aux Canards, which uniformly terminated in his being repulsed with loss. I had judged it proper to detach a force down the river Thames, capable of acting, in conjunction with the garrison of Amherstburg, offensively; but captain Chambers, whom I had appointed to direct this detachment, experienced difficulties that frustrated my intentions. The intelligence received from that quarter admitting of no delay, colonel Proctor was directed to assume the command, and his force was soon after increased with 60 rank and file of the 41st regiment.

In the mean time the most strenuous measures were adopted to counteract the machinations of the evil-disposed; and I soon experienced the gratification of receiving voluntary offers of service from that portion of the embodied militia the most easily collected. In the attainment of this important point, gentlemen of the first character and influence shewed an example highly creditable to them; and I cannot on this occasion avoid mentioning the essential assistance I derived from John M'Donnell, Esq. his majesty's attorney-general, who, from the beginning of the war has honoured me with his services as my provincial aid-de-camp. A sufficiency of boats being collected at Long Point for the conveyance of 300 men, the embarkation took place on the 8th inst. and in 5 days arrived in safety at Amherstburg. I found that the judicious arrangement which had been adopted immediately

upon the arrival of col. Proctor, had compelled the enemy to retreat and take shelter under the guns of his fort: that officer commenced operations by sending strong detachments across the river, with a view of cutting off the enemy's communication with his reserve. This produced two smart skirmishes on the 5th and 9th inst., in both of which the enemy's loss was very considerable, whilst ours amounted to 3 killed and 13 wounded; amongst the latter I have particularly to regret capt. Muir and lieut. Sutherland of the 41st regiment; the former, an officer of great experience, and both ardent in his majesty's service. Batteries had likewise been commenced opposite fort Detroit, for one 18 pounder, two 12's, and two  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch mortars; all of which opened on the evening of the 15th (having previously summoned brigadier-general Hull to surrender); and although opposed by a well-directed fire from seven 24 pounders, such was their construction, under the able directions of captain Dixon of the royal engineers, that no injury was sustained from its effect.

The force at my disposal being collected in the course of the 5th, in the neighbourhood of Sandwich, the embarkation took place a little after day-light on the following morning, and by the able arrangements of lieut. Dewar of the quartermaster-general's department, the whole was in a short time landed without the smallest confusion, at Spring Well, a good position, 3 miles west of Detroit. The Indians who had in the mean time effected their landing 2 miles below, moved forwards and occupied the woods, about a mile and a half on our left.

The force which I instantly directed to march against the enemy consisted of 30 royal artillery, 250 41st regiment, 50 royal Newfoundland regiment, 400 militia, and about 600 Indians, to which were attached 3 six pounders, and 2 three pounders. The services of lieut. Troughton, commanding the royal artillery, an active and intelligent officer, being required in the field, the direction of the batteries was intrusted to captain Hall, of the marine department; and I cannot withhold my entire approbation of their conduct on that occasion.

I crossed the river with an intention of waiting in a strong position the effect of our force upon the enemy's camp, and in the hope of compelling him to meet us in the field; but receiving information upon landing that colonel M'Arthur, an officer of high reputation, had left the garrison three days before with a detachment of 500 men, and hearing soon after

that his cavalry had been seen that morning three miles in our rear, I decided on an immediate attack. Accordingly the troops advanced to within one mile of the fort, and having ascertained that the enemy had taken little or no precaution towards the land side, I resolved on an assault, whilst the Indians penetrated his camp. Brig.-gen. Hull, however, prevented this movement by proposing a cessation of hostilities, for the purpose of preparing terms of capitulation. Lieut. col. John M'Donnell and capt. Glegg were accordingly deputed by me on this mission, and returned within an hour with the conditions, which I have the honour herewith to transmit. Certain considerations afterwards induced me to agree to the two supplementary articles.

The force thus surrendered to his majesty's arms cannot be estimated at less than 2500 men. In this estimate col. M'Arthur's detachment is included, as he surrendered, agreeably to the terms of capitulation, in the course of the evening, with the exception of two hundred men, whom he left escorting a valuable convoy at some little distance in his rear; but there can be no doubt the officer commanding will consider himself equally bound by the capitulation.

The enemy's aggregate force was divided into two troops of cavalry; one company of artillery regulars; the fourth United States' regiment; detachments of the first and third United States' regiment volunteers; three regiments of the Ohio militia; one regiment of the Michigan territory.

Thirty-three pieces of brass and iron ordnance have already been secured.

When this contest commenced, many of the Indian nations were engaged in active warfare with the United States, notwithstanding the constant endeavours of this government to dissuade them from it. Some of the principal chiefs happened to be at Amherstburg, trying to procure a supply of arms and ammunition, which for years had been withheld, agreeably to the instructions received from sir James Craig, and since repeated by your excellency.

From that moment they took a most active part, and appeared foremost on every occasion; they were led yesterday by col. Elliot and capt. M'Kee, and nothing could exceed their order and steadiness. A few prisoners were taken by them during the advance, whom they treated with every humanity; and it affords me much pleasure in assuring your excellency, that such was their forbearance and attention to what was required of them, that the enemy sustained no

other loss of men than what was occasioned by the fire of our batteries.

The high sense I entertain of the abilities and judgment of lieut.-col. Myers, induced me to appoint him to the important command at Niagara; it was with reluctance that I deprived myself of his assistance, but I had no other expedient; his duties as head of the quarter-master-general's department were performed to my satisfaction by lieut.-col. Nicholl's, quarter-master-general of the militia.

Captain Glegg, my aid-de-camp, will have the honour of delivering this despatch to your excellency; he is charged with the colours taken at the capture of fort Detroit, and those of the 4th United States' regiment.

Captain Glegg is capable of giving your excellency every information respecting the state of this province; and I shall esteem myself highly indebted to your excellency to afford him that protection, to which his merit and length of service give him a powerful claim. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

ISAAC BROCK, *Major-gen.*

P. S. I have the honour to enclose a copy of a proclamation, which I issued immediately on taking possession of this country.

I should have mentioned in the body of my despatch the capture of the Adams; she is a fine vessel, and recently repaired, but without arms.

PROCLAMATION.

*By Isaac Brock, Esq. Major-General, commanding his Majesty's Forces in the Province of Upper Canada, a Proclamation.*

Whereas the territory of Michigan was this day, by capitulation, ceded to the arms of his Britannic majesty, without any other condition than the protection of private property; and wishing to give an early proof of the moderation and justice of the government, I do hereby announce to all the inhabitants of the said territory that the laws heretofore in existence shall continue in force until his majesty's pleasure be known, or so long as the peace and safety of the said territory will admit thereof. And I do hereby also declare and make known to the said inhabitants that they shall be protected in the full exercise and enjoyment of their religion, of which all persons, both civil and military, will take notice, and govern themselves accordingly.

All persons having in their possession, or having any knowledge of any public property, shall forthwith deliver in

the same, or give notice thereof to the officer commanding, or lieutenant-colonel Nichol, who are hereby authorised to receive and give proper receipts for the same.

Officers of the militia will be held responsible that all arms in possession of the militia-men be immediately delivered up; and all individuals whatever, who have in their possession arms of any kind, will deliver them up without delay. Given under my hand, at Detroit, this 16th day of August, 1812, and in the 52d year of his majesty's reign.

(Signed) ISAAC BROCK, *Major-General.*

A true copy.

*J. Macdonnell, Lt.-Col. Militia, & A. D. C.*

*Regulations of the Civil Government of the Territory of Michigan.*

Whereas the territory of Michigan was, on the sixteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and twelve, ceded by capitulation to the arms of his Britannic majesty, and the American flag removed and the British flag substituted on the same day at noon; and whereas on the same day a proclamation was issued by Isaac Brock, esq. major-general, commanding his majesty's forces in the province of Upper Canada, &c. &c. &c. And the said proclamation, among other things, announces to all the inhabitants of the said territory, that "wishing to give an early proof of the moderation and justice of the British government, the American laws heretofore in existence shall continue in force until his majesty's pleasure be known, or so long as the peace and safety of the said territory will admit thereof." And whereas the said laws cannot be carried into execution according to the effect and intention so announced to the inhabitants, without providing for the existence and continuance of the proper civil officers, for the execution of the same, and without the necessary courts and other judicial authorities for the administration of justice amongst the said inhabitants: Now therefore be it known, that I, the undersigned Henry Proctor, colonel in the military forces of his Britannic majesty, now commanding in the territory of Michigan, do make and establish, for the time being, the following regulations for the civil administration of the said territory:

1st, The civil officers, remaining in the country, shall continue to exercise the respective functions appertaining to their offices, without any new commissions for the same, and those offices which are suspended by the departure from the country of those holding them, shall be supplied as hereinafter provided.

2d, The civil executive powers shall be exercised by a civil governor. The civil governor shall appoint to all civil offices, which are or shall be vacant, and shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

3d, Courts of justice shall be held as usual.

4th, Legislative provisions need not be adopted from the laws of any of the American states. A majority shall not be necessary when any of the offices are vacant. The secretary shall make two copies of all executive proceedings and legislative regulations, one of which shall be transmitted for the use of the British government, and the other be retained.

5th, The expenses of the civil administration shall be defrayed quarterly by the proper officer in the military department, paying the lawful amount thereof to the civil treasurer. The duties, customs, and revenues accruing according to the laws of the United States, shall be paid quarterly by the collectors to the proper officer in the military department. The internal duties and revenues accruing to the territory of Michigan, shall be paid to the proper treasurers thereof.

6th, The undersigned will act as civil governor of the territory of Michigan for the time being. Augustus B. Woodward, chief justice of the said territory, is appointed secretary. The offices of register and receiver of the land office and post-master are superseded, reserving a full right to adjust all anterior concerns. All officers in the Indian department are superseded.

Given under my hand at Detroit, the 21st day of August, one thousand eight hundred and twelve, and in the 52d year of his majesty's reign.

(Signed)

HENRY PROCTOR, *Col.*

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#### EVACUATION OF CHICAGO.

*Extract of a letter from Captain Heald, late Commandant at Fort Chicago, dated at Pittsburgh, Oct. 23, 1812.*

On the 9th of August last, I received orders from general Hull to evacuate the post and proceed with my command to Detroit by land, leaving it at my discretion to dispose of the public property as I thought proper. The neighbouring Indians got the information as early as I did, and came in from all quarters in order to receive the goods in the factory store, which they understood were to be given them. On the 13th, captain Wells, of fort Wayne, arrived with about 30 Miamies, for the purpose of escorting us in, by the request

of general Hull. On the 14th I delivered the Indians all the goods in the factory store, and a considerable quantity of provisions which we could not take away with us. The surplus arms and ammunition I thought proper to destroy, fearing they would make bad use of it if put in their possession. I also destroyed all the liquor on hand soon after they began to collect. The collection was unusually large for that place, but they conducted with the strictest propriety till after I left the fort. On the 15th, at nine in the morning, we commenced our march; a part of the Miamies were detached in front, and the remainder in our rear, as guards, under the direction of captain Wells. The situation of the country rendered it necessary for us to take the beach, with the lake on our left, and a high sand bank on our right, at about 100 yards distance. We had proceeded about a mile and a half, when it was discovered the Indians were prepared to attack us from behind the bank. I immediately marched up with the company to the top of the bank, when the action commenced; after firing one round, we charged and the Indians gave way in front and joined those on our flanks. In about 15 minutes they got possession of all our horses, provisions, and baggage of every description, and, finding the Miamies did not assist us, I drew off the few men I had left, and took possession of a small elevation in the open prairies, out of shot of the bank or any other cover. The Indians did not follow me, but assembled in a body on the top of the bank, and, after some consultation among themselves, made signs for me to approach them. I advanced towards them alone, and was met by one of the Potawatamie chiefs, called the Black Bird, with an interpreter. After shaking hands, he requested me to surrender, promising to spare the lives of all the prisoners. On a few moments consideration I concluded it would be most prudent to comply with his request, although I did not put entire confidence in his promise. After delivering up our arms we were taken back to their encampment near the fort, and distributed among the different tribes. The next morning they set fire to the fort and left the place, taking the prisoners with them.—Their number of warriors was between four and five hundred, mostly of the Potawatamie nation, and their loss, from the best information I could get, was about 15. Our strength was 54 regulars and 12 militia, out of which 26 regulars and all the militia were killed in the action, with two women and twelve children. Ensign George Roman and Dr. Isaac V. Van Voorhis of my company, with captain Wells, of fort Wayne, are, to my great



sorrow, numbered among the dead. Lieutenant Lina D. T. Helm, with 25 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 11 women and children, were prisoners when we separated. Mrs. Heald and myself were taken to the mouth of the river St. Joseph, and being both badly wounded, were permitted to reside with Mr. Burnett, an Indian trader. In a few days after our arrival there, the Indians all went off to take fort Wayne, and in their absence I engaged a Frenchman to take us to Michillimackinac by water, when I gave myself up as a prisoner of war, with one of my serjeants. The commanding officer, captain Roberts, offered me every assistance in his power to render our situation comfortable while we remained there, and to enable us to proceed on our journey. To him I gave my parole of honour, and came on to Detroit, and reported myself to colonel Proctor, who gave us a passage to Buffaloe; from that place I came by the way of Presque Isle, and arrived here yesterday.

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CRUIZE OF THE SQUADRON UNDER COMMODORE RODGERS.

*Letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy. United States' Frigate President, Boston, Sept. 1, 1812.*

Sir, I had the honour yesterday of informing you of the arrival of the squadron, and have now to state the result and particulars of our cruize.

Previous to leaving New York on the 21st of June, I heard that a British convoy had sailed from Jamaica for England on or about the 20th of the preceding month, and on being informed of the declaration of war against Great Britain, I determined, in the event of commodore Decatur joining me with the United States, Congress, and Argus, as you had directed, to go in pursuit of them.

The United States, Congress, and Argus did join me on the 21st; with which vessels, this ship, and the Hornet, I accordingly sailed in less than an hour after I received your orders of the 18th of June, accompanied by your official communication of the declaration of war.

On leaving New York I shaped our course south-eastwardly, in the expectation of falling in with vessels, by which I should hear of the before mentioned convoy, and the following night met with an American brig that gave me the sought-for information; the squadron now crowded sail in pursuit; but the next morning was taken out of its course by the pursuit of a British frigate, that I since find was the Bel-

videra, relative to which I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed extract from my journal; after repairing as far as possible the injury done by the Belvidera to our spars and rigging, we again crowded all sail, and resumed our course in pursuit of the convoy, but did not receive further intelligence of it, until the 29th day of June, on the western edge of the banks of Newfoundland, where we spoke an American schooner, the master of which reported that he had two days before passed them in latitude  $43^{\circ}$ , longitude  $55^{\circ}$ , steering to the eastward. I was surprised to find that the convoy was still so far to the eastward of us, but was urged, however, as well by what I considered my duty, as my inclination, to continue the pursuit.

On the 1st of July, a little to the eastward of Newfoundland bank, we fell in with quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, &c. which indicated that the convoy were not far distant, and we pursued it with zeal, although frequently taken out of our course by vessels it was necessary to chase, without gaining any further intelligence until the 9th of July, in latitude  $45^{\circ} 30'$ , longitude  $23^{\circ}$ , we captured the British private armed brig *Dolphin*, of Jersey, and were informed by some of the crew, that they had seen the convoy the preceding evening, the weather was not clear at the time, but that they had counted 85 sail, and that the force charged with the protection consisted of one two-decker, a frigate, a sloop of war, and a brig.

This was the last intelligence I received of the before-mentioned convoy, although its pursuit was continued until the 13th of July, being then within 18 or 20 hours sail of the British channel.

From this we steered for the island of Madeira, passed close by it on the 21st of July, thence near the Azores, and saw Corvo and Flores; thence steered for the banks of Newfoundland: and from the latter place (by the way of Cape Sable) to this port, it having become indispensably necessary (by the time we reached our own coast) to make the first convenient port in the United States; owing, I am sorry to say, to that wretched disease the scurvy having made its appearance on board of the vessels, most generally to a degree seriously alarming.

From the western parts of the banks of Newfoundland to our making the island of Madeira, the weather was such, at least six days out of seven, as to obscure from our discovery every object that we did not pass within four or five miles of, and indeed for several days together the fog was so thick

as to prevent our seeing each other, even at cable's length asunder, more than twice or thrice in the twenty-four hours.

From the time of leaving the United States until we arrived here, we chased every vessel we saw, and you will not be a little astonished when I inform you that, although we brought to every thing we did chase, with the exception of four vessels, we only made seven captures and one recapture.

It is truly an unpleasant task to be obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country; the only consolation I individually feel on the occasion being derived from knowing that our being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an incalculable amount of American property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice.

I am aware of the anxiety you must have experienced at not hearing from me for such a length of time, but this I am sure you will not attribute in any degree to neglect, when I inform you that not a single proper opportunity occurred from the time of leaving the United States until our return.

Mr. Newcomb, who will deliver you this, you will find an intelligent young man, capable of giving such further information as you may deem of any moment: he will at the same time deliver you a chart, shewing the tract in which we cruised: annexed is a list of vessels captured, re-captured, and burnt.

The four vessels we chased and did not come up with were the *Belvidera*, a small pilot-boat schooner supposed to be an American privateer, the hermaphrodite privateer brig *Yankee*, which we lost sight of in a fog, but whose character we afterwards learnt, and a frigate supposed to be British, that we chased on the 28th ult. near the shoal of George's Bank, and should certainly have come up with, had we had the advantage of two hours more day-light.

On board of the several vessels of the squadron there are between 80 and 100 prisoners, taken from the vessels we captured during our late cruize. The government not having any agent for prisoners here. I shall send them to commodore Bainbridge, to be disposed of in such manner as best appears to be the interest of the United States, and which I hope may meet your approbation. With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS.

*The hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary  
of the Navy, Washington.*

*Extract from the journal referred to in the preceding letter.*

June 23d. Pleasant breezes from N. N. W. to W. S. W. at 3 A. M. spoke an American brig from Madeira, bound to New York, the master of which informed me, that four days before (in lat. 36. long. 67) he passed a fleet of British merchantmen, under convoy of a frigate and brig, steering to the eastward; I now perceived that this was the convoy of which I had received intelligence prior to leaving New York, and shaped our course east in pursuit of them. At 6 A. M. (Nantucket shoal bearing N. E. distant 35 miles) saw a large sail in N. E. standing to S. W. which was soon discovered to be a frigate. The signal was made for a general chase, when the several vessels of the squadron took in their studding sails and made all sail by the wind (on the starboard tack) in pursuit: at a quarter before seven, the chase tacked, made all sail, and stood from us, by the wind, on the same tack; at half past 8 he made signals, when, perceiving we were coming up with him, he edged away a point or thereabouts, and set his top-gallant studding sails: at 11 cleared ship for action, in the expectation that we would soon be up with the chase; the breeze about this time however began to incline more to the westward and became lighter, which I soon discovered was comparatively an advantage to our opponent: at a quarter past 1 P. M. the chase hoisted English colours: at 2 the wind veered to the W. S. W. and became lighter: at 20 minutes past 4, having got within gun shot of the enemy, when perceiving that he was training his chase guns, and in the act (as I suppose) of firing, that the breeze was decreasing, and we now sailed so nearly alike, that to afford him an opportunity of doing the first injury to our spars and rigging would be to enable him to effect his escape, I gave orders to commence a fire with the bow chase guns, at his spars and rigging, in the hope of crippling one or the other, so far as to enable us to get alongside. The fire from our bow chase guns he instantly returned with those from his stern, which was now kept up by both ships, without intermission, until 30 minutes past 4 P. M. when one of the President's chase guns burst, and killed and wounded 16 persons, among the latter myself. This was not however the most serious injury, as by the bursting of the gun and the explosion of the passing box, from which it was served with powder, both the main and fore-castle decks (near the gun) were so much shattered as to prevent the use of the chase gun on that side for some time; our main deck guns being single shotted, I now gave orders to put our helm to starboard and fire the starboard broadside, in the expectation of disabling some of his spars, but did not succeed, although I could discover that his rigging had

sustained considerable damage, and that he had received some injury in the stern.

I now endeavoured, by altering course half a point to port and wetting our sails, to gain a more effectual position on his starboard quarter, but soon found myself losing ground. After this a similar attempt was made at his larboard quarter, but without any better success, as the wind at this time being very light, and both ships sailing so nearly alike that by making an angle of only half a point from the course he steered enabled him to augment his distance: no hope was now left of bringing him to close action, except that derived from being to windward, and the expectation the breeze might favour us first: I accordingly gave orders to steer directly after him, and to keep our bow chase guns playing on his spars and rigging, until our broadside would more effectually reach him. At 5, finding from the advantage his stern guns gave him, that he had done considerable injury to our sails and rigging, and being within point blank shot, I gave orders to put the helm to starboard and fire our main deck guns; this broadside did some further damage to his rigging, and I could perceive that his fore top sail yard was wounded, but the sea was so very smooth, and the wind so light, that the injury done was not such as materially to effect his sailing. After this broadside our course was instantly renewed in his wake (under a galling fire from his stern chase guns, directed at our spars and rigging) and continued until half past six; at which time being within reach of his grape, and finding our sails, rigging, and several spars (particularly the main yard, which had little left to support it except the lifts and braces) very much disabled, I again gave orders to luff across his stern, and gave him a couple of broadsides.

The enemy at this time finding himself so hardly pressed, and seeing, while in the act of firing, our head sails to left, and supposing, that the ship had in a measure lost the effect of her helm, he gave a broad yaw, with the intention of bringing his broadside to bear: finding the President, however, answered her helm too quick for his purpose, he immediately resumed his course, and precipitately fired his four after main deck guns on the starboard side, although they did not bear upon us at the time by 25 or 30 degrees, and he now commenced lightening his ship, by throwing over-board all his boats, waste anchors, &c. &c. and by this means was enabled by a quarter before seven to get so far ahead as to prevent our bow chase guns doing execution; and I now perceived, with more mortification than words can express, that there was little or no chance left of getting within gunshot of the enemy again. Under every disadvantage of disabled spars, sails, and rigging, I however continued the chase

with all the sail we could set, until half past 11 P. M. when perceiving he had gained upwards of three miles, and not the slightest prospect left of coming up with him, I gave up the pursuit, and made the signal to the other ships as they came up to do the same.

During the first of the chase, while the breeze was fresh and sailing by the wind, I thought the whole of the squadron gained upon the enemy. It was soon discoverable, however, the advantage he acquired by sailing large, and thus I conceive he must have derived in so great a degree by starting his water, as I could perceive, upwards of an hour before we came within gun shot, water running out of his scuppers.

While in chase it was difficult to determine whether our own situation or that of the other vessels of the squadron was the most unpleasant. The superior sailing of the President was not such (off the wind) as to enable us to get upon the broad-side of the enemy; the situation of the others was not less irksome, as not even the headmost, which was the Congress, was able at any time to get within less than two gun shots distant, and even at that but for a very little time.

In endeavouring to get alongside of the enemy the following persons were killed and wounded; 16 of whom were killed and wounded by the bursting of our own gun, viz.

## KILLED.

John Taylor, jun. midshipman.

John H. Bird, do.

Francis H. Dwight, marine.

## WOUNDED.

Commodore Rodgers.

Thomas Gamble, lieutenant, severely.

John Heath, lieutenant marines, slightly.

Matthew C. Perry, midshipman, slightly.

Frank Ellery, midshipman, slightly.

Lawrence Montgomery, midshipman, lost his left arm.

John Barrett, quarter-gunner, severely.

John Beasley, do. slightly.

David Basset, do. severely, since dead.

Andrew Matthews, do. slightly.

Jordan Beebe, armorer, severely.

John Clapp, seaman, severely.

James Stewart, do. slightly.

George Ross, do. slightly.

William Thomas, ordinary seaman, severely.

Neil Harding, do. do.

John Berry, do. do.

Henry Gilbert, do. do.

John Smith, 5th boy, severely.

NOTE—The greater part of the wounded have since nearly recovered.

*List of vessels captured, re-captured, and destroyed.*

July 2d. Brig Traveller, 277 tons, James Amery master, of Newcastle, England, 10 men, bound from the bay of Fundy, owned by George Dunn, George Watson, Matthew Dunn, and John Stocker, cargo timber. Burnt.

July 4th. Brig Dutchess of Portland, 6 guns, 11 men, of Newcastle, England, bound from Newcastle to Nova Scotia, in ballast. Burnt.

July 9th. Brig Dolphin, 241 tons, 12 guns and 20 men, Philip Cabbot, of Jersey, England, bound from Jersey to Newfoundland, in ballast and some cargo, owned by Winter and Nicoll—sent into the United States.

July 24th. Ship John, of Lancaster, 16 guns and 30 men, bound from London to Martinique, in ballast—sent into the United States.

August 2d. Brig Argo, 168 tons, 10 guns and 10 men, William Middleton master, of London, bound from Pernambuco to London, laden with cotton, fustic, and about \$ 8000 in gold—ordered for the United States.

August 17th. Schr. Adeline, of London, 10 men, bound from Hayti to London, laden with coffee—ordered her for the United States.

August 25th. Schr. Betsey, of Marblehead, from Naples, laden with brandy, re-captured from the Guerriere, who had ordered her for Halifax; 4 men and a midshipman (prize master)—ordered her for the United States.

JOHN RODGERS.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain Hull to the Secretary of  
the Navy.*

Sir, *United States' Frigate Constitution, August 28, 1812.*

The enclosed account of the affair between the President, commodore Rodgers, and the British frigate Belvidera, fell into my hands<sup>d</sup> by accident. It clearly proves that she only escaped the commodore by superior sailing, after having lightened her, and the President being very deep.

As much has been said on this subject; and commodore Rodgers has not arrived to give you his statement of the affair, if it meet your approbation I should be pleased to have this account published, to prevent people from making up their minds hastily, as I find them willing to do.

I am confident could the commodore have got alongside the Belvidera, she would have been his, in less than one hour. I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC HULL.

*The Honourable Paul Hamilton, &c.*

*An Account of the Proceedings of his Majesty's ship Belvidera,  
Richard Byron, Esq. Captain, 23d day of June, 1812.*

A. M., 4, 40, Nantucket Shoal bearing S. W. saw several sail, made sail towards them; at 6, 30, they bore S. W. S. made them out to be three frigates, one sloop, and one brig of war, standing to the S. E. under a press of sail. Observed them to make signals, and haul up in chase of us, hauling down their steering sails, in a confused and irregular manner. Tacked ship, and made the private signal, which was not answered; made all sail possible. N. E. by E. at eight, moderate and fine weather, the headmost ship of the chase S. S. W.  $\frac{1}{3}$  W. apparently gaining ground on us at times, and leaving her consorts. At 11, 30, hoisted our colours and pendant, the chase hoisted American colours, two of them hoisted commodores' broad pendants, at noon the commodore and the second headmost ship of the chase S. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W. about 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  of a mile, Nantucket Shoal N. 4 00 E. 48 miles, moderate and fine weather, cleared ship for action, commodore of chase gaining, the other ships dropping, observed the chase pointing her guns at us; at 3, 30, the commodore fired three shots, one of which struck the rudder coat, and came into the after gun-room, the other two came into the upper, or captain's cabin, one of which struck the muzzle of the larboard chase gun, the other went through the beam under the skylight, killed William Gould, seaman;



wounded John Hill, armourer, mortally; Joseph Lee, seaman, severely; George Marlon, ship's corporal, badly; Lieutenant Bruce, James Kelly, and James Larmon, seamen, slightly. At 3, 45, commenced firing with our stern guns, shot away her larboard lower steering-sail, keeping our ship a steady course N. E. by E. At four the chase bore up and fired her larboard broadside, which cut our rigging and sails much, the long bolts, breeching hooks, and breechings of the guns and carronades frequently breaking (by one of which captain Byron was severely wounded in the left thigh), all of which was instantly replaced. Kept up a constant fire, which was returned by our opponent with bow chase guns, and at times by broadsides, which, by her superiority of sailing, she was enabled to do till 6, 45, when we cut away our spare sheet, and small bower anchors, barge, yawl, and jolly-boats, and started fourteen tons of water; we then gained on him, when he bore up and fired three broadsides, part of which fell short of us; at seven our opponent ceased firing, and the second frigate commenced, but finding her shot fall short, ceased again. Employed fishing our cross-jack yard, and main top-mast (both badly wounded), knotting and splicing our rigging, which was much cut and damaged. At eleven altered our course to E. by S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S. and lost sight of our opponents.

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ESCAPE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

*United States' Frigate Constitution, at Sea,*

Sir,

*July, 21, 1812.*

In pursuance of your orders of the 3d instant, I left Annapolis on the 5th instant, and the capes on the 12th, of which I advised you by the pilot who brought the ship to sea.

For several days after we got out, the wind was light and a-head, which with a strong southerly current prevented our making much way to the northward. On the 17th, at two, P. M., being in 22 fathoms water off Egg Harbour, four sail of ships were discovered from the mast head, to the northward and in shore of us, apparently ships of war. The wind being very light all sail was made in chase of them, to ascertain whether they were the enemy's ships or our squadron having got out of New York, waiting the arrival of the Constitution, the latter of which I had reason to believe was the case.

At four in the afternoon, a ship was seen from the mast head, bearing about N. E., standing for us under all sail, which she continued to do until sun-down, at which time she was too far off to distinguish signals, and the ships in shore only to be seen from the tops; they were standing off to the southward and eastward. As we could not ascertain before dark what the ship in the offing was, I determined to stand for her, and get near enough to make the night signal.

At ten in the evening, being within six or eight miles of the strange sail, the private signal was made, and kept up nearly one hour, but finding she could not answer it I concluded she and the ships in shore were enemy.

I immediately hauled off to the southward and eastward, and made all sail, having determined to lie off till day-light to see what they were. The ship that we had been chasing hauled off after us, showing a light and occasionally making signals, supposed to be for the ships in shore.

18th, at day-light, or a little before it was quite light, saw two sail under our lee, which proved to be frigates of the enemy's. One frigate astern within about five or six miles, and a line of battle ship, a frigate, a brig, and schooner, about ten or twelve miles directly astern, all in chase of us, with a fine breeze, and coming up fast, it being nearly calm where we were. Soon after sun-rise the wind entirely left us and the ship would not steer, but fell round off with her head towards the two ships under our lee. The boats were instantly hoisted out and sent ahead to tow the ship's head round, and to endeavour to get her farther from the enemy, being then within five miles of three heavy frigates. The boats of the enemy were got out and sent ahead to tow, by which, with the light air that remained with them, they came up very fast. Finding the enemy gaining on us, and but little chance of escaping from them, I ordered two of the guns on the gun-deck to be run out at the cabin windows for stern guns on the gun-deck, and hoisted one of the 24 pounders off the gun-deck, and run that, with the fore-castle gun, an 18 pounder, out at the ports on the quarter-deck, and cleared the ship for action, being determined they should not get her without resistance on our part, notwithstanding their force and the situation we were placed in.

At about seven in the morning, the ship nearest us approaching within gun shot, and directly astern, I ordered one of the stern guns fired to see if we could reach her to endeavour to disable her masts; found the shot fell a little short, would not fire any more.

At eight, four of the enemy's ships nearly within gun-shot, some of them having six or eight boats ahead towing, with all their oars and sweeps out to row them up with us, which they were fast doing. It now appeared that we must be taken, and that our escape was impossible—four heavy ships nearly within gun-shot, and coming up fast, and not the least hope of a breeze to give us a chance of getting off by out-sailing them.

In this situation, finding ourselves in only twenty-four fathoms water, by the suggestion of that valuable officer lieutenant Morris, I determined to try and warp the ship ahead, by carrying out anchors and warping her up to them; three or four hundred fathoms of rope was instantly got up, and two anchors got ready and sent ahead, by which means we began to gain ahead of the enemy: they however soon saw our boats carrying out the anchors, and adopted the same plan, under very advantageous circumstances, as all the boats from the ships furthestmost off were sent to tow and warp up those nearest to us, by which means they again came up, so that at nine the ship nearest us began to fire her bow guns, which we instantly returned by our stern guns in the cabin and on the quarter-deck. All the shot from the enemy fell short; but we have reason to believe that some of ours went on board her, as we could not see them strike the water. Soon after nine a second frigate passed under our lee and opened her broadside, but finding her shot fall short, discontinued her fire; but continued, as did all the rest of them, to make every possible exertion to get up with us. From nine to twelve all hands were employed in warping the ship ahead, and in starting some of the water in the main hold to lighten her, which with the help of a light air we rather gained of the enemy, or at least held our own. About two in the afternoon, all the boats from the line of battle-ship and some of the frigates were sent to the frigate nearest to us, to endeavour to tow her up, but a light breeze sprung up, which enabled us to hold way with her, notwithstanding they had eight or ten boats ahead, and all her sails furled to tow her to windward. The wind continued light until eleven at night, and the boats were kept ahead towing and warping to keep out of the reach of the enemy, three of the frigates being very near us; at eleven we got a light breeze from the southward, the boats came alongside and were hoisted up, the ship having too much way to keep them ahead, the enemy still in chase, and very near.

19th, at day-light passed within gun-shot of one of the frigates, but she did not fire on us, perhaps for fear of becoming her, as the wind was light; soon after passing us she backed and stood after us—at this time six sail were in sight, under all sail after us. At nine in the morning saw a strange sail on our weather beam, supposed to be an American merchant ship; the instant the frigate nearest us saw her she hoisted American colours, as did all the squadron in hopes to decoy her down; I immediately hoisted English colours, that she might not be deceived; she soon hauled her wind, and it is to be hoped made her escape. All this day the wind increased gradually, and we gained on the enemy, in the course of the day, six or eight miles; they however continued chasing us all night under a press of sail.

20th, at day-light in the morning, only three of them could be seen from the mast head, the nearest of which was about twelve miles off, directly astern. All hands were set at work wetting the sails, from the royals down, with the engine and fire-buckets, and we soon found that we left the enemy very fast. At a quarter past eight the enemy finding that they were fast dropping astern, gave over chase, and hauled their wind to the northward, probably for the station off New-York.—At half past eight saw a sail ahead, gave chase after her under all sail. At nine saw another strange sail under our lee-bow, we soon spoke the first sail discovered, and found her to be an American brig from St. Domingo, bound to Portland; I directed the captain how to steer to avoid the enemy, and made sail for the vessel to leeward; on coming up with her, she proved to be an American brig from St. Bartholomews, bound to Philadelphia; but on being informed of war we bore up for Charleston, S. C. Finding the ship so far to the southward and eastward, and the enemy's squadron stationed off New-York, which would make it impossible for the ship to get in there, I determined to make for Boston, to receive your further orders, and I hope my having done so will meet your approbation. My wish to explain to you as clearly as possible why your orders have not been executed, and the length of time the enemy were in chase of us, with various other circumstances, have caused me to make this communication much longer than I could have wished, yet I cannot, in justice to the brave officers and crew under my command, close it without expressing to you the confidence I have in them, and assuring you that their conduct whilst under the guns of the enemy was such as might have been expected from American officers and seamen. I have the ho-

nour to be, with very great respect, sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

ISAAC HULL.

*To the Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary  
of the Navy, Washington.*

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CAPTAIN HULL'S SECOND CRUIZE.

*United States' Frigate Constitution, off Boston Light,*  
Sir, *August 28, 1812.*

I have the honour to inform you, that after leaving Boston Light on the 2d instant, the date of my last letter to you, I stood to the eastward along the coast, in hopes to fall in with one of the enemy's frigates, which was reported to be cruising in that direction, the day before I left Boston. I passed near the coast, as far down as the Bay of Fundy, but saw nothing. I then run off Halifax and Cape Sables, and remained near there for three or four days without seeing any thing, which made me determine to change my situation to the eastward towards Newfoundland. I accordingly bore up, and run to the eastward under all sail, passing near the Isle of Sables, and hauling in to take a station off the Gulph of St. Lawrence, near Cape Race, to intercept the ships of the enemy bound either to or from Quebec or Halifax, or to be in a situation to re-capture such of our vessels as they might be sending in.

On the 10th instant, being off Cape Race, I fell in with a light merchant brig, bound to Halifax from Newfoundland; and as she was not worth sending in, I took the crew on board and set her on fire. On the 11th I fell in with the British brig Adeona, from Nova-Scotia, bound to England, loaded with timber. I took the crew out of her and set her on fire, and made sail to take a station nearer Cape Race, where we continued cruising until the morning of the 15th, at day-light; when five sail were in sight ahead of us, apparently a small convoy. I gave chase under a press of sail, and soon found that we gained on them very fast, and discovered that one of them was a ship of war; at sun-rise they tacked and stood on the same tack with us. By this time we could plainly discover that the ship of war had a brig in tow. At 6, coming up very fast with the ship, and could see that she had cast off the brig that she had in tow, and had set her on fire, and had ordered a second brig to stand

before the wind to separate them. The ship of war making sail to windward, I gave chase to a ship which appeared to be under her convoy; but when we came up with her, she proved to be a British ship, prize to the Dolphin privateer, of Salem. She had been spoken by the ship of war, but we came up with them before they had time to put men on board and take charge of her. Whilst our boats were boarding this vessel, the ship of war had got nearly hull down from us; and understanding from one of the prisoners that she was a very fast sailer, I found it would not be possible to come up with her before night, or perhaps not then; I therefore gave chase to the brig that run before the wind, determined to destroy all his convoy; we soon found we came fast up with the brig, and that they were making every exertion to get off by throwing overboard all the lumber, water casks, &c.

At 2, P. M., we brought to the chase, and found her to be the American brig *Adeline*, from Liverpool, loaded with dry goods, &c. took the prize-master and crew out, and put midshipman Madison and crew on board, with orders to get on the nearest port she could make. From the prize-master of this vessel I learnt that the brig burnt by the sloop of war belonged to New-York, and was loaded with hemp, duck, &c. last from Jutland, having gone in there in distress.

Having chased so far to the eastward as to make it impossible to come up with the sloop of war, I determined to change my cruising ground, as I found by some of the prisoners that came from this vessel, that the squadron that chased us off New-York were on the western end of the Grand Bank, not far distant from me. I accordingly stood to the southward, intending to pass near Bermuda, and cruise off our southern coast. Saw nothing till the night of the 8th; at half past 9, P. M., discovered a sail very near us, it being dark; made sail and gave chase, and could see that she was a brig. At 11 brought her to, and sent a boat on board, found her to be the American privateer *Decatur*, belonging to Salem, with a crew of 108 men, and 14 guns, 12 of which he had thrown overboard whilst we were in chase of her. The captain came on board, and informed me that he saw her day before a ship of war standing to the southward, and that she could not be far from us; at 12, P. M., made sail to the southward, intending, if possible, to fall in with her. The privateer stood in for Cape Race, intending to cruise here, and take ships by boarding, as he had lost all his guns but two. The above is a memorandum of what took place

on board the *Constitution*, under my command, from the time we left Boston up to the 18th instant, which I hope will meet your approbation. I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC HULL.

*The Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary  
of the Navy, Washington City.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE AND  
DESTRUCTION OF THE *GUERRIERE*.

*United States' Frigate Constitution, off Boston Light,*  
Sir, *August 30, 1812.*

I have the honour to inform you that on the 19th instant, at 2, P. M., being in latitude  $41^{\circ} 41'$ , and longitude  $55^{\circ} 48'$ , with the *Constitution* under my command, a sail was discovered from the mast-head, bearing E. by S. or E. S. E., but at such a distance we could not tell what she was. All sail was instantly made in chase, and soon found we came up with her. At 3, P. M., could plainly see that she was a ship on the starboard tack under easy sail, close on a wind—at half past 3, P. M., made her out to be a frigate—continued the chase until we were within about three miles, when I ordered the light sails taken in, the courses hauled up, and the ship cleared for action. At this time the chase had backed her main-top-sail, waiting for us to come down. As soon as the *Constitution* was ready for action, I bore down with an intention to bring him to close action immediately; but on our coming within gun shot, she gave us a broadside, and filled away and wore, giving us a broadside on the other tack, but without effect, her shot falling short. She continued wearing and manœuvring for about three quarters of an hour, to get a raking position—but finding she could not, she bore up and run under her top-sails and jib, with the wind on the quarter. I immediately made sail to bring the ship up with her, and at five minutes before 6, P. M., being along side within half pistol shot, we commenced a heavy fire from all our guns, double-shotted with round and grape, and so well directed were they, and so warmly kept up, that in 16 minutes her mizen-mast went by the board, and his main-yard in the slings, and the hull, rigging, and sails, very much torn to pieces. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for 15 minutes longer, when his main-mast and fore-mast

went, taking with them every spar, excepting the bowsprit; on seeing this we ceased firing; so that in thirty minutes after we got fairly along side the enemy, she surrendered, and had not a spar standing, and her hull below and above water so shattered, that a few more broadsides must have carried her down.

After informing that so fine a ship as the *Guerriere*, commanded by an able and experienced officer, had been totally dismantled and otherwise cut to pieces, so as to make her not worth towing into port, in the short space of 30 minutes, you can have no doubt of the gallantry and good conduct of the officers and ship's company I have the honour to command. It only remains, therefore, for me to assure you, that they all fought with great bravery; and it gives me great pleasure to say, that from the smallest boy in the ship, to the oldest seaman, not a look of fear was seen. They all went into action giving three cheers, and requesting to be laid close alongside the enemy.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a list of the killed and wounded on board the *Constitution*, and a report of the damages she sustained—also a list of killed and wounded on board the enemy, with his quarter bill, &c. I have the honour to be, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC HULL.

*The Honourable Paul Hamilton, &c. &c.*

*Return of killed and wounded on board the United States' Frigate Constitution, Isaac Hull, Esq. Captain, in the action with H. M. S. Guerriere, J. R. Dacres, Esq. Captain, on the 19th day of August, 1812.*

*Killed*—William S. Bush, first lieutenant of marines; Jacob Sago, seaman; Robert Brice, do.; John Brown, do.; James Read, do.; Caleb Smith, do.; James Ashford, do.

*Wounded*—Charles Morris, first lieutenant, dangerously; John C. Alwin, master, slightly; Richard Dunn, seaman, dangerously; George Reynolds, ordinary seaman, dangerously; Daniel Lewis, do., dangerously; Owen Taylor, do. do.; Francis Mullen, marine, slightly.

*Recapitulation*—*Killed*, one lieutenant of marines, and six seamen.—Total killed, seven.

*Wounded*—Two officers, four seamen and one marine.—Total wounded, seven.

*List of the killed and wounded on board the Guerriere.*

*Wounded*—James R. Dacres, captain; Bartholomew Kent, lieutenant; Robert Scoot, master; Samuel Grant, master's



mate; James Enslie, midshipman; John Little, seaman; James Miller, ordinary seaman; Henry Verderie, do.; Hugh M'Kinley, do.; James Morris, seaman; T. Harrington, armourer; William Mee, armourer's mate; Peter Stempstead, ordinary seaman; Peter Peterson, do.; Ralph Williams, do.; Henry Holt, do.; William Somers, do.; William Willington, do.; Patrick Murphy, quarter gunner; J. Cromwell, quartermaster; Mat. Reardon, ordinary seaman; John Campbell, do.; John Southgate, do.; Henry Dent, do.; Stephen Kelly, boy; John O'Hare, ordinary seaman; Philip Dwyer, do.; J. Smith, third seaman; K. M'Donald, do.; Alexander Ferguson, ordinary seaman; George Meathers, seaman; James Crooker, do.; David Lewis, ordinary seaman; John Hibbs, do.; Joseph Lushwood, do.; Robert Taylor, do.; George Read, seaman; William Jones, ordinary seaman; D. M'Mechen, carpenter's crew; William Cooper, seaman; Lawrence Norman, do.; G. Emmerson, sail-maker; J. Jameson, seaman; William Hall, do.; John Bruntlot, do.; J. Sholer, boatswain's mate; R. Baily, first do.; J. Copeland, seaman; Samuel Miller, do.; Roger Spry, marine; John Fake, do.; Melchis Archer, do.; John Goss, do.; Edward Daking, do.; William Cooper, do.; Samuel Long, do.; Thomas Chambers, do.; Joseph Fountain, do.; William Ryan, do.; Thomas Couter, do.; John Robinson, do.; William Jones, ditto.

*Killed*—H. Ready, second lieutenant; J. Smith, second gunner's mate; G. Griffiths, quarter gunner; J. Tuck, ordinary seaman; William Baker, do.; Alexander Cowie, seaman; Richard Chusman, landsman; William White, seaman; Henry Brown, ordinary seaman; Robert Rodgers, seaman; John Peterson, do.; William Brown, second do.; J. A. Fox, sergeant of marines; J. Wodcock, marine; T. Pratt, do.

*Missing*—James Johnson, Moses Virgin, Benjamin Hinworth, James Greenwood, William Cole, James Johnson, third, corporal Webb, marine; John Griswell, J. M'Gill, James Batterwitch, William Raysdon, William Hammock, Robert Mittwoft, A. Joaquin, John Jacobs, lieutenant James Pullman, Mr. Garton, John Newman, Robert Winn, James Guy, Robert Scott, lieutenant Roberts, John Flavitt, John Hosey.

Sir,

*Boston, September 18, 1813.*

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 9th instant, and have read it publicly to the ship's company.

I now have the honour of forwarding to you the name of the man who lost his leg in the action ; and shall take the first moment's leisure I have to carry that part of your orders into execution, directing me to make a present to the brave fellow who lashed the flag to the top-mast head.

The name of the man that got his leg shot off is Richard Dunn, he was born near West Chester, Pennsylvania, he was rated seaman on the books. I have collected for him one thousand dollars, which I intend putting into funds that will give him the interest quarterly. I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

ISAAC HULL.

*The Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary  
of the Navy, Washington.*

*From the London Gazette.*

*Admiralty Office, October 10.*

*Copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sawyer, to John Wilson Croker, Esq., dated on board His Majesty's Ship Africa, at Halifax, the 15th Sept. 1812.*

Sir, It is with extreme concern I have to request you will be pleased to lay before the lords commissioners of the admiralty, the enclosed copy of a letter from captain Dacres, of his majesty's late ship *Guerriere*, giving an account of his having sustained a close action of near two hours, on the 19th ultimo, with the American frigate *Constitution*, of very superior force, both in guns and men (of the latter almost double), when the *Guerriere* being totally dismasted, she rolled so deep as to render all further efforts of the guns unavailing, and it become a duty to spare the lives of the remaining part of her valuable crew, by hauling down her colours. The masts fell over the side from which she was about to be engaged, in a very favourable position for raking by the enemy. A few hours after she was in possession of the enemy, it was found impossible to keep her above water ; she was therefore set fire to and abandoned, which I hope will satisfy their lordships she was defended to the last. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

H. SAWYER, *Vice-Admiral.*

Sir,

*Boston, Sept. 7, 1812.*

I am sorry to inform you of the capture of his majesty's late ship *Guerriere*, by the American frigate *Constitution*, after a severe action on the 19th August, in latitude 40° 20',

N., and longitude  $55^{\circ}$  W. At 2, P. M., being by the wind on the starboard tack, we saw a sail on our weather beam, bearing down on us. At 3 made her out to be a man of war, beat to quarters and prepared for action. At 4, she closing fast, wore to prevent her raking us. At 10 minutes past 4, hoisted our colours and fired several shot at her; at 20 minutes past 4, she hoisted her colours and returned our fire, wore several times to avoid being raked, exchanging broadsides. At five she closed on our starboard-beam, both keeping up a heavy fire and steering free, his intention being evidently to cross our bow. At 20 minutes past 5, our mizen-mast went over the starboard quarter, and brought the ship up in the wind; the enemy then placed himself on our larboard bow, raking us, a few only of our bow guns bearing, and his grape and riflemen sweeping our deck. At 40 minutes past 5, the ship not answering her helm, he attempted to lay us on board; at this time Mr. Grant, who commanded the forecastle, was carried below badly wounded. I immediately ordered the marines and boarders from the main-deck; the master was at this time shot through the knee, and I received a severe wound in the back. Lieutenant King was leading the boarders, when the ship coming to, we brought some of our bow guns to bear on her, and had got clear of our opponent, when at 20 minutes past 6, our fore and main-mast went over the side, leaving the ship a perfect unmanageable wreck. The frigate shooting ahead I was in hopes to clear the wreck, and get the ship under command to renew the action, but just as we had cleared the wreck, our spritsail-yard went, and the enemy having rove new braces, &c. wore round within pistol shot, to rake us, the ship lying in the trough of the sea, and rolling her main deck guns under water, and all attempts to raise her before the wind being fruitless, when calling my few remaining officers together, they were all of opinion that any further resistance would only be a needless waste of lives, I ordered, though reluctantly, the colours to be struck.

The loss of the ship is to be ascribed to the early fall of her mizen mast, which enabled our opponent to choose his position. I am sorry to say, we suffered considerably in killed and wounded, and mostly while she lay on our bow, from her grape and musquetry; in all, 15 killed, and 63 wounded, many of them severely; none of the wounded officers quitted the deck until the firing ceased.

The frigate proved to be the United States' ship Constitu-

tion, of thirty 24 pounders on her main-deck, and twenty-four 32 pounders, and two 18s on her upper deck, and 476 men: her loss in comparison with us is trifling, about 20: the first lieutenant of marines and 8 killed; and first lieutenant and master of the ship and eleven men wounded; her lower masts badly wounded, and stern much shattered, and very much cut up about the rigging.

The *Guerriere* was so cut up, that all attempts to get her in would have been useless. As soon as the wounded were got out of her, they set her on fire; and I feel it my duty to state, that the conduct of captain Hull and his officers to our men, has been that of a brave enemy, the greatest care being taken to prevent our men losing the smallest trifle, and the greatest attention being paid to the wounded, who, through the attention and skill of Mr. Irvine, surgeon, I hope will do well.

I hope, though success has not crowned our efforts, you will not think it presumptuous in me to say, the greatest credit is due to the officers and ship's company for their exertions, particularly when exposed to the heavy raking fire of the enemy. I feel particularly obliged for the exertions of lieutenant Kent, who, though wounded early by a splinter, continued to assist me—in the second lieutenant the service has suffered a severe loss; Mr. Scott, the master, though wounded, was particularly attentive, and used every exertion in clearing the wreck, as did the warrant officers. Lieutenant Nicholl of the royal marines, and his party, supported the honourable character of their corps, and they suffered severely. I must recommend Mr. Shaw, the master's mate who commanded the foremast main-deck guns in the absence of lieutenant Pullman, and the whole after the fall of lieutenant Ready, to your protection, he having received a severe contusion from a splinter. I must point out Mr. Garby, acting purser, to your notice, who volunteered his services on deck, and commanded the after quarter-deck guns, and was particularly active, as well as Mr. Bannister, midshipman. I hope in considering the circumstances, you will think the ship entrusted to my charge properly defended—the unfortunate loss of our masts, the absence of the third lieutenant, second lieutenant of marines, three midshipmen, and 24 men, considerably weakened our crew, and we only mustered at quarters 244 men, and 19 boys, on coming into action; the enemy had such an advantage from his marines and riflemen, when close, and his superior sailing enabled him to choose his distance.

I enclose herewith a list of killed and wounded on board the *Guerriere*. And have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES R. DACRES.

*A List of Officers, Seamen, and Marines, Killed and Wounded on board His Majesty's Ship Guerriere, in the action of the 19th of August, 1812.*

*Killed*—Henry Ready, second lieutenant, and 14 seamen.

*Wounded*—James R. Dacres, Esq. captain, severely; Bartholomew Kent, first lieutenant, slightly, and 61 seamen.

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CRUIZE OF THE ESSEX.

*Copies of Letters received at the Navy Department from Captain Porter, of the United States' Frigate Essex, of 32 guns.*

Sir, *At Sea, August 20, 1811.*

I have the honour to inform you that on the 13th his Britannic majesty's sloop of war *Alert*, captain T. L. P. Laugharne, ran down on our weather quarter, gave three cheers and commenced an action (if so trifling a skirmish deserves the name), and after eight minutes firing struck her colours, with seven feet water in her hold, much cut to pieces, and three men wounded.

I need not inform you that the officers and crew of the *Essex* behaved as I trust all Americans will in such cases, and it is only to be regretted that so much zeal and activity could not have been displayed on an occasion that would have done them more honour. The *Essex* has not received the slightest injury.

The *Alert* was out for the purpose of taking the *Hornet*!

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

D. PORTER.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

Sir, *At Sea, August 20, 1811.*

Finding myself much embarrassed by the *Alert*, from the great number of prisoners we have already made (about five hundred), I concluded that before our arrival in America the number would be considerably augmented, and as I found my provisions and water getting short, and being well satisfied that a plan had been organized by them for rising on the

ship in the event of an engagement; I conceived it to be the interest of my country to get clear of them as speedily as possible, particularly as I was well assured that immediately on their arrival in St. John's, an equal number of my countrymen would be released, and find a sure and immediate conveyance. I, therefore, drew up written stipulations corresponding with the accompanying letters; threw all the guns of the Alert overboard; withdrew from her all the men belonging to the Essex; appointed lieutenant J. P. Wilmer to command her as a cartel, put all my prisoners on board her, and dispatched her for St. John's, in Newfoundland, with orders to proceed from thence to New-York, with such Americans as he may receive in exchange.

At a more suitable opportunity I shall do myself the honour to lay before you copies of every paper relative to this transaction, and sincerely hope that my conduct in this affair may meet with your approbation.

As the Essex has been so annoying about Bermuda, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, I expect I shall have to run the gauntlet through their cruizers; you may, however, rest assured, that all a ship of her size can do shall be done, and whatever may be our fate, our country shall never blush for us. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

D. PORTER.

*Ton. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

[The following are the papers accompanying the preceding, viz. my two letters to captain Laugharne, with his answer, verbal and written, to the first; a copy of the passport given to lieutenant Wilmer, and a copy of captain Laugharne's certificate, certifying to the number of prisoners put on board the cartel Alert.]

Sir,

*August 18, 1812.*

An arrangement has suggested itself to me, which, in my opinion, is calculated to advance the interest of the United States as well as that of his Britannic majesty, and if acceded to by you, shall be immediately put in execution: should you object to the terms, they will not, after this, be repeated, and the treatment usual to prisoners of war, will in future be observed towards your crew.

Art. 1. The Alert to be deprived of all her armament, and to proceed under charge of an officer of this ship, as a cartel, to such British port as you may deem most adviseable, and to take your officers and crew, together with the British cap-

tains and mates of merchant vessels, with their crews, now prisoners on board this ship.

Art. 2. The officers to go on parole of honour, not to serve against the United States of America during the existing war, until regularly exchanged. The captains and mates of merchant vessels, and their crews, as well as the petty officers, seamen, marines, landsmen and boys, composing your crew, to be exchanged immediately on their arrival in a British port, for an equal number of equal grades of American prisoners, and are not to serve against the United States until the exchange takes place.

Art. 3. The swords of the officers to be returned to them.

Art. 4. You to remain as a pledge for the faithful fulfilment of the foregoing articles. I have the honour to be, &c.  
(Signed) D. PORTER.

*Capt. T. P. Laugharne, late Commander of  
H. B. M's. Sloop of War Alert, present.*

After delivering the preceding letter to captain Laugharne, he verbally informed me "that his officers preferred remaining with him, and sharing his fate, and as he was confident some of his ship's company were much prejudiced against him, he did not wish them to go to Newfoundland, until he could be present to appear in his own justification, before they could have an opportunity of injuring his honour and reputation as an officer, both of which he held as inestimable, and as a court martial could not take place in his absence." He then wrote me the following letter :

Sir,

*August 18, 1812.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, offering an arrangement for the officers and crew of his majesty's late sloop Alert.

In answer thereto, I beg leave to inform you that I accept and agree to the first, second, and third articles, but permit me to mention my objection to the last, as it seems by your requiring me to remain as an hostage for the performance of the preceding ones, to cast (though I am willing to believe unintentionally) an indirect suspicion on the faith of the British government, so universally known for its fulfilment of every compact entered into by its public servants.

By your allowing me to accompany my ship's company and officers, I will pledge to you mine honour to see the articles of our release fully complied with on our arrival in a British port.

Should you object to this, my officers prefer remaining with me till we are regularly exchanged. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

T. L. P. LAUGHARNE,

*Late Commander of his M's. Sloop Alert.  
Capt. D. Porter, United States' Frigate Essex.*

Sir,

*August 18, 1812.*

In reply to one paragraph in your letter in answer to the terms offered by me I shall observe that, having on two former instances permitted cartels to proceed to British ports without reserving hostages, I have sufficiently evinced that I entertained the highest confidence in the honour and faith of the British government as respects the fulfilment of compacts entered into by their officers; nor should I have proposed the last article in this instance, were it not that I felt a necessity for holding some pledge as a justification of my conduct to my own government for the unlimited confidence I have reposed. For the reasons, however, which you have stated, I am willing to yield that condition; and you may consider yourself at liberty to proceed with your officers and crew, and on the same terms. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

D. PORTER.

*Capt. T. L. P. Laugharne, late Commander of  
his B. M's. Sloop of War Alert, present.*

[Here follow copies of the agreement, passport, &c. and a list of the prisoners.]

Sir,

*At Sea, September 1, 1812.*

On the afternoon of the 30th August, in latitude  $35^{\circ}$  N. longitude  $62^{\circ}$  W. discovered one of the enemy's frigates standing towards us under a press of sail, apparently with an intention of speaking us. Stood for him under easy sail, with the ship prepared for action; apprehensive that he might not find us in the night, I hoisted a light. At 9 he made a signal, consisting of two flashes and one blue light, apparently about four miles distance from us. I continued to stand on for the point where they were seen until midnight, when not getting sight of the enemy, I concluded it would be best to heave to for him until day-light, presuming that he had done the same, or that he would at least have kept in our neighbourhood; but to my great surprise, and the mortification of my officers and crew (whose zeal on every occasion excites my admiration), we discovered in the morning that the bird



had flown! From the latitude and longitude in which we saw this vessel, and from her fleetness, which enabled her to disappear so soon, I think it not unlikely it was the *Acasta*, of 50 guns and 350 men, sent out with so much parade, accompanied by the *Ring Dove* of 22 guns, to cruize for the *Essex*! Perhaps, however, she went to seek her consort.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

D. PORTER.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir,

*At Sea, September 6, 1812.*

On the 4th instant, off the tail of St. George's Bank, I discovered two ships of war to the southward, and a brig to the northward—the brig in chase of an American merchant ship, and I have not the slightest doubt of their being enemies—gave chase to the brig, which attempted to get past us to join the rest of the squadron; this we prevented, and compelled her to stand to the northward; continued in chase until we got abreast the American ship, when we gave over chase, as the wind was getting light, and the brig leaving us, with her sweeps out. On showing our colours to the American ship, several signal guns were fired by the ships to the southward, which made all sail in chase of us. At 4, P. M., they had gained our wake, and had come up with us very fast. Calculating on making my escape by some manœuvre in the course of the night, I hoisted American colours and fired a gun to windward; the ships still continuing to gain on us, and the largest being considerably to windward of the other and about five miles astern of us, bearing S. by W., I determined to heave about as soon as it grew dark, and in the event of our not being able to pass him, to fire a broadside into him and lay him on board. With this view, made every arrangement and preparation, the crew in high spirits, and gave three cheers when the plan was proposed to them. At 20 minutes after seven, hove about and stood S. E. by S. (the wind heading us off the moment we hove in stays) until thirty minutes after eight, when we bore away S. W. without seeing any thing more of them, which seems the more extraordinary, as a pistol was fired by accident on board this ship at the moment when we must have been at our shortest distance from them. Finding myself thus cut off from New York and Rhode Island, I made the best of my way for the Delaware.

Considering this escape as a very extraordinary one, I have

the honour to enclose you a sketch of the position of the ships at three different periods, by which you will perceive at once the plan of effecting it. I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

D. PORTER.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir,

*Mouth of the Delaware, Sept. 7, 1812.*

In pursuance of your orders of the 24th June, I sailed from Sandy Hook on the 3d July, shaping my course to the southward; in the lat. of 30° 52' N. long. 66° 16' W. I captured the brig *Lamprey*, 21 days from Jamaica; by her I received certain intelligence that at the time of her departure the *Thetis* frigate with specie and a large convoy for England was to sail on or about the 26th of June, and that several running ships were on the departure. I consequently made every exertion to get off St. Augustine, in time to fall in with them, without effect, as fresh gales prevailed from the southwest and increased until the 19th July, when we were compelled to scud. I succeeded in getting as far south as St. Augustine, but was baffled in every attempt to get to the westward; as the gales continued to increase, and as there was no probability of getting there in time to meet the convoy, I concluded it best to endeavour to intercept it on the banks of Newfoundland, to which place I proceeded, taking Halifax in my way, and although I have been disappointed in my expectations, I hope that the facts above stated, and the services rendered by the *Essex* may be considered a sufficient apology for departing from the letter of your instructions.

It is much to be regretted that I had not with me a sloop of war at the time I fell in with the convoy of the *Minerva*, (as well as on all other important occasions) that the ships of the convoy might be kept in play while I engaged the frigate. Had this been the case, instead of taking only 200 prisoners, including the transports' crew, I have not a doubt that we should have made prisoners of the whole of the troops, as well as the frigates and transports' crews, which would have exceeded 2000 men. I have the honour to be, with great respect, &c.

D. PORTER.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a letter from Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, commanding his Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces at Newfoundland, to D. Porter, Esq. commanding the U. S. Frigate Essex.*  
 Sir, *St. John's, Newfoundland, Aug. 5, 1812.*

Your letter of the 2d instant was delivered to me yesterday, by Mr. M'Knight, midshipman of the United States' frigate Essex, under your command.

I am sensible of the good disposition you have evinced to alleviate the distresses of war, and would gladly have embraced your proposal for an exchange of the prisoners that we have respectively made; but I am sorry to say that at the present moment, and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it is not in my power to do so.

In the first place, I have not yet received those instructions from my government which I considered necessary for the guidance of my conduct in respect to any such arrangement; and in the next, the officer whom you charged with the British prisoners has only delivered to me a list of their names, without producing any of their persons, acquainting me that they had taken the vessel from him, and put into another port of this island.

I can only therefore assure you, that I shall report the matter fully to his majesty's government, transmitting a copy of your letter, and of the list of British prisoners by which it is accompanied.

I have had the pleasure of forwarding to Halifax the young gentleman whom you sent to me; an opportunity having already occurred.—And I have written to the commander in chief on that station, requesting that he will endeavour to provide the means of his conveyance to the United States.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) J. T. DUCKWOTRH.

*To Captain Porter,  
 Commandant of the United States' Frigate the Essex.*

*Extract of a letter from Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, to the Honourable Secretary of the Navy of the United States, dated*

*St. John's, Newfoundland, August 31.*

A vessel captured as the *Alert* has been, could not have been vested with the character of a cartel, until she had entered a port of the nation by which she had been captured and been regularly fitted out from thence. For every prize might otherwise be provided with a flag of truce, and propo-

sals for an exchange of prisoners ; and rendered thus effectually secure against the possibility of re-capture, while the cruising ship would be enabled to keep at sea with an undiminished crew ; the cartels being always navigable by the prisoners of war.

Nevertheless, I am willing to give proof at once of my respect for the liberality with which the captain of the Essex has acted, in more than one instance, towards the British subjects who have fallen into his hands ; of the sacred obligation that is always felt to fulfil the engagements of a British officer ; and of my confidence in the disposition of his royal highness the prince regent to allay the violence of war, by encouraging a reciprocation of that courtesy by which its pressure upon individuals may be so essentially diminished.

On the 4th of this month, a midshipman of the Essex arrived, and presented to me a letter from his captain, proposing an exchange for 86 British prisoners. The midshipman had however been placed alone in the charge of one of the captured vessels, with 86 prisoners, to conduct them to this port. A list of 40 prisoners of the same description, disposed of in the same manner, has been sent to me by the commander of the American private armed schooner the *Rossie*.

It is incumbent upon me to protest in the strongest manner against the practice of conducting exchanges upon terms like these ; and to signify to you that it will be utterly impossible for me to incur, in future, the responsibility of assenting to them.

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CAPTURE OF THE NAUTILUS.

Sir,

*Halifax, July 29th, 1812.*

I am under the unpleasant necessity of acquainting you with the loss of the United States' brig *Nautilus*, late under my command.

I sailed, in obedience to your order of the 11th instant, on the 15th, and passed Sandy Hook at 6, P. M., with the wind fresh and squally at N. by E., standing E. by S. At 4, A. M., we had cleared the Hook about 75 miles, under reefed topsails and fore course ; at a quarter past four discovered five large sails about two points before our weather beam.—Immediately wore ship, turned out the reefs, and made all sail the vessel would bear. The ships bore up, and made sail in

chase, displaying signals which were not understood, and hoisted American colours. I also hoisted my private signal and ensign, which not being answered, continued to carry a press of sail to the westward.

There was a heavy swell from the northward, and it was impossible to gain the wind from our pursuers. We had many times to take in sail to preserve spars, and finally carried away our topmast steering-sail boom, which was immediately replaced. It was soon evident that they were drawing up with us. Every manœuvre in trimming ship was tried, but this not having the desired effect, I ordered the anchors to be cut from the bows, when we appeared to hold way with them. At 9 the wind became lighter, and the brig laboured excessively in the swell. I then ordered a part of the water to be started, threw over her lee guns, and a part of the round shot. She was instantly relieved, and bore her canvas with much greater ease. The wedges were then driven out from the masts, and the standing rigging slackened up. At 10 the squadron hoisted French colours, and we saw they neared us fast. At 11 the leading ship was within grape distance, but owing to the construction of the Nautilus, she can fire no guns abaft.

There was now no chance of escape if the chasing vessels were enemies, of which we were not certain, as they still kept French colours flying. At 12 the leading ship was within musket shot, when I destroyed the signals, signal books, and the despatches with which I was entrusted.

At half past twelve I consulted with my principal officers. All were of opinion that every thing had been done to preserve the vessel, and that no hopes of escape were left. I then took in studding-sails and light sails, trained the weather guns aft, and put the helm a-lee. The chasing ship put her helm up, hoisted a broad pendant and English colours, and ranged under my lee quarter. Unable to resist, I was compelled to strike the flag of the United States.

I have been particular in detailing to you, sir, circumstances as they occurred, in order to prove to you that no efforts were wanting to effect our escape. It is but justice to my officers and crew to add, that they executed my orders with promptness, and rendered me every possible assistance; and I feel persuaded, had an opportunity offered of engaging any thing of equal force, they would have distinguished themselves.

The frigate hoisted out her boats and sent for me on board. She proved to be the Shannon of 38 guns, commodore Broke.

The other vessels of the squadron were, *Africa*, 64 guns, captain Bastard; *Guerriere*, 38 guns, captain Dacres; *Belvidera*, 36 guns, captain Byron; *Æolus*, 32 guns, captain lord Townsend.

My officers and crew were sent on board the *Africa*. I remained with the *Nautilus*. The treatment I received from commodore Broke was polite and gentlemanly. We arrived here last evening. If it is not improper, I beg leave to request your interference in having me exchanged, as I feel great unwillingness to remain inactive at this time.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

W. M. CRANE.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*The Secretary of the Navy to Lieutenant Crane, late of the Nautilus.*

Sir, *Navy Department, 7th Oct. 1812.*

The following is the opinion of the court of enquiry convened agreeably to your request, for the purpose of investigating the circumstances of the loss of the late United States' brig *Nautilus*:

“The court were unanimously and decidedly of opinion, that in the capture of the late United States' brig *Nautilus*, lieutenant Crane, her late commander, and his officers, are entirely free from the least blame or censure, and do consider lieutenant Crane did every thing to prevent said capture that a skilful and experienced officer could possibly do.”

This opinion of the court, sir, only confirms the impression confidently entertained with respect to your conduct on the occasion to which it refers.

I have the honour to be, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

PAUL HAMILTON.

*Wm. M. Crane, Esq., of the Navy, Boston.*

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CRUIZE OF COMMODORE RODGERS.

*Copy of a Letter received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commodore Rodgers.*

Sir, *United States' Frigate President, at Sea, Oct. 17, 1812.*

I have the honour to acquaint you that on the 15th inst., near the Grand Bank, this ship, the *Congress* in company, captured the British king's packet *Swallow*, Joseph Mor-

phew commander, bound from Kingston, Jamaica, to Fal-mouth. The rank of the commander of this vessel is that of a master and commander in the navy. She had no cargo on board except eighty-one boxes of gold and silver, amounting to between one hundred and fifty and two hundred thousand dollars. The specie I took out of her, and had intended sending her to England in the character of a cartel with her own crew: having fallen in with the American schooner Eleanor, bound from Baltimore to France, dismasted, induced me to change my first determination, and instead of sending her to England I have sent her to the United States in charge of the master and crew of the before-mentioned schooner, who, at the moment of writing this have charge of the Swallow with the schooner in tow, but which, as soon as the weather will permit, they intend abandoning, after having taken her cargo on board the Swallow.

I parted company with the United States and Argus five days since; they are not however far from me at present, I apprehend.

We have not seen a single British vessel of war as yet, except one frigate, which the want of wind and the approach of night prevented our chasing with any effect; although from information afterwards received we must have passed very near a squadron of five frigates the evening preceding that on which we saw the one before mentioned.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS.

*Hon. P. Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *At Sea, long. 32, lat. 33, Nov. 1, 1812.*

I wrote you on the 18th ultimo, by the British packet Swallow, informing you of having captured that vessel with between an hundred and fifty and two hundred thousand dollars on board; and I now write you by a British South Sea ship, loaded with oil, captured yesterday, one of two ships under convoy of the frigate Galatea.

The above ship is manned from the Congress, and it is now blowing so fresh, that I cannot learn from captain Smith her name, having separated from him yesterday in chase of the Galatea, whilst he was manning the prize, and, owing to excessive bad weather last night, was unable to join him to-day.

I got within six or seven miles of the Galatea by sun-set, but the extreme darkness of the night enabled her to escape. With the greatest respect, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE  
OF THE FROLIC AND WASP.

*Copy of a letter from Captain Jones, late of the United States' Sloop of War the Wasp, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New-York, 24th November, 1812.*

I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of the occurrences of our cruize, which terminated in the capture of the Wasp on the 18th of October, by the Poitiers of seventy-four guns, while a wreck from the damages received in an engagement with the British sloop of war Frolic of twenty-two guns; sixteen of them thirty-two pound carronades, and four twelve pounders on the main-deck, and two twelve pounders, carronades, on the top-gallant-fore-castle, making her superior to us by four twelve pounders. The Frolic had struck to us, and was taken possession of, about two hours before our surrendering to the Poitiers.

We had left the Delaware on the 13th. The 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and two men. Half past eleven on the night of the 17th, in the latitude of 37 degrees N. and longitude 65 degrees W., we saw several sail, two of them appearing very large; we stood from them for some time, then shortened sail and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight on Sunday, the 18th, we saw them a-head—gave chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a sloop of war, four of them large ships, mounting from sixteen to eighteen guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven, A. M., we engaged the sloop of war, having first received her fire, at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well supported fire of forty-three minutes; and although so near, while loading the last broadside, that our rammers were shoved against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surren-



dered upon our gaining their fore-castle, so that no loss was sustained on either side after boarding.

Our main-top-mast was shot away between four and five minutes from the commencement of the firing; and falling, together with the main-top-sail yard, across the larboard fore and fore-top-sail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At eight minutes the gaff and mizen-top-gallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the commencement of the action every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell upon the deck, the main-mast going close by the deck, and the fore-mast 12 or 15 feet above it.

The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rodgers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, shewed by the incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight and every other officer, acted with a courage and promptitude highly honourable, and I trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.

I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the mast and spars that had fallen upon deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states, that from what he saw, and from information from the officers, the number of killed must have been about thirty, and that of the wounded about forty or fifty—of the killed is her first lieutenant and sailing master, of the wounded captain Whinyates and the second lieutenant.

We had five killed and five wounded, as per list; the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained upon deck, and shewed by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer. I am, respectfully, yours,

JACOB JONES.

*The Honourable Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*From the London Gazette, December 26.*

*Letter from the Captain of the Frolic to Admiral Warren.*

Sir, *His Majesty's Ship Poictiers, at Sea, Oct. 28.*

It is with the most bitter sorrow and distress I have to report to your excellency the capture of his majesty's brig Frolic, by the Wasp, belonging to the United States of America, on the 18th instant.

Having under convoy the homeward bound trade from the bay of Honduras, and being in latitude 36 degrees N. and 64 degrees W. on the night of the 17th, we were overtaken by a most violent gale of wind, in which the Frolic carried away her main yard, lost her topsails, and sprung the main-topmast. On the morning of the 18th, as we were repairing the damages sustained in the storm, and re-assembling the scattered ships, a suspicious ship came in sight, and gave chase to the convoy.

The merchant ships continued their voyage before the wind under all sail; the Frolic dropped astern, and hoisted Spanish colours, in order to decoy the stranger under her guns, and to give time for the convoy to escape. About ten o'clock, both vessels being within hail, we hauled to the wind, and the battle began. The superior fire of our guns gave every reason to expect its speedy termination in our favour, but the gaff head-braces being shot away, and there being no sail on the main-mast, the brig became unmanageable, and the enemy succeeded in taking a position to rake her, while she was unable to bring a gun to bear.

After lying some time exposed to a most destructive fire, she fell with the bowsprit betwixt the enemy's main and mizen rigging, still unable to return his fire.

At length the enemy boarded, and made himself master of the brig, every individual officer being wounded, and the greater part of the men either killed or wounded, there not being twenty persons remaining unhurt.

Although I shall ever deplore the unhappy issue of this contest, it would be great injustice to the merits of the officers and crew, if I failed to report that their bravery and coolness are deserving of every praise; and I am convinced, if the Frolic had not been crippled in the gale, I should have to make a very different report to your excellency. The Wasp was taken, and the Frolic re-captured the same afternoon, by his majesty's ship Poictiers. Being separated from them, I cannot transmit at present a list of killed and wounded. Mr. Charles M'Kay, the first lieutenant, and Mr. Stephens the master, have died of their wounds. I have the honour to be, &c.

T. WHINYATES.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF  
THE MACEDONIAN.

*Letter from Commodore Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy.*  
Sir, *U. S. Ship United States, at Sea, Oct. 30, 1812.*

I have the honour to inform you that on the 25th instant, being in the latitude 29° N. longitude 29° 30' W., we fell in with, and after an action of an hour and a half, captured his Britannic majesty's ship *Macedonian*, commanded by captain John Carden, and mounting 49 carriage guns (the odd gun shifting). She is a frigate of the largest class, two years old, four months out of dock, and reputed one of the best sailers in the British service. The enemy being to windward had the advantage of engaging us at his own distance, which was so great, that for the first half hour we did not use our carronades, and at no moment was he within the complete effect of our musquetry or grape—to this circumstance and a heavy swell, which was on at the time, I ascribe the unusual length of the action.

The enthusiasm of every officer, seaman, and marine, on board this ship, on discovering the enemy—their steady conduct in battle, and precision of their fire, could not be surpassed. Where all met my fullest expectations, it would be unjust in me to discriminate. Permit me, however, to recommend to your particular notice my first lieutenant, William H. Allen. He has served with me upwards of five years, and to his unremitting exertions in disciplining the crew, is to be imputed the obvious superiority of our gunnery exhibited in the result of this contest.

Subjoined is a list of the killed and wounded on both sides. Our loss, compared with that of the enemy, will appear small. Amongst our wounded, you will observe the name of lieutenant Funk, who died a few hours after the action—he was an officer of great gallantry and promise, and the service has sustained a severe loss in his death.

The *Macedonian* lost her mizen-mast, fore and main-top-masts and main yard, and was much cut up in her hull. The damage sustained by this ship was not so much as to render her return into port necessary, and had I not deemed it important that we should see our prize in, should have continued our cruise.

With the highest consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

STEPHEN DECATUR.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, &c.*

*List of killed and wounded on board the United States.*

*Killed*—Thomas Brown, New-York, seaman; Henry Shepherd, Philadelphia, do.; William Murray, Boston, a boy; Michael O'Donnell, New-York, private marine; John Roberts, do. do.

*Wounded*—John Mercer Funk, Philadelphia, lieutenant, since dead; John Archibald, New-York, carpenter's crew, do.; Christian Clark, do. seaman; George Christopher, do. ordinary seaman; George Mahar, do. do.; William Jones, do. do.; John Laton, do. private marine.

On board the Macedonian there were 36 killed and 68 wounded. Among the former were the boatswain, one master's mate, and the schoolmaster, and of the latter were the first and third lieutenants, one master's mate, and two midshipmen.

*From the London Gazette, January 1.*

*Admiralty Office, Dec. 29, 1812.*

*Copy of a letter from Captain John Surman Carden, late Commander of his Majesty's Ship the Macedonian, to John Wilson Croker, Esq. dated on board the American Ship the United States, at Sea, the 28th October, 1812.*

Sir, it is with the deepest regret I have to acquaint you, for the information of my lords commissioners of the admiralty, that his majesty's late ship Macedonian was captured on the 25th instant by the United States' ship United States, commodore Decatur, commander. The detail is as follows:

A short time after day-light, steering N. W. by W. with the wind from the southward, in latitude 29° N. and longitude 29° 30' W., in the execution of their lordships' orders, a sail was seen on the lee-beam, which I immediately stood for, and made her out to be a large frigate under American colours; at 9 o'clock I closed with her, and she commenced the action, which we returned, but for the enemy keeping two points off the wind I was not enabled to get as close to her as I could have wished.

After an hour's action the enemy backed and came to the wind, and I was then enabled to bring her to close battle; in this situation I soon found the enemy's force too superior to expect success unless some very fortunate chance occurred in our favour, and with this hope I continued the battle to two hours and ten minutes, when having the mizen-mast shot away by the board, top-mast shot away by the caps, main-yard shot in pieces, lower-masts badly wounded, lower rigging all cut to pieces, a small proportion only of the fore-

sail left to the fore-yard, all the guns on the quarter-deck and fore-castle disabled but two, and filled with wreck, two also on the main-deck disabled, and several shot between wind and water, a very great proportion of the crew killed and wounded, and the enemy comparatively in good order, who had now shot ahead, and was about to place himself in a raking position, without our being enabled to return the fire, being a perfect wreck and unmanageable log, I deemed it prudent, though a painful extremity, to surrender his majesty's ship, nor was this dreadful alternative resorted to till every hope of success was removed, even beyond the reach of chance, nor till, I trust, their lordships will be aware every effort had been made against the enemy by myself, my brave officers, and men, nor should she have been surrendered whilst a man lived on board had she been manageable.

I am sorry to say our loss is very severe; I find by this day's muster 36 killed, three of whom lingered a short time after the battle, 36 severely wounded, many of whom cannot recover, and 32 slightly wounded, who may all do well; total 104.

The truly noble and animating conduct of my officers, and the steady bravery of my crew to the last moment of the battle, must ever render them dear to their country.

My first lieutenant David Hope was severely wounded in the head towards the close of the battle, and taken below; but was soon again on deck, displaying that greatness of mind and exertion, which, though it may be equalled, can never be excelled; the third lieutenant, John Bulford, was also wounded, but not obliged to quit his quarters; second lieutenant Samuel Motley and he deserve my highest acknowledgments. The cool and steady conduct of Mr. Walker, the master, was very great during the battle, as also that of lieutenants Wilson and Magill of the marines.

On being taken on board the enemy's ship I ceased to wonder at the result of the battle. The United States is built with the scantling of a 74 gun ship, mounting 30 long 24 pounders (English ship guns) on her main deck, and 22 42 pounders carronades, with two long 24 pounders on her quarter deck and fore castle, howitzer guns in her tops, and a travelling carronade on her upper deck, with a complement of 478 picked men.

The enemy has suffered much in masts, rigging, and hull, above and below water; her loss in killed and wounded I am not aware of, but I know a lieutenant and six men have been thrown overboard.

J. S. CARDEN.

## CAPTURE OF THE CALEDONIA AND THE DETROIT.

*Correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and Captain Chauncey and Lieutenant Elliott, relative to the capture and subsequent disposition of the British armed Brigs Caledonia and Detroit, on the 8th of October, 1812.*

*Lieutenant Elliott to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir,

*Black Rock, 9th October, 1812.*

I have the honour to inform you, that on the morning of the 8th instant, two British vessels which I was informed were his Britannic majesty's brig *Detroit*, late the United States' brig *Adams*, and the brig *Hunter*, mounting 14 guns, but which afterwards proved to be the brig *Caledonia*, both said to be well armed and manned, came down the lake and anchored under protection of Fort Erie. Having been on the lines for some time, and in a measure inactively employed, I determined to make an attack, and, if possible, get possession of them: a strong inducement to this attempt arose from a conviction that with these two vessels, added to those which I have purchased and am fitting out, I should be able to meet the remainder of the British force on the upper lakes, and save an incalculable expense and labour to the government. On the morning of their arrival I heard that our seamen were but a short distance from this place, and immediately despatched an express to the officers, directing them to use all possible despatch in getting the men to this place, as I had important service to perform. On their arrival, which was about 12 o'clock, I discovered that they had only about twenty pistols, and neither cutlasses, nor battle-axes; but on application to generals *Smyth* and *Hall*, of the regulars and militia, I was supplied with a few arms; and general *Smyth* was so good, on my request, as immediately to detach fifty men from the regulars, armed with muskets. By four o'clock in the afternoon I had my men selected, and stationed in two boats, which I had previously prepared for the purpose: with those boats, fifty men in each, and under circumstances very disadvantageous, my men having had scarcely time to refresh themselves, after a fatiguing march of five hundred miles, I put off from the mouth of *Buffaloe* creek, at one o'clock the following morning, and at three I was along side the vessels. In about ten minutes I had the prisoners all secured, the topsails sheeted home, and the vessels under way. Unfortunately the wind was not sufficiently strong to get me up against a rapid current into the lake,

where I understood another armed vessel lay at anchor ; and I was obliged to run down the river by the forts, under a heavy fire of round, grape, and canister, from a number of pieces of heavy ordnance, and several pieces of flying artillery, and was compelled to anchor at a distance of about four hundred yards from two of their batteries. After the discharge of the first gun, which was from the flying artillery, I hailed the shore, and observed to the officer, that if another gun was fired I would bring the prisoners on deck, and expose them to the same fate we should all share ; but notwithstanding they disregarded the caution : they continued a constant and destructive fire. One single moment's reflection determined me not to commit an act that would subject me to the imputation of barbarity. The *Caledonia* had been beached in as safe a position as the circumstances would admit of, under one of our batteries at Black Rock ; I now brought all the guns of the *Detroit* on one side, next the enemy, stationed the men at them, and directed a fire, which was continued as long as our ammunition lasted and circumstances permitted. During the contest I endeavoured to get the *Detroit* on our side, by sending a line (there being no wind) on shore, with all the line I could muster ; but the current being so strong the boat could not reach the shore. I then hailed our shore, and requested that warps should be made fast on the land, and sent on board ; the attempt to all which again proved useless, as the fire was such as would in all probability sink the vessel in a short time. I determined to drop down the river out of reach of the batteries, and make a stand against the flying artillery. I accordingly cut the cable and made sail, with very light airs ; and at that instant discovered that the pilot had abandoned me. I dropped astern for about ten minutes, when I was brought up on our shore on Squaw island ; got the boarding boat made, had all the prisoners put in and sent on shore, with directions for the officer to return for me and what property we could get from the brig : he did not return, owing to the difficulty of the boat's getting on shore. Discovering a skiff under the counter, I sent the four remaining prisoners in the boat, and with my officer I went on shore to bring the boat off. I asked for protection of the brig of lieutenant-colonel Scott, who readily gave it. At this moment I discovered a boat with about 40 soldiers, from the British side, making for the brig ; they got on board, but were soon compelled to abandon her, with the loss of nearly all their men. During the whole of this morning both sides of the river kept up alternately a constant fire

on the brig, and so much injured her that it was impossible to have floated her: before I left her she had received twelve shot of large size in her bends, her sails in ribbons, and her rigging all cut to pieces.

To my officers and men I feel under great obligations: to captain Townson and lieutenant Roach of the 2d regiment of artillery, ensign Pressman of the infantry, to Cornelius Chapin, Mr. John M'Comb, Messrs. John Tower, Thomas Davis, Peter Overtaks, James Sloan, resident gentlemen of Buffaloe, for their soldier and sailor-like conduct; in a word, every man fought with their hearts animated only by the interest and honour of their country. The prisoners I have turned over to the military. The Detroit mounted 6 six-pound long guns, a commanding lieutenant of marines, a boatswain, and gunner, and 56 men, about 30 American prisoners on board, muskets, pistols, and battle-axes: in boarding her I lost one man, one officer wounded, Mr. John C. Cummings, acting midshipman, a bayonet through the leg: his conduct was correct, and deserves the notice of the department. The Caledonia mounted two small guns, blunderbusses, pistols, muskets, cutlasses, and boarding pistols, 12 men including officers, 10 prisoners on board; the boat boarding her commanded by sailing-master George Watts, performed his duty in a masterly style; but one man killed, and four badly wounded, I am afraid mortally. I enclose you a list of the officers and men engaged in the enterprize, and also a view of the lake and river, in the different situations of attack. In a day or two I shall forward the names of the prisoners. The Caledonia belongs to the N. W. company, laden with furs, worth, I understand, two hundred thousand dollars.

(Signed)

JESSE D. ELLIOTT.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Lieutenant Elliott to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir,

*Black Rock, October 10, 1812.*

In my letter of yesterday's date I stated my intention to enclose to you a list of the officers and men engaged with me in capturing his Britannic majesty's brig the Detroit and the brig Caledonia. From the incessant fire of the enemy and my own constant engagements for the protection of the vessels, compel me to postpone sending that list till another opportunity. Last evening, having observed an intention on the part of the enemy, to remove the ordnance and military stores with which the Detroit was charged, I determined at



once to set her on fire, thereby to prevent them having the aid of masts and yards in getting her guns into boats, she having five 12 pound guns in her hold, and six 6 pounders on deck; that I could prepare them, and with my sailors remove the ordnance during the night, when unobserved by the enemy. These preparations I am now making, and shall with as much expedition as possible continue to get the ordnance, and place it in our battery, as we are much in want: not one piece at Black Rock. The Caledonia I have perfectly recovered from the enemy.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, &c.

(Signed)

JESSE D. ELLIOTT.

*Lieutenant Elliott to Commodore Chauncey,*

Sir,


*Black Rock, October 10, 1812.*

I have the honour to inform you, that on the morning of the sixth instant, two vessels under British colours came down Lake Erie, and anchored under the protection of Fort Erie: that on the same day a detachment of men arrived from New-York, accompanied by sailing masters Watts and Chisson, with some masters' mates, and midshipmen: that on the morning following, I, with two boats previously prepared for the purpose, boarded and took possession of them, with the loss of two men killed, Samuel Fortune and Daniel Martin, and four wounded; acting midshipman John C. Cummings, John Garling, Nathan Armstrong, Jerome Sardie, and John Yocem. As there is not a probability of receiving this shortly, I have made communication to the department upon the subject, a copy of which I enclose for your perusal. I beg you will not have conceived me hasty in making this attack: I acted as if the action came directly from yourself. Let me recommend to your particular attention the officers and men who performed this service; each and all did their duty. The ensign of the Adams I will send you by an early opportunity; it is at your disposal. The particulars, as it regards the vessels, I will forward you in a day or two; at present I am much engaged.

With sentiments, &c.

P. S. I have neglected mentioning to you the names of the vessels captured. One, his Britannic Majesty's brig *Detroit*, formerly the United States' brig *Adams*; the other, a brig belonging to the N. W. company, loaded with skins, called the *Caledonia*.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.



*Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*  
Sackett's Harbour, October 16, 1812.

Sir,

I have great pleasure in informing you that, by a gentleman who arrived here yesterday afternoon from Buffalo, I learnt that lieutenant Elliott, with about sixty sailors, and a number of volunteer militia, cut out from under the guns of Fort Erie, on the night of the 8th instant, the brig Adams, (lately surrendered at Detroit) and the brig Caledonia, laden with peltry, said to be very valuable; but in running these vessels for Black Rock, they both grounded, in such a situation that the British fort was firing on them, when my informant left there on Friday morning last. It was however believed, that if they could not be got off they could be destroyed. I however hope that lieutenant Elliott will be able to save both vessels; for such an addition to our little force on lake Erie, at this time, would be invaluable. Lieutenant Elliott deserves much praise for the promptness with which he executed this service; as the sailors had only arrived at Black Rock on the 8th, and he had no particular orders from me, except to have boats built and prepared for cutting out the British vessels, which I knew rendezvoused near Fort Erie. If lieutenant Elliott succeed in saving the Adams and Caledonia, I think that we shall obtain the command of lake Erie before December. But as to this lake, I hardly know what to say, as there has not a single pound of powder nor a gun arrived yet: and I can make no calculation when any will arrive. I feel quite discouraged, and shall be tempted to seek the enemy with the Oneida alone, if the guns do not arrive soon.

The sailors have all arrived at their places of destination; but the marines have not arrived. I however hope to see them to-day or to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, Sackett's Harbour, 27th October, 1812.

I have the honour of enclosing you copies of two letters from lieutenant Elliott, giving an account of his having cut out from under Fort Erie, on lake Erie, in a most gallant manner, two British brigs, the Detroit (late Adams) and the Caledonia. The Detroit was manned and armed as a man

of war; the Caledonia belonged to the N. W. company, and was loaded with peltry.

Nothing that I can say, more than I have already said, in a former communication upon this subject, will add to the credit of lieutenant Elliott, and the gallant officers and men who accompanied him. The thing speaks for itself, and will, I am sure, be duly appreciated by all who have any idea of the difficulties that he had to encounter, after getting possession of these vessels.

I have the honour to be, respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Captain Harris H. Hickman to Lieutenant Elliott.*

Sir, *Washington, January 8, 1813.*

In answer to your note, requesting of me "a general description of the armament and stores on board, at the time of the capture of the Adams, and the probable number of men," I can state that I sailed from Malden in the Adams, and arrived at Fort Erie on the morning preceding the night in which you captured that vessel. I left her in the afternoon, and crossed in her boat to Buffalo with a flag. When I left the Adams, she had on board five guns mounted (six and four pounders), and six long twelves in her hold. She had also on board a quantity of powder and ball, and a number of boxes of muskets. I am not able to state, of my own knowledge, the number of stands of arms, but I have been informed that nearly all the arms taken at Detroit were on board; if that was the fact, the number must have exceeded two thousand. The number of the crew that I left on board could not vary much from sixty, and the number of American prisoners about thirty, including three officers.

I have the honour to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARRIS H. HICKMAN.

*Lieut. J. D. Elliott, U. S. N.*

*The Secretary of the Navy to Lieutenant Elliott.*

Sir, *Navy-Department, 27th October, 1812.*

I have received, with great satisfaction, your communication of the 9th instant, and have been desired by the president of the United States to return to you, and through you, to the officers and men under your command in the expedition to Fort Erie, which terminated to the glory of the American arms, his particular thanks.

I am, with great respect, sir, your most obedient seryant,  
PAUL HAMILTON.

P. S. Your having abstained from fulfilling your intimation, that you would expose your prisoners to the enemy's fire is highly approved.

*Jesse D. Elliott, Esq., Lieutenant commanding, Black Rock.*

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BATTLE OF QUEENSTOWN.

*Letter from Major-General Van Rensselaer, of the New York Militia, to Major-general Henry Dearborn, transmitted by the latter to the Department of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Lewistown, October 14, 1812.*

As the movements of the army under my command, since I had last the honour to address you on the 8th instant, have been of a very important character, producing consequences serious to many individuals; establishing facts actually connected with the interest of the service and safety of the army: and as I stand prominently responsible for some of these consequences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and through you to my country, the situation and circumstances in which I have had to act, and the reasons and motives which governed me; and if the result is not all that might have been wished, it is such, that when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheerfully submit myself to the judgment of my country.

In my letter of the 8th instant, I apprised you that a crisis in this campaign was rapidly advancing; and that (to repeat the same words) "the blow must be soon struck, or all the toil and expense of the campaign go for nothing; and worse than nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonour."

Under such impressions, I had on the 5th instant written to brigadier-general Smyth, of the United States forces, requesting an interview with him, major-general Hall, and the commandants of the United States' regiments, for the purpose of conferring upon the subject of future operations. I wrote major-general Hall to the same purport. On the 11th I had received no answer from general Smyth; but in a note to me, of the 10th, general Hall mentioned that general Smyth had not yet then agreed upon any day for the consultation.

In the mean time, the partial success of lieutenant Elliot,

at Black Rock (of which, however, I have received no official information), began to excite a strong disposition in the troops to act. This was expressed to me through various channels in the shape of an alternative; that they must have orders to act; or, at all hazards, they would go home. I forbear here commenting upon the obvious consequences to me, personally, of longer withholding my orders under such circumstances.

I had a conference with —— as to the possibility of getting some person to pass over to Canada and obtain correct information. On the morning of the 4th, he wrote to me that he had procured the man who bore his letter to go over. Instructions were given him; he passed over—obtained such information as warranted an immediate attack. This was confidently communicated to several of my first officers, and produced great zeal to act;—more especially as it might have a controuling effect upon the movements at Detroit, where it was supposed general Brock had gone with all the force he dare spare from the Niagara frontier. The best preparations in my power were therefore made to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown, and possess ourselves of the village, where the troops might be sheltered from the distressing inclemency of the weather.

Lieutenant-colonel Fenwick's flying artillery, and a detachment of regular troops under his command, were ordered to be up in season for Fort Niagara. Orders were also sent to general Smyth, to send down from Buffaloe such detachments of his brigade as existing circumstances in that vicinity might warrant. The attack was to have been made at four o'clock in the morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats from the old ferry opposite the heights. To avoid any embarrassment in crossing the river (which is here a sheet of violent eddies) experienced boatmen were procured to take the boats from the landing below to the place of embarkation. Lieutenant Sims was considered the man of greatest skill for this service. He went ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the intended place far up the river—and there, in a most extraordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all the boats. In this agonizing dilemma stood officers and men, whose ardour had not been cooled by exposure through the night to one of the most tremendous north-east storms, which continued, unabated, for twenty-eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. The approach of day-light extinguished every

prospect of success, and the detachment returned to camp. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to have commanded the detachment.

After this result, I had hoped the patience of the troops would have continued until I could submit the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that I might act under and in conformity to the opinion which might be then expressed. But my hope was idle; the previously excited ardour seemed to have gained new heat from the late miscarriage—the brave were mortified to stop short of their object, and the timid thought laurels half won by an attempt.

On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion and the service in disgrace.

Viewing affairs at Buffaloe as yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the march of general Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of the first expedition; but having now determined to attack Queenstown, I sent new orders to general Smyth to march; not with the view of his aid in the attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient, but to support the detachment should the conflict be obstinate and long continued.

Lieutenant-colonel Christie, who had just arrived at the four mile creek, had, late in the night of the first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own and his men's service; but he got my permission too late. He now again came forward; had a conference with colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might have the honour of a command in the expedition. The arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was to command one column of 300 militia; and lieutenant-colonel Christie a column of the same number of regular troops.

Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and the most confidential and experienced men to manage them. At an early hour in the night, lieutenant-colonel Christie marched his detachment, by the rear road, from Niagara to camp. At seven in the evening lieutenant-colonel Stranaham's regiment moved from Niagara Falls; at eight o'clock, Meads; and at nine, lieutenant-colonel Blan's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two columns were to pass over together; and soon as the heights should be carried, lieutenant-colonel Fenwick's flying artillery was to pass over; then major Mullany's detachment of regulars; and the other troops to follow in order.

At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the troops commenced embarkation under the cover of a commanding battery, mounting two eighteen pounders and two sixes. The movement was soon discovered, and a brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line of the Canada shore. Our battery then opened to sweep the shore, but it was for some minutes too dark to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade was now opened upon the boats from three different batteries—our battery returned their fire, and occasionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself served with shells from a small mortar of the enemy's. Colonel Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march from Niagara falls in the night, arrived in season to return the enemy's fire with two six pounders.

The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the eddies, as well as with a shower of shot: but colonel Van Rensselaer, with about 100 men, soon effected his landing amidst a tremendous fire, directed upon him from every point; but to the astonishment of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column advanced slowly against the fire. It was a serious misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expedition, that in a few minutes after landing, colonel Van Rensselaer received four wounds—a ball passed through his right thigh, entering just below the hip-bone—another shot passed through the same thigh, a little below—the third through the calf of his leg—and a fourth confused his heel. This was quite a crisis in the expedition. Under so severe a fire it was difficult to form raw troops. By some mismanagement of the boatmen, lieutenant-colonel Christie did not arrive until some time after this, and was wounded in the hand in passing the river. Colonel Van Rensselaer, still able to stand, with great presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gallantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction. Soon after this both parties were considerably reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in various places—many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone guard house, where a piece of ordnance was now briskly served. I ordered the fire of the battery directed upon the guard house; and it was so effectually done, that with eight or ten shot the fire was silenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large store house; but in a short time the rout became general, and the enemy's fire was silenced except from a one-gun battery, so far down the river as to be out of the reach of our heavy ordnance, and our light pieces could

not silence it. A number of boats now passed over unannoyed, except from the one unsilenced gun. For some time after I had passed over, the victory appeared complete; but in the expectation of future attacks, I was taking measures for fortifying my camp immediately—the direction of this service I committed to lieutenant Totten, of the engineers. But very soon the enemy were reinforced by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippewa—they commenced a furious attack—but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. By this time, I perceived my troops were embarking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements—but, to my utter astonishment, I found that at the very moment when complete victory was in our hands, the ardour of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all directions, urged men by every consideration to pass, but in vain.—Lieutenant-colonel Bloom, who had been wounded in action, returned, mounted his horse, and rode through the ranks—as did also judge Peck, who happened to be here, exhorting the companies to proceed, but all in vain.

At this time a large reinforcement from Fort George was discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an important check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of ammunition, as I had learnt there was left only 20 shot for the 18-pounders. The reinforcement, however, obliqued to the right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians in the rear of the heights. Finding, to my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would pass over; seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence; and knowing that the brave men on the heights were quite exhausted and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do was to send them a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment I despatched a note to general Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation—leaving the course to be pursued much to his own judgment—with assurance that if he thought best to retreat, I would endeavour to send as many boats as I could command, and cover his retreat by every fire I could safely make. But the boats were dispersed; many of the boatmen had fled, panic struck; and but few got off. But my note could but little more than have reached general W. about 4 o'clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict commenced, and continued about half an hour, with a tremendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry. The enemy succeeded in re-possessioning their battery,



and gained advantage on every side ; the brave men who had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect of their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict.

I can only add that the victory was really won ; but lost for the want of a small reinforcement. One-third part of the idle men might have saved all.

I have been so pressed with the various duties of burying the dead, providing for the wounded, collecting the public property, negotiating an exchange of prisoners, and all the concerns consequent of such a battle, that I have not been able to forward this despatch at so early an hour as I could have wished. I shall soon forward you another despatch, in which I shall endeavour to point out to you the conduct of some most gallant and deserving officers. But I cannot in justice close without expressing the very great obligation I am under to brigadier-general Wadsworth, colonel Van Rensselaer, colonel Scott, lieutenant-colonels Christie and Fenwick, and captain Gibson. Many others have also behaved most gallantly. As I have reason to believe that many of our troops fled to the woods, with the hope of crossing the river, I have not been able to learn the probable number of killed, wounded, or prisoners. The slaughter of our troops must have been very considerable. And the enemy have suffered severely.

General Brock is among their slain, and his aid-de-camp mortally wounded.

I have the honour to be, sir, with great respect and consideration, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

STN. VAN RENSSELAER,

*Major-General.*

*Major-General Dearborn.*

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AFFAIR AT ST. REGIS.

*Letter from Major Young to Brigadier-General Bloomfield,  
Commander of the Northern Army.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp, French-Mills, 24th October, 1812.*

On the 22d I despatched several confidential friends to reconnoitre about the village of St. Regis: they returned with the information that the enemy had landed in the village, and that we might expect a visit from them immediately. Their number was stated by no one at less than 110, and from that

to 300; the most certain information fixed on the former number. It was also believed that the enemy were determined to make a stand at that place, and would speedily increase their number.—This determined me to make an immediate attempt to take out those already landed, before any reinforcement could arrive. I ordered the men to be furnished with two day's rations of provisions, with double rations of whiskey; and at 11 at night we marched with the utmost silence, that we might give as little alarm as possible. We took a circuitous route through the woods, and arrived at Gray's mills at half past 3, A. M. We found here a boat, a small canoe, and two cribs of boards. Captain Lyon's company crossed in a boat, captain M'Niel's in the canoe, and the remainder, with our horses, crossed on the cribs. We arrived within half a mile of the village at 4 o'clock, where being concealed from the enemy by a little rise of the ground, we halted to reconnoitre, refresh the men, and make our disposition for the attack, which was arranged in the following order:

Captain Lyon was detached from the right, with orders to take the road running along the bank of the St. Regis river, with directions to gain the rear of captain Mountaigny's house, in which, and Donally's, the enemy were said to be quartered. Captain Tildon was detached to the St. Lawrence, with the view of gaining the route of Donally's house, and also securing the enemy's boats (expected to have been stationed there) to prevent their retreat. With the remainder of the force I moved on in front, and arrived within 50 yards of Mountaigny's house, when I found by the firing that captain Lyon was engaged; at the same instant I discovered a person passing in front, and ordered him to stand; but not being obeyed, ordered captain Higbie's first platoon to fire, and the poor fellow soon fell. He proved to be the ensign named in the list of killed. The firing was at an end in an instant, and we soon found in our possession 40 prisoners, with their arms, equipments, &c.

[Here follows a list of killed, four in number, and one wounded, mortally. Equipments, one stand of colours, two batteaux, 38 guns, &c.]

After searching, in vain, for further military stores, we recrossed the river at the village, and returned to camp by the nearest route, where we arrived at 11, A. M. The batteaux with baggage, &c. arrived a few minutes before us. We had not a man hurt. I cannot close this letter without stating to your excellency, that the officers and soldiers, for their con-

duct on this occasion, deserve the highest encomiums; for so strict was their attention to duty and orders, that we entered the place without being even heard by the Indians' dogs. The prisoners I have just sent off to Plattsburgh, to wait the disposition of your excellency. I am, &c.

G. P. YOUNG, *Major,*  
*Commanding the Troops stationed at F. Mills.*  
*Brig.-Gen. Bloomfield, commanding advanced N. Army.*

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CRUIZE OF THE SQUADRON ON LAKE ONTARIO.

*Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy,*  
Sir, *Sackett's Harbour, 6th November, 1812.*

As I have reason to believe that the Royal George, Prince Regent, and Duke of Gloucester, have gone up the lake with troops to reinforce Fort George: and as I have reason to believe that other troops are waiting at Kingston for their return, destined for the same port; I have determined to proceed with the force I have ready in quest of the enemy. My present intention is, to take a position on the Canada shore, near some small islands, called the "False Ducks," where the enemy are obliged to pass, and where I will wait their return to Kingston. If I should succeed in my enterprize (which I have little doubt of), I shall make an attack upon Kingston, for the purpose of destroying the guns and public stores at that station.

I shall proceed for my station this evening, or to-morrow morning, with the following vessels, to wit: brig Oneida, and schooners Hamilton, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Growler, Julia, and Pert: mounting altogether 40 guns of different calibres, and 430 men, including mariners.

With this force I hope to give a good account of the enemy, although he is more than double our force in guns and men. His consists of the following vessels, as near as I can ascertain, to wit: The ship Royal George, 26 guns, 260 men—ship Earl Moira, 18 guns, 200 men—schooners Prince Regent, 18 guns, 150 men—Duke of Gloucester, 14 guns, 80 men—Taranto, 14 guns, 80 men—Governor Simcoe, 12 guns, 70 men—Seneca, 4 guns, 40 men—making a grand total of 108 guns and 890 men.

The officers and men under my command are extremely anxious to meet the enemy. We cannot command success, but we will endeavour to deserve it.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*The Hon. Paul Hamilton, &c.*

*Letter from Mr. S. T. Anderson, enclosing one from Commodore Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *Sackett's Harbour, 13th Nov. 1812—at night.*

Since the enclosed letter from the commodore was written, the Growler has returned with a prize, and in her captain Brock, brother to the late general of that name, with the baggage of the latter. By the prize we learned, that the Earl of Moria was off the False Ducks, and the commodore has put off in a snow storm in the hope of cutting her off from Kingston.

From information received from captain Brock, there is no question but Kingston is very strongly defended. He expressed surprise to find our vessels had got out of the harbour after having been in it; and says that the regiment to which he belongs is quartered there 500 strong, besides other regulars, and a well appointed militia. The resistance made fully justifies this report. Be assured, sir, that in the action of which the commodore has given you an account, the national honour has been most ably supported.

In great haste, your most obedient servant,

SAML. T. ANDERSON.

*The Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *Sackett's Harbour, 13th Nov. 1812.*

I arrived here last evening in a gale of wind, the pilots having refused to keep the lake. On the 8th I fell in with the Royal George, and chased her into the bay of Quant, where I lost sight of her in the night. In the morning of the 9th we again got sight of her, lying in Kingston channel. We gave chase, and followed her into the harbour of Kingston, where we engaged her and the batteries for one hour and 45 minutes. I had made up my mind to board her, but she was so well protected by the batteries, and the wind blowing directly in, it was deemed imprudent to make the attempt at this time; the pilots also refused to take charge of the vessels.

Under these circumstances, and it being after sun-down, I determined to haul off and renew the attack next morning. We beat up in good order under a heavy fire from the Royal George and batteries to Four-mile-point, where we anchored.

It blew heavy in squalls from the westward during the night, and there was every appearance of a gale of wind. The pilot became alarmed, and I thought it most prudent to get into a place of more safety. I therefore (very reluctantly) deferred renewing the attack upon the ships and forts until a more favourable opportunity.

At 7, A. M., on the 10th, I made the signal to weigh, and we beat out of a very narrow channel under a very heavy press of sail to the open lake. At 10 we fell in with the Governor Simcoe running for Kingston, and chased her into the harbour. She escaped by running over a reef of rocks, under a heavy fire from the Governor Tompkins, the Hamilton, and the Julia, which cut her very much. All her people ran below while under the fire of these vessels. The Hamilton, chased her into nine feet water before she hauled off. We tacked to the southward with an intention of running to our station at the Ducks, but it coming on to blow very heavy, the pilots told me it would be unsafe to keep the lake. I bore up for this place, where I arrived last night.

In our passage through the bay of Quanti, I discovered a schooner at the village of Armingstown, which we took possession of; but finding she would detain us (being then in chase of the Royal George), I ordered lieutenant Macpherson to take out her sails and rigging, and burn her, which he did. We also took the schooner Mary Hall from Niagara, at the mouth of Kingston harbour, and took her with us to our anchorage. The next morning, finding that she could not beat through the channel with us, I ordered the sailing master in the Growler to take her under convoy, and run down past Kingston, anchor on the east end of Long Island, and wait for a wind to come up on the east side. I was also in hopes that the Royal George might be induced to follow for the purpose of retaking our prize, but her commander was too well aware of the consequences to leave his moorings.

We lost in this affair one man killed, and three slightly wounded, with a few shot through our sails. The other vessels lost no men, and received but little injury in their hulls and sails, with the exception of the Pert, whose gun bursted in the early part of the action, and wounded her commander (sailing master Arundel) badly, and a midshipman and three men slightly. Mr. Arundel, who refused to quit the deck although wounded, was knocked overboard in beating up to our anchorage, and I am sorry to say was drowned.

The Royal George must have received very considerable injury in her hull and in men, as the gun vessels, with a long

32-pounder, were seen to strike her almost every shot, and it was observed that she was reinforced with men four different times during the action.

I have great pleasure in saying that the officers and men on board of every vessel behaved with the utmost coolness, and are extremely anxious to meet the enemy on the open lake; and as long as I have the honour to command such officers and such men, I can have no doubt of the result.

I think I can say with great propriety, that we have now the command of the lakes, and that we can transport troops and stores to any part of it without any risk of an attack from the enemy; although the whole of his naval force was not collected at Kingston, yet the force at the different batteries would more than counterbalance the vessels that were absent. It was thought by all the officers in the squadron that the enemy had more than 30 guns mounted at Kingston, and from 1000 to 1500 men. The Royal George, protected by this force, was driven into the inner harbour, under the protection of the musketry, by the Oneida, and four small schooners fitted out as gun boats; the Governor Tompkins not having been able to join in the action until about sundown, owing to the lightness of the winds, and the Pert's gun having burst the second or third shot.

We are replacing all deficiencies, and I shall proceed up the lake the first wind, in the hopes to fall in with the Earl Moira and the Prince Regent; at any rate I shall endeavour to prevent them from forming a junction with the Royal George again this winter. I shall also visit Niagara river if practicable, in order to land some guns and stores that I have taken on board for that purpose. If the enemy are still in possession of Queenstown, I shall try to land them a few miles below. I shall have the honour of writing you more in detail upon this subject on my return, or perhaps before I leave here if the wind continue ahead.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

## CANNONADING BETWEEN FORTS GEORGE AND NIAGARA.

*Official Report to Brigadier-General Smyth, commanding the Army of the Centre.*

Sir,

I beg leave to inform you, that on the morning of the 21st Nov. at six o'clock, a heavy cannonading opened upon this garrison from all the batteries at and in the neighbourhood of Fort George, which lasted without intermission until sundown. They had five detached batteries, two mounting 24-pounders, one mounting a nine, and two mortar batteries, one 10½ the other 5½ inch. The batteries firing hot shot, which set some of our buildings on fire, but from the extraordinary vigilance of the officers and men, particularly major Armistead of the United States corps of engineers, whose indefatigable exertions were extended to all parts of the garrison, the fires were got under without being observed by the enemy.

Our garrison was not as well provided with artillery and ammunition as I could have wished—however, the batteries opened a tremendous fire upon them, in return, with hot shot, admirably well directed.

Several times during the cannonading, the town of Newark was in flames, but was extinguished by their engines—as also the centre building in Fort George. Their mess-house and all the buildings near it were consumed. Capt. M'Keen commanded a twelve-pounder in the S. E. block-house, and distinguished himself by his usual gallantry and skill. Captain Jacks, of the 7th regiment militia artillery, commanded a six-pounder on the north block-house, and, together with a part of his own company, though placed in a situation the most exposed to the fire of the enemy, maintained their position like veterans.

Lieutenant Rees had the command of an eighteen-pounder, on the S. E. battery, which was pointed at the battery *en barbette* mounting a 24-pounder, and also at Fort George; several well directed shots were made from this gun, which proved the skill of its commander. About ten o'clock, lieutenant Rees had his left shoulder bruised by a part of the parapet falling on him—which, though it did not materially injure him, obliged him to retire, and captain Leonard of the 1st regiment United States artillery at that moment arriving, he took the command of this battery for the remainder of the day. Lieutenant Wendel, of the second regiment artillery, had the command of an 18 and four-pounder on the west battery—and Dr. Hooper, of captain Jack's company militia

artillery, had the command of a six-pounder on the mess-house. Of these gentlemen and their commands I cannot speak with too much praise; they distinguished themselves highly, and from their shot, all of which was hot, the town of Newark was repeatedly fired, and one of the enemy's batteries silenced for a time.

An instance of extraordinary bravery in a female (the wife of one Doyle, a private in the United States artillery, made a prisoner at Queenstown) I cannot pass over. During the most tremendous cannonading I have ever seen, she attended the six-pounder on the mess-house with red hot shot, and showed fortitude equal to the maid of Orleans. Lieutenants Gansevoort and Harris of the first regiment United States artillery, had the command of the salt battery at Youngstown mounting an 18 and a four-pounder; these two guns played upon the garrison of Fort George and the buildings near it: from every observation I could make during their fire, I am happy to say they merited my warmest thanks for their skill in the service of these guns. Lieutenant Harris from his four-pounder sunk a schooner, which lay at their wharf; she was one of those taken by the enemy at the mouth of the Genessee river a short time since. He also assisted in burning and destroying the buildings near the wharf. These two officers and their men in the warmest part of the cannonading having fired away all their cartridges, cut up their flannel waistcoats and shirts, and the soldiers their trowsers, to supply their guns.

I cannot say too much in praise of all the officers and soldiers of the artillery immediately under my observation, in this garrison; they merit the thanks and esteem of their country for the defence of it, and I believe it never sustained so sharp and continued a bombardment.

The enemy threw more than two thousand red hot balls into it, and a number of shells amounting to more than 180, only one of which did injury to our men.

Lieutenant-colonel Gray commanded the artillery; the unremitting attention paid to his duty, proves him an officer whose zeal and science do honour to himself and country: to this gentleman I feel much indebted for the manner he acquitted himself.

To the officers of my regiment (particularly captain Milligan) and the soldiers who assisted the artillery, and those employed in extinguishing the fires and carrying off the killed and wounded, I am also much indebted; they merit my warmest thanks. To Dr. West of the garrison, Dr. Hagan



of the 14th regiment United States infantry, and Dr. Craige, of the 22d regiment United States infantry, I offer my thanks. They were employed during the entire day in the most critical duties of their profession.

Our killed and wounded amount to eleven.

*Killed*—Serjeant Jones, first regiment United States artillery; Salisbury, 2d do. do. do.—Privates, Stewart, 22d do. United States infantry; Lewis, first do. United States artillery.

*Wounded*—Officers, lieutenant Thomas, 22d regiment United States infantry—Privates, Boman, 14th do. do. M'Evoy, first do. do. Campbell, first do. do. Welsh, first do. do. Ray, third do. do. Woodsworth, seventh do. militia artillery.

From the number we saw carried off from the enemy's batteries, I presume many more were killed and wounded on their side.

Only two of the above men were killed by the enemy's shot, the rest by the bursting of a 12-pounder in S. E. block-house, and by the sponges of the guns on the north block-house, and at the Salt battery.

GEO. M'FEELEY,

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding Fort Niagara.*

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GENERAL SMYTH'S EXPEDITION.

*Official Letter from General Smyth to Major-General Dearborn, respecting the failure of his projected enterprise against Canada.*

Sir, *Camp, near Buffalo, 8th December, 1812.*

The troops under my command having been ordered to hut themselves for the winter, it becomes my duty to report to you the proceedings had there since I took the command on this frontier.

On or about the 26th of October, I ordered that 20 scows should be prepared for the transportation of the artillery and cavalry, and put the carpenters of the army on that duty.

On the 26th of November ten scows were completed, and by bringing boats from lake Ontario, the number was increased to seventy.

I had issued an address to the men of the state of New York, and perhaps 500 volunteers had arrived at Buffalo. I presumed that the regular troops, and the volunteers under colonels Swift and M'Clure, would furnish 2300 men for duty;

and of general Tannehill's brigade, reporting a total of 1650 as many as 413 had volunteered to cross into Canada. I deemed myself ready to cross "with 3000 men at once," according to your orders.

Preparatory thereto, on the night of the 27th November, I sent over two parties; one under lieutenant-colonel Børstler; the other under captain King, with whom lieutenant Angus of the navy, at the head of a body of seamen, united. The first mentioned party was to capture a guard and destroy a bridge about five miles below Fort Erie; the second party were to take and render useless the cannon of the enemy's batteries and some pieces of light artillery. The first party made some prisoners, but failed to destroy the bridge; the second party, after rendering unserviceable the light artillery, separated by some misapprehension. Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, and a part of the troops returned with all the boats, while captains King, Morgan, Sproul, lieutenant Houston and about 60 men, remained; captain King, notwithstanding, with those under his command, advanced to the enemy's batteries, attacked and took two of them in succession, rendered unserviceable the cannon, and took a number of prisoners. In descending the Niagara some distance, two boats were found, on board of which captain King sent his prisoners, all his officers, and half of his men. His high sense of honour would not allow him to quit the remainder. He was captured with them.

Orders had been given that all the troops in the neighbourhood should march at reveille to the place of embarkation. A part of the detachment sent in the night having returned, and excited apprehensions for the residue; about 350 men under colonel Winder, put off in boats for the opposite shore; a part of this force had landed, when a superior force with a piece of artillery, appeared. A retreat was ordered, and colonel Winder's detachment suffered a loss of 6 killed and 22 wounded, of whom 6 were officers.

The general embarkation commenced as the troops arrived; but this being the first time the troops had embarked, the whole of the scows were occupied by about one-third part of the artillery, while about 800 regular infantry, something upwards of 200 twelve-months' volunteers, and perhaps 200 of those militia who had volunteered their services for a few days occupied all the boats that were ready. The troops thus embarked moved up the stream to Black Rock, without sustaining loss from the enemy's fire. It was now afternoon, and they were ordered to disembark and dine.

The enemy showed a force estimated at 5 or 600 men drawn up in a field at some distance from the river; and had one piece of artillery, said to be a nine-pounder, ready to fire on our troops.

There remained unembarked a part of the artillery, a few cavalry, the volunteers under colonel M'Clure, amounting on that day to 340 men, a detachment from general Tannehill's brigade number unknown and little relied on. There were also sundry crowds who might perhaps have followed the army had it been successful.

Recollecting your instructions "to cross with 3000 men at once;" and to consult some of my principal officers in "all important movements;" I called for the field officers of the regulars and twelve-months' volunteers embarked. Colonel Porter not being found at the moment, captain Gibson was called as the senior officer of artillery.

These questions were put—Is it expedient now to cross over? Is the force we have sufficient to conquer the opposite coast?

The first question was decided in the negative, by colonels Parker, Schuyler, Winder, lieutenant-colonels Bærstler and Coles, and major Campbell. Colonel Swift, of volunteers, alone gave an opinion for then crossing over.

The second question was not decided—Colonel Parker, colonel Schuyler, lieutenant-colonel Coles, and major Campbell, were decidedly of opinion the force was insufficient. Colonel Winder, colonel Swift, lieutenant-colonel Bærstler, and captain Gibson deemed the force sufficient.

I determined to postpone crossing over until more complete preparations would enable me to embark the whole force at once, according to your instructions.

The next day was spent in such preparations; and the troops were ordered to be again at the place of embarkation at eight o'clock on the 30th November. On their arrival they were sent into the adjacent woods, there to build fires, and remain until three o'clock in the morning of the 1st December, when it was intended to put off two hours before daylight, so as to avoid the fire of the enemy's cannon, in passing the position which it was believed they occupied below; to land above Chippewa, assault that place, and, if successful, march through Queenstown for Fort George. The contractor was called on to furnish rations for 2500 men for four days, when it was found he could furnish the pork but not the flour. Sixty barrels were required, and only thirty-five furnished.

The embarkation commenced, but was delayed by circumstances, so as not to be completed until day-light, when it was found that the regular infantry 688 men, the artillery 177, colonel Swift's volunteers amounting to 230, six companies of federal volunteers amounting to 276 men, about 100 militia of colonel Dobbin's regiment, and a few men in a boat with Mr. P. B. Porter, contractor's agent, who was to pilot the enterprise, had embarked; the whole on board without the commissioned officers, being 1500 men, or thereabouts: and it was now two hours later than the time fixed on for setting out. There were some groups of men not yet embarked; they were applied to, requested, and ordered by the brigademajor, to get into the boats; they did not: he estimated their number at 150; it was probably greater.

It then became a question whether it was expedient to invade Canada, in open day-light, with 1500 men, at a point where no reinforcements could be expected for some days. I saw that the number of regular troops was declining rapidly. I knew that on them chiefly I was to depend.

I called together the officers commanding corps of the regular army. Colonel Parker being sick, those present were colonel Porter of the artillery, colonel Schuyler, colonel Winder, and lieutenant-colonel Coles. I put to them this question: Shall we proceed? They unanimously decided that we ought not.

I foresaw that the volunteers who had come out for a few days would disperse. Several of them had, on the evening of the 28th, broken their muskets because they had not seen a battle. I foresaw that the number of regular troops would decrease, the measles affected them generally; the constant use of fresh meat had produced dysenteries; and they were now in tents in the month of December. I informed the officers that the attempt to invade Canada would not be made until the army was reinforced; and directed them to withdraw their troops, and cover them with huts immediately.

The volunteers and neighbouring people were dissatisfied, and it has been in the power of the contractor's agent to excite some clamour against the course pursued. He finds the contract a losing one at this time; and would wish to see the army in Canada, that he might not be bound to supply it.

I am sorry the situation of the force under my command had not been such as to make the propriety of a forward movement obvious to all. Circumstanced as we were, I have thought it my duty to follow the cautious counsels of experience, and not precipitation, to add to the list of our defeats.

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I am sorry the situation of the force under my command had not been such as to make the propriety of a forward movement obvious to all. Circumstanced as we were, I have thought it my duty to follow the cautious counsels of experience, and not precipitation, to add to the list of our defeats.

You will perceive my motives by my letter of the 30th of October, wherein I said, " I would cross in three days, if I had the means. Without them it would be injustice to the nation and myself to attempt it. I must not be defeated."

Allow me to recommend to your attention and that of the secretary at war, captain William King of the 13th infantry, as an officer of the first class. His dauntless bravery, refined mind, high sense of honour, and ambition to distinguish himself, render him a fit subject for promotion, and he is perhaps the best disciplinarian in the army.

I have the honour to be, with perfect respect, sir, your most obedient,

ALEXANDER SMYTH,

*Brigadier-General.*

*Major-General Dearborn.*

*Statement of the number of troops embarked on the morning of the 1st of December, on the Niagara river, under the command of Brigadier-General Smyth.*

*From official returns*—12th and 20th infantry 214; 5th and 13th infantry 271; 14th and 23d infantry 214; artillery 177; colonel M'Clure's volunteers 276.

*By estimate*—Colonel Swift's volunteers 230; two companies of Dobbins' regiment 100; with general Porter 30.—Total 1512.

I certify that the strength of the 12th, 20th, 5th, 13th, 14th and 23d infantry, the artillery, and colonel M'Clure's volunteers embarked, are stated from official returns, and that no other troops than the above were embarked when the enterprise was abandoned.

JAMES BANKHEAD,

*Captain and Brigade-Major.*

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#### INDIAN WARFARE.

The following documents contain all the official intelligence which has appeared respecting the Indian War in 1812.

The first letter contains the account of an expedition from Georgia against the Florida Indians. The others contain the proceedings of various detachments of the North-Western Army, under General Harrison.

*Letter from Colonel Newnan to his Excellency David B. Mitchell, Governor of Georgia.*

Dear Sir, *New-Hope, St. John's, Oct. 19, 1812.*

I have now the honour of transmitting to your excellency an account of the several engagements which have taken

place between the Lotchaway and Alligator Indians, and the detachment of Georgia volunteers under my command. As the object of this expedition, and the views of the persons engaged in it, have been misconstrued, and mis-statements relative to its protraction circulated, I ask the indulgence of your excellency to detail every transaction from its commencement to its termination.

I arrived upon St. John's, in obedience to your orders, about the 15th of August, with the whole of my detachment, consisting (including officers) of about 250 men, and with few on the sick report. I immediately waited on colonel Smith, before Augustine, and received orders dated the 21st of August, to proceed immediately against the hostile Indians within the province of East Florida, and destroy their towns, provisions, and settlements. I then returned to the detachment upon the St. John's, and made every preparation to comply with my orders, by despatching parties to procure horses from the few inhabitants that had not fled from the province, in preparing packs and provisions, and taking every step which I deemed necessary to insure success to the enterprise. In consequence of the sickness of myself and nearly one half of the detachment, the period of our marching was delayed until the 24th of September; and when just upon the eve of departing, an express arrived from colonel Smith, informing me that his provision waggons and the escort was attacked by a body of negroes and Indians, and ordering me to join him immediately with ninety men, and bring all the horses and carriages I could command, for the removal of his baggage, field-pieces, and sick, he having only 70 men fit for duty. I marched to the relief of the colonel with 130 men and 25 horses, and assisted him in removing to the block-house upon Davis's creek. This service delayed for a few days our expedition to the nation; and when the detachment again assembled upon the St. John's, and were about to commence their march, the men had but six or seven days to serve. About this time I received a letter from colonel Smith, advising me to propose to the detachment an extension of their service for 15 or 20 days longer, as the time for which they were engaged was deemed insufficient to accomplish any object of the expedition. This measure I had contemplated, and its sanction by the colonel met with my most hearty approbation; for I was unwilling to proceed to an enemy's country with a single man, who would declare, that, in any event, he would not serve a day longer than the time for which he had originally volunteered. I accordingly assem-



bled the detachment, and after stating the necessity of a tender of further service, proposed that the men should volunteer for three weeks longer; when 84 men, including officers, stepped out and were enrolled, which, with the addition of 23 volunteer militia sent to my aid by colonel Smith, and nine patriots under the command of captain Cone, made my whole force amount to 117. With this small body, provided with four days' provisions and 12 horses, I was determined to proceed to the nation and give those merciless savages at least one battle; and I was emboldened in this determination by the strong expectation of being succoured by a body of cavalry from St. Mary's, and which it has since appeared did assemble at Colerain, but proceeded no farther. On the evening of the 24th of September, we left the St. John's, marching in Indian file, captain Humphrey's company of riflemen in front, captain Fort's company, under the command of lieutenant Fannin, in the centre, and captain Coleman's company, with Cone's detachment, under the command of lieutenant Broadnax, in the rear. A small party marched in front of the main body, and another in the rear; the openness of the country (except in particular places) rendered it unnecessary to employ men upon the right and left. Our encampment of nights (there being three companies) was in the form of a triangle, with the baggage in the centre, the men with their clothes on, lying with their feet pointing outwards, and their firelocks in their arms. In case of an attack, the officers were instructed to bring up their companies upon the right and left of the company fronting the enemy, and attend to the Indian mode of fighting until ordered to charge. In case of meeting the enemy upon our march, Humphrey's company was instructed to file off to the right, Fort's company to advance and form to the front in single rank, and Coleman's company to file off to the left; the whole then to advance in the form of a crescent, and endeavour to encircle the enemy. On the morning of the 4th day of our march, when within six or seven miles of the Lotchaway towns, our advance party discovered a body of Indians marching along the path meeting us, and at the same moment they appeared to have discovered us. As soon as I was informed of it, I lost no time in giving the necessary directions for the companies to advance, and obey the instructions which had been previously given to them, and which appeared exactly suited to the situation in which we found the enemy. As soon as Fort's company (at the head of which I had placed myself) had advanced to its proper ground, I discovered the Indians

falling back and making every preparation for battle, by unslinging their packs, trimming their rifles, and each man taking his place. We continued to advance, taking advantage of the trees in our progress, until we were within 130 yards of the Indians, when many of them fired, and I instantly ordered the charge, which drove them from behind the trees, and caused them to retire with the greatest precipitation; our men all the while firing at them, slew several, and by repeated charges drove them half a mile, when they took shelter in the swamp. It unfortunately happened (I presume through inadvertence), that Humphreys' company in filing to the right took too great a circuit, got a small swamp between them and the enemy, and thereby rendered the victory less decisive than it would have been, had the whole charged together, and before the Indians had dispersed themselves, and extended their force (which they soon did) near half a mile up and down the swamp. The company, however, was of service afterwards in preventing the enemy, after their dispersion, from entering our camp, retaking their baggage and provision (all of which fell into our hands), or falling upon the wounded, that had been sent to the rear. The action, including the skirmishing upon the flanks, lasted two hours and a half, the Indians frequently attempting to outflank us and get in our rear, but were repulsed by the companies extending to the right and left. We had one man killed and nine wounded, two of which have since died of their wounds. The loss of the enemy must have been considerable. I saw seven fall to the ground with my own eyes, among whom was their king, Payne; two of them fell near the swamp, the rest our men had the curiosity to scalp. The rifle company on the right, and Broadnax's on the left, speak of killing several near the swamp, who were borne off by their comrades, it being a principle among the savages to carry off their dead at the risk of their lives. We remained on the battle ground watching the movements of the Indians, who were near the swamp painting themselves, and appeared to be in consultation, all of which indicated an intention to renew the combat. Accordingly, at half an hour before sunset, having obtained a considerable reinforcement of negroes and Indians from their towns, they commenced the most horrid yells imaginable, in imitating the cries and noise of almost every animal of the forest, their chiefs advancing in front in a stooping serpentine manner, and making the most wild and frantic gestures, until they approached within two hundred yards of us, when they halted and commenced

firing. Our men were not to be alarmed by their noise and yells, but, as instructed, remained perfectly still and steady behind logs and trees until the enemy by this forbearance had approached somewhat nearer, when a brisk and well directed fire from our line soon drove them back to their original ground. I would now have ordered the charge, but being under the necessity, from the extension of the enemy's line, of detaching nearly one-half of my force to protect our camp and wounded (the assailing of which is a great object with Indians), I was left to contend with a force three times as numerous as my own. The action lasted until eight o'clock, when the enemy were completely repulsed in every attempt, whether made upon our centre or flanks. We had two men killed and one wounded; the enemy carried off several of their men before it was dark—after which all firing (of course random) was at the spot from whence the flash arose. After fighting and fasting the whole day, we had to work throughout the night, and at day-light had a tolerable breast-work of logs and earth, with port holes, on the ground on which the battle was fought. We were reduced to this necessity, for in despatching captain Whitaker about dark to St. John's for a reinforcement, six more men took the liberty to accompany him, taking with them our best horses: our pilot and surgeon (who was sick) was among the number. The two days succeeding the battle, we neither saw nor heard any thing of the enemy, but on the evening of the third day they commenced firing at our work at a long distance, and renewed it every day for five or six days, but without killing or wounding any of our men.—After killing two or three of them through our port holes, they seldom came within gun-shot. Seven or eight days had now elapsed since our express had left us, hunger was staring us in the face, and we were now reduced to the necessity of eating one of our horses; we had no surgeon to dress the wounded, and apprehensions were entertained that the enemy would receive reinforcements from Augustine or the Makasukie Indians. Expecting relief every hour, I was unwilling to leave our breast-works while we had a horse left to eat, but understood from some of my officers that a certain captain was determined to leave us with his company, and that many of the men, giving up all hopes of relief, talked of deserting in the night rather than perish or fall a sacrifice to the merciless negroes and Indians, whom they were taught to believe would surround us in great numbers in a few days. In this trying situation, when our few remaining horses were shot down by them, and the number of our sick daily in-

creasing, I reluctantly assented to leave our works that night, and directed the litters to be prepared to carry the wounded. About nine o'clock we commenced our distressing march, carrying five wounded men in litters, and supporting two or three more. We had not proceeded more than eight miles, when the men became perfectly exhausted from hunger and fatigue, and were unable to carry the wounded any farther. About two hours after we left our breast-works, 25 horsemen, with provisions, arrived to our relief, on a different road from the one we had taken, but from motives best known to themselves, instead of following us, returned to St. John's, and we were left to encounter new difficulties, two men that I had despatched on the path the horsemen came, by some means or other missing them. We again constructed a place of defence, and I despatched serjeant-major Reese, with one private, to Picolata, to learn what had occasioned the delay of our expected supplies, and told him I should remain where I was until I could hear from him, and endeavour to procure cattle, as we discovered signs of their being near us.

The evil genius of captain —— again prevailed, and I have since learned from captain Cone, that this person instigated not only him, but many of the privates, to urge a departure from our works even in the day-time, when I was convinced that the Indians, knowing our weak situation, would endeavour to ambuscade. This gentleman, if innocent, will have an opportunity of proving himself so before a court martial. With a burning fever on me, and scarcely able to walk, the march was ordered about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I had directed the adjutant, captain Hardin, to march in front, to avoid all places where there could be an ambuscade, and the litters should be distributed among the different companies. Being extremely weak, I marched in the rear with captain —— (who carried my firelock), lieutenant Fannin, and about 15 or 20 privates. We had scarcely marched five miles before the front of the detachment discovered the heads of several Indians on both sides of the path, from among several pine trees that were laid prostrate by the hurricane; the same instant the enemy fired upon our advanced party, and shot down four of them: one, a Spaniard, died on the spot, and two survived a few days; my negro boy was one of them. The moment I heard the firing I ordered the detachment to charge, and the Indians were completely defeated in 15 minutes, many of them dropping their guns, and the whole running off without ever attempting to rally. Four were left dead on the field, and I am convinced, from the constant fire

we kept up, that many more must have been slain, but were hid from our view by the thick and high Palmetto bushes. We lay on the battle ground all night, and started next day at ten o'clock, marched five miles, and again threw up breastworks between two ponds, living upon gophers, alligators, and palmetto stocks, until serjeant-major Reese arrived with provisions, and 14 horses, when we were enabled to proceed to St. John's with all our sick and wounded, where a gunboat, by the direction of colonel Smith, was in waiting for us, which conveyed us to his camp, where we met with every attention that humanity and benevolence could bestow. I cannot refrain from here expressing the high sense I have of the care and anxiety which colonel Smith has manifested for the detachment under my command, and his promptitude in affording every aid in his power, when apprized of our situation. My pen can scarcely do justice to the merits of the brave officers and men under my command, their fortitude under all their privations and distresses never forsaking them. Captain Hamilton (who volunteered as a private, his company having left him at the expiration of their term), lieutenant Fannin, ensign Hamilton, and adjutant Harden, distinguished themselves in a particular manner, being always among the first to charge, and first in pursuit; serjeants Holt and Attaway likewise acted very bravely, and Fort's company in general (being always near me, and under my immediate view) advanced to the charge with the steadiness of veterans. Lieutenant Broadnax showed a great deal of courage and presence of mind, and ensign Mann, who was wounded in the first action, fought well. Captain Cone, who was wounded in the head early in the action, behaved well, and lieutenant Williams did himself great honour in every action, but particularly in the bold and manly stand he made in the night engagement. Serjeant Hawkins and corporal Neil of Coleman's company acted like soldiers, and serjeant-major Reese's activity was only surpassed by his courage; he was every where, and always brave. Captain Humphreys' company acted bravely, particularly lieutenant Reed, serjeant Fields, serjeant Cowan, serjeant Denmark, and many of the privates. I can only speak of captain Humphreys from the report of some of his men, who say he acted well; it so happening he never met my eye during either of the engagements, while the conduct of every other person that I have mentioned (except one or two) came under my personal observation. The number of Indians in the first engagement, from every circumstance that appeared, must have been from

75 to 100. In the second engagement their number (including negroes, who are their best soldiers) was double ours, and in the third engagement there appeared to be 50, which was nearly equal to our force, after deducting the sick and wounded.—From every circumstance I am induced to believe that the number of killed and wounded among the Indians must be at least 50.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

DANIEL NEWNAN.

*His Excellency David B. Mitchell.*

*Letter from Capt. Z. Taylor, commanding Fort Harrison, Indiana Territory, to General Harrison.*

Dear Sir, *Fort Harrison, September 10.*

On Thursday evening the 3d instant, after retreat beating, four guns were heard to fire in the direction where two young men (citizens who resided here) were making hay, about 400 yards distance from the fort. I was immediately impressed with an idea that they were killed by the Indians, as the Miamies or Weas had that day informed me that the prophet's party would soon be here for the purpose of commencing hostilities; and that they had been directed to leave this place, which they were about to do. I did not think it prudent to send out at that late hour of the night to see what had become of them; and their not coming in convinced me that I was right in my conjecture. I waited until 8 o'clock next morning, when I sent out a corporal with a small party to find them, if it could be done without running too much risk of being drawn into an ambuscade. He soon sent back to inform me, that he had found them both killed, and wished to know my further orders; I sent the cart and oxen, had them brought in and buried; they had been each shot with two balls, scalped, and cut in the most shocking manner. Late in the evening of the 4th instant, old Joseph Lenar and between 30 and 40 Indians arrived from the prophet's town, with a white flag; among whom were about 10 women, and the men were composed of chiefs of the different tribes that compose the prophet's party. A Shawanoe man, that spoke good English, informed me that old Lenar intended to speak to me next morning, and try to get something to eat. At retreat beating I examined the men's arms, and found them all in good order, and completed their cartridges to 16 rounds per man. As I had not been able to mount a guard of more than six privates and two

non-commissioned officers, for some time past, and sometimes part of them every other day, from the unhealthiness of the company—I had not conceived my force adequate to the defence of this post should it be vigorously attacked, for some time past. As I had just recovered from a very severe attack of the fever, I was not able to be up much through the night. After tattoo I cautioned the guard to be vigilant, and ordered one of the non-commissioned officers, as the sentinels could not see every part of the garrison, to walk round the inside during the whole night, to prevent the Indians taking any advantage of us, provided they had any intention of attacking us. About 11 o'clock, I was awakened by the firing of one of the sentinels; I sprung up, ran out, and ordered the men to their posts; when my orderly sergeant (who had command of the upper block-house) called out that the Indians had fired the lower block-house (which contained the property of the contractor, which was deposited in the lower part, the upper having been assigned to a corporal and 10 privates, as an alarm post.) The guns had begun to fire pretty smartly from both sides. I directed the buckets to be got ready, and water brought from the well, and the fire extinguished immediately, as it was hardly perceptible at that time; but from debility or some other cause, the men were very slow in executing my orders. The word *fire* appeared to throw the whole of them in confusion; and by the time they had got the water and broken open the door, the fire had unfortunately communicated to a quantity of whiskey (the stock having licked several holes through the lower part of the building, after the salt that was stored there, through which they had introduced the fire without being discovered, as the night was very dark), and in spite of every exertion we could make use of, in less than a moment it ascended to the roof, and baffled every effort we could make to extinguish it. As that block-house adjoined the barracks that make part of the fortifications, most of the men immediately gave themselves up for lost, and I had the greatest difficulty in getting any of my orders executed—and, sir, what from the raging of the fire—the yelling and howling of several hundred Indians—the cries of nine women and children (a part of soldiers' and a part of citizens' wives, who had taken shelter in the fort)—and the desponding of so many of the men, which was worse than all—I can assure you that my feelings were very unpleasant—and indeed there were not more than 10 or 15 men able to do a great deal, the others being either sick or convalescent—and to add to

our other misfortunes, two of the stoutest men in the fort, and that I had every confidence in, jumped the picket, and left us. But my presence of mind did not for a moment forsake me. I saw, by throwing off part of the roof that joined the block-house that was on fire, and keeping the end perfectly wet, the whole row of buildings might be saved, and leave only an entrance of 18 or 20 feet for the Indians to enter after the house was consumed; and that a temporary breast-work might be erected to prevent their even entering there—I convinced the men that this could be accomplished, and it appeared to inspire them with new life, and never did men act with more firmness and desperation. Those that were able (while the others kept up a constant fire from the other block-house and the two bastions) mounted the roofs of the houses, with Dr. Clark at their head (who acted with the greatest firmness and presence of mind the whole time the attack lasted, which was seven hours), under a shower of bullets, and in less than a moment threw off as much of the roof as was necessary. This was done only with the loss of one man killed, and two wounded, and I am in hopes neither of them dangerously—the man that was killed was a little deranged and did not get off the house as soon as directed, or he would not have been hurt—and although the barracks were several times in a blaze, and an immense quantity of fire against them, the men used such exertions that they kept it under, and before day raised a temporary breast-work as high as a man's head, although the Indians continued to pour in a heavy fire of ball and an innumerable quantity of arrows during the whole time the attack lasted, in every part of the parade. I had but one man killed, nor any other wounded inside the fort, and he lost his life by being too anxious—he got into one of the gallies in the bastions, and fired over the pickets, and called out to his comrades that he had killed an Indian, and neglecting to stoop down, in an instant was shot dead. One of the men that jumped the pickets, returned an hour before day, and running up towards the gate, begged for God's sake for it to be opened. I suspected it to be a stratagem of the Indians to get in, as I did not recollect the voice. I directed the men in the bastion, where I happened to be, to shoot him let him be who he would, and one of them fired at him, but fortunately he ran up the other bastion, where they knew his voice, and Dr. Clark directed him to lie down close to the pickets behind an empty barrel that happened to be there, and at day-light I let him in. His arm was broke in a most shocking manner: which



he said was done by the Indians—which I suppose was the cause of his returning. I think it probable he will not recover. The other they caught about 120 yards from the garrison, and cut him all to pieces. After keeping up a constant fire until about 6 o'clock the next morning, which we began to return with some effect after day-light, they removed out of the reach of our guns. A party of them drove up the horses that belonged to the citizens here, and as they could not catch them very readily, shot the whole of them in our sight, as well as a number of hogs. They drove off the whole of the cattle, which amounted to 65 head, as well as the public oxen. I had the vacancy filled up before night (which was made by the burning of the block-house) with a strong row of pickets, which I got by pulling down the guard house. We lost the whole of our provisions, but must make out to live upon green corn until we can get a supply, which I am in hopes will not be long. I believe the whole of the Miamies or Weas were among the prophet's party, as one chief gave his orders in that language, which resembled Stone Eater's voice; and I believe Negro Legs was there likewise. A Frenchman here understands their different languages, and several of the Miamies or Weas, that have been frequently here, were recognized by the Frenchman and soldiers, next morning. The Indians suffered smartly, but were so numerous as to take off all that were shot. They continued with us until the next morning, but made no further attempt on the fort, nor have we seen any thing more of them since. I have delayed informing you of my situation, as I did not like to weaken the garrison, and I looked for some person from Vincennes, and none of my men were acquainted with the woods, and therefore I would either have to take the road or river, which I was fearful was guarded by small parties of Indians that would not dare attack a company of rangers that was on a scout; but being disappointed, I have at length determined to send a couple of men by water, and am in hopes they will arrive safe. I think it would be best to send the provisions under a pretty strong escort, as the Indians may attempt to prevent their coming. If you carry on an expedition against the prophet this fall, you ought to be well provided with every thing, as you may calculate on having every inch of ground disputed between this and there that they can defend with advantage. Wishing, &c. &c.

(Signed)

Z. TAYLOR.

*His Excellency Governor Harrison.*

Dear sir,

*Fort Harrison, September 13, 1812.*

I wrote you on the 12th instant, giving you an account of the attack on this place, as well as my situation, which account I attempted to send by water, but the two men whom I despatched in a canoe after night, found the river so well guarded, that they were obliged to return. The Indians had built a fire on the bank of the river, a short distance below the garrison, which gave them an opportunity of seeing any craft that might attempt to pass, and were waiting with a canoe ready to intercept it. I expect the fort as well as the road to Vincennes, is as well or better watched than the river. But my situation compels me to make one other attempt by land, and my orderly serjeant, with one other man, set out to-night, with strict orders to avoid the road in the day-time, and depend entirely on the woods, although neither of them have ever been to Vincennes by land, nor do they know any thing of the country, but I am in hopes they will reach you in safety. I send them with great reluctance, from their ignorance of the woods. I think it very probable there is a large party of Indians way-laying the road between this and Vincennes, likely about the Narrows, for the purpose of intercepting any party that may be coming to this place, as the cattle they got here will supply them plentifully with provisions for some time to come. Please, &c. &c.

(Signed)

Z. TAYLOR.

*His Excellency Gov. Harrison.*

*Extract of a Letter from General Harrison to Governor Shelby, dated*

*Head Quarters, Fort Wayne, 18th Sept. 1812.*

I arrived here with the troops on Saturday last: the Indians had closely invested the fort for several days, and burnt the United States factory, and many other valuable houses. But three of our people were killed: they (the Indians) raised the siege the day before we reached here, and retreated precipitately.

Not being able to move on towards Detroit immediately, on account of the want of proper supplies, I determined to employ the intermediate time in destroying the towns within two days march of this place. The whole force was accordingly divided, and placed under the command of general Payne and colonel Wells. The former was directed to destroy the Miami towns at the forks of the Wabash; and the latter directed to go against the Potawatamie villages at Elk Hart.

duty can be best and most expeditiously done with mounted men, you will this morning pursue their trail with a part or the whole of your force, and dislodge, kill, and destroy them if in your power. This duty performed, you can take the course directed by general Harrison. The attitude of the enemy requires this change in your destination, and as commanding officer of the left wing of the north-western army, I have deemed it my duty to make it: if you do not return to report, you will send an officer for that purpose.

(Signed)

J. WINCHESTER,

*Brig.-Gen. com. left wing N. W. Army.*

*Gen. Tupper.*

I waited on general Winchester immediately on the receipt of the foregoing order, informing him of my having previously sent out a scout, and the object of it; that the Indians had the evening before been overtaken seven or eight miles from our camp, and their numbers computed at from 20 to 40; that in all probability they had then advanced too far to be overtaken without a long pursuit; that our horses were feeble, and that I wished to preserve as much of their strength as possible for the general object of the expedition; and, that if it was agreeable to him, we would wait the arrival of the scouts, to take such measures as were deemed proper on their return. General Winchester made no objection to this arrangement: at the same time I informed him that we had not three rounds of ammunition to a man, and requested of him to order me a supply.—He replied that he would order his ammunition examined, and would endeavour to furnish me a part of what was required to complete the 12 rounds. My brigade quarter-master attended this day, and returned at evening with the information that no ammunition could be had. Early the following morning I ordered the horses saddled for a march, and repaired to general Winchester's quarters, and requested a supply of 2000 cartridges, being about one-third of the quantity required, without which I could not feel myself justifiable in proceeding on the expedition. In answer he stated to me, that he had but 6000 cartridges not issued, that his men had very few in their boxes, that he had a good supply of powder and balls, but no paper; the latter was in waggons, expected to arrive that or the day following; and then directed me to return to my camp, and make a report of the actual quantity on hand, and he would then inform me whether he would deliver the 2000 cartridges. I hastened back to my camp, and gave the neces-

sary orders for furnishing the returns ; but in a few minutes after, received from general Winchester the following order :

General Tupper, longer delay, consistent with strict military principles, cannot be indulged ; you will therefore proceed immediately on the reconnoitering duty ordered yesterday, with the troops under your command, except colonel Simerall's corps, who shall return immediately to the settlement to recruit their horses, agreeably to general Harrison's orders.

(Signed)

J. WINCHESTER, *Brig.-Gen.*

When colonel Simerall's regiment moved off, a large proportion of major Röper's battalion, from Kentucky, followed, which reduced that battalion (being the whole force now remaining from Kentucky) to less than 80 men. I was indebted to colonel Simerall for all the cartridges he had, excepting two rounds, but as the most of them had been damaged and dried, they did not add one sound round to each man. I was on the point of taking up the line of march to execute general Winchester's orders, when colonel Allen, commanding a regiment of Kentucky troops in general Winchester's camp, came up and informed me he had obtained leave to accompany me to the Rapids in any station I thought proper to place him, from a soldier upwards. I thankfully accepted his services, and caused him to be announced as an aid. Colonel Allen proposed, that as it was general Winchester's wish, the troops should move on the direct route to the Rapids, that none should be taken but such as would go freely. The experiment was made, when about 400 volunteered for the service. Scarcely had those troops moved forward from the ranks when colonel Allen beckoned me aside, and showed me an order which general Winchester had that moment forwarded to him, giving colonel Allen the command of the men ordered to the Rapids. I requested of colonel Allen a copy of the order, which he declined giving. It would be difficult, sir, for me to describe the state of my feelings at this moment. I turned to the troops which had refused to volunteer, and ordered them to cross the Auglaize on the route you directed me to take, as the best calculated to carry your orders into effect. When it was found general Winchester had suspended me in the command, the whole force from Ohio broke off, crossed the Auglaize, and refused to march as directed by general Winchester. Colonel Allen and major Brush returned to general W., who assured them he had mistook the object of colonel Allen's request :

general Winchester then proposed to divide the force, a party to proceed on the direct route from Defiance to the Rapids, the other by Tawa towns, to unite at a certain time, 12 miles above the Rapids—I was unwilling to consent to this measure ; the force united was not half the number you thought necessary to order on the most secret route to effect the object of the expedition ; a division of less than 500 men to meet in an enemy's country, where many circumstances might prevent their junction, was to me a measure I could only consent to by compulsion—this measure was in the end abandoned.

With the then remaining force, I proceeded to this place, where I directed colonel Findley and major Roper to discharge such men only as had continued to do their duty.

Thus, sir, has terminated an expedition, at one time capable of tearing the British flag from the walls at Detroit, wherein our troops might have returned with the pleasing reflection of having rendered their country an essential service.

It is a duty, sir, I owe to the officers of the Kentucky forces, to colonel Findley and the officers of his first battalion, to say, that they were zealous in pressing forward the expedition—while the officers of the second battalion, commanded by major Taylor, with a few exceptions, were shrinking from their duty, and deserting the cause of their country.

The detachment of colonel Simerall's regiment from our force stands prominent among the causes of our failure ; already was there panic in some parts of our camp ; the enemy that had retired at general Winchester's approach, had been greatly magnified. The day succeeding the alarm, general Winchester drew in one wing of his lines, and strengthened his camp with a breast-work—even this circumstance was noticed, and urged as an evidence that he apprehended a force superior to his own. Thus when imaginary obstacles unite with those that are real, to oppose the movement of a force so insubordinate, as that every man's will is his law, little can be expected by the officers but a plentiful harvest of mortification and disgrace.

It cannot be denied that at the time those men refused to march, there was a scarcity of provisions in the camp—not three rations of meat to each soldier who remained, and no bread or flour. But we had found at those towns an abundant supply of good sound corn, together with nearly 30 bushels cured when green, or, tossamanona. Our sufferings with this supply could not have been great in going and returning from the Rapids.

The man whose courage and patriotism expires when his rations are reduced, ought never to place himself between his country and its enemies.

When you shall have examined and considered the whole causes of our failure, should doubts rest on your mind whether some part of it does not attach to my conduct, may I not hope, sir, that you will order a court of inquiry, that I may have an opportunity of meeting an investigation.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

EDWARD W. TUPPER, *Brigadier-General.*  
Gen. Wm. H. Harrison, Com. in Chief of the N. W. Army.

## GENERAL ORDERS.

*Head-Quarters, Miami Rapids, Feb. 17, 1813.*

Certain charges of misconduct having been alleged against brigadier-general Edward W. Tupper, of the first brigade of Ohio militia, now in the service of the United States, as a commanding officer of a mounted force, intended for an expedition down the Miami river; on or about the — day of October, 1812; and an investigation by the proper authority having been demanded by the said brigadier-general Tupper, a court of enquiry, to consist of Brigadier-general Leftwich, of the Virginia militia, president; brigadier-general Crooks, of the Pennsylvania militia, and major Amos Stoddard, of the first regiment United States artillerists, members, is hereby appointed to meet this day, at ten o'clock, A. M., to examine and enquire into the nature of the aforesaid charges; which charges, together with the testimony in support thereof, will be laid before the court by the division judge advocate, John S. Wills, Esq., who will act as recorder; and the court is hereby empowered and required to give its opinion as to the real merits of the case for the information of the commanding general. By order.

NATHL. F. ADAMS, *Dep.-Adj.-Gen.*

## OPINION OF THE COURT.

After mature investigation, it appears to the court, that the following are the injurious reports in circulation against brigadier-general Tupper, viz:—That he refused or neglected to obey the orders of general Winchester, of the 6th and 7th Oct, 1812; and that he omitted to pursue with an organized force, the Indians who shot one of his men on the 6th of the same month.

General Tupper admits, that he did not obey the above orders, and neglected to pursue the Indians, as above stated; and as an excuse or justification of his conduct, relative to said orders, he adduced to the court satisfactory proofs of the following facts, viz:—That most of the ammunition of the soldiery was damaged by long and frequent rains, and rendered unfit for service; that he called for a supply, but was unable to obtain it; that the troops were almost destitute of provisions, and a supply could not be obtained; that the force of the enemy was represented as much superior to their own: all which circumstances combined to create a panic among them, and to induce a considerable portion of them to refuse marching under the aforesaid orders. It also appeared in evidence that general Tupper was, at the same time, acting under the superior orders of general Harrison, of the 4th of the same month.

From the whole view of the evidence in this case, and the peculiar circumstances attending it, the court is decidedly of opinion that the execution of the above order was rendered impracticable on the part of general Tupper, and that too from reasons not within his controul; that he acted wisely in not pursuing the Indians, with an organized force, who shot one of his men, as aforesaid, as a considerable number of his men advanced in pursuit of the Indians in such haste, that they could not be properly organized; and as the character of that transaction afforded sufficient evidence, to a prudent general, that a violent attack was meditated from another quarter; and that therefore, general Tupper stands acquitted, in the opinion of this court, of all censure and blame, and that there is no just foundation for the injurious reports in circulation.

JOEL LEFTWICH, *Esq.* President.

*John S. Wills, Div. Judge Advocate.*

*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Tupper, commanding the Ohio Volunteers in the N. W. Army, to Brigadier-General Harrison, transmitted to the Department of War, dated Sir, Camp near M. Arthur's Block-house, Nov. 16, 1812.*

My letter of the 10th instant informed you of my preparation to march that day to the Rapids, in consequence of the information I obtained of the prisoner, captain Clark. I am sorry to inform you, that I have not succeeded to the extent of my expectations; though I am convinced the movement will prove beneficial to the service.

On the morning of the 10th, about 11 o'clock, we moved

from this camp, with a force consisting of 604 men, exclusive of officers, with one light six-pounder, the soldiers carrying in their knapsacks five days' provision. Owing to the state of the roads, I soon found the field-piece could not be carried forward without retarding our march—I left it at the block-house, 15 miles in advance.

On the evening of the 13th, we reached Carrying river (about 18 miles from the Rapids). I ordered captain Hinkton to proceed that night to examine the situation of the enemy; captain Hinkton met me the next day about five miles from the Rapids, with the information that the enemy still occupied the Rapids, and that the boats and vessels lay a little below. I detained the troops till sun-setting, so as not to fall in with their daily scouts, and proceeded in the evening to the ford, about two and a half miles above the Rapids; I there again halted, while captains Hinkton and Wood proceeded down and examined the exact situation of the encampments of the enemy. At nine o'clock they returned and gave me the necessary information: they were encamped in a body above the Bougron's house; were engaged in dancing, and (as they concluded) drinking. I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to cross the river—to attack the enemy at the dawn of day.

Colonel Stafford, who commanded the second regiment, I ordered to proceed, marching by the left flank in single files; colonel Miller, commanding the third regiment, followed in the same order; major Galloway, who commanded a battalion of the first regiment, I ordered to march thirty paces to the left, so as to act as a reserve, as circumstances might require, the two regiments being sufficient to form a line to enclose the enemy with the river. Every officer had been instructed in his duty, and every soldier ordered to leave the ranks, who felt an unwillingness to pass over, that our situation would admit of no retreat, and that when they had gained the other shore, they had only to choose between victory and death. The soldiers cheerfully took up the line of march. Though I had ordered the fords examined, I had still fears, whether the men could resist the current—they had undergone a fatiguing march, had then to lie on the ground without fires nearly three hours, the wind blowing almost a gale from the north-west. Though the soldiers were shivering with cold, they did not hesitate to attempt the ford. I proceeded over with the first section, instructing them to lock arms to resist the current. A part of the first company passed over



in safety ; but scarcely had they reached the shore, when the cry of " Help, I am drowning," was heard from the companies in the rear. The current was sweeping the men down the Rapids in spite of the exertions of those who were stronger and better able to resist it. The few horses we had were sent in to save the men, and fortunately succeeded ; about ten guns were lost, and, the greater part of the ammunition of the musket men entirely destroyed. I next attempted to bring the men over on horses, but owing to their being weak, many of the horses were swept from their feet and their riders thrown into the current. I soon found that it would not be possible to cross the whole force by day-light ; and some, when over, would not be in a condition to contend with a force of two-thirds their numbers. I was very reluctantly compelled to stop the passing over of the men, and send back such as had crossed ; this occupied us till 3 o'clock in the morning. I immediately ordered the wet arms to be dried, and caused cartridges to be taken from the men who had not been in the river, and distributed to those whose cartridges had been wet.

In the morning, convinced we were unable to get at the enemy, I ordered the spies to endeavour to decoy them over ; they proceeded down and discovered themselves ; about 15 came over, but they were so cautious as not to be drawn within our lines. The spies, however, wounded two of them. After finding they were not coming over with any considerable force, I marched down and showed the heads of our columns opposite their encampment at Bougron's. They appeared in considerable disorder, as the advanced guard opened from the woods. The British, who were in the vessels and boats, immediately cut loose and proceeded down the river. The women were seen running off, on the road leading to Detroit ; the men commenced a fire towards us. The Indians showed a force of between four and five hundred ; every one discharged his piece. They had one piece of artillery which they discharged ; from its report I considered it a four-pounder. After a number of challenges for them to cross over by our men, I ordered the march back to our encampment, having previously observed a number of Indians mounting their horses and taking the direction of the road. When within about one mile of our encampment, some of the soldiers, without permission and contrary to orders, fired upon a gang of hogs from the rear of the right column, and pursued them nearly half a mile ; at the same time, eight or ten men, without my knowledge, left the ranks and entered a field to gather corn—at this moment a body of mounted Indians came upon

them, and killed four men; and then rode violently up to the rear of the right flank and commenced an attack.

I ordered the right column thrown back, and commenced a brisk fire, at the same time advancing upon them, they gave the ground; but in a few minutes rallied, and passing along our van-guard, made a violent charge upon the rear of the left column. This was thrown briskly back, and resisted every attempt they made to break the lines. In 20 minutes they were driven from the field. Conceiving that the attack by this force of mounted men was but to get our troops into disorder, to make room for an attack of their foot, I ordered the right column to move up into marching order, lest that attack should be made on our right flank. This column had scarcely regained their position, when major Beasley, who commanded a battalion on that flank, sent and informed me that the Indians were crossing the river in considerable numbers at the head of that column. I immediately ordered the left column to resume their marching order, and proceeded to the head of the right column, which was nearly up to the ford. I found a number of Indians had crossed on horse-back; some in the middle of the river crossing, and about two hundred still on the opposite bank. I ordered major Bently to advance with his battalion and dislodge them. In this he succeeded in a few minutes; several of them were shot from their horses while crossing the river—I observed them floating down the Rapids at a distance below their horses. The sun at this time was setting.

The Indians which had made the attack upon our rear, crossed at a ford below the rear of our columns. We had but one man touched by a bullet in our lines, and he but slightly; one of our spies was also wounded. A number of Indians were shot from their horses—they, with great dexterity, threw them on again and carried them off the field; from the information of a number of men on whom I can rely, as well as from what I was witness to, from 15 to 20 Indians were carried off, either killed or wounded. Split Log, mounted on an active white horse, led on the several attacks at the commencement—his horse was well trained; he sometimes fired from him, and at other times leaped from him behind a tree. At some of the last attacks another rider was mounted on that horse, when the horse was wounded and taken from the field. Colonel Elliott was along our rear and right column, at about 300 yards distance; he was well known by several persons in our lines. The Indians' horses were very different from such as I have been accustomed to see them riding; they were

high and active—they were also supplied with pistols and holsters. I have reason to believe the whole force of the enemy was very little, if any, inferior to our own; of this I was well convinced from the information of captains Hinkton and Wood, who examined the number of their files before we attempted to cross; but from the advantage we had gained by our approach, and the determined spirit of the soldiers, I felt not the least hesitation in attacking them; and well am I convinced that nothing but the situation of the river prevented our making a complete slaughter of their whole force, and securing the gun-boats and batteaux loading with corn.

The troops under my command had consumed their provisions (some on the evening of the 13th and all on the 14th), and had then a distance of 40 miles to travel back before there was a possibility of supply. I was therefore compelled to abandon a position I felt myself fully able to maintain.

It is a duty, sir, I owe both to the officers and soldiers, to say that they have performed this march through roads, almost impassable, wet and deep; they have marched late and early; have endured wet, cold, and hunger, without a murmur or a complaint. They have at all times cheerfully sought the enemy, and when engaged and commanded to charge them have rushed upon them at full speed.

The enemy had gathered very little of the corn from the fields on this side of the Rapids, and I have reason to believe they took but little off in their boats; what quantity remains on the other shore, I am not able to determine.

The troops encamped this evening 10 miles from this place. I left them this morning, at 10 o'clock; they will arrive in the course of the day to-morrow, when they will have performed a march of one hundred and sixty miles in eight days, one of which was spent in manœuvring and contending with the enemy. I am, very respectfully, &c.

(Signed)

EDWARD W. TUPPER.

*Brig.-Gen. Harrison.*

*Head-Quarters, Franklinton, 19th Nov. 1812.*

GENERAL ORDERS.

The commanding general returns his thanks to brigadier-general Tupper and the corps which lately advanced to the Miami Rapids, for the perseverance, zeal, activity, and bravery with which they conducted themselves on that enterprise. A casual circumstance only, and one which neither the general or his men could controul, prevented them from surprising

and cutting to pieces a detachment of the enemy equal in numbers to their own. The measures of general Tupper appear to have been highly judicious, both in his advance to the enemy, and in resisting their attacks. The general is sorry that any circumstance in an affair which reflects honour on almost the whole of the troops engaged in it, should deserve his censure—such, however, is merited by the small detachment, which, in the face of a positive order from their commander, left their ranks to gather corn, and pursue a drove of hogs. But for this disorderly conduct, general Tupper would have brought back in safety his whole command. The commanding general feels, however, so much more to praise than blame, in the conduct of general Tupper's detachment, that he derives no small satisfaction in exhibiting it as a worthy example of military spirit and enterprise to the rest of his army.

NATHL. F. ADAMS,

*Deputy Adj.-Gen.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Hopkins, to his Excellency Governor Shelby, of Kentucky, dated*

My dear Sir, *Fort Harrison, 6th Oct. 1812.*

The expedition of the mounted riflemen has terminated. The Wabash was re-crossed yesterday, and the whole corps are on their way to Busseron, where the adjutant-general will attend, in order to have them properly mustered and discharged; and where their horses may get forage during the delay necessary for this object.

Yes, sir, this army has returned, without hardly obtaining the sight of an enemy. A simple narrative of facts, as they occurred, will best explain the reasons that have led to this state of things. The army having finished crossing the Wabash on the 14th instant, marched about three miles and encamped. I here requested the attendance of the general and field officers and captains, to whom I imparted the objects of the expedition, and the advantages that might result from a fulfilment of them. The nearest Kickapoo villages were from 80 to 100 miles distant, and the Peoria not more than 160. By breaking up these, or as many as our resources would permit, we would be rendering a service to all the territories. That from their numbers, this tribe was more formidable than any near us; and from their situation and hostility, had it more in their power to do us mischief; of course to chastise and destroy these would be rendering real benefit to our country. It was observed by some officers, that they would meet the next morning, consult together, and re-

port to me their opinion; desiring at the same time to be furnished with the person on whom I had relied for intelligence of the country.

This council was held, and all the intelligence furnished that had been requested, and I had a report highly favourable to the enterprise. This, to me, was more gratifying, as early as our encampment at Vincennes, discontents and murmurings, that portended no wish to proceed further. At Buseron I found an evident increase of discontent, although no army was ever better or more amply supplied with rations and forage than at this place. At Fort Harrison, where we encamped on the 10th, and where we were well supplied with forage, &c. I found on the 12th and 13th many breaking off and returning, without applying to me for a discharge, and, as far as I know, without any notification to their officers: indeed I have every reason to suppose the officers of every grade gave no countenance to such a procedure.

Thinking myself now secure in the confidence of my brother officers and the army, we proceeded on our march early on the 15th, and continued it four days, our course nearly north in the prairie, until we came to an Indian house, where some corn, &c. had been cultivated. The last day of the march to this place, I had been made acquainted with a return of that spirit of discontent, that had, as I had hoped, subsided, and when I had ordered a halt near sun-set (for the first time that day), in a fine piece of grass in the prairie, to aid our horses, I was addresssed in the most rude and dictatorial manner, requiring me immediately to resume my march, or his battalion would break from the army, and return!—This was a major Singleton! I mention him in justice to the other officers of that grade. But from every information I began to fear the army waited for a pretext to return. This was afforded next day by our guides, who had thought they had discerned an Indian village on the side of a grove about ten miles from where we encamped on the fourth night of our march, and turned us about six or eight miles out of our way. An almost universal discontent seemed to prevail, and we took our course in such a direction as we hoped would best atone for the error in the morning. About or after sun-set, we came to a thin grove affording water; here we took up our camp; and about this time arose one of the most violent gusts of wind I ever remember to have seen, not proceeding from clouds. The Indians had set fire to the prairie, which drove on us so furiously, that we were compelled to fire around our camp, to protect ourselves.

This seems to have decided the army to return: I was informed of it in so many ways, that early in the next morning (October 20th), I requested the attendance of the general and field officers, and stated to them my apprehensions, the expectations of our country, the disgrace attending the measure, and the approbation of our own consciences.— Against this I stated the weary situation of our horses, and the want of provisions (which to me seemed only partial, six days having only passed since every part of the army, as was believed, was furnished with 10 days in bacon, beef, or bread stuff), the reasons given for returning; I requested the commandants of each regiment to convene the whole of the officers belonging to it, and to take fully the sense of the army on this measure; report to commandants of brigades, who were requested to report to me in writing; adding that if 500 volunteers would turn out, I would put myself at their head, and proceed in quest of the towns; and the balance of the army might retreat in safety to Fort Harrison. In less than one hour the report was made almost unanimously to return. I then requested that I might dictate the course to be pursued that day only, which I pledged myself should not put them more than six miles out of the way, my object being to cover the reconnoitering parties I wished to send out for the discovery of the Indian towns. About this time the troops being paraded, I put myself in front, took my course, and directed them to follow me; the columns moved off quite a contrary way. I sent captain Taylor and major Lee to apply to the officers leading the columns, to turn them. They were told it was not in their power. The army had taken their course, and would pursue it. Discovering great confusion and disorder in the march, I threw myself in the rear, fearing an attack on those who were there from necessity, and continued in that position all day. Neither the exhausted state of the horses, nor the hunger of the men, retarded this day's march; so swiftly was it prosecuted that it was long before the rear arrived at the encampment. The generals Ray, Ramsay, and Allen, lent all their aid and authority in restoring our march to order, and so far succeeded as to bring on the whole with much less loss than I had feared; indeed I have no reason to think we were either followed or menaced by an enemy. I think we marched at least 80 or 90 miles in the heart of the enemy's country: had he possessed a design to fight us, opportunities in abundance presented. So formidable an appearance in the prairie, and in the country (as I am told) never trod before by hostile

feet, must impress the bordering tribes with a sense of their danger. If it operates beneficially in this way, our labour will not be altogether in vain.

I hope the expense attending this expedition will be found less than usual on such occasions. I have consulted economy in every instance; subject only to real necessity has been the expenditure; the forage has been the heaviest article.

To the officers commanding brigades, many of the field officers, captains, &c. my thanks are due; many of the old Kentucky veterans, whose heads were frosted by time, are entitled to every confidence and praise their country can bestow. To the adjutant, quarter-master-general, and the members of my own family, I feel indebted for ready, able, and manly support, in every instance. Let me here include our friend George Walker, our judge advocate general; who lived with me, took more than a common share of fatigue and toil, and who did all in his power to further the service in the corps of spies and guides, under the direction of major Dubois, and the two companies of Kentucky and Gwatkin, who encamped near me, and were under my immediate orders. I experienced an alertness and attention highly honourable to them; these corps were ready to have gone on to execute any service; the whole amounted to about 120, and deserve honourable mention.

Mr. Barron and Mess. Lucelly and Le Plant, interpreters and guides, deserve well of me; I am certain we were not 20 miles from the Indian village when we were forced to retire, and I have many reasons to prove we were in the right way.

I have myself (superadded to the mortification I felt at thus returning) been in a bad state of health from first to last; and am now so weak as not to be able to keep myself on my horse.

A violent diarrhœa has pursued me ten days past, and reduced me extremely low; I had resolved to continue with the line of march a little, if unable to ride. There are yet many things of which I wish to write; they relate substantially to prospective operations. Soon again shall I have the honour to address your excellency, in the mean time be assured of the perfect consideration and high regards of your obedient friend and servant,

SAMUEL HOPKINS.

*Governor Shelby.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Samuel Hopkins, to his  
Excellency Governor Shelby.*

*On Wabash, near the mouth of Pine Creek,*

My dear Sir,

*November 26, 1812.*

By colonel Richard Taylor, quarter-master-general, who goes on as quick as possible to Frankfort, I have it in my power to give you general information of the movements of the army since my last.

On the 11th the army marched from Fort Harrison, on the road formerly made by governor Harrison's army, and the boats set out at the same time. The length of time the enemy had expected us, made it necessary to guard ourselves in an especial manner. The rise of the waters, from the heavy fall of rain preceding our march, and some large creeks, left us no doubt of considerable difficulty and embarrassment; insomuch that not until the 14th did we pass Sugar creek, three miles above the road.

From every information, I had no hesitation in moving on the east side of the Wabash. The Vermillions, Pine creek, and other impediments on the west side, superadded to the presumption that we were expected, and might more easily be annoyed and ambuscaded on that route, determined me in this measure. The boats too, with our provisions of rations, forage, and military stores, could be more easily covered and protected, as the line of march could be invariably nearer the river. Lieutenant-colonel Barbour, with one battalion of his regiment, had command of the seven boats, and encamped with us on the bank of the river almost every night. This so protracted our march that we did not reach the Prophet's town until the 19th. On the morning of this day I detached 300 men to surprise the Winebago town lying on Ponce Passu creek, one mile from the Wabash and four below the Prophet's.—This party, commanded by general Butler, surrounded the place about break of day, but found it evacuated. There were in the main town about 40 houses, many of them from 30 to 50 feet in length, besides many temporary huts in the surrounding prairie, in which they had cultivated a good deal of corn. On the 20th, 21st, and 22d, we were embarked in the complete destruction of the Prophet's town, which had about 40 cabins and huts; and the large Kickapoo village adjoining below it on the west side of the river, consisting of about 160 cabins and huts; finding and destroying their corn, reconnoitring the circumjacent country, and constructing works for the defence of our boats and army. Seven miles east of us, on the Ponce Passu creek, a party of



Indians were discovered; they had fired on a small party of ours on the 21st, and killed a man by the name of Dunn, a gallant soldier in captain Duval's company. On the 22d upwards of 60 horsemen, under the command of lieutenant-colonels Miller and Wilcox, anxious to bury their comrade, as well as gain a more complete knowledge of the ground, went on to a point near the Indian encampment, fell into an ambuscade, and 18 of our party killed, wounded, and missing. Among these are three hopeful young officers, and one private from the 8th (Wilcox's) regiment, Mars, Edwards, Murray, and the private Webb, presumed to be killed; the other 14 were of the rangers. On the return of this party, and the information of a large assemblage of the enemy, who, encouraged by the strength of their camp, appeared to be waiting for us, every preparation was made to march early, and engage the enemy at every risk; when, from the most violent storm and fall of snow, attended with the coldest weather I ever saw or felt at this season of the year, and which did not subside until the evening of the 23d, we were delayed until the 24th. Upon arriving on the ground, we found the enemy had deserted their camp before the fall of the snow, and passed the Ponce Passu. I have no doubt but their ground was the strongest I have ever seen—the deep rapid creek spoken of was in their rear, running in a semi-circle, and fronted by a bluff 100 feet high, almost perpendicular, and only to be penetrated by three steep ravines. If the enemy would not defend themselves here, it was evident they did not intend fighting at all. After reconnoitring sufficiently, we returned to camp, and found the ice so accumulated as to alarm us for the return of the boats. I had fully intended to have spent one more week in endeavouring to find the Indian camps; but the shoeless, shirtless state of the troops, now clad in the remnants of the summer dress; a river full of ice; the hills covered with snow; a rigid climate, and no certain point to which we could further direct our operations; under the influence of the advice of every staff and field officer, orders were given and measures pursued for our return on the 25th.

We are now progressing to Fort Harrison, through ice and snow, where we expect to arrive on the last day of this month. From Vincennes I shall have the honour of addressing your excellency again; but before I close this, I cannot forbear expressing the merits of the officers and soldiers of this command. After leaving at Fort Harrison all unfit for duty, we had in privates of every corps about 1000

—in the total 1250, or thereabouts. At the Prophet's town, upwards of 100 of these were on the sick report. Yes, sir, we have progressed in such order as to menace our enemy, free from any annoyance; seven large keel-boats have been covered and protected to a point heretofore unknown in Indian expeditions; three large Indian establishments have been burnt and destroyed, with nearly three miles of fence, (and all the corn, &c. we could find) besides many smaller ones; the enemy have been sought in their strong holds, and every opportunity afforded them to attack or alarm us; a march on the east side of the Wabash, without road or cognizance of the country, fully 100 miles perfected; and this has been done with a naked army of infantry, aided by only about 50 rangers and spies. All this was done in 20 days—no sigh, no murmur, no complaint.

I certainly feel particular obligations to my friends general Butler, and colonel Taylor, for their effectual and ready aid in their line; as also to captain Z. Taylor, of the seventh United States regiment; Messrs. Gist and Richeson, my aids-de-camp, and major J. C. Breckenridge, my secretary, for a prompt and effectual support in every instance. The firm and almost unparalleled defence of Fort Harrison, by captain Z. Taylor, has raised for him a fabric of character not to be effaced by my eulogy. To colonel Barbour, for his officer-like management, in conducting and commanding the boats, my thanks are due, as also to colonels Miller and Wilcox, and to major Hughes and Shacklet, and to the captains and subalterns of the army generally. From lieutenants Richeson, Hawkins, and Sullivan, of the United States troops, I have to acknowledge my obligations for their steady and uniform conduct, as well as captain Beckers, of the rangers, captain Washburn, of the spies, and the staff generally.

Let me refer your excellency to colonel Taylor for more minute information; and believe me, with high regard and consideration, to be, your most obedient servant,

SAMUEL HOPKINS.

*Copy of a Letter from Colonel Russell, commanding a Detachment of the United States Rangers, to the Secretary at War, dated*  
*Camp Russell, 31st Oct. 1812.*

Sir, this will inform you that I arrived at this place from Vincennes, after general Hopkins had marched his mounted riflemen up to Fort Harrison. I took with me part of three companies of the United States rangers, where I was joined by governor Edwards with his mounted riflemen. The whole

of our strength only amounted to 360 privates. We penetrated very far in the Indian country, with an expectation of co-operating with general Hopkins, who by appointment was to meet us at the Peoria, on the Illinois river. In this we were sadly disappointed, as we could get no intelligence of his army. This prevented us from doing as much damage to the Indians as otherwise we could have done; as our numbers were too weak to make any delay in that quarter, as this was farther than any troops had hitherto penetrated. We stole a march upon the celebrated Pimertam's town, situated about twenty-one miles above Peoria Lake. This was a well built town, and contained a number of Indians. Between the town and river was a dismal swamp, in which they immediately flew for shelter, returning a few scattered shots. Our men nobly pursued them through the swamp for three miles, up to their waists in mud and water, and killed some of them in the swamp, and also others as they were crossing the Illinois river; the men also pursued them to the opposite bank, and brought back some of their canoes and several dead bodies. The governor states upwards of twenty to be killed of the enemy. This was a flourishing town, with an immense deal of Indian plunder in it, together with a great deal of corn, all of which was committed to the flames. I believe that not less than 80 horses fell into our hands, belonging to the enemy. Several white persons' scalps were also found amongst their plunder. I had the immediate command of the battalion, and the superior command was retained by his excellency the governor. On this expedition we were fortunate; we had four men wounded, none of whom mortally. This tour was performed from this camp and back to the same place in thirteen days.

I have the honour to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

W. RUSSELL,

*Col. 7th and Dist. Commandt.*

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell to General Harrison, dated*

*Camp on Mississinewa, two miles above Silver Heels,*

Dear General,

*December 12, 1812.*

After a fatiguing march of three days and one night from Greenville, I arrived with the detachment under my command at a town on the Mississinewa, thought by the spies to be Silver Heels' town; but proved to be a town settled by a mixture of Delaware and Miami Indians.

About eight o'clock on the morning of the 17th, undis-

covered, a charge was made upon the town, when many fled over the river, others surrendered—those who fled made resistance after crossing, by firing across the river. Thirty-seven prisoners are taken, whom I shall bring in with me, including men, women, and children—seven warriors were killed. After disposing of the prisoners I marched a part of the detachment down the river, and burned three villages without resistance; I then returned and encamped on the ground where stood the first village attacked.

This morning about day-light, or a little before, my camp was attacked by a party of Indians (the number unknown, but supposed to be between two and three hundred), on my right line occupied by major Ball's squadron, who gallantly resisted them for about three quarters of an hour, when the Indians retreated, after being most gallantly charged by captain Trotter at the head of his troop of cavalry. We lost in the first action one killed and one wounded (by accident the last)—in the action of this morning, we have eight killed, and about twenty-five or thirty wounded; not having yet gotten a report, I am unable to state the number exactly. The Indians have lost about forty killed, from the discoveries now made; the spies are out at present ascertaining the number. I have sent to Greenville for a reinforcement, and send you this hasty sketch. A detailed report shall hereafter be made known to you, noticing particularly those companies and individuals, who have distinguished themselves signally.

I anticipate another attack before I reach Greenville, but rest assured, my dear general, they shall be warmly received. I have a detachment composed of the bravest fellows, both officers and soldiers, in the world. Our return will be commenced this morning. Among our killed I have to deplore the loss of the brave captain Pierce—lieutenant Waltz, of captain Markle's troop of cavalry, is also mortally wounded. Their gallant conduct shall be noticed hereafter.

Yours, with the greatest respect and esteem,

(Signed)

JOHN B. CAMPBELL,

*Lieut.-col. 19th regt. U. S. Infantry.*

*Gen. W. H. Harrison, com. N. W. Army.*

## AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE AND DESTRUCTION OF THE JAVA.

*Letter from Commodore Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Frigate Constitution, St. Salvadore, 3d Jan. 1813.*

Sir, I have the honour to inform you, that on the 29th ult. at 2, P. M., in south latitude  $13^{\circ} 6'$ , and west longitude  $38^{\circ}$ , about ten leagues distance from the coast of Brazils, I fell in with and captured his Britannic majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns and upwards of 400 men, commanded by captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer. The action lasted one hour 55 minutes, in which time the enemy was completely dismasted, not having a spar of any kind standing. The loss on board the Constitution was nine killed and 25 wounded. The enemy had 60 killed and 101 wounded certainly (among the latter captain Lambert mortally); but by the enclosed letter written on board this ship (by one of the officers of the Java), and accidentally found, it is evident that the enemy's wounded must have been much greater than as above stated, and who must have died of their wounds previously to their being removed. The letter states 60 killed and 170 wounded.

For further details of the action, I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed extracts from my journal. The Java had, in addition to her own crew, upwards of 100 supernumerary officers and seamen to join the British ships of war in the East Indies; also lieutenant-general Hislop, appointed to the command of Bombay, major Walker and captain Wood of his staff, and captain Marshall, master and commander in the British navy, going to the East Indies to take command of a sloop of war there.

Should I attempt to do justice by representation to the brave and good conduct of all my officers and crew, during the action, I should fail in the attempt; therefore, suffice it to say, that the whole of their conduct was such as to merit my highest encomiums. I beg leave to recommend the officers particularly to the notice of government, as also the unfortunate seamen who were wounded, and the families of those brave men who fell in the action.

The great distance from our own coast, and the perfect wreck we made the enemy's frigate, forbad every idea of attempting to take her to the United States, I had, therefore, no alternative but burning her, which I did on the 31st ult., after receiving all the prisoners and their baggage, which

was very tedious work, only having one boat left (out of eight), and not one left on board the Java.

On blowing up the frigate Java, I proceeded to this place, where I have landed all the prisoners on their parole, to return to England and there remain until regularly exchanged, and not to serve in their professional capacities in any place or in any manner whatever against the United States of America, until their exchange shall be effected.

I have the honour to be, sir, with the greatest respect,  
(Signed) W. BAINBRIDGE.

*List of Military and Naval Officers paroled.*

*Military officers.*—One lieutenant-general, one major, one captain. *Naval officers.*—One post-captain, one master and commander, five lieutenants, three lieutenants of marines, one surgeon, two assisting surgeons, one purser, fifteen midshipmen, one gunner, one boatswain, one master, one carpenter, two captain's clerks, and 323 petty officers, seamen, marines, and boys, exclusive of nine Portuguese seamen, liberated and given up to the governor of St. Salvadore, and three passengers, private characters, whom the commodore did not consider prisoners of war and permitted them to land without restraint. Total paroled, 361.

*Extract from the Journal referred to in the above Letter.*

*Tuesday, Dec. 29, 1812.*

At nine, A. M., discovered two strange sails on the weather bow. At ten, discovered the strange sails to be ships; one of them stood in for the land, and the other stood off shore, in a direction towards us. At 10 45, A. M., we tacked ship to the northward and westward, and stood for the sail standing towards us; at 11, A. M., tacked to the southward and eastward, hauled up the main-sail, and took in the royals. At 30 minutes after 11, made the private signal for the day, which was not answered, and then set the main-sail and royals to draw the strange sail off from the neutral coast, and separate her from the sail in company.

Wednesday, 30th Dec. (nautical time). In latitude  $13^{\circ}$  S. longitude  $38^{\circ}$  W. ten leagues from the coast of Brazil, commences with clear weather and moderate breezes from E. N. E. hoisted our ensign and pendant. At 15 minutes past meridian, the ship hoisted her colours—an English ensign, having a signal flying at main.

At 1 26, P. M., being sufficiently from the land, and find-

ing the ship to be an English frigate, took in the main-sail and royals, tacked ship, and stood for the enemy. At 1 50, P. M., the enemy bore down with the intention of raking us, which we avoided by wearing. At 2, P. M., the enemy being within half a mile of us, and to windward, and having hauled down his colours except the union, the jack at the mizen-mast head, induced me to give orders to the officer of the 3d division to fire a gun ahead of the enemy, to make him show his colours, which being done, brought on a fire from us of the whole broadside, on which the enemy hoisted his colours, and immediately returned our fire. A general action, with round and grape, then commenced; the enemy keeping at a much greater distance than I wished; but could not bring him to a closer action, without exposing ourselves to several rakes. Considerable manœuvres were made by both vessels to rake and avoid being raked. The following minutes were taken during the action:—

“At 2 10, P. M., commenced the action within good grape and canister distance, the enemy to windward, but much farther than I wished.

“At 2 30, our wheel was shot entirely away.

“At 2 40, determined to close with the enemy, notwithstanding his raking. Set the fore and main-sail, and luffed up close to him.

“At 2 50, the enemy’s jib-boom got foul of our mizen rigging.

“At 3, the head of the enemy’s bowsprit and jib-boom shot away by us.

“At 3 5, shot away the enemy’s fore-mast by the board.

“At 3 15, shot away his main-top-mast just above the cap.

“At 3 40, shot away the gaff and spanker-boom.

“At 3 55, shot away his mizen-mast, nearly by the board.

“At 4 5, having silenced the fire of the enemy completely, and his colours in main rigging being down, supposed he had struck; then hauled down the courses to shoot ahead to repair our rigging, which was extremely cut; leaving the enemy a complete wreck: soon after discovered that the enemy’s flag was still flying. Hove to, to repair some of our damage.

“At 20 minutes past 4, the enemy’s main-mast went nearly by the board.

“At 50 minutes past 4, wore ship and stood for the enemy.

“At 25 minutes past 5, got very close to the enemy in a very effectual raking position, athwart his bows, and was at the very instant of raking him, when he most prudently struck

his flag, for, had he suffered the broadside to have raked him, his additional loss must have been extremely great—as he lay an unmanageable wreck upon the water.”

After the enemy had struck, wore ship, and reefed the top-sails—then hoisted out one of the only two remaining boats we had left out of eight, and sent lieutenant Parker, first of the Constitution, to take possession of the enemy, which proved to be his Britannic majesty’s frigate *Java*, rated 38, but carried 49 guns, and manned with upwards of 400 men, commanded by captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer, who was mortally wounded. The action continued, from commencement to the end of the fire, one hour and 55 minutes. The Constitution had 9 killed, and 25 wounded. The enemy had 60 killed, and 101 certainly wounded; but by a letter written on board the Constitution by one of the officers of the *Java*, and accidentally found, it is evident the enemy’s wounded must have been considerably greater than as above stated, and who must have died of their wounds previously to being removed. The letter states 60 killed, and 170 wounded. The *Java* had her own complement of men complete, and upwards of 100 supernumeraries, going to join the British ships of war in the East Indies; also several officers, passengers, going out on promotion. The force of the enemy in number of men at the commencement of the action is no doubt considerably greater than we have been able to ascertain—which is upwards of 400 men. The officers were extremely cautious in discovering the number. By her quarter bill, she had one man more stationed to each gun than we had.

The Constitution was very much cut in her sails and rigging, and many of her spars injured.

At 7, P. M., the boat returned with lieutenant Chads, the first lieutenant of the enemy’s frigate, and lieutenant-general Hislop (appointed governor of Bombay), major Walker, and captain Hood.

Captain Lambert was too dangerously wounded to be removed immediately. The cutter returned on board the prize for the prisoners, and brought captain Marshall, master and commander, of the British navy, who was passenger on board, also several other naval officers.

The *Java* was an important ship, fitted out in the completest manner to carry lieutenant-general Hislop and staff to Bombay.



*Admiralty Office, London, April 20.*

*Letters of which the following are Copies and Extracts, have been transmitted to the Office by Lieutenant Chads, late 1st Lieutenant of His Majesty's Ship Java.*

*United States' Frigate Constitution,*

Sir,

*off St. Salvadore, Dec. 31, 1812.*

It is with deep regret that I write you, that his majesty's ship Java is no more, after sustaining an action on the 29th instant, for several hours, with the American frigate Constitution, which resulted in the capture and ultimate destruction of his majesty's ship. Captain Lambert being dangerously wounded in the height of the action, the melancholy task of writing the detail devolves on me.

On the 29th instant, at 8, A. M., off St. Salvadore (coast of Brazil), the wind at N. E. we perceived a strange sail: made all sail in chase, soon made her out to be a large frigate; at noon prepared for action, the chase not answering our private signals, and tacking towards us under easy sail; when about four miles distant she made a signal, and immediately tacked and made all sail upon the wind. We soon found we had the advantage of her in sailing; and came up with her fast, when she hoisted American colours; she bore about three points on our lee-bow. At 50 minutes past 1, P. M., the enemy shortened sail, upon which we bore down upon her; at 10 minutes past 2, when about half a mile distant, she opened her fire by giving us her larboard broadside, which was not returned until we were close on her weather bow. Both ships now manœuvred to obtain advantageous positions, our opponent evidently avoiding close action, and firing high to disable our masts, in which she succeeded too well, having shot away the head of our bowsprit, with the jib-boom, and our running rigging so much cut as to prevent our reaching the weather gauge.

At five minutes past 3, finding the enemy's raking fire extremely heavy, captain Lambert ordered the ship to be laid on board, in which we should have succeeded had not our fore-mast been shot away at this moment, the remains of our bowsprit passing over his taffrail; shortly after this the main-top-mast went, leaving the ship totally unmanageable, with most of our starboard guns rendered useless from the wreck lying over them.

At half past three our gallant captain received a dangerous wound in the breast, and was carried below; from this time we could not fire more than two or three guns until a quarter past 4, when our mizen-mast was shot away; then fell

off a little, and brought many of our starboard guns to bear; the enemy's rigging was so much cut that he could not avoid shooting a-head, which brought us fairly broadside and broadside. Our main-yard now went in the slings; both ships continued engaged in this manner till 35 minutes past 4, we frequently on fire, in consequence of the wreck lying on the side engaged. Our opponent now made sail ahead out of gun shot, where he remained an hour repairing his damages, leaving us an unmanageable wreck, with only the main-mast left, and that tottering. Every exertion was made by us during this interval, to place the ship in a state to renew the action. We succeeded in clearing the wreck of our masts from our guns, a sail was set on the stumps of the foremast and bowsprit, the weather half of the main-yard remaining aloft, the main tack was got forward in the hope of getting the ship before the wind, our helm being still perfect; the effort unfortunately proved ineffectual, from the main-mast falling over the side, from the heavy rolling of the ship, which nearly covered the whole of our starboard guns.

We waited the attack of the enemy, he now standing towards us for that purpose; on his coming nearly within hail of us, and from his manœuvre, perceiving he intended a position ahead, where he could rake us without a possibility of our returning a shot: I then consulted the officers, who agreed with myself, that our having a great part of our crew killed and wounded, our bowsprit and three masts gone, several guns useless, we should not be justified in wasting the lives of more of those remaining, who I hope their lordships and the country will think have bravely defended his majesty's ship; under these circumstances, however reluctantly, at 50 minutes past 5, our colours were lowered from the stump of the mizen-mast, and we were taken possession of a little after 6, by the American frigate *Constitution*, commanded by commodore Bainbridge, who, immediately after ascertaining the state of the ship, resolved on burning her, which we had the satisfaction of seeing done as soon as the wounded men were removed. Annexed I send you a return of the killed and wounded, and it is with pain I perceive it so numerous; also a statement of the comparative force of the two ships, when I hope their lordships will not think the British flag tarnished, although success has not attended us. It would be presumptuous in me to speak of captain Lambert's merits, who, though still in danger from his wound, we still entertain the greatest hopes of his being restored to the service of his country.

It is most gratifying to my feelings to notice the gallantry of every officer, seaman, and marine on board; in justice to the officers, I beg leave to mention them individually. I can never speak too highly of the able exertions of lieutenants Harrington and Buchanan, and also Mr. Robinson, master, who was severely wounded, and lieutenants Mercer and Davis, of the marines, the latter of whom also was severely wounded.—To captain John Marshall, R. N. who was a passenger, I am particularly obliged for his exertions and advice throughout the action. To lieutenant Alpin, who was on the main deck, and lieutenant Saunders, who commanded on the fore-castle, I also return my thanks. I cannot but notice the good conduct of the mates and midshipmen, many of whom are killed, and the greater part wounded. To Mr. T. D. Jones, surgeon, and his assistants, every praise is due for their unwearied assiduity in the care of the wounded. Lieutenant-general Hislop, major Walker, and captain Wood, of his staff, the latter of whom was wounded, were solicitous to assist and remain on the quarter-deck.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my grateful acknowledgments, thus publicly, for the generous treatment captain Lambert and his officers have experienced from our gallant enemy, commodore Bainbridge and his officers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HY. D. CHADS.

**P. S.** The Constitution has also suffered severely both in her rigging and men, having her fore and mizen masts, main top-mast, both main-topsail yards, spanker-boom, gaff, and top-sail mast badly shot, and the greatest part of the standing rigging very much damaged, with 10 men killed, the commander, fifth lieutenant, and 46 men wounded, four of whom are since dead.

*Force of the two Ships.*

*Fava*—28 long 18 pounders—16 carronades, 32 pounders—two long 9 pounders—46 guns. Weight of metal 1034lbs.—Ships' company and supernumeraries, 377.

*Constitution*—22 long 24 pounders—22 carronades, 32 pounders—one carronade, 18 pounder, 55.—Weight of metal 1490lbs.—Crew 480.

[Here follow the lists of the killed and wounded: 22 killed, 102 wounded.]

## CRUIZE OF THE CHESAPEAKE.

*Copies of Letters from Captain Evans, commanding the Frigate Chesapeake, to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Frigate Chesapeake, at Sea,*

Sir,

*January 13, 1813.*

You will receive this by the British ship Volunteer, which we captured this morning on her passage to the Brazils. She is one of a large convoy that sailed from Cork on the 19th ult. for the West Indies and South America; she parted with the West India convoy on the 3d instant, off Madeira, and on the 7th she parted with the Cherub sloop, having under her convoy 11 ships bound to South America and the Pacific ocean.

The ship has on board salt and dry goods, and I have ordered her to the United States, under charge of midshipman Yarnall, who, from his merit, I beg leave to recommend to your attention.

On the first instant, while I was despatching the American brig Julia, by which vessel I had the honour of addressing you, we were chased by two ships. As I am anxious to despatch the Volunteer, so as to proceed to the eastward in quest of the convoy, I beg to refer you for further particulars to an extract from my journal on that day.

“At half past three, P. M., discovered a sail bearing E. S. E.—made all sail in chase—at five came up with the chase—sent a boat on board with lieutenant Page, and found her to be the American brig Julia of Boston, from Lisbon bound to Boston. On examination, lieutenant Page discovered she had two British licenses—brought the captain on board. At half past eight, sent the captain of the brig on board her. At nine, the boat returned, leaving lieutenant Budd on board the brig, with directions to keep near us all night, as I had determined to send a midshipman in her to Boston with the licenses and her papers. Wore to the southward and eastward—at half past seven, A. M., wore ship to the northward and westward, and hove to, and sent for the captain of the brig. At half past eight, two ships were discovered in chase of us, bearing W. S. W. At half past nine discovered them to be ships of war—sent Mr. Blodget and the captain on board the brig to proceed to Boston. On the boat's returning with lieutenant Budd, run her up and wore round, and stood E. by S., under the top-sails, to draw the vessels, in chase of us, more from the brig, and to ascertain more cor-

rectly their force. At ten backed the mizen-top-sail—at half past filled it, and hauled up E. S. E. to get to windward of them. Clewed the sail up. At this time very thick and squally, lost sight of the two ships. At meridian strong gales and squally—the ship under reefed fore-sail and main-top-sail—top-gallant-masts housed, flying jib-boom in, and gaff down. At 2, P. M., it clearing away a little, we wore and stood in the direction we had last seen the ships, but could discover nothing of them.”

From then until to-day we have not seen a vessel of any description.

Respectfully, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,  
SAML. EVANS.  
*The Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *United States Frigate Chesapeake, Jan. 14, 1813.*

We this morning fell in with another of the Brazil convoy, the brig Liverpool Hero, of Liverpool. As she did not appear to be of sufficient consequence to man, I have taken from her the most valuable articles she had on board, and we are now employed in scuttling her.

There is another of them in sight, and I am in hopes we shall have her in the morning.

Respectfully, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,  
SAML. EVANS.  
*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

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#### CAPTURE AND SHIPWRECK OF THE VIXEN.

*Letter from Lieutenant Glen Drayton, late of the United States Brig Vixen, to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *Spanish Town, Jamaica, February 8th, 1813.*

I am extremely sorry, that by the death of captain G. W. Reed (late of the United States brig Vixen), it devolves on me, as senior officer of said vessel, to inform you of her capture and subsequent loss by shipwreck, the particulars of which are as follow:

Being on our return from a cruize of thirty days, without meeting any of the enemy's vessels, having ranged along the West India islands, from as far eastward as Turk's island, on the 22d of November, being in the latitude of 30° 30' N. and longitude 79° W., at 7, A. M., discovered a sail to the northward, the wind being light from the eastward, which we soon discovered to be a large ship, apparently a frigate,

standing for us. We immediately made sail, and hauled our wind to the southward. Finding her gaining on us fast, captain Reed ordered the water to be started; and the wind becoming light, we got out our sweeps, by the means of which we at first hoped to escape. About 1, P. M., the wind freshened and became more steady, when she again overhauled us. Our private signal being made, which was not answered, captain Reed directed the anchors to be cut from the bows, the bow-guns, kedge anchors, shot, and all lumber to be hove overboard, in order to lighten the vessel, slacked up the stays, and started the wedges of the masts, all of which proved ineffectual. We then bore up, in hopes of eluding her until night; but from her superior sailing she soon got within gun shot, when she commenced firing, her shot then passing over us, and there appearing no possible chance of escape, captain Reed called us together, when, conceiving that any resistance against so superior a force would be a wanton and useless sacrifice of a brave crew, we were compelled, after firing two guns, to surrender. She proved to be his majesty's frigate *Southampton*, of 38 guns, sir James Lucas Yeo commander. Captain Reed went on board the frigate and tendered his sword, which was immediately returned him. The officers and men being taken on board the ship, both vessels filled away, steering to the southward and eastward. From the 22d to the 25th, the wind blowing fresh, and sea running high, we could have no communication with the brig, consequently could not get our trunks, &c. from on board. On the night of the 26th, about half past 12, being at meridian in latitude  $24^{\circ} 54'$  N., longitude  $74^{\circ} 30'$  W., the ship struck on a reef of rocks; immediately afterwards, the brig struck on our starboard bow, about a quarter of a mile from us. At 3, A. M., the officer and crew of the brig deserted her, she having bilged. At day-light on the 27th we saw the land astern, which proved to be *Little Windward*, or *Conception* island, where we were fortunate enough to land the crews of both vessels in safety. Our officers and crew, however, were unable to save any thing from the wreck of the brig, she having settled so quickly. Boats were then despatched to *New-Providence* and the neighbouring islands to procure relief. On the 6th December, his majesty's brig *Rhodian*, with two transports, arrived to our assistance, on board of which the two crews were embarked, and sailed on the 9th for this island, where we arrived on the 14th, and were put on parole, the men being put on board the prison-ship at *Port Royal*.

I am extremely sorry, sir, that the much to be lamented death of captain Reed, who died of a fever in this place, on the 5th of January, prevents his recommending his crew (which I know to have been his intention). Their orderly and decorous behaviour during the time of the ship's striking, and afterwards on the island, was such as to induce sir James to assemble them before his own crew, and thank them publicly for their services; and I trust, sir, that though they have been unfortunate, they have not been inactive, and should it please their country to call them out again, they will support the dignity of her naval character, which has so recently and generally been established.

I feel it a duty incumbent on me, sir, to inform you, that there are upwards of four hundred American prisoners now at this place, who I believe would willingly enter the service should a cartel arrive.

To Mr. Satterwhite, purser of the late brig, I have entrusted this, who also has the several indents and vouchers respecting the monies drawn. He has obtained permission to return home from the admiral, being considered a non-combatant. The surgeon and clerk have also applied, and I have no doubt will obtain permission.

Trusting, sir, that upon our arrival in America, and the usual enquiries being made into our conduct, it may meet your approbation,

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

GLEN DRAYTON,

*Lieutenant of the United States' Navy.*

*Hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.*

According to general usage in such cases, a court of enquiry has been held relative to the surrender of the United States' brig *Vixen*, while under the command of master commandant George W. Reed, to his Britannic majesty's frigate *Southampton*. The following is the opinion of the court, approved by the secretary of the navy.

*Opinion.*

The court having heard the statement of lieutenant Drayton, and the other evidence, and maturely considered the same, are unanimously of opinion, that there was no impropriety of conduct on the part of the officers and crew on the occasion of the surrender of the United States' brig of war the *Vixen*, of 14 guns, while under the command of master commandant George W. Reed, Esq. to his Britannic majesty's frigate *Southampton*, rated at 32 guns; and that every

exertion was made and the most proper means adopted, by the commander, officers, and crew, of said brig Vixen, to escape from the said frigate Southampton, after the force and size of said frigate was discovered.

A like enquiry has been held, and the same proceedings had, on the conduct of lieutenant John D. Henley, for the surrender of the United States brig Viper, to his Britannic majesty's frigate Narcissus. The following is the opinion of the court, approved as above, respecting the same.

*Opinion.*

The court having heard the statement and evidence in this case, and maturely considered the circumstances attending the surrender of the United States brig of war the Viper, of 12 guns, while under the command of lieutenant J. D. Henley, Esq. to his Britannic majesty's frigate the Narcissus, rated at 32 guns, under the command of captain Lumby, are unanimously of opinion, that there was no impropriety of conduct on the part of said lieutenant John D. Henley, or the officers and crew of the said brig the Viper, on occasion of said surrender; but that every exertion was made by the said lieutenant John D. Henley, and the officers and crew of the said brig Viper, to preserve her from capture after they discovered the enemy to be a frigate, but from the superior force and sailing of said frigate, all exertions to save the said brig Viper were unavailing.

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CAPTURE AND DESTRUCTION OF THE PEACOCK.

*Letter from Captain Lawrence to the Secretary of the Navy.*  
*United States Ship Hornet, Hobnes' Hole,*  
 Sir, *March 19, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you of the arrival at this port of the United States ship Hornet, under my command, from a cruize of 145 days; and to state to you, that after commodore Bainbridge left the coast of Brazils, January 6th, I continued off the harbour of St. Salvadore, blockading the Bonne Citoyenne, until the 24th, when the Montague, 74, hove in sight and chased me into the harbour; but night coming on, I wore and stood out to the southward. Knowing that she had left Rio Janeiro for the express purpose of relieving the Bonne Citoyenne and the packet (which I had also blockaded for 14 days, and obliged her to send her mail to Rio, in a Portuguese smack), I judged it most prudent to



shift my cruising ground, and hauled by the wind to the eastward, with the view of cruising off Pernambuco, and on the 4th February, captured the English brig *Resolution*, of 10 guns, from Rio Janeiro, bound to Moranham, with coffee, jerked beef, flour, fustic, and butter, and about \$23,000 in specie. As she sailed dull, and I could not spare hands to man her, I took out the money, and set her on fire. I then ran down the coast of Moranham, and cruised there a short time; from thence ran off Surinam. After cruising off that coast from the 15th to the 22d of February, without meeting a vessel, I stood for Demarara, with an intention, should I not be fortunate on that station, to run through the West Indies, on my way to the United States. But on the 24th, in the morning, I discovered a brig to leeward, to which I gave chase—ran into quarter less four, and not having a pilot was obliged to haul off—the fort at the entrance of Demarara river at this time bearing S. W. distant two and a half leagues. Previous to giving up the chase, I discovered a vessel at anchor without the bar, with English colours flying, apparently a brig of war. In beating around Carobana bank, in order to get at her, at half past 3, P. M., I discovered another sail on my weather quarter, edging down for us. At 20 minutes past 4, she hoisted English colours, at which time we discovered her to be a large man of war brig—beat to quarters, and cleared ship for action, and kept close to the wind, in order, if possible, to get the weather gauge. At 10 minutes past 5, finding I could weather the enemy, I hoisted American colours, and tacked. At 25 minutes past 5, in passing each other exchanged broadsides within half pistol shot. Observing the enemy in the act of wearing, I bore up, received his starboard broadside, ran him close on board on the starboard quarter, and kept up such a heavy and well-directed fire, that in less than 15 minutes he surrendered (being literally cut to pieces), and hoisted an ensign, union down, from his fore-rigging, as a signal of distress. Shortly after her mainmast went by the board. Despatched lieutenant Shubrick on board, who soon returned with her first lieutenant, who reported her to be his Britannic majesty's late brig *Peacock*, commanded by captain William Peake, who fell in the latter part of the action—that a number of her crew were killed and wounded, and that she was sinking fast, having then six feet water in her hold. Despatched the boats immediately for the wounded, and brought both vessels to anchor. Such shot holes as could be got at, were then plugged; her guns thrown overboard, and every possible exertion used to

keep her afloat, until the prisoners could be removed, by pumping and bailing, but without effect, as she unfortunately sunk in five and a half fathoms water, carrying down 13 of her crew, and three of my brave fellows, viz. John Hart, Joseph Williams, and Hannibal Boyd.—Lieutenant Conner, midshipman Cooper, and the remainder of my men, employed in removing the prisoners, with difficulty saved themselves, by jumping into a boat that was lying on her booms, as she went down.

Four men, of the 13 mentioned, were so fortunate as to gain the fore-top, and were afterwards taken off by the boats. Previous to her going down, four of her men took to her stern boat, that had been much damaged during the action, who, I sincerely hope, reached the shore in safety; but from the heavy sea running at that time, the shattered state of the boat, and the difficulty of landing on the coast, I am fearful they were lost. I have not been able to ascertain from her officers the exact number killed. Captain Peake and four men were found dead on board. The master, one midshipman, carpenter, and captain's clerk, and 29 seamen were wounded; most of them very severely, three of whom died of their wounds after being removed, and nine drowned. Our loss was trifling in comparison, John Place, killed, Samuel Coulsan, and John Dalrymple, slightly wounded; George Coffin and Lewis Todd, severely burnt by the explosion of a cartridge. Todd survived only a few days. Our rigging and sails were much cut. One shot through the foremast: and the bowsprit slightly injured. Our hull received little or no damage. At the time I brought the Peacock to action, the L'Espiegle (the brig mentioned as being at anchor) mounting 16 two-and-thirty-pound carronades and two long nines, lay about six miles in shore of me, and could plainly see the whole of the action. Apprehensive that she would beat out to the assistance of her consort, such exertions were made by my officers and crew in repairing damages, &c. that by 9 o'clock my boats were stowed away, a new set of sails bent, and the ship completely ready for action. At 2, A. M., got under way, and stood by the wind to the northward and westward, under easy sail.

On mustering next morning, found we had two hundred and seventy-seven souls on board (including the crew of the American brig Hunter, of Portland, taken a few days before by the Peacock). As we had been on two-thirds allowance of provisions for some time, and had but 3400 gallons of water on board, I reduced the allowance to three pints a man,

and determined to make the best of my way to the United States.

The Peacock was deservedly styled one of the finest vessels of her class in the British navy. I should judge her to be about the tonnage of the *Hornet*. Her beam was greater by five inches; but her extreme length not so great by four feet. She mounted sixteen 24-pound carronades, two long nines, one twelve-pound carronade on her top-gallant fore-castle as a shifting gun, and one four or six-pounder, and two swivels mounted aft. I find by her quarter bills, that her crew consisted of 134 men, four of whom were absent in a prize.

The cool and determined conduct of my officers and crew during the action, and their almost unexampled exertions afterwards, entitle them to my warmest acknowledgments, and I beg leave most earnestly to recommend them to the notice of government.

By the indisposition of lieutenant Stewart, I was deprived of the services of an excellent officer. Had he been able to stand the deck, I am confident his exertions would not have been surpassed by any one on board. I should be doing injustice to the merits of lieutenant Shubrick, and acting-lieutenants Conner and Newton, were I not to recommend them particularly to your notice. Lieutenant Shubrick was in the actions with the *Guerriere* and *Java*. Captain Hull and commodore Bainbridge can bear testimony to his coolness and good conduct on both occasions.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

JAMES LAWRENCE.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

P. S. At the commencement of the action, my sailing master and seven men were absent in a prize: and lieutenant Stewart and six men on the sick list. As there is every prospect of the wind being to the eastward, in the morning I shall make the best of my way to New York.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF  
THE CHESAPEAKE.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Budd to the Secretary of the  
Navy, dated*

Sir, *Halifax, June 15, 1813.*

The unfortunate death of captain James Lawrence and lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow, has rendered it my duty to inform you of the capture of the late United States frigate Chesapeake.

On Tuesday, June 1st, at eight, A. M., we unmoored ship, and at meridian got under way from President roads, with a light wind from the southward and westward, and proceeded on a cruize. A ship was then in sight in the offing which had the appearance of a ship of war, and which, from information received from pilot boats and craft, we believed to be the British frigate Shannon. We made sail in chase, and cleared ship for action. At half past four, P. M., she hove to, with her head to the southward and eastward. At five, P. M., took in the royals and top-gallant sails, and at half past five hauled the courses up.

About 15 minutes before 6, P. M., the action commenced within pistol shot. The first broadside did great execution on both sides, damaged our rigging, killed among others Mr. White the sailing master, and wounded captain Lawrence. In about twelve minutes after the commencement of the action, we fell on board of the enemy; and immediately after, one of our arm chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand grenade thrown from the enemy's ship. In a few minutes one of the captain's aids came on the gun-deck to inform me that the boarders were called. I immediately called the boarders away, and proceeded to the spar deck, where I found that the enemy had succeeded in boarding us, and had gained possession of our quarter deck.

I immediately gave orders to haul on board the fore-tack, for the purpose of shooting the ship clear of the other, and then made an attempt to regain the quarter-deck, but was wounded and thrown down on the gun deck. I again made an effort to collect the boarders, but in the mean time the enemy had gained complete possession of the ship. On my being carried down to the cockpit, I there found captain Lawrence and lieutenant Ludlow both mortally wounded; the former had been carried below previously to the ship's being boarded; the latter was wounded in attempting to re-

pel the boarders. Among those who fell in the early part of the action was Mr. Edward J. Ballard, the fourth lieutenant, and lieutenant James Broom of marines.

I herein enclose to you a return of the killed and wounded, by which you will perceive, that every officer upon whom the charge of the ship would devolve was either killed or wounded previously to her capture. The enemy report the loss of Mr. Watt, their first lieutenant; the purser; the captain's clerk, and 23 seamen killed; and captain Broke, a midshipman, and 56 seamen wounded.

The Shannon had, in addition to her full complement, an officer and 16 men belonging to the Belle Poule, and a part of the crew belonging to the Tenedos.

I have the honour to be, with very great respect, &c.

GEORGE BUDD.

*The Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

[Here follow the lists of the killed and wounded; killed 48, wounded 98, of whom 13 are since dead.]

*Admiralty Office, July 10.*

*Copy of a Letter from the Honourable Captain Capel, of His Majesty's Ship La Hogue, to John Wilson Croker, Esq. dated*

Sir,

*Halifax, June 11, 1813.*

It is with the greatest pleasure I transmit you a letter I have just received from captain Broke, of his majesty's ship Shannon, detailing a most brilliant achievement in the capture of the United States frigate Chesapeake, in 15 minutes. Captain Broke relates so fully the particulars of this gallant affair, that I feel it unnecessary to add much to his narrative: but I cannot forbear expressing the pleasure I feel in bearing testimony to the indefatigable exertions and persevering zeal of captain Broke during the time he has been under my orders; placing a firm reliance on the valour of his officers and crew, and a just confidence in his system of discipline, he sought every opportunity of meeting the enemy on fair terms; and I have to rejoice with his country and his friends, at the glorious result of this contest; he gallantly headed his boarders in the assault, and carried all before him. His wounds are severe, but I trust his country will not be long deprived of his services.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THOMAS BLADEN CAPEL,  
*Captain and Senior Officer, Halifax*

Sir,

*Shannon, Halifax, June 6, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you, that being close in with Boston Light House, in his majesty's ship under my command, on the 1st instant, I had the pleasure of seeing that the United States frigate Chesapeake, which we had long been watching, was coming out of the harbour to engage the Shannon. I took a position between capes Ann and Cod, and then hove to for him to join us. The enemy came down in a very handsome manner, having three ensigns flying. When closing with us he sent down his royal yards. I kept the Shannon's up, expecting the breeze would die away. At half past 5, P. M., the enemy hauled up within hail of us on the starboard side, and the battle began, both ships steering full under the top-sails; after exchanging between two and three broadsides, the enemy's ship fell on board of us, her mizen channels locking in with our fore rigging. I went forward to ascertain her position, and observing that the enemy were flinching from their guns, I gave orders to prepare for boarding. Our gallant band appointed to that service, immediately rushed in under their respective officers upon the enemy's decks, driving every thing before them with irresistible fury. The enemy made a desperate but disorderly resistance. The firing continued at all the gangways and between the tops, but in two minutes' time the enemy were driven sword in hand from every post. The American flag was hauled down, and the proud old British Union floated triumphant over it. In another minute they ceased firing from below, and called for quarter. The whole of this service was achieved in 15 minutes from the commencement of the action.

I have to lament the loss of many of my gallant ship-mates, but they fell exulting in their conquest.

My brave first lieutenant Mr. Watt, was slain in the moment of victory, in the act of hoisting the British colours. His death is a severe loss to the service. Mr. Aldham, the purser, who had spiritedly volunteered the charge of a party of small arm men, was killed at his post on the gangway. My faithful old clerk, Mr. Dunn, was shot by his side. Mr. Aldham has left a widow to lament his loss. I request the commander in chief will recommend her to the protection of my lords commissioners of the admiralty. My veteran boatswain, Mr. Stephens, has lost an arm. He fought under Lord Rodney on the 12th of April. I trust his age and services will be duly rewarded.

I am happy to say that Mr. Samwell, a midshipman of

much merit, is the only other officer wounded beside myself, and he not dangerously. Of my gallant seamen and marines we had twenty-three slain and fifty-six wounded. No expressions I can make use of can do justice to the merits of my valiant officers and crew; the calm courage they displayed during the cannonade, and the tremendous precision of their fire could only be equalled by the ardour with which they rushed to the assault. I recommend them all warmly to the protection of the commander in chief. Having received a severe sabre wound at the first onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy who had rallied on their fore-castle, I was only capable of giving command till assured our conquest was complete, and then directing second lieutenant Wallis to take charge of the Shannon, and secure the prisoners. I left the third lieutenant Mr. Falkiner (who headed the main-deck boarders), in charge of the prize. I beg to recommend these officers most strongly to the commander in chief's patronage, for the gallantry they displayed during the action, and the skill and judgment they evinced in the anxious duties which afterwards devolved upon them.

To Mr. Etouch, the acting master, I am much indebted, for the steadiness with which he carried the ship into action. The lieutenants Johns and Law, of the marines, bravely boarded at the head of their respective divisions. It is impossible to particularize every brilliant deed performed by my officers and men; but I must mention, when the ships' yard-arms were locked together, that Mr. Cosnahan, who commanded in our main-top, finding himself screened from the enemy by the foot of the top-sail, laid out at the main-yard arm to fire upon them, and shot three men in that situation. Mr. Smith, who commanded in our fore-top, stormed the enemy's fore-top from the fore-yard-arm, and destroyed all the Americans remaining in it. I particularly beg leave to recommend Mr. Etouch, the acting master, and Messrs. Smith, Leake, Clavering, Raymond, and Littlejohn, mid-shipmen. This latter officer is the son of captain Littlejohn, who was slain in the Berwick. The loss of the enemy was about 70 killed and 100 wounded. Among the former were the four lieutenants, a lieutenant of marines, the master, and many other officers—captain Lawrence is since dead of his wounds.

The enemy came into action with a complement of four hundred and forty men, the Shannon having picked up some re-captured seamen, had three hundred and thirty. The Chesapeake is a fine frigate, and mounts forty-nine guns,

eighteens on her main-deck, two-and-thirties on her quarter-deck and fore-castle. Both ships came out of action in the most beautiful order, their rigging appearing as perfect as if they had only been exchanging a salute.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

P. B. V. BROKE.

*To Captain, the Hon. T. Bladen Capel, &c. Halifax.*

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CAPTURE OF THE FLY.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain Blakely, forwarded by Captain Hull to the Navy Department.*

*United States Brig Enterprize,*

*Portsmouth, N. H. 20th Aug. 1813.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report to you the capture of the British privateer schooner the Fly. She was captured yesterday afternoon off cape Porpoise, after a chase of eight hours.

Very respectfully, &c.

(Signed)

J. BLAKELEY.

*Isaac Hull, Esq. commanding United States Naval Forces on the Eastern Station, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.*

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CAPTURE OF THE DOMINICO.

*Extract of a Letter from Captain John H. Dent, commanding Naval Officer at Charleston, South Carolina, dated*

Sir,

*August 21, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you that the privateer schooner Decatur, of this port, arrived here yesterday, with his Britannic majesty's schooner Dominico, her prize. She was captured on the 5th instant, after a most gallant and desperate action of one hour, and carried by boarding, having all her officers killed or wounded, except one midshipman. The Dominico mounts 15 guns, one a 32-pounder on a pivot, and had a complement of 83 men at the commencement of the action, sixty of whom were killed or wounded. She was one of the best equipped and manned vessels of her class I have ever seen. The Decatur mounts seven guns, and had a complement of 103 men at the commencement of the action, 19 of whom were killed and wounded.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN H. DENT.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*



## CAPTURE OF THE ARGUS.

*Admiralty Office, August 24.**Extract of a Letter from Captain Maples, of his Majesty's Sloop Pelican, to Vice-Admiral Thornborough, and transmitted by the latter Officer to John Wm. Croker, Esq.**His Majesty's Sloop Pelican, St. David's Head, East five Leagues, Aug. 14.*

I have the honour to inform you, that in obedience to your orders to me of the 12th instant, to cruize in St. George's Channel, for the protection of the trade, and to obtain information of the American sloop of war, I had the good fortune to board a brig, the master of which informed me he had seen a vessel, apparently a man of war, steering to the N. E. ; at four this morning I saw a vessel on fire, and a brig standing from her which I soon made out to be a cruiser ; made all sail in chase, and at half past five came alongside of her (she having shortened sail, and made herself clear for an obstinate resistance), when, after giving her three cheers, our action commenced, which was kept up with spirit on both sides 43 minutes, when we laid her alongside, and were in the act of boarding when she struck her colours. She proves to be the United States sloop of war Argus, of 360 tons, 18 twenty-four-pound carronades, and 2 long twelve-pounders ; had on board when she sailed from America (two months since), a complement of 149 men, but in the action 127, commanded by lieutenant commandant W. H. Allen, who, I regret to say, was wounded early in the action, and has since suffered amputation in his left thigh.

No eulogium I could use would do sufficient justice to the merits of my gallant officers and crew (which consisted of 116); the cool courage they displayed, and the precision of their fire, could only be equalled by their zeal to distinguish themselves ; but I must beg leave to call your attention to the conduct of my first lieutenant Thomas Welsh ; of Mr. Granville, acting master ; Mr. William Ingram, the purser, who volunteered his services on deck ; and Mr. Richard Scott, the boatswain.

Our loss, I am happy to say, is small ; one master's mate, Mr. William Young, slain in the moment of victory, while animating, by his courage and example, all around him ; one able seaman, John Kitery ; besides five seamen wounded who are doing well ; that of the enemy I have not yet been able to ascertain, but it is considerable : her officers say, about forty killed and wounded. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

J. F. MAPLES, *Commander.*

## CAPTURE OF THE BOXER.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain Hull to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir,

*Portland, Sept. 7, 1813.*

I had the honour last evening to forward you by express, through the hands of commodore Bainbridge, a letter I received from Samuel Storer, Esq. navy agent at this place, detailing an account of the capture of the British brig Boxer by the United States brig Enterprize.

I have now to inform you that I left Portsmouth this morning, and have this moment arrived, and, as the mail is closing, I have only time to enclose you the report of lieutenant M'Call of the Enterprize, and to assure you that a statement of the situation of the two vessels as to the damage they have received, &c. shall be forwarded as soon as surveys can be made. The Boxer has received much damage in her hull, masts, and sails, indeed it was with difficulty she could be kept afloat to get her in. The Enterprize is only injured in her masts and sails.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC HULL.

*The Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States' Brig Enterprize,*

*Portland, 7th Sept. 1813.*

Sir,

In consequence of the unfortunate death of lieutenant commandant William Burrows, late commander of this vessel, it devolves on me to acquaint you with the result of our cruize. After sailing from Portsmouth on the 1st instant, we steered to the eastward; and on the morning of the 3d, off Wood Island, discovered a schooner, which we chased into this harbour, where we anchored. On the morning of the 4th, weighed anchor and swept out, and continued our course to the eastward. Having received information of several privateers being off Manhagan, we stood for that place; and on the following morning, in the bay near Penguin Point, discovered a brig getting under way, which appeared to be a vessel of war, and to which we immediately gave chase. She fired several guns and stood for us, having four ensigns hoisted. After reconnoitring and discovering her force and the nation to which she belonged, we hauled upon a wind to stand out of the bay, and at three o'clock shortened sail, tacked and run down with an intention to bring her to close action. At twenty minutes after three, P. M. when within half pistol shot, the firing commenced from both, and after

being warmly kept up, and with some manœuvring, the enemy hailed and said they had surrendered about four, P. M. ; their colours being nailed to the masts, could not be hauled down. She proved to be his Britannic majesty's brig Boxer, of 14 guns, Samuel Blythe, Esq. commander, who fell in the early part of the engagement, having received a cannon shot through the body. And I am sorry to add that lieutenant Burrows, who had gallantly led us to action, fell also about the same time by a musket ball, which terminated his existence in eight hours.

The Enterprize suffered much in spars and rigging, and the Boxer both in spars, rigging, and hull, having many shots between wind and water.

It would be doing injustice to the merit of Mr. Tillinghast, second lieutenant, were I not to mention the able assistance I received from him during the remainder of the engagement, by his strict attention to his own division and other departments. And the officers and crew generally, I am happy to add, their cool and determined conduct have my warmest approbation and applause.

As no musterroll that can be fully relied on has come into my possession, I cannot exactly state the number killed on board the Boxer, but from information received from the officers of that vessel, it appears there were between twenty and twenty-five killed, and fourteen wounded. Enclosed is a list of the killed and wounded on board the Enterprize.

I have the honour to be, &c.

EDWARD R. M'CALL,  
*Senior Officer.*

*Isaac Hull, Esq. commanding Naval Officer  
on the Eastern Station.*

[Killed 1, wounded 13, of whom two are since dead.]

*Copy of a Letter from Isaac Hull, Esq. commanding Naval Officer  
on the Station East of Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  
United States Navy Yard,*

Sir,  
*Portsmouth, 14th Sept. 1813.*

I have the honour to forward you by the mail, the flags of the late British brig Boxer, which were nailed to her mast-heads at the time she was captured by the United States brig Enterprize.

Great as the pleasure is that I derive from performing this part of my duty, I need not tell you how different my feelings would have been, could the gallant Burrows have had this honour.

He went into action most gallantly, and the difference of injury done the two vessels proves how nobly he fought.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

ISAAC HULL.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

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CRUIZE OF COMMODORE RODGERS.

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, dated*

*United States Frigate President, Newport,*

Sir,

*Sept. 27th, 1813.*

Your having been informed of my leaving Boston on the 23d of April last, and of my departure from President roads in company with the Congress, on the 30th of the same month, it now only remains for me to make you acquainted with my proceedings since the latter date.

In a few hours after getting to sea, the wind, which had been light from the westward, shifted to the S. E., and obliged me to beat, consequently prevented our getting clear of the bay until the 3d of May, when, in the afternoon, while in chase of a British brig of war, near the shoal of George's Bank, we passed to windward of three sail, two of which, from their appearance and the information previously received, I judged to be the La Hogue 74, and the Nymphé frigate, and the third a merchant brig. After getting clear of George's Bank, the wind veered to the north-eastward, and we continued along east southwardly, in the direction of the southern edge of the Gulf Stream, until the 8th of May, in longitude 60° W., latitude 39° 30' N., when I parted company with the Congress. After parting company I shaped a course, as near as the wind would permit, to intercept the enemy's West India commerce passing to the southward of the Grand Bank. Not meeting with any thing in this direction—except American vessels from Lisbon and Cadiz, I next pursued a route to the northward on a parallel with the eastern edge of the Grand Bank, so as to cross the tracks of his West India, Halifax, Quebec, and St. John's trade. In this route experiencing constant thick fogs for a number of days, and not meeting any thing, after reaching the latitude of 38° N., I steered to the S. E. towards the Azores, off which, in different directions, I continued until the 6th of June, without meeting a single enemy's vessel, or any others, except two Americans.

At this time falling in with an American ship bound to Cadiz, and receiving information that she had, four days before, passed an enemy's convoy from the West Indies, bound to England, I crowded sail to the N. E., and, although disappointed in falling in with the convoy, I nevertheless made four captures, between the 9th and 13th of June.

Being now in the latitude of  $46^{\circ}$  N., and longitude  $28^{\circ}$  W., I determined on going into the North Sea, and accordingly shaped a course that afforded a prospect of falling in with vessels bound to Newfoundland from St. George's Channel, by the way of Cape Clear, as well as others that might pass north about to the northward of Ireland; to my astonishment, however, in all this route I did not meet with a single vessel, until I made the Shetland Islands, and even off there nothing but Danish vessels trading to England under British licenses. At the time I reached the Shetland Islands, a considerable portion of my provisions and water being expended, it became necessary to replenish these, previous to determining what course to pursue next; and I accordingly, for this purpose, put into North Bergen on the 27th of June; but, much to my surprise and disappointment, was not able to obtain any thing but water, there being an unusual scarcity of bread in every part of Norway, and at the time not more in Bergen than a bare sufficiency for its inhabitants for four or five weeks. This being the case, after replenishing my water I departed on the 2d of July, and stretched over towards the Orkney islands, and from thence toward the North Cape, for the purpose of intercepting a convoy of 25 or 30 sail, which it was said would leave Archangel about the middle of July, under the protection of two brigs or two sloops of war; and which was further confirmed by two vessels I captured on the 13th and 18th of the same month. In this object, however, the enemy had the good fortune to disappoint me, by a line of battle ship and a frigate making their appearance off the North Cape on the 19th of July, just as I was in momentary expectation of meeting the convoy; on first discovering the enemy's two ships of war, not being able, owing to the haziness of the weather, to ascertain their character with precision, I stood toward them until, making out what they were, I hauled by the wind on the opposite tack to avoid them; but, owing to faint, variable winds, calms, and entire day-light (the sun in that latitude, at that season, appeared at midnight several degrees above the horizon) they were enabled to continue the chase upwards of 80 hours; during which time owing to different changes of the wind

in their favour, they were brought quite as near to us as was desirable. At the time of meeting with the enemy's two ships, the privateer schooner *Scourge*, of New-York, which I had fallen in with the day before, was in company; but their attention was so much engrossed by the President, that they permitted the *Scourge* to escape, without appearing to take any notice of her.

Being thus disappointed in meeting with the convoy, and a still further portion of my provisions being expended, I determined to proceed to a more westerly station, and accordingly steered to gain the direction of the trade passing out of and into the Irish Channel. In this position, between the 25th of July and 2d of August, I made three captures, when finding that the enemy had a superior force in that vicinity, I found it expedient to change my ground; and after a circuit round Ireland, and getting into the latitude of Cape Clear, steered for the Banks of Newfoundland, near to which I made two more captures, and by the latter one found that the *Bellerophon* 74, and *Hyperion* frigate were on the eastern part of the bank, and only a few miles to the westward of me; I however did not fall in with them. From the eastward edge of the Grand Bank, to which I had beat all the way from the N. W. coast of Ireland (the wind having prevailed, without intermission, from the 1st of August to the middle of September from west), I steered for the United States, without seeing a single vessel of any kind until the 22d of the present month, being near the south shoal of Nantucket I met with a Swedish brig and an American cartel (the Russian ship *Hoffnung*) from London, bound to New-Bedford.

By this time my provisions, and particularly bread, was so nearly consumed, as to make it indispensably necessary that I should put into the first convenient port after gaining the requisite information of the disposition of the enemy's cruizers as would enable me to steer clear of a superior force; and this I was enabled to do in a manner which I shall communicate in another letter. On the 23d instant I captured his Britannic majesty's schooner *High Flyer* (tender to admiral Warren), with which vessel I now have to inform you of my arrival at this port.

Annexed is a list of vessels captured and destroyed, in which were made 271 prisoners. I have now, however, only 55 prisoners on board, having sent to England on parole 78 in the Duke of Montrose; 76 in the Greenland ship *Eliza Swan*, and 62 in the barque *Lion*, of Liverpool.

During my cruize, although I have not had it in my power to add any additional lustre to the character of our little navy, I have nevertheless rendered essential service to my country, I hope, by harrassing the enemy's commerce, and employing to his disadvantage more than a dozen times the force of a single frigate.

My officers and crew have experienced great privations since I left the United States, from being nearly five months at sea, and living the last three months of that time upon a scanty allowance of the roughest fare; and it is with peculiar pleasure I acquaint you that they are all in better health than might be expected, although you may well suppose that their scanty allowance has not been of any advantage to their strength or appearance.

The High Flyer was commanded by lieutenant Hutchinson, second of the St. Domingo. She is a remarkably fine vessel of her class, sails very fast, and would make an excellent light cruizer, provided the government have occasion for a vessel of her description.

Just at the moment of closing my letter, a newspaper has been handed me containing captain Broke's challenge to my late gallant friend captain Lawrence, in which he mentions with considerable emphasis, the pains he had taken to meet the President and Congress with the Shannon and Tenedos.

It is unnecessary at present to take further notice of captain Broke's observations than to say, if that was his disposition, his conduct was so glaringly opposite as to authorise a very contrary belief. Relative to captain Broke, I have only further to say, that I hope he has not been so severely wounded as to make it a sufficient reason to prevent his re-assuming the command of the Shannon at a future day.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

*The Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*List of Vessels captured and destroyed.*

June 9, brig Kitty, of Greenock, Robert Love, master, of two guns and 11 men, from Newfoundland bound to Alicant (Spain), with a cargo of codfish. Ordered her for France.

June 10, packet brig Duke of Montrose, A. G. Blewett, commander, of 12 guns and 34 men, from Falmouth bound to Halifax. Sent her to England as a cartel, with 78 prisoners.

June 11, letter of marque brig Maria, of Port Glasgow (Scotland), John Bald, master, of 14 guns and 55 men, from

Newfoundland bound to Spain, with a cargo of codfish—ordered her for France.

June 12, schooner Falcon, of Guernsey, John Mauger, master, of two guns and 10 men, from Newfoundland bound to Spain, with a cargo of codfish—ordered her for France.

July 12, brig Jane and Ann, of Salt Coats, Robert Caldwell, master, from Cork bound to Archangel, in ballast, took out her crew and sunk her.

July 18, brig Daphne, of Whitby, William Gales, master, of two guns and nine men, from South Shields bound to Archangel, in ballast, took out her crew and sunk her.

July 24, ship Eliza Swan, of Montrose, John Young, master, of eight guns and 48 men, from a Greenland whaling voyage, bound to Montrose with fish blubber—ransomed her for 5000 pounds sterling.

July 29, brig Alert of Peterhead, George Shand, master, from Archangel bound to Oporto (via England), with a cargo of pitch and tar—took out the crew and burnt her.

August 2, barque Lion, of Liverpool, Thomas Hawkins, master, of eight guns and 52 men, from Greenland, whaling voyage, bound to Liverpool, with fish and blubber—ransomed her for 3000 pounds sterling.

August 30, hermaphrodite brig Shannon, of St. Kitts, John Perkins, master, from St. Kitts bound to London, with a cargo of rum, sugar and molasses—ordered her for the United States.

September 9, brig Fly, of Bermuda, James Boyey, master, of six guns and nine men, from Jamaica bound to London, with a cargo of coffee—ordered her for the United States.

September 23, his Britannic majesty's schooner Highflyer, lieutenant George Hutchinson, commander, of five guns, five officers, and 34 men.

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CAPTURE OF THE DART.

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Rodgers, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated*

*United States Frigate President,*

*Pawtuxet, Oct. 7th, 1813.*

Sir,

Enclosed I have the honour of transmitting you a letter this moment received from lieutenant Nicholson, command-



ing the gun boats at Newport, informing me of the capture of the private armed sloop Dart.

With great respect I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN RODGERS.

*The Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Nicholson to Commodore Rodgers.*

Sir,

*Newport, Oct. 5, 1813.*

I have the pleasure to inform you of the capture of the British armed sloop "Dart," by the revenue cutter of this place last evening. She appeared off the harbour before sunset; the captain of the cutter offered his services to go out; I put on board three sailing masters and about 20 men; she immediately made sail and laid aboard the Dart, and carried by boarding: her first officer was killed; two of our own men wounded slightly. The prisoners I send for your disposal.

Very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

JOSEPH NICHOLSON.

*Commodore John Rodgers, U. S. Frigate President.*

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CRUIZE OF THE ESSEX.

*Copies of Letters from Captain David Porter commanding the United States Frigate Essex, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated*

*United States Frigate Essex,*

Sir,

*Pacific Ocean, July 2, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you that on the 29th of April, in the latitude of 40° N. longitude 91° 15' W. about 20 miles to the northward of the island of Albermarle, one of the Gallapagos in the Pacific Ocean, I captured the British ship Montezuma; two others being in sight, close together, distant from us about seven miles, which we were informed were the British letters of marque ships Policy and Georgiana; the first mounting ten guns, six and nine pounders; the other six 18-pounders, four swivels, and six long blunderbusses, mounted on swivels. The wind being light and variable, and confiding greatly in the bravery and enterprise of my officers and men, and apprehensive of their escape, from the prevalence of fogs in that climate, I directed

the boats of this ship to be armed and manned, and divided into two divisions, placing the first under the command of lieutenant Downes, first lieutenant in a whale boat, accompanied by midshipman Farragut. The officers in command of boats under lieutenant Downes were, lieutenant S. D. McKnight, in the third cutter, accompanied by midshipman W. H. Odenheimer, sailing master John P. Cowell, in the jolly boat, accompanied by midshipman H. W. Ogden, and midshipman George Isaacs, in the second cutter. The second division under the command of lieutenant Wilmer, second lieutenant in the pinnace, accompanied by midshipman Henry Gray, and master's mate James Terry; lieutenant Wilson and Mr. Shaw, purser, in the first cutter; and lieutenant Gamble, of the marines, in the gig. Suitable signals were established, and each boat had her particular station pointed out for the attack, and every other previous arrangement was made to prevent confusion. The boats, seven in number, rowed off in admirable order. Guns were fired from the enemy to terrify them; they rowed up under the muzzles of the guns, and took their stations for attacking the first ship, and no sooner was the American flag displayed, by lieutenant Downes, as the signal for boarding, and the intention was discovered by the enemy, than the colours were struck without a shot being fired; so much were they daunted by the intrepidity of our brave officers and men. They then left a crew on board the prize, and took their stations for attacking the other vessel, when her flag was also struck, on the first call to surrender. Thus were two fine British ships each pierced for 20 guns, worth near half a million of dollars, mounting between them 16 guns and manned with 55 men, well supplied with ammunition and small arms, surrendered, without the slightest resistance, to seven small open boats, with 50 men, armed only with muskets, pistols, boarding axes, and cutlasses! Be assured, sir, that Britons have either learned to respect the courage of Americans, or they are not so courageous themselves as they would wish us to believe.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

D. PORTER.

*The Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*United States' Frigate Essex, at Sea,  
Pacific Ocean, July 2d, 1813.*

Sir,

On the 23d March last, I sailed from —, shaping my course to the northward, and on the 26th of the same month

fell in with the Peruvian corsair ship, *Nereyda*, mounting 15 guns; she had, a few days before, captured two American whale ships, the crews of which (amounting in number to 24 men), were then detained prisoners on board her; and they could assign no other motive for the capture, than that they were the allies of Great Britain and as such, should capture all American vessels they could fall in with; therefore to prevent in future such vexatious proceedings, I threw all her armament into the sea, liberated the Americans, and dismissed the *Nereyda*.

I then proceeded with all possible despatch for Lima, to intercept one of the detained vessels, which had parted with the *Nereyda* only three days before, and I was so fortunate as to arrive there and re-capture her on the 5th April, at the moment she was entering the port. This vessel (the ship *Barclay*, captain Gideon Randall of New Bedford), I took under my protection, and have had her with me ever since.

From Lima I proceeded for the Gallapagos island, where I captured the following British ships, viz.

*Letters of Marque.*

*Montezuma*, 270 tons, 21 men, two guns; *Policy*, 275 do., 26 do., 10 do.; *Georgiana*, 280 do., 25 do., 6 do.; *Atlantic*, 354 do., 24 do., 8 do.; *Greenwich*, 338 do., 25 do., 10 do.

The *Georgiana* being reputed a very fast sailer, and apparently well calculated for a cruizer, I mounted 16 guns on her, and gave the command of her to that excellent officer, lieutenant John Downes, with a complement of 42 men, appointing midshipman W. H. Haddaway acting lieutenant on board her, and sent her on a cruize.

Lieutenant Downes joined me at Tumbez, near Guiaquil on the coast of Peru, on the 24th June, after capturing three prizes, to wit:

*Letters of Marque Ships.*

*Hector*, 270 tons, 25 men, 11 guns; *Catharine*, 270 do., 25 do., 8 do.; *Rose*, 220 do., 21 do., 8 do.

The first had two men killed, and six badly wounded in her rencontre with the *Georgiana*—and the *Rose* was discharged (after being deprived of her armament) with all the prisoners captured by the *Georgiana*, as they amounted to nearly double her crew. She was furnished with a passport to proceed to St. Helena.

My own prisoners I liberated on parole at Tumbez. I found by experience that the *Georgiana* did not deserve the character given of her for sailing, I therefore shipped her

officers and crew to the Atlantic, and mounted on her 20 guns, with a complement of 60 men, and appointed midshipman Richard Dashiell acting sailing-master on board her—to this vessel I gave the name of the *Essex Junior*. I also fitted up the ship *Greenwich* as a store ship, and mounted on her 20 guns, placing her under the command of lieutenant Gamble, of the marines. On board her I have put all the provisions and stores of my other prizes, except a supply of three and a half months for each, and have by this means secured myself a full supply of every necessary article for seven months. I had hoped to dispose of my other prizes at Guaiquil; the governors in Peru, however, are excessively alarmed at my appearance on the coast, as my fleet now amounts to nine sail of vessels, all formidable in their appearance, and they would, if they dare, treat us with a hostility little short of declared enemies.

I have given to Mr. J. G. Cowell, sailing master, an appointment to act third lieutenant; midshipman J. S. Cowan, to act fourth lieutenant, and midshipman Odenheimer, as sailing master. I beg, sir, that the appointment of those officers, as well as of lieutenant S. D. McKnight, who is acting second lieutenant, and those serving on board the *Essex Junior*, may be confirmed by the department. Drs. Richard R. Hoffman and Alexander M. Montgomery, two gentlemen of great merit, who volunteered their services with me at the commencement of hostilities, have received acting appointments from me, the first as surgeon, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Dr. Miller; the other as surgeon's mate. To the great care and attention of those gentlemen, may, in a considerable degree, be attributed the extraordinary health of the crew—and as they are both desirous of joining the navy, I hope their appointments may be confirmed.

I have also appointed my marine officer and chaplain to the command of prizes; they all enter with much cheerfulness into their new duties; and if the expedition should not prove successful, it will not be, I am persuaded, owing to our want of activity or vigilance; and of this you must be satisfied, as for the last eight months we have been constantly at sea, with the exception of 23 days, and yet, sir, we have enjoyed extraordinary health and spirits; no symptom of the scurvy having yet appeared in the ship, nor have we, at this moment, more than two on the sick list; and their diseases are more owing to the infirmities of age than any other cause. Indeed, sir, when I compare my present situation with what it was when I doubled Cape Horn, I cannot but esteem my-

self fortunate in an extraordinary degree.—There my ship was shattered with tempestuous weather, and destitute of every thing; my officers and crew half starved, naked, and worn out with fatigue. Now, sir, my ship is in prime order, abundantly supplied with every thing necessary for her. I have a noble ship for a consort of 20 guns, and well manned, a store ship of 20 guns well supplied with the best of every thing that we may want, and prizes which would be worth in England two millions of dollars; and what renders the comparison more pleasing, the enemy has furnished all.—Excuse me, sir, for not making known my present intentions, as this letter may not reach you. It, however, may be satisfactory to you to know how I intend to dispose of my prizes. Let it suffice to say that I shall endeavour to [cypher.]

British letters of marque are numerous in these seas, and, were it not for my arrival, our whale fisheries would have been much harrassed; but they now find it necessary to keep together for mutual protection. I expect to be [cypher], but shall be [cypher.]

Subjoined is a list of deaths since I left the United States; and I beg you will relieve the anxiety of my family, and all our friends, by communicating as much of this letter as you may think proper.

The times of my best men have expired; but their attachment to the ship, and their zeal for the service we are engaged on, prevent all complaints on that account. It is not probable that you will hear of me for several months to come, unless some disaster happens; but I beg leave to assure you, sir, that I shall not be idle; and I hope before my return to make the services of the Essex as important as those of any other single ship. We may not be individually benefited, but we shall do the enemy much injury, which will be a sufficient compensation to us for all the hardships and privations we must naturally experience, while cut off from all communication with the rest of the world, and are dependent on the precarious supplies the enemy may afford.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

D. PORTER.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*List of Deaths since my departure from the United States.*

1812, December 3, Levi Holmes, seaman, palsy.

1813, January 24, Edward Sweeny, O. S. old age.

1813, January 24, Samuel Groce, seaman, contusion of the brain by a fall from the main-yard.

1813, March 1, Lewis Price, marine, consumption.

1813, April 4, James Shafford, gunner's mate, accidental gun-shot—wound of the lungs.

1813, May 25, Dr. Robert Miller, surgeon, disease of the liver.

1813, May 26, Benjamin Greers, quarter-gunner, inflammation of the stomach.

1813, June 20, John Rodgers, quarter-gunner, fall from the main yard.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORTH-WESTERN ARMY.

*Camp at French-town, Jan. 20, 1813.*

*On the River Raisin.*

*Brigadier-General Winchester,*

Sir, in obedience to your order I proceeded on the march with the detachment under my command, to Presque isle, on the 17th instant, where the reinforcement under lieutenant-colonel Allen arrived at 7 o'clock, P. M., on the 18th. As I informed you it was my determination, I set out for the camp of the enemy at this village—from an early start, together with the advantage of a passage on the ice of the lake, and the rapid march we made, we were enabled to meet them by three o'clock in the evening.

When we were within three miles of the enemy, correct information was obtained that they were prepared to receive us. Having arranged the troops in the following order—they were directed to prepare for action, the right wings composed of the companies commanded by captain M'Cracken, subalterns lieutenant Williamson and ensign M'Clary; captain Bledsoe, subalterns ensign Morrison (acting as lieutenant) and ensign Chinn; captain Matson, subalterns ensign Nash (acting as lieutenant) and ensign Cardwell. The left wing composed of the companies commanded by captain Hamilton, subalterns lieutenant Moore and ensign Heron; captain Williams, subalterns lieutenant Higgins and ensign Harrow; captain Kelley, subalterns lieutenant M'Guire and ensign Rash. The centre composed of the companies commanded by captain Hightower, (17th United States regiment) subalterns lieutenant Holder and ensign Butler; captain Collier, subalterns lieutenant Story and ensign Fleet; captain Sebree, subalterns lieutenant Rull and ensign Bowles. Lieutenant-colonel Allen commanding the right wing, major

Graves the left, and major Madison in the centre. Captain Ballard (acting as major) was placed in the advance of the whole, with two companies, one commanded by captain Hickman, subaltern lieutenant Chinn—the other by captain Graves, subaltern lieutenant Comstock, and also captain James with his spies. In this order we proceeded within a quarter of a mile of the enemy, when they commenced a fire on us with a howitzer, from which no injury was received. The line of battle was instantly formed, and the whole detachment ordered to move on the direction of the enemy without delay. The river at this time being between us and the enemy's lines, we succeeded well in crossing it, though the ice in many places was extremely slippery. Having crossed at the instant the long roll beat (the signal for a general charge), when I ordered major Graves and major Madison to possess themselves of the houses and picketing, about which the enemy had collected, and where they had placed their cannon. This order was executed in a few minutes, and both their battalions advanced amidst an incessant shower of bullets; neither the picketing nor the fencing over which they had to pass retarded their progress to success; the enemy were dislodged in that quarter—meantime, colonel Allen fell in with them at a considerable distance to the right, when, after pursuing them to the woods, (a distance of more than a mile) they then made a stand with their howitzer and small arms, covered by a chain of enclosed lots and a groupe of houses; having in their rear a thick brushy wood full of fallen timber. I directed brigade-major Garrard (one of my aids) to instruct majors Graves and Madison to possess themselves of the wood on the left, and to move up towards the main of the enemy as fast as practicable to divert their attention from colonel Allen. As the moment the fire commenced with the battalions, the right wing advanced. The enemy were soon driven from the fences and houses, and our troops began to enter the wood after them. The fight now became close, and extremely hot on the right wing—the enemy concentrating the chief of their forces of both kinds to force the line. They were still kept moving in the retreat, although slowly, our men being much exhausted. My orders to majors Graves and Madison were executed with despatch and success—which, joined with the exertions of colonel Allen's line, completely routed the enemy—the distance they retreated before us was not less than two miles, and every foot of the way under a continual charge—the battle lasted from three o'clock till dark. The detach-

ment was then drawn off in good order, and encamped at the place which the enemy had first occupied, being the best for a camp then near us.

The gallant conduct of lieutenant-colonel Allen during every charge of this warmly contested action, has raised for him no ordinary military merit. Majors Graves and Madison deserve high praise for their undeviating attendance to orders, and the energy and despatch with which they executed them—captain Ballard led the van with great skill and bravery; I take this opportunity of tendering my most hearty thanks to brigade-major Garrard, captain Smith, and adjutant M'Goller, who acted as my aids, for the great support they gave me during the whole of the action. The company officers acted with great bravery. It would be an almost endless task to particularise all who distinguished themselves; for as all had an opportunity so to do, there was none but what accepted it; there was not a solitary instance of a retreat on our part: both officers and soldiers supported the double character of Americans and Kentuckians. I have not been able to ascertain the exact force of the enemy, but from the best information, there was between 80 and 100 British troops, and about 400 Indians. Major Reynolds was present, and it is understood, commanded the whole—the number of their killed and wounded is unknown, we having left the woods after dark, so that not only during the battle, but after night, they had an opportunity of bearing off all, except those left on the field where the action first commenced, say about 15; but from the blood, the trails of bodies dragged off, and the reports from the people who live near this place, the slaughter must have been great. One Indian and two of the Canadian militia were taken prisoners. So steady and composed were our men in the assaults, that while the enemy were killed or driven from the houses, not a woman or child was hurt.

Our loss is, 12 killed, and 55 wounded, one has since died; enclosed is a list of their names, also a list of the public stores taken from the enemy.

I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

WILL. LEWIS,

*Commandant of the Detachment.*



*Copy of a Letter from General William H. Harrison to Governor Meigs, dated*

*Head-Quarters, Carrying River, 24th Jan. 1813.*

Dear sir, the event which I expressed so much apprehension in my letter to you, from Lower Sandusky, has happened. The detachment under colonel Lewis was reinforced by general Winchester with 250 men. He attended it, and took the command at the river Raisin on the 20th, and on the 22d, he was attacked at reveille, by a considerable British and Indian force with six pieces of artillery; the troops being surprised, and the ground unfavourable, had but little opportunity of forming to advantage. They were surrounded and broke in 20 or 25 minutes. A major and captain and about twenty-five privates were all that effected their escape.

I had but 360 men with me, about three miles above the Rapids, where the news first reached me. I immediately ordered them to prepare to march, and set out with my staff to overtake a detachment of 300 men that had set out that morning for the river Raisin. I overtook them at the distance of six miles, but before the other troops (colonel Andrews' Ohio regiment) came up, it was ascertained that the defeat was complete, and it was the unanimous opinion of generals Payne and Perkins, and the field officers, that we should return. A detachment, to the amount of 170 of the most active men, was sent forward with directions to proceed as far as possible to assist those who were fortunate enough to escape: there were, however but few; the snow was so deep that the fugitives were entirely exhausted in running a few miles: those that did get off effected it by turning down to the lake and secreting themselves. I believe there were not more than 40 or 50 that got a mile from the scene of action, and the greater part of them were overtaken.

Never were the affairs of any army in a more prosperous situation than ours before the unfortunate step of marching the detachment to the river Raisin; it was made not only without any authority from me, but in opposition to my views. Every thing in my power was, however, done to prevent any disaster, and reinforcements were pushed on with as much rapidity as possible. Major Cotgrove's battalion, the first in the army, was within fourteen miles of the scene of action, when he heard of the defeat, and 300 regular troops were also on their way. I remained at the Rapids with one regiment only. In justice to general Winchester, I must observe, that I have understood that the measure of marching the de-

tachment to the river Raisin, was forced upon him by his officers, but, whatever may have been the cause, and however great the calamity, both as it regards the nation and individuals, it is certainly not irreparable. By the unanimous advice of the general and field officers, I took this position yesterday, for the purpose of forming a speedy junction with the troops in the rear, and to cover the very valuable convoy of artillery and stores that are coming from Upper Sandusky. Unless the weather is very unfavourable, I shall be at the Rapids again in four or five days, and shall certainly give the enemy an opportunity of measuring their strength with us in another contest. For myself I feel no doubt as to the result, and if I can judge of the disposition of the troops, from the manner in which they received an address from me yesterday, a desire of avenging their lost companions and retrieving their country's disgrace is the predominant passion that occupies their minds.

I know not what proportion the prisoners of general Winchester's late troops bear to the killed; some of the French who have come in report the latter at 500, and others at 800. The detachment amounted to nearly 1000.

I am, with much regard, dear sir, your humble servant,  
WM. H. HARRISON.

*His Excellency Governor Meigs.*

[*The following is an Extract of the Letter alluded to in the commencement of the above Letter of General Harrison. It was dated Lower Sandusky, January 19, 1813.*]

"General Winchester has been at the Rapids since the 10th—he has pushed a detachment to the river Raisin. I have not learned the precise object. I shall set out this morning, and reach his camp this night. I have strong fears that colonels Lewis and Allen may be overpowered."

*Copies of Letters from Brigadier-General Winchester, now a Prisoner of War, to the Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Malden, January 23d, 1813.*

A detachment from the left wing of the north-western army, under my command, at Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, was attacked on the 22d instant, by a force greatly superior in number, aided by several pieces of artillery. The action commenced at the dawn of day; the piquet guards were driven in; and a heavy fire opened on the whole line, by which a part thereof was thrown into disorder; and, being ordered to retire a small distance, in order to form on more

advantageous ground, I found the enemy doubling our left flank with force and rapidity.

A destructive fire was sustained for some time; at length, borne down by numbers, the few of us that remained with the party that retired from the lines, submitted. The remainder of our force, in number about 400, continued to defend themselves with great gallantry, in an unequal contest against small arms and artillery, until I was brought in as a prisoner to that part of the field occupied by the enemy.

At this place, I understood that our troops were defending themselves in a state of desperation, and was informed by the commanding officer of the enemy, that he would afford them an opportunity of surrendering themselves prisoners of war; to which I acceded. I was the more ready to make the surrender from being assured, that unless done quickly the buildings adjacent would be immediately set on fire, and that no responsibility would be taken for the conduct of the savages, who were then assembled in great numbers.

In this critical situation, being desirous to preserve the lives of a number of our brave fellows, who still held out, I sent a flag to them, and agreed with the commanding officer of the enemy, that they should be surrendered prisoners of war, on condition of being protected from the savages, allowed to retain their private property, and having their side arms returned to them. It is impossible for me to ascertain with certainty the loss we have sustained in this action, from the impracticability of knowing the number who have made their escape.

Thirty-five officers, and about four hundred and eighty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates are prisoners of war. Our loss in killed is considerable.

However unfortunate may seem the affair of yesterday, I am flattered by a belief, that no material error is chargeable upon myself, and that still less censure is deserved by the troops I had the honour of commanding.

With the exception of that portion of our force which was thrown into disorder, no troops have ever behaved with more determined intrepidity.

I have the honour to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,

JAMES WINCHESTER,

*Brig.-Gen. U. S. Army.*

*Hon. Secretary at War.*

The Indians have still a few prisoners in their possession, which I have reason to hope will be given up to colonel Proctor at Sandwich.

JAMES WINCHESTER,

*Brig.-Gen. U. S. Army.*

*Fort George, Upper Canada,**11th February, 1813.*

Sir,

On the 23d ultimo I had the honour of communicating to your excellency the result of the action at Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, the preceding day. I have it now in my power to transmit to you a more detailed account of that transaction, together with a more minute statement of our loss. A list of the killed, wounded, and missing is herewith enclosed. The attack upon our camp was commenced about 6 o'clock in the morning by a heavy fire of small arms, together with the discharge of six pieces of artillery, directed immediately at our lines, and the houses and temporary breast-work, from behind which a portion of our troops were engaged with the enemy. Early in the action a charge was made by the assailants; but the fire from our lines was so intense that they were quickly compelled to retire.

In this charge the 41st regiment of British regulars principally suffered, their loss during the charge, and in the subsequent engagement, being very considerable. Out of 300 of those troops, about 30 fell dead upon the field, and 90 or 100 wounded were removed from the ground.

It is impossible to state, with any degree of accuracy, the number of Canadian militia and Indians, which was either killed or wounded during the engagement; it could, however not have been small, having received for three or four hours the constant fire of our musquetry and riflemen from the breast-work under which they were formed. The action had endured about a quarter of an hour, when the right division of our troops, who were less secured by a breast-work, and exposed to a heavy fire from a body of Indians and militia, who had possessed themselves of some out-houses within their reach, were obliged to retreat from their lines in the encampment, for the purpose of occupying ground less exposed. This retreat being discovered by the enemy, the whole Indian force, together with a portion of the militia, bore down upon them with redoubled violence, and prevented, by their superiority of numbers and the severity of their fire, the practicability of ever again forming this portion of our troops in order of battle. It was from this division that our principal loss was sustained, few indeed having escaped. Every effort was in vain employed to form them into some order of action, as affording the only mean of either repelling the pursuers, or regaining the temporary breast-work, from behind which the remaining part of our troops still gallantly defended themselves; but every exertion was in vain

employed, and the very few who survived of the party surrendered as prisoners to the enemy.

Our loss in this action will be ascertained by the list herewith enclosed. Among the killed I have to lament several brave and valuable officers, some of whom had distinguished themselves in the action of the evening of the 18th, and fell on the 22d, while unavailingly engaged in rallying the troops, who retreated in disorder from the lines. Among those, the loss of colonel John Allen and major Elijah M'Clannahan, is to be particularly regretted, as also captain John H. Woolfolk, one of my aids-de-camp; their exertions were unsuccessful, notwithstanding every possible exertion was employed; they bravely fell in the discharge of their respective duties. While I regret the fate of those who fell upon this occasion, I should do injustice to pass over, without notice, the few partakers in their danger, who were fortunate to survive them. To lieutenant-colonel William Lewis, who commanded on the 18th, and to captain James Overton, my aid-de-camp, who attended my person on the field, my thanks are particularly due, for their prompt and willing exertion during every period of the conflict.

To the officers and soldiers who bravely maintained their ground in the temporary fortification, too much praise cannot be bestowed. Assailed by numbers greatly superior, supported by six pieces of artillery constantly employed, they gallantly defended with small arms alone, for nearly four hours of constant battle. No troops ever behaved with more cool and determined bravery: from the commanding officer down to the private soldier there was scarce a single abandonment of duty, and, at the last, when their ammunition was nearly exhausted, and surrounded by the enemy, greatly superior in numbers and in the means of war, surrendered with a reluctance rarely to be found on similar occasions. The officers commanding in the breast-work and who deserve particular notice, if distinction could easily be drawn, were majors Benjamin Graves and George Madison; captains Hightower, Hart, Williams, Cholier, Sebree, Hamilton, Keleby, Bledsoe, Ballard, and James; brigade-major James Garrard, adjutant John M'Calla, and quarter-master Pollard Keen; they defended themselves to the last with great gallantry, and merit my warmest gratitude, as well as the highest praise of their country.

With sentiments of the highest respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

J. WINCHESTER,

*Brigadier-General U. S. Army.*

*The Hon. the Secretary at War, Washington City, U. S.*

Abstract of the killed, wounded and missing in the action at Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, 22d of January, 1813.

*Seventeenth Regiment United States Infantry.*

*Killed and missing*—1 regimental surgeon, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 112 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Wounded*—

*First Regiment Kentucky Militia.*

*Killed and missing*—1 major, 1 captain, 1 surgeon's mate, 1 ensign, 36 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Wounded*—1 ensign, 5 privates.

*First Rifle Regiment Kentucky Militia.*

*Killed and missing*—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 regimental surgeon, 4 captains, 1 ensign, 154 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Wounded*—2 ensigns, 6 privates.

*Fifth Regiment Kentucky Militia.*

*Killed and missing*—1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 73 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Wounded*—1 serjeant, 3 corporals, 7 privates.

P. S. The wounded are included in the list of prisoners forwarded. JAMES GARRARD, *jun. Brig. Ins.*

An abstract of prisoners captured in the action on the river Raisin, the 22d January, 1813.

*Seventeenth Regiment United States Infantry.*

1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 54 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*First Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Militia.*

2 captains, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 104 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*First Rifle Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Militia.*

1 major, 2 captains, 4 ensigns, 133 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Fifth Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Militia.*

1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 189 non-commissioned officers and privates.

*Staff of the Fifth Regiment.*

1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 1 regimental surgeon, 1 surgeon's mate.

*Second Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Militia.*

1 captain, 20 privates.

*Brigade Staff.*

1 brigadier-general, 1 brigade-inspector, 1 aid-de-camp, lieutenant 17th United States regiment.

JAMES GARRARD, *jun. Brigade Inspector.*

*Extract of a Letter from Ensign J. Baker to General James Winchester, dated*

*Fort Niagara, Feb. 26, 1813.*

*Brigadier-general Winchester,*

Sir, in compliance to your order of the 29th of January, directed to Doctor Bowen and myself, I took charge of the American prisoners at Sandwich on the 30th of the same month. On the 15th instant, I was ordered on to this place by colonel Proctor; having arrived, I deemed it my duty to report to you whatever transpired with the prisoners under my charge, and the information I was able to collect concerning the other prisoners taken by the Indians.

For the greatest number of our unfortunate fellow-soldiers being sent from Detroit, we are indebted to the exertions of our prisoner fellow-citizens there, who, with an unexampled generosity, when they saw their countrymen driven through the streets like sheep to a market, lavished their wealth for their ransom; nor was the procuration of our liberty all—we had been almost entirely stripped by the Indians; clothes such as the exigency of the occasion permitted to be prepared were furnished us.

On the 8th instant, colonel Proctor ordered me to make out a return of all the prisoners who were killed by the Indians subsequent to the battle, agreeably to the best information I could collect. The inclosed return marked (B) was produced by this order; I might have added the gallant captain Nathaniel Gray S. Hart, deputy inspector general; captain Virgil M'Cracken, of colonel Allen's regiment; captain John H. Woolfolk, your secretary; ensign Levi Wells, of the seventh United States Infantry; and a number of privates, whom I find, by subsequent information, have been massacred. The memory of past services rendered me by captain Hart's family, made me particularly anxious to ascertain his fate: I flattered myself he was alive, and every information I could get for some time flattered my hopes; but one of the last prisoners who was brought in, told me that the captain was certainly massacred: he was so badly wounded as to prevent him from walking; the Indians took him some distance on a horse, but at length took him off and tomahawked him.

About the 10th inst., an Indian brought captain M'Cracken's commission to Sandwich: the paper was bloody. The fellow said he took the captain in trust, but some time after, when stripped and examining him he found an Indian scalp

in his bosom which induced him to kill him. This you cannot but be assured is an humbug of the fellow's own making, to screen himself from the odium of barbarity.—The captain's character and the danger that attended his carrying such furniture in a disastrous battle gives it the lie.

Captain Woolfolk, after having been wounded in two places, by some means had got refuge in one of the French houses on the Raisin—he was discovered next day, and dragged from his asylum—he was taken from the house of a Mr. Lasselle, where he said he would give 1000 dollars to any one who would purchase him. Mr. Lasselle said it was out of his power, but he had no doubt his brother would do it, who lived at hand—he directed his owners to the house of his brother, but as they were on their way an Indian from a waste house shot him through the head.

Ensign Wells was taken from my side unhurt. I considered him alive until on my arrival at this place, captain Naggs tells me he was killed by a Puttawatamie Indian not long after he was taken.

Many fresh scalps have been brought in since the battle, and dead bodies seen through the country, which prove that others have been killed, whose names I have not been able to find out; independent of those reported to colonel Proctor.

This, sir, is all the information I have been able to collect concerning those who have been massacred. The fifteen or eighteen mentioned in the remarks to the return made to colonel Proctor, whose names do not appear, were not known by those who saw them killed.

Major Graves of the fifth regiment of the Kentucky volunteers, I have been able to get no information of, further than that he was brought to the river Rouge on the 25th or 26th of January, in a sleigh; I fear, from our not having heard any thing of him since, that he is no more—and that valuable officer for ever lost to his country. At a rough guess, founded on the few facts I have been able to glean, I may say with some certainty that there are still thirty or forty alive with the Indians.

The prospect of a speedy return of those poor fellows I think but gloomy, as colonel Proctor has issued an order enjoining all individuals to purchase no more: the Indians having been paid a greater price for those already delivered than the government will give.—Colonels Wells', Lewis', and Allen's servants are acting as valets to Indian chiefs. Captain Hart's servant is alive, but where he is, is uncertain.

The dead of our army are still denied the rights of sepul-



ture ; at the time I left Sandwich I was told the hogs were eating them ; a gentleman told me he had seen them running about with skulls, arms, legs, and other parts of the human system in their mouths. The French people on the river Raisin buried captains Hart, Woolfolk, and some others, but it was more than their lives were worth to have been caught paying this last accustomed tribute to mortality.

I several times agitated the subject of burying the dead while in company with British officers, but they always answered that the Indians would not suffer it.

Before I close this communication, I must, in justice to my own feelings, mention those of our fellow citizens of Detroit who were most serviceable to us. Colonel Elijah Brush, Mr. Richard Jones, Henry I. Hunt, esq., Judge May, major Mack, and Mouse Godfrey, were most active ; Oliver Williamson, esq., Mr. Chittenden, Mr. Ten Eyke, Mr. Smart, Dr. Brown, Mr. Miller, Mr. M'Daniel, Monsieur Odrain, lieutenant Reed, Mr. M'Comb, and many others purchased provisions and alleviated their wants ; others befriended, whose names through ignorance or want of retention are not inserted. But in paying a just tribute to our patriotic fellow-citizens, who for their services to us are driven from their homes, our fair country-women should not be forgotten— young ladies were frequently seen soliciting their fathers for horses, and when they had gained their point, exchanged their presents for Kentuckians. Mademoiselle Lasselle and Labardie, Miss Scott, M. Hays, and others, deserve to be mentioned.

The exertions of those worthy people were directed and point given to them by our ever to be venerated countryman Augustus B. Woodward, who with unwearied zeal exerted himself in our behalf at Detroit ; he was the life and soul of the remaining Americans, the man to whom they all looked up for succour in the hour of difficulty, for advice on every occasion. This, added to the influence he at first had with some of the British officers, enabled him to do wonders for us. This gentleman, whose exalted understanding entitles him to the first consideration for talents, appears to have no wish separate from the interest of his country ; though eminently qualified to enjoy society, he gives up all its sweets to shield the unfortunate of his country from savage cruelty and British oppression.

In the admiration of our countrymen, the deed of our generous enemies should be remembered. Colonel Baubee took an active part in providing for our welfare, and showed that

he possessed a generous nature, the highest attribute of a soldier.

Colonel Elliot was serviceable in rescuing some prisoners from the Indians.

Major Muir is truly a gentleman, and showed every disposition to serve us.

The reverend Mr. Pollard, of Sandwich, visited the hospital frequently, and read the service over Wetherford when he was interred. Captains Aikins, Curtiss, and Parrow, who commanded the guard of our prisoners, all deserve my thanks. Dr. Bowen was unwearied in his attendance upon the wounded, and during our stay studied only to alleviate their pain. He was ordered on to this place with me.

Doctor M'Keehan is the gentleman who was sent through general Harrison with a flag of truce to attend the wounded—his wounds prevented him from doing much while we remained. He is a worthy man, and I have no doubt but the prisoners will do well under his care.

Wishing you health, and all the happiness your situation permits,

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC BAKER.

*Ensign 2d Regt. U. S. Inf.*

*General James Winchester.*

( B )

*A return of the American Prisoners who were tomahawked by the Indians subsequent to the Battle of Frenchtown, January 22d, 1813.*

*January 23d.* Captain Pascal Hickman, and James E. Blythe, private, in Frenchtown. Charles Gerles, private, at Sandy creek. Thomas S. Crow, private, three miles from Frenchtown. Daniel Darnell, Thomas Ward, and William Butler, privates, between Sandy creek and Frenchtown.

*January 24.* Henry Downy, private, near Brownstown.

*January 26.* John P. Sidney, serjeant, at the river Rouge.

In addition to the above number, I saw two others tomahawked at Sandy creek myself, and find that the prisoners now in the hospital at Sandwich saw, say 15 or 18 others, treated in the same manner. Two men tell me, they saw one who had the appearance of having been burned to death. Those men who saw Henry Downy, and William Butler killed, tell me that the Indians left them without scalping.

ISAAC L. BAKER, *Ensign 2d U. S. Inf.*

*Col. H. Proctor.*

*Extract of a Letter from Major-General Harrison to the Secretary at War, dated at the Miami Rapids, February 11, 1813.*

“I have the honour to enclose to you the deposition of Medard Labardie, who was at the river Raisin on the 22d ultimo, and remained there till the 6th instant. His account of the loss of the enemy in the action, is corroborated by several others, nor is there the least reason to doubt his statement as it regards the horrible fate of our wounded men. There is another circumstance which plainly shows that the British have no intention to conduct the war (at least in this quarter) upon those principles which have been held sacred by all civilized nations. On the 30th ultimo, I despatched Doctor M'Keehan, a surgeon's mate in the militia, with a flag to ascertain the situation of the wounded. He was attended by one of our militia-men and a Frenchman. On the night after their departure they halted near this place, for the purpose of taking a few hours sleep, in a vacant cabin upon the bank of the river. The cariole in which they travelled was left at the door with the flag set up in it. They were discovered by a party of Indians (accompanied it is said by a British officer) and attacked in the manner described in the deposition. The militia-man was killed and scalped, the Doctor and the Frenchman taken. Doctor M'Keehan was furnished with a letter addressed to any British officer whom he might meet, describing the character in which he went, and the object for which he was sent, an open letter to general Winchester, and written instructions to himself, all of which he was directed to show to the first officer he met with. He was also supplied with 100 dollars in gold, to procure necessaries for the prisoners.”

The affidavit of Medard Labardie, late resident near the river Raisin, in the Michigan territory. He being sworn, saith he was in his house when he heard the guns at the commencement of the action at the river Raisin, on the 22d January, 1813, between the American forces under general Winchester, and the British, Canadian, and Indian forces, said to be commanded by colonel St. George. After some little time, he heard that the Indians were killing the inhabitants as well as the Americans, upon which he went towards the scene of action, in order to save his family. As he went on, he was with one other inhabitant taken prisoner by two Wyandot Indians, and carried prisoner to the Indian lines, from which he saw great part of the action. The right wing

of the Americans had given way before he got a sight of the action. It terminated after the sun was some hours high, not far from 11 o'clock, A. M., by the surrender of the American forces that then remained on the ground. He saw the flag hoisted by the British sent to the American forces, and saw it pass three times to the Americans before the surrender. He could not understand English, but understood that general Winchester was taken prisoner before he got to the lines of his own men; that he was compelled to carry the flag to his own forces after he was taken; that he understood the reason of the flag passing so often, was, that the Americans refused to surrender upon any other terms than that the wounded should be taken care of, the dead buried, and the inhabitants protected in their property. That the British first refused to agree to these terms, but finally did agree to them. He also understood that the loss of the British and Indians in the action was about 400 killed. He also understood that the loss of the Americans in the action was about 180 killed.

He knows that on the day of the action all the prisoners who were able to march, were marched off towards Malden, the wounded, about 60 or 80 in number, left in two houses without any of their friends or a physician to take care of them, and without any British officer or men. About 10 Indians remained behind upon the ground, the balance of the Indians went off with the British, and he was told by some of the Canadian militia, that the British had promised the Indians a frolic that night, at Stoney creek, about six miles from the river Raisin.

He was liberated after the line of march was formed for Malden. The next morning he was in the houses where the wounded were. That morning about 50 Indians returned, they brought whiskey with them; they drank some, and gave some to the Indians there, and between 9 and 10 o'clock, A. M., commenced killing the wounded, then set fire to the houses the wounded were in, and consumed them. He was at his father's on this side of the Detroit river, about seven days after the action, and saw across the river the prisoners marched off for Niagara, from Malden.

He saith that he saw taken by his house, by captain Elliott and nine Wyandot Indians, two men that he understood had been sent by general Harrison with a flag to the British. One of the men (Mr. Tessier) he knew, the other he did not know, but understood he was a doctor. He had not an opportunity of conversing with them, but understood from an inhabitant, to whom Mr. Tessier communicated it, that they

stopped for the night and left the flag hoisted on the cariole ; that the flag was taken away unknown to them, and that the Indians fired on them ; that he, Tessier, told them they were Frenchmen, and surrendered, upon which the Indians ceased firing, and took them. They then mentioned they were sent with a flag. The Indians said they were liars, and took them off.

Mr. Tessier was set at liberty at the river Raisin, and remained two days, expecting the doctor to return ; at the end of which time Tessier was sent for by the British and taken to Malden. He understood that the doctor was sent off immediately to Niagara ; the doctor was wounded in the ankle. He understood the British charged the doctor and Tessier with being spies. And further he saith not.

(Signed)

MEDARD LABARDIE.

Witness, C. Gratiot, captain of engineers, and interpreter.

Sworn to, before me, this 11th day of February, 1813.  
Camp, foot of the Miami Rapids.

(Signed)

C. S. TODD, *Dis. Judge Ad.*

A true copy.

R. GRAHAM, *Aid-de-camp.*

*General Orders.*

*Adjutant-General's Office, Quebec, Feb. 3, 1813.*

His excellency the commander of the forces has the highest satisfaction in announcing to the troops under his command another brilliant action achieved by the gallant division of the army at Detroit, under colonel Proctor.

Information having been received, that an advanced corps of the American army, under brigadier-general Winchester, amounting to upwards of 1000 strong, had entered and occupied Frenchtown, about 26 miles south of Detroit ; colonel Proctor did not hesitate a moment in anticipating the enemy by attacking his advanced corps before it could receive support from the forces on their march, under general Harrison.

At day-break, on the 22d January, colonel Proctor, by a spirited and vigorous attack, completely defeated general Winchester's division, with the loss of between 4 and 500 slain ; for all who attempted to save themselves by flight, were cut off by the Indian warriors.

About 400 of the enemy took refuge in the houses of the town, and kept up a galling fire from the windows, but finding further resistance unavailing, they surrendered themselves at discretion.

On this occasion the gallantry of colonel Proctor was most

nobly displayed, in his humane and unwearied exertions, which succeeded in rescuing the vanquished from the revenge of the Indian warriors.

The prisoners at the close of the action amounted to one general, one colonel, one staff, one major, nine captains, 20 subalterns, 27 serjeants, and 435 rank and file; but the Indian warriors were hourly bringing in prisoners, and had taken a strong escort of the enemy with 500 hogs.

Colonel Proctor reports in strong terms the gallantry displayed by all descriptions of troops, and the able support received from colonel St. George, and from all the officers and men under his command; whose spirited valour and steady discipline was above all praise.

The Indian chief Round Head, with his band of warriors, rendered essential service by their bravery and good conduct.

It is with regret colonel Proctor reports the British loss amounts to 24 killed, and 158 wounded.

*Officers wounded*—Colonel St. George, four wounds, but not severely—captain Tallon, and lieutenant Clemow, 41st regiment—ensign Ker, R. N. F. L. regiment dangerously—lieutenants Rollet and Irwin, and midshipman Richardson, marine department—captain Mills, lieutenants M'Cormick and Gordon, and ensign Garvin, Essex militia.

G. O.—Major-general Glasgow will direct a salute of 21 guns to be fired at 12 o'clock this day, on this glorious occasion.

(Signed) EDW. BAYNES, *Adj. Gen. N. A.*

G. O.—The commander of the forces is pleased to appoint, till further orders, or until the pleasure of his royal highness the prince regent be known,

Colonel Vincent, 49th regiment, and colonel Proctor, 41st regiment, to have the rank of brigadier-general in Upper Canada.

Lieutenant-colonel Pearson, inspecting field-officer, to have the rank of colonel in Kingston and the eastern district.

Major M'Donnell, Glengary light infantry, to have the rank of lieutenant-colonel in do.

*Copy of a Letter from General W. H. Harrison to the Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Camp Meigs, 9th May, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you that the enemy having been several days making preparations for raising the siege of this post, accomplished this day the removal of their artillery from the opposite bank, and about 12 o'clock left

their encampment below, were soon embarked and out of sight. I have the honour to enclose you an agreement entered into between general Proctor and myself for the discharge of the prisoners of the Kentucky militia in his possession, and for the exchange of the officers and men of the regular troops which were respectively possessed by us. My anxiety to get the Kentucky troops released as early as possible, induced me to agree to the dismissal of all the prisoners I had, although there was not as many of ours in general Proctor's possession. The surplusage is to be accounted for, and as many of ours released from their parole, whenever the government may think proper to direct it.

The two actions on this side the river on the 5th, were infinitely more important and more honourable to our arms than I had at first conceived: In the sortie made upon the left flank, captain Waring's company of the 19th regiment, a detachment of 12 months' volunteers under major Alexander, and three companies of Kentucky militia, under colonel Boswell, defeated at least double the number of Indians and militia.

The sortie on the right was still more glorious; the British batteries in that direction were defended by the grenadiers and light infantry companies of the 41st regiment, amounting to 200 effectives, and two companies of militia flanked by a host of Indians. The detachment sent to attack those consisted of all the men off duty belonging to the companies of Croghan and Bradford of the 17th regiment, Langham Elliott's (late Graham's) and Warin's of the 19th, about 80 of major Alexander's, and a single company of Kentucky militia under captain Sebry, amounting in the whole to not more than 340. Yet the event of the action was not a moment doubtful, and had not the British troops been covered in their retreat by their allies, the whole of them would have been taken.

It is not possible for troops to behave better than ours did throughout—all the officers exerted themselves to execute my orders, and the enemy, who had a full view of our operations from the opposite shore, declared that they had never seen so much work performed in so short a time.

To all the commanders of corps I feel particular obligations. These were colonel Miller of the 19th infantry, colonel Mills of the Ohio militia, major Stoddard of the artillery, major Ball of the dragoons, and major Johnson of the Kentucky militia. Captain Gratiot of the engineers having been for a long time much indisposed, the task of fortifying

this post devolved on captain Wood. It could not be placed in better hands. Permit me to recommend him to the president, and to assure you that any mark of his approbation bestowed on captain Wood would be highly gratifying to the whole of the troops who witnessed his arduous exertions.

From major Hukill, acting inspector-general, my aid-de-camp major Graham, lieutenant O'Fallon, who has done the duty of assistant adjutant-general in the absence of major Adams, and my volunteer aid-de-camp John Johnson, esq., I received the most useful assistance.

I have the honour to enclose you a list of the killed and wounded during the siége and the two sorties; those of the latter were much greater than I had at first expected.

Want of sleep and exposure to the continued rains which have fallen almost every day for some time past, renders me incapable of mentioning many interesting particulars; amongst others a most extraordinary proposition of general Proctor's, on the subject of the Indians within our boundary—this shall form the subject of a communication to be made to-morrow, or next day, and for which I will provide a safer conveyance than that which carries this. All the prisoners and deserters agree in saying that the information given to major Stoddard by Ryland, of the British having launched a sloop of war this spring, is incorrect, and the most of them say that the one which is now building will not be launched for many weeks.

I have the honour to be, sir, with great respect, your humble servant,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

P. S. Captain Price of the regiment of light artillery, and the 90 regulars, prisoners with general Proctor, were taken on the N. W. side of the river, with the Kentucky militia. We had no prisoners taken on this side during the siege.

*Copy of a Despatch from Major General William H. Harrison, to the Secretary of War, dated*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Lower Sandusky, May 13th, 1813.*

Having ascertained that the enemy (Indians as well as British) had entirely abandoned the neighbourhood of the Rapids, I left the command of Camp Meigs with general Clay, and came here last night. It is with the greatest satisfaction, I inform you, sir, that I have every reason to believe, that the loss of the Kentucky troops in killed on the north side of the river does not exceed 50. On the 10th and 11th



instant, I caused the ground which was the scene of action and its environs to be carefully examined, and after the most diligent search 45 bodies only of our men were discovered—amongst them was the leader of the detachment, colonel Dudley. No other officer of note fell in the action. I have strong reason to believe that a considerable number of the Kentuckians effected their retreat up the river to Fort Winchester. General Proctor did not furnish me with a return of the prisoners in his possession, although repeatedly promised. His retreat was as precipitate as it could properly be, leaving a number of cannon ball, a new elegant sling carriage for cannon, and other valuable articles. The night before his departure two persons that were employed in the British gun-boats (Americans by birth) deserted to us. The information they gave me was very interesting—they say that the Indians, of which there were from 1600 to 2000, left the British the day before their departure in a high state of dissatisfaction, from the great loss they had sustained in the several engagements of the 5th, and the failure of the British in accomplishing their promise of taking the post at the Rapids. From the account given by these men, my opinion is confirmed of the great superiority of the enemy which were defeated by our troops in the two sallies made on the 5th instant. That led by colonel Miller did not exceed 350 men, and it is very certain that they defeated 200 British regulars 150 militia, and four or 500 Indians. That American regulars (although they were raw recruits), and such men as compose the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and PETERSBURG, Virginia, volunteers, should behave well, is not to be wondered at—but that a company of militia should maintain its ground against four times its numbers, as did captain Sebres of the Kentucky, is truly astonishing. These brave fellows were at length, however, entirely surrounded by Indians, and would have been entirely cut off, but for the gallantry of lieutenant Gwynne of the 19th regiment, who, with part of captain Elliott's company, charged the enemy and released the Kentuckians. I enclose you a list of the killed and wounded during the whole siege. It is considerably larger than I had supposed it would be when I last wrote to you—but it is satisfactory to know that they did not bleed uselessly—but in the course of successful exertions. The return does not embrace those who fell on the N. W. side of the Miami.

You will also receive herewith a monthly return of the troops at Camp Meigs for the last month; the communication with the other posts being cut off, the returns were not

received.—A copy of general Clay's report to me of the manner of his executing my order for the attack on the enemy's batteries, is likewise forwarded, by which it will be seen that my intentions were perfectly understood, and the great facility with which they might have been executed is apparent to every individual who witnessed the scene. Indeed the cannon might have been spiked, the carriages cut to pieces, the magazine destroyed, and the retreat effected to the boats without the loss of a man, as none were killed in taking the batteries, so complete was the surprise.

An extensive open plain intervenes between the river and the hill upon which the batteries of the enemy were placed; this plain was raked by four of our eighteen-pounders, a twelve, and a six. The enemy, even before their guns were spiked, could not have brought one to bear upon it. So perfectly secured was their retreat, that the 150 men who came off effected it without loss, and brought off some of the wounded, one of them upon the backs of his comrades. The Indians followed them to the woods, but dared not enter into the plain.

I am unable to form a correct estimate of the enemy's force. The prisoners varied much in their accounts; those who made them least, stated the regulars at 560, and militia at 800; but the numbers of Indians were beyond comparison greater than have ever been brought into the field before; numbers arrived after the siege commenced. I have caused their camps on the south-east side of the river to be particularly examined, and the general opinion is, that there could not have been fewer on that side than 1000 or 1200; they were indeed the efficient force of the enemy.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your favours of the 14th, 18th, and 28th ultimo, and 4th instant.

I am sorry to inform you that major Stoddard died the night before I left the Rapids, of a lock-jaw, produced by a slight wound from a fragment of a shell which struck him on the thigh. Several have died in this way from their great and unavoidable exposure to the cold; but perhaps there never were so many instances of desperate wounds being likely to do well.

The gallant captain Bradford will recover.

I shall go from here to Upper Sandusky, and shall take my station at Delaware or Franklinton until the troops are assembled. General Clay, who commands at the Rapids, is a man of capacity, and entirely to be relied on.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your humble servant,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

*The Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

Return of the killed and wounded in the siege of Camp Meigs, and the several sorties of the 5th instant.

*Killed*—United States artillery, one; do. infantry, 39; do. dragoons, three; Kentucky militia, 30; Ohio do. three; 12 months' volunteers, two; detachment of infantry of the United States, three—total 81.

*Wounded*—United States infantry, 90; do. dragoons, 17; Kentucky militia, 42; Ohio do., 8; 12 months' volunteers, 29; detachment of infantry of the United States, three—total, 189. Total killed and wounded, 269.

*Remarks.*

Majors Stoddard and Hukil—the former died of his wounds, the latter slightly wounded.

Sixty-four of the above were killed in the sorties, and one hundred and twenty-four wounded: the balance, eighty-one, killed and wounded within the fortified camp.

J. O. FALLON,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*Copy of a Letter from General Clay to General Harrison.*

Sir,

*Camp at Fort Meigs, May 13, 1813.*

On the 5th instant, about 8 o'clock, A. M., descending the Miami of the Lake, about midway to Rapids, with 1200 of the Kentucky troops in 18 flat-bottomed boats, I was met by captain Hamilton and a subaltern, who delivered me (as he said) the orders of major-general Harrison to the following effect:

“You must detach about 800 men from your brigade, who will land at a point I will show about one or one and a half miles above the fort, and I will conduct them to the British batteries on the left bank of the river. They must take possession of the enemy's cannon, spike them, cut down the carriages, and return to their boats.”

Observing that the British force at their large batteries was inconsiderable, but that their main force was at the old garrison about one and a half miles below on the same side of the river; that the Indian forces were chiefly on the right bank of the river: “The balance of the men under your command must land on the right bank opposite the first landing, and will fight their way through the Indians to the fort.”

observing that the route thus to be taken would be shown by a subaltern officer there in company with captain Hamilton, who would land the perogue at the point on the right bank, at which the boats would land.

The order of descending the river in boats was the same as the order of march in line of battle, in solid column, each officer taking position according to his rank. Colonel Dudley, the eldest colonel, led the van, and in this order the river had been descended. As soon as captain Hamilton had delivered these orders, being in the 13th boat from the front, I directed him to proceed immediately to colonel Dudley, and order him to take the men in the 12 front boats, and execute general Harrison's orders on the left bank of the river; and to post his (captain Hamilton's) subaltern on this right bank to conduct myself with the men in the six boats to the fort. I ordered the five boats in the rear to fall in a line and follow me. High winds and the rapidity of the current drove four of the rear boats ashore in the attempt to follow on according to order, where they remained a short time, sufficient, however, to detain them half or three quarters of a mile to the rear. To land according to order I kept close along the right bank until opposite colonel Dudley's landing. There I found no guide left to conduct me to the fort, as captain Hamilton had promised. I then made an attempt to cross the river and join colonel Dudley, but from the rapid current on the falls I was unable to land on the point with him. Being nearly half way across the river, and the waves running too high to risk the boat then driving down the current sidewise—veered about the boat and rowed the boat the best way we could to save our boat.

My attempt to cross the river to colonel Dudley occasioned all the boats (I presume in the rear of me), and which were then out of hailing distance, to cross over and land with colonel Dudley.—Having been defeated in a landing on the left, we then endeavoured to effect one on the right, even without a guide: but before a landing could be effected we received a brisk fire from the enemy on shore, which was returned and kept up on both sides. And I was in this unavoidable situation compelled to make to Fort Meigs with no other force than about 50 men on board (the other boats being still in the rear), and to receive the enemy's fire until we arrived under the protection of the fort. Colonel Boswell's command (except the men in my boat) having landed to join colonel Dudley, were, as I have been informed, ordered by captain Hamilton immediately to embark, and land on

the right-hand shore about a mile above the fort, and prepare to fight his way through to the garrison.

The colonel embarked, landed as he conceived at the proper point, pursuant to captain Hamilton's order, and was forming his men in order of battle when he was met by captain Shaw, and ordered to march into the garrison at open order, the safest route.

When my own boat landed we were met by two men, who took charge of the boat, as we understood, to bring her under the protection of the fort batteries. Believing our baggage to be thus made safe we forbid our servants to carry any portion of it, but loaded them with cannon ball, which they bore to the fort. Our baggage was, however, taken by the Indians in a very short time after we left the boat. Upon receiving the orders of captain Hamilton, I asked if he had brought spikes to spike the enemy's cannon—to which he replied, he had plenty.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GREEN CLAY, *Brig.-Gen.*

*His Excellency Major-General Harrison.*

P. S. Captain Hamilton, on delivering the orders of general Harrison, observed, that the object of landing and marching a portion of the troops on the right bank was to draw the attention of the Indians, and by thus engaging them afford an opportunity to the garrison to make a sally, and by a circuitous route surprise and carry the batteries and cannon of the enemy below the fort on the right bank.

G. C. *Bg.-Gen.*

A true copy.

G. CROGHAN, *A. D. C.*

*From the London Gazette Extraordinary.*

*Copy of a Despatch addressed to Earl Bathurst, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.*

My Lord,

*Kingston, June 14, 1813.*

I have the honour to transmit to your lordship the inclosed report from colonel Proctor, which, owing to the temporary possession of York by the enemy, has only just reached me by a circuitous route. I sincerely congratulate your lordship on this additional proof of the steady discipline and valour of his majesty's forces on the Detroit frontier, and which have enabled them under the judicious arrangements of their distinguished leader, so successfully to repel the attack of the enemy. By the last accounts received from colonel Proctor, dated the 4th instant, he was still at Sandwich

waiting for the reinforcements, which, had it not been for the late event on the Niagara frontier, would have long ago reached him. I have reason to think they are now on their way to him, and when arrived, he will probably again be enabled to advance against major-general Harrison, who remains strengthening himself in his position at Fort Meigs, where he is watched by a large body of Indians.

I have the honour, &c.

GEORGE PREVOST.

*Earl Bathurst, &c.*

Sir,

*Sandwich, May 14.*

From the circumstances of the war I have judged it expedient to make direct report to your excellency of the operations and present state in this district.

In expectation of being able to reach the enemy, who had taken post near the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, before the reinforcement and supplies could arrive, for which only he waited to commence active operations against us, I determined to attack him without delay, and with every means in my power; but from the necessary preparations and some untoward circumstance, it was not in my power to reach him within three weeks of the period I had proposed, and at which he might have been captured or destroyed.

From the incessant and heavy rains we experienced, and during which our batteries were constructed, it was not until the morning of the first instant, the fifth day after our arrival at the mouth of the river, twelve miles from the enemy, that our batteries could be opened.

The enemy, who occupied several acres of commanding ground, strongly defended by block-houses, and the batteries well furnished with ordnance, had, during our approach, so completely entrenched and covered himself, as to render unavailing every effort of our artillery, though well served, and in batteries most judiciously placed and constructed, under the able direction of captain Dixon, of the royal engineers, of whose ability and unwearied zeal, shown particularly on this occasion, I cannot speak too highly.

Though the attack has not answered fully the purpose intended, I have the satisfaction to inform your excellency of the fortunate result of an attack of the enemy, aided by a sally of most of their garrison, made on the morning of the 5th instant, by a reinforcement which descended the river, a considerable distance in a very short time, consisting of two corps, Dudley's and Roswell's, amounting to 1300 men, un-

der the command of brigadier-general Green Clay. The attack was very sudden, and on both sides of the river. The enemy were for a few minutes in possession of our batteries and took some prisoners. After a severe contest, though not of long continuance, the enemy gave way, and except the body of those who sallied from the fort, must have been mostly killed or taken.

In this decisive affair the officers and men of the 41st regiment, who charged and routed the enemy near the batteries, well maintained the long established reputation of the corps. Where all deserve praise, it is difficult to distinguish. Captain Muir, an old officer, who had seen much service, had the good fortune to be in the immediate command of these brave men. Besides my obligations to captain Chambers for his unwearied exertions preparatory to, and on the expedition, as deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general, I have to notice his gallant conduct in attacking the enemy near the batteries at the point of the bayonet; a service in which he was well supported by lieutenants Bullock and Clements of the 41st, and lieutenant Le Breton of the royal Newfoundland regiment. The courage and activity displayed through the whole scene of action by the Indian chiefs and warriors, contributed largely to our success. I have not been able to ascertain the amount of prisoners in possession of the Indians. I have sent off, agreeably to agreement, nearly 500 prisoners to the river Huron, near Sandusky.

I have proposed an exchange, which is referred to the American government.

I could not ascertain the amount of the enemy's loss in killed, from the extent of the scene of action, and mostly in the woods. I conceive his loss in killed and prisoners to have been between 1000 and 1200 men. These unfortunate people were not volunteers, and complete Kentucky's quota. If the enemy had been permitted to receive his supplies undisturbed, I should have had at this critical juncture to contend with him for Detroit, or perhaps on this shore.

I had not the option of retaining my situation on the Miamis. Half of the militia had left us. I received a deputation from the chiefs, counselling me to return, as they could not prevent their people, as was their custom after any battle of consequence, returning to their villages with their wounded, their prisoners, and plunder, of which they had taken a considerable quantity in the boats of the enemy.

Before the ordnance could be withdrawn from the batteries, I was left with Tecumseh, and less than 20 chiefs and

warriors, a circumstance that strongly proves, that under present circumstances, at least, our Indian force is not a disposable one, or permanent, though occasionally a most powerful aid. I have, however, brought off all the ordnance, and, indeed have not left any thing behind; part of the ordnance was embarked under the fire of the enemy.

The service on which we were employed has been, though short, a very severe one; and too much praise cannot be given to both officers and men, for the cheerfulness with which, on every occasion, they met the service. To lieutenant-colonel Warburton I feel many obligations for the aid he zealously afforded me on every occasion. From my brigade-major, lieutenant M'Lean, I received the same zealous assistance as on former occasions. To captain Mockler, royal Newfoundland regiment, who acted as my aid-de-camp, I am much indebted for the assistance afforded me.

Lieutenant Le Breton, of the Newfoundland regiment assistant engineer, by his unwearied exertions, rendered essential service, as did lieutenant Gardner of the 41st regiment, from his science in artillery. The naval artillery, in the laborious duties they performed, displayed their usual unwearied zeal, and were well assisted by the royal Newfoundland (under lieutenant Gardner) as additional gunners. The laborious duties which the marine, under commodore Hall, have performed, have been most cheerfully met, and the most essential service rendered.

I have the honour to send an embarkation return of the force that served under my command at the Miami, exclusive of the Indians, who may be stated at twelve hundred.

I also enclose a return of our killed, wounded, and prisoners, who have, however, been exchanged.

I had taken upon me to give the rank of major to the six captains of the line, as militia were employed on the same service with them; some of them are old officers; all of them deserving; any mark of your excellency's approbation of them would be extremely grateful to me.

I beg leave to mention the four volunteers of the 41st regiment, Wilkinson, Richardson, Laing, and Proctor, as worthy of promotion. I have the honour to be, &c.

HENRY PROCTOR,

*Brig.-Gen. commanding.*

I beg to acknowledge the indefatigable exertions of the commissariat.

HENRY PROCTOR.

*To his Excellency Lieutenant-General*

*Sir G. Prevost, Bart. &c.*



*Embarkation Return of the Western Army, commanded by Brigadier-General Proctor, on an Expedition to the Miamis. Amherstburgh, April 15, 1813.*

General staff—1 general, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general, 1 brigade-major, 1 staff-adjutant.

Royal artillery—1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 surgeon, 27 rank and file.

Royal engineers—1 captain.

10th veteran battalion—5.

41st regiment—3 captains, 7 lieutenants, 1 assistant surgeon, 22 serjeants, 6 drummers and bugles, 374 rank and file.

Royal Newfoundland regiment—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 2 drummers, 55 rank and file.

Commissariat—1 deputy assistant commissary-general, 1 assistant to do., 1 issuer.

Field train—1 clerk of stores, 1 conductor.

Militia—1 major, 12 captains, 11 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 22 serjeants, 406 rank and file.

PETER L. CHAMBERS, *Major,*  
*Capt. 41st Regt. D. A. Quarter-Master-General.*

*Return of killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners of the Army under the command of Brigadier-General Proctor, at the Battle fought at the Miamis, 5th May, 1813.*

Total—1 drummer, 15 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 4 serjeants, 41 rank and file wounded; 2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 37 rank and file, prisoners.

*Names of Officers wounded and Prisoners.*

41st regiment—lieutenant Bullock, wounded on the 3d ultimo; lieutenants M'Intire and Hails, prisoners.

Militia—captain Bandy, since dead.

PETER L. CHAMBERS, *Major,*  
*Capt. 41st Regt. D. A. Quarter-Master-General.*

*Return of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Privates, taken Prisoners from the Enemy on the 5th May, 1813, at the Battle fought at the Miamis.*

United States regulars—1 captain, 21 rank and file.

10th and 13th detached Kentucky militia—2 majors, 1 brigade-inspector, 8 captains 9 lieutenants, 6 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 paymaster, 1 surgeon, 26 serjeants, 3 drummers, 375 rank and file.

*Prisoners since delivered up by the Indians.*

1 ensign, 1 assistant surgeon, 12 rank and file; grand total, 467.

There are a number of prisoners not yet come in, who are in possession of the Indians, but they are bringing them in daily.

PETER L. CHAMBERS, *Major,*

*Capt. 41st Regt. D. A. Quarter-Master-General.*

*May 17.*—Since the above return 28 prisoners have been given up by the Indians.

A. H. M'LEAN, *B. M.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF YORK.

*Copies of Letters from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Ship Madison, at anchor off York,*

Sir,

*8 o'clock, P. M., 27th April, 1813.*

I have the satisfaction to inform you that the American flag is flying upon the fort at York. The town capitulated this afternoon at 4 o'clock. Brigadier-general Pike was killed.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*United States Ship Madison,*

*at anchor off York, 28th April, 1813.*

Sir,

Agreeably to your instructions, and arrangements made with major-general Dearborn, I took on board of the squadron under my command the general and suite, and about 1700 troops, and left Sackett's harbour on the 25th instant, for this place. We arrived here yesterday morning, and took a position about one mile to the south and westward of the enemy's principal fort, and as near the shore as we could with safety to the vessels. The place fixed upon by the major-general and myself for landing the troops was the scite of the old French fort Tarento.

The debarkation commenced at 8 o'clock, A. M., and was completed about 10. The wind blowing heavy from the eastward, the boats fell to the leeward of the position fixed upon, and were in consequence exposed to a galling fire from

the enemy, who had taken a position in a thick wood near where the first troops landed; however, the cool intrepidity of the officers and men overcame every obstacle. Their attack upon the enemy was so vigorous, that he fled in every direction, leaving a great number of his killed and wounded upon the field. As soon as the troops were landed, I directed the schooners to take a position near the forts, in order that the attack upon them by the army and navy might be simultaneous. The schooners were obliged to beat up to their position, which they did in a very handsome order, under a very heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, and took a position within about six hundred yards of their principal fort, and opened a heavy cannonade upon the enemy, which did great execution, and very much contributed to their final destruction. The troops as soon as landed were formed under the immediate command of brigadier-general Pike, who led in a most gallant manner the attack upon the forts, and after having carried two redoubts, in their approach to the principal works, the enemy (having previously laid a train) blew up his magazine, when its effects upon our troops was dreadful, having killed and wounded a great many, and amongst the former the ever to be lamented brigadier-general Pike, who fell at the head of his column by a contusion received by a heavy stone from the magazine. His death at this time is much to be regretted, as he had the perfect confidence of the major general; and his known activity, zeal and experience, make his loss a national one.

In consequence of the fall of general Pike, the command of the troops devolved, for a time, upon colonel Pierce, who soon after took possession of the town. At about 2, P. M., the American flag was substituted for the British, and at about 4, our troops were in quiet possession of the town. As soon as general Dearborn learnt the situation of general Pike, he landed and assumed the command. I have the honour of enclosing a copy of the capitulation which was entered into and approved by general Dearborn and myself.

The enemy set fire to some of his principal stores, containing large quantities of naval and military stores, as well as a large ship upon the stocks nearly finished. The only vessel found here is the Duke of Gloucester, undergoing repairs. The Prince Regent left here on the 24th for Kingston. We have not yet had a return made of the naval and military stores, consequently can form no correct idea of the quantity, but have made arrangements to have all taken on board that we can receive, the rest will be destroyed.

I have to regret the death of midshipmen Thompson and Hatfield, and several seamen killed—the exact number I do not know as the returns from the different vessels have not been received.

For the judicious arrangements made by general Dearborn, I presume that the public stores will be disposed of, so that the troops will be ready to re-embark to-morrow, and proceed to execute other objects of the expedition the first fair wind.

I cannot speak in too much praise of the cool intrepidity of the officers and men generally under my command, and feel myself particularly indebted to the officers commanding vessels for their zeal in seconding all my views.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy Washington.*

*Terms of Capitulation entered into on the 27th April, 1813, for the Surrender of the Town of York in Upper Canada, to the Army and Navy of the United States, under the command of Major-General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey.*

That the troops, regulars and militia, at this post, and the naval officers and seamen, shall be surrendered prisoners of war. The troops, regulars and militia, to ground their arms immediately on parade, and the naval officers and seamen be immediately surrendered.

That all public stores, naval and military, shall be immediately given up to the commanding officers of the army and navy of the United States—that all private property shall be guaranteed to the citizens of the town of York.

That all papers belonging to the civil officers shall be retained by them—that such surgeons as may be procured to attend the wounded of the British regulars and Canadian militia shall not be considered prisoners of war.

That one lieutenant-colonel, one major, 13 captains, nine lieutenants, 11 ensigns, one quarter-master, one deputy-adjutant-general of the militia, namely—

Lieutenant-colonel Chewitt, major Allen, captains John Wilson, John Button, Peter Robinson, Reuben Richardson, John Arnold, James Fenwick, James Musturd, Duncan Cameron, David Thomson, John Robinson, Samuel Ridout, Thomas Hamilton, John Burn, William Jarvie, quarter-master Charles Baynes, lieutenant John H. Shultz, George Mus-

turd, Barnet Vanderburch, Robert Stanton, George Ridout, William Jarvis, Edward M'Mahon, John Wilson, Ely Playter, ensigns Andrew Thompson, Alfred Senally, Donald M'Arthur, William Smith, Andrew Mercer, James Chewett, George Kink, Edward Thompson, Charles Denison, George Robison, Darcey Boulton.

Nineteen serjeants, four corporals, and two hundred and four rank and file.

One of the field train department, William Dunbar.

Of the provincial navy, captain Francis Govereaux.

Midshipmen, John Ridou, Louis Baupre.

Lieutenant Green—Clerk, James Langsdon.

Of his majesty's regular troops, lieutenant D. Koven— one serjeant-major—and of the royal marines, one bombardier and three gunners, shall be surrendered as prisoners of war, and accounted for in the exchange of prisoners between the United States and Great Britain.

(Signed)

G. S. MITCHELL,

*Lieut.-Col. 3d A. U. S.*

SAMUEL S. CONNER,

*Maj. and A. D. C. to Maj.-Gen. Dearborn.*

WILLIAM KING,

*Major 15th U. S. Infantry.*

JESSE D. ELLIOT,

*Lieutenant U. S. Navy.*

W. CHEWITT,

*Lieut.-Col. commanding 3d regt. York Militia.*

W. ALLAN,

*Major 3d regt. York Militia.*

F. GAURREAU,

*Lieutenant M. Dpt.*

*Copies of Letters from Major-General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

*Head-Quarters, York, Capital of Upper Canada,*

Sir, *April 27, 1813,—8 o'clock, P. M.*

We are in possession of this place after a sharp conflict, in which we lost some brave officers and soldiers.

General Sheaffe commanded the British troops, militia, and Indians, in person.

We shall be prepared to sail for the next object of the expedition the first favourable wind.

I have to lament the loss of the brave and active brigadier-general Pike.

I am, with the highest respect and consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

H. DEARBORN.

*The Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War, Washington.*

*Head-Quarters, York, Capital of Upper Canada.*

Sir,

*April 28th, 1813.*

After a detention of some days by adverse winds, we arrived at this place yesterday morning, and at 8 o'clock commenced landing the troops, about three miles westward from the town, and one and a half from the enemy's works. The wind was high, and in an unfavourable direction for the boats, which prevented the landing of the troops at a clear field, the scite of the ancient French fort Tarento. It prevented also, many of the armed vessels from taking positions, which would have most effectually covered our landing—but every thing that could be done was effected.

The riflemen under major Forsyth first landed, under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. General Sheaffe commanded in person. He had collected his whole force in the woods near the point where the wind compelled our troops to land. His force consisted of 700 regulars and militia, and 100 Indians. Major Forsyth was supported as promptly as possible; but the contest was sharp and severe for nearly half an hour, and the enemy was repulsed by a number far inferior to theirs. As soon as general Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works. Our troops were now formed on the ground originally intended for their landing, advanced through a thick wood, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving in columns towards the main work; when within sixty rods of this, a tremendous explosion took place from a magazine previously prepared, and which threw out such immense quantities of stones as most seriously to injure our troops.—I have not yet been able to collect the returns of the killed and wounded; but our loss will I fear exceed 100; and among these I have to lament the loss of that brave and excellent officer brigadier-general Pike, who received a contusion from a large stone, which terminated his valuable life within a few hours. His loss will be severely felt.

Previously to this explosion, the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regulars, to the number of 40, who did not escape the effects of the shock, and were destroyed.

General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops, and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. In the mean time all further resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on.

As soon as I learned that general Pike had been wounded, I went on shore. To the general I had been induced to confide the immediate attack, from a knowledge that it was his wish, and that he would have felt mortified had it not been given to him.

Every movement was under my view. The troops behaved with great firmness, and deserve much applause, particularly those first engaged, and under circumstances which would have tried the steadiness of veterans.

Our loss in the morning, and in carrying the first battery, was not great, perhaps 40 or 50 killed and wounded, and of them a full proportion of officers.

Notwithstanding the enemy's advantage in position and numbers in the commencement of the action, their loss was greater than ours, especially in officers. It was with great exertion that the small vessels of the fleet could work into the harbour against a gale of wind, but as soon as they got into a proper position, a tremendous cannonade opened upon the enemy's batteries, and was kept up against them, until they were carried or blown up, and had, no doubt, a powerful effect upon the enemy.

I am under the greatest obligations to commodore Chauncey for his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible manner which could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is equally estimable for sound judgment, bravery, and industry. The government could not have made a more fortunate selection.

Unfortunately the enemy's armed ship Prince Regent, left this place for Kingston, a few days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks and nearly planked up, and much naval stores, were set fire to by the enemy soon after the explosion of the magazine. A considerable quantity of military stores and provisions remain, but no vessels fit for use.

We have not the means of transporting the prisoners, and must of course leave them on parole.

I hope we shall so far complete what is necessary to be done here, as to be able to sail to-morrow for Niagara, whether I send this by a small vessel, with notice to general Lewis of our approach. I have the honour to be, sir,

**HENRY DEARBORN.**

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War, Washington.*

*Extract of a Letter from Major-General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

*Niagara, May 8.*

“As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, the loss of the enemy, in the late affair of York, amounted to 100 killed, 200 prisoners, and 300 wounded. I have not been able to ascertain precisely the amount of the militia put on their parole—I presume it could not be less than 500. There was an immense depot of naval and military stores. York was a magazine for Niagara, Detroit, &c. and notwithstanding the immense amount which was destroyed by them, we found more than we could bring off. General Sheaffe’s baggage and papers fell into my hands; the papers are a valuable acquisition. A scalp was found in the executive and legislative council chamber, suspended near the speaker’s chair, in company with the mace, &c.”

*United States Ship Madison, Sackett’s Harbour,*

Sir,

*4th June, 1813.*

I have the honour to present to you by the hands of lieutenant Dudley, the British standard, taken at York on the 27th of April last, accompanied by the mace, over which was hung a human scalp. These articles were taken from the parliament house by one of my officers and presented to me. The scalp I caused to be presented to general Dearborn, who, I believe, still has it in his possession. I also send, by the same gentleman, one of the flags taken at Fort George on the 27th of May.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*From the London Gazette.*

*Head-Quarters, Kingston, Upper Canada,*

My lord,

*May 18, 1813.*

I have the honour of transmitting to your lordship a copy of a despatch, which I have received from major-general sir R. Sheaffe, containing the particulars of an attack made by the land forces, and the flotilla of the enemy, upon York, in Upper Canada, on the 27th ultimo.

The enemy left York on the 8th instant, and proceeded to Niagara, where I understood they landed, on the American side of the lake, 1200 men under general Dearborn, for the purpose of strengthening their army on that line, and proba-



slightly; general staff—captain Loring, 10<sup>th</sup> regiment, slightly; incorporated militia, captain Jarvis; volunteer, — Horney, barrack master.

(Signed)

RICHARD LEONARD,  
*Acting Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.*

EDWARD BAYNES,

*Adjutant-General North America.*

By the terms of the capitulation, the troops, regulars and militia, at this post, and the naval officers and seamen, shall be surrendered prisoners of war; the troops, regulars and militia, to ground their arms immediately on the parade, and the naval officers and seamen be immediately surrendered on the parade.

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CAPTURE OF FORT GEORGE.

*Copies of Letters from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Ship Madison, Niagara River,*

*27th May, 1813.*

Sir,

I am happy to have it in my power to say, that the American flag is flying upon Fort George. We were in quiet possession of all the forts at 12 o'clock.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*United States Ship Madison, Niagara River,*

*28th May, 1813.*

Sir,

Agreeably to arrangements which I have already had the honour of detailing to you, I left Sackett's Harbour with this ship on the 22d instant, with about 350 of colonel M'Comb's regiment on board—the wind being light from the westward, I did not arrive in the vicinity of Niagara before the 25th, the other parts of the squadron had arrived several days before, and landed their troops. The Fair American and Pert I had ordered to Sackett's Harbour, for the purpose of watching the enemy's movements, at Kingston. I immediately had an interview with general Dearborn for the purpose of making arrangements to attack the enemy as soon as possible, and it was agreed between him and myself to make the attack the moment that the weather was such as to allow the vessels and boats to approach the shore with safety.

On the 26th, I reconnoitred the position for landing the troops, and at night sounded the shore, and placed buoys to sound out the stations for the small vessels. It was agreed between the general and myself to make the attack the next morning (as the weather had moderated, and had every appearance of being favourable). I took on board of the Madison, Oneida, and Lady of the Lake, all the heavy artillery and as many troops as could be stowed. The remainder were to embark in boats and to follow the fleet—at three yesterday morning the signal was made for the fleet to weigh, and the troops were all embarked on board the boats before four, and soon after generals Dearborn and Lewis came on board this ship, with their suites. It being however nearly calm, the schooners were obliged to sweep into their positions. Mr. Trant in the Julia, and Mr. Mix in the Growler, I directed to take a position in the mouth of the river, and to silence a battery near the light-house, which from its position commanded the shore where our troops were to land. Mr. Stevens, in the Ontario, was directed to take a position to the north of the light-house, so near in shore as to enfilade the battery, and cross the fire of the Julia and Growler. Lieutenant Brown in the Governor Tompkins, I directed to take a position near the Two Mile Creek, where the enemy had a battery, with a heavy gun. Lieutenant Pettigrew in the Conquest, was directed to anchor to the S. E. of the same battery, so near in as to open on it in the rear, and cross the fire of the Governor Tompkins. Lieutenant M'Pherson in the Hamilton, lieutenant Smith in the Asp, and Mr. Osgood in the Scourge, were directed to anchor close to the shore, and cover the landing of the troops, and to scour the woods and plain whenever the enemy made his appearance.

All these orders were most promptly and gallantly executed. All the vessels anchored within musket shot of the shore, and in ten minutes after they opened upon the batteries, they were completely silenced and abandoned. Our troops then advanced in three brigades, the advance led by colonel Scott, and landed near the fort, which had been silenced by lieutenant Brown. The enemy, who had been concealed in a ravine, now advanced in great force to the edge of the bank, to charge our troops. The schooners opened so well directed and tremendous a fire of grape and canister, that the enemy soon retreated from the bank. Our troops formed as soon as they landed, and immediately ascended the bank and charged and routed the enemy in every direction, the schooners keeping up a constant well-directed

fire upon him, in his retreat towards the town. Owing to the wind's having sprung up very fresh from the eastward, which caused a heavy sea directly on shore, I was not able to get the boats off to land the troops from the Madison and Oneida, before the first and second brigades had advanced. Captain Smith with the marines, landed with colonel M'Comb's regiment, and I had prepared 400 seamen, which I intended to land with myself, if the enemy had made a stand; but our troops pursued him so rapidly into the town and Fort George, that I found there was no necessity for more force; moreover the wind had increased so much and hove such a sea on shore, that the situation of the fleet had become dangerous and critical. I, therefore, made the signal for the fleet to weigh, and ordered them into the river, where they anchored immediately after the enemy had abandoned Fort George. The town and forts were in quiet possession of our troops at 12 o'clock, and the enemy retreated in a direction towards Queenstown.

Where all behaved so well, it is difficult to select any one for commendation, yet in doing justice to lieutenant Macpherson, I do not detract from the merits of others. He was fortunate in placing himself in a situation where he rendered very important service in covering the troops so completely, that their loss was trifling.

Captain Perry joined me from Erie on the evening of the 25th, and very gallantly volunteered his services, and I have much pleasure in acknowledging the great assistance which I received from him, in arranging and superintending the debarkation of the troops; he was present at every point where he could be useful, under showers of musketry, but fortunately escaped unhurt. We lost but one killed and two wounded, and no injury done to the vessels.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*United States Ship Madison, Niagara River,*

Sir,

*May 29, 1813.*

Deeming the command of Lake Erie of primary importance, I despatched captain Perry yesterday, with 55 seamen to Black Rock, to take the five vessels there to Erie as soon as possible, and to prepare the whole squadron for service by the 15th of June. General Dearborn has promised me 200 soldiers to put on board the vessels at Black Rock, to assist in protecting them to Erie. Mr. Eckford has with

uncommon exertions prepared these vessels for service since the capture of York, and I think that captain Perry will be ready to proceed for Presque Isle about the 3d or 4th of June. The two brigs building at Erie have been launched.

The Queen Charlotte and three others of the enemy's vessels came down to Fort Erie on the 26th instant, but as soon as they heard of the capture of Fort George and its dependencies, they proceeded up the lake, I presume for Malden.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*Copies of Letters from Major-General Henry Dearborn to the Secretary of War.*

*Head-Quarters, Fort George, Upper Canada,*

Sir,

*May 27, 1813.*

The light troops under the command of colonel Scott and major Forsyth, landed this morning at nine o'clock. Major-general Lewis's division, with colonel Porter's command of light artillery, supported them. General Boyd's brigade landed immediately after the light troops, and generals Winder and Chandler followed in quick succession. The landing was warmly and obstinately disputed by the British forces: but the coolness and intrepidity of our troops soon compelled them to give ground in every direction. General Chandler, with the reserve (composed of his brigade and colonel Maccomb's artillery), covered the whole. Commodore Chauncey had made the most judicious arrangements for silencing the enemy's batteries, near the point of landing. The army is under the greatest obligations to that able naval commander for his co-operation in all its important movements, and especially in its operations this day. Our batteries succeeded in rendering Fort George untenable; and when the enemy had been beaten from his positions, and found it necessary to re-enter it, after firing a few guns and setting fire to the magazines, which soon exploded, he moved off rapidly by different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles, the troops having been under arms from one o'clock in the morning, were too much exhausted for any further pursuit. We are now in possession of Fort George and its immediate dependencies; to-morrow we shall proceed further on. The behaviour of our troops, both officers and men, entitles them to the highest praise; and the difference in our loss

with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had 17 killed and 45 wounded. The enemy had 90 killed and 160 wounded of the regular troops. We have taken 100 prisoners exclusive of the wounded. Colonel Meyers of the 49th was wounded and taken prisoner. Of ours only one commissioned officer was killed—lieutenant Hobart of the light artillery. Enclosed is the report of major-general Lewis.

I have the honour to be, sir, with great consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

*Hon. Gen. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

Dear Sir, *On the Field, 1 o'clock, 27th May, 1813.*

Fort George and its dependencies are ours. The enemy, beaten at all points, has blown up his magazine and retired. It is impossible at this moment to say any thing of individual gallantry—there was no man who did not perform his duty, in a manner which did honour to himself and country. Scott's and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's and Winder's brigades, sustained the brunt of the action. Our loss is trifling, perhaps not more than 20 killed, and twice that number wounded. The enemy has left in the hospital 124, and I sent several on board the fleet. We have also made about 100 prisoners of the regular forces.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

MORGAN LEWIS.

*Major-General Dearborn, Com. in Chief of the N. Army.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Fort George, May 29, 1813.*

General Lewis was ordered to march yesterday morning with Chandler's and Winder's brigades—the light artillery, dragoons, and riflemen, in pursuit of the enemy by the way of Queenstown. I had received satisfactory information that the enemy had made a stand on the mountain at a place called Beaver Dam, where he had a deposit of provisions and stores, and that he had been joined by 300 regulars from Kingston, landed from small vessels near the head of the lake. I had ascertained that he was calling in the militia, and had presumed that he would confide in the strength of his position and venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut off his retreat. I have been disappointed—although the troops from Fort Erie and Chippewa had joined the main body at Beaver Dam, he broke up yesterday pre-

cipitately, continued his route along the mountains, and will reach the head of the lake by that route.

Lieutenant-colonel Preston took possession of Fort Erie and its dependencies last evening; the post had been abandoned and the magazine blown up.

I have ordered general Lewis to return without delay to this place, and if the winds favour us we may yet cut off the enemy's retreat.

I was last evening honoured with your despatch of the 15th instant. I have taken measures in relation to the 23 prisoners who are to be put in close confinement.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

H. DEARBORN.

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

Sir,

*Head-Quarters, 8th June, 1813.*

I hasten to state to you, that the whole of our officers and men discovered, in the action of the 27th ultimo, that readiness and ardour for action which evinced a determination to do honour to themselves and their country. The animating examples set by colonel Scott and by general Boyd deserve particular mention. I am greatly indebted to colonel Porter of the light artillery, to major Armistead of the third regiment of artillery, and to lieutenant Totten of the engineer corps, for their judicious and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's fort and batteries. The officers of the artillery generally, who had the direction of the guns, are very deserving.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

*Hon. Gen. Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

*Return of the Loss of the Army of the United States, in the Action of the 27th May, 1813.*

The light troops under the command of lieutenant-colonel Scott—captain Roach of the 23d infantry wounded; lieutenant Swearingen, do.; 23 non-commissioned officers and privates killed; 64 do. wounded;—total 89.

General Lewis's division—first or Boyd's brigade, lieutenant H. A. Hobart, killed; rank and file, 1 wounded.

Sixth regiment of infantry, captain Arrowsmith, wounded; rank and file, 6 killed, 16 wounded.

Fifteenth regiment of infantry, major King, wounded; rank and file, 1 killed, 6 wounded.

Sixteenth regiment of infantry, captain Steel, wounded; rank and file, 8 killed, 9 wounded.

New York volunteers, rank and file, 4 wounded.

Second, or Winder's brigade, rank and file, 6 wounded.

Third or Chandler's brigade none.

Of the wounded, but 61 have been sent to the hospital. The wounds of the others are very slight.

*Return of the Loss of the Enemy in killed, wounded, and taken, in the Action of the 27th May, 1813.*

*Killed*—108.

*Prisoners*—wounded, 1 colonel, 3 subalterns, 7 serjeants, and 152 rank and file—163. Not wounded—1 captain, 1 subaltern, 1 surgeon, 8 serjeants, and 102 rank and file—113.

Total loss of the enemy, 384—Militia paroled, 507.

E. BEEBE, *Asst. Adjt.-General.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE ATTACK ON  
SACKETT'S HARBOUR.

*Copy of a Despatch from Brigadier-General Brown to the Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Sackett's Harbour, June 1, 1813.*

You will have received my despatch of the 29th ultimo, written from the field of battle, and stating generally, that this post had been attacked by sir George Prevost, and that we had succeeded in repulsing him, principally owing to the gallantry of colonel Backus and the regular troops under his immediate command. Now I beg leave to offer to you the events of that day more in detail.

On the 25th ultimo, I received a letter from general Dearborn, requesting me to repair to this post for the purpose of taking the command. Knowing that lieutenant-colonel Backus, an officer of the first regiment of dragoons and of experience, was here, I hesitated, as I would do no act which might wound his feelings. In the night of the 27th I received a note from this officer by major Swan, deputy-quarter-master-general, joining in the request already made by major-general Dearborn. I could no longer hesitate, and accordingly arrived at this post early in the morning of the 28th.—These circumstances will explain how I came to be in command upon this occasion. Knowing well the ground, my arrangements for defence, in the event of an attack, were soon made.

In the course of the morning of the 28th, lieutenant Chauncey of the navy came in from the lake firing guns of alarm. Those of the same character, intended to bring in the militia, were fired from the posts. The enemy's fleet soon after appeared, accompanied by a large number of boats. Believing that he would land on the peninsula, commonly called Horse Island, I determined to meet him at the water's edge with such militia as I could collect, and the Albany volunteers, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Mills; lieutenant-colonel Backus, with the regulars, formed a second line; the care of Fort Tompkins was committed to the regular artillerists and some volunteers, and that of Navy Point to lieutenant Chauncey of the navy. If driven from my position, lieutenant-colonel Backus was ordered to advance and meet the head of the enemy's column, while rallying my corps. I was to fall on its flanks. If here unable to resist the enemy's attack, lieutenant Chauncey was in that case to destroy the stores, &c. and retire to the south shore of the bay, east of Fort Volunteer, while I proceeded to occupy that fort as our dernier resource.

In the course of the 28th, and during the nights of the 28th and 29th ultimo, a considerable militia force came in, and were ordered to the water side near Horse Island, on which was lieutenant-colonel Mills and his volunteers. Our strength at this point was now 500 men—all anxious for battle, as far as professions would go. The moment it was light enough to discover the approach of the enemy we found his ships in line between Horse Island and Stoney Point, and in a few minutes afterwards 33 large boats, filled with troops, came off to the Larger Indian or Garden Island, under cover of the fire of his gun-boats. My orders were that the troops should lie close and reserve their fire till the enemy had approached so near that every shot might hit its object.

It is, however, impossible to execute such orders with raw troops unaccustomed to subordination. My orders were in this case disobeyed. The whole line fired, and not without effect—but in the moment while I was contemplating this, to my utter astonishment, they rose from their cover and fled. Colonel Mills fell gallantly, in brave but vain endeavours to stop his men. I was personally more fortunate. Gathering together about 100 militia, under the immediate command of captain M'Nitt of that corps, we threw ourselves on the rear of the enemy's left flank, and, I trust, did some execution. It was during this last movement that the regulars under colonel Backus first engaged the enemy—nor was it long before



they defeated him. Hurrying to this point of the action, I found the battle still raging, but with obvious advantage on our side. The result of the action, so glorious for the officers and soldiers of the regular army, has already been communicated in my letter of the 29th. Had not general Prevost retreated most rapidly under the guns of his vessels, he would never have returned to Kingston.

One thing in this business is to be seriously regretted. In the midst of the conflict, fire was ordered to be set to the navy barracks and stores. This was owing to the infamous conduct of those who brought information to lieutenant Chauncey, that the battle was lost, and that to prevent the stores from falling into the enemy's hands, they must be destroyed.

The enemy's force consisted of 1000 picked men, led by sir George Prevost in person. Their fleet consisted of the new ship Wolfe, the Royal George, the Prince Regent, Earl of Moira, two armed schooners, and their gun and other boats.

Of the officers who distinguished themselves, I cannot but repeat the name of lieutenant-colonel Backus, who, praised be God! yet lives. Captain M'Nitt's conduct was noble, he will deserve to be placed in the regular army. Major Swan of the army, served as my adjutant-general, and was highly useful. Lieutenant Chauncey is a brave and honourable man. To him no blame can attach for what happened at Navy Point. He was deceived. Lieutenant-colonel Tuttle was in march for this post, but with every exertion was unable to reach it in time to take part in the action. This is felt by the colonel and every officer of his detachment, as a misfortune.

At the moment I am closing this communication, commodore Chauncey has arrived with his squadron. This renders my longer stay here unnecessary. I shall therefore immediately return to my home.

I am, sir, with the highest respect, &c.

JACOB BROWN,

*Brig.-Gen. of the New York Militia.*

*The Hon. General John Armstrong,  
Secretary at War, Washington.*

*Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of the  
29th May, 1813, at Sackett's Harbour.*

*Killed*—29 privates, regulars, and 1 volunteer.

*Wounded*—1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 2d lieutenants, 1 ensign, 7 non-commissioned officers, 1 musician, and 68 privates, regulars, and 1 musician and 2 privates, volunteers.

*Missing*—2 non-commissioned officers, 7 privates, regulars, 1 non-commissioned officer, 1 musician, and 15 privates, volunteers.

*Aggregate loss*—110 regulars and 21 volunteers. Number not known, but not to exceed 25 militia—Total 156.

WM. SWANN,

*Major 2d Regt. Infantry, & Act'g. Adj.-Gen.*

*Sackett's Harbour, June 1, 1813.*

N. B. About 400 of the regular troops sustained the heat of the action; these consisted chiefly of the 1st regiment light dragoons, some of the 9th, 21st, and a few of the 23d infantry, 3d and light artillery.

*Report of the enemy's loss in the action of the 29th May, 1813, at Sackett's Harbour.*

Adjutant-general Gray, colonel Moody, major Edwards, 1 captain, and 25 rank and file found dead in the field.

2 captains, and 20 rank and file found wounded in the field.

2 captains, 1 ensign, and 32 rank and file made prisoners.

In addition to the above many were killed and wounded in their boats by the militia and Albany volunteers, while effecting a landing; a number were likewise carried off the field by the enemy, previous to the commencement of his retreat.

WM. SWANN,

*Major 2d Infantry, & Act'g. Adj.-Gen.*

*Sackett's Harbour, June 1, 1813.*

*From the London Gazette.*

*Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, dated*

*Head-Quarters, Kingston, June 1, 1813.*

Although, as your lordship will perceive by the report of colonel Baynes, which I have the honour herewith to transmit, the expedition has not been attended with the complete success which was expected from it, I have great satisfaction in informing your lordship, that the courage and patience of the small band of troops employed on this occasion, under circumstances of peculiar hardship and privation, have been exceeded only by their intrepid conduct in the field, forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet, through a thickly wooded country, affording a constant shelter and strong positions to the enemy; but not a single spot of cleared ground favourable to the operations of disciplined soldiers.

Sir,

*Kingston, May 30, 1812.*

I have the honour to report to your excellency, that in conformity to an arranged plan of operations with commodore sir James Yeo, the fleet of boats assembled astern of his ship at ten o'clock on the night of the 20th instant, with the troops placed under my command, and led by a gun-boat, under the direction of captain Molcaster, of the royal navy, proceeded towards Sackett's Harbour, in the order prescribed to the troops, in case the detachment was obliged to march in column, viz. the grenadier company, 100th, with one section of the Royal Scots, two companies of the 8th or King's, four of the 104th, two of the Canadian Voltigeurs, two six-pounders, with their gunners, and a company of Glengary light infantry, were embarked on board a light schooner, which was proposed to be towed, under the direction of officers of the navy, so as to insure the guns being landed in time, to support the advance of the troops. Although the night was dark, with rain, the boats assembled in the vicinity of Sackett's Harbour, by one o'clock, in compact and regular order, and in this position it was intended to remain, until the day broke, in the hope of effecting a landing before the enemy could be prepared to line the woods with troops, which surround the coast; but unfortunately, a strong current drifted the boats considerably, while the darkness of the night, and ignorance of the coast, prevented them from recovering the proper station until the day dawned, when the whole pulled for the point of debarkation.

It was my intention to have landed in the cove formed by Horse island, but on approaching it we discovered the enemy were fully prepared by a very heavy fire of musketry from the surrounding woods, which were filled with infantry, supported with a field piece. I directed the boats to pull round to the other side of the island, where a landing was effected in good order and with little loss, although executed in the face of a corps formed with a field piece in the wood, and under the enfilade of a heavy gun of the enemy's principal battery. The advance was led by the grenadiers of the 100th regiment with undaunted gallantry, which no obstacle could arrest; a narrow causeway in many places under water, not more than four feet wide, and about 400 paces in length, which connected the island and main land, was occupied by the enemy in great force with a six-pounder. It was forced and carried in the most spirited manner, and the gun taken before a second discharge could be made from it; a tumbril, with a few rounds of ammunition, was found, but unfortu-

nately the artillerymen were still behind, the schooner not having been able to get up in time, and the troops were exposed to so heavy and galling a fire from so numerous but almost invisible foe, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up. At this spot two paths led in opposite directions round the hill. I directed colonel Young of the King's regiment, with half of the detachment, to penetrate by the left, and major Drummond of the 104th, to force the path by the right, which proved to be more open and was less occupied by the enemy. On the left the wood was very thick, and was most obstinately maintained by the enemy.

The gun-boats which had covered our landing, afforded material aid, by firing into the woods, but the American soldier secure behind a tree, was only to be dislodged by the bayonet. The spirited advance of a section produced the flight of hundreds—from this observation all firing was directed to cease, and the detachment being formed in as regular order as the nature of the ground would admit, pushed forward through the wood upon the enemy, who, although greatly superior in numbers, and supported by field-pieces, and a heavy fire from their fort, fled with precipitation to their block-house and fort, abandoning one of their guns. The division under colonel Young was joined in the charge by that under major Drummond, which was executed with such spirit and promptness, that many of the enemy fell in their enclosed barracks, which were set on fire by our troops; at this point the further energies of the troops became unavailing.

Their block-house and stockaded battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them; the fire of the gun-boats proved inefficient to attain that end—light and adverse winds continued, and our larger vessels were still far off. The enemy turned the heavy ordnance of the battery to the interior defence of the post. He had set fire to the store-houses in the vicinity of the fort.

Seeing no object within our reach to attain that could compensate for the loss we were momentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy's cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position on the crest of the hill we had charged from. From this position we were ordered to re-embark, which was performed at our leisure, the enemy not presuming to show a single soldier without the limits of his fortress. Your excellency having been a witness of the zeal and ardent courage of every soldier in the field, it is unnecessary in me

to assure your excellency that but one sentiment animated every breast, that of discharging to the utmost of their power their duty to their king and their country: but one sentiment of regret and mortification prevailed, on being obliged to quit a beaten enemy whom a small band of British soldiers had driven before them for three hours, through a country abounding in strong positions of defence, but not offering a single spot of cleared ground favourable for the operations of disciplined troops, without having fully accomplished the duty we were ordered to perform.

The two divisions of the detachments were ably commanded by colonel Young of the king's, and major Drummond of the 104th. The detachment of the king's, under major Evans, nobly sustained the high and established character of that distinguished corps; and captain Burke availed himself of the opportunity afforded him in leading the advance to display the intrepidity of British grenadiers. The detachment of the 104th regiment, under major Moody, captain M'Pherson's company of Glengary light infantry, and two companies of Canadian voltigeurs, commanded by major Hainot, all of them levies of the British provinces of North America, evinced most striking proofs of their loyalty, steadiness, and courage. The detachment of the Royal Newfoundland regiment behaved with great gallantry.

Your excellency will lament the loss of that active and intelligent officer, captain Gray, acting deputy-quarter-master-general, who fell close to the enemy's work, while reconnoitering it, in the hope to discover some opening to favour an assault.

Commodore sir James Yeo conducted the fleet of boats in the attack, and accompanying the advance of troops, directed the co-operation of the gun-boats.

I feel most grateful for your excellency's kind consideration, in allowing your aids-de-camp, majors Coore and Ful-ton, to accompany me in the field; and to these officers for the able assistance they afforded me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

EDWARD BAYNES,

*Colonel Glengary Light Infantry, commanding.*

*To his Excellency, Lieutenant-General*

*Sir George Prevost, Bart. &c.*

*Return of killed, wounded and missing, in an attack on Sackett's Harbour, on the 29th May.*

Total—1 general staff, 3 serjeants, 43 rank and file killed,

3 majors, 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 7 serjeants, 2 drummers, 172 rank and file, 2 gunners wounded; 2 captains, 1 ensign, 13 rank and file, wounded and missing.

*Names of officers killed and wounded.*

*Killed*—captain A. Gray, acting deputy-quarter-master-general.

*Wounded*—8th or King's regiment, major Evans, slightly; captain Blackmore, dangerously; captain Tythe, severely, lieutenant Nutall, since dead, lieutenant Gregg, prisoner.

104th regiment, majors Drummond and Moodie, slightly; captain Leonard, severely, captain Shore, slightly, lieutenants Rainford, Moore, and Delances.

Glengary light infantry, captain M'Pherson, severely; ensign Mathewson, slightly.

(Signed)

EDW. BAYNES,

*Adjutant-General, North America.*

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF  
GENERALS CHANDLER AND WINDER.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, dated*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Fort George, June 6, 1813.*

I have received an express from the head of the lake this evening, with intelligence that our troops, commanded by brigadier-general Chandler, were attacked at two o'clock this morning by the whole of the British and Indian forces, and by some strange fatality, though our loss was small (not exceeding thirty), and the enemy completely routed and driven from the field, both brigadier-generals Chandler and Winder were taken prisoners. They had advanced to ascertain the situation of a company of artillery when the attack commenced. General Vincent is reported to be among the killed of the enemy; colonel Clark was mortally wounded, and fell into our hands, with 60 prisoners of the 49th British regiment. The whole loss of the enemy is two hundred and fifty. They sent in a flag with a request to bury their dead. General Lewis, accompanied by brigadier-general Boyd, goes on to take the command of the advanced troops.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

*Hon. Gen. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

P. S. June 8.—The enemy's fleet has passed this place—two ships and four schooners.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Lewis, to the Secretary of War, dated*

Sir,

*Niagara, June 14, 1813.*

You will perceive by the enclosed copy of orders marked 1, that general Dearborn, from indisposition, has resigned his command, not only of the Niagara army but of the district. I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service. He has been repeatedly in a state of convalescence; but relapses on the least agitation of mind.

In my last I mentioned the unfortunate circumstance of the capture of our two brigadiers, Chandler and Winder. The particulars are detailed in the report of colonel Burn, which he gives from the best information he could collect. His corps lay a considerable distance from the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed diagram, which is on a scale of about 100 yards to the inch. The light corps spoken of were captain Hindman's, Nicholas's, and Biddle's companies of the 2d artillery, serving as infantry. These three gentlemen, and captains Archer and Towson of the same regiment, and Leonard of the light artillery, are soldiers who would honour any service. Their gallantry and that of their companies was equally conspicuous on this occasion as in the affair of the 27th ultimo. A view of general Chandler's encampment will be sufficient to show that his disaster was owing to its arrangement. Its centre being its weakest point, and that being discovered by the enemy in the evening, received the combined attack of his whole force, and his line was completely cut. The gallantry of the 5th, 25th, and part of the 23d, and light troops, saved the army—of the 5th it is said, that when the day broke not a man was missing—and that a part of the twenty-third under major Armstrong was found sustaining its left flank. Their fire was irresistible—and the enemy was compelled to give way. Could he have been pressed the next morning, his destruction was inevitable. He was dispersed in every direction, and even his commanding general was missing, without his hat or horse. I understand he was found the next morning almost famished, at a distance of four miles from the scene of action.

Lieutenant M'Chesney's gallantry recovered a piece of artillery, and prevented the capture of others. He merits promotion for it.

On the evening of the 6th of June, I received the order No. 4, and joined the army at five in the afternoon of the 7th. I found it at the Forty Mile Creek, 10 miles in the rear of

the ground on which it had been attacked, encamped on a plain about a mile in width, with its right flank on the lake, and its left on the creek which skirts the base of a perpendicular mountain of a considerable height. On my route I received Nos. 5 and 6 enclosed.

At six in the evening the hostile fleet hove in sight—though its character could not be ascertained with precision. We lay on our arms all night. At dawn of day struck our tents, and descried the hostile squadron abreast of us, about a mile from the shore. Our boats which transported the principal part of our baggage and camp equipage lay on the beach—it was a dead calm—and about six the enemy towed in a large schooner which opened her fire on our boats. As soon as she stood for the shore, her object being evident, I ordered down Archer's and Towson's companies, with four pieces of artillery, to resist her attempts. I at the same time sent captain Totten of the engineers (a most valuable officer) to construct a temporary furnace for heating shot, which was prepared and in operation in less than 30 minutes. Her fire was returned with vivacity and effect (excelled by no artillery in the universe), which soon compelled her to retire.

A party of savages now made their appearance on the brow of the mountain (which being perfectly bald, exhibited them to our view), and commenced a fire on our camp. I ordered colonel Christie to dislodge them, who entered on the service with alacrity, but found himself anticipated by lieutenant Eldridge, the adjutant of his regiment, who with a promptness and gallantry highly honourable to that young officer, had already gained the summit of the mountain, with a party of volunteers, and routed the barbarian allies of the defender of the christian faith. This young man merits the notice of government.

These little affairs cost us not a man. Sir James L. Yeo being disappointed of a tragedy, next determined in a true dramatic stile to amuse us with a farce. An officer with a flag was sent to me from his ship, advising me, that as I was infested with savages in my rear, a fleet in my front, and a powerful army on my flank, he, and the officers commanding his Britannic majesty's land forces, thought it their duty to demand a surrender of my army. I answered that the message was too ridiculous to merit a reply.

No 7 was delivered to me at about six this morning; between 7 and 8 o'clock the four waggons we had being loaded first with the sick and next with ammunition, &c. the residue of camp equipage and baggage was put into the boats,



and a detachment of 260 men of the sixth regiment detached to proceed in them. Orders were prepared to be given them to defend the boats, and if assailed by any of the enemy's small vessels, to carry them by boarding. By some irregularity, which I have not been able to discover, the boats put off without the detachment, induced probably by the stillness of the morning. When they had progressed about three miles a breeze sprung up, and an armed schooner overhauled them; those who were enterprising kept on and escaped, others ran to the shore and deserted their boats; we lost twelve of the number, principally containing the baggage of the officers and men.

At ten I put the army in motion on our return to this place. The savages and incorporated militia hung on our flanks and rear throughout the march, and picked up a few stragglers. On our retiring the British army advanced, and now occupies the ground we left.

The enemy's fleet is constantly hovering on our coast, and interrupting our supplies. The night before last, being advised of their having chased into Eighteen Mile Creek two vessels laden with hospital stores, &c., I detached at midnight 75 men for their protection. The report of the day is (though not official), that they arrived too late for their purpose, and that the stores are lost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORGAN LEWIS.

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

*No. 5, referred to in the Report of General Lewis.*

*(Copy.)*

*Niagara, June 6, 1813.*

Dear General, a ship having appeared this morning steering towards the head of the lake, which is undoubtedly one of the enemy's ships; and as others are appearing, you will please to return with the troops to this place as soon as possible.

Yours, with esteem,

H. DEARBORN.

P. S. The object of the enemy's fleet must be either to cover the retreat of their troops, or to bring on a reinforcement.

H. D.

*Major-General Lewis.*

*Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of the 6th of June, at Stony Creek.*

*Killed—1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 15 privates.*

*Wounded*—1 captain, 1 serjeant, 2 corporals, and 34 privates.

*Missing*—2 brigadier-generals, 1 major, 3 captains, 1 subaltern, 9 serjeants, 4 corporals, and 80 privates.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, 154.

Correct return from the reports of the different corps in the action of the 6th instant at Stoney Creek.

J. JOHNSON, *Assist. Adj.-Gen.*

*Extract from the British General Orders, dated  
Head-Quarters, 7th June, 1813.*

Brigadier-general Vincent congratulates the troops on the success which crowned the attack made by the King's and 49th regiments on the enemy's position and camp at Gages yesterday morning, when his force, consisting of not less than 3500 men, advantageously posted, and protected by a considerable number of guns, was completely routed and driven off the field; 4 pieces of cannon, with their tumbrils, horses, &c. 2 brigadier-generals, 5 field officers and captains, and upwards of 100 prisoners, were the trophies of this brilliant enterprise. Immediately after our troops had retired towards their cantonments, the enemy abandoned the position to which he had fled, and after burning and destroying a quantity of baggage and provisions, carriages, blankets, arms, &c. commenced a precipitate retreat, and did not halt until he reached the Forty Mile Creek, 12 miles (through the worst possible roads) from the scene of action: here he effected a junction with a reinforcement which was on its march to join him.

*Head-Quarters, Kingston, 8th June, 5 o'clock, P. M.*

His excellency the commander of the forces has just received an express, announcing that a strong division of the American army had advanced to the Forty Mile Creek, with the intention of attacking the position occupied by brigadier-general Vincent at the head of Burlington bay. The enemy's plan was however anticipated by the gallant general, and completely defeated by a spirited attack at day-break on the 6th instant on the American army, which was completely defeated and dispersed. Twelve officers, two of whom are generals, and five pieces of cannon were taken—and the fugitives were pursued in every direction by a numerous body of Indians under the chief Norton. The enemy's force is stated at 200 cavalry and 4000 infantry, besides a strong force in boats.

The intelligence was communicated off York, at 2 P. M. to commodore sir James Yeo, who had sailed with the fleet on the 3d instant, to co-operate with general Vincent—and immediately proceeded with reinforcements on board to support the general's further attack upon the enemy. Further reinforcements under major De Haren, proceeded this day from Kingston to join general Vincent. The British loss has been very slight. The official despatch is hourly expected. E. B. A G.

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF  
THE DETACHMENT UNDER COLONEL BOERSTLER.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Dearborn to the  
Secretary at War, dated Head Quarters,*

Sir, *Fort George, June 25th, 1813.*

I have the mortification of informing you of an unfortunate and unaccountable event which occurred yesterday. On the 23d, at evening, lieutenant-colonel Børstler, with 570 men, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen, in due proportion, was ordered to march, by the way of Queenstown, to a place called the Beaver Dams, on the high ground, about eight or nine miles from Queenstown, to attack and disperse a body of the enemy, collected there for the purpose of procuring provisions, and harassing those inhabitants who are considered friendly to the United States.

Their force was, from the most direct information, composed of one company of the 104th regiment, above eighty strong; from 150 to 200 militia, and from fifty to sixty Indians. At eight o'clock, yesterday morning, when within two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment was attacked from an ambuscade; but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods, and then retired to a clear field, and sent an express for a reinforcement, saying he would maintain his position until reinforced; a reinforcement of 300 men marched immediately under the command of colonel Christie; but on arriving at Queenstown, colonel Christie received authentic information that lieutenant-colonel Børstler with his command had surrendered to the enemy, and the reinforcement returned to camp.

A man who belonged to a small corps of mounted volunteer riflemen, came in this morning, who states that the enemy surrounded our detachment in the woods, and towards twelve o'clock commenced a general attack—that our troops

ought more than two hours, until the artillery had expended the whole of its ammunition, and then surrendered; and at the time of the surrender the informant made his escape. Why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods, without either risking a decisive action or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for, as well as the project of waiting for a reinforcement from a distance of 15 or 16 miles.

No information has been received of the killed or wounded. The enemy's fleet has again arrived in our neighbourhood.

With respect and esteem, I am, sir, yours, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

*From the London Gazette, September 11.*

*Colonial Department.*

*Downing Street, September 7.*

*A Despatch, of which the following is an extract, has been received by Earl Bathurst, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, from Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart.*

*Kingston, Upper Canada, July 3, 1813.*

I have the honour to transmit to your lordship copies of letters from colonel Vincent and lieutenant-colonel Bishop, and of the papers accompanying them, containing the highly gratifying intelligence of the capture, on the 24th ultimo, of a body of the enemy's forces, consisting of 2 field-officers, 21 other officers of different ranks, 27 non-commissioned officers, and 462 privates, together with a stand of colours and 2 field-pieces. The details of this gallant affair, which reflects so much credit on our Indian allies, as well as upon lieutenant Fitzgibbon, for the promptitude and decision with which he availed himself of the impression their attack had made upon the enemy, will, I have no doubt, be read by your lordship with great satisfaction. Since the surprise of the enemy's camp at Stoney Creek, on the 6th ultimo, and their subsequent retreat from the Forty Mile Creek, in which almost the whole of their camp equipage, together with a quantity of stores and provisions, fell into our hands, major-general Dearborn has withdrawn the troops from Fort Erie, and has concentrated his forces at Fort George. Colonel Vincent has, in consequence, made a forward movement from the head of the lake, in order to support the light infantry and Indian warriors, who are employed in circumscribing the

enemy, so as to compel them to make use of their own resources for the maintenance of their army. Major-general de Rottenburgh has assumed the command of the centre division of the army of Upper Canada. After the squadron under commodore sir James Yeo had shown itself off the Forty Mile Creek, which principally determined the enemy to retreat from that position, it was very successfully employed in interrupting and cutting off the supplies going from the Genessee river, and their other settlements upon the southern shore of the lake; five small vessels, with provisions, clothing, and other articles were taken, and several loaded boats were captured, and some destroyed.

*(Transmitted by Colonel Vincent.)*

Sir,

*Beaver Dam, June 24, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you, that the troops you have done me the honour to place under my command, have succeeded this day in taking prisoners a detachment of the United States' army, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Børstler. In this affair the Indian warriors, under the command of captain Kerr, were the only force actually engaged: to them great merit is due, and to them I feel particularly obliged for their gallant conduct on this occasion. On the appearance of the detachment of the 49th regiment, under lieutenant Fitzgibbon, and the light company of the 8th or King's regiment, the two flank companies of the 104th, under major De Haren, and the provincial cavalry under captain Hall, the whole surrendered to his majesty's forces. To the conduct of lieutenant Fitzgibbon, through whose address the capitulation was entered into, may be attributed the surrender of the American force. To major De Haren, for his speedy movement to the point of attack, and execution of the arrangements I had previously made with him, I am very much obliged. I have the honour to enclose the capitulation entered into between colonel Børstler and myself, and a return of prisoners taken, exclusive of wounded, not yet ascertained. I lost no time in forwarding my staff-adjutant, lieutenant Barnard, to communicate to you this intelligence. He has been particularly active and useful to me upon all occasions. I take this opportunity of mentioning him to you, and beg the favour of you to recommend him to his excellency sir George Prevost, as an active and promising young officer. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

CECIL BISHOPP,

*Lieutenant-colonel, commanding the troops in advance.  
Brigadier-General Vincent, &c.*

Sir, *Township of Louth, June 24, 1813.*

At De Coris, this morning, about 7 o'clock, I received information that about 1000 of the enemy, with guns, were advancing towards me from St. David's. I soon after heard a firing of cannon and musketry, and in consequence rode in advance, 2 miles on the St. David's road. I discovered by the firing that the enemy was moving for the road on the mountain. I sent off cornet M'Kenny to order out my detachment of the 49th, consisting of a subaltern and 46 rank and file, and close upon the enemy to reconnoitre. I discovered him on the mountain road, and took a position on an eminence to the right of it. My men arrived and pushed on in his front to cut off his retreat, under a fire from his guns, which however did no execution. After examining his positions, I was informed he expected reinforcements: I therefore decided upon summoning him to surrender.—After the exchange of several propositions, between lieutenant-colonel Børstler and myself in the name of lieutenant-colonel De Haren, lieutenant-colonel Børstler agreed to surrender on the terms stated in the articles of capitulation. On my return to my men to send out an officer to superintend the details of the surrender, you arrived.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. FITZGIBBON, *Lieut. 49th Foot.*  
To Major De Haren, &c. &c.

*June 24, 1813.*

Particulars of the capitulation made between captain M'Dowell, on the part of lieutenant-colonel Børstler, of the United States' army, and major De Haren, of his Britannic majesty's Canadian regiment, on the part of lieutenant-colonel Bishop, commanding the advance of the British, respecting the force under the command of lieutenant-colonel Børstler.

1st. That lieutenant-colonel Børstler, and the force under his command, shall surrender prisoners of war.

2d. That the officers shall retain their arms, horses, and baggage.

3d. That the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall lay down their arms at the head of the British column, and become prisoners of war.

4th. That the militia and volunteers, with lieutenant-colonel

nel Boerstler, shall be permitted to return to the United States on parole.

(Signed)

ANDW. M'DOWELL.

*Captain United States' Light Artillery.*

*Acceded to,*

(Signed)

P. G. BOERSTLER,

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding Detachment United States' Army.*

P. V. DE HAREN,

*Major Canadian Regiment.*

*Return of American Prisoners taken near Fort George,  
June 24, 1813.*

Light dragoons—1 cornet, 1 serjeant, 19 rank and file.  
Light artillery—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 31 rank and file. 6th regiment of infantry—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 3 serjeants, 54 rank and file. 14th ditto—1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 15 serjeants, 301 rank and file. 20th ditto—1 major. 23d ditto—1 captain, 4 serjeants, 2 drummers, 57 rank and file.

Total—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 6 captains, 13 lieutenants, 1 cornet, 1 surgeon, 25 serjeants, 2 drummers, 462 rank and file.

30 militia released on parole, not included in this return.

*Return of Ordnance, &c. taken.*

One 12 pounder, one 6 pounder, 2 cars, stand of colours of the 14th United States' regiment.

(Signed)

EDW. BAYNES, *Adj.-Gen.*

The loss of the enemy is supposed to be about 190 in killed and wounded.

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#### SKIRMISHES AT FORT GEORGE.

*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier-General Boyd to the  
Secretary of War, dated*

*Fort George, July 20.*

I have the honour to report, that on 17th instant, the enemy attacked our pickets, in a body of about 200 British, besides Indians. Detachments were sent out to support them, but with instructions to act defensively. After a contest of one hour, occasionally severe, the enemy was dispersed. Our loss was trifling—only three or four being killed, and a few wounded; the loss of the enemy has not been ascertained,

but being exposed to some well-directed fires of our light artillery, under the command of lieutenant Smith, it is probable their loss must have been comparatively great. Colonel Scott, who had the direction of our troops which were engaged, speaks highly of the ardour and steadiness of both officers and men. Being fought in detachments, many young officers had an opportunity of evincing their activity and bravery. To use the language of colonel Scott, "this affair, though small, served to test the merits of the officers and men engaged. More ardour has seldom been displayed. Captain Vandeur-sen fought his detachment with good effect; and captain Madison, with his picket guard, was fully engaged. They could not lose their ardour under major Cumming. Captain Bird-sall's riflemen were nearest to the enemy in pursuit. Major Armstrong, who was officer of the day, was active in concentrating and arranging the troops and pickets. Captain Towson, of the artillery, was wounded in the hand while voluntarily bearing colonel Scott's orders; and an officer of the rifle corps was slightly wounded."

*Copies of Letters from Brigadier-General Boyd to the  
Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Fort George, August 17, 1813.*

In the last letter which I had the honour to address to you, I had to communicate the information that commodore Chauncey had left this part of the lake; yesterday an express arrived from the Eighteen Mile Creek, stating that he was then off that place, in pursuit of the British fleet, which was likewise to be seen.

A body of volunteers, militia and Indians, under command of brigadier-general Porter of the New York militia, having arrived at this place, and very impatient to engage the enemy, a plan was this morning concerted to cut off one of his pickets. About 300 volunteers and Indians, under the command of major Chapin, was to effect this object, supported by 200 regulars under the command of major Cumming, of the 16th infantry.

A heavy rain, and other untoward circumstances, defeated the primary object, but in a skirmish that ensued, in which the enemy was completely routed, our Indians captured 12 of the British Indians, and four whites. Many of the enemy's dead were left on the field, among whom is supposed to be the famous chief, Norton. Our loss was only two Indians, and a few slightly wounded. Those who participated in this contest, particularly the Indians, conducted with great



bravery and activity. General Porter volunteered in the affair, and major Chapin evinced his accustomed zeal and courage. The regulars under major Cumming, as far as they were engaged, conducted well. The principal chiefs who led the warriors this day, were Farmer's Brother, Red Jacket, Little Billey, Pollard, Black Snake, Johnson, Silver Heels, captain Halftown, major Henry O. Ball (Cornplanter's son), and captain Cold, chief of Onondago, who was wounded. In a council which was held with them yesterday, they covenanted not to scalp or murder; and I am happy to say, that they treated the prisoners with humanity, and committed no wanton cruelties upon the dead.

The Canadian volunteers, under major Wilcox, were active and brave as usual.

I have the honour to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

JNO. P. BOYD, *Brig.-Gen. com.*

*Hon. John Armstrong.*

*Head-Quarters, Fort George, Upper Canada,*

*August 18, 1813.*

*Hon. John Armstrong.*

Sir, yesterday I had the honour to address to you a letter detailing the conduct of the Indians in a late skirmish. Their bravery and humanity were equally conspicuous. Already the quietness in which our pickets are suffered to remain, evinces the benefit arising from their assistance. Permit me to suggest the propriety of immediately depositing presents for them in the hands of Mr. Granger, of whose exertions, and those of Mr. Parish, I must express my entire approbation.

I have the honour to be, sir, your respectful obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brig.-Gen.*

*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Boyd to the Secretary of War, dated*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Fort George, August 24, 1813.*

I have the honour to report, that at day-break this morning, the enemy attacked us at all our pickets, which retired towards the camp, pursued by his advance guards. A skirmish ensued in the village, with little effect upon us; after which he retreated, having come within reach of our cannon, but never within musket shot of our entrenchments.

One captain of the 49th and a few privates have been brought in prisoners. We lost two men, and a few wounded;

the enemy left about 15 dead on the different grounds. He is supposed to have brought his whole force into the field; but finding our position so strong, desisted from a general attack. Sir George Prevost was in person at the attack. His force is withdrawn out of our reach into his strong holds.

I have the honour to be, sir, your respectful, obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD, *Brig.-Gen.*

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier-General M'Clure to his Excellency Governor Tompkins, dated  
Fort George, half past 5 o'clock,  
P. M., 6th October, 1813.*

Since writing the above we have commenced offensive operations against the enemy. About 500 militia volunteers and about 150 Indians, commanded by colonel Chapin, attacked the picket guard of the enemy about a mile and a half from Fort George, and drove them into the main body, when the enemy opened a fire from several field-pieces. Our men retired in good order into the fort, with the loss of one man killed and two or three wounded. The enemy's loss was seven killed, many wounded, and four prisoners. In a short time the enemy appeared in considerable force within 500 yards of the fort, at the edge of the woods; Chapin again sallied out with about 300 men and some Indians, commenced a brisk fire on the whole of the enemy's line, and drove them half a mile—but perceiving by the movements of the enemy that they would outflank us, I ordered 200 to reinforce him, and in two detachments to attack the enemy's flank. We succeeded in driving the enemy into the woods, when night coming on put an end to the conflict. Our loss was trifling; I have not ascertained that of the enemy. Colonel Chapin is a brave man. Every officer and soldier did his duty.

*Address to the Inhabitants of the Upper Province of Canada.*

Brigadier-general M'Clure, commanding on the Niagara frontier, finds the upper province deserted by the British army, and abandoned by its government—In the peculiar situation of the inhabitants, it is essential to their security that some regulation should be established for their government, while the American army has the power of enforcing them. The general regrets to say, that illegal, unauthorized, and forbidden pillage has been committed by a few, who are lost to

all honour, and insensible of the obligations of a soldier To arrest such practices, to afford all the protection in his power, and to ensure safety to the property and persons of the inhabitants who are now under his controul, the general has issued this address.

The employment of the Indians has been a source of extreme regret to the general. But finding them called out by the government of the United States, and expecting to attack an army who had long employed them in scenes of atrocity and outrage, at which humanity shudders, he was driven to the only alternative left him of using the same weapon against our enemies which they had used against ourselves.—That the British army had abandoned their encampments and fled before the American force, does not weaken the necessity which he was under, of employing the Indians before he knew that the enemy had absconded.—At the same time, it is due to them to say, that the Indians have conducted themselves far better than had been expected, if the example of the British officers and British savages be a criterion. Not a single individual has been scalped or tomahawked by them, no prisoner of war has been burnt, the dead have not been thrown into the public highways, women and children have not been massacred, nor has private property been destroyed, except in cases where the former conduct of the owners required exemplary retaliation. The property which they have plundered, was, in cases where it was possible, restored to the inhabitants at the expence of the United States, and when the necessity for their employment ceased to exist, the Indians were sent to the American side of the river, beyond the reach of temptation, to wait until circumstances justified another call upon them.—The relation of these facts is due to the honour of our government, to the reputation of the general, and to the merits of the Indians. From it also, the inhabitants of Canada may learn what they may expect from American forbearance and clemency.

To insure that forbearance, the inhabitants have an easy duty to perform. Let them be perfectly neutral, let them abstain from communications with the British army, and remain at home quietly pursuing their avocations. Those who conduct differently will incur the penalties of rigorous martial law. The character of our free republican government, and the nature of our institutions, will justify your expectation of security and protection. All civil magistrates will continue to exercise the functions of their offices merely as conservators of the peace; as far as they are able, they will

preserve order and quiet among the inhabitants. The existing laws of the province, so far as they regard the public peace, and not interfering with the regulations of the army, will be considered in force until other measures are taken. The magistrates are particularly required to give information at head-quarters, of all violences committed by American troops on citizens, unless they are authorized by a written order. The general enjoins the inhabitants to submit to their magistrates, and those who refuse obedience must be reported to head-quarters. The brigadier-general invites all the inhabitants who are disposed to be peaceable, orderly, and neutral, to return to their homes and their business. He cannot promise complete security, but he engages, as far as his power extends, to protect the innocent, the unfortunate, and the distressed.

GEO. M'CLURE,

*Commanding Niagara Frontier.*

*Head-Quarters, Fort George, October 16, 1813.*

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SIEGE OF LOWER SANDUSKY.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Seneca Town, August 4, 1813.*

In my letter of the 1st instant, I did myself the honour to inform you that one of my scouting parties had just returned from the lake shore, and had discovered, the day before, the enemy in force near the mouth of the Sandusky bay. The party had not passed Lower Sandusky two hours, before the advance, consisting of Indians, appeared before the fort, and in half an hour after a large detachment of British troops; and in the course of the night they commenced a cannonading against the fort with three six-pounders and two howitzers; the latter from gun-boats. The firing was partially answered by major Croghan, having a six-pounder, the only piece of artillery.

The fire of the enemy was continued at intervals, during the second instant, until about half after five, P. M., when, finding that their cannon made little impression upon the works, and having discovered my position here, and apprehending an attack, an attempt was made to carry the place by storm. Their troops were formed in two columns; lieutenant-colonel Short headed the principal one, composed of the light and battalion companies of the 41st regiment.

This gallant officer conducted his men to the brink of the ditch, under the most galling and destructive fire from the garrison, and leaping into it was followed by a considerable part of his own and the light company; at this moment a masked port hole was suddenly opened, and a six-pounder with a half load of powder and a double charge of leaden slugs, at the distance of 30 feet, poured destruction upon them, and killed or wounded nearly every man who had entered the ditch. In vain did the British officers exert themselves to lead on the balance of the column; it retired in disorder under a shower of shot from the fort, and sought safety in the adjoining woods. The other column headed by the grenadiers had also retired, after having suffered from the muskets of our men, to an adjacent ravine. In the course of the night, the enemy, with the aid of their Indians, drew off the greater part of the wounded and dead, and embarking them in boats descended the river with the utmost precipitation. In the course of the 2d instant, having heard the cannonading, I made several attempts to ascertain the force and situation of the enemy; our scouts were unable to get near the fort, from the Indians which surrounded it. Finding, however, that the enemy had only light artillery, and being well convinced that it could make little impression upon the works, and that any attempt to storm it would be resisted with effect, I waited for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers, which on the evening before had left Upper Sandusky. But as soon as I was informed that the enemy were retreating, I set out with the dragoons to endeavour to overtake them, leaving generals M<sup>r</sup>Arthur and Cass to follow with all the infantry (about 700) that could be spared from the protection of the stores and sick at this place. I found it impossible to come up with them. Upon my arrival at Sandusky, I was informed by the prisoners that the enemy's forces consisted of 490 regular troops, and 500 of Dixon's Indians, commanded by general Proctor in person, and that Tecumseh, with about 2000 warriors, was somewhere in the swamps, between this and Fort Meigs, expecting my advancing, or that of a convoy of provisions.

As there was no prospect of doing any thing in front, and being apprehensive that Tecumseh might destroy the stores and small detachments in my rear, I sent orders to general Cass, who commanded the reserve, to fall back to this place, and to general M<sup>r</sup>Arthur with the front line to follow and support him. I remained at Sandusky until the parties that were sent out in every direction returned—not an enemy was to be seen.

I am sorry that I cannot transmit you major Croghan's official report. He was to have sent it to me this morning, but I have just heard that he was so much exhausted by 36 hours of continued exertion, as to be unable to make it. It will not be amongst the least of general Proctor's mortifications to find that he has been baffled by a youth who has just passed his twenty-first year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle (general George R. Clark).

Captain Hunter, of the 17th regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great propriety; and never were a set of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz. lieutenants Johnson and Baylor, of the 17th, Anthony of the 34th, Meeks of the 7th, and ensigns Shipp and Duncan of the 17th.

The following account of the unworthy artifice and conduct of the enemy will excite your indignation. Major Chambers was sent by general Proctor, accompanied by colonel Elliott, to demand the surrender of the fort. They were met by ensign Shipp. The major observed, that general Proctor had a number of cannon, a large body of regular troops, and so many Indians whom it was impossible to controul; and if the fort was taken, as it must be, the whole of the garrison would be massacred. Mr. Shipp answered, that it was the determination of major Croghan, his officers and men, to defend the garrison or be buried in it; and that they might do their best. Colonel Elliott then addressed Mr. Shipp, and said, "you are a fine young man; I pity your situation; for God's sake surrender, and prevent the dreadful slaughter that must follow resistance." Shipp turned from him with indignation, and was immediately taken hold of by an Indian, who attempted to wrest his sword from him. Elliott pretended to exert himself to release him, and expressed great anxiety to get him safe in the fort.

I have the honour to enclose you a copy of the first note received from major Croghan. It was written before day; and it has since been ascertained, that of the enemy there remained in the ditch one lieutenant-colonel, one lieutenant, and 25 privates: the number of prisoners, one serjeant and 25 privates; 14 of them badly wounded: every care has been taken of the latter, and the officers buried with the honours due to their rank and bravery. All the dead that were not in the ditch, were taken off in the night by the Indians. It is impossible, from the circumstances of the attack, that they should have lost less than 100. Some of the prisoners think that it amounted to 200. A young gentlemen, a private in

the Petersburg volunteers, of the name of Brown, assisted by five or six of that company, and of the Pittsburg blues, who were accidentally in the fort, managed the six-pounder which produced such destruction in the ranks of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

N. B. Of our few wounded men there is but one that will not be well in less than six days.

*Major Croghan's Note.*

(Copy.)

Dear sir,

*Lower Sandusky, August 3, 1813.*

The enemy made an attempt to storm us last evening, but was repulsed with the loss of at least 100 killed, wounded, and prisoners. One lieutenant-colonel (lieutenant-colonel Short), a major, and a lieutenant, with about 40 privates, are dead in our ditch. I have lost but one in killed, and but few wounded. Further statements will be made you by the bearer.

GEO. CROGHAN, *Major,*  
*Commanding Fort Sandusky.*

N. B. Since writing the above, two soldiers of the 41st regiment have got in, who state that the enemy have retreated. In fact, one of their gun boats is within 300 yards of our works, said to be loaded with camp equipage, &c. which they in their hurry have left.

GEO. CROGHAN.

*From General Harrison to the Secretary of War.*

*Head-Quarters, Seneca Town,*

*5th August, 1813—6 o'clock, A. M.*

I have the honour to enclose you major Croghan's report of the attack upon his fort, which has this moment come to hand. Fortunately the mail has not closed.

With great respect I have the honour to be, sir, your humble servant,

WM. HENRY HARRISON.

(Copy.)

Dear sir,

*Lower Sandusky, August 5, 1813.*

I have the honour to inform you, that the combined forces of the enemy, amounting to at least 500 regulars and 700 or 800 Indians, under the immediate command of general Proctor, made its appearance before this place, early on Sunday evening last, and so soon as the general had

made such disposition of his troops as would cut off my retreat, should I be disposed to make one, he sent colonel Elliott, accompanied by major Chambers, with a flag, to demand the surrender of the fort, as he was anxious to spare the effusion of blood, which he should probably not have in his power to do, should he be reduced to the necessity of taking the place by storm. My answer to the summons was, that I was determined to defend the place to the last extremity, and that no force, however large, should induce me to surrender it. So soon as the flag had returned, a brisk fire was opened upon us from the gun-boats in the river, and from a 5½ inch howitzer on shore, which was kept up with little intermission throughout the night. At an early hour the next morning, three sixes (which had been placed during the night within 250 yards of the pickets) began to play upon us with little effect. About four o'clock, P. M., discovering that the fire from all his guns was concentrated against the north-western angle of the fort, I became confident that his object was to make a breach, and attempt to storm the works at that point, I therefore ordered out as many men as could be employed for the purpose of strengthening that part, which was so effectually secured by means of bags of flour, sand, &c. that the picketing suffered little or no injury; notwithstanding which the enemy, about 500, having formed in close column, advanced to assault our works at the expected point, at the same time making two feints on the front of captain Hunter's lines. The column which advanced against the north-western angle, consisting of about 350 men, was so completely enveloped in smoke, as not to be discovered until it had approached within 18 or 20 paces of the lines, but the men being all at their posts and ready to receive it, commenced so heavy and galling a fire as to throw the column a little into confusion; being quickly rallied, it advanced to the outer works, and began to leap into the ditch. Just at that moment a fire of grape was opened from our six-pounder (which had been previously arranged so as to rake in that direction), which, together with the musketry, threw them into such confusion that they were compelled to retire precipitately to the woods.

During the assault, which lasted about half an hour, an incessant fire was kept up by the enemy's artillery (which consisted of five sixes and a howitzer), but without effect. My whole loss during the siege, was one killed and seven wounded, slightly. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must exceed 150: one lieutenant-colonel, a lieutenant,



and 50 rank and file were found in and about the ditch, dead or wounded.—Those of the remainder who were not able to escape were taken off during the night by Indians. Seventy stand of arms, and several brace of pistols have been collected near the works. About three in the morning the enemy sailed down the river, leaving behind them a boat, containing clothing and considerable military stores.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates under my command, for their gallantry and good conduct during the siege.

Yours, with respect,

(Signed)

G. CROGHAN,

*Major 17th United States' Inf. com. L. S.  
Major-General Harrison, commanding N. W. Army.*

*Copy of a Letter from the British General Proctor to General Harrison.*

Sir,

*Amherstburg, August 7th, 1813.*

The bearer, lieutenant Le Breton, in the service of his Britannic majesty, I send under a flag of truce, with surgical aid, of which you may not have a sufficiency, for the brave soldiers who were too severely wounded to come off, or who may have lost their way after the unsuccessful attack made on the 2d instant, on the fort at Sandusky.

Expecting every consideration from the brave soldier for a wounded enemy, I flatter myself that those prisoners in your possession, and who can be removed without injury, will be permitted to return here on my parole of honour, that they shall not serve until truly and regularly exchanged.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

HENRY PROCTOR.

*The Officer commanding the Fort at Sandusky.*

*General Harrison's Reply.*

*Head-Quarters, 8th Military District of the United States,*

Sir,

*August 10, 1813.*

Your letter addressed to the officer commanding at Lower Sandusky, was forwarded from thence to me, and received this moment. Upon my arrival at Fort Sandusky on the morning of the 3d instant, I found that major Croghan, conformably to those principles which are held sacred in the American army, had caused all the care to be taken of the wounded prisoners that his situation would permit. Having with me my hospital surgeon, he was particularly charged to attend to them, and I am

warranted in the belief that every aid that surgical skill could give was afforded.—They have been liberally furnished too with every article necessary in their situation which our hospital stores could supply.

Having referred to my government for orders respecting the disposition of the prisoners, I cannot with propriety comply with your request for an immediate exchange.

But I assure you, sir, that as far as it depends upon me, the course of treatment which has been commenced towards them, whilst in my possession, will be continued.

I have the honour to be, sir, your humble servant,

WM. HENRY HARRISON,

*Major-General commanding 8th U. S. Military District.  
Brig.-Gen. Proctor, commanding the British Forces  
at Amherstburg, &c.*

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OPERATIONS OF THE BLOCKADING SQUADRON.

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore John Cassin to the Secretary  
of the Navy.*

Sir,

*Navy Yard, Gosport, June 21, 1813.*

On Saturday, at 11, P. M., captain Tarbell moved with the flotilla under his command, consisting of 15 gun-boats, in two divisions, lieutenant John M. Gardner 1st division, and lieutenant Robert Henley the 2d, manned from the frigate, and 50 musketeers general Taylor ordered from Craney Island, and proceeded down the river; but adverse winds and squalls prevented his approaching the enemy until Sunday morning at 4, P. M., when the flotilla commenced a heavy galling fire on a frigate, at about three quarters of a mile distance, lying well up the roads, two other frigates lying in sight.

At half past four a breeze sprung up from E. N. E. which enabled the two frigates to get under way, one a razee or very heavy ship, and the other a frigate, to come nearer into action. The boats in consequence of their approach hauled off, though keeping up a well-directed fire on the razee and other ship, which gave us several broadsides. The frigate first engaged, supposed to be the Junon, was certainly very severely handled—had the calm continued one half hour that frigate must have fallen into our hands or been destroyed. She must have slipt her mooring so as to drop nearer the razee, who had all sails set coming up to her with the other

frigate. The action continued one hour and a half with the three ships. Shortly after the action, the razeed got along side of the ship, and had her upon a deep careen in a little time, with a number of boats and stages round her. I am satisfied considerable damage was done to her, for she was silenced some time, until the razeed opened her fire, when she commenced again.

Our loss is very trifling. Mr. Allinson, master's mate on board No. 139, was killed early in the action by an 18-pound ball, which passed through him and lodged in the mast. No. 154 had a shot between wind and water. No. 67 had her franklin shot away, and several of them had some of their sweeps as well as their stanchion shot away, but two men slightly injured by the splinters from the sweeps; on the flood tide several ships of the line and frigates came into the roads, and we did expect an attack last night. There are now in the roads, 13 ships of the line and frigates, one brig, and several tenders.

I cannot say too much for the officers and crew on this occasion: for every man appeared to go into action with so much cheerfulness, apparently, to do their duty, resolved to conquer. I had a better opportunity of discovering their actions than any one else, being in my boat the whole of the action. I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN CASSIN.

*The Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*Copy of a Letter from General Taylor to the Secretary at War.*  
Sir, *Head-Quarters, Norfolk, 4th July.*

I have the honour to transmit colonel Beatty's report of the attack on Craney Island, on the 22d of June last. His multiplied and pressing avocations have prevented his completing it till to day.

The whole force on the island at the time of the attack, consisted of 50 riflemen, 446 infantry of the line, 91 state artillery, and 150 seamen and marines, furnished by captain Tarbell. Of these 43 were on the sick list.

The courage and constancy with which this inferior force, in the face of a formidable naval armament, not only sustained a position in which nothing was complete, but repelled the enemy with considerable loss, cannot fail to inspire the approbation of their government and the applause of their country. It has infused into the residue of the army a general spirit of competition, the beneficial effects of which will, I trust, be employed at our future combats.

I cannot withhold my grateful acknowledgments to commodore Cassin, captain Tarbell, and the officers and crews of the Constellation and gun-boats, who have in every instance aided our operations with a cordiality, zeal, and ability not to be surpassed.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT TAYLOR,

*Brigadier-General commanding.*

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

*Copy of Colonel Beatty's Report to General Taylor.*

Sir,

*Craney Island, June 25, 1813.*

Some movements on the 21st instant, among the British shipping, lying near Newport's Noose, seemed to indicate an early attack on this island, and in the course of the next morning, on the 22d instant, they landed two miles from this, from the best accounts that can be ascertained from deserters, 2500 troops of various descriptions. The object of this movement was, no doubt, with the view to approach this post on the west side of the island, across the water in that direction, which at low water is passable by infantry. Soon after their landing, there approached 45 or 50 boats full of men, which directed their course from the shipping as above stated, to the north side of the island.

The British troops, at the same time (that were previously landed), made their appearance on the main land with a view of attacking the west and north positions of the island at the same moment. Two twenty-four-pounders and four six-pounders were advantageously posted under the direction of major Faulkner of the artillery, which being so well served by captain Emerson, lieutenants Howell and Goodwin, who displayed that cool and deliberate conduct, which will at all times insure success to the cause in which they are engaged. Lieutenant Neale, of the Constellation, during our defence, conducted himself with active zeal and courage, which at all times add a lustre to the name of an American naval officer. Captain Rook, of the ship Manhattan, conducted himself with great activity and judgment in defence of the place, which will no doubt give him a distinguished part in the success of the day. Great praise is also due to the conduct of serjeant Young and corporal Moffit of captain Emerson's company, for the active part they took in the management of two six-pounders.

Much credit is due to captain Tarbell, of the Constellation, for the aid he gave in defence of the island, in forward-

ing from his ship 150 sailors and marines, with the officers commanding the same, which no doubt contributed greatly in the successful defence of the island. Indeed, both officers and soldiers of every description showed a degree of zeal for the defence of the place; and when opportunity may offer, we may confidently hope they will not be wanting in duty. The loss of the enemy cannot be less than 200 in the course of the day, a number of which were killed on the land side by our artillery. But it is known that four or five of their barges were sunk, one of which, the Centepiede, said to be 52 feet long, working twenty-four oars, belonging to admiral Warren's ship, was taken and brought in with twenty-two prisoners, and a small brass three-pounder, with a number of small arms, pistols, and cutlasses.

Beside the loss in killed, there must have been at least 40 deserters brought in, in the course of the day, and dispersed through the country.

It is with pleasure I have to state to you that not a man was lost on our part; the only weapon made use of by the enemy in the course of the day were the Congreve rockets, a few of which fell in our encampment, though without injury.

I am, sir, with the greatest respect, your humble servant,

H. BEATTY, *Lieut.-Col. com.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major Crutchfield to his Excellency James Barbour, Governor of Virginia.*

Sir, *York County, Half-way House, June 28, 1813.*

Although I have given you, by two communications, a partial account of the engagement with the enemy at Hampton, on the 25th instant, I will now, having it more in my power, beg leave to communicate to your excellency a detail of the occurrences of the day.

At an early period of the morning on the 25th instant, our Mill-creek patrol gave information that from 30 to 40 British barges filled with men were approaching the mouth of Hampton creek by the inner channel, from the direction of Newport's Noose. Our troops were immediately formed on their encampment, on Little England plantation, south-west of, and divided from Hampton by a narrow creek, over which a slight foot-bridge had been erected. In a short time after, our Celey's patrol reported the landing and approach of a number of the enemy's troops in our rear. A little after five o'clock, several barges were seen approaching Black-beard's Point, the headmost of which commenced a firing of round shot, which was immediately returned from our battery of

four long 12-pounders. The enemy, intimidated by the quick and direct fire of our cannon, drew back and sheltered himself behind the point; and from thence continued to throw his round 12 and 18-pound shots, accompanied by a great number of rockets, charged with combustible matter, which, with very few exceptions, and those without injurious effect upon our detachment or encampment, either fell short of, or over-reached their object. For the space of three quarters of an hour or more, during which time an exchange of discharges took place without the enemy's doing any damage, our infantry troops were posted under cover of a high ditch, immediately in front of our camp. During this period, many rockets and large shots fell within our encampment. At this time our rifle company, which, upon the earliest information of the enemy's approach by land, had been despatched to conceal themselves in the woods, near the road by which it was supposed the enemy was approaching, commenced a well-directed and destructive fire on the head of the invading columns. Being now well satisfied as to the point of attack on us from the land side, and discovering, from the timidity of the enemy in his barges, that no landing was intended to be made on our water position, and knowing that our rifle corps, from its great inferiority to the enemy, was in a very critical situation, I marched with the infantry under my command to the point of attack, in order to support it, as well as to annoy the enemy in his approach, and prevent his making an attack in our rear, advantageous to his views, and in aid of his intention to surround and cut us off from retreat.

We advanced in columns of platoons through a lane and an open cornfield which led from our encampment to the enemy, and to the Main and Celey's roads—and when in the field within 200 yards of the gate opening into the Celey road and a thicket of pines, we were fired upon by the enemy's musketry from a thick wood at the upper end of a field immediately bordering on the road. Upon this discharge orders were given to wheel to the left into line and march upon the enemy. In this position we had marched not more than 50 yards, when the enemy opened upon us two six-pound field-pieces loaded with grape and cannister shot, and his machines filled with rockets of a small size. Upon this sudden, and to our whole detachment, totally unexpected attack with ordnance, I deemed it necessary to wheel again into column, and gain, if possible, a passage through the gate defile, with a position in the woods immediately behind

*Extract of a Letter from General Taylor to Admiral Warren, dated Head-Quarters, Norfolk, 29th June, 1813.*

I have heard with grief and astonishment of the excesses both to property and persons committed by the land troops who took possession of Hampton. The respect I entertain for your personal character leads me to make known these excesses. It would not become me to suggest what course of inquiry and punishment is due to the honour of your arms. But the world will suppose those acts to have been approved, if not excited, which are passed over with impunity. I do not, however, deprecate any measures you may think necessary or proper, but am prepared for any species of warfare, which you may be disposed to prosecute. It is for the sake of humanity I enter this protest.

We are in this part of the country merely in the noviciate of our warfare. The character it will hereafter assume, whether of mildness or ferocity, will materially depend on the first operations of our arms, and on the personal character and dispositions of the respective commanders.

For myself, I assure you most solemnly, that I neither have authorised, nor will sanction any outrage on humanity or the laws of civilized warfare. On the contrary, I think it due no less to my personal honour than to that of our country, to repress and punish every excess. I hope that these sentiments will be reciprocated. It will depend on you whether the evils inseparable from a state of war, shall, in our operations, be tempered by the mildness of civilized life, or, under your authority, be aggravated by all the fiend-like passions which can be instilled into them.

*His Britannic Majesty's Ship San Domingo,*  
Sir, *Hampton Roads, Chesapeake, June 29th, 1813.*

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day, stating that you had communicated to your government the proposal of an exchange of prisoners, and also, that some excesses had been committed by the troops in the late affair at Hampton. I have communicated to my friend, sir Sidney Beckwith, the commander of his majesty's forces on shore, this part of your letter, and he will have the honour of writing to you upon the points to which it alludes.

I beg leave to assure you that it is my wish to alleviate the misfortunes of the war commenced against my country, by every means in my power; at the same time I am prepared to meet any result that may ensue between the two nations.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient, faithful  
humble servant,

(Signed)                      JOHN BORLASE WARREN,  
*Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief.*  
*Brigadier-General Taylor, commanding the*  
*United States' Forces at Hampton.*

Sir,                      *His Majesty's Ship San Domingo, June 29th, 1813.*

Admiral sir John Warren having communicated to me the contents of your letter, I lose no time in assuring you that your wish cannot exceed mine to carry on war with every attention to the unfortunate individuals in whose immediate vicinity military operations may take place. In this spirit I shall vie with you to the utmost. At the same time I ought to state to you, that the excesses of which you complain at Hampton, were occasioned by a proceeding of so extraordinary a nature, that if I had not been an eye-witness, I could not have credited it. At the recent attempt on Craney Island, the troops in a barge sunk by the fire of your guns, clung to the wreck of the boat. Several Americans, I assure you most solemnly, waded off from the island, and in presence of all engaged, fired upon, and shot these poor fellows. With a feeling natural to such a proceeding, the men of that corps landed at Hampton.

That occurrences of that kind may never occur again, and that the troops of each nation may be guided by sentiments of honour and humanity, is the earnest wish of, sir, your very obedient servant,

(Signed)                      SIDNEY BECKWITH, *Q.-M. Gen.*  
*To Brig.-Gen Taylor, commanding the U. S. Troops, Norfolk.*

Sir,                      *Head-Quarters, Norfolk, July 1, 1813.*

It affords me the highest satisfaction to receive your assurance that you wish "to carry on war with every attention to the unfortunate individuals in whose immediate vicinity military operations may take place." Such sentiments can alone give splendour to courage and confer honour on military skill. Worthless is the laurel steeped in female tears, and joyless the conquests which have inflicted needless woe on the peaceful and unresisting. The frankness with which you admit the excesses at Hampton is a guarantee against the repetition.

I cannot doubt, sir, your conviction that the scene described by you at Craney Island was really acted. But the very reason it appeared to you incredible and inhuman, it should have



been unauthorised. Your own perception of propriety shall decide, if facts should not have been ascertained and redress demanded, before retaliation was resorted to, a retaliation too, extravagant in its measures, applying not to the perpetrator of the alleged offence, or their comrades, but to the innocent and helpless. I have reason to think that you are mistaken in your impressions of the conduct of our troops at Craney Island. That they waded into the water on the sinking of your boat is true ; but I learn that it was for the purpose of securing their conquest and assisting the perishing. One person, perhaps more, was shot, but it was only for a continued effort to escape, after repeated offers of safety on surrender (such at least is the representation made to me). If, however, your yielding troops have been butchered, it is due to the honour of our arms to disclaim and punish the enormity. The fame of my country shall never be tarnished by such conduct in the troops under my command. I have to day ordered an inquiry into the facts, by a board of field officers. Proper measures shall be taken to punish whatsoever of impropriety may have been committed. I flatter myself you will perceive in these measures a disposition to afford no cause of reproach in any future conflict. When we meet let us combat as soldiers, jealous of the honour of our respective countries, anxious to surpass each other as well in magnanimity as in courage.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my consideration and respect.

(Signed)

ROBERT B. TAYLOR,

*Brigadier-General, commanding.*

*To Sir Sidney Beckwith, Q.-M. Gen. commanding the  
Land Forces of his B. M. Hampton Roads.*

*Extract of a Letter from Brigadier-General Taylor to the Secretary of War, dated Norfolk, 2d July, 1813.*

I enclose, as was promised yesterday, copies of the letters written to admiral Warren and general Beckwith. My aid, who carried them down yesterday, brought back a letter from admiral Warren, of which a copy is enclosed, and has made a statement of what occurred in his conference with the general.

The letter of the admiral, though polite, is certainly not responsive to any thing which has occurred, and the conversation with the general, though equally civil, is obviously designed to prevent any further discussion on the subject. From the report of prisoners and deserters, there is too much reason to believe that before the attack on Craney Island, the

cupidity of the troops had been excited by a promise of the pillage of Norfolk. To inflame their resentment after their failure, and to keep alive the hope of plunder at Norfolk, there is much reason to fear that our troops have unmeritedly been charged with misconduct at Craney Island, and that made a pretext for their excesses and their conduct at Hampton. I entertain no doubt of the justification of the honour and magnanimity of our men, by the reports of the board of officers. I do not mean that the subject shall drop, but when I communicate the report, I shall leave the British commander the alternative, either of adopting similar measures in his own army, or remaining under the imputation of having excited their troops to commit these excesses. Our troops are highly inflamed.

(Copy.)

*Notes for Captain Myers in his interview with Admiral Warren.*

A defenceless and unresisting town has been given up to indiscriminate pillage, though civilized war tolerates this only as to fortified places carried by assault, and after summons.

Individuals have been stripped naked; a sick man stabbed twice in the hospital; a sick man shot at Pembroke in his bed, and in the arms of his wife, long after the defeat of the troops; his wife also shot at and wounded—a Mr. and Mrs. Kirby.

Females have been not only assaulted and personally abused and struck, but even violated.

If occasion offers, notice may be immediately made of the information given by prisoners and deserters, of the promise to plunder Norfolk.

As to the imputation on our troops at Craney Island, if admiral Warren should mention it, deny the fact, and state the actual conduct of our troops, in going into the water to assist their men, and then giving them refreshments as soon as they entered the fort. Refer to the conduct of all our prisoners, particularly those taken from the boats of the Victorious.

JOHN MYERS, *Capt. and Aid-de-camp.*

(Copy.)

Sir,

*Head-Quarters, Norfolk, July 2d, 1813.*

In obedience to your orders, I proceeded yesterday with a flag of truce to admiral Warren in Hampton Roads, to whom I handed both the dispatch for himself and that for sir Sidney

Beckwith. The admiral received me with civility, and with many acknowledgments for the terms of your letter. Sir Sidney was on shore at Old Point Comfort. Feeling some difficulty about the propriety of delaying on board for his arrival, I was about to depart, but admiral Warren expressed a wish that I would remain, saying that he would desire no doubt to give a reply.

Sir Sidney did not arrive till 8 o'clock. He expressed great respect for the motives that had actuated you, sir, in the measures which you were pursuing. They were more than he desired. It was sufficient, he said, if your own mind was satisfied. He expressed regret at the trouble that you had taken, and much deference for your character, with a resolution to vie with you in efforts to confine future operations within the bounds of humanity, and the usages of war. He said, in allusion to the pretended conduct of our men at Craney Island, that it proceeded no doubt from a few of the more disorderly. I denied the charge altogether, as I had done in my previous interview, when it was made the justification of their outrages at Hampton, on the ground of retaliation.

I found that it was not his intention to give to your despatch a written reply. By the light manner in which he glanced at the the subject of your investigation, I could perceive that it was pressed further than was desirable to him. It was my wish, however, to be able to report to you the probability of a like course of inquiry on his part, and I enumerated the catalogue of abuses and violence at Hampton. I mentioned the pillage of the town and the wanton destruction of medicine; that individuals had been stripped naked, a sick man stabbed twice, who was in the hospital; a sick man shot in his bed at Pembroke, and in the arms of his wife, who was also shot at and wounded, long after the defeat of the troops, a Mr. and Mrs. Kirby; and finally the assault on females, their being struck and personally abused, and even violated.

At the mention of the murder of Kirby and the wound given to his wife, sir Sidney distinctly admitted it; the others he appeared not to be acquainted with the particulars of, and expressed some concern at it. He said that he had, however, on coming to a knowledge of their conduct, immediately ordered the embarkation of the troops that were concerned, with a determination that they should not again land; and that while he was unable to controul a past event, the responsibility of a recurrence should rest on himself; that the troops under his command were strangers to him on his arrival here, and appealing to my knowledge of the nature of the war in

Spain, in which these men (meaning the French corps) he said had been trained, told me they could not be restrained. Thus far he thought he could not give a more convincing proof of the sincerity of his professions than in the withdrawal of these troops, and that he had, moreover, just been employed in finding a new watering place on Back river in order to remove from Hampton, and to quiet the minds of the inhabitants.

He assured me that in making such a pledge as he was doing, it should not be lightly regarded. That he would either send away these troops, or wait the arrival of others, for new operations. He concluded by expressing a hope that you, sir, would in future use no reserve in communicating any subject of impropriety; and on his part, that he should certainly do so, with a due regard to the liberality of your conduct; he hoped the subject was at rest.—I took my leave.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN MYERS, *Capt and Aid-de-camp.*  
*Brigadier-General Robert B. Taylor, Norfolk.*

*Extract of a Letter from General Taylor to Sir Sidney Beckwith, Quarter-Master-General, commanding the Land Force of His Britannic Majesty at Hampton Roads, dated*  
*Head-Quarters, July 5, 1813.*

I have now the honour to transmit to you the proceedings of the board of officers convened to enquire into the transactions at Craney Island. They doubtless will convince you that in that affair the American troops merited no censure; that their conduct was distinguished by humanity and magnanimity; and that the distance to which you were removed from the scene, by rendering it impossible that you could be informed of the motives of their conduct, unhappily led you to draw conclusions equally mistaken and unmerited.

You have done me the justice to declare that the measures pursued by me, evince a disposition to permit in my troops no abuses on humanity or the laws of authorized war. As I cannot doubt the existence of similar sentiments with you, I have a right to expect on your part, measures equally decisive and unambiguous. If I have deemed it needful to forbid openly to my whole army all acts of impropriety, and to direct a public investigation of charges believed to be unmerited, but having the sanction of your imputation, I put it to your candour to determine, if excesses in your troops, admitted by yourself, and some of them of the most atrocious

character, should pass unnoticed. My conduct and your declarations, give me a claim to ask that these excesses be punished. Your army will then learn the abhorrence you feel for such acts, and be restrained, by the fear of your indignation, from similar outrages. But if these admitted excesses are passed by, the impunity of the past will be construed by your troops into an encouragement of future outrages, and your own humane intentions be completely defeated. Neither can you be unmindful of the propriety of taking from my army the pretexts for impropriety, by a knowledge of effectual restraints on yours.

I am fully impressed with the liberality of your conduct in promising to remove the troops who committed the outrages at Hampton, from the opportunity of repeating these enormities. But, besides that my confidence in the gallantry of the American troops forbids me to desire any diminution of your force, such a measure being liable to misconception by our own troops, might not attain your object. The rank and file of an army seldom reason very profoundly, and, however erroneously, might ascribe their withdrawal to the desertions which have on every opportunity taken place in that corps, and in their unwillingness, if any should have been displayed, to fire on the American troops. If this should unfortunately be the case, your force will be diminished, without securing the great ends of discipline and humanity, for which you had, with so much liberality, made the sacrifice. I am the more pressing on this subject, because I have reason to believe, that even since your assurance, though unquestionably against your wishes, very improper acts have been committed by the troops on James river. The domestic property of peaceable private citizens, respected by all civilized nations, has been pillaged, and what furnished no allurements to cupidity, has been wantonly defaced and destroyed.

If such acts are either directed or sanctioned, it is important to us and to the world, to know what species of warfare the arms of Great Britain mean to wage. If authorized, it will be of little practical avail to know that the director of these arms entertains the most liberal personal dispositions, while these dispositions remain dormant and inoperative.

If I am troublesome on this subject, charge it to my anxious desire that nothing may occur to embitter our own feelings and those of our respective nations. In the progress of the war charges of inhumanity have unhappily been frequent and reciprocal. I am not indifferent to the infamy which such a charge fixes on the officer, who either encou-

rages or permits it. I derive the highest satisfaction from the assurances you have given of similar sentiments. We have, sir, become enemies, by the sacred obligations we owe our respective countries. But on the great and expanded subject of human happiness, we should be friends by the sympathy of our feelings. Let us then cordially unite, and exercising effectually the powers with which our governments have invested us, give to our warfare a character of magnanimity, conferring equal honour on ourselves and on our countries.

*Extract from General Orders. Norfolk.*

*Assistant Adjutant-General's Office, July 1st, 1813.*

The general commanding has deemed it proper to remonstrate against the excesses committed by the British troops who took possession of Hampton. It has been attempted to justify or palliate these excesses, on the ground of inhumanity in some of the troops at Craney Island, who are charged with having waded into the river and shot at the unresisting and yielding foe, who clung to the wreck of a boat which had been sunk by the fire of our guns.

Humanity and mercy are inseparable from true courage, and the general knows too well the character of the troops under his command, to doubt their magnanimity towards an unresisting foe. It is equally due to the honour of the troops engaged, and to the hitherto unquestioned fame of the American arms for honour and clemency, that the imputation should be investigated. If the charge be well founded, the army must be purified by punishment for this abomination. If, as the commander hopes and believes, the conduct of our troops has been misconceived, the world should have an authentic record to repel the imputation.

He therefore directs that a board of officers, to consist of colonel Freeman, president, lieutenant-colonels Boykin, Mason, and Read, do convene the day after to-morrow, at a place to be appointed by the president, for the purpose of investigating these charges, and report accordingly.

JAMES MAURICE, *Major, Act. Assist. Adj.-Gen.*

*The Evidence having been gone through, the Board, after deliberate and mature consideration, do pronounce the following opinion:*

That it appears from the testimony adduced, that on the 22d of last month, in the action at Craney Island, two of the enemy's boats, in front of their line, were sunk by the fire of

our batteries, the soldiers and sailors who were in those boats were consequently afloat and in danger of drowning, and being in front of the boats which were uninjured, to disable these our guns were necessarily fired in a direction of the men in the water, but with no intention whatever to do them further harm, but on the contrary, orders were given to prevent this by ceasing to fire grape, and only to fire round shot. It also is substantiated that one of the enemy, who had apparently surrendered, advanced towards the shore, about 100 yards, when he suddenly turned to his right and endeavoured to make his escape to a body of the enemy who had landed above the island, and who were then in view, then, and not till then, was he fired upon, to bring him back, which had the desired effect, and he was taken unhurt to the island.

It further appears that the troops on the island exerted themselves in acts of hospitality and kindness to the unresisting and yielding foe.

Therefore the board do, with great satisfaction, declare, as their unbiassed opinion, that the charge alleged against the troops is unsupported, and that the character of the American soldiery for humanity and magnanimity, has not been committed, but on the contrary confirmed.

(Signed)

CONSTANT FREEMAN,

*Colonel Artillery, President.*

ARMISTEAD T. MASON,

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding 5th Regt. Inf.*

FRANCIS M. BOYKIN,

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding 3d Regt. Inf.*

THOMAS READ, *junr.*

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding Artillery.*

JOHN BARBER, *Recorder.*

*Copy of a Note from Sir Sidney Beckwith to General Taylor, dated His Majesty's Ship San Domingo, July 6, 1813.*

Quarter-master-general sir Sidney Beckwith begs leave to return his best acknowledgments to general Taylor for his polite communication, and to repeat his earnest wish that military operations should be carried on with all the liberality and humanity which becomes the respective nations. Any infringement of the established usages of war will instantly be noticed and punished.

*Copy of a Letter from Midshipman M'Clintock to the  
Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *Kinsale, Va. July 15, 1813.*

I have to inform you of the unfortunate event which occurred here on the 14th; the action between the British barges and the United States schooner *Asp*, commanded by Mr. Segourney.

At 9, A. M., the *Scorpion* and *Asp* got under way from Yeocomico river and stood out; at 10, discovered a number of sail, which proved to be the enemy; the *Scorpion* then made signal to act at discretion, and stood up the river; the schooner being a bad sailer and the wind ahead, we were not able to get out. Finding the enemy approaching us, we thought it best to return; immediately two of the brigs stood towards us and anchored a short distance from the bar, where they manned their boats. Mr. Segourney thought it would be for our advantage to run further up the creek, which we did, but finding the enemy had left their vessels, we had no time to weigh anchor, therefore we were obliged to cut our cables. We were attacked by three boats well manned and armed, we continued a well-directed fire on them, and after a short time had elapsed, they were compelled to retreat, and obtain a reinforcement. About an hour after they retired, we were attacked by five boats; we continued doing the same as before, but having so few men, we were unable to repel the enemy. When they boarded us, they refused giving us any quarter; there were upwards of fifty men on our decks, which compelled us to leave the vessel, as the enemy had got possession. They put her on fire and retreated. A short time after they left her we went on board, and with much difficulty extinguished the flames. But it is with deep regret that I inform you of the death of Mr. Segourney, who fought most gallantly in defence of the vessel, and the utmost exertion was used by every man on board. Our crew only consisted of 21; there are ten killed, wounded, and missing.

Your obedient servant,

H. M. M'CLINTOCK,

*Midshipman in the U. S. Navy.*

*The Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Despatch to his Excellency William Hawkins,  
Governor of North Carolina.*

Sir, *Newbern, July 24.*

In compliance with your request I have made the following statement of facts relative to the late affair at Ocracoke.



cock, which I believe to be correct. On the 11th instant about 9 o'clock, P. M., arrived off Ocracock bar, and anchored within one mile of the inlet, a British fleet, consisting of one 74, three frigates, one brig, and three schooners, under the command of admiral Cockburn, which was discovered by the inhabitants of Ocracock, some of whom apprised the inhabitants of Portsmouth, before day, of the circumstance. As soon as day-light appeared I sent my trunk, containing all the money and custom-house bonds belonging to the office, on board the revenue cutter Mercury, which was got under way by captain Wallace, as soon as the pilot was able to discern the stakes which mark out the channel. The barges started from the fleet about the time the cutter weighed her anchors and such was the rapidity of their movements, that they were within one mile and a half of her when she cleared the Swash. The first eleven barges came in regular order, close together, until they came nearly within reach of the shot of the privateer brig Anaconda, of New York, and the letter of marque schooner Atlas, of Philadelphia, they then separated from one to two hundred yards apart, and hauled off under the edge of Ocracock, and waited a short time for the approach of the other barges, ten in number; and upon their arrival, they all began slowly to approach the above-mentioned vessels, discharging their twelve-pound carronades, which they carried in their launches and barges—they also fired several of their Congreve rockets at the shipping, without effect. The Anaconda and Atlas commenced firing very spiritedly, though it was of short duration, for the former had but 15 men on board, the latter but 30, they were therefore compelled to submit to overwhelming numbers, as there could not have been less than 3000 men, at that time inside the bar and crossing it together. These men abandoned the brig and schooner, and betook themselves to their boats, most of whom escaped. The captain of the Atlas remained in her, and continued to fire at the enemy after all his men had forsaken him. Several of the barges proceeded immediately on, without stopping to board the prizes, in pursuit of the cutter, thinking (as they afterwards said) if they could have taken the cutter, they would have precluded the possibility of information reaching Newbern until they arrived themselves. The cutter very narrowly escaped, by crowding upon her every inch of canvas she had, and by cutting away her long boat. The admiral did not hesitate to declare, that it was his intention to have gone to Newbern, provided he could have reached that place

previous to the citizens receiving any intelligence of his approach. After pursuing the cutter eight or ten miles through the Sound they gave out the chase and returned. Several hundred men were landed on Portsmouth, and I presume as many on Ocracock; among those landed on Portsmouth, there were about 300 regulars of the 102d regiment, under the command of colonel Napier, and about 400 marines and sailors. They had several small field-pieces in their launches, but did not land them. On both the above-mentioned places there was the most wanton, cruel, and savage-like destruction of property I have ever witnessed; furniture of all kinds split and broken in pieces, beds ripped open and the feathers scattered in the wind, women and children robbed of their clothing, and indeed many little children have been left without a second suit to their backs. They broke open my office, and destroyed every paper they could lay their hands on, private as well as public. I very fortunately had buried the most valuable papers belonging to the office, which escaped them: they robbed me of all the books in my library as well as every other species of property they could lay their hands on, except the law books, and them, with savage fury, they tore in pieces.

They plundered the two islands of 200 head of cattle, 400 sheep, and 1600 fowls of various kinds, for which they *pretended* to pay; they paid 1600 dollars for the above articles, which is about one-half the value of the cattle. This was done, no doubt, to acquire the reputation of being a generous enemy, without deserving it. After they had been at Portsmouth two days, I was informed by captain Powell, that the admiral considered it necessary for the safety of his men and officers, that I should go on board his Britannic majesty's ship *Sceptre*, and there remain until they had all embarked and the squadron ready to sail. I was immediately sent on board, where I remained two days, during which time I was very politely treated. At the expiration of the two days, I was turned adrift in the ocean with four Spaniards, in a small boat, who were as little acquainted with the bar as myself, by which means we all narrowly escaped being lost in the breakers. On the 26th they hoisted sail and stood to sea, the wind at S. S. W.

Very respectfully I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS SINGLETON.

*His Excellency William Hawkins, Esq.*

P. S. The inhabitants being much alarmed, a number of them endeavoured to make their escape from the island.

among whom was a Mr. Richard Casey, with his family. He had got into his boat with his wife and children, and was under way when he was hailed by a party of soldiers and ordered back, which he was about obeying, though slowly (for he is a decrepid old man), when one of the soldiers fired on him and shot him in the breast. I believe the wound will not prove mortal. The admiral told him (as he told every other person, who complained of depredations), point out the man who did it and he shall be corrected—well knowing it was impossible for them to identify any one among such a number of strangers.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Angus, commanding the United States Delaware Flotilla, to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *United States Flotilla, Cape May, July 29th, 1813.*

Lying off Dennis's Creek this morning I discovered that an enemy's sloop of war had chased a small vessel, and taken her near the Overfalls. I immediately got under way and stood down the bay. The sloop of war stood so near the Overfalls, that she grounded slightly on the outer ridge of Crow's shoals. I thought proper to endeavour to bring him to action. I succeeded and got within three quarters of a mile, and anchored the boats, (consisting of eight gun-boats and two block-sloops) in a line a-head. A heavy frigate had by this time anchored about half a mile further out. After a cannonade of one hour and 45 minutes, in which the ships kept up a constant and heavy fire, heaving their shot from a half to three quarters of a mile over us, they doing us but little damage, their shot seldom striking us, the sloop of war and frigate, finding our shot to tell on their hulls, manned their boats, ten in number (two launches, the rest large barges and cutters), with from 30 to 40 men in each, and despatched them after gun-boat No. 121, sailing master Shead, which had unfortunately fell a mile and a half out of the line, although it had been my positive and express orders to anchor at half cable length apart and not farther.

From the strong ebb tide they succeeded in capturing her, after a gallant resistance (for three times did No. 121 discharge her long gun, apparently full of canister among the whole line of boats when at a very short distance, which must have done execution, and not till after he was boarded did the colours come down); before any assistance could be given her, however, we got near enough to destroy three or four of their boats, and must have killed a vast number of men. It being a calm, they succeeded in getting her away,

by sending all their boats ahead and towing her, but have paid dearly for their temerity, they must at least have had one-third of their men killed and wounded. They put one shot through the foot of the Buffaloe's jib, and one through the under part of the bowsprit, and cut gun-boat No. 125, sailing master L. Moliere's rigging in several places, and an 18-pound shot struck her long gun and indented it several inches; but happy am I to say, that not a man was wounded in any of the boats, except the one captured, and have not yet learnt their fate. I feel much indebted to L. Mitchell and officers commanding gun-boats for their spirited conduct in carrying into execution my orders; and if I may judge from the gallant resistance made by sailing master Shead in engaging when surrounded by the boats of the enemy, that every officer and man of the flotilla will do their duty in all situations. I have the honour to be, &c.

SAMUEL ANGUS,

*Commanding United States Del. Flotilla.*

P. S. The action commenced at 7 minutes before 1, P. M., and ended 37 minutes after 2, P. M.

Sir, *United States Flotilla, Newcastle, Aug. 17, 1813.*

I have just received a letter from sailing master Shead, respecting the capture of gun-boat No. 121 (a copy of which I have the honour of enclosing to you). I see from this the enemy had 7 killed and 12 wounded, 4 since dead. I am convinced they have deceived him, both as to the number of killed and wounded as well as the number of men in the boats, which at the smallest calculation could not have been less than 250.

I have the honour to remain, with the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

SAML. ANGUS.

*Hon. Wm. Jones Secretary of the Navy.*

*Mr. Shead's Letter enclosed in the above.*

*On board His Majesty's Sloop Martin, off Rhode Island,*

Sir, *August 6, 1813.*

It is with the deepest regret that I announce to you the capture of the United States gun-boat, No. 121, under my command, by the boats of the Junon frigate, and Martin sloop of war, eight in number, three of which mounted 12-pound carronades and carrying in all 150 men. At ten minutes before meridian on the 27th July, I received orders from you to form a line ahead and to fire on the enemy, but finding

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Jacob Lewis, commanding the New York Flotilla, to the Secretary of the Navy.*

Sir, *New York, Nov. 30, 1813.*

I have to inform you, that on the 29th, the flotilla force recaptured from the Plantagenet, a schooner from New Orleans, loaded with cotton and lead.

The enemy had chased the schooner on shore about 13 miles from where the flotilla lay at anchor; however, before the enemy had time to get the vessel off, or to unlade the cargo, they were attacked, beaten off, and the vessel taken possession of. The enemy sent a flag to demand a ransom for the schooner and cargo, stating she was in their power, and unless we consented to ransom the vessel, he would destroy her, also all the houses on the shore. All his threats did not answer his purpose; the vessel and cargo are ours.

I have the honour to assure you of my consideration and respect,

J. LEWIS.

*Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

P. S. One man wounded in the affair.

J. L.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, &c.*

CRUIZES OF COMMODORE CHAUNCEY ON LAKE ONTARIO.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Chauncey to Commodore Chauncey.*

Sir, *Sackett's Harbour, 18th June, 1813.*

According to your orders of the 14th instant, I proceeded off Presque Isle in the schooner Lady of the Lake. On the morning of the 16th fell in with and captured the English schooner Lady Murray, from Kingston bound to York, with provisions and ammunition.

Enclosed is a list of one ensign, 15 non-commissioned officers and privates found on board, with six men attached to the vessel.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WOLCOTT CHAUNCEY.

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*U. S. ship General Pike, at anchor off Niagara,*

Sir,

*August 4, 1813.*

After leaving Sackett's Harbour I stretched over for the enemy's shore, and from thence stood up the lake; the

winds being light, I did not arrive off this port until the evening of the 27th ult. On the 24th I fell in with the *Lady of the Lake*, on her return to Sackett's Harbour, with prisoners from Fort George. I transferred the prisoners to the *Raven*, and ordered her to Sackett's Harbour. The *Lady of the Lake* I despatched to Fort George, for guides for the head of the lake. General Boyd having informed me that the enemy had a considerable deposit of provisions and stores at Burlington Bay, I was determined to attempt their destruction. On the 25th I was joined by the *Pert*, and on the 27th the *Lady of the Lake*, with guides, and captain Crane's company of artillery, and colonel Scott, who had very handsomely volunteered for the service. After conversing with colonel Scott upon the subject, it was thought adviseable to take on board 150 infantry, which, by the extraordinary exertions of that excellent officer, were embarked before 6 o'clock the next morning, and the fleet immediately proceeded for the head of the lake; but owing to light winds and calms, we did not arrive to an anchorage before the evening of the 29th. We sent two parties on shore, and surprised and took some of the inhabitants, from whom we learned that the enemy had received considerable reinforcements within a day or two, and that his force in regulars was from 600 to 800 men. We however landed our troops and marines and some sailors the next morning, and reconnoitred the enemy's position; found him posted upon a peninsula of very high ground, and strongly intrenched, and his camp defended by about 8 pieces of cannon. In this situation it was thought not adviseable to attack him with a force scarcely half his numbers, and without artillery; we were also deficient in boats, not having a sufficient number to cross the bay with all the troops at the same time. The men were all re-embarked in the course of the afternoon, and in the evening we weighed and stood for York; arrived and anchored in that harbour at about 3, P. M. On the 31st ran the schooners into the upper harbour; landed the marines and soldiers under the command of colonel Scott, without opposition; found several hundred barrels of flour and provisions in the public storehouse, five pieces of cannon, eleven boats, and a quantity of shot, shells, and other stores, all of which were either destroyed or brought away. On the 1st instant, just after having received on board all that the vessels could take, I directed the barracks and the public storehouses to be burnt. We then re-embarked the men, and proceeded for this place, where I arrived yesterday. Between 400 and 500 men left York for the head of the lake 2

days before we arrived there. Some few prisoners were taken, some of whom were paroled; the others have been landed at Fort George.

I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Extract of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board the ship General Pike, at Sackett's Harbour, 13th August, 1813.*

Sir, I arrived here this day with this ship, the Madison, Oneida, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, and Lady of the Lake. The Fair American and Asp I left at Niagara. Since I had the honour of addressing you last I have been much distressed and mortified: distressed at the loss of part of the force intrusted to my command, and mortified at not being able to bring the enemy to action. The following movements and transactions of the squadron, since the 6th instant, will give you the best idea of the difficulties and mortifications that I have had to encounter.

On the 7th, at day-light, the enemy's fleet, consisting of 2 ships, 2 brigs, and 2 large schooners, were discovered, bearing W. N. W. distant about 5 or 6 miles, wind at west. At 5 weighed with the fleet and manœuvred to gain the wind. At 9, having passed to leeward of the enemy's line, and abreast of his van ship, the Wolfe, hoisted our colours and fired a few guns, to ascertain whether we could reach him with our shot. Finding they fell short, I wore and hauled upon a wind on the starboard tack, the rear of our schooners then about 6 miles astern. The enemy wore in succession, and hauled upon a wind on the same tack, but soon finding that we should be able to weather him upon the next tack, he tacked and made all sail to the northward. As soon as our rear vessels could fetch his wake, tacked and made all sail in chase. In the afternoon the wind became very light, and towards night quite calm. The schooners used their sweeps all the afternoon, in order to close with the enemy, but without success. Late in the afternoon I made the signal of recal, and formed in close order. Wind during the night from the westward, and after midnight squally: kept all hands at quarters and beat to windward, in hopes to gain the wind of the enemy. At 2, A. M., missed two of our schooners. At day-light discovered the missing schooners to be the Hamilton and Scourge. Soon after spoke the Governor Tompkins, who informed me that the Hamilton and Scourge both overset and sunk in a heavy squall about two o'clock; and distressing to

relate, every soul perished except 16. This fatal accident deprived me at once of the services of two valuable officers, lieutenant Winter and sailing master Osgood, and two of my best schooners, mounting together 19 guns. This accident giving to the enemy decidedly the superiority, I thought he would take advantage of it, particularly as, by a change of wind, he was again brought dead to the windward of me. Formed the line upon the larboard tack and hove to. Soon after 6, A. M., the enemy bore up and set studding sails, apparently with an intention to bring us to action. When he had approached us within about 4 miles, he brought to on the starboard tack. I wore and brought to on the same tack. Finding that the enemy had no intention of bringing us to action, I edged away to gain the land, in order to have the advantage of the land breeze in the afternoon. It soon after fell calm, and I directed the schooners to sweep up and engage the enemy. About noon we got a light breeze from the eastward. I took the Oneida in tow, as she sails badly, and stood for the enemy. When the van of our schooners was within one and an half or two miles of his rear, the wind shifted to the westward, which again brought him to windward. As soon as the breeze struck him, he bore up for the schooners, in order to cut them off before they could rejoin me; but with their sweeps, and the breeze soon reaching them also, they were soon in their station. The enemy, finding himself foiled in his attempt on the schooners, hauled his wind and hove to. It soon after became very squally and the appearance of its continuing so during the night, and as we had been at quarters for nearly forty-eight hours, and being apprehensive of separating from some of the heavy sailing schooners in the squall, induced me to run in towards Niagara, and anchor outside the bar. General Boyd very handsomely offered any assistance in men that I might require. I received 150 soldiers, and distributed them in the different vessels, to assist in boarding or repelling boarders, as circumstances might require. It blew very heavy in squalls during the night. Soon after day-light discovered the enemy's fleet, bearing north; weighed and stood after him. The winds soon became light and variable, and before 12 o'clock quite calm. At 5 fresh breezes from north, the enemy's fleet bearing north, distant about 4 or 5 leagues. Wore the fleet in succession and hauled upon a wind on the larboard tack. At sun-down the enemy bore N. W. by N. on the starboard tack. The wind hauling to the westward, I stood to the northward all night, in order to gain the north shore. At day-light tacked to the



westward, the wind having changed to N. N. W. Soon after discovered the enemy's fleet, bearing S. W. I took the Asp, and the Madison the Fair American in tow, and made all sail in chase.

It was at this time we thought of realising what we had been so long toiling for ; but before twelve o'clock the wind changed to W. S. W., which brought the enemy to windward: tacked to the northward; at three, the wind inclining to the northward, wore to the southward and westward, and made the signal for the fleet to make all sail. At four, the enemy bore S. S. W., bore up and steered for him. At five, observed the enemy becalmed under the land, nearing him very fast with a fine breeze from N. N. W. At six, formed the order of battle, within about four miles of the enemy, the wind at this time very light. At seven, the wind changed to the S. W. and a fresh breeze, which again placed the enemy to windward of me. Tacked, and hauled upon a wind on the larboard tack, under easy sail; the enemy standing after us. At nine, when within about two gun shot of our rear, he wore to the southward: I stood on to the northward under sail—the fleet formed in two lines, a part of the schooners forming the weather line, with orders to commence the fire upon the enemy as soon as their shot would take effect, and as the enemy reached them to edge down upon the line to leeward and pass through the intervals and form to leeward. At about half past ten, the enemy tacked and stood after us. At eleven, the rear of our line opened his fire upon the enemy: in about 15 minutes the fire became general from the weather line, which was returned from the enemy. At half past eleven, the weather line bore up and passed the leeward, except the Growler and Julia, which soon after tacked to the southward, which brought the enemy between them and me. Filled the main-top-sail and edged away two points to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the Growler and Julia. He, however, kept his wind until he completely separated those two vessels from the rest of the squadron, exchanged a few shot with this ship as he passed, without injury to us, and made sail after our two schooners. Tacked and stood after him. At twelve, midnight, finding that I must either separate from the rest of the squadron, or relinquish the hope of saving the two which had separated, I reluctantly gave up the pursuit, rejoined the squadron then to leeward, and formed the line on the starboard tack. The firing was continued between our two schooners and the ene-

my's fleet until about one, A. M., when, I presume, they were obliged to surrender to a force so much their superior. Saw nothing more of the enemy that night: soon after daylight discovered them close in with the north shore, with one of our schooners in tow, the other not to be seen. I presume she may have been sunk. The enemy showed no disposition to come down upon us, although to windward, and blowing heavy from W. The schooners labouring very much, I ordered two of the duller to run into Niagara and anchor. The gale increasing very much, and as I could not go into Niagara with this ship, I determined to run into Genessee Bay, as a shelter for the small vessels, and with the expectation of being able to obtain provisions for the squadron, as we were all nearly out, the Madison and Oneida having not a single day's on board when we arrived opposite Genessee Bay. I found there was every prospect of the gale's continuing, and if it did, I could run to this place, and provision the whole squadron with more certainty, and nearly in the same time that I could at Genessee, admitting that I could obtain provisions at that place. After bringing the breeze as far as Oswego, the wind became light, inclining to a calm, which had prolonged our passage to this day. I shall provision the squadron for five weeks, and proceed up the lake this evening; and when I return again, I hope to be able to communicate more agreeable news than this communication contains.

The loss of the Growler and Julia, in the manner in which they have been lost, is mortifying in the extreme; and although their commanders disobeyed my positive orders, I am willing to believe that it arose from an error of judgment, and excess of zeal to do more than was required of them; thinking, probably, that the enemy intended to bring us to a general action, they thought, by gaining the wind of him, they would have it in their power to annoy and injure him more than they could by forming to leeward of our line. From what I have been able to discover of the movements of the enemy, he has no intention of engaging us, except he can get decidedly the advantage of wind and weather, and, as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron, he can always avoid the action, unless I can gain the wind, and have sufficient day-light to bring him to action before dark. His object is evidently to harrass us by night attacks, by which means he thinks to cut off our small dull-sailing schooners in detail. Fortune has evidently favoured him thus far. I hope that it will be my turn next; and although inferior in point of force, I feel very confident of success.

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ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Extract of another Letter, of the same date, to the Secretary, from Commodore Chauncey.*

On my way down the lake I fell in with the Lady of the Lake, on her return from Sackett's Harbour, where I had sent her on the 6th instant, for the purpose of taking up fifty marines. I have brought her back with me to this place, to man the new schooner, which will be launched on the 18th.

*Head-Quarters, Kingston, 14th August, 1813.*

By accounts received by his excellency the governor in chief and commander of the forces, from commodore sir James Yeo, dated off York, at half past 1, P. M., on the 11th instant, the following particulars have just been transmitted, of the capture and destruction of four of the enemy's armed schooners.

On Tuesday evening, the 10th instant, the enemy's squadron, under commodore Chauncey, got under weigh from their anchorage off the mouth of the Niagara river, and, with a fine breeze from the eastward, stood towards our fleet, which was becalmed off the port at Twelve Mile Creek. At sun-set, a fine breeze coming off the land, gave us the wind of the enemy, when our squadron stood for them, on which they immediately bore away from us, under as much sail as the schooners could carry to keep up with the larger vessels. The enemy's fleet formed a long line; the Pike, Madison, Oneida, and six schooners, two schooners being placed to windward, for the purpose of raking the masts of our squadron as they should come up. At 11 o'clock got within gunshot of the schooners, when they opened a brisk fire, and, from their going so fast, it was more than an hour before the Wolfe, our headmost ship, could pass them.

At this time the rest of the squadron was between two and three miles astern of the Wolfe, and on her coming up with the Madison and Pike, they put before the wind and made sail, firing their stern-chase guns. Sir James Yeo, finding it impossible to get the squadron up with the enemy, as the Wolfe was the only ship which could keep up with them, made sail between them and the two schooners to windward, which he captured, and which proved to be the Julia and Growler, each mounting one long 32 and one long 12-pounder. Two of the enemy's largest schooners, the Scourge, of 10, and the Hamilton, of 9, upset on the night of the 9th in-

stant, in carrying sail to keep from our squadron, and all on board perished, in number about one hundred.

By the loss and capture of the two schooners, the enemy's squadron has been reduced to ten vessels, and ours increased to eight. It is ascertained that the Pike mounts 28 long 24 pounders, and has a complement of 420 men, and that the Madison mounts 22 thirty-two pound carronades, with 340 men. Nine boat loads of troops were taken on board the squadron on Monday, for the purpose it is supposed, of repelling boarders.

The Wolfe has not received any material damage, and not a man was hurt on board. The prisoners were landed from her on the 11th instant, and the damages of the Growler were repairing. She had lost her bowsprit, and was otherwise much cut up.

Nothing could exceed the eagerness and enthusiasm manifested by the officers and men serving on board our squadron for a close engagement with the enemy, and the only apprehension and regret expressed by all were, that their opponents, though superior in guns and weight of metal, and men, would be too wary to afford them an opportunity of terminating, by a decisive action, the contest for ascendancy on the lake.

*Extract of a Letter from Commodore Isaac Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Sept. 13, 1813, on board the United States Ship General Pike, off Duck Island.*

Sir, on the 7th at day-light the enemy's fleet was discovered close in with Niagara river, wind from the southward.— Made the signal and weighed with the fleet (prepared for action), and stood out of the river after him. He immediately made all sail to the northward. We made sail in chase, with our heavy schooners in tow, and have continued the chase all round the lake, night and day, until yesterday morning, when he succeeded in getting into Amherst Bay, which is so little known to our pilots, and said to be full of shoals, that they are not willing to take me in there. I shall, however, unless driven from my station by a gale of wind, endeavour to watch him so close as to prevent his getting out upon the lake.

During our long chase we frequently got from within one to two miles of the enemy, but our heavy sailing schooners prevented our closing with him, until the 11th, off Genessee river, we carried a breeze with us while he lay becalmed within about three quarters of a mile of him, when he took the breeze, and we had a running fight for three and a half hours, but by his superior sailing he escaped me, and ran into Am-

herst Bay yesterday morning. In the course of our chase on the 11th, I got several broadsides from this ship upon the enemy, which must have done him considerable injury as many of the shot were seen to strike him, and people were observed over the side plugging shot holes. A few shot struck our hull and a little rigging was cut, but nothing of importance—not a man was hurt.

I was much disappointed that sir James refused to fight me; as he was so much superior in point of force both in guns and men—having upwards of 20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot.

This ship, the Madison, and Sylph have each a schooner constantly in tow, yet the others cannot sail as fast as the enemy's squadron, which gives him decidedly the advantage, and puts it in his power to engage me when and how he chooses. I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated*

*United States Ship General Pike, Niagara River,*

Sir,

*25th September, 1813.*

After I had the honour of addressing you on the 13th, I continued to blockade the enemy until the 17th, when the wind blowing heavy from the westward, the enemy having run into Kingston, and knowing that he could not move from that place before a change of wind, I took the opportunity of running into Sackett's Harbour.

I remained but a few hours at the Harbour, and left it at day-light on the morning of the 18th, but did not arrive here until yesterday, owing to continual head winds, not having laid our course during the passage. On the 19th I saw the enemy's fleet near the False Ducks, but took no notice of him, as I wished him to follow me up the lake.

There is a report here, and generally believed, that captain Perry has captured the whole of the enemy's fleet on Lake Erie. If this should prove true in all its details (and God grant that it may), he has immortalised himself, and not disappointed the high expectations formed of his talents and bravery.

I have learnt from a source that may be depended upon, that we did the enemy much more injury in our rencontre on the 11th than I had expected—I find that we killed captain Molcaster of the Royal George and a number of his men,

and did considerable injury to that ship, as well as several of the other vessels. It was truly unfortunate that we could not have brought the enemy to a general action on that day, as I am confident that the victory would have been as complete as that upon Lake Erie. I however have the consolation to know that every exertion was used to bring him to close action. If we did not succeed it was not our fault.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Ship General Pike,*

Sir,

*off Niagara, 1st Oct. 1813.*

On the 26th ultimo it was reported to me that the enemy's fleet was in York. I immediately despatched the *Lady of the Lake* to look into York, and ascertain the fact—she returned in the evening with the information that the enemy was in York bay. I immediately prepared to weigh, but owing to a strong wind from the N. N. E. was not able to get out of the river before the evening of the 27th, and owing to the extreme darkness of the night, a part of the squadron got separated and did not join before next morning at 8, A. M.—On the 28th, the *General Pike*, *Madison*, and *Sylph*, each took a schooner in tow and made all sail for York. Soon after discovered the enemy's fleet under way in York Bay, shaped our course for him, and prepared for action—he perceiving our intention of engaging him in his position, tacked and stood out of the bay, wind at east; I formed the line and run down for his centre. When we had approached within about three miles he made all sail to the southward—I wore in succession and stood on the same tack with him, edging down gradually in order to close—at ten minutes past meridian, the enemy, finding that we were closing fast with him, and that he must either risk an action or suffer his two rear vessels to be cut off, he tacked in succession, beginning at the van, hoisted his colours, and commenced a well-directed fire at this ship, for the purpose of covering his rear, and attacking our rear as he passed to leeward; perceiving his intention, I was determined to disappoint him; therefore, as soon as the *Wolfe* (the leading ship) passed the centre of his line and abeam of us, I bore up in succession (preserving our line) for the enemy's centre; this manœuvre not only covered our rear but hove him in confusion; he im-



mediately bore away; we had however closed so near as to bring our guns to bear with effect, and in twenty minutes the main and mizen-top-masts and main-yard of the Wolfe were shot away; he immediately put before the wind, and set all sail upon his foremast. I made the signal for the fleet to make all sail; the enemy, however, keeping dead before the wind, was enabled to outsail most of our squadron. As it brought all the sail upon one mast, he did not feel the loss of his main and mizen-top-masts. I continued the chase until near three o'clock, during which time I was enabled, in this ship, with the Asp in tow, to keep within point blank shot of the enemy, and sustained the whole of his fire during the chase. Captain Crane, in the Madison, and lieutenant Brown in the Oneida, used every exertion to close with the enemy; but the Madison having a heavy schooner in tow, and the Oneida sailing very dull before the wind, prevented those officers from closing near enough to do any execution with their carronades. The Governor Tompkins kept in her station until her fore-mast was so badly wounded as to oblige her to shorten sail. Lieutenant Finch, of the Madison, who commanded her this cruize, owing to the indisposition of lieutenant Pettigrew, behaved with great gallantry, and is an officer of much promise. Captain Woolsey, in the Sylph, was kept astern by the Ontario, which he had in tow, but did considerable execution with his heavy gun.

At fifteen minutes before 3, P. M., I very reluctantly relinquished the pursuit of a beaten enemy. The reasons that led to this determination were such as I flatter myself that you will approve. They were these: at the time I gave up the chase, this ship was making so much water, that it required all our pumps to keep her free, owing to our receiving several shot so much below the water edge, that we could not plug the holes from the outside; the Governor Tompkins with her fore-mast gone, and the squadron within about six miles of the head of the lake; blowing a gale of wind from east, and increasing with a heavy sea on, and every appearance of the equinox. I considered that if I chased the enemy to his anchorage at the head of the lake, I should be obliged to anchor also, and although we might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was that we should go on shore also, he amongst his friends, and we amongst our enemies; and, after the gale abated, if he could succeed in getting off one or two vessels out of the two fleets, it would give him as completely the command of the lake as if he had twenty vessels. Moreover, he was covered at his anchorage by part of

his army, and several small batteries thrown up for the purpose. Therefore if we could have rode out the gale, we should have been cut up by their shot from the shore. Under all these circumstances, and taking into view the consequences resulting from the loss of our superiority on the lake at this time, I without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then presenting itself, of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my country.

The loss sustained by this ship was considerable owing to her being so long exposed to the fire of the whole of the enemy's fleet; but our most serious loss was occasioned by the bursting of one of our guns, which killed and wounded 22 men, and tore up the top-gallant forecastle, which rendered the gun upon that deck useless. We had four other guns cracked in the muzzle, which rendered their use extremely doubtful. Our main-top-gallant-mast was shot away in the early part of the action, and the bowsprit, fore and main-mast wounded, rigging and sails much cut up, and a number of shot in our hull, several of which were between wind and water, and 27 men killed and wounded, including those by the bursting of the gun. The Madison received a few shot, but no person hurt on board. The Governor Tompkins lost her fore-mast, and the Oneida her main-top-mast badly wounded. We have, however, repaired nearly all our damages, and are ready to meet the enemy. During our chase, one, if not two of the enemy's small vessels was completely in our power, if I could have been satisfied with so partial a victory, but I was so sure of the whole, that I passed them unnoticed, by which means they finally escaped.

The gale continued until last night, but the wind still blows from the eastward. I thought it important to communicate with general Wilkinson, to ascertain when he meant to move with the army. I therefore ran off this place for that purpose, and he thinks that the public service will be promoted by my watching sir James at the head of the lake, and, if possible, preventing his return to Kingston, while he proceeds with the army for Sackett's Harbour. I shall, therefore, proceed immediately in quest of the enemy.

I have great pleasure in acknowledging the assistance I received from captain Sinclair, during our chase, in using his best endeavours to bring this ship into close action. The other officers and men behaved to my perfect satisfaction, and were very anxious to close with the enemy, even singly; and if he ever gives us an opportunity for close action, they will show that they are not inferior to any of their countrymen.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States Ship General Pike, Sackett's Harbour, 6th October, 1813.*

Sir, I have the pleasure to inform you, that I arrived here this morning, with five sail of the enemy's vessels, which I fell in with and captured last evening off the Ducks. These were part of a fleet of seven sail which left York on Sunday, with 234 troops on board, bound to Kingston. Of this fleet five were captured, one burnt, and one escaped. The prisoners amounting to nearly 300, besides having upwards of 300 of our troops on board from Niagara, induced me to run into port, for the purpose of landing both.

I have an additional pleasure in informing you, that amongst the captured vessels are the late United States schooners Julia and Growler; the others are gun vessels.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Ship General Pike, Sackett's Harbour,*

Sir,

*8th October, 1813.*

As soon as the last of the flotilla with the troops cleared the Niagara, I proceeded in quest of the enemy. On the 2d instant, at 10, A. M., discovered him steering a course for Niagara, with studding sails and all sails set, wind from the south and westward. We made all sail in chase, but as soon as we shot out from the land, so that he could fairly make us out, he took in studding sails, and hauled upon a wind to the westward and made all sail from us; the wind being light all day, we made but little progress against the current, and at sun-down the enemy was off the Twenty Mile Creek, and had evidently gained considerably from us. During the night the wind continued so light, that we altered our position but very little, and at day-light on the 3d, saw the enemy at anchor close in with the land, between Twelve and Twenty Mile Creek. As soon as he saw us, he weighed and made all sail to the westward, wind from south to south-west and squally. I made all sail in chase, and continued the chase the whole

day, it blowing very heavy in squalls; at sun-down we could barely make him out from the mast-head; when he appeared nearly up to the head of the lake; it continued squally with rain, and the night very dark; at day-light on the 4th hazy, could see nothing of the enemy—continued working up for the head of the lake; towards meridian it became calm, I ordered the *Lady of the Lake* to sweep up to Burlington Bay, and ascertain whether the fleet was there—at half past 9, P. M., she returned with information that the fleet was not there. Saw but two gun-boats. It struck me at once that he had availed himself of the darkness of the preceding night, and had either run for Kingston, or down the lake for the purpose of intercepting the flotilla with the army; I therefore made all sail and shaped my course for the Ducks, with a view of intercepting him or his prizes if he should have made any. The wind increased to a strong gale from the northward and westward, and continued during the whole day on the 5th, we therefore made a great run, for at 1, P. M., we passed Long Point; at 3 discovered seven sail near the False Ducks; presuming them to be the fleet, made sail in chase; at 4 made them out to be sloops and schooners. I made the signal for the *Sylph* and the *Lady of the Lake* to cast off their tow, and chase N. E. soon after perceiving the enemy separating on different tacks, I cast off the *Governor Tompkins* from this ship, gave the squadron in charge of captain Crane, and made all sail in chase; at 5 the enemy finding us to gain fast upon him, and one of his gun vessels sailing much worse than the rest, he took the people out and set her on fire. At sun-down, when opposite the Real Ducks, the *Hamilton* (late *Growler*), *Confiance* (late *Julia*), and *Mary Ann*, struck to us, the *Sylph* soon after brought down the *Drummond*, cutter rigged. The *Lady Gore* run into the Ducks, but the *Sylph* (which was left to watch her) took possession of her early the next morning. The *Enterprize*, a small schooner, is the only one that escaped, and she owed her safety to the darkness of the night.

Finding much difficulty in shifting the prisoners, owing to the smallness of our boats and a heavy sea, I determined to take the prizes in tow and run for this place, and land the prisoners and troops that I had on board. We arrived here at day-light. On the 6th, the *Lady of the Lake* having towed one of the prizes in, I despatched her immediately to cruise between the Real and False Ducks. She returned the same afternoon, having discovered the enemy's squadron going into Kingston.

I have repaired the principal damages sustained by this ship in the action of the 28th ultimo, and have put a new foremast into the Governor Tompkins. We are now ready and waiting the movements of the army, which it is contemplated will leave here on the 10th.

The vessels captured on the 5th are gun-vessels, mounting from one to three guns each, with troops from the head of the lake (but last from York) bound to Kingston. We learnt from the prisoners that the enemy was very much cut up in their hulls and spars, and a great many men killed and wounded, particularly on board the Wolfe and Royal George. I enclose herewith a list of the prisoners taken on the 5th.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

*Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.*

*Return of British Prisoners of War landed from on board the Squadron under the command of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, October 6th and 7th, 1813.*

C. W. Grant, lieutenant-colonel, B. M. L. C.; Charles de Villatte, major, Watteville regiment, lieutenant-colonel by brevet; Frederick Zehinder, captain do. major; Francis Dincer, lieutenant do. captain; William A. Steele, lieutenant and adjutant, 89th do.; Arthur Carter, lieutenant Royal Artillery, do.; Charles Morris volunteer, do. do.; David Duval, lieutenant, Watteville regiment, do.; Albert Manuel, lieutenant, do. do.; Mort. M'Mahan, lieutenant, 8th or king's do.; — Orbi, assistant surgeon, Watteville regiment; Hector M'Lean, lieutenant Royal Navy, commanding sloop Drummond; James Jackson, master's mate, do., commanding schooner Hamilton; David Wingfield, do. do. Confiance; Theophilus Sampson, ———, late master of the sloop Betsey; Joseph Jillet, sailing-master; Joseph Dennis, —; John Segarford, pilot.

*Non-commissioned Officers, Musicians, Privates, and Seamen.*

Royal Artillery 1; 80th regiment 10; Watteville regiment 186; Newfoundland regiment 3; Voltigeurs 1; Royal Navy 38—officers of the army and navy 18—total 252.

## CAPTURE OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON ON LAKE ERIE.

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Perry to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Brig Niagara, off the Western Sister, Head Sir, of Lake Erie, September 10th, 1813, 4, P. M.*

It has pleased the Almighty to give to the arms of the United States a signal victory over their enemies on this lake. The British squadron, consisting of two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop, have this moment surrendered to the force under my command, after a sharp conflict.

I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. PERRY.

*The Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Perry to the Secretary of the Navy.*

*United States Schooner Ariel, Put-in Bay, Sir, 13th September, 1813.*

In my last I informed you that we had captured the enemy's fleet on this lake. I have now the honour to give you the most important particulars of the action. On the morning of the 10th instant, at sun-rise, they were discovered from Put-in-Bay, where I lay at anchor with the squadron under my command. We got under weigh, the wind light at south-west, and stood for them. At 10, A. M., the wind hauled to south-east, and brought us to windward: formed the line and bore up. At fifteen minutes before 12, the enemy commenced firing; at five minutes before 12 the action commenced on our part. Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, and its being mostly directed at the *Lawrence*, I made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline being soon shot away, she became unmanageable, notwithstanding the great exertions of the sailing-master. In this situation she sustained the action upwards of two hours within canister distance, until every gun was rendered useless and the greater part of her crew either killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of lieutenant Yarnall, who I was convinced, from the bravery already displayed by him, would do what would comport with the honour of the flag. At half past two, the wind springing up, captain Elliot was enabled to bring his vessel, the *Niagara*, gallantly into close action; I

immediately went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish, by volunteering to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action. It was with unspeakable pain that I saw, soon after I got on board the Niagara, the flag of the Lawrence come down, although I was perfectly sensible that she had been defended to the last, and that to have continued to make a show of resistance would have been a wanton sacrifice of the remains of her brave crew; but the enemy was not able to take possession of her, and circumstances soon permitted her flag again to be hoisted. At forty-five minutes past 2, the signal was made for close action. The Niagara being very little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy's line; bore up, and passed a-head of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and sloop from the larboard side, at half pistol shot distance. The smaller vessels at this time having got within grape and canister distance, under the direction of captain Elliot, and keeping up a well-directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.

Those officers and men who were immediately under my observation evinced the greatest gallantry, and I have no doubt that all the others conducted themselves as became American officers and seamen. Lieutenant Yarnall, first of the Lawrence, although several times wounded, refused to quit the deck. Midshipman Forrest, doing duty as lieutenant, and sailing-master Taylor were of great assistance to me. I have great pain in stating to you the death of lieutenant Brook of the marines, and midshipman Laub, both of the Lawrence, and midshipman John Clarke, of the Scorpion: they were valuable and promising officers. Mr. Hambleton, purser, who volunteered his services on deck, was severely wounded late in the action. Midshipmen Claxton and Swartwout, of the Lawrence, were severely wounded. On board of the Niagara, lieutenants Smith and Edwards, and midshipman Webster, doing duty as sailing-master, behaved in a very handsome manner. Captain Brevoort, of the army, who acted as a volunteer, in the capacity of marine officer on board that vessel, is an excellent and brave officer, and with his musketry did great execution. Lieutenant Turner, commanding the Caledonia, brought that vessel into action in the most able manner, and is an officer that in all situations may be relied on. The Ariel, lieutenant Parker, and the Scorpion, sailing-master Champion, were enabled to get early into

action, and were of great service. Captain Elliott speaks in the highest terms of Mr. Magrath, purser, who had been despatched in a boat on service previous to my getting on board the Niagara, and, being a seaman, since the action has rendered essential service, in taking charge of one of the prizes. Of captain Elliot, already so well known to the government, it would be almost superfluous to speak. In this action he evinced his characteristic bravery and judgment, and, since the close of the action, has given me the most able and essential assistance.

I have the honour to enclose you a return of the killed and wounded, together with a statement of the relative force of the squadrons. The captain and first lieutenant of the Queen Charlotte, and first lieutenant of the Detroit, were killed. Captain Barclay, senior officer, and commander of the Lady Prevost severely wounded. The commander of the Hunter and Chippeway slightly wounded. Their loss in killed and wounded I have not yet been able to ascertain; it must, however, have been very great.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

O. H. PERRY.

*The Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.*

*Statement of the Force of the British Squadron.*

Ship Detroit, 19 guns, one on a pivot, and 2 howitzers; Queen Charlotte, 17 do. 1 do.; schooner Lady Prevost, 13, do. 1 do.; brig Hunter, 10 do.; sloop Little Belt, 3; schr. Chippeway, 1 do. and 2 swivels—63 guns.

*Note*—The Detroit is a new ship very strongly built, and mounts long twenty-fours, eighteens, and twelves.

*Statement of the Force of the United States Squadron.*

Brig Lawrence, 20 guns; Niagara, 20 do.; Caledonia, 3 do.; schooner Ariel, 4 do. (one burst early in the action); Scorpion, 2 do.; Somers, 2 do. and 2 swivels; sloop Trippe, 1 do.; schooner Tigress, 1 do.; Porcupine, 1 do.—54 guns.

The exact number of the enemy's force has not been ascertained; but I have good reason to believe that it exceeded ours by nearly one hundred men.

*List of Killed and wounded on board the United States Squadron under command of O. H. Perry, esquire, in the action of 10th September, 1813, viz.*

Lawrence, killed 22, wounded 61, total 83; Niagara, killed 2, wounded 25, total 27; Caledonia, wounded 3; Somers,



wounded 2; Ariel, killed 1, wounded 3, total 4; Trippe, wounded 2; Scorpion, killed 2—killed 27, wounded 96, total 123.

S. HAMBLETON, *Purser.*

O. H. PERRY, *Captain and  
Senior Officer.*

[On the morning of the action the sick list of the Lawrence contained 31, that of the Niagara 28, unfit for duty. In the small vessels, 51 were unfit for service two days previous to the action.]

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CAPTURE OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER GENERAL  
PROCTOR.

*Copy of a Letter from General Harrison to the Department of War. Head-Quarters, near Moravian Town, on the River Thames, 80 miles from Detroit, 5th Oct. 1813.*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, that by the blessing of Providence, the army under my command has this evening obtained a complete victory over the combined Indian and British forces under the command of general Proctor. I believe that nearly the whole of the enemy's regulars are taken or killed. Amongst the former are all the superior officers excepting general Proctor.

My mounted men are in pursuit of him. Our loss is trifling. The brave colonel R. M. Johnson is the only officer whom I have heard of that is wounded, he badly, but I hope not dangerously. I have the honour, &c.

WM. H. HARRISON.

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major general Harrison to the Secretary of War.*

Sir,

*Head-Quarters, Detroit, 9th Oct. 1813.*

In my letter from Sandwich of the 30th ultimo, I did myself the honour to inform you, that I was preparing to pursue the enemy the following day. From various causes, however, I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the 2d instant, and then to take with me only about 140 of the regular troops, Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of governor Shelby's volunteers as were fit for a rapid march, the whole amounting to about 3500 men. To general M'Arthur (with about 700 effectives) the protecting

of this place and the sick was committed. General Cass's brigade and the corps of lieutenant-colonel Ball were left at Sandwich, with orders to follow me as soon as the men received their knapsacks and blankets, which had been left on an island in lake Erie.

The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no disadvantage to us. General Proctor had posted himself at Dalson's on the right bank of the Thames (or Trench), 56 miles from this place, where I was informed he intended to fortify, and wait to receive me. He must have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him, or that he had secured my continuance here, by the reports that were circulated that the Indians would attack and destroy this place upon the advance of the army; as he neglected to commence the breaking up the bridges until the night of the 2d instant. On that night our army reached the river, which is 25 miles from Sandwich and is one of four streams crossing our route, over all of which are bridges, and being deep and muddy, are unfordable for a considerable distance into the country—the bridge here was found entire, and in the morning I proceeded with Johnson's regiment to save if possible the others. At the second bridge over a branch of the river Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a lieutenant of dragoons and 11 privates, who had been sent by general Proctor to destroy them. From the prisoners I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain information of our advance. The bridge having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's farm, four miles below Dalson's.

The river Thames, along the banks of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen, after the passage of the bar at its mouth, over which there is six and a half feet water.

The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats protected by three gun-boats, which commodore Perry had furnished for the purpose, as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames itself, or the mouths of its tributary streams; the banks being low and the country generally open (prairies) as high as Dalson's, these vessels were well calculated for that purpose. Above Dalson's however, the character of the river and adjacent country is considerably changed. The former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody. The commodore and myself therefore agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of 1&O infantry, and I determined to trust to for-

tune and the bravery of my troops to effect the passage of the river. Below a place called Chatham, and four miles above Dalson's, is the third unfordable branch of the Thames; the bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as that at M'Gregor's mills, one mile above—several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and, upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of battle, and brought up our two six-pounders to cover the party that were ordered to repair the bridge—a few shot from those pieces soon drove off the Indians, and enabled us, in two hours, to repair the bridge and cross the troops. Colonel Johnson's mounted regiment being upon the right of the army, had seized the remains of the bridge at the mills under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our loss upon this occasion was two killed and three or four wounded—that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house near the bridge containing a very considerable number of muskets had been set on fire—but it was extinguished by our troops and the arms saved. At the first farm above the bridge, we found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, loaded with arms and ordnance stores, and learned that they were a few miles ahead of us, still on the right bank of the river, with the great body of the Indians. At Bowles's farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels and a large distillery filled with ordnance and other valuable stores to an immense amount in flames—it was impossible to put out the fire—two 24-pounders with their carriages were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes. The army was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th; I pushed on in advance with the mounted regiment, and requested governor Shelby to follow as expeditiously as possible with the infantry; the governor's zeal and that of his men enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and by 9 o'clock we were at Arnold's mills, having taken in the course of the morning two gun-boats and several batteaux loaded with provisions and ammunition.

A rapid at the river at Arnold's mills affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance, but, upon examination it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately taken two or three boats and some Indian canoes on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each, the whole were safely crossed

by 12 o'clock. Eight miles from the crossing we passed a farm, where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of colonel Warburton. The detachment with general Proctor had arrived the day before at the Moravian towns, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to accelerate their march for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy's waggons being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position and order of battle, to determine that, which it was proper for me to adopt.

I have the honour herewith to enclose you my general order of the 27th ult. prescribing the order of march and of battle when the whole army should act together. But as the number and description of the troops had been essentially changed since the issuing of the order, it became necessary to make a corresponding alteration in their disposition. From the place where our army was last halted to the Moravian towns, a distance of three and a half miles, the road passes through a beech forest without any clearing, and for the first two miles near to the bank of the river. At from two to three hundred yards from the river, a swamp extends parallel to it, throughout the whole distance. The intermediate ground is dry, and although the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of under-brush. Across this strip of land, its left *appuyed* upon the river, supported by artillery placed in the wood, their right in the swamp, covered by the whole of their Indian force, the British were drawn up.

The troops at my disposal consisted of about one hundred and twenty regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry, under his excellency governor Shelby, averaging less than five hundred men, and colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making in the whole an aggregate something above three thousand. No disposition of an army opposed to an Indian force can be safe, unless it is secured on the flanks and in the rear. I had therefore no difficulty in arranging the infantry conformably to my general order of battle. General Trotter's brigade of 500 men formed the front line, his right upon the road and his left upon the swamp. General King's brigade, as a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's, and Chiles's brigade, as a

corps of reserve, in the rear of it. These three brigades formed the command of major general Henry. The whole of general Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were formed *en potence* upon the left of Trotter.

Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed colonel Johnson's regiment, which was still in front, to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy, and, upon the advance of the infantry, to take ground to the left, and forming upon that flank, to endeavour to turn the right of the Indians. A moment's reflection, however convinced me that from the thickness of the woods and swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do any thing on horseback, and there was no time to dismount them and place their horses in security; I therefore determined to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British lines at once, by a charge of the mounted infantry. The measure was not sanctioned by any thing that I had ever seen or heard of; but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American backwoods-men ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being used to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded too that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it. Conformably to this idea, I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column, with its right at the distance of fifty yards from the road (that it might be in some measure protected by the trees from the artillery), its left upon the swamp, and to charge at full speed as soon as the enemy delivered their fire. The few regular troops of the 27th regiment, under their colonel (Paul) occupied, in column of sections of four, the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery, and some ten or twelve friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The crotchet formed by the front line and general Desha's division was an important point. At that place the venerable governor of Kentucky was posted, who, at the age of sixty-six, preserves all the vigour of youth, the ardent zeal which distinguished him in the revolutionary war, and the undaunted bravery which he manifested at King's Mountain. With my aids-de-camp, the acting assistant adjutant-general, captain Butler, my gallant friend, commodore Perry, who did me the honour to serve as my volunteer aid-de-camp, and brigadier-general Cass, who, having no command, tendered me his assistance, I placed myself at the head of the front line of infantry, to direct the movement of the cavalry, and give them the neces-

sary support. The army had moved on in this order but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line and were ordered to charge; the horses in the front of the column recoiled from the fire; another was given by the enemy, and our column, getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute the contest in front was over; the British officers, seeing no hope of reducing their disordered ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon them and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only of our troops were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however, the contest was more severe with the Indians. Colonel Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect. The Indians still further to the right advanced and fell in with our front line of infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and for a moment made an impression upon it. His excellency governor Shelby, however brought up a regiment to his support, and the enemy receiving a severe fire in front, and a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear, retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.

I can give no satisfactory information of the number of Indians that were in the action; but they must have been considerably upwards of 1000. From the documents in my possession (general Proctor's official letters, all of which are taken), and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians kept in pay by the British were much more numerous than has been generally supposed. In a letter to general De Rottenburg, of the 27th instant, general Proctor speaks of having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany him. Of these it is certain that fifty or sixty Wyandot warriors abandoned him\*.

The number of our troops were certainly greater than that of the enemy; but when it is recollected that they had chosen a position that effectually secured their flank, which it was impossible for us to turn, and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery.

\* A British officer of high rank assured one of my aids de-camp, that on the day of our landing general Proctor had at his disposal upwards of 3000 Indian warriors, but asserted that the greatest part had left him previous to the action.

In communicating to the president, through you, sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers who served under my command, I am at a loss how to mention that of governor Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of mine can reach his merits. The governor of an independant state, greatly my superior in years, in experience, and in military character, he placed himself under my command, and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity, than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders. The major-generals Henry and Desha, and the brigadiers Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles, and Trotter, all of the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity. Of governor Shelby's staff, his adjutant-general, colonel M'Dowell, and his quarter-master-general, colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aids-de-camp, general Adair, and majors Barry and Crittenden. The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my adjutant-general col. Gaines, who was left at Sandwich. His duties were, however, ably performed by the acting assistant adjutant-general, captain Butler. My aids-de-camp, lieutenant O'Fallon and captain Todd, of the line, and my volunteer aids, John Speed Smith and John Chambers, esquire, have rendered me the most important services from the opening of the campaign. I have already stated that general Cass and commodore Perry assisted me in forming the troops for action. The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the appearance of the brave commodore cheered and animated every breast.

It would be useless, sir, after stating the circumstances of the action, to pass encomiums upon colonel Johnson and his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more firmness. The colonel's numerous wounds prove that he was in the post of danger. Lieutenant-colonel James Johnson and the majors Payne and Thompson were equally active, though more fortunate. Major Wood, of the engineers, already distinguished by his conduct at Fort Meigs, attended the army with two six-pounders. Having no use for them in the action he joined in the pursuit of the enemy, and with major Payne of the mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made many prisoners.

I left the army before an official return of the prisoners, or that of the killed and wounded, was made out. It was, how-

ever, ascertained that the former amounts to six hundred and one regulars, including 25 officers. Our loss is seven killed and twenty-two wounded, five of which have since died. Of the British troops twelve were killed and twenty-two wounded. The Indians suffered most, thirty-three of them having been found on the ground, besides those killed on the retreat.

On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two 24-pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, and can be easily procured. Of the brass pieces three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by General Hull. The number of small arms taken by us and destroyed by the enemy must amount to upwards of 5000; most of them had been ours, and taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the river Raisin, and colonel Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retains no other military trophy of their victories than the standard of the 4th regiment. They were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.

You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in action; it gives me great pleasure to inform you, that they merit also the approbation of their conduct, in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness.

The infantry were entirely without tents, and for several days the whole army subsisted upon fresh beef without bread or salt. I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

*General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

P. S. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by 40 dragoons and a number of mounted Indians.

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BRITISH ACCOUNT OF THE DEFEAT OF GENERAL PROCTOR  
AND CAPTAIN BARCLAY.

*Montreal, October 18th, 1813.*

GENERAL ORDERS.

The commander of the forces has the deepest regret in announcing to the army, that lieutenant Riffenstein, staff-adjutant, arrived yesterday, and is the bearer of the following unpleasant intelligence. That major-general Proctor having sustained, by the unfortunate capture of the squadron on



Lake Erie, the loss of a very considerable portion of his military force, which was serving on board that fleet, as well as the principal heavy ordnance necessary for the defence of his military positions—commenced his retreat from the fort of Sandwich on the 24th September, having previously dismantled the posts of Amherstburg and Detroit, and burned and destroyed every public building and stores of every description.

The retreating regular force consisting of a small detachment of royal artillery, a troop of provincial dragoons, and the remains of the 41st regiment, in all about 450 rank and file—which was accompanied by a body of Indian warriors from 1000 to 1500.

The enemy's fleet and army appeared off Amherstburg on the 26th September, and landed on the following day, but soon re-embarked their troops and proceeded by Lake St. Clair to the mouth of the Thames river. The American army was again landed, and, accompanied by gun-boats, followed the route of major-general Proctor's corps, which having been much retarded by the slow progress of loaded batteaux, they were enabled to come up with the rear guard and loaded boats on the 3d instant, and succeeded in capturing the whole. Major-general Proctor being thus deprived of the means of supporting his little army, was under the necessity of awaiting the enemy's attack; which took place at 4 o'clock on the evening of the 5th instant, near the Moravian village.

A six-pounder on the flank was, by some unpardonable neglect, left destitute of ammunition, and the enemy, availing himself of this unfortunate circumstance, pressed upon that part of the line, which, wanting the support of artillery, was forced by the superior numbers of the enemy. Major-general Proctor exerted himself to rally the troops, who being exhausted with fatigue, not having received any provisions the preceding day, were unable to make adequate exertions to resist the superior numbers by which they were assailed.

The safety of major-general Proctor, the officers of his personal staff, and some few others, together with about 50 men has only as yet been ascertained. The Indian warriors retreated towards Mackedash.

The enemy's forces employed on this service is estimated from 10 to 12,000 strong, including troops of every description.

EDWARD BAYNES, *Adj.-Gen.*

## GENERAL ORDERS.

*Head-Quarters, Montreal, Nov. 21.*

His excellency the commander of the forces has received an official report from major-general Proctor of the affair which took place on the 5th October, near the Moravian village, and he has in vain sought in it, for grounds to palliate the report made to his excellency by staff-adjutant Reiffenstein, upon which the general order of the 18th October was founded—on the contrary, that statement remains confirmed in all the principal events which marked that disgraceful day; the precipitancy with which the staff-adjutant retreated from the field of action prevented his ascertaining the loss sustained by the division on that occasion; it also led him most grossly to exaggerate the enemy's force, and to misrepresent the conduct of the Indian warriors, who, instead of retreating towards Mackedash, as he had stated, gallantly maintained the conflict, under their brave chief, Tecumseh, and in their turn harrassed the American army on its retreat to Detroit.

The subjoined return states the loss the right division has sustained in the action of the fleet on Lake Erie, on the 10th of September, and in the affair of the 5th October, near the Moravian village; in the latter but very few appear to have been rescued by an honourable death from the ignominy of passing under the American yoke, nor are there many whose wounds plead in mitigation of this reproach. The right division appears to have been incumbered with an unmanageable load of unnecessary and forbidden private baggage—while the requisite arrangements for the expeditious and certain conveyance of the ammunition and provisions, the sole objects worthy of consideration, appear to have been totally neglected, as well as all those ordinary measures, resorted to by officers of intelligence, to retard and impede the advance of a pursuing enemy. The result affords but too fatal a proof of this unjustifiable neglect. The right division had quitted Sandwich on its retreat, on the 26th of September, having had ample time for every previous arrangement; on the 2d October following, the enemy pursued by the same route, and on the 4th succeeded in capturing all the stores of the division, and on the following day attacked and defeated it, almost without a struggle.

With heartfelt pride and satisfaction the commander of the forces had lavished on the right division of this army, that tribute of praise which was so justly due to its former gallantry and steady discipline. It is with poignant grief and

mortification that he now beholds its well earned laurels tarnished, and its conduct calling loudly for reproach and censure.

The commander of the forces appeals to the genuine feelings of the British soldier, from whom he neither conceals the extent of the loss the army has suffered, nor the far more to be lamented injury it has sustained in its wounded honour, confident that but one sentiment will animate every breast, and that, zealous to wash out the stain which, by a most extraordinary and unaccountable infatuation, has fallen on a formerly deserving portion of the army; all will vie to emulate the glorious achievements recently performed by a small but highly spirited and well disciplined division, led by officers possessed of enterprise, intelligence, and gallantry, nobly evincing what British soldiers can perform, when susceptible of no fear but that of failing in the discharge of their duty.

His excellency considers it an act of justice to exonerate most honourably from this censure the brave soldiers of the right division who were serving as marines on board the squadron on Lake Erie. The commander of the forces having received the official report of captain Barclay of the action which took place on Lake Erie, on the 10th of September, when that gallant officer, from circumstances of imperious necessity, was compelled to seek the superior force of the enemy, and to maintain an arduous and long contested action, under circumstances of accumulating ill fortune.

Captain Barclay represents that the wind, which was favourable early in the day, suddenly changed, giving the enemy the weather gage, and that this important advantage was shortly after the commencement of the engagement heightened by the fall of captain Finnis, the commander of the *Queen Charlotte*. In the death of that intrepid and intelligent officer captain Barclay laments the loss of his main support.—The fall of captain Finnis was soon followed by that of lieutenant Stokoe, whose country was deprived of his services at this very period, leaving the command of the *Queen Charlotte* to provincial lieutenant Irvine, who conducted himself with great courage, but was too limited in experience to supply the place of such an officer as captain Finnis, and in consequence this vessel proved of far less assistance than might be expected.

The action commenced about a quarter before 12 o'clock, and continued with great fury until half past 2, when the American commodore quitted his ship, which struck shortly

after to that commanded by captain Barclay (the Detroit). Hitherto the determined valour displayed by the British squadron had surmounted every disadvantage, and the day was in our favour; but the contest had arrived at that period when valour alone was unavailing. The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were perfect wrecks, and required the utmost skill of seamanship, while the commanders and second officers of every vessel were either killed or wounded; not more than fifty British seamen were dispersed in the crews of the squadron, and of these a great proportion had fallen in the conflict.

The American commodore made a gallant and but too successful effort to regain the day. His second largest vessel, the Niagara, had suffered little, and his numerous gun-boats, which had proved the greatest annoyance during the action, were all uninjured.

Lieutenant Garland, first lieutenant of the Detroit, being mortally wounded previous to the wounds of captain Barclay obliging him to quit the deck, it fell to the lot of lieutenant Inglis, to whose intrepidity and conduct the highest praise is given, to surrender his majesty's ship, when all further resistance had become unavailing.

The enemy, by having the weather-gauge, were enabled to choose their distance, and thereby availed themselves of the great advantage they derived in superiority of heavy long guns; but captain Barclay attributes the fatal result of the day to the unprecedented fall of every commander and second in command, and the very small number of able seamen left in the squadron, at a moment when the judgment of the officer, and skilful exertions of the sailor, were most eminently called for.

To the British seamen captain Barclay bestows the highest praise—that they behaved like British seamen. From the officers and soldiers of the regular forces serving as marines captain Barclay experienced every support within their power, and states that their conduct has excited his warmest thanks and admiration.

Deprived of the palm of victory, when almost within his grasp, by an overwhelming force which the enemy possessed in reserve, aided by an accumulation of unfortunate circumstances, captain Barclay and his brave crew have, by their gallant daring and self devotion to their country's cause, rescued its honour and their own, even in defeat.

E. BAYNES, *Adj.-Gen.*

*Return of the Right Division of the Army of Upper Canada.*

Detachment serving as marines on board the squadron in the action of the 10th of September, 1813,—Killed, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 21 rank and file ; wounded, 3 serjeants, 46 rank and file ; prisoners, 2 lieutenants, 1 assistant surgeon, 4 serjeants, 4 drummers, 167 rank and file.

Killed, wounded, and missing in the retreat and in the action of the 5th of October, 1813,—1 inspecting field-officer, 1 deputy-assistant quarter-master-general, 1 fort-adjutant, 1 hospital mate, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 6 captains, 12 lieutenants, 3 cornets or ensigns, 1 paymaster, 1 assistant surgeon, 34 serjeants, 13 drummers, 559 rank and file, 46 horses.

*Assembled at Ancaster on the 17th of October, 1813.*

1 major-general, 1 major of brigade, 1 aid-de-camp, 1 staff-adjutant, 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 cornets or ensigns, 1 adjutant, one quarter-master, 2 assistant surgeons, 15 serjeants, 9 drummers, 204 rank and file, 53 horses.

*Total strength of the Right Division on the 10th of September.*

1 major-general, 1 inspecting field-officer, 1 major of brigade, 1 deputy quarter-master-general, 1 aid-de-camp, 1 staff-adjutant, 1 fort-adjutant, 1 hospital mate, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 9 captains, 23 lieutenants, 5 cornets or ensigns, 1 paymaster, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 4 assistant surgeons, 57 serjeants, 26 drummers, 944 rank and file, 99 horses.

Killed, lieutenant Gordon, Royal Newfoundland regiment.  
E. BAYNES, *Adj.-Gen.*

## EXPEDITION AGAINST THE PEORIA INDIANS.

*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Benjamin Howard, to the Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, St. Louis, October 28th, 1813.*

I had the honour of expressing to you the opinion during the last summer, that a movement of troops to dislodge the Indians at the head of Peoria Lake was indispensable to guard against that pressure upon our frontier in autumn which I believed would take place. It was with pleasure I found the measure approved. In pursuance of the plan, on the 19th of September, the effective rangers of Missouri and Illinois, with about 100 from Indiana, 250 mounted men furnished by the executives of Missouri and Illinois, were concentrated at Tower-Hill, east of the Mississippi, 30 miles above the frontier. In embodying these troops, the

immediate safety of the frontier was steadily kept in view, by moving detachments in such directions as would enable them to discover and dislodge any parties which might be upon our borders. The 1st regiment commanded by colonel M'Nair, was marched on the west side of the Mississippi, and crossed just below the rendezvous; the 2d, commanded by colonel Stephenson, was marched on the east side of the river, crossing the Illinois a few miles above its mouth; a detachment of about 200 regulars under the command of colonel Nicholas, of the 1st regiment of United States infantry, at the same time ascended the Illinois in armed boats. It was soon ascertained, upon the arrival of those several detachments at points a little beyond the settlements, that the enemy had descended the Illinois to invade the frontier. A skirmish took place between some of colonel Stephenson's command and a party of Indians; the latter were driven. From appearances in the route of the 1st regiment some parties had crossed in the west side of the Mississippi, upon the approach of the troops. I have no doubt of the Indians having returned to their canoes in the Illinois, when they found lieutenant-colonel Nicholas rapidly ascending the river, and fled before him without injuring a single citizen—believing that the frontier would be safe for the moment, I marched the mounted troops up the Mississippi bottom to Christy's creek, passing opposite the encampment of the Sac nation, who have professed themselves friendly, but many of whom I believe have taken part in the war against us, while others were undecided. At this time, Mr. Boilvain, Indian agent, was in the neighbourhood, sent by governor Clark to conduct them to the Missouri, where they had agreed to winter.—However unsettled their neutrality might have been before, the display of troops in their vicinity soon confirmed it; they immediately descended the Mississippi to the Portage de Sioux, from whence they were sent up the Missouri from Christy's creek. The army was marched across the country towards Peoria, and on the evening of the 28th arrived within a few miles of the old village. That night three men were sent to discover whether the command of lieutenant-colonel Nicholson had arrived, and bearing a letter to that officer, stating my position, and calling for such information in regard to the enemy as he might possess. During the night he descended the Illinois to my encampment, and reported to me, that the day before, an attack was made upon his command at Peoria, where he had commenced building a fort agreeably to my orders; however the enemy were soon dis-

persed by a well-directed discharge of musketry, with the aid of a six-pounder from two unfinished block-houses. It was evident that the assailants suffered in this attack; but to what extent could not be ascertained. None of our men were killed, and only one wounded. On the 29th the mounted troops arrived at Peoria; and so soon as provisions could be drawn, were marched up the Illinois to the villages at the head of the lake, which was the direction in which the enemy appeared to have retired from Peoria.—Upon my arrival at those villages, I found them deserted. From my examination made by reconnoitring parties, I had no doubt of the Indians having ascended the Illinois in canoes, which is so situated, from swamps on both banks, that it was impossible to pursue them by land. The villages were destroyed, and some property of inconsiderable amount taken. The army then returned to Peoria, and remained until the garrison was put in a state of defence. Shortly after my return, I sent a detachment in two armed boats, under the command of major Christy, in pursuit of the enemy. This detachment ascended the Illinois above the mouth of the Vermillion to the Rapids, and within 75 miles of Chicago; but it was impossible to come up with the Indians, notwithstanding the great efforts of the commanding officer and his command. Soon after the departure of major Christy, major Boone was sent with about 100 men in the direction of Rock river, to examine whether there were any parties in that quarter.

He penetrated the country northwardly from Peoria, in my opinion within 45 miles of Rock river, and reported that there were several encampments on the Maquoine which appeared to have been deserted about the time the army arrived at Peoria. The mounted troops remained near Peoria from the 2d until the 15th of October, during which time they were actively engaged, together with the United States infantry, in erecting Fort Clarke, which stands at the lower end of the lake, completely commanding the river. This important fort was erected under many disadvantages—the weather being unusually cold for the season, and without the aid of a single team the timbers were hauled by the troops a considerable distance to the lake (nearly a mile in width), and rafted over.—This fort is unquestionably one of the strongest I have ever seen in the western country, and certainly highly important to the safety of the three territories with the defence of which I have been entrusted.

On the 15th the mounted troops moved from Peoria for the settlements, pursuing generally a south course until they

arrived at Camp Russell on the 21st instant, when the mounted militia were discharged. The Indiana rangers on the march were sent across from the old Kickapoos towns to Vincennes under the command of captain Andre. The safety to the frontier which was anticipated from this movement has been fully realized, and the same enemy that has kept our exposed settlements under continual apprehensions of danger was compelled to fly before a force in their own country less than that assigned by the government for the immediate defence of the frontier.—It is with pleasure I acknowledge the energetic and intelligent execution of my orders by those officers to whom I confided the command of detachments, and laudable conduct of the officers and men generally during the campaign, but more particularly on those occasions (not unfrequent), when it was hoped and believed by all that the enemy had determined to give us battle.

I am, sir, with high consideration, your humble servant,

BENJ. HOWARD.

*The Hon. John Armstrong.*

P. S. I have delayed the transmission of this communication, until I heard of captain Andre, who was sent across direct from the Kickapoos towns to Vincennes—he has reported to me his safe arrival.

B. H.

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BRITISH ACCOUNT OF A SKIRMISH WITH THE ADVANCED  
GUARD OF THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL HAMPTON.

*Head-Quarters, A Fourche, on Chateauguay River,  
October 27th, 1813.*

*General Orders.*

His excellency the governor in chief and commander of the forces has received from major-general De Watteville, the report of the affair which took place at the advanced position of his post at 11 o'clock on Tuesday morning, between the American army under the command of major-general Hampton, and the advanced pickets of the British, thrown out for the purpose of covering working parties, under the direction of lieutenant-colonel De Salisbury. The judicious position chosen by that officer, and the excellent disposition of his little band, composed of the light company of Canadian fencibles and two companies of Canadian voltigeurs, repulsed with loss the advance of the enemy's principal column, commanded by general Hampton in person, and the American



light brigade, under colonel M'Carty, was in a like manner checked in its progress on the south side of the river, by the gallant and spirited advance of the flank company second battalion embodied militia, under captain Daly, supported by captain Bruyer's company of sedentary militia. Captains Daly and Bruyer's being both wounded, and their having sustained some loss, their position was immediately taken up by a flank company of the first battalion embodied militia. The enemy rallied and repeatedly returned to the attack, which terminated only with the day, in his complete disgrace and defeat, being foiled by a handful of men, not amounting to a twentieth part of the force opposed to them, but which, nevertheless, by their determined bravery maintained their position, and effectually protected the working parties, who continued their labours unmolested. Lieutenant-colonel De Salisbury reports having experienced the most able support from captain Ferguson in command of the light company Canadian fencibles, and also from captain Jean Baptiste Duchesnay, and captain Juchereau Duchesnay of the two companies of voltigeurs; from captain Lamotte, and adjutants Hebden and O'Sullivan, and from every officer and soldier engaged, whose gallantry and steadiness were conspicuous and praiseworthy in the highest degree.

His excellency the governor in chief and commander of the forces having had the satisfaction of himself witnessing the conduct of the troops on this brilliant occasion, feels it a gratifying duty to render them that praise which is so justly their due; to major-general De Watteville, for the admirable arrangement established by him for the defence of his post; to lieutenant-colonel De Salisbury, for his judicious and officer-like conduct displayed in the choice of position and arrangement of his force; to the officers and men engaged with the enemy, the warmest acknowledgments of his excellency are due for their gallantry and steadiness, and to all the troops at the station the highest praise belongs, for their zeal, steadiness, and discipline, and for the patient endurance of hardship and privation which they have evinced. A determined perseverance in this honourable conduct cannot fail crowning the brave and loyal Canadians with victory, and hurling disgrace and confusion on the head of the enemy that would pollute their happy soil.

By the report of prisoners, the enemy's force is stated at 7,500 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 10 field-pieces. The British advanced force actually engaged did not exceed 300. The enemy suffered severely from our fire, as well as from their

own; some detached corps having fired upon each other by mistake in the woods.

*List of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

Killed, 5; wounded, 16; missing 4.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES, *Adj.-Gen.*

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OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL WILKINSON.

*From General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Head-Quarters, French Mills, adjoining the Province of Lower Canada, November 16, 1813.*

Sir, I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter, for the particulars of the movement of the corps under my command, down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavour to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued since my departure from Grenadier island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, on the 3d instant.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung on my rear, and in concert with a heavy galley and a few gun-boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was strongly tempted to halt, turn about, and put an end to his teasing; but alas! I was confined to my bed; major-general Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and above all, I did not dare to suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of government. I had written major-general Hampton on the 6th instant, by his adjutant-general, colonel King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enabled them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus, while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined by musketry in front, at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment, and this impeded my progress.

On the evening of the 9th instant the army halted a few miles from the head of the Long Bar. In the morning of the 10th the enclosed order was issued. General Brown marched agreeably to order, and about noon we were appri-

sed, by the report of his artillery, that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their galley and gun-boats approached our flotilla, and opened a fire upon us, which obliged me to order a battery of 18-pounders to be planted, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties. But by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far spent that our pilots did not dare to enter the Saut (eight miles a continued rapid) and therefore we fell down about two miles and came to for the night. Early the next morning every thing was ready for motion; but having received no intelligence from general Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed I should learn the result of his affair before I committed the flotilla to the Saut. At 10 o'clock, A. M., an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter, in which the general informed me he had forced the enemy, and would reach the foot of the Saut early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun-boats appeared, and began to throw shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time from brigadier-general Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column.

I immediately sent orders to him to attack them; this report was soon contradicted. Their gun-boats, however, continued to scratch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and counter-movements were brought to me in succession, which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack, when it could be done to the greatest advantage, and therefore I resolved to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent, by that distinguished officer, colonel Swift of the engineers, to brigadier-general Boyd, to throw the detachments of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, and composed of men of his own, Covington's, and Swartwout's brigades, into three columns, to march upon the enemy, outflank them, if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling, and with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, for upwards of two and a half hours, the adverse lines alternately yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to render safe the passage of the Saut. Generals Covington and Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action, at the head of detachments

from their respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by brigadier-general Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached 1600 or 1700 men. That of the enemy was estimated from 1200 to 2000,—consisting, as I am informed, of detachments from the 49th, 84th, and 101st regiments of the line, with three companies of the Voltigeur and Glengary corps, and the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honour on the valour of the American soldier, as no examples can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field or yielding to their antagonists. But, sir, the information I now give you, is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict; for though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded: the disease with which I was assailed on the 2d of September, on my journey to Fort George, having, with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since, and at the moment of this action I was confined to my bed, and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to sit on my horse, or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair. The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed—the last being bound by the instructions of his government, and the most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means; because this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American arms would be surmounted; and the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard and if possible prevent such descent. He is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose. The British commander, having failed to gain either of his objects, can lay no claim to the honours of the day. The battle fluctuated, and triumph seemed at different times inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy were at first forced back more than a mile, and, though they never regained the ground they lost, their stand was permanent, and their charges resolute. Amidst these charges, and near the close of the contest, we lost a field-piece, by the fall of the officer who was serving it with the same

coolness as if he had been at a parade or review. This was lieutenant Smith of the light artillery, who, in point of merit, stood at the head of his grade. The enemy having halted, and our troops being again formed in battalion front to front, and the firing having ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re-embarked and proceeded down the river without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun-boats, while the dragoons with five pieces of light artillery marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth, and his services that I should make particular mention of brigadier-general Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men and leading them to the charge. He fell, where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the Saut, and joined that excellent officer brigadier-general Brown, at Barnhart's near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival, and where I confidently expected to hear of major-general Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But immediately after I halted, colonel Atkinson, the inspector-general of the division under major-general Hampton, waited on me with a letter from that officer, in which, to my unspeakable mortification and surprise, he declined the junction ordered, and informed me he was marching towards Lake Champlain by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. This letter, together with a copy of that to which it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of my general officers and the colonel commanding the elite, the chief engineer, and the adjutant-general, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season, and the army near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore, for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions (which had been reduced by the acts of God), because that of our meat had been increased five days and our bread had been reduced only two days, and because we could, in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy; but because the loss of the division under major-general Hampton, weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt. In all my measures and movements of moment,

I have taken the opinions of my general officers, which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the "powerful force" of the enemy in our neighbourhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica and its vicinity, and I expect are 50 or 60 miles on the march.

You have under cover a summary abstract of the killed and wounded in the affair of the 11th instant, which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honour, and the wounded bled for their country and deserve its gratitude.

With perfect respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

JAMES WILKINSON.

*Extract of a Letter of the 15th November, from General Wilkinson.*

It is a fact, for which I am authorised to pledge myself on the most confidential authority, that on the 4th of the present month, the British garrison of Montreal consisted solely of 400 marines and 200 sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. We have, with the provision here and that left at Chateaugay, about 40 days' subsistence, to which I shall add 30 more.

*Hon. General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

*Return of the American loss in Killed and Wounded in the Battle of Williamsburgh.*

Killed, 102; wounded, 237.

*From General Wilkinson to General Hampton.*

*Head-Quarters of the Army, seven miles above Ogdensburg, November 6th, 1813, in the evening.*

Sir,  
I address you at the special instance of the secretary of war, who by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th ult.

I am destined to and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to

the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes by which you must march, makes it necessary that your own judgment should determine the point. To assist you in making the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation, in some respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it, shall cross the cavalry at Hamilton, which will not require a day. I shall thence press forward and break down every obstruction on this river to Grand River, there to cross the Isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foot-hold on Montreal Island at about 20 miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets, and swords must secure our triumph, or provide us honourable graves.

Enclosed you have a memorandum of field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own; but we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found.

On the subject of provisions I wish I could give a favourable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at 20. In speaking on this subject to the secretary of war, he informed me ample magazines were laid up on Lake Champlain, and therefore I must request of you to order forward two or three months supply by the safest route, in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from if not see you at that place on the 9th.

And have the honour to be, respectfully, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

JA. WILKINSON.

*Major-General Hampton.*

*From General Hampton to General Wilkinson.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Four Corners, November 8, 1813.*

I had the honour to receive, at a late hour last evening, by colonel King, your communication of the 6th, and

was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our co-operation. The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provisions. Colonel Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back; and when I reflected that in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, when all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Coghawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the junction at St. Regis. The way is in many places blockaded and abated, and the road impracticable for wheel carriages during winter—but by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed that the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance. My troops and other means will be described to you by colonel Atkinson. Besides the rawness and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon the subject I must refer you to colonel Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertions I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

W. HAMPTON.

*His Excellency Major-General James Wilkinson.*

*General Wilkinson to General Armstrong.*  
Sir, *Head-Quarters, French Mills, November 13, 1813.*

I beg this may be considered as an appendage to my official communication respecting the action of the 11th instant. I last evening received the enclosed information, the result of the examination of sundry prisoners, taken on the field of battle, which justifies the opinion of the surviving general officers who were in the engagement. This goes to prove, that although the imperious obligations of duty did not



allow me sufficient time to route the enemy, they were beaten, the accidental loss of one field-piece notwithstanding, after it had been discharged fifteen or twenty times. I have also learned, from what is considered good authority, but I will not vouch for the correctness of it, that the enemy's loss exceeded five hundred killed and wounded. The enclosed report will correct an error in my former communication—as it appears it was the 89th and not the 84th British regiment which was engaged on the 11th. I beg leave to mention, relative to the action of the 11th, what, from my extreme indisposition, I have omitted. Having received information late in the day, that the contest had become somewhat dubious, I ordered up a reserve of six hundred men, whom I had directed to stand by their arms under lieutenant-colonel Upham, who gallantly led them into the action, which terminated a few minutes after their arrival on the ground.

With much consideration and respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

JA. WILKINSON.

*The Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.*

*Statement of the Strength of the Enemy in the Action of the 11th November, 1813, on Kesler's Field, in Williamsburgh, in Upper Canada, founded on the separate examination of a number of British Prisoners taken on the Field of Battle.*

Of the 8th regiment, 760; 49th do., 450; Voltigeurs, 270; Glengary's, 80, one company; of the 100th, 40, a detachment from Prescott; Canadian fencibles, 220; Indians, 40; Incorporated militia, 300—2170; four pieces of mounted artillery; and seven gun-boats, one mounting a 24-pounder.

I certify that the above statement is correct, agreeably to the statement of the above-mentioned prisoners.

(Signed)

I. JOHNSON,

*Inspector-General 2d Division.*

*Head-Quarters, French Mills, November 16, 1813.*

*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General John P. Boyd, who commanded in the Battle of Williamsburgh, to Major-General James Wilkinson, Commander in chief.*

Sir,

*Camp near Cornwall, November 12, 1813.*

I have the honour to report to you, that yesterday, while the rear division of the army, consisting of detachments from the first, third, and fourth brigades, and placed under my command to protect the flotilla from the enemy that hung on our rear, was under arms in order to move, agreeably to your orders, down the bank of the St. Lawrence, a report was

brought to me from the rear guard, that a body of about 200 British and Indians had advanced into the woods that skirted our rear. General Swartwout, with the fourth brigade, was immediately ordered to dislodge them; general Covington, with the third brigade, at the same time directed to be within supporting distance. General Swartwout dashed into the woods, and with the 21st infantry (a part of his brigade), after a short skirmish, drove them back to the position of their main body. Here he was joined by general Covington. The enemy had judiciously chosen his ground among the deep ravines which every where intersected the extensive plain, and discharged a heavy and galling fire upon our advanced columns. No opposition or obstacle, however, checked their ardour. The enemy retired for more than a mile before their resolute and repeated charges. During this time the detachment of the first brigade under colonel Coles, whose greater distance from the scene of action retarded its arrival, rapidly entered the field. Being directed to attack the enemy's left flank, this movement was promptly and bravely executed, amid a shower of musketry and shrapnell shells. The fight now became more stationary, until the brigade first engaged, having expended all their ammunition, were directed to retire to a more defensible position to wait for a re-supply. This movement so disconnected the line as to render it expedient for the first brigade likewise to retire. It should be remarked that the artillery, except two pieces under captain Irvine attached to the rear division, which, from the nature of the ground and the circuitous route they had to take, were likewise much retarded in their arrival, did not reach the ground until the line, for want of ammunition, had already begun to fall back. When they were arranged, in doing which I was assisted by the skill of colonel Swift of the engineers, their fire was sure and destructive. When the artillery was finally directed to retire, having to cross a deep, and excepting in one place (to artillery) impassable ravine, one piece was unfortunately lost. The fall of its gallant commander, lieutenant Smith, and most of his men, may account for this accident. In the death of this young man, the army has lost one of its most promising officers.

The squadron of the 2d regiment of dragoons, under major Woodford, was early on the field, and much exposed to the enemy's fire, but the nature of the ground, and the position of his line, did not admit of those successful charges, which their discipline and ardour, under more favourable circumstances, are calculated to make. The reserve, under

colonel Upham and major Malcolm, did not arrive from the boats in time to participate in but a small part of the action—but the activity and zeal they displayed while engaged, evinced the benefit that might have been derived from their earlier assistance.

The whole line was now reformed on the borders of those woods from which the enemy had first been driven—when, night coming on and the storm returning, and conceiving that the object you had in view, which was to beat back the enemy that would retard our junction with the main body below, to have been accomplished, the troops were directed to return to the ground near the flotilla; which movement was executed in good order, and without any molestation from the enemy.

I cannot close my representation of this battle, without indulging in a few remarks upon those officers, whose conduct will give a character to the conflict of this day. General Covington, whose readiness to enter the field was an earnest of his subsequent activity, received a mortal wound, while leading his men on to a successful charge. His troops, still seeing the effect of his gallant example, continued to advance long after their brave commander had fallen. His fate will perpetuate the memory of the plain which has been crimsoned by his blood. Colonel Preston was severely wounded, while nobly fighting at the head of his regiment. The universal sympathy which is excited by the honourable misfortune of this amiable officer, attests the estimation which is entertained of his talents as a soldier, and his virtues as a man. Major Cummings, with whose military merits and exertions I have long been acquainted, met with a similar fate while leading to a charge, and, undiscouraged by the wound, continued to advance, until loss of blood obliged him to retire. Many platoon officers received disabling or slight wounds in the honourable discharge of their duty, a report of whose names and merits I have directed the several chiefs of brigades to make to me, in order that I may transmit it to you. It is with great satisfaction I acknowledge my warmest approbation of the gallantry and zeal which was constantly displayed throughout this eventful day, by brigadier-general Swartwout and colonel Coles, who commanded the detachment of the 1st brigade.

After the fall of general Covington, colonel Pierce, on whom the command of the third brigade devolved, conducted with his characteristic coolness and valour. In speaking of the other numerous field-officers who participated in this bat-

tle—colonels Gaines and Ripley, lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall, and majors Morgan, Grafton, and Gardner, their equal claim to applause forbids the invidious task of discrimination. I find a pleasure likewise in acknowledging the eminent service I derived from the experience and activity of adjutant-general Walback; from the assistance of inspector-general colonel Johnston, and assistant adjutant-generals majors Beebe and Chambers; the latter was wounded in the honourable discharge of his duty. In addition to these acknowledgments, a sense of justice, as well as personal friendship, induces me to express my entire approbation of the conduct of lieutenant Henry Whiting, my aid-de-camp, who was in this instance, as he has been during the whole campaign, my zealous and brave assistant; lieutenant Worth, aid-de-camp to major-general Lewis, led by a laudable ambition, left the flotilla and volunteered his acceptable services to me on the field.

Permit me now to add, sir, that though the result of this action was not so brilliant and decisive as I could have wished, and the first stages of it seemed to promise, yet when it is recollected that the troops had been long exposed to hard privations and fatigues, to inclement storms from which they could have no shelter—that the enemy were superior to us in numbers, and greatly superior in position, and supported by seven or eight heavy gun-boats—that the action, being unexpected, was necessarily commenced without much concert; that we were, by unavoidable circumstances, long deprived of our artillery; and that the action was warmly and obstinately contested for more than three hours, during which there were but a few short cessations of musketry and cannon; when all these circumstances are recollected, perhaps this day may be thought to have added some reputation to the American arms. And if, on this occasion, you shall believe me to have done my duty, and accomplished any one of your purposes, I shall be satisfied.

Allow me to adjoin my regret, which is felt in common with the army, that the severity of your indisposition deprived us of your presence on this occasion. The adjutant-general has been directed to furnish a report of the killed, wounded, and the casualties:—and

I have the honour to be, sir, with great consideration and respect, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

JOHN P. BOYD,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

*British Account.*

Sir,

*Christler's, Williamsburg, 12th Nov, 1813.*

I have the heartfelt gratification to report the brilliant and gallant conduct of the detachment from the centre division of the army, as yesterday displayed in repulsing and defeating a division of the enemy's force, consisting of two brigades of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, amounting to between 3 and 4000 men, who moved forward about 2 o'clock in the afternoon from Christler's point, and attacked our advance, which gradually fell back to the position selected for the detachment to occupy, the right resting on the river, and the left on a pine wood, exhibiting a front of about 700 yards. The ground being open, the troops were thus disposed :

The flank companies 49th regiment, the detachment Canadian regiment, with one field-piece, under lieutenant-colonel Pearson, on the right, a little advanced on the road. Three companies 89th regiment under captain Barnes, with a gun, formed in echelon with the advance, in its left, supporting it. The 49th and 89th thrown more to the rear, with a gun, formed the main body and reserve, extending to the woods on the left, which were occupied by the voltigeurs under major Harriott, and the Indians under lieutenant Anderson. At about half past two, the action became general, when the enemy endeavoured, by moving forward a brigade from his right, to turn our left, but was repulsed by the 89th forming en potence with the 49th, and both corps moving forward, occasionally firing by platoons ; his efforts were next directed against our right, and to repulse this movement the 49th took ground in that direction, in echelon, followed by the 89th. When within half musket shot, the line was formed under a heavy but irregular fire from the enemy. The 49th was then directed to charge their guns, posted opposite to ours, but it became necessary, when within a short distance of them, to check this forward movement, in consequence of a charge from their cavalry on the right, lest they should wheel about, and fall upon our rear ; but they were received in so gallant a manner by the companies of the 89th under captain Barnes, and the well-directed fire of the artillery, that they quickly retreated, and by a charge from those companies one gun was gained. The enemy immediately concentrated their force to check our advance, but such was the steady countenance and well-directed fire of the troops and artillery, that about half past four they gave way at all points from an exceeding strong position, endeavouring by their

light infantry to cover their retreat, who were soon driven away by a judicious movement made by lieutenant-colonel Pearson. The detachment for the night occupied the ground from which the enemy had been driven, and are now moving forward in pursuit. I regret to find our loss in killed and wounded has been considerable; but trust a most essential service has been rendered to the country, as the whole of the enemy's infantry after the action precipitately retreated to their own shores.

It is now my grateful duty to point out to your honour, the benefit the service has received from the ability, judgment, and active exertions of lieutenant-colonel Harvey, the deputy adjutant-general, for sparing whom to accompany the detachment, I must again publicly express my acknowledgments. To the cordial co-operation and exertions of lieutenant-colonel Pearson, commanding the detachment from Prescott, lieutenant-colonel Plenderleath, 49th regiment, major Clifford, 89th regiment, major Harriott, of the Voltigeurs, and captain Jackson, of the royal artillery, combined with the gallantry of the troops, our great success may be attributed; every man did his duty, and I believe I cannot more strongly speak their merits than in mentioning that our small force did not exceed 800 rank and file.

To captains Davis and Skinner of the quarter-master-general's department, I am under the greatest obligations for the assistance I have received from them; their zeal and activity have been unremitting. Lieutenant Hagernum of the militia, and lieutenant Anderson of the department, have also for their service derived my public acknowledgments.

As the prisoners are hourly being brought in, I am unable to furnish your honour with a correct return of them, but upwards of 100 are now in our possession; neither of the ordnance stores taken, as the whole has not yet been collected.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

J. W. MORRISON,  
*Lieutenant-colonel, 89th Regt. com'g.*  
*His honour Major-General De Rottenburg, &c. &c. &c.*

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, in an Action with the Enemy, at Williamsburg, on the 11th Nov. 1813.*

Killed, 22; wounded, 147; missing, 9 and 3 Indians.

## WAR WITH THE CREEK INDIANS.

*Copy of a Letter from George S. Gaines, Esq. to Governor Blount, dated*

Sir, *Fort St. Stephens (Miss. Ter.), July 30.*

About a week ago the colonel of this county (having been satisfactorily informed that the party of Indians, who had gone to Pensacola for ammunition, and threatened these settlements with an attack, had actually been supplied by the Spanish governor with a quantity of powder) collected about 180 militia, pushed out to the Creek trading road, about seventy miles east of this place, and on the 27th instant met with the party, had a battle with them, and succeeded in taking away a considerable quantity of powder, but the Indians had so much the advantage of the battle-ground (being on the edge of a cane-break), our militia after fighting them two hours were compelled to retreat with the loss of three men killed and eight or ten wounded. It was believed that upwards of twenty Indians were killed.

It is said that our settlements will be attacked by great numbers in a few days, and I trust that some assistance may be afforded us from your state immediately. Our communication with Georgia is entirely cut off; the last mail attempted to be sent through the Creek nation was taken from the post rider by the party of Creek Indians who went to Pensacola for ammunition, and I am told has been delivered to the governor at that place.

Yours, affectionately,

GEORGE S. GAINES.

*Extract of a Letter from General Ferdinand L. Claiborne, to General Flournoy, commanding the 7th Military District.*

Sir, *Cantonment, Mount Vernon, Sept. 3, 1813.*

On the 31st ultimo I had the honour to receive your letter of the 24th, with its enclosure, forwarded by express to me, then at Easley's station, near the Creek line, and about 85 miles above this, on the Tombigbee.

Col. Hawkins's communications for some time past have unfortunately had a tendency to lessen our apprehensions, and to beget a belief of our almost perfect security. My little, but inestimable corps, have felt the effects begotten by the doubts which existed as to the real intention of the Creeks. It probably prevented you yourself, and certainly governor Holmes, from sending troops to this exposed part of the

country. About the 23d ult. I received information that 1200 Indians were on the eve of entering the territory, with intention to attack the upper posts on the Tombigbee, that commanded by colonel Carson in the fork of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers, and the one on Tensaw, commanded by major Beasley. The Indians from the Black Warrior were to attack the upper posts; and those from the Alabama that on Tensaw. This information was immediately communicated to colonel Carson and to major Beasley, and my arrangements made for the defence of the three places threatened, in the best manner of which the limited means I possessed would admit.

With eighty men I went myself to Easley's, and was joined by two detachments of volunteer militia, under the command of colonel Haines, aid-de-camp to governor Holmes, and by a captain Cassity. The place was not attacked at the time expected, and after several unsuccessful attempts to gain intelligence, my scouts fell in with two Chaktaw Indians, from whose information I was induced to believe, that no attack would soon be made. In fact they seemed rather to insinuate that the enemy was rather intimidated, and stated that the Chaktaws in the immediate neighbourhood who had joined them, had, at the instance of Pooshemataha (a medal chief), withdrawn from them, intending to remain neutral; and that they had removed and were removing from the scene of action, to a more secure place for their women and children. This I ascertained to be the fact. Their towns were visited by captain Wells, of dragoons, and found abandoned. Under these circumstances I left Easley's station, and, on my way to this post, learned that major Beasley had been attacked. I reached this place at twelve o'clock last night, having rode seventy miles since morning.

The attack on major Beasley was made at about 11 o'clock, A. M., on the 30th ult. It was unexpected at the moment it occurred, but the whole garrison was immediately under arms. The front gate was open, and the enemy ran in great numbers to possess themselves of it. In the contest for the gate many fell on both sides. Soon, however, the action became general, the enemy fighting on all sides in the open field, and as near the stockade as they could get. The port-holes were taken and retaken several times. A block-house was contended for by captain Jack, at the head of his brave riflemen, for the space of an hour after the enemy were in possession of part of it, when finally they succeeded in driving this company into a house in the fort, and having stopped



many of the port-holes with the ends of rails, possessed themselves of the walls. From the houses our troops made a most gallant defence, but the enemy set fire to the roofs, and an attempt to extinguish the flames proved unsuccessful. The few who remained now attempted a retreat under the direction of captain Bayley, of the militia, and ensign Chambliss, of the rifle company, both of whom had been badly wounded. Previously to their retreat, they threw into the flames many of the guns of the dead men. Few of them succeeded in escaping. Both the officers are missing, and supposed to be dead. Nine of the volunteers and three of the volunteer militia have reached this, several of them wounded. A few citizens who fought in the stockade, but not enrolled in any company, also escaped, one of them leaving a wife and six children, who were probably burnt to death.

Major Beasley fell gallantly fighting at the head of his command near the gate, at the commencement of the action. Captain Jack was killed about the close of the scene, having previously received two wounds. Captain Middleton also distinguished himself, having received four or five wounds before he fell. He was active, and fought bravely from the commencement of the action until he died. Lieutenant Spruce M. Osborn, of Wilkinson county, after receiving two wounds, was taken into a house, but requested to die on the ground, that he might as long as possible see the men fight. The other officers fell nobly doing their duty; and the non-commissioned officers and privates deserve equally well. The action continued until five o'clock in the evening.

Our loss is great—sixty-five, including officers and men, were killed belonging to the 1st regiment of Mississippi territory volunteers, and twenty-seven volunteer militia, officers included. Many respectable citizens, with numerous families, who had abandoned their farms for security, were also killed or burnt in the houses into which they had fled. The loss of the enemy must have been from one hundred and fifty to two hundred killed and wounded. Their force is supposed to have been from five to seven hundred.

At the mills of Messrs. I. and W. Pierce, about a mile from the post, is a small guard, commanded by lieutenant Montgomery, which were stationed previous to and at the time of the attack; but it is believed he abandoned his position in time to save his command. He has not yet been heard of, but I hope made good his retreat to Mobile.

Lieutenant-colonel Ross, whilst at Mobile, hearing of the fate, or probable fate of our troops on Tensaw, ordered captain Blue, of the 7th United States regiment, with 100 men, to this place, and he arrived about day-break this morning, and will here wait your orders. We are busily engaged in fitting this cantonment for defence, and will be prepared to give a good account of the enemy, should an opportunity offer. They will, however, not attack us until they unite all their forces; but, when they do, you may rely on their being warmly received. It is my belief that they cannot bring a force against us which we will not be able to defeat; but we can do no more than defend ourselves in this place.

I have not heard from colonel Carson. He has a good stockade, and a garrison of about 150 volunteers, and within 200 yards is a station, in which are many families, and about fifty fighting men. Should the Indians attack the colonel, he will certainly defeat them. Dent's and Scott's companies are ordered from Easley's to St. Stephens, where are also the broken companies of Morrison and Foelckill. In the Chactaw factory at St. Stephens, there is much public property. At this place we have the papers belonging to the land office. The farms in the country are entirely abandoned; the citizens having left them and fled to the different forts, and the enemy will enrich themselves with plunder. I have not a force which will enable me to guard this extensive frontier, and the country must rest upon governor Holmes in part for aid. I know that your situation will not admit of your drawing much, if any force, from Mobile to Mobile Point, and that you have no disposable troops on the Mississippi. Manac (a half breed), who can be relied on, was at Pensacola about ten days ago. He says that while he was there, three vessels with Spanish troops arrived.

Judge Toulmin and a great many families, have left this part of the country and gone to Mobile. I fear many of the negroes will run off to the enemy—indeed they are already in possession of about 100 of them, and a large quantity of stock and other property.

Six o'clock, P. M. An express has this moment arrived from general Flournoy, with orders for the 3d United States regiment to march immediately.

The volunteer cavalry are also under similar orders.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain Kennedy to Brigadier-General Claiborne, dated Mount-Vernon, September 26th, 1813.*

Sir, agreeably to your order of the 21st instant, we proceeded to Mims' Fort, to collect the bones of our countrymen that fell in the late attack on that place, and to bury their remains, the last humane office that we could perform to the obsequies of our fellow-citizens and brother soldiers.

We collected and consigned to the earth two hundred and forty-seven, including men, women, and children.

The adjacent woods were strictly searched for our countrymen, and in that pursuit we discovered at least one hundred slaughtered Indians. They were covered with rails, brush, &c. We could not be mistaken as to their being Indians, as they were interred with their war dresses and implements; and although they have massacred a number of our helpless women and children, it is, beyond doubt, to them a dear bought victory. The adjacent country we had strictly examined, and no sign of Indians could be discovered.

We have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servants,

J. P. KENNEDY, *Captain*  
and *Brigade-Major commanding the Detachment.*  
F. L. Claiborne, *Brigadier-General, commanding*  
*Mount-Vernon and its Dependencies.*

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Bower to Brigadier-General Claiborne, dated Mobile Point, September 14, 1813.*

Sir, I have information from a source in which I place every confidence, that a British armed schooner from the Bahamas arrived at Pensacola on the 10th instant, with a large supply of arms, ammunition, clothing, and blankets for the Creek Indians, also that the old Seminole chief Perriman and his son William, the latter lately appointed a brigadier-general in the British service, are at Pensacola. They drove into that place two hundred head of fine cattle, and sacrificed them at the heretofore unknown price of from one to eight dollars per head. Fifty cows and calves sold for fifty dollars, so anxious were they to get supplies to join the hostile Indians.

I am well acquainted with those chiefs, and know they have great influence with their people.

It appears that the arms, &c. were forwarded in consequence of an address sent to the governor of Jamaica some time since by the Creek Indians. The schooner, the property of a well-known free-booter, a captain Johnson of the Ba-

hamas, who has made his fortune by preying upon the commerce of France, Spain, and the United States. I recollect his breaking out of the prison in New-Orleans in the year 1809.

I hope the arrival of these supplies will give you a short respite, and enable you to prepare for any force the whole confederation can possibly bring against your posts. It would astonish you to see the labour we have performed at this post. We have, literally speaking, levelled mountains and filled up valleys.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

JOHN BOWER,

*Lieutenant-Colonel commanding.*

*Brigadier-General Claiborne.*

*Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Coffee to Major-General Jackson, commanding the Tennessee Militia.*

*Camp at Ten Islands, November 4, 1813.*

Major-General Jackson,

Sir, I had the honour yesterday of transmitting you a short account of an engagement that took place between a detachment of about nine hundred men from my brigade, with the enemy at Tullushatches towns, the particulars whereof I beg leave herein to recite to you. Pursuant to your orders of the 2d, I detailed from my brigade of cavalry and mounted riflemen, nine hundred men and officers, and proceeded directly to the Tullushatches towns; crossed Coosey river at the Fish-Dam ford, three or four miles above this place. I arrived within one and a half miles of the town (distant from this place south-east eight miles) on the morning of the 3d, at which place I divided my detachment into two columns, the right composed of the cavalry commanded by colonel Allcorn, to cross over a large creek that lay between us and the towns, the left column was of the mounted riflemen under the command of colonel Cannon, with whom I marched myself. Colonel Allcorn was ordered to march up on the right and encircle one half of the town, and at the same time the left would form a half circle on the left, and unite the head of the columns in front of the town; all of which was performed as I could wish. When I arrived within half a mile of the towns, the drums of the enemy began to beat, mingled with their savage yells, preparing for action. It was after sun-rise an hour when the action was brought on by captain Hammond and lieutenant Patterson's companies, who had gone on within the circle of alignment for

the purpose of drawing out the enemy from their buildings, which had the most happy effects. As soon as captain Hammond exhibited his front in view of the town (which stood in open woodland), and gave a few scattering shot, the enemy formed and made a violent charge on him; he gave way as they advanced, until they met our right column, which gave them a general fire and then charged. This changed the direction of charge completely. The enemy retreated firing, until they got around and in their buildings, where they made all the resistance that an overpowered soldier could do; they fought as long as one existed; but their destruction was very soon completed; our men rushed up to the doors of the houses, and in a few minutes killed the last warrior of them. The enemy fought with savage fury, and met death with all its horrors without shrinking or complaining; not one asked to be spared, but fought so long as they could stand or sit. In consequence of their flying to their houses and mixing with their families, our men, in killing the males, without intention killed a few of the squaws and children, which was regretted by every officer and soldier of the detachment, but which could not be avoided.

The number of the enemy killed was one hundred and eighty-six that were counted, and a number of others that were killed in the woods not found. I think the calculation a reasonable one to say two hundred of them were killed, and eighty-four prisoners, of women and children, were taken. Not one of the warriors escaped to carry the news, a circumstance unknown heretofore.

I lost five men killed and forty-one wounded, none mortally, the greater part slightly, a number with arrows. Two of the men killed were with arrows. This appears to form a very principal part of the enemy's arms for warfare, every man having a bow with a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first fire with the gun, until a leisure time for loading offers.

It is with pleasure I say that our men acted with deliberation and firmness. Notwithstanding our numbers were far superior to that of the enemy, it was a circumstance to us unknown, and from the parade of the enemy we had every reason for supposing them our equals in number; but there appeared no visible traces of alarm in any, but, on the contrary, all appeared cool and determined, and no doubt, when they face a foe of their own or superior number, they will show the same courage as on this occasion.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

JNO. COFFEE,

*Brig.-Gen. of Cavalry and Riflemen.*

*Maj.-Gen. Andrew Jackson.*

Killed, 5 privates; wounded, 4 captains, 2 lieutenants, 2 cornets, 3 serjeants, 5 corporals, 1 artificer, 24 privates—total killed and wounded, 46.

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Jackson, commanding the Tennessee Militia, to Governor Blount.*

Sir, *Camp Strother, near Ten Islands, 15th Nov. 1813.*

In my letter of the 11th, I gave you a hasty account of the battle of Talledega; and of the causes which compelled me return to this place. I now do myself the honour of transmitting you a more detailed account of the action; together with the report of the adjutant-general of the killed and wounded.

About thirty miles below, at a place known by the name of Talledega, 160 men of the friendly party of the Creeks, with their women and children, are fortified, the more effectually to resist the efforts of the "Red Sticks," or hostile party. Late in the evening of the 7th, one of the principal men of that fort (Lashly), arrived here with the information that the enemy had arrived there in great numbers, and would certainly destroy the fort and all within it, unless speedy relief could be obtained from this army. Urged by this representation, I immediately gave orders for taking up the line of march with 1200 infantry and 800 cavalry and mounted riflemen—leaving behind me the sick, the wounded, and all my baggage, with what I considered a sufficient force to protect them, until the arrival of general White, who was hourly expected. At 12 o'clock at night the army was in motion, and I commenced crossing the river at the Ten Islands, opposite our late encampment, which in a few hours was effected. On the night of the 8th, I encamped within six miles of the enemy; and about 11 o'clock two of the friendly Indians, with George Mayfield, whom I had sent to reconnoitre the enemy, returned with the intelligence that they were encamped within a quarter of a mile of the fort; but were unable to approach near enough to give me any accurate information of their number or precise situation. Within an hour afterwards old Chenubby arrived from Turkey Town, with a letter from general White, advising me of his retrograde movement, occasioned by an order of major-

general Cocke. Finding that the utmost despatch had now become necessary for the protection of my rear, I immediately ordered the adjutant-general to prepare the line of march, and at 4 o'clock we were in motion—the infantry in three columns—the cavalry and mounted riflemen in the rear, with flankers on each wing. The right wing of the infantry was led on by colonel Bradley—the centre by colonel Pillow—the left by colonel M'Crory—the right of the cavalry by colonel Allcorn—and the left by colonel Carmon. The advance consisting of captain Deadrick's company of artillery, with muskets—captain Bledsoe's and captain Caperton's companies of riflemen; and captain Gordon's company of spies were marched 400 yards in front, under the command of colonel Carrol, the inspector-general, to bring on the engagement. At 7 o'clock, having arrived within a mile of the enemy, I ordered the cavalry and mounted riflemen to advance on the right and left of the infantry, and enclose the enemy in a circle.

Two hundred and fifty of the cavalry and mounted riflemen, commanded by lieutenant colonel Dyer, were placed in the rear of the centre as a corps de reserve. General Hall's brigade occupied the right—general Roberts' the left; and were ordered to advance by heads of companies. The cavalry were ordered, after having encircled the enemy by uniting the fronts of their columns, and keeping their rear connected with the infantry, to face and press inwards towards the centre, so as to leave the enemy no possibility of escape. In the execution of this order it unfortunately happened, that too great a space was left between the rear of the right wing of cavalry and general Hall's brigade, through which a part of the enemy ultimately effected their retreat. At 8 o'clock, the advance having arrived within 80 yards of the enemy, who were concealed in the thick shrubbery which covered the margin of a branch, received from them a heavy fire, which was returned with great rapidity; charged and dislodged them from their position; and turned upon the right wing of general Roberts' brigade. The advance then fell back, as they had been previously ordered, to the centre. At the approach of the enemy, three companies of the militia, having given one fire, commenced a retreat, notwithstanding the utmost exertion of colonel M'Crory and major Sevier, who are entitled to great praise for their bravery on that occasion. To fill the vacancy occasioned by this retreat, I immediately ordered up colonel Bradley's regiment of volunteers; but finding the advance of the enemy too rapid to ad-

mit of their arrival in time, I was compelled to order the reserve to dismount and meet them. This order was executed with great promptitude and gallantry; and the enemy in that quarter speedily repulsed. The militia who had retreated, seeing the spirited stand which was making by the reserve, immediately rallied; and recovering the position which the enemy had just driven them from, poured upon them a most destructive fire. The engagement now became general; and in fifteen minutes the enemy were seen flying in every direction. On the left they were met and repulsed by the mounted riflemen. On the right a part of them escaped through the opening between the right wing of the cavalry and the infantry, and were pursued with great slaughter to the mountains, a distance of three miles. In this pursuit the brave colonels Pillow of the infantry, and Lauderdale of the cavalry, major Boyd of the mounted infantry, and lieutenant Barton, were wounded—the latter of whom has since died.

You will perceive from a draft which I shall send you, that had there been no departure from the original order of battle, not an Indian could have escaped; and even as the battle did terminate, I believe that no impartial man can say that a more splendid result has in any instance attended our arms on land, since the commencement of the war. The force of the enemy is represented by themselves to have been 1080; and it does not appear from their fire and the space of ground which they occupied, that their number can have been less. Two hundred and ninety-nine were left dead on the ground; and no doubt many more were killed who were not found. It is believed that very few escaped without a wound. In a very few weeks, if I had a sufficiency of supplies, I am thoroughly convinced I should be able to put an end to Creek hostility.

The friendly Creeks from Talledega fort tell me that the enemy consider themselves already completely beaten; and state as a proof of their sense of the magnitude of the defeat they have sustained, and of their returning disposition for peace, that they have, since the battle, liberated several of the friendly party whom they had previously taken as prisoners.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the advance, led on by colonel Carrol, for the spirited manner in which they commenced and sustained the attack; nor upon the reserve, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Dyer, and composed of captains Smith's, Morton's, Axum's, Edwards', and Hammond's companies, for the gallantry with which they met



and repulsed the enemy. In a word, officers of every grade, as well as the privates, realized the high expectations I had formed of them, and merit the gratitude of their country.

I should be doing injustice to my staff, composed of majors Reid and Searcy, my aids; colonel Sittler and major Anthony, adjutant and assistant-adjutant-general; colonel Carol, inspector-general; major Strother, topographer; Mr. Cunningham, my secretary; and colonel Stackey D. Hayes, quartermaster-general; not to say that they were every where in the midst of danger, circulating my orders. They deserve and receive my thanks.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON.

*Killed and wounded*—In general Coffee's brigade, 10 killed and 45 wounded; total 55—In general Hall's brigade, 1 killed and 11 wounded; total 12—In general Roberts' brigade, 4 killed and 24 wounded;—total 28.

Total of killed and wounded—95.

The above statement is correct, agreeably to the reports made to me.

J. W. SITTLER, *Adjutant-Gen.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp Strother, near  
Ten Islands, 15th Nov. 1813.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Cocke to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Armstrong, November 28th, 1813.*

Sir, I have the honour to enclose you a copy of brigadier-general James White's detailed report of his excursion to the Hillibee towns.

I am, with sentiments of esteem, your most obedient servant,

JOHN COCKE, *Major-General.*

*Fort Armstrong, November 24th, 1813.*

Dear general, in mine of the 19th instant, by major Outlaw, I promised you a more detailed report, respecting the detachment ordered by you to the Hillibee towns in the Creek nation. In compliance with that promise I have now the honour to state, that under your order of the 11th instant I immediately marched with the mounted infantry, under the immediate command of colonel Burch, the cavalry under the command of major Porter, and a few of the Cherokee Indians under the command of colonel Morgan, with very short rations for four days only. We continued our march

to Little Oakfuskie,\* when we fell in with and captured five hostile Creek warriors, supposed to be spies. Finding no other Indians at that place, we burned the town, which consisted of thirty houses. We then proceeded to a town called Genalga, and burned the same, consisting of ninety-three houses; thence we proceeded to Nitty Choptoa, consisting of about twenty-five houses, which I considered it most prudent not to destroy, as it might be of use at some future period. From thence we marched to the Hillibee town, consisting of about twenty houses, adjoining which was Grayson's farm. Previous to our arrival at that place, I was advised that a party of hostile Creeks was assembled there. Having marched within six or eight miles of it on the evening of the 17th, I dismounted a part of the force under my command, and sent them, under the command of colonel Burch, with the Cherokees, under the command of colonel Morgan, in advance, to surround the town in the night, and make the attack at daylight on the 18th. Owing to the darkness of the night, the town was not reached until after day-light; but so complete was the surprise, that we succeeded in surrounding the town, and killing and capturing almost, if not entirely, the whole of the hostile Creeks assembled there, consisting of about 316, of which number about 60 warriors were killed on the spot, and the remainder made prisoners. Before the close of the engagement, my whole force was up and ready for action, had it become necessary; but owing to the want of knowledge on the part of the Indians of our approach, they were entirely killed and taken before they could prepare for any effectual defence. We lost not one drop of blood in accomplishing this enterprise. We destroyed this village; and, in obedience to your orders, commenced our march for this post, which we were unable to reach until yesterday. I estimate the distance from this to Grayson's farm at about 100 miles. The ground over which we travelled is so rough and hilly, as to render a passage very difficult. Many defiles it was impossible to pass in safety, without the greatest precaution. For a part of the time the weather was so very wet; being encumbered with prisoners, and the troops and their horses having to subsist, in a very great degree, upon such supplies as we could procure in the nation, rendered our march more tardy than it otherwise would have been.

The troops under my command have visited the heart of that section of the Creek nation where the Red Sticks were first distributed.

In justice to this gallant band, I am proud to state, that the

whole of the officers and men under the command of Colonel Burch performed their duty cheerfully and without complaint—that from the cool, orderly, and prompt manner in which Major Porter, and the cavalry under his command, formed and conducted themselves in every case of alarm, I had the highest confidence in them. Colonel Morgan and the Cherokees under his command gave undeniable evidence that they merit the employment of the government. In short, sir, the whole detachment under my command conducted in such a manner as to enable me to assure you that they are capable of performing any thing to which the same number of men are equal.

It gives me pleasure to add, that Mr. M'Crory, who acted as my aid in this expedition, rendered services that to me were indispensable, to his country very useful, and to himself highly honourable.

I have the honour to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES WHITE, *Brigadier-General.*

*Major-General John Cocke.*

*Copy of a Letter from Major-General Pinckney to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, 6th and 7th Districts, Milledgeville, 7th December, 1813.*

Sir, I have the honour of enclosing you despatches just received from general Floyd, commanding the troops of the state of Georgia, employed on the expedition against the Creek Indians.

I have the honour to be, with sentiments of respect, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS PINCKNEY.

*The Secretary of War.*

*Camp west of Chatahouchie, December 4, 1813.*

Major-General Pinckney,

Sir, I have the honour to communicate to your excellency an account of an action fought the 29th ultimo, on the Talapoosie river, between part of the force under my command and a large body of Creek Indians.

Having received information that numbers of the hostile Indians were assembled at Autossee, a town on the southern bank of the Talapoosie, about eighteen miles above the Hickory-Ground, and twenty above the junction of that river with the Coosa, I proceeded to its attack with 950 of the Georgia militia, accompanied by between three and four hun-

dred friendly Indians. Having encamped within nine or ten miles of the point of destination the preceding evening, we resumed the march a few minutes before one on the morning of the 29th, and at half after six were formed for action in front of the town.

Booth's battalion composed the right column, and marched from its centre. Watson's battalion composed the left, and marched from its right. Adams' rifle company and Meriwether's, under lieutenant Hendon, were on the flanks. Captain Thomas's artillery marched in front of the right column in the road.

It was my intention to have completely surrounded the enemy by *appuying* the right wing of my force on Canleebee creek, at the mouth of which I was informed the town stood, and resting the left on the river bank, below the town; but, to our surprise, as the day dawned, we perceived a second town about five hundred yards below that which we had first viewed, and were preparing to attack. The plan was immediately changed. Three companies of infantry on the left were wheeled to the left into echelon, and advanced to the lower town, accompanied by Meriwether's rifle company and two troops of light dragoons, under the command of captains Irwin and Steele.

The residue of the force approached the upper town, and the battle soon became general. The Indians presented themselves at every point, and fought with the desperate bravery of real fanatics. The well-directed fire, however, of the artillery, added to the charge of the bayonet, soon forced them to take refuge in the out-houses, thickets, and copses in the rear of the town; many, it is believed, concealed themselves in caves previously formed for the purpose of securing retreat, in the high bluff of the river, which was thickly covered with reed and brush-wood. The Indians of the friendly party, who accompanied us on the expedition, were divided into four companies, and placed under the command of leaders of their own selection. They were, by engagement entered into the day previous, to have crossed the river above the town, and been posted on the opposite shore during the action, for the purpose of firing on such of the enemy as might attempt to escape, or keeping in check any reinforcements which might probably be thrown in from the neighbouring towns; but, owing to the difficulty of the ford, and the coolness of the weather, and the lateness of the hour, this arrangement failed, and their leaders were directed to cross Canleebee creek and occupy that flank, to prevent escapes from the

Tallisee town. Some time after the action commenced, our red friends thronged in disorder in the rear of our lines. The Cowetaws, under M'Intosh, and the Tookaubatchians, under the Mad Dog's Son, fell in on our flanks, and fought with an intrepidity worthy of any troops.

At nine o'clock the enemy was completely driven from the plains, and the houses of both towns wrapped in flames. As we were then sixty miles from any depot of provisions, and our five days' rations pretty much reduced, in the heart of an enemy's country, which in a few moments could have poured from its numerous towns hosts of the fiercest warriors; as soon as the dead and wounded were properly disposed of, I ordered the place to be abandoned, and the troops to commence their march to Chatahouchie.

It is difficult to determine the strength of the enemy; but from the information of some of the chiefs, which it is said can be relied on, there were assembled at Autossee, warriors from eight towns for its defence, it being their beloved ground, on which they proclaimed no white man could approach without inevitable destruction. It is difficult to give a precise account of the loss of the enemy; but from the number which were lying scattered over the field, together with those destroyed in the towns, and the many slain on the bank of the river, which respectable officers affirm they saw lying in heaps at the water's edge, where they had been precipitated by their surviving friends, their loss in killed, independent of their wounded, must have been at least two hundred (among whom are the Autossee and Tallisee kings); and from the circumstance of their making no efforts to molest our return, probably greater. The number of buildings burnt (some of a superior order for the dwellings of savages, and filled with valuable articles), is supposed to be four hundred.

Adjutant-general Newman rendered important services during the action, by his cool and deliberate courage. My aid, major Crawford, discharged with promptitude the duties of a brave and meritorious officer. Major Pace, who acted as field-aid, also distinguished himself; both these gentlemen had their horses shot under them, and the latter lost his. Dr. Williamson, hospital-surgeon, and Dr. Clopton, were prompt and attentive in the discharge of their duty towards the wounded during the action.

Major Freeman, at the head of Irwin's troop of cavalry, and part of Steele's, made a furious and successful charge upon a body of Indians, sabred several, and completely defeated them—captain Adams and lieutenant Hendon's rifle

companies killed a great many Indians, and deserve particular praise. Captain Barton's company was in the hottest of the battle, and fought like soldiers. Captain Myrick, captain Little, captain King, captain Broadnax, captain Cleavelands, captain Joseph T. Cunningham, and captain Lee, with their companies, distinguished themselves. Brigade-major Shackleford was of great service in bringing the troops into action; and adjutant Broadnax, and major Montgomery, who acted as assistant-adjutant, showed great activity and courage. Major Booth used his best endeavours in bringing his battalion to action, and major Watson's battalion acted with considerable spirit. Irvin's, Patterson's, and Steele's troops of cavalry, whenever an opportunity presented, charged with success. Lieutenant Strong had his horse shot, and narrowly escaped, and quarter-master Tennell displayed the greatest heroism, and miraculously escaped, though badly wounded, after having had his horse shot from under him. The topographical engineer was vigilant in endeavours to render service.

The troops deserve the highest praise for their fortitude in enduring hunger, cold, and fatigue without a murmur, having marched 120 miles in seven days.

The friendly Indians lost several killed and wounded, the number not exactly known. Captain Barton, an active and intelligent officer (the bearer of these despatches), can more particularly explain to your excellency the conduct, movements, and operations of the army.

I have the honour to be, with high regard, your most obedient servant,

JOHN FLOYD, *Brigadier-Gen.*

Accompanying the above is a detailed statement of the killed and wounded in the engagement of the 29th November, as furnished by the hospital-surgeon, the amount of which is as follows :

Killed, 11 ; wounded, 54.

*Letter from General Adams to the Governor of Georgia.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Monticello, 24th December, 1813.*

The detachment of militia under my command, authorised by a resolution of the legislature of this state, to proceed against the upper and most adjacent warring Creek towns, having returned from that service, I take the liberty of laying before your excellency the following statement.

On the 9th instant the detachment, consisting of about 530 men, took up their line of march from Camp Patriotism

near Monticello, but in consequence of frequent rains, and having almost innumerable narrow passes to go through, where our pack horses, as well as others, often met with considerable difficulty, and were very generally compelled to march in single file, we were unable to cross Chatahouchie before Wednesday the 15th, which we did about 12 o'clock on that day; it was then rainy, and some of the men, as well as most of the baggage, were very wet. Believing that we should be more successful by being able to surprise the enemy, I determined on marching all that night, and attacking the most adjacent town, New-Yauca, which was then 30 miles distant, at day-light on Thursday, the 16th. The night, however, being extremely dark and wet, we found it impossible, after repeated exertions by torch-light, to proceed; we were consequently compelled to encamp 18 or 20 miles from the town we wished to surprise. The repeated and almost continued rains which had fallen during our march, and particularly that night, unavoidably placed our arms in such a situation as to render it indispensably necessary that some time should be occupied next morning in putting them in order; hence we were unable to march in a suitable condition to meet an enemy, before 10 or 11 o'clock, and therefore could not that day reach the town which was our immediate object.

As soon as we were in a situation to meet the enemy, the line of march was formed, and we proceeded near a small settlement, containing eleven houses, known by the name of the Mad Warrior's village, where the army was halted, and a small detachment sent forward to cut off such of the enemy as might be found there; not a single Indian was to be seen, though there were strong evidences of its having been recently evacuated. Finding some corn here, such persons as were most deficient supplied themselves; we then set fire to the buildings, which contained several articles of property, proceeded to within three miles of New Yauca, and encamped without fire. On the morning of Friday, the 17th instant, the army was formed into three detachments; the right commanded by captain Hagerty, the left by captain Dawson, and the centre by captain Brown; in this order the three divisions marched through different pass-ways, and over very hilly ground, to an eminence within half a mile of the town, where the whole were dismounted, except captain Martin's company of cavalry and about 85 riflemen, under the command of captain Cocke.

The march was then resumed by the three divisions, so

arranged that the centre should fall immediately upon the town, and the right and left wings form such an alignment as would prevent the escape of the enemy either up or down the river, near the margin of which the town was situated. The mounted riflemen under the command of captain Cocke, and captain Martin's corps of cavalry, were directed to form near the bank of the river so as to prevent any from escaping in that direction. A guard, consisting of about 40 men, were left upon the eminence, to protect the horses. When we arrived at a little hill which overlooked the town, we found, to our mortification, as we found at the little village the preceding day, not a single Indian, though there were abundant signs of a very recent evacuation, and repeated yells within our hearing on the opposite side of the river.

The several divisions, after ascertaining that we should be unable to accomplish that part of the resolution of the legislature which related to the destruction of the enemy, were ordered to repair to the place where the horses were left, to return to the town, secure what corn was wanting, and consume the balance with the houses. Upon our return up the hill, where our horses were left, the yell of Indians was heard near them, and two small detachments, consisting of the cavalry and mounted riflemen, were immediately despatched in the direction from whence the sounds seemed to issue; but the ground being extremely hilly, so as to obstruct the view at very short distances, no Indians could be found. The whole were then marched down to the town, when we discovered, on the opposite side of the river, a number of Indians in a wood on the brow of a small hill which commanded the ford, and at a distance of perhaps four or five hundred yards, that space being occupied by a large old field and the river Talapoosie.

The guides who had been procured for this expedition informed me, that the river at this place was more shoal than at any other within our reach, and that it would be impossible to cross here, in consequence of a swell occasioned by the late rains. Judging also from the signs on our route, and from the information given by one of our guides, who was well acquainted with the habits and general plan of the war party in this neighbourhood, that we should not find any of them on this side the river, and our stock of provisions being by frequent rains very much injured, we were under the painful necessity of executing so much only of the object of the expedition as came within our immediate reach, which we did by burning the town, containing 85 houses, and the pro-



perty found in them, consisting principally of a considerable quantity of corn. I judged it expedient to return for encampment the ensuing night beyond the surrounding hills, and we accordingly marched about two and a half miles from the town, within half a mile of the river bank, where we lay without fire, though a very cold night, within hearing of frequent yells, which were generally supposed to be on the opposite side of the river, and prepared for any attack that the enemy might think proper to make upon us.

During our stay in town, while procuring corn for our horses, three or four of the men went to the margin of the river, where one, under the cover of an Indian hut, and others under cover of such brush and shrubbery as the old field afforded, exchanged a few shot with the enemy, and three of them say they saw an Indian fall at the fire of their guns.

The adjutant, Thomas M. Berrien, who was at the moment considerably advanced towards the margin of the river, and had a spy glass in his hand, endeavouring to ascertain the strength of the enemy, states positively that he saw an Indian fall at the fire of Zachariah Simms' musket and John M. Patrick's rifle; that they were dragged up the hill and fires raised near them. Those few men were in a situation very much exposed in proportion to that of the enemy, and one of them, John M. Patrick of Jasper county, while stooping to take aim at a crowd of Indians, received a ball in his left shoulder, which it was found impossible to extract—he is however on the mend, and will probably recover.

It is proper to add, that they went to the margin of the river not only without, but in direct violation of positive orders.

The other towns which we contemplated burning, Tookaubatchie, Tallahassee and Immookfau, were on the opposite side of the river, and it was impossible to get at them, owing to the high water—hence, nothing was left for us but to pursue our march home, which was done with proper precautionary measures to prevent a surprise until we crossed Chatahouchie, when the whole were permitted to proceed in the order they chose, which very much facilitated our march, and all have arrived safe.

Since my return, I learn from captain Hamilton of general Floyd's army, who is now in this neighbourhood, that his company of cavalry, and some friendly Indians with McIntosh at their head, were ordered to join us at Chatahouchie;

this they failed to accomplish, and the friendly Indians were deterred from pursuing us by information which they received, that a force of 2000 hostile Indians were assembled at Oakfuskee, and if we should fall in with them, would inevitably cut us off. Captain Hamilton would have followed us, but was apprehensive that we were so far advanced, that he would be unable to overtake us.

Before I conclude this communication, it is proper to state, that the officers and privates (with such exceptions only as are noted within the remarks of the muster roll) evinced, during the whole expedition, and particularly at every alarm, a degree of firm and deliberate courage, which would have done honour to Spartan valour.

I have the honour to be, with high consideration, your excellency's most obedient and humble servant,

DAVID ADAMS.

*His Excellency Peter Early, Governor of Georgia.*

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AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT  
NIAGARA, AND THE DESOLATION OF THAT FRONTIER.

*Copy of a Letter from General McClure, of the New-York State  
Troops, to the Secretary of War.*

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Buffalo, December 22d, 1813.*

I regret to be under the necessity of announcing to you the mortifying intelligence of the loss of Fort Niagara. On the morning of the 19th instant, about 4 o'clock, the enemy crossed the river at the Five-Mile Meadows in great force, consisting of regulars and Indians, who made their way undiscovered to the garrison, which, from the most correct information I can collect, was completely surprised. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter. Such as escaped the fury of the first onset retired to the old mess-house, where they kept up a destructive fire on the enemy, until a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender. Although our force was very inferior, and comparatively small indeed, I am induced to think that the disaster is not attributable to any want of troops, but to gross neglect in the commanding officer of the fort, captain Leonard, in not preparing, being ready, and looking out for the expected attack.

I have not been able to ascertain correctly the number of killed and wounded. About twenty regulars have escaped

out of the fort, some badly wounded. Lieutenant Peck, 24th regiment, is killed, and it is said three others.

You will perceive, sir, by the enclosed general orders, that I apprehended an attack, and made the necessary arrangements to meet it; but have reason to believe, from information received by those who have made their escape, that the commandant did not in any respect comply with those orders.

On the same morning a detachment of militia, under major Bennet, stationed at Lewistown heights, was attacked by a party of savages; but the major and his little corps, by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat, after being surrounded by several hundred, with the loss of six or eight, who doubtless were killed, among whom were two sons of captain Jones, Indian interpreter. The villages of Youngstown, Lewistown, Manchester, and the Indian Tuscarora village, were reduced to ashes, and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape were, without regard to age or sex, inhumanly butchered by savages, headed by British officers painted. A British officer who is taken prisoner, avows that many small children were murdered by their Indians. Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser with about forty Canadian volunteers, advanced to Lewistown heights, and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back to the foot of the mountain. The major is a meritorious officer. He fought the enemy two days, and contended every inch of ground to the Tauntawanty Creek. In these actions lieutenant Lowe, 23d regiment United States' army, and eight of the Canadian volunteers were killed. I had myself, three days previous to the attack on Niagara, left it with a view of providing for the defence of this place, Black-Rock, and the other villages on this frontier. I came here without troops, and have called out the militia of Genessee, Niagara, and Chataugue counties *en masse*.

This place was then thought to be in most imminent danger, as well as the shipping; but I have no doubt is now perfectly secure. Volunteers are coming in in great numbers; they are, however, a species of troops that cannot be expected to continue in service for a long time. In a few days one thousand detached militia, lately drafted, will be on.

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEO. M'CLURE,

*Brigadier-General commanding.*

*Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.*

*Extract of a second Letter from General M'Clure to the Secretary at war.*

*Batavia, December 25, 1813.*

It is a notorious fact, that the night on which Fort Niagara was captured, captain Leonard left the fort about 11 o'clock, P. M. I am assured that he has since given himself up to the enemy, and that he and his family are now on the Canadian side of the streight.

*Extract of a Letter from Major-General Hall, commanding on the Niagara Frontier, to his Excellency Governor Tompkins, dated Buffalo, December 25, 1813.*

On my receiving information of the enemy's crossing the Niagara river, and taking the fort, I immediately set off for that frontier. On my arrival at Batavia, I found a number of volunteers assembled. I tarried there one day to forward them on to the frontier, and make arrangements for those who should follow.

I this day arrived at Buffalo and assumed the command of the troops, being all volunteers, now on this station. The whole number here, at Lewistown, &c. may amount to 2000 of all descriptions. The enemy have made their appearance off Black Rock, and an invasion is to be expected. The troops now out can be kept out but a few days. Those called out on your excellency's last requisition, cannot all arrive at this place till the middle or last of this week. The order did not reach me till the evening of the 16th instant.

Our loss in the capture of Niagara has been immense. What number of brave men have been sacrificed, we have not been able to learn.—It must have been great.

Several inhabitants have been killed at Lewistown, &c. among whom it is not ascertained there are any women or children. I have the honour, &c.

AMOS HALL.

*From the same to the same, dated Head-Quarters,  
Niagara Frontier, Dec. 30, 1813, 7 o'clock P. M.*

Sir,

*Received by Express.*

I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, and to add that this frontier is wholly desolate. The British crossed over, supported by a strong party of Indians, at a little before day this morning, near Black Rock—they were met with the militia under my command with spirit; but, overpowered by numbers and discipline of the enemy, the militia gave way and fled on every side;

every attempt to rally them was ineffectual. The enemy's purpose was obtained, and the flourishing village of Buffalo is laid in ruins. The Niagara frontier now lies open and naked to our enemies. Your judgment will direct you what is most proper in this emergency. I am exhausted with fatigue, and must defer particulars till to-morrow. Many valuable lives are lost.

I have the honour, &c.

A. HALL, *Major-Gen.*

*Head-Quarters, Upper Canada, Dec. 19, 1813.*

Lieutenant-general Drummond congratulates the troops under his command, on the brilliant success which has crowned the attack made this morning on Fort Niagara. It was assaulted an hour before day-light, and after a short but severe contest, it was carried with a very slight loss on our part; that of the enemy was 65 killed and 15 wounded—all by the bayonet—the remainder of the garrison, to the number of about 350 regular troops and artillery, were made prisoners; 27 pieces of ordnance were found in the fort. Our loss does not exceed 5 killed and 3 wounded. Lieutenant Nowlan of the 100th regiment, a very promising young officer, is the only officer killed. The lieutenant-general has to regret that a severe wound which colonel Murray has received, is likely to deprive the army of the services of that gallant officer for some time. The troops employed on this occasion were the 100th regiment, the grenadier company of the royals, and the flank companies of the 41st regiment. Their instructions were not to fire, but to carry the place at the point of the bayonet. These orders were punctually obeyed; a circumstance that not only proves their intrepidity, but reflects great credit on their discipline. Colonel Murray expresses his admiration of the valour and good conduct of the whole of the troops, particularly of the 100th regiment, which led the attack. He also bestows his particular thanks on lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, &c. (Here follow the names of several regular and militia officers who distinguished themselves). Of the brilliant service of lieutenant Dawson of the 100th who led the forlorn hope, and captain Fawcett, of the 100th, grenadiers, in entirely cutting off two of the enemy's pickets and surprising the sentries on the glacis and at the gate, by which means the watch-word was obtained, and the entrance into the fort greatly facilitated, the colonel speaks in terms of the highest and most deserved praise.

Lieutenant-general Drummond will perform a most grateful duty in bringing under the notice of his royal highness the prince regent, through his excellency the commander of the forces, the admirable execution of this brilliant achievement on the part of every individual concerned. The useful services of the militia volunteers in launching the boats, and rowing the troops across the river, were not unnoticed by the lieutenant-general.

The lieutenant-general has received from major-general Riall a very favourable report of the zeal and alacrity of the detachment of the Royal Scots, under lieutenant-colonel Gordon, and the 41st battalion companies under major Friend, who advanced under the major-general's command to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Lewistown. Their steadiness and regularity, under circumstances of great temptation, were highly creditable to them. Nothing could more strongly indicate their anxious wish to meet the enemy; and the lieutenant-general has only to regret that his rapid retreat from Lewistown heights, did not afford to major-general Riall an opportunity of leading them to victory.

Lieutenant-general Drummond begs that major-generals Riall and Vincent will accept his acknowledgment for the assistance he has received from them in making arrangements for the late operations.

Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, 100th regiment, is appointed to command Fort Niagara, and the lieutenant-general will recommend that the same command-money be annexed to it as was granted at Fort George.

A board of survey, composed of lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, commandant, president, major Holcroft, commanding royal artillery, and a captain of the 100th regiment, members, will assemble as soon as possible in Fort Niagara, for the purpose of taking an exact account and inventory of the immense quantity of ordnance stores, arms, provisions, clothing, &c. captured in that place.

J. HARVEY,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Dept. Adj. Gen.*