



FURTHER  
AND *STILL* MORE IMPORTANT  
*SUPPRESSED*  
DOCUMENTS.



## PREFACE.

*THE right which every Government possesses to keep secret its intercourse and negotiations with foreign nations, so long at least as they are still pending, has been most grossly abused by the present Administration.*

*Availing themselves of the privilege of secret debate, and of the right to impose injunctions of secrecy on the members of the two houses, they have published just so much, and no more of the Correspondence of our Government with foreign powers, as would subserve their own views, as would tend to palliate the conduct of France, and exasperate the People against Great Britain*

*It will be perceived by the Documents which we are now about to publish, the authenticity of which may be relied on, and which we challenge Mr. Madison to disavow if he dare, that while the most important facts in the treatment of France to us, and the most interesting opinions of Gen. Armstrong, tending to shew the necessity of a war, or of spirited measures against that nation, have been purposely kept back, letters from Mr. Pinckney on the other hand, favourable to Great Britain, and to her views and feelings, have been equally suppressed.*

*It will be seen, that as the Government professed to take hostile ground equally against both, no honourable motives of policy or prudence, no rules of diplomatic delicacy required the suppression of these letters.*

*We are happy in being able to give them to the public.--- We shall place them in order of time, and accompany them with such explanatory remarks only, as are absolutely necessary to the right understanding of such mutilated extracts.— The other parts of the same correspondence will be found by our readers among the documents published by order of the Senate early in the present session.*



## *Further Suppressed Documents.*

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THE first Document which we present to the public is an extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison, dated Dec. 27, 1807, in which our Minister declares, that every man in France agrees, that the Decrees of the Emperor are impolitic ; but that no man had the hardihood to state this opinion to the Emperor. It results from this correspondence that so great are the apprehensions entertained of the violence of the temper of this tyrant, that we have no means of communicating to him the sense we have of his injustice. As his *own* ministers dare not express their own convictions, and as the rules of diplomatic forms forbid a direct application to him, we are obliged to submit to all his caprices, without the possibility of remedy. This may be an apology in the minds of the admirers and advocates of this despot, but it proves our case to be hopeless.

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*Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison.*

PARIS, DEC. 27, 1807.

" I FORWARDED to Mr. McElhony a Copy of a second and very extraordinary Decree\* of this Government with regard to neutral commerce. Whether it be meant to stimulate Great Britain to the commission of new outrages, or to quicken us in repelling those she has already committed...the policy is equally unwise, and so decidedly so, that I know not a man of consideration who approves of it. It is however not less true, that it is as difficult to find *one* who will *hazard an objection to it*. T——d, who in this way is permitted to go further than any other person, dare not avow his opinion of it, nor (bad as he thinks it) do more than state that the present moment would appear to dictate some modifications. To this point he stands engaged to go, and I wait the result with much anxiety. The Emperor is expected here on the last day of the month."

\*The Milan Decree of Dec. 17th.

THE second suppressed document is a part of the letter of Mr. Madison of the 8th of Feb. 1808, to Mr. Armstrong. The letter was published as a perfect whole. No reference whatever was made to any suppressed extract, nor was it intimated that any part had been suppressed.

The part now added originally followed the sentiment, expressed by Mr. Madison, that his Britannic Majesty had declared, "that he would repeal or relinquish his Orders *pari passu* (with equal pace) with his enemy, France."—Mr. Madison in the *suppressed* extract, now first laid before the public, adds, that he presumes the British Government did not contemplate the distinction between that part of the French decrees which operated *on land* and that part which operated *at sea*. And the inference is, that Great Britain would not admit the absurd and disgraceful distinction set up by our Government, that the French decrees *so far* as they affected our trade in their ports were lawful, but so far as they affected our trade on the ocean were *unjust*: and Mr. Madison concludes with urging a *modification only* of the French decrees so far as respects the *seizure* in their *ports*, and urges it on the ground, not of our rights secured by treaty, but on the effect it would have on the *objects* of France. That *these objects*, the destruction of British commerce, would be as effectually promoted by annihilating our treaty and confining her seizures to her own ports and those of her dependencies as by captures on the ocean. The late report of a relaxation of the Milan decree seems to be founded on this treacherous concession of Mr. Madison, and probably was produced by the mean councils of our cabinet.

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*Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong.*

FEBRUARY 8, 1808.

[To follow the paragraph ending with the words "*pari passu* with his enemy."] ]

"WHETHER these intimations have any reference to the distinction between such parts of the French Decree as operate municipally on shore, and such as operating on the high seas, violate the rights of neutrals, or to a distinction between the former restriction, and the late extension of the Decree with respect to the United States, Mr. Erskine did not seem authori-

zed to say. The probability is, that neither of these distinctions entered into the views of the British Cabinet. But it is certainly neither less the duty nor the true policy of the Emperor of the French, so to vary his Decree, as to make it consistent with the rights of neutrals and the *freedom of the seas*, and particularly with his positive stipulations with the United States. This may be the more reasonably expected, as nothing can be more clear, as has been already observed, than the effect of the Decree, as far as it can be carried into effect, would not be sensibly diminished by abolishing its operation beyond the limits of the territorial sovereignty."

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THE next documents in order of time are the suppressed letters of Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison of 22d Feb. 1808, and of the 9th March of the same year.

The first, which in the *pure* periods of our history would have roused our nation to a flame, contained facts and allegations of the most important tendency, and proofs of a temper, to which no nation ever yet submitted before it was subdued; we now give it to the public.

It appears, that Bonaparte declared we should be either "ALLIES or ENEMIES,"---that the amount of property sequestered was upwards of one hundred millions of francs, or seventeen millions of dollars, nearly three times as great as the whole amount of British captures during the whole of fifteen years war;---that our ambassador at Paris, who cannot be charged with *too much* spirit, declared, that the *very magnitude* of these sums, rendered all hope of redress abortive—and that he presumed as soon as we should know from him that France had thus definitively taken *her* ground, "WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE OURS." In other words, that we should resist with our whole energies such flagrant insults and violations of our rights.

Yet *this letter* is *suppressed*—and it produced no sentiment of indignation in our submissive rulers. We did take *our ground*, but it was the ground of base submission, of further humiliation.

The letter of the 9th of March, hereto subjoined, shews, that Bonaparte had stated, that he would modify his decrees, if we could point out a mode in which he *could do it without departing from his system*; but Mr. Armstrong explicitly states, that *he doubted the sincerity of this declaration*. . . .

In fact he made a proposal for modification to which no reply has ever been given.



*Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison.*

FEBRUARY 22, 1808.

“MR. PATTERSON offering so good a conveyance that I cannot but employ it. Nothing has occurred here since the date of my public dispatches (the 17th) to give to our business an aspect more favorable than it then had ; but on the other hand, I have come to the knowledge of two facts, which I think sufficiently shew the decided character of the Emperor's policy with regard to us. These are first, that in a Council of Administration held a few days past, when it was proposed to modify the operation of the Decrees of Nov. 1806, and Dec. 1807, (though the proposition was supported by the whole weight of the Council,) he became highly indignant, and declared that these decrees should *suffer no change*—and that the Americans should be compelled to take the positive character of either *Allies* or *Enemies* : 2d, that on the 27th of Jan. last, twelve days after Mr. Champagny's written assurances, that these Decrees should *work no change* in the *property sequestered* until our *discussions with England were brought to a close*, and seven days before he reported to me verbally these very assurances, the Emperor had by a *special decision* confiscated two of our ships and their cargoes (the Julius Henry, and Juniata) for want merely of a document *not required by any law or usage* of the commerce in which they had been engaged. This act was taken as I am informed on a general report of sequestered cases, amounting to one hundred and sixty, and which, at present prices, will yield upwards of *one hundred millions of francs*, a sum whose magnitude alone renders *hopeless* all attempts at saving it—Danes, Portuguese and Americans, will be the principal sufferers. If I am right in supposing that the Emperor has definitively taken his ground, I cannot be wrong in concluding *that you will immediately take yours.*”

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison.*

9TH MARCH, 1808.

“THE conversation alluded to in the copy of the letter ——— did not take place till the 8th inst. when the Emperor declared that if means could be found to make an exception of the Nov. Decree, that such exception should have his consent.”

*Extract from the same to the same.*

15TH MARCH, 1808.

“I STATED in my last letter the substance of a declaration made by the Emperor, viz. that if means could be found to except American property from the operation of the Decree of Nov. 1806, without infringing the principles of the Decrees.

he would immediately make the exception. No time was lost in communicating this declaration to me, and I was invited to point out the means it required, and assured that they should be immediately submitted to his Majesty. Little as I liked the proposition, and much as *I doubted the sincerity of the declaration out of which it grew*, I could not refuse any agency of mine in rescuing so much of the American property sequestered in the ports of France as should come within this new rule. I accordingly wrote the Note (a copy of which is subjoined to this letter) pointing out in a few words the property to which that rule would apply. This note was put into the Emperor's hand by the Prince of Benevento, who, though six days have now elapsed, has not yet received an answer."

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THE following document from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong, proves that our Government were resolved to *give up* all claims for the unjust decrees of France, so far as they operated *on land*: that Mr. Madison chose to overlook the captures in the West-Indies, stated in his *own* letter of May 22d, 1807: that though Bonaparte had expressly avowed *nine* months before that his *original plan* was to extend the decree of Berlin to American Commerce, Mr. Madison chose to consider the *original plan confined* to seizures in port; and that all we wished was, that France should *so modify* her decrees, as to cut us off from all trade with the Continent, provided they would permit us to navigate *the ocean*. This hint is said at last to have reached the *Imperial* ear, and that he has consented to modify, not his Berlin decree, but the decree of *Milan*, which rendered a forcible boarding by a British cruizer cause of condemnation. . . . Generous Prince! Thy bounty is equal to thy moderation! No doubt Mr. Madison will thank the Emperor for this favour, and as before, defend the Berlin decree as a just and lawful measure.

For the Emperor's understanding of his Berlin decree, and its original plan, see Armstrong's letter published in the documents, page 20, in which he says, "that the application of that decree to *us* was the result of the general expressions of the article," and that the Emperor's decision, that it should apply to us, was the declaration of an *anterior and positive* disposition.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong.*

MAY 2, 1808.

{To follow the paragraph ending with the words "will be immediately taken."}]

"THE repeal of her decrees is the more to be expected, above all, if Great-Britain should repeal, or be likely to repeal hers, as the *plan* of the original decree at Berlin did not extend to a violation of the *freedom of the seas*, and was restricted to a municipal operation for nearly an intire year, notwithstanding the illegal British order of Jan. 1807, and as a return of France, to that restricted scope of her plan, would so immaterially diminish its operation against the British commerce; that operation being so completely in the power of France on land, and so little in her power on the high seas. But although we cannot, if right, demand of France more than a repeal of so much of her decrees as violate the *freedom of the seas*, and a great point will be gained by a repeal of that part of them, yet as it may not have the effect of inducing a repeal of the whole illegal system of the British government, which may seek pretexts, to plead a necessity for counteracting the unprecedented and *formidable mode of warfare practised against her*; it will be desirable, that as little room as possible should be left, for this remaining danger to the tranquil enjoyment of our commercial rights."

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THE following frank, and open letter from Armstrong to Pinckney proves that all hopes of operating on France, either through her justice or wisdom, were wholly vain, and worse than vain, *mischievous*.

He adds, that France has become convinced, "that *Words*, and *words* only are the weapons we can employ."

This is too severe from a friend.... "And you Brutus--- then die Cæsar." Have the Federalists been unjust in ascribing this pompous boasting character to the government, when its own officers dare tell it so? Yet this officer still holds his place.

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*Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Pinkney.*

PARIS, 26th JUNE, 1808.

"THE St. Michael arrived at L'Orient, on the first inst. and the government messenger at Paris on the 8th; a passport for the vessel to Falmouth, thence to L'Orient again, was immediately requested, but one in the form could not be granted but by order of the Emperor, and this was not given till the 18th; these circumstances will account for the long detention of your dispatches. We have reason to regret that the views of our

government, founded on the justice and wisdom of the belligerent powers, are so little likely to succeed. *Attempts of this character made here* (and they have not been unfrequent) *have hitherto done no good.* Nay, the repetition of these may be fairly presumed have *done mischief*, inasmuch as it has tended to establish a creed, that words in some form or other, are the ONLY MEANS we have to employ. The French Council of Prizes, which is (I am told) as like the English Court of Admiralty, as one egg is like an other, has lately began a career of condemnation. Between the 1st and 15th inst. five cases have been decided, and I am assured that orders have been received from Bayonne, for condemning all American cases en bloc [in mass.] What has suspended the *axe* since the 15th, we can but conjecture. It may be presumed that the reflections of the Spanish Junta, on the political and other relations, subsisting between Spain and the United States, through the medium of the colonies, may have produced the pause. That it is not owing to any conquest which good principles have obtained over bad ones, is certain. Are things any better your side the channel ?”

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THE following letter from Gen. Armstrong proves his sense of the folly and inutility, the incompetency and fruitlessness of our Embargo. He recommends vigorous measures against France. . . . The reasons he assigns, his conviction, that we can do much against France, and the belief entertained by France, that we *dare not* do any thing against her, while they prove, that France knew our rulers, and had *pledges from them*, of which *he* was ignorant, prove also a private good understanding with France, through some other channel than that of our accredited Minister.

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*Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison.*

30th AUGUST, 1808

“ WE have somewhat overrated our means of coercion, of the two great belligerents to a course of justice. The Embargo is a measure calculated above any other, to keep us whole, and keep us in peace, but beyond this you must not count upon it. Here it is not felt, and in England (in the midst of the more recent and interesting events of the day) it is forgotten. I hope that unless France shall do us justice, we shall raise the Embargo, and make in its stead the experiment of an armed commerce. Should she adhere to her wicked and foolish measures, we ought not to content ourselves with doing this. There is much, very much besides that we can do, and we ought not to

omit doing all we can, because it is believed here, that we cannot do much, and even that we will not do what we have the power of doing."

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THE letter from Mr. Pinkney which we now present to our readers, fully establishes a truth which we have all of us well known, that Great Britain is earnestly desirous of a good understanding with us---that for the attainment of this object, she will sacrifice every thing but her honor and her essential rights.

That as to the business of TRIBUTE, which our Government and Members of Congress have shamefully made a subject of complaint, it *arose solely from our own Minister*. . . . He declares that revenue was no object with the British Ministry, that they offered to place the affair on the footing of the French decrees, that is, an *absolute prohibition*: and that the course of imposing a duty was adopted as being more agreeable to us; that they have offered to take it off, if more *agreeable* to our Government, and that our Government and Minister preferred to keep it on as a source of popular complaint.

Mr. Pinkney declares, that the *motives* of the British Government would be acceptable to the President.

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*Letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison.*

FEBRUARY 2, 1808.

"SIR, I had an interview this morning with Mr. Canning, at his own request. One object of the interview related to the Message of the President, of the 27th of Oct. last, of which a newspaper copy had been received from Mr. Erskine. A call for a copy of this message was expected in parliament, and Mr. C. wished to be in a situation to produce it. I could not assist him, and I suppose the newspaper copy will be considered sufficient.

"As soon as this subject was disposed of, Mr. C. observed, that he had requested to see me principally for the purpose of conversing with me privately and extra officially upon the duty proposed to be laid in consequence of their late blockading orders, upon cotton intended for re-exportation to enemy ports upon the Continent. The very few occasional remarks which I had made upon this subject at our last interview, (already mentioned in my letter of the ult.) had led him to suppose that it was only to this mode of excluding our cotton from France, that the United States would be likely to object. And if their object could be accomplished in another way, the measure would cease to be offensive. Having admitted (what indeed was sufficiently

obvious before) that they looked to the intended duty upon cotton, as a complete prohibition. .he said that if it would be more acceptable to the United States that the form of the proceeding should be changed, so as to leave the exclusion of cotton from the Continent to the mere effect of the blockade, their desire to consult the feelings and wishes, in whatever did not entirely counteract the great end of the measure, would dispose them to adopt such a modification of their plan. In the course of his explanations upon this point, he introduced professions of good will towards our Country, of regret that France had imposed upon them the necessity of resorting to a step which might, be supposed, to press with severity upon our interests, and of an anxious desire that a return to a system of equity and moderation on the part of her enemies, would speedily enable Great Britain to abandon (as she would in that case certainly do) the whole of the recent Orders in Council. He stated that it was peculiarly important towards the first effect of the orders, (of which it was the object to compel France to relieve the commerce of the world from the oppression of her late decrees,) that considerable supplies of cotton should not be introduced into the Continent. .that it had been hoped and believed, that the United States would not receive harsh or unfriendly, a constrained attempt by Great Britain to prevent such supplies from being received by the other parties to the war, especially as it was certain that Great Britain could herself consume the whole of the cotton which we were in the habit of sending abroad, and that they had preferred the imposition of a duty upon cotton to a direct prohibition through the operation of the blockade, because it was consistent with those various and extensive modifications of the blockade to which they had been led, not merely by views of advantage to themselves, but by respect for the convenience and feelings of other nations, and particularly of America. In fine, he wished to know my private opinion, before the subject came before the Parliament, whether an alteration in this respect from a prohibitory duty to an absolute interdict, would be likely to be acceptable to us. I replied in as conciliatory a manner as I could, that as soon as I had understood that a duty was to be proposed on re-exported cotton, I had been disposed to take for granted that the object was not revenue but prohibition.

“That whether the object were the one or the other, it was as he knew, my opinion that the United States would hold that object as well as the means and the whole system connected with them, to be utterly inadmissible, and that I did not feel myself authorised to say, to which of the causes he had suggested, my government would give the preference, or that it would feel any preference for either. Mr. C. at length asked me, if I should think it worth while to consult my government on this subject,

observing at the same time, that he would not *wish it to be done if there was the least danger of giving offence, and assuring me that what he had said, proceeded from motives the most amicable and respectful towards us.* He added, that upon reflection this would be the most convenient mode, as it would now give them a good deal of trouble to accommodate their plan, as prepared for Parliament, to a change of so much importance in season, to be acted upon.

"I answered in substance, (as I saw it was his wish) that I could mention what had passed to you. And that I did not doubt, that the motives of his proposal, whatever might be thought of the proposal itself, would be acceptable to the President.—He requested me to say to you, that although the necessary bills would be proposed, and would pass in Parliament, according to their first project of a duty, yet that the alteration above suggested, would be adopted whenever it should be known, that it would be agreeable to us.

"I must not trouble you with any reflections upon this conversation, but it is my duty to say, that although Mr. C's manner was extremely conciliatory, not a word escaped him to encourage a hope, that the orders in Council would be in any degree abandoned, or that I should gain any thing by urging a reconsideration of them. I threw out some intimations with that tendency, but soon perceived that it could not be useful to follow them up. I have the honor to be, &c."

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THE following letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison is exceedingly favourable as to the views of the British Cabinet and their wishes to preserve a good understanding with the United States.

Mr. Canning received our embargo it seems, with great apparent satisfaction, and expressed the most friendly disposition towards the United States, and in the explanations which our minister asked of him in that interview, as to the doubtful parts of their orders, Mr. Canning replied, "that it was their *sincere* wish to shew in every thing connected with the orders in Council, which necessity only "compelled them to adopt, their *anxiety* to accommodate "them to the *feelings and interest* of the American government."

Compare this with the contemptuous silence of Bonaparte and Mr. Armstrong's declaration, that further solicitation would be injurious.

*A letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison.*

LONDON, JANUARY 26th, 1808.

“SIR—I had the honor to receive this morning your letter of the 23d of last month, inclosing a copy of a message from the President to Congress, and of their act in pursuance of it, laying an embargo on our vessels and exports. It appeared to be my duty to loose no time in giving such explanations to the British government, of this *wise and salutary measure*, as your LETTER SUGGESTS. And accordingly I went to Downing-street immediately, and had a short conference with Mr. Canning, who received my explanations with great apparent satisfaction, and took occasion to express the most friendly disposition towards our country. I ~~availed~~ myself of this opportunity, to mention a subject of some importance, connected with the late orders in Council.

“I had been told, that American vessels coming into British ports under warning, could not obtain any document to enable them to return to the United States, in the event of its being found imprudent, either to deposit their cargoes, or to resume their original voyages, although they are not prohibited from returning, yet as the warning is indorsed on their papers, the return may be hazardous, without some British documents to prove compliance with it, and give security to the voyage. Mr. C. took a note of what I said, and assured me that whatever was necessary to give the facility in question, would be done without delay; and he added, that it was their sincere wish to shew, in every thing connected with the orders in Council, which *only necessity had compelled them* to adopt, their anxiety to accommodate them, as far as was consistent with their object, to the feelings and interest of the American government and people. I was induced by these observations to mention and to make several strong remarks upon the duty intended to be imposed on our cotton when reexported to the continent, and the adherence to the determination not to allow to our vessels warned into British ports, any change of destination. He told me that these subjects (with which, however, it was evident he was very little acquainted) should be taken into immediate consideration, and that he would let me know the result. I am to have another interview with him in the course of a few days.”



THE letter from Mr. Pinkney, which we now present to our readers, is worthy of all their attention, and will excite the most serious and alarming reflections.

It may be considered as the grand clue to all the conduct of our administration, during the important and interesting session which is now about to close. In order to understand correctly, and to weigh with judgment, the opinions of Mr. Pinkney, it may be useful to state his character, and his political situation, as well as the particular motives, which influenced him to take the extraordinary and untenable ground, which he has assumed in this letter.

Mr. Pinkney was originally a federalist, educated under the patronage of Judge Chase, and first brought into notice under the administration of Washington. In the office of Commissioner under the British treaty, in which he acted in conjunction with Mr. Gore, he was so far from holding the opinions of the present administration, that he was rather opposed to Mr. Gore and Col. Trumbull, on one of the most important questions which came before the board ; the question of the Colonial Trade. Before the commission had been entirely fulfilled, Mr. Pinkney betrayed some strong symptoms, of a change of politics, and on his return to Maryland, he discovered such unequivocal marks of disaffection to his old friends and principles, that Mr. Jefferson was induced to nominate him to his present important office. Any man who has noticed the course and conduct of political men, must have remarked, that *new* converts always manifest a zeal, proportioned to the diffidence and distrust, which would, and which does naturally arise, with respect to those who suddenly change their political opinions. Our republic, though in its infancy, has exhibited many striking examples of this nature.

In the course of the late interesting correspondence with Great Britain, the whole public and private conduct of Mr. Pinkney evinces a fixed determination to retain his place ; to humour and flatter the destructive whims and notions of the present Administration.

In no instance has this spirit been more strikingly exhibited than in the following letter.

Mr. Pinkney had learned that the unexpected and astonishing change in Portugal and Spain, had excited a great and honourable sensibility in this country, and that our

people, yielding to the influence of these generous feelings, which perfectly coincided not only with their *own* immediate interests but with the public welfare, were extremely urgent to have the intercourse with Portugal and Spain opened.

Mr. Pinkney, reasoning rather like a French Minister, than an American Representative, with his eyes open *only* to the effects which such a proper and noble measure would have on France, rather than its operation on our own interests, or the dictates of generous sympathy, combats with great zeal the policy of opening our intercourse with these two gallant nations, who were struggling for their freedom.

The **SUBSTANCE**, and indeed the only argument of weight urged by him is the danger of a rupture with France. To avoid this (in *his mind*) greatest calamity, we are to forego our own *rights and advantages*, we are to be cold towards these assertors of the rights of mankind, and we are to throw ourselves into the humble train of the vassals of France.

Mr. Pinkney after stating that it would be more agreeable to France that we should take off the Embargo wholly, or even take it off as to Great Britain alone rather than remove it as to Spain and Portugal, proceeds to eulogize the *Embargo* at large, to praise the wisdom and energy of that measure, which all intelligent men have now abandoned.

That Mr. Pinkney should be disposed to frame his letter so as to favour the views of the Administration will not be surprising to any man who knows the circumstances of his appointment.

Still, however, **TRUTH**, always unchangeable, and indeed almost omnipotent, enables us to triumph over these well concerted diplomatic manœuvres.

Mr. Pinkney was sent to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary with Mr. Munroe, in order to negotiate a Treaty. They effected the object of their mission, and in a manner so satisfactory, that they declared to Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Jefferson stated to Congress, that "ALL the points in dispute were satisfactorily adjusted."

The interest of France however forbad the ratification of this Treaty, and the pretended **FRIEND** of the People, Mr. Jefferson, ventured to do what Washington never did, nor would have dared to have done, he **REJECTED** this solemn

and advantageous Treaty on his own mere authority and opinion, without submitting it to the Senate.

Mr. Pinkney's powers ceased on the signing this Treaty, and when Mr. Munroe left England, he remained there not as an *accredited Minister*, but a mere *Charge des Affaires*, or Agent for Mr. Munroe. It was then necessary to appoint a new Minister, or clothe Mr. Pinkney with powers. In Feb. 1808, Mr. Jefferson nominated him *merely as a form*, and Gen. Bradley, and all the friends of the President in the Senate were instructed, that the appointment was to be negatived, in order to relieve the President, from the odium and responsibility of removing a man appointed by himself.

Gen. Bradley, went so far as to move an enquiry, into the manner in which he had executed his office, and obeyed his instructions, with a view to negative the nomination. In the interim, a letter was received from Mr. Pinkney, so fully supporting the views, the whims and destructive notions of the Cabinet, so replete with prejudice and abuse against Great-Britain, that the President's friends shamelessly withdrew their objections and enquiries, without any avowed reason, and assented to the appointment of a man whom they found quite suppliant enough, and sufficiently *hostile* to the government to which he was agent, to be safely trusted. They knew that in such hands there was no danger of a good understanding or amicable settlement with Great-Britain, which of all things they most dreaded.

We have too high an opinion of Mr. Pinkney's talents to believe these opinions to arise from any thing, but a desire to please his patrons. They were the expected returns for his public honours and emoluments. They were a necessary sacrifice for the reputation of his patrons.

Will any man, acquainted with the state of Great-Britain, believe him when he tells us the Embargo is deeply felt in that country; that their wheat crop had failed, or was *alarmingly short*? Our mercantile men know better. We know that the embargo produces no political effect in G. Britain, but that the first operation was the most considerable. The anticipation was more serious than the reality, and every day while it lessens the effect, diminishes the apprehension. In short we should be obliged to let Mr. Pinkney down to a low niche in the scale of understanding, if we could not find a refuge for him, in his desire to please his political patrons.

*Extract of a private letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison.*

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 21, 1808.

“THE Hope arrived at Cowes from France, the 13th.

“Not having heard from Mr. Canning, although he returned to London the 16th, I called again yesterday at Downing Street, and was assured that the answer to my note would be sent to night or early tomorrow morning. Mr Atwater will of course be able to leave town on Friday, and embark on Saturday with a copy of it.

“I have been told since the arrival of the last British Packet, (but do not believe it,) that there is more probability than I had anticipated, that the late events in Spain and Portugal, (which ought not to be considered as deciding any thing,) will have an effect on public opinion in America against the continuance of the embargo, and favorable to all the purposes of Great Britain. If this were true, I should think it was deeply to be lamented. I may misunderstand the subject, but I cannot persuade myself that any thing that has happened on this side the Atlantic, ought to induce us in any degree to retreat from our present system. If we should resolve to trade with Spain and Portugal, (Great Britain and France persisting in their orders and decrees,) in any way to which Great Britain would not object, we must suspend the embargo as to those Countries only, or as to those Countries and *Great Britain*, or we must repeal it altogether. The temptation to the first of these courses is, even in a commercial sense inconsiderable—the objection to it endless. The object to be gained (if no more was gained than ought to be gained) would be trifling. There could indeed be no gain. An inadequate market redundantly supplied, would be more injurious than no market at all—it would be a lure to destruction and nothing more. A suspension of the embargo so limited in its nature as this would be, (supposing it could be in fact what it could be in form,) would have a most unequal and invidious operation in the different quarters of the Union, of which the various commodities, would not in the ports of Portugal and Spain, be in equal demand. A war with France would be inevitable... and such a war (so produced) from which we could not hope to derive either honor or advantage, would place us at the mercy of Great Britain, and on that account would in the end do more to cripple and humble us, than any disaster that could otherwise befall us. The actual state of Spain and Portugal is moreover not to be relied upon. My first opinion on that subject remains. But even the most sanguine will admit that there is great room to doubt. The Emperor of France is evidently collecting a mighty force for the reduction of Spain, and Portugal must share its fate. And even if that force should be destined (as some sup-

pose) first to contend with Austria—the speedy subjugation of Spain is not the less certain. If France should succeed—Spain and Portugal would again fall under the British Orders of Nov. as well as under the operation of the French Decrees. Our cargoes would scarcely have found their way to the ocean in search of the boasted market, before they would be once more in a state of prohibition, and we should in the meantime have incurred the scandal of suffering an improvident thirst of gain to seduce us from our principles into a dilemma presenting no alternative but loss in all the senses of the word.

“But it is not even certain, what Great-Britain would herself finally say to such a partial suspension of the Embargo. She would doubtless at *first* approve of it. But her ultimate course (especially if war between France and the United States, were not the immediate consequence, or if the measure were eventually less beneficial to herself, than might be supposed at the outset), ought not to be trusted. That she should approve at first, is hardly to be questioned, and the considerations upon which she would do so, are precisely those which should dissuade us from it. Some of these are—the aid it would afford to her allies, as well as to her own troops cooperating with them, and its consequent tendency to destroy every thing like system in our conduct—its tendency to embroil us with France, its tendency to induce us by overstocking a limited market, to make our commodities of no value—to dissipate our capital—to ruin our merchants without benefiting our agriculture—to destroy our infant manufactures without benefiting our commerce—its tendency to habituate us to a tramelled trade, and to fit us for acquiescence in a maritime despotism. But there are other reasons—our trade with Spain and Portugal while it lasted, would be a circuitous one with *Great-Britain and her Colonies*, for their benefit. Our productions would be carried in the first instance to Spain and Portugal, would be bought there for British account, and would find their way to the West-Indies or enter here, as British convenience might require, and thus in effect, the embargo be removed as to Great-Britain, while it continued as to France, and we professed to continue it as to both. And if any profits should arise from this *sordid traffic* they would become a fund, to enable us to import into the United States directly or indirectly the manufactures of Great-Britain, and thus relieve her in another way, while her orders would prevent us from receiving the commodities of her enemy. *It would be far better openly to take off the embargo as to Great-Britain, than while affecting to continue it as to that power, to do what must rescue her completely (and that too, without advantage to ourselves) from the pressure of it, at the same time that it would promote her views against France, in Portugal and Spain.*

As to withdrawing the embargo as to Great-Britain, as well as Spain and Portugal, while the British orders are unrepealed, the objections to that course are just as strong *now* as they were *four months ago*. The change in Spain and Portugal (if it were even likely to last) cannot touch the principle of the Embargo, as regards Great-Britain, who reasserts her orders of November, in the very explanations of the 4th July, under which we must trade with those countries, if we trade with them at all. If we include Great-Britain in the suspension, and exclude France, we do now what we have declined to do before, for the sake of a delusive commerce, which may perish before it can be enjoyed, and cannot in any event be enjoyed with credit, with advantage, or even with safety. We take part at once with Great-Britain against France, at a time the least suited that could be imagined to such a determination, at a time when it might be said we were emboldened by French reverses, to do what before we could not resolve upon, or even tempted by a prospect of a scanty profit, exaggerated by our cupidity and impatience to forget what was due to consistency, to character and permanent prosperity. We sanction too the maritime pretensions which insult and injure us; we throw ourselves bound hand and foot upon the generosity of a government that has hitherto refused us justice, and all this when the affair of the Chesapeake, and a host of other wrongs are unredressed, and when Great-Britain has just rejected an overture which she must have accepted with eagerness if her views were not such as it became us to suspect and guard against.—To repeal the embargo altogether would be preferable to either of the other courses, but would notwithstanding be so fatal to us in all respects, that we should long feel the wound it would inflict, unless indeed some other expedient,\* as strong at least and as efficacious in *all its* bearings, can (as I fear it cannot) be substituted in its place. War would seem to be the unavoidable result of such a step. If our commerce should not flourish in consequence of this measure, nothing would be gained by it but dishonor. And how it could be carried on to any valuable purpose it would be difficult to shew. If our commerce *should* flourish in spite of French and British edicts, and the miserable state of the world in spite of war with France, if that should happen, it would I doubt not, be assailed in some other form. The spirit of monopoly has seized the people and government of this Country. We shall not under any circumstances be tol-

\* "This strong measure equally efficacious is the present Non-Inter-course, proposed by Mr. Giles. We see how exactly the advice of this supple minister has been followed. We refused to aid Spain and Portugal by taking off the Embargo as to them, and we now adopt his recommendation of a strong substitute."

erated as Rivals in navigation and trade—it is in vain to hope that Great Britain will voluntarily foster the naval means of the United States. All her prejudices. . . all her calculations are against it. Even as Allies we should be subjects of jealousy. It would be endless to enumerate in detail the evils which would cling to us in this new career of vassalage and meanness, and tedious to pursue our backward course to the extinction of that very trade to which we had sacrificed every thing else.

“On the other hand if we persevere we must gain our purpose at last. By complying with the little policy of the moment, we shall be lost—By a great and systematic adherence to principle, we shall find the end to our difficulties. The embargo and the loss of our trade are deeply felt here, and will be felt with more severity every day. *The wheat harvest\* is likely to be alarmingly short*, and the state of the Continent will augment the evil. The discontents among their manufacturers are only quieted for the moment by temporary causes. Cotton is rising and soon will be scarce. Unfavorable events on the Continent will subdue the temper unfriendly to wisdom and justice, which now prevails here. But above all, the world will I trust be convinced that our firmness is not to be shaken. Our measures have not been without effect. They have not been *decisive*, because we have not been thought capable of persevering in self denial, if that can be called self denial, which is no more than prudent abstinence from destruction and dishonor.

“I ought to mention that I have been told by a most respectable American merchant here, that large quantities of such woollen cloths as are prohibited by our non-importation act, have been and continue to be sent to Canada, with the view of being smuggled into the United States.

“I need not tell you that I am induced to trouble you with my hasty reflections, because I think you stand in need of them. I give them merely because I believe that you are entitled to know the impressions which a public servant on this side of the water receives from a view of our situation.—I have the honour to be with the sincerest attachment and respect, dear sir, your obedient servant, (Signed) WILLIAM PINKNEY.

\* That the public may judge of Mr. Pinkney's correctness and prejudices, we would observe that flour or wheat, does not exceed its average price in time of war in Great-Britain. The truth is, this letter, if not written here and sent out to be signed by Mr. Pinkney, was designed to forward the views of the President, as to keeping on the Embargo.

## REFLECTIONS

ON THE FOREGOING INTERESTING STATE PAPERS.

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THE importance and interest of the foregoing documents are too obvious to require very elaborate remarks ; but it may be useful to state briefly the inferences which irresistibly present themselves upon reading them.

The first idea, which we cannot keep back even with the most charitable feelings, is the unparalleled duplicity and hypocrisy manifested by our Government in pretending to give the People the true state of their diplomatic Intercourse with foreign nations, while facts *vastly* more important than any heretofore published, were knowingly suppressed.

This Duplicity is enhanced beyond belief, by the knowledge, that while the Government pretended to give some documents as professed extracts, and others as *whole and entire letters*, these latter were in fact as mutilated as the former, and we are now enabled to give the publick whole pages which are to be inserted in letters heretofore published as *perfectly* complete.

2dly. That while the Government have been passing resolutions, and adopting or rather proposing measures leading to War, while they have called upon the people to *support them* in these MOST SERIOUS measures, and while they have deluded a small part of the citizens into expressions of approbation, and into declarations that *both* the belligerents have given us equal cause of complaint, it turns out that the most interesting facts, the most insulting and injurious conduct of the Emperor of France, have been suppressed, and the most pacific expressions and friendly explanations of Great Britain have been withheld..... With what views let the public decide.

3dly. That Gen. Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, advised, and long ago expected measures of resistance and hostility to France. . . . that he declared, that we were considered a WORDY and WINDY nation, which did not dare proceed beyond *resolutions*, and that our Embargo was wholly ineffectual as to its objects.

Lastly. It is apparent, that if our people have been so roused, so convinced of the partiality and hypocrisy of the Ad-



ministration in consequence of the Glimmering of light which was permitted to escape through the mutilated dispatches before published, through the speeches of our patriotic members of Congress, and the Commentaries upon the public Documents heretofore given to the publick, their Indignation could hardly have been restrained, if this whole irresistible torrent of light had been at once darted forth upon their astonished and affrighted minds.

In addition to the evidence thus reluctantly extorted and finally obtained without the consent of the Administration, of their devotion to France, the whole correspondence proves beyond a question, that Mr. Armstrong was never in the confidence of Mr. Jefferson. . . . that he never entered into his views perfectly, and that the real intercourse has been carried on either through Monsieur Turreau, or some private confidential agent. The sending out Mr. Coles, the President's private Secretary, is very strong corroborative evidence of what the documents themselves would lead us almost necessarily to presume.

One single reflection will occur to every thinking and considerate man, that if our exertions to resist the corrupt and destructive course of Administration were heretofore thought necessary, the present documents prove them to be doubly important. If those exertions have been heretofore crowned with signal success, we ought not to doubt that our reward will in future be not less abundant or satisfactory.



