

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
OF THE
Civil and Military Services
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
WILLIAM H. HARRISON,
AND
A VINDICATION
OF HIS
CHARACTER AND CONDUCT
AS A STATESMAN, A CITIZEN, AND A SOLDIER,
WITH A DETAIL OF HIS
NEGOTIATIONS AND WARS WITH THE INDIANS,
UNTIL THE FINAL OVERTHROW OF THE
CELEBRATED CHIEF TECUMSEH,
AND HIS BROTHER
THE PROPHET.

THE WHOLE WRITTEN AND COMPILED FROM ORIGINAL AND AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY MANY OF THE MOST RESPECTABLE
CHARACTERS IN THE UNITED STATES,

BY MOSES DAWSON,

Editor of the Cincinnati Advertiser.



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1824.

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TO
THE HONOURABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Late President of the United States,

THIS
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
IS, WITH THE MOST PROFOUND RESPECT AND VENERATION,

Inscribed,

BY HIS OBEDIENT SERVANT,

MOSES DAWSON.

P R E F A C E.

TH**ERE** may be some apology due to the patrons of this work for the length of time it has been on hands, which circumstance has been owing to several causes. When the prospectus was issued last year, there was not a single line of the work written, nor were the documents arranged, or even all in hands. A considerable time elapsed before a sufficient number could be procured to make the proper arrangement of them, and in order to expedite the work, the printing was commenced long before the manuscript was finished, in consequence of which an erroneous calculation was made as to the bounds of the work. It was supposed that from 250 to 300 pages would have contained all the matter, and the prospectus was issued accordingly; but in the course of the work the matter increased on the hands of the writer, and, determined to make the book as complete as possible, he sacrificed interest to the hoped-for gratification of his readers: to this cause, and having to wait the leisure of those gentlemen who were kind enough to lend their assistance by furnishing some of the most important documents, may be attributed the delay which has occurred.

The writer of this book is sensible that it contains many defects, and therefore will not be disappointed on its receiving the lash of criticism: but he has the fullest reliance on the candour and moderation of a discerning and generous public, who in the

conviction that the work has been written and compiled in the spirit of candour and of truth, will readily overlook those literary defects which may appear of importance only to fastidious critics.

It is apprehended that this first impression will not be sufficient for the supply of all the subscribers to the work; in order to make up the deficiency, a second edition is now in hands, and as none of the causes of delay above alluded to can exist at present, it will be before the public in a very short time.

Cincinnati, September, 1824.

ERRATA:

- Page 14, line 12, from top, for "Mr. Mills," read "Mr. Wells."
 The Note in page 104 is incorrect and superfluous.
 Page 201, line 11, from top, for "constantly invited," read "immediately invited."
 Page 203, line 11, from bottom, for "often crossing," read "after crossing."
 Page 204, line 4, from top, for "8 miles," read "80 miles."
 Page 204, line 8, from top, for "General Harrison," read "General Harmer."
 Page 378, line 8, from top, for "captain Laughan," read "captain Langham."
 Page 382, line 12, from top, for "the Glaze," read "the Auglaize."
 Page 384, line 14, from top, for "carried the men," read "caused the men."
 Page 387, line 11, from top, for "an attack," read "an attempt."
 Page 388, line 20, from top, for "to the fort," read "from the fort."
 Page 389, line 3, from top, for "captain Herring's," read "captain Nearing's."
 Page 389, line 22, from top, for "several covert's," read "secret covert's."
 Page 389, line 6, from bottom, for "the prospect," read "the parapet."
 Page 390, line 16, from top, for "captain Dudley," read "colonel Dudley."
 Appendix, last page but one, line 18, from bottom, for "C. A. Brown," read "E. A. Brown."

In the hasty sketch we have given of the course pursued by General Harrison in the house of representatives of the United States, we omitted to mention the fact, that pending the investigation into the conduct of the bank of the United States, he voted in every instance against the bank, as will be seen by reference to the journals.

INTRODUCTION.

IT has been a favorite opinion with many wise and good men, that no man's life should be written while he is alive, and that the person who writes, or procures to be written, memoirs of his own life, is at least chargeable with egotism, if not with vanity. However well founded this opinion may be when taken in a general sense, it is confidently expected that the following detail of facts will prove to the satisfaction of every candid reader, that the subject of these memoirs is an exception, and that it is justly due to the history and character of the nation, as well as to the individual, that a plain, impartial, and authentic detail of the public transactions of General Harrison should be given at a period when the best possible testimony, that of living witnesses, can be procured; and when there has been a lapse of time sufficient to cool down the partial predilections of friends, or the vindictive malice of enemies. Let us wait for the demise of the principal, and we may lose the benefit of the evidence of those best qualified to give testimony to the facts; as time, which has been fatal to him, may be equally so to his cotemporaries, and therefore instead of having the best possible testimony directly issuing from the mouths or the pens of living witnesses, who can be called upon for the explanation of obscurities or the reconciliation of incongruities, we must be satisfied with that kind of posthumous testimony which is always more or less uncertain. When we wish to ascertain a fact in the business of common life, we never apply to hearsay evidence when we can have the direct testimony of eye-witnesses—why then should we wish to deprive our posterity of the benefit of living testimony in matters of history in which we are all more or less concerned, lest the vanity of the actors may be flattered or gratified: this is not only unjust but it is impolitic. If a public officer have done his duty, he ought in common justice to be gratified by the plaudits or the approbation of his fellow-citizens, and it is equally politic in them to render to him due applause for his conduct, in order not only to encourage him, but to induce others to follow in the track of public usefulness.

There is another erroneous impression upon the minds of many, and that is, that an impartial history cannot be written in the life time of the actors in the various scenes. However this may apply to countries governed by tyrants, as it relates to these United States it is completely fallacious. It is only in those countries where the iron hand of despotism restrains or has destroyed the liberty of the press, that any importance can be attached to the idea. In these states the press is free: if false representations are made, or a false coloring given to facts, immediate contradiction and exposure follows, and truth is elicited. What may have been necessary in other countries is quite unnecessary here. We have no occasion to wait for the death of the parties, or the removal from power of the partisans, to compile or to write an impartial history, but on the contrary we have every inducement to step forward when the impressions made by the occurrences are strong upon the minds of the witnesses, to write the history of those occurrences; and the historian, being sensible that the rod of the critic hangs over him, and that a thousand eyes are upon him to watch any aberrations he may make from truth, and to expose any invidious or flattering coloring he may give to the facts or circumstances he may relate, is induced to be impartial and to let the strictest veracity guide his pen. Under these considerations, then, it must be plain, that the best possible chance for having an impartial and authentic history of our country is to have a record made of public events as soon after they have occurred as possible, without reference to the death or the removal from power of the persons concerned in those events.

There are other circumstances connected with the present case which not only authorize but demand an appeal to the public. General Harrison has acted a conspicuous part in the great drama of public life. He has been a governor, a congressional, and a state legislator; he has been commander-in-chief of the largest military district in the United States at an important era of the late war, and he has been an agent in some of the most important negotiations and contracts with the Indians. To expect that a man in any or all of those different situations should not have enemies, would be to expect more from human nature than a true estimate of it would warrant. If in those characters he has acted wisely and with integrity, he may have fools and knaves for his enemies: if on the contrary he has acted wickedly or corruptly the wise and the virtuous cannot be his friends—in either cases he must have enemies, and though it may be said that those enemies are only to be found in the ranks of the wicked or the credulous, yet it should be shown from indubitable authority that the assertion is correct and that the opinion is founded in truth.

Under an economical republican government, the principal motive which impels men to come forward in the service of their country is a pure principle of patriotism, and a noble ambition of being useful to their fellow-citizens, for it is obvious that the emoluments attached to the superior offices of the state are so insignificant, that it cannot altogether be attributed to avarice. A virtuous ambition, then, being the impelling motive, and the public approbation being almost all the reward, to a generous, high-minded individual, conscious of having done his duty, there can be nothing more mortifying, nothing more unjust, than to be stigmatised with calumny, or to be told that he has acted upon principles and from motives which he does not hold, or of which his very soul is abhorrent.

That the subject of these memoirs has been calumniated, that he has been basely traduced as a legislator, as an executive officer, and as a commander, is too well known to those who are best acquainted with his character: it is therefore in common justice due to him as an individual, it is due to his country, which has a common interest in the character of her public servants, that those foul and unjust aspersions should be refuted, and the authors of them brought to the bar of public opinion, there to receive that execration which every generous, every virtuous mind must award to the propagator of slander, or the detractor of innocence and public virtue.

As the calumnies propagated against General Harrison have been founded upon those parts of his conduct immediately connected with the public affairs of his country, it will appear to every candid, thinking mind, that there cannot be a better plan of drawing up a defence than by putting that defence into the shape of a *historical narrative*, for how can the slanders of the detractor of public character be more effectually refuted than by impartially detailing the public transactions of the person calumniated.

To deny that the writer of this memoir has not had the assistance of General Harrison would be culpable affectation, because many of the most important documents have been furnished by him, and could not have been procured from any other source, but it is confidently relied on that the circumstances above alluded to will acquit that gentleman of any improper degree of egotism in having this appeal made to the public opinion.

CHAPTER I.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON was born of respectable parents on the 9th February, 1773, at a place called Berkely, on the banks of the James' River, about 25 miles from Richmond, in the State of Virginia. His father, Mr. Benjamin Harrison, descended from one of Cromwell's Generals of the name, represented the State of Virginia in Congress, in the years 1774, 1775, and 1776; he was Chairman of the Committee of the whole House, when the celebrated Declaration of Independence was agreed to, and was one of those illustrious patriots who signed that important instrument. In the year '77 he was chosen Speaker of the House of Delegates in the State Legislature, which office he continued to fill till the year 1782, when he succeeded Governor Nelson as Governor of Virginia, on that gentleman resigning that situation.

In all those offices, Mr. Harrison acquitted himself with great ability, and so much to the satisfaction of his fellow citizens, that few men of his standing enjoyed a more solid and permanent degree of popular favor;—nor did his popularity exceed his disinterestedness, for it is well known, that so far from being remunerated in a pecuniary way for his services, he very materially injured his own fortune by his attachment to the liberties, and to the service of his country. But we do not claim for the subject of our history any merit for the glorious and patriotic conduct of his respected sire, nor for his being descended from an opulent and respectable line of ancestry—his own conduct shall be the basis of his character. For if he had derived his origin from a King or an Emperor, or if more congenial to our own republican principles he could claim for his ancestor a Hampden or a Sydney, and that all those who intervened had been equally illustrious, we would not claim for him more honor than if he had been descended from a race the most depraved. On the contrary, we would more readily give credit to such a man as General Harrison for being the son of a wretch the most wicked, inasmuch as there must be more merit due to a man who has not suffered the example of a vicious parent to lead him

from the paths of rectitude, than to one who has not been exposed to such temptation. In fact we cannot but view that deference and respect which is usually paid to family without regard to individual merit as a relic of ancient barbarism, which is only equalled in absurdity and evil tendency by another, the law of primogeniture, both of which we wish were unknown in a republican country. If every man be made accountable for his own actions, and the splendid character of his ancestors be not attributed to him as meritorious, then will we have the better security that he will make a character and a name for himself—but if we give him credit for the virtues of his ancestors, we take from him a strong inducement towards raising himself to that eminence to which he imagines the merits of those ancestors have already raised him. As one of those circumstances which arise from aristocratical or monarchical governments we deprecate as antirepublican, that homage which is paid in those countries where such governments prevail, to the antiquity or splendor of family name.

The father of Bonaparte was an obscure lawyer. So long as that hero was the successful general of a republican army, we heard nothing of the antiquity or the nobility of his family; but no sooner did he assume the imperial purple, than his parasites set about to trace his ancestry, and though they failed in making him derive his pedigree from a royal stock, yet they gave him one of the Italian noblesse for an ancestor:—and thus instead of exalting they debased him; for when it is considered that the noblesse of Italy are the lineal descendants of those savage hordes of freebooters, that in the middle ages destroyed the Roman power, who is it that would not say, a man might have as much honor at least, in being the offspring of an honest scrivener, as the descendant of a noble robber.

The father of General Harrison was a wise and intelligent man, a distinguished patriot, and a true republican; his valuable principles therefore as well as the example of an active public and well spent life, must have been powerful in forming the character of this his youngest son—this to him was an advantage, but not a merit, and is mentioned here, merely to show that his career in public life, perfectly accorded with those republican principles which it was the delight of his venerated sire to instil into his young and flexible mind—and this we propose most unequivocally to prove, by the following detail of the public transactions of the subject of our history.

AS the memoirs of the private life of General Harrison do not come within the scope of the design of this history, he will be taken up on his entrance into public life; when after having served in the army commanded by General Wayne as a subaltern,

and in the family of that hero as Aid-de-Camp, he was appointed Secretary to the North-Western Territory in the year 1797.

The North-Western Territory at that time under the government of General St. Clair, comprised the whole of what are now the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, as well as the Territory of Michigan.

In the year 1799 Mr. Harrison was elected a Delegate to represent the Territory in Congress, in which high and confidential station, he not only performed his duty to his constituents generally to their satisfaction, but he was mainly instrumental in introducing such a change in the sale of public lands as contributed greatly to the speedy settlement of the Western Country, and the consequent increase of its population.

The former law for the sale of lands by the Government of the United States, ordained that no less a quantity than 4,000 acres could be sold, with the exception of fractions on the banks of rivers, which were to be sold separately. This law was highly unfavorable to the actual settlers, and would have put it in the power of land speculators to extort from them a high price for such small quantities of land as they might be able to purchase, or otherwise to rent out the farms, by which a landed aristocracy would have been created, which in time would have been destructive of every principle of Republicanism. Under this impression Mr. Harrison used his utmost influence while in Congress to have another arrangement made. He saw clearly that nothing could so much retard the settlement of the great western region, as thus suffering the land to be monopolized by speculators, who would find means to purchase 4,000 acre tracts—that it would prevent poor industrious men from obtaining that independence which they could derive from the possession in fee simple of the farms which they could cultivate. That it would create an order of men who would live upon the industry of others, whilst they would exert themselves to increase their own power and influence in a political way, that might eventually cause the Government itself to degenerate into a mischievous aristocracy, and reduce the power of the people to a mere cypher.

The late plan of selling land by sections and half sections was first proposed by General Harrison, and he procured the passage of a bill through the House of Representatives to that effect; but it was so amended in the Senate that one half was to be sold in sections of 640 acres, and the other half in half sections of 320 acres. The old system of forfeiture for nonpayment was abolished, and payment to be made, one fourth in hand, and the balance at the end of two, three, and four years; allowing the purchaser one year after the fourth payment became due, to collect the money, and in case it should not be paid for in that time, the land to be sold, the public reimbursed, and the balance of its produce handed over to the delinquent purchaser.

These were the best terms that could be obtained at that time, as Mr. Harrison could not prevail upon Congress to sell the land in less quantities than 320 acres—though it was his wish that it should be sold in much smaller parcels.

During this session (1800) the Law was passed for dividing the Indiana Territory from that called the Territory of the U. States northwest of the Ohio. The part of the bill which fixed the Seat of Government for the Eastern division, was strongly objected to by Mr. Harrison, on the ground of its being a violation of the ordinance for the Government of the Territory, which gave the sole and exclusive right of Legislation to the General Assembly of the Territory, but in cases where it was expressly withheld—and though the bill finally passed, yet in his letter to his constituents he expresses his hope, that from the unanimous disapprobation of the principle expressed by the House of Representatives in rejecting the amendment of the Senate in the first instance, and the warm opposition which it met with in the Senate, no attempt would be made to revive it.

Mr. Harrison was also present during the discussion of the bill for the settlement of Judge Symmes' Purchase; and though the Judge was at that time his father-in-law he paid particular attention to the interests of those persons who had purchased lands of him before he had obtained his patent. It had been suggested to him, that there were some doubts whether those persons who had sued the Judge in the Courts of Common Law, would be entitled to the remedy in equity against the Judge—he immediately went before the committee, and urged them to insert a provision in their favor, declaring that it was the meaning of the committee who framed the bill, that those persons should be entitled to all the benefit arising from it, and that he should object to the passage of the bill, if they were not included. And he also stated the question to the Attorney General of the United States, to Mr. Harper, and other eminent legal characters, whose decided and unanimous opinion was, that they were within the provisions of the act as it then stood, upon which he was satisfied. And thus he performed his duty towards those persons, though the interest of his father-in-law was considerably involved in the transaction.

Mr. Harrison served but one year as Delegate in Congress from the North-Western Territory. It has been stated above, that the Territory had been divided during the session in which he was in Congress; he was in 1801 appointed by President Adams the first Governor of that part called the Indiana Territory.

When Mr. Harrison took command of the Government of Indiana, the Territory was in a very open and unprotected state. The whole consisted of but three settlements, so widely settled that they could do but little as to mutual defence. There were

no fixed or regular roads through the country, or houses of accommodation between the settlements;—it was therefore necessary for travellers to carry with them their provisions, and also materials for encampment, to protect them from the inclemency of the weather;—and the great distance from one settlement to another rendered them very insecure against the attacks of the Indians, and that protection to be acquired from mutual support very precarious indeed. The three settlements consisted of: 1st, Clark's Grant, a tract of about 150,000 acres at the falls of Ohio, which had been granted to General Clark's regiment of Virginia troops, as compensation for their services during the Revolutionary War. 2d, The old French settlement at Vincennes and its vicinity on the Wabash; and 3d, a tract lying on the Mississippi extending from Kaskaskia to Cahokia about sixty miles.

The population of these settlements, so widely distant from each other, amounted to about 5,000 souls, and all the immense regions to the north and northwest of them were unsettled, or in possession of the Indians; so that no governor since the original settlement of the country ever had had a more arduous task on hand than our Governor when he undertook the government of the Territory of Indiana. He had not only the natural hostility of the Indians to guard against, but the intrigues of the British agents, which, from the establishment of the independence of America, had been incessant, and too frequently successful—that mistaken policy, which had so long influenced the British government, induced them to keep in their employ, agents, who industriously propagated evil and unfounded reports, among the Indians, for the purpose of exciting jealousy and hostility in their minds against the Americans, in order to prevent the extensive settlement of the frontier provinces, and to make a monopoly of the fur trade—they established posts and factories, far within those boundaries which had been prescribed to the United States by the treaty of 1783, and thereby cut off the trade of vast regions of the Indian country from our citizens within our own boundaries, as well as the commercial intercourse with the more distant tribes. With the malignity of demons they viewed the liberal and humane policy of the United States (so opposite to their own) in extending their dominion by purchase rather than by conquest—in endeavoring to introduce among the Indians the arts of civilized life instead of exterminating them by the sword. This policy was so different in principle to every thing they had pursued in similar cases, that their agents endeavored all in their power to misrepresent to the Indians, every step taken by the American government to effect these purposes;—they told them that the great object of the Americans was to obtain their lands;—and that their reason for advising

them to adopt an agricultural or pastoral life was to enervate them, and to deprive them of their arms, in order to make of them an easier conquest. They took advantage of the inclination and fondness of the Indians for spiritous liquors—they abused the American government for making laws against having them supplied with that article by the traders, and they contrasted with that policy, the goodness and liberality of their great father George the third, who loved his red children so well that he gave them every thing they wished for, and among other good things plenty of rum.

The governors of territories being ex-officio superintendants of Indian affairs, very considerably augmented their duties as well as their responsibility. At the same time that the government of the United States felt every disposition of humanity and solicitude for the welfare and preservation of the Indians, it being essential to the safety of the settlements west of the mountains, that an extensive barrier should be formed against the encroachments of the European nations who held possessions to the west and north-west of the United States, they were extremely anxious to have the Indian title extinguished to those lands bordering upon their western settlements—because that so long as the Indians continued to be spread over the country, they were the mere tools of British and French intrigue, and both in peace and in war were troublesome neighbors. In carrying into effect this important measure the original documents from which this history is drawn, give the most decided proof, that every possible just and generous feeling was entertained by the government of the United States towards the Indians, and that their directions to the superintendants of Indian affairs were dictated by the principles of benevolence as well as justice—and the event has proved, that they could not have appointed any man better qualified for such an important and arduous undertaking than the subject of this history. General Harrison as a civil governor, from his education and talents was a man eminently qualified, and having studied and learnt the art of war, and particularly of Indian warfare, under that distinguished veteran and hero, General Wayne, all the qualifications essential to a governor were combined in his person, the evidence of which, may be fully established by reference to the numerous treaties with the Indians, by which about seventy millions of acres of land have been from time to time, ceded to the United States, and by which the condition of the Indians themselves has been considerably ameliorated—and the frontier settlements rendered as safe and secure against the hostile attempts of belligerent Europeans, as the states on the borders of the Atlantic ocean.

CHAPTER II.

1801. **S**HORTLY after his appointment Governor Harrison had a very extensive communication with the Indian tribes, he was visited by the chiefs of most of the nations which inhabited that part of the territory over which he presided. In all their communications heavy complaints were made by the Indians against the conduct of the white people;—they said their people had been killed, their lands settled upon, their game wantonly destroyed, their young men made drunk, and cheated of the peltry which were the means of procuring for them the necessary articles of clothing, arms, and ammunition to hunt with. Of the truth of these allegations there was no doubt in the mind of the governor—the Delaware chiefs enumerated six persons who had been killed since the Treaty of Greenville, and of those six, only one had been killed in a justifiable manner, he having been killed by a boy in his own defence, who was tried and acquitted upon that ground. But we regret to say that in another instance, a man had been tried and acquitted, although it appeared on evidence that he was guilty of a most cruel and unprovoked murder. The case, however, which seemed to lie heaviest upon the minds of the Indians at that time was one of more than common atrocity. Two Indian men a woman and some children, about three years before had been quietly hunting near the Ohio on the waters of Blue River;—their camp was discovered by three white men, who resolved to murder and rob them of about 50 dollars worth of peltry;—one of the Indians was well known to the whites by the name of Jim Gallaway and also to have been a man of great strength and bravery;—those fellows therefore dared not attack them openly, but approached their camp as friends, requesting leave to stay with them a few days;—with this request they readily complied,—and the villains were hospitably entertained, who, waiting a favorable opportunity, made their attack and were but too successful in their nefarious design. The whole party were murdered, and their property carried off;—and their fate would never have been discovered but for the villains themselves;—who, after a considerable lapse of time, thinking themselves safe, began to boast of their exploit, and one of them said that he was very near being overpowered by the Indian whom it fell to his lot to murder—and but that his comrade came to his assistance he would

himself have been the victim to his own villany—as he was not, singly, able for his powerful adversary.

The Governor found great difficulty in punishing crimes of this nature, from the circumstance that the boundaries of the Territory of the United States were uncertain or unknown.—In his communication with the Secretary at War, he expresses himself anxious that the government should speedily have the lands surveyed, and the boundaries fixed. . Wherever the line was known or understood he was careful to have the Indians to remove beyond it;—and if any of the whites should encroach upon their country, and hunt upon their grounds, contrary to law and in violation of the treaties, they could be punished— but where the boundary was uncertain, it was impossible to bring intruders to justice; and owing to the state of uncertainty, no doubt, many acts of injustice and atrocity had been committed. The practice of hunting on the lands of the Indians in violation of law and existing treaties, had grown into a monstrous abuse; thousands of the wild animals from which they derived their subsistence, had been destroyed by the white people. Many parts of the country which had abounded with game at the conclusion of the general peace of 1795, scarcely contained as many as would subsist the few Indians that would pass through them. The Kentucky settlers on the Ohio, from the mouth of the Kentucky river down to the Mississippi, were in the constant habit of passing over into the Indian Territory every fall, to kill deer, bears and buffaloes, merely for the skins; by means of which, all those animals became scarce, and the last in particular, which formerly abounded in great numbers, were now difficult to be met with. The Indians for a length of time bore all those injuries with astonishing patience and forbearance, and still continued friendly to the United States.

But the Governor well acquainted with the manners and dispositions of this unfortunate race, saw clearly that though they were not inclined then to go to war with our people, yet the provocations they were receiving, and the privations they were made to suffer, would powerfully operate in favor of any of the European nations who might go to war with the United States, and would prepare the Indians to join them in any incursions they might think proper to make upon our future settlements. With this serious apprehension in his mind, as well as that sense of justice and humanity, which an honest and benevolent man must feel towards an unfortunate race of people who had suffered severely from the intrusion of the whites upon their country, Governor Harrison made the most feeling representation of their unhappy situation to the government. These representations accorded so well with the dispositions, and benevolent intentions of the executive, that the fullest confidence was placed in the Governor, and the most ample powers were given

to him, to make such arrangements as he found necessary and proper, both for the safety and protection of the Indians, and the furtherance of the interests of the United States.

"All these injuries," says Governor Harrison in his communication to the Secretary at War, under date of 15th July, 1801, "the Indians have hitherto borne with astonishing patience. But though they discover no disposition to make war upon the United States at present, I am confident that most of the tribes would eagerly seize any favorable opportunity for that purpose. And should the United States be at war with any of the European nations, who are known to the Indians, there would probably be a combination of more than nine tenths of the northern tribes against us, unless some means are made use of to conciliate them.*

"The British have been unremitting in their exertions to preserve their influence over the Indians resident within our territory, even prior to the surrender of the forts upon the lakes; and those exertions are still continued. Last year they delivered a greater quantity of goods to those Indians than they have ever before been known to do; and I have lately been informed, that talks are now in circulation amongst them which are intended to lessen the small influence which we have over them. I cannot vouch for the truth of this report; but I think it very probable that the British will redouble their efforts to keep the Indians in their interest, as a means of assisting them in any designs they may form against Louisiana, which it is said will shortly be delivered over to the French. I have had much difficulty with the small tribes in this immediate neighborhood, viz: the Piankishaws, the Weas, and the Eel river Miamis; these three tribes form a body of the most depraved wretches upon earth. They are daily in this town in considerable numbers; and are frequently intoxicated to the number of thirty or forty at once, when they commit the greatest disorders, drawing their knives and stabbing every one they meet with; breaking open the houses of the citizens; killing their cattle and hogs, and breaking down their fences. But in all their frolics they generally suffer the most themselves; they kill each other without mercy. Some years ago so many as four were found dead in a morning, and although those murders were actually committed in the streets of the town, yet no attempt to punish them has ever been made. This forbearance has rendered them astonishingly insolent, and on a late occasion (within 8 weeks) when one of them had, without provocation, killed two

* The war with Great Britain, which broke out in 1812, verified this observation of the Governor to a tittle; and there is great reason to believe, that the irritation created by those acts of oppression and injustice made enemies of Indian tribes in that war, when a contrary mode of treatment might have secured them as allies.

of the citizens in one of the trader's houses in this place, it was found impossible to apprehend him alive, and he therefore was put to death. This piece of justice so highly exasperated his tribe, that they actually assembled in the borders of the town, with the design of seizing upon some favorable opportunity of doing mischief. The militia were ordered out and the insurrection has subsided.

“Should you think proper to garrison Fort Knox with a small body of troops, it may be the means of keeping the Indians under much better control, when they come here to trade, and would enable the civil magistrate to punish those who violate the laws. Indeed I do not think that a military force is so necessary on any part of the frontiers, as at this place;—the inhabitants though fully able to repulse them when aware of their designs, are continually in danger from their treachery. Five hundred warriors might introduce themselves into the town undiscovered by the white people, and after doing all the mischief in their power might make their escape with as much facility. I do not indeed apprehend that the neighboring tribes have any inclination to make open war upon us;—I fear only the effect of some sudden resentment arising from the constant intercourse with the people of this town. From this intercourse causes of irritation are constantly produced;—twice within a few months an appeal has been made to arms by both parties;—once occasioned by some drunken Indians attempting to force a house, in which one was killed and another wounded;—the other, at the time when the two white men were killed, as above mentioned. Luckily, however, no other mischief was done in either instance.

“The Indian Chiefs complain heavily of the mischiefs produced by the enormous quantity of whiskey which the traders introduce into their country. I do not believe that there are more than six hundred warriors upon the Wabash, and yet the quantity of whiskey brought here, annually, for their consumption, is said to amount to six thousand gallons. This noxious liquor not only incapacitates them to obtain a living by hunting, but it leads to the most atrocious crimes. Killing each other has become so customary amongst them that it is no longer thought criminal. They murder those whom they have been most accustomed to esteem and regard,—their chiefs and their nearest relations fall under the stroke of their tomahawks and their knives. This has been so much the case with the three tribes of the Piankishaws, the Weas, and Eel River Miamis that there is scarcely a chief to be found amongst them. The Little Beaver, a Wea chief of note, well known to me, was murdered not long since by his own son. The Little Fox, another chief, who was always a friend to the white people, was murdered at midday, in the streets of this town, by one of his own nation. All those

horrors are produced to those unhappy people by their too frequent intercourse with the white people. This is so certain, that I can at once tell, upon looking at an Indian whom I chance to meet, whether he belongs to a neighboring, or to a more distant tribe. The latter is generally well clothed, healthy, and vigorous; the former, half naked, filthy, and enfeebled by intoxication; and many of them without arms, excepting a knife, which they carry for the most villanous purposes. The chiefs of the Potawatamies, Sacs, and Kickapoos, who lately visited me, are sensible of the corruption of their manners, and their vices amongst themselves, which they are convinced will lead to utter extirpation, and earnestly desire that the introduction of whiskey amongst them may be prevented. Whether something ought not to be done to prevent the reproach which will attach to the American name and character by the extirpation of so many human beings, I beg most respectfully to submit to the consideration of the President. That this extirpation will take place, no one, who knows the astonishing annual decrement of these unhappy beings, can doubt. The Delawares are making one other attempt at becoming agriculturalists—they are forming settlements upon the White River, a branch of the Wabash, under the conduct of two missionaries of the society of United Brethren for the propagation of the gospel amongst the heathens,—otherwise called Moravians. To assist them in this plan the chiefs desire that one half of the next annuity may be laid out in implements of agriculture, and in the purchase of some domestic animals, as cows, and hogs. The Kaskaskias and Piankishaws require the same,—and the Potawatamies wish that a few corn hoes may be sent with their goods. The Sun, a great chief of the last-mentioned nation, requests that a coat and hat of the uniform of the United States may be sent to him; and to prevent jealousy, a few more may be added for the other chiefs of his nation. Indeed I am convinced that nothing would please the chiefs of all the nations more than a donation of this kind. It was a method always practised by the British, and nothing contributed more towards preserving their influence.

“I therefore take the liberty of recommending that about half a dozen coats, and as many cocked hats, may be sent for each of the nations that have an annuity of 1000 dollars, and half that number for those who have 500;—the expenses to be taken from the allowance of each nation. The Kickapoos, a strong and warlike nation, have not a proper proportion of goods allowed them by the United States; their annuity is \$500 only, which is the sum allowed to the remnant of the Kaskaskias, who have but 15 or 20 warriors. The Kickapoos of the Prairie, a large branch of that nation, never received any part of the goods, they therefore frequently steal horses, which are never returned, because they do not fear the withholding of their annuity.

The Sacks, a very large nation, which inhabit the banks of the Illinois river, are not bound by any treaty, and will not deliver up horses or prisoners in their possession. I have reason to believe that there are still several persons with them, which were taken during the late war. They say they are very willing to treat, on being put on a footing with the rest of the Indian nations.

“Some weeks ago I received a letter from the Paymaster General of the army, written, as he said, by your directions, requesting to know whether the services of Mr. Rivet, Roman Catholic priest, of this place, and Indian missionary, could not be dispensed with. If it continues to be the intention of the government to attempt the conversion of the Indians, the employment of missionaries like Mr. Rivet will be found one of the best means which can be employed for the accomplishment of this object. People of this description can be procured at much less expense than any other; and they certainly will be attended to by the Indians, much more than any other that could be employed.—At any rate the services of Mr. Rivet have been, and still continue to be, equal to the small sum allowed him. The Indians in this quarter venerate the old French government formerly established here, and it would excite the most disagreeable feelings amongst them to have the only one of that nation removed who is allowed to speak to them. Mr. Rivet is, indeed, constant in his exertions to diffuse principles of sobriety and justice amongst the Indians, and to cause them to respect the authority of the United States.”

It appears that prior to the formation of the Indiana Territory, the affairs of the whole territory were in the greatest confusion; both among white people and Indians, discord and anarchy ruled with undisputed sway. Murders were committed, and reprisals made on the property of both parties, without control of law or justice; two or three years would elapse without any court being held, and the most atrocious criminals escaped punishment. The uncertainty whether the laws of the United States authorized the punishment of crimes perpetrated beyond the limits of their own dominion, and the routes or paths (there being no regularly laid out roads) by which the inhabitants passed through the lands of the Indians to the different white settlements, not being secured by any treaties, rendered it difficult to bring any person to punishment for acts committed thereon. In the month of October this year, 1801, two Indians were delivered up by the chiefs of their nation to be tried under the laws of the United States for the murder of a white man.

The chief who apprehended them, Captain Allen, had had a son murdered in Vincennes about a year before; the murderers had escaped, eluding the vigilance of the Governor, who

exerted himself to the utmost to discover and bring them to justice; notwithstanding this, the chief gave up these two Indians to General Wilkinson, who sent them under a military escort by the desire of the Governor to Kaskaskia, when one of them was brought to trial, condemned, and executed, the other having turned U. S. evidence by which his life was saved.

This trial however did not settle the point with respect to the jurisdiction of the court. The culprit pleaded guilty, but no exception was taken to the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore his conviction and execution followed without the point being argued.

The execution of this man somewhat irritated the Indians about the place where he was executed, but it does not appear however that any bad consequences ensued—but rather that his punishment had a salutary effect.

It is here worthy of note that this Captain Allen had been present at the treaty of Greenville, when it was agreed that murderers should be given up on both sides;—and though there had been several murders committed on the Indians, and none of the murderers had been given up, or had suffered punishment—yet he, true to the principle which had been agreed on by the treaty, brought forward this man and gave him up to be tried for the offence. After he was convicted and sentence passed upon him by the judge, Allen stood forth, and intreated for his pardon, upon the principle, that as many murders had been committed against the Indians, and not one of the murderers had suffered, he did think that this man should be pardoned. He was told by the judge that such power was not vested in him, that he had only the power to try him, and if found guilty, to condemn him to death; but that the power of pardoning alone rested with the Governor, after the criminal had been convicted. Allen then sent a talk to the Governor, beseeching him to pardon the guilty man upon the principle above mentioned, but the Governor on mature consideration of the case did not think it proper that this man should escape, and he acted accordingly.

In making communication to the general government of the execution of this man, Governor Harrison endeavored to impress on the mind of the President, the necessity of securing the roads leading through the Indian country to the several settlements of the territory. “If this measure,” says he in his letter, “is not effected, I apprehend some serious consequences. It has already become a subject of discussion among the people of the territory, whether an Indian is punishable by our laws for a murder committed on their own lands, or on a road leading through their country; the negative of this question is strongly maintained by many; and, should it reach the Indians, it will be no longer safe to pass the roads which connect the

several settlements of the Territory." In the same letter he alludes to some information he had had of a talk having been sent among the Indians by a British agent, and in a subsequent letter, he goes more at large into an account of that transaction. This letter is to the Secretary at War, dated 19th February, 1802, in reply to one requesting that every inquiry should be made as to the nature and tendency of that communication.— The Governor proceeds thus: "I have taken much pains to find the drift of the talks, which the British agents in Canada so frequently send to the Indians residing within our limits. The report mentioned in the postscript of my letter of the 3d December last, came from Mr. Mills, the person who attended the Indian chiefs who were lately at Washington. I have since seen the chief who is said to have been the bearer of the talk alluded to. Upon my interrogating him, he denied that he had received any particular message from M^r Kee, the British superintendant for Indian affairs for Upper Canada, whom he acknowledged to have visited. But he made so many complaints of the usage which the Indians had received from the Americans, and some of them were of a nature so far above his capacity, that I am sure they must have been put into his mouth by the said M^r Kee, or by some of the British merchants.— Among other grievances, he mentioned the high price of Indian goods, which he attributed entirely to the duty which was laid upon the importation of those goods at Detroit, and which he said was contrary to the practice under the British government, and intended to impoverish and reduce the Indians. Indeed, other chiefs have frequently informed me that they had heard we resolved to destroy them, that we might take possession of their lands. This idea I am confident has been infused into their minds by the British agents or traders, which last enjoy all the Indian trade; and that they may still do so, they take every opportunity to prejudice the Indians against us. They have even attempted to make the Indians believe that the United States intended to destroy them by means of the small pox, which was to be communicated to them by the goods which they receive from us. I have never been able to fix the spreading of these lies upon any one of the traders, they manage their business with so much art; but when I do make such discovery, I shall make an example of him, by instantly depriving him of his license, and sending him out of the Indian country. In order the better to find out what is going forward among the Indians, I have endeavored to attach some of the best informed traders to our interest; but, generally speaking, they are unprincipled men, and entirely devoted to the British, by whom they are supplied with all their goods. Could this be otherwise—could the valuable skin and fur trade which our territory supplies, be diverted to the ports of the United States, instead of Canada,

it would not only give a handsome emolument to our merchants, and increase our revenue by the additional consumption of imported goods, but it would also confirm the dependence of the Indians upon us. The principal objection made by the traders to whom I have recommended the carrying of their furs and peltry to the ports of the United States, is, that there are none of our merchants who make the importation of Indian goods, or purchase of furs and peltry their business, and of course they are not always certain of making sale of their commodities, or of obtaining in return goods suitable for their purpose; both of which, they are sure of when they go to the British merchants, who are exclusively employed in this kind of traffic."

From this and subsequent despatches to the government, it will plainly appear, that the British government has disgraced itself by employing agents for the express purpose of embroiling the Indians with the citizens of the United States; and by the vilest and most falacious insinuations, infusing into their minds those jealousies, doubts and fears, which produced that extensive combination of the numerous tribes of which we will hereafter treat at large. What can be said for the government that could resort to such abominable schemes, for the purpose of exciting an ignorant and uninformed race of beings to rise up and murder and rob their neighbors, well knowing that their marauding upon the frontiers of the United States would produce a reaction, which would be fatal to those unfortunate victims to their avaricious rapacity. What a strong degree of inconsistency, if not of moral turpitude, in this government employing agents to foment discord and jealousy between the Indians and Americans, from which circumstance arose so many atrocious murders of men, women and children, at the same instant of time when they were patronizing bible and missionary societies for the conversion of the heathen in both hemispheres. What shocking barbarity! what consummate hypocrisy! Let it not be said that the government ought not to be blamed for the conduct of its agents. Let it not be said that those agents acted of their own mere motion, and on their own responsibility—facts "speak trumpet-tongued," and declare to the world, that the agents must have had their instructions to act as they have done;—they were supplied with the means, and without the means they could not have effected those purposes;—and it is clear, and will by other circumstances be made still more manifest, that it was the government of England that provided those means. Enough on this subject for the present.

We will now advert to a very important document relative to the claims of the United States on certain lands upon the Washash river. Upon this subject, Governor Harrison obtained information, and communicated to the government, very important information, which cannot be better given to the reader than in the

words of his own letter to the secretary at war, under date of 26th February, 1802.

“The subject,” says the Governor, “of the boundary line between us and the Indians, has engaged my attention for some time past; and as I consider myself possessed of all the information relating to it which I am likely to obtain in this quarter, I have thought it best to state to you the result of my inquiries and reflections.

“If the obvious construction of the treaty of Greenville is to be taken as the ground upon which our claim to land in this country is to be supported, I believe it will be found to be much more extensive than is generally imagined. The tract which the United States may rightfully claim, extends on the Wabash from Point Coupee, 12 leagues above the mouth of White river, to 12 leagues below this town, and in width from the river on the east, 40 leagues, and on the west 30 leagues. The grant of the land is said to have been made to Monsieur De Vincennes, a captain in the French army, and the founder of the colony which bears his name, for the use of the French settlers, and although the instrument of conveyance (if there ever was one in writing) is lost, the fact is ascertained not only by the testimony of all the old French inhabitants, but is completely authenticated by a clause in a subsequent deed, made by the Indians to the Wabash Company in the year 1775, in which the bounds of the tract before granted to the French are laid down, for the purpose of excepting it from the sale then about to be made. An extract from the said deed, which is on record here, is enclosed. Although our title to the land is thus clearly ascertained, I think it would be extremely impolitic to insist on taking the whole of it. I am not certain that the Indians would agree to it. At present I believe they have no idea of a claim being set up to that extent, and it is said that general Putnam gave them assurance when he assembled the Wabash chiefs at this place in 1793, that our claim would not be very extensive. The right to the whole tract may be declared, but the lines which are to run from the two points on the Wabash above mentioned, may be extended no further than 10 or 12 leagues on each side the river. This would readily be acceded to by the Indians, and would make the settlements here sufficiently large. None of the Piankishaw chiefs (by which tribe all the former sales in this country were made) attended the treaty of Greenville, and the Wea chiefs, who are said to have represented them, are all dead.

“At a council which was held here last summer, the subject of the boundary line was mentioned by the Piankishaw chiefs, and they expressed great uneasiness that the boundary line had not been ascertained, and at the reports which had been circulated amongst them, that the Americans meant to take from them all their country. They also said, that the settlements

which had been formed on the south side of White river, were an encroachment upon them. I took this opportunity to explain to them that part of the treaty of Greenville which relates to this place, and assured them that an investigation would take place, in order to ascertain the extent of country which had been actually conceded to the French. That from what I can learn, our claim on the Wabash was contained between Point Coupee and White river, but I could not determine how far it might extend on each side the river,—nor in what direction the lines would run from these two points; but if it should appear on investigation, that it was the intention of their forefathers, that the line should run from the mouth of White river up the channel of that river, instead of at right angles to the Wabash, that they would be paid for all the land on the south side of White river which had been included in our settlements and surveys. This explanation seemed satisfactory. It appears that all the Indians have understood that the claim to the land between Point Coupee and White river had been extinguished, and I believe they would readily agree that it should extend in depth on each side the river so far as to make a square of 24 leagues, which is the distance between the above-mentioned points. The remainder of their claim may be relinquished, and this liberality will authorize us to ask for an extension of our territory on the Illinois, if our claim in that country is not sufficiently large to prevent our settlements from being cramped.

“My views as to the boundary line in that quarter are, that it should commence at the mouth of the Illinois river, run up that river for 30 or 35 miles, thence by a line parallel to the course of the Mississippi, until it intersects at right angles a line to be drawn from a point opposite Cape St. Combs, which is on the west side of the Mississippi, and about 10 miles below Kaskaskia. This would give a tract of country of 80 miles by 35, over almost the whole of which our settlements are now scattered.

“There are some other objects of importance which might be settled at the time the Indians meet upon the subject of the boundary line. I have before stated to you that none of the roads passing through one settlement to any other in this Territory were made free by treaty, admitting that free ingress and egress were contemplated at the time that the several tracts were ceded to the French. Yet this can, I should suppose, extend no further than the allowance of one road to the Ohio, and one to the Mississippi, but the extension of the settlements and the constant emigration from the Ohio to this place, and the countries on the Mississippi, make it necessary to have two or three main roads. The settlements which extend from the Great Miami to the Indian boundary, running from the Kentucky river, will shortly be attached to this territory, and will totally be cut off from a communication with the seat of government unless we can have

a new road; and the opening of those I presume ought not to be attempted without the consent of the Indians; this consent I am sure can be had, as well as permission to establish small stations at the distance of 25 or 30 miles apart on the roads most used for the accommodation of travellers. Another object to be provided for is the security of the persons and property of the traders residing in the Indian country. Frequent complaints have been made to me of robberies and personal injuries committed by the Indians on the traders, and I know of no redress for them.

“In the treaty of Greenville the chiefs promised to take the traders under their protection, but there is no specific mode of redress pointed out. Their treatment of the traders shows that they consider them entirely at their mercy, and they do frequently rob and abuse them. This insecurity to the persons and properties of the traders is the reason that so few decent and respectable men are employed in the Indian trade, which, with a few exceptions, is in the hands of the greatest villains in the world, and the authors of all those falsehoods which so frequently agitate the Indians.

“The Sacks, or Sackees, a considerable nation who reside between the Illinois river and the Mississippi, were not included in the treaty of Greenville. They sent deputies to agree to a cessation of hostilities the spring previous to the treaty, but by some accident or other, they mistook the time, and did not attend the treaty. They are now extremely desirous to be put on a footing with the other tribes, and receive an annual present, and it appears reasonable that they should. There is another reason for including them in the treaty of Greenville. I have reasons to believe that several of the white persons and negroes who were taken during the war are still in the possession of those people, particularly the son of a Mr. Tanner of Kentucky, who is extremely desirous to recover him.

“To accomplish those objects I beg leave, Sir, respectfully to recommend to the President, that a deputation from each of the neighboring tribes, viz: the Delawares, Potawatamies, Miamis, Eel river Indians, Weas, Kickapoos, Sacks, and Kaskaskias, should be assembled early in the ensuing summer, and that some person on the part of the United States be impowered to agree with them on the permanent boundaries between their's and the lands of the United States at this place and the Illinois country. To obtain their consent to open the following roads, viz: one from the Ohio at or near the mouth of Pigeon creek to Vincennes; one from the settlements between the Great Miami and the Indian boundary line to Vincennes; and one from some convenient spot on the Ohio to Kaskaskia.

“To extend to the Sack nation the provisions of the treaty of Greenville.

“To provide for the security of the persons and properties of the traders residing in the Indian country, and the punishment of those who injure them.

“To obtain the consent of the Indians to establish houses of accommodation at the distance of twenty-five or thirty miles apart on the post road from Louisville to Vincennes, and thence to Kaskaskia.

“And should it be considered practicable, to make new arrangements of the annuities. The Kaskaskias, for instance, who have only fifteen or sixteen warriors, and the Piankishaws who are reduced to twenty-five or thirty, receive each 500 dollars, which is the sum allowed the Kickapoos, who have some hundreds. I think it possible to prevail upon those two tribes to give up 200 dollars each of their annuity, which may be added to those of the Kickapoos and Potawatamies; or with the addition of another 100 dollars, make an annuity of 500 dollars for the Sacks.

“I am persuaded, Sir, that nothing can be done with respect to any of these objects but in a general assembly of the chiefs of all the tribes. There appears to be an agreement amongst them, that no proposition which relates to their lands can be acceded to without the consent of all the tribes; and they are extremely watchful and jealous of each other lest some advantage should be obtained in which they do not all participate.

“A general meeting of the chiefs has been long wished for, in order to settle some disputes which have arisen amongst them, which but for my interposition, would have terminated in war. These disputes cannot (on account of the jealousies above mentioned) be amicably adjusted but by the mediation of the United States.

“The meeting would be further beneficial, as it would give an opportunity of explaining to them the conditions of the treaties they have made with us, which are very imperfectly understood.

“I do not know of any pretensions to land on the part of individuals without the acknowledged boundary of the lands of the United States, but those which are made by the Illinois and Wabash companies; these companies are composed nearly of the same persons, and their claims include almost the whole country between the Lakes, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Indian boundary line, running from the mouth of the Kentucky river to the northern boundary of the United States.

“A person attended at the treaty of Greenville on behalf of one or both of these companies, and as well as I can recollect (for I was at that time in the family of General Wayne) the subject was not brought before the Indians. It is I believe, acknowledged that these purchases were unauthorized by any government. To remedy this, the conveyance is made to the company or to the King of Great Britain.

“I can form no idea of the number of Indians that may attend at the proposed meeting; I shall, however, endeavor to make it as small as possible, and dismiss them as soon as the business can be done. I believe that the chiefs will endeavor to bring with them as large a retinue as possible, which some will do from ostentation, and some from apprehension of danger, several of the tribes being much irritated against each other.

“I think it would be better to have the meeting immediately after the delivery of the annuities at Fort Wayne; no other presents will then be expected, excepting a few special ones for the chiefs. Should the President approve of giving an annuity to the Sacks, they will probably expect to have an advance of one year on their arrival here. One of the chiefs of this tribe attended the trial of the Delaware Indian at Kaskaskia last fall, and complained heavily of the neglect with which his tribe was treated by the United States.

“I have enclosed a sample of virgin copper, found on the Vermillion river, about eighty miles above this place. This piece has undergone no process excepting that of being heated in a common fire, and then beaten, with a hammer to get off some small bits of stone and earth which adhered to it. I have reason to suppose that there is a considerable quantity at the place whence this piece was brought. Recollecting that there was a resolution of congress, passed two years ago, directing a search to be made after copper on Lake Superior, it occurred to me that the President might wish some inquiries to be made after the mine from which this sample was taken.”

CHAPTER III.

THE vast importance of the object which occupied the attention of the Governor about this period must be obvious to the reader. It would however be a waste of time to recapitulate these objects after the very luminous exposition given of them in the foregoing chapter. We shall only mention that it was with considerable difficulty, in the course of the summer, he obtained a consent for the holding of the projected conference;—there being many more obstacles in the way of it than he had anticipated. He had not only the mutual jealousies and suspicions which subsisted among the Indians themselves to surmount, but he had the secret intrigues and influence of an artful and unprincipled British agent to counteract. By this agent the fears, the jealousies, and even the hatred of many of the Indians were excited against the United States. Circumstances were suggested to them which could never have been thought of by those simple, untutored savages. And such was the ascendancy gained over them by M'Kee, and the foul and false representations which he made to them, that when they did meet, they were prepared to repel every proposition that would be made to them by the Governor. Such was the hostility excited in their minds by the evil insinuations of this agent of a corrupt and tyrannical government, that if they had not been managed with the greatest delicacy and address, a warlike combination against the United States would have been the consequence, rather than an amicable adjustment of the differences, or a consent to alienate any of their lands.

In order that the reader may have a more comprehensive view of this important subject, and the more immediately to connect the project of the convention with its meeting and its ultimate consequences, we will pass over the intervening time, and proceed to give some account of the meeting, and a detail of the agreement entered into, and signed by the parties—the original of which we have found among our documents—as also a copy of the speech made by the Governor to the meeting at its first opening.

The Indians did not begin to assemble till the beginning of September, though the meeting had been called for August, and it was not till the 12th that business was proceeded on. The tribes which attended were the Potawatamies, the Kickapoos,

the Eel river Miamis, Weas, Piankishaws, and Kaskaskias.—The Miamis and Delawares would not attend; the former being influenced by the British agents, and the latter were afraid that their title to the lands between White river and the Ohio would be discussed, and found defective.

On the opening of the council the Governor delivered to them the following speech:

“MY CHILDREN—

“I have been, for a considerable time, desirous of having a general council composed of the chiefs and wise men of all the different tribes, whose concerns have been committed to my management, by your great father, the President of the United States.

“Since my first arrival in this country, you well know how extremely anxious I have been to preserve your peace and harmony, not only between you and your white brethren, but between each particular tribe of my red children.

“When the tomahawk was raised some time ago by some of your inconsiderate and rash young men, and your blood already began to flow, you know what pains I took to arrest the fury of the bloody weapon and to bury it where I thought it could never again be found.

“My Children, the great tree of peace which was planted at Greenville, I have watered and cultivated with the greatest care, and I have cherished the hope that this tree would spread its branches over the whole of this great Island, and that the white and red people would smoke the pipe of friendship under its shade till the end of time.

“But in spite of all my care, this fair and flourishing tree has been severely wounded by the rash and inconsiderate young men of both colors; and but a very few weeks ago, it received a most terrible gash, and one, which I much fear, will endanger the very existence of those large branches which hang over the Illinois river.

“My Children, let us all exert ourselves to shield from future danger this sacred plant: let us cut off the branches which are withered and decayed, and extirpate the weeds which have hitherto retarded its growth, and then let us entwine our arms around its trunk, that the vicious and unruly may be unable to injure it.

“My Children, whilst your father, the President, was forming plans for your future happiness, and was communicating to me his directions upon the subject of clearing your understandings, and making you acquainted with those arts by which the white people are enabled to live with so much ease and comfort, how much must he have been grieved and surprised to hear that two of his people had been murdered by some of those very persons

for whose welfare and happiness his thoughts were thus anxiously employed. Are these delightful plains, which were made by the Great Spirit to afford nourishment for his children, to be for ever deluged with blood? Will foolish men never learn that war and bloodshed are as offensive to the maker of us all, as they are destructive of the happiness of those which might engage in it?

“My Children, aim your arrows at the buffaloe, the bear, and the deer, which are provided for your use, but spare your brother man; let those whom the Great Spirit has placed upon the same Island, live in peace with each other. Let the nations to whom it has pleased God to give abundance of the comforts of life, share them with their neighbors who may be deficient.

“My Children, by this principle your great father, the President of the United States is strongly actuated; he bids me inform you that it is his ardent wish to see you prosperous and happy; he has directed me to take every means in my power to have you instructed in those arts, which the Great Spirit has long ago communicated to the white people, and from which they derive food and clothing in abundance.

“My Children, some of you whom I now address are old and wise men, who have lived long enough to see that the kind of life you lead is neither productive of happiness to yourselves, nor acceptable to the Great Spirit. You know the constant state of warfare in which you have lived has reduced some of your most powerful nations to a mere handful; and even in time of peace, the difficulty of procuring provisions at some seasons of the year is so great, that your women are unable to raise a sufficient number of children to supply the constant waste occasioned by the excessive use of that most pernicious liquor, whiskey.

“My Children, the Great Spirit must assuredly have been angry with us when he discovered to man the mode of making this mischievous liquid. You well know the innumerable miseries which this fatal liquor has produced amongst you. Many of your young men spend the whole profit of their hunting in whiskey, and their children and old fathers are left to struggle with cold and hunger. Nay more, when reason is driven away by the intoxicating draft—what shocking scenes have been exhibited. The knife of a brother is aimed at a brother's life, and the tomahawk of the son is frequently buried in the head of his father; and those beautiful plains which were only to be stained by the blood of the deer and buffaloe are crimsoned with the gore of your best chiefs and warriors.

“But my Children, let us turn away our eyes from those shocking scenes, and let us unite our endeavors to introduce other manners amongst the generation which is now growing up.

“Your father, the President, has directed me to inform you, that he wishes you to assemble your scattered warriors, and to

form towns and villages, in situations best adapted to cultivation; he will cause you to be furnished with horses, cattle, hogs, and implements of husbandry, and will have persons provided to instruct you in the management of them. My children, turn your thoughts seriously to this important object. You know that the game which afforded you subsistence is yearly becoming more scarce, and in a short time you will be left without resource, and your wives and children will in vain ask you for food.

“My Children, it is very easy for you to avoid this calamity. A great many years ago the white people subsisted as you do now upon the wild beasts of the forest. When those were becoming scarce, the Great Spirit communicated to them the method of raising grain for bread, and taught them to bring the ox and the horse under their subjection, though they had been as wild as your deer and buffaloe, and thus to assist them in cultivating the earth.

“My Children, our Great Father, who lives in heaven, has admirably contrived this earth for the comfort and happiness of his children; but from the beginning he has made it a law that man should earn his food by his own exertions: the beasts of the forest cannot be taken without trouble and fatigue; nor can bread or clothing be made without considerable labor. It is necessary that the grain should be deposited in the earth, and the intruding beasts kept off and noxious weeds destroyed; the munificent Deity performs the rest. He sends the rain and the dew to fertilize the soil and give vigor to the tender plants, and causes the sun to ripen and perfect the fruit.

“There is nothing so pleasing to God as to see his children employed in the cultivation of the earth. He gave command to our ancestors to increase and multiply until the whole earth should be filled with inhabitants. But you must be sensible my Children that this command could not be obeyed if we were all to depend upon the chance for our subsistence. It requires an immense extent of country to supply a very few hunters with food, and the labor and fatigue which the wives of hunters undergo and their constant exposure to the inclemency of the seasons make the raising of a very few children a matter of the greatest difficulty.

“My Children, you may perhaps think that the plan I have recommended is too difficult to be effected; but you may depend upon it that with the proper exertions on your part there is no doubt of its success. The experiment has been fairly tried with your brothers the Creeks and Cherokees. Many individuals of the former have herds of cattle consisting of some hundreds together with an abundance of corn and vegetables. This has had a most happy effect on their population, and all their wigwams are already filled with children.

“At any rate let me entreat you to make the experiment, for

the sake of the rising generation; although it may be difficult for an old man to change entirely the mode of life in which he has been brought up, with children it is otherwise; they can be formed to any thing, can be made to assume any shape like the young shoots of the willow or the tender branches of the vine."

Soon after the council was opened, the Governor perceived that the minds of the greater part of the chiefs had been poisoned, and that they came prepared to reject any propositions that might be made to them; he therefore postponed the subject of the lands until each particular chief could be sounded, and his real disposition ascertained. In effecting this latter object, he was more fully convinced of the arts which had been practised upon them to defeat the object of the council, and to make them look upon every thing which came from the United States with an eye of suspicion. Most of the chiefs had shortly before made a visit to M^r Kee, the Indian agent, and had received from him presents to a considerable amount. One, called the Little Turtle, was of the number—and though the measure of holding the council had been particularly recommended by him, he refused to attend, assigning as his reason, that the jealousy with which the chiefs viewed the footing on which he stood with the United States, would make his presence rather more injurious than serviceable. But it was the opinion of captain Wells, who had been Indian agent for the United States, that he had been bought over by the British. However that might have been, it was evident that he used all his influence to prevent the Indians attending the meeting; and among other expedients, he appointed a meeting of the chiefs at the Tawa towns, at the very time on which they were to have attended the Governor at the council.

As soon as the Governor thought the subject of the boundaries of the lands of the United States in the neighborhood of Vincennes could be mentioned with propriety, he urged the claim to the tract granted to the Wabash company as the one which had been set apart for the use of the settlement of Vincennes.

Although the subject was brought forward in terms the most guarded, it was received with marked indignation. They first of all declared that such a gift had never been made, that the land from Point Coupee to the mouth of White river had been lent by their ancestors to the French—but that it had never been sold or given, and that it was to be used only for purposes of commerce.

They said that it had been often foretold to them that the period would arrive when their country would entirely be usurped by the white people, and they earnestly besought the Governor not to insist upon their giving up any part of it at that time,

They further stated that admitting the grant had been made by the Piankishaws, it could not be binding on them, as the Piankishaws owned but a small part of the country; and further that they had been always told by the agents of the United States, that their claims would be very small. This was found by the Governor to be strictly true. At the treaty which general Putnam had held with them, the subject was mentioned, and they declared that the grant made by their ancestors to the French extended no further than the high lands round the town of Vincennes, which did not amount to more than 7 or 8000 acres. Captain Wells also declared, that governor St. Clair directed him to inform the Indians, that a surveyor's chain should not be stretched on the opposite side of White river, and that the few settlements on them should be withdrawn.

On further investigation the Governor found, that the sales were made by the Indians to the Wabash company, through the influence of the French citizens of Vincennes, who were induced to exert themselves in behalf of the company in consideration of the tract between Point Coupee and White river, and 90 leagues in depth being set apart for their use; this combined with other circumstances impressed the Governor with a belief that in the whole transaction the Indians had been imposed upon. Of one thing he had no doubt, and that was, that none but the chiefs over whom the French of Vincennes had the greatest ascendancy were concerned in the transaction.

The Governor could not obtain any satisfactory information as to the depth of the tract originally given to Monsieur De Vincennes—but he was inclined to think that it was never considered to have extended beyond White river, as the object of making an establishment was purely that of making it a trading post.

On hearing the grounds of the claim made by the Governor, the chiefs asked one day to consider of it, and then they flatly refused to acknowledge it, declaring that such a claim could not have existed for so long a time without its having been mentioned to them; that the Great Spirit was angry with them for having parted with so much of their lands, and they were determined to offend him in that way no longer.

Under these circumstances it required the utmost exertions of the Governor to bring them to a better temper; and in this, he, with the assistance of captain Wells, completely succeeded upon terms which are inserted below. The Governor not thinking himself vested with powers sufficient for a formal treaty, chose to put the business in that shape, particularly as the land which they agreed to give up was not what was claimed under treaty, but was rather a compromise, or equivalent for the claim; and he also conceived that the signature of the chiefs who were formally empowered to sign a treaty in behalf of the tribes,

would be as obligatory as if it were signed by all the chiefs, and the trouble and expence of getting them together would be entirely avoided.

At the desire of the chiefs, it was agreed, that the treaty should be signed at Fort Wayne, when the four persons who were appointed on their part were to meet, at any time, such persons as might be appointed by the President for that purpose.

The chiefs at this council could not be prevailed upon to name what compensation they would have for the salt spring, most of them was for giving it as a present, but others said they wanted horses, guns, powder and ball for it:—Neither would they agree to say that it was sold or given, but that it might be used by the United States, so long as the Great Spirit produced water there.

Upon the whole the council went off much better than was expected from first appearances. And though at the commencement the chiefs exhibited much ill humour, and violent opposition to the proposed arrangements, yet the address of the Governor overcame all obstacles; and those who were acquainted with the subject declared, they never saw the chiefs who were present, so well disposed towards the United States.

Here follows the memorandum of agreement which was afterwards ratified at Fort Wayne.

“ In a conference, holden by William Henry Harrison, Governor and commander in chief in and over the Indiana Territory, and intendant of Indian affairs, and the Sachems and Chiefs of the Potawatamy, Kickapoo, Eel River, Kaskaskia, Wea, and Piankishaw nations, the said Sachems and Chiefs aforesaid have nominated and appointed the Little Turtle, Richarville, To-pinee-bik, and Winemak, or a majority of them, to finally settle and adjust a treaty with such agent or agents as may be appointed on behalf of the United States, which shall be established on the following article, to wit:

“ That the United States shall relinquish all claim to lands in the neighborhood of Vincennes, excepting the following described tract, which we the undersigned Sachems and Chiefs for ourselves and the nations we represent, do by these presents authorize and empower you, the said Little Turtle, Richarville, To-pinee-bik, and Winemak, or a majority of you, to transfer and make over to the United States in consideration of the relinquishment above mentioned, the tract of land comprised within the following lines and boundaries, to wit: beginning at Point Coupee on the Wabash river, thence running a westwardly line four leagues, thence southwardly by a line drawn parallel to the general course of the Wabash river until it will be intersected by a westwardly line drawn from the confluence of the White river and Wabash river, thence from the point of intersection aforesaid along the said line by the confluence of the White and Wabash rivers in an easterly direction twenty-four leagues;

thence northeastwardly by a line drawn parallel to the general course of the said Wabash river until it will intersect an easterly line drawn from Point Coupee aforesaid, on the Wabash river, thence by the line last mentioned to Point Coupee, the place of beginning.

“And we, the undersigned Sachems and Chiefs, also authorize and empower you the said Little Turtle, Richarville, To-pinee-bik, and Winemak, or a majority of you, to transfer and make over to the United States the right and privilege of making salt for ever at the salt lick on the Saline river, and also a tract of land four miles square, including the salt lick aforesaid.

Done at Vincennes, the 17th day of September, 1802.

WONONGASEAH, X (or five medals)	}	<i>Potawatamy Chiefs.</i>
MA-GAA-GOH, X		
WAKE-NAH, (or <i>Left Hand</i>) X		
KEE-SAS, (or <i>Sun</i>) X	}	<i>Eel river Chiefs.</i>
MA-MI-LA-CHICH, (or <i>ground hog</i>) X		
MA-TOP-SA-NI-AH, (or <i>Sam</i>) X		
NONTOUR, X	}	<i>Piankishaw Chiefs.</i>
GROSBLE, X		
TROISFESSES, X		
FUSEE, X	}	<i>Wea Chiefs.</i>
YOUNG LABOSSIÈRE, X		
SE-CON-QUAN-ING-GUAH, X	}	<i>Kaskaskia Chief.</i>
BAPTISTE DUÇOIGNE, X a		
PA-KE-KA-NAK, X	}	<i>Kickapoo Chiefs.</i>
POS-SE-LAN-CON-GUAH, X		

DONE IN THE PRESENCE OF

W. WELLS, agent for the district of Fort Wayne.

JNO. GIBSON.

HENRY VANDERBURGH.

JNO. RICE JONES.

B. PARKER.

DAVID COUPLAND, *Virg'a.*

CORNELIUS LYMAN, *com't. 1st In'fy. Reg.*

CARTER B. HARRISON, *Virg'a.*

JOSEPH BARON, *sworn Interpreter.*

JAS. JOHNSTON.

CHAPTER IV.

HAVING thus disposed of the important business of conciliating the Indians, frustrating the views of the intriguing British agent, M^r Kee, and settling the claims for the tract of land on the Wabash and White rivers, we request the reader to revert back to some circumstances which occurred anterior to the final conclusion of the affairs to which we have just done referring him; circumstances, which we were obliged to pass over, in order to give him a more connected and comprehensive view of that important subject than if we had suffered it to fall in the regular order of time.

In the spring of this year (1802) some chiefs of the Delaware and Shawanese tribes had made a visit to the President of the United States at Washington city, where they made loud and bitter complaints against the white people hunting on their grounds and stealing their horses. They at the same time proposed leasing the great Saline spring, near the mouth of the Wabash, to the United States. On these subjects the secretary at war, by order of the President, wrote a letter to the Governor, wherein he advises that the Saline should be leased; that measures should be taken to protect the Indians in their persons and properties; that every exertion should be used to reconcile the jarring interests among the Indians themselves; and that all fair means should be taken to discourage a jealousy that was understood to have subsisted between the Indian chiefs of several tribes, and the one called Little Turtle, who was esteemed as a man of considerable talents and much respected both by the executive and the Governor himself: he at the same time expressed an expectation that congress in the course of the then session would interdict the sale of spirituous liquors among the Indians, and would establish trading houses in some places north-west of the Ohio. In this letter he also recommended that boundaries should be run between the Delaware Indians and their neighbors, directing that those lines should be run and land marks fixed, at the expense of the United States.

On the subject of the salt spring the Governor answered as follows:—"With respect to the salt spring which the chiefs who were at the seat of government lately expressed a wish to lease, my opinion is, that it would be altogether improper to comply with their request, considering both the present advantage of the Indians and the interests of the white settlers, nor

and in time to come. The spring alluded to, is perhaps the very best in the whole extent of country from the Alleghany mountains to the Mississippi, and may, if the preservation of the wood in the neighborhood be properly attended to, give so large a supply of salt as very considerably to reduce the price of that indispensable article in all the settlements of the Ohio and the navigable branches of that river. Should the proposed lease take place, the tenant would endeavor to make as much present advantage as possible—the young trees and the branches of the older would alone be made use of, while the heavy trunks would be left to rot on the ground, and in a few years would be effected the destruction of as much timber as would be sufficient, under proper management to last for a century. The leasing of this spring would probably produce a disagreement among the Indians themselves. Every tribe in the country would expect to partake in the benefits of the lease, and the proportion which would fall to the lot of each would be so small, as to disgust those who really have a right to the land: the Delawares and Shawanese have none. The better plan appears to be to extinguish the title altogether to the spring and a small tract around it: the United States could very well afford to give each of the tribes a sum equal to one year's annuity for the spring and 10,000 acres around it. It might then be put under such management as completely to indemnify the public for the expense of the purchase, and produce a sufficiency of salt at a moderate price for the present inhabitants and those who are to follow."

By this and a subsequent letter, the Governor endeavored to convince the President that it would be much more judicious to purchase out the Saline and 10,000 acres around it, than to lease it. To this proposal the government acceded, and at the subsequent conference it was finally agreed upon by the Indians, and though they would not consent that an absolute sale should take place, yet they agreed that it should be lent to the United States for an indefinite time;—but in a subsequent treaty, the title to it with a much larger tract of land was extinguished, and thereby the United States have become possessed in fee simple of a property which they would only have held by lease but for the management of Governor Harrison.

In the Governor's letter of 25th of March, he expressed apprehension that the Potawatamies and Kickapoos intended making an attack upon the Weas and Miamis, and his determination by all means in his power to prevent it. He also states the circumstance of receiving a letter from a gentleman of Peoria, saying that the Kickapoos of the Prairie had declared very hostile dispositions towards the United States.

The Governor's letter concludes with the remark, that the Indians had become very restless, and they required some object

to engage their attention, otherwise they would go to war with the United States or with each other.

About this period the Governor having learnt that two of the miscreants who had been concerned in the murder of the Indian family, alluded to in a prior chapter, were in Kentucky, the third one having escaped to Orleans, he made the legal application to Governor Greenup required by law, for having fugitives fleeing from justice, given up by one state to another, in order to their being brought to trial. He appointed Captain Floyd, an active and respectable citizen of Indiana, to execute the writ of the Governor of Kentucky, and to conduct the persons from that state into the territory. In this duty he, the captain, partly succeeded, having arrested one of them, John Williams; but the inhabitants of the village in which the other, named Cutchelow resided, rising upon the captain and the sheriff of Brackenridge county, they were obliged to retreat lest they might have lost the person they had already secured. He however brought Williams over into the territory and lodged him in jail.

The interference of the people in favor of the criminal, Cutchelow, it appears, was the consequence of the prevailing opinion that a white man ought not in justice to suffer for killing an Indian. And so prevalent was the mischievous notion, that the Governor had great doubts that he would not be able with all his power and influence to prevail upon the witnesses to come forward and prove against the accused, though the circumstances were known to as many as twenty persons.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, the Governor, under the impression that every possible exertion should be made, not only in furtherance of public justice, but to convince the Indians that no means should be left untried to have justice done them, he determined to send for one or two of the witnesses, though the whole of them lived in Kentucky, except one who could only prove against Martin Williams who had absconded to Orleans. His efforts, however, proved ineffectual,—the witnesses he could not procure;—and the man whom he had a prisoner at Vincennes, by the help of his friends, in a few days broke jail and escaped. But though these criminals eluded the sentence which the law would have passed upon them, and the punishment consequent to it, they all three met with violent deaths, some short time after:—and that from the Indians; for, to elude that law, of which they had committed a breach so flagrant, they went off to the Missouri territory on a trapping expedition for procuring beaver, and having by some means excited the ire of the Indians, two of them were killed by them and the third in attempting to reach a camp of American troops, which happened to be there by accident, was shot by a sentinel.

So strongly was the Governor impressed with the necessity of making an example of those villains, as well for the purpose of

detering the whites from committing violence upon the Indians, under the deluded notion that to kill an Indian was not murder and did not merit punishment, as to convince the latter that he was determined to render justice to them, that he immediately on the escape of John Williams, issued a proclamation offering a reward of 300 dollars for him and 100 dollars for each of his accomplices in breaking the jail, and 500 dollars each for Martin Williams and Cutchelow, to be paid on their being convicted of the murder of which they had been charged. Here we cannot help remarking upon the extreme impropriety of the people who interfered in favor of those atrocious villains, and the impolicy, as well as wickedness, of attempting to shield them from the just retribution so justly due to their crimes. Murder is the most heinous crime that can be committed against the community, and in every situation of society ought to be punished with death. It is a crime for which no restitution can be made. The man who has once steeped his hands in blood, is not only capable of doing the same again, but being more familiarised with the crime, is ready to commit the second murder with more facility than even the first; there is therefore no safety in society, when the murderer is suffered to escape.

But under circumstances such as we have been relating, such murders tend to greater dangers on the margin of an uncivilized country. The ignorant savage listens to no suggestion but that of his revenge: when violence is committed upon him or his friends, it is usually upon the innocent that he wreaks his vengeance; defenceless women and children, or feeble and unsuspecting men, become his victims; and it is not the murderer on whom he takes revenge, but on such of his nation as may first fall in his way, and thus the innocent suffers for the guilty. On this view of the subject then, it is the worst of policy to screen the real criminal. As to the stupid idea that killing an Indian is not, nor deserves the punishment of murder; it is not worthy of refutation. The words, "thou shalt not kill" are plain and explicit, and they apply as well to the Indian as to the christian, to the negro as well as to the white man, and must be understood without qualification of color, nation, or religion.

The Governor found great difficulty in procuring funds for the apprehension of persons charged with the commission of crimes against the Indians:—In his letter to the secretary at war he thus expresses his doubts, as to how that expense was to be defrayed. "Where the prosecution is to be had under a law of Congress, as is the case with all those which have for their object the punishment of offences committed in the Indian territory, I have no hesitation in incurring any necessary expense, as I am satisfied the president will approve of it—but I am not so clear with regard to those which may arise under the territorial laws. If the means of apprehending fugitives are to come

from the territory, very few of those who flee for murdering Indians will be brought to justice.' As we have not a legislature chosen by the people, we have no revenue laws but such as are for the use of the counties, and consequently no money in the treasury but what is derived from fines and forfeitures." He was, however, speedily relieved from this difficulty and uncertainty, as by a letter in reply to the above, the secretary thus expresses himself:—"It is the earnest wish of the President that you continue to exert every means in your power for apprehending and bringing to justice those offenders, and all others who have been, or shall be guilty of like crimes—and you may rely upon all reasonable expenses in the execution of your duty in bringing such offenders to justice, where no provision is made by the territorial government, being paid by the United States, provided it shall appear that the persons employed have acted with zeal and fidelity."

CHAPTER V

THE period of the appointment of General Harrison to the government of the territory of Indiana appears to have been a remarkable era in the history of the Indians. At this time their own condition as well as their relation with the United States seems to have more seriously than formerly occupied the attention of congress: a law was passed for the establishment of trading houses among them, and for introducing agriculture and manufactures, thereby to induce them to cultivate the arts of civilized life, and to give up the hunter's state. As the substance of this law is contained in a letter to the Governor from the secretary at war, with directions for the future management of Indian affairs, it is here inserted verbatim—which with two other letters, private and unofficial, written by the President, Jefferson, to the same gentleman, will give the reader a comprehensive view of the disposition and intentions of the government towards the Indians, and will fully develop the benevo-

lent and paternal feelings of the venerable patriot last named, unclogged with official formality, but expressed in all the glow of pure and unaffected philanthropy. It is much to be lamented that all those exertions in favor of the Indians, which were equally honorable to the heads and hearts of the rulers of the nation, were, at least for a time, nugatory and abortive; and that force had finally to be resorted to for the purpose of keeping them quiet. And this we have no hesitation in attributing to the wickedness and intriguing spirit of one of the most corrupt governments upon earth, who, by their agents, contrived to poison the minds of the Indians against the government and people of the United States.

“WAR DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY 23d, 1802.

“SIR:—It is the ardent wish of the President of the United States, as well from a principle of humanity, as from duty and sound policy, that all prudent means in our power should be unremittingly pursued for carrying into effect the benevolent views of congress relative to the Indian nations within the jurisdiction of the United States. The provisions made by congress, under the heads of intercourse with the Indian nations, and for establishing trading houses among them, &c. have for their object, not only the cultivation and establishment of harmony and friendship between the United States and the different nations of Indians, but the introduction of civilization, by encouraging and gradually introducing the arts of husbandry and domestic manufactures among them. The President is more induced to continue to raise all the means in his power for effecting the foregoing object, from the happy effects already produced in several of the Indian nations, by the zeal and industry of the agents among them.

“With a view of giving every assistance in the power of the executive, to the measures contemplated, relating to the Indians generally, the President has considered it necessary to make the following regulations:

“That the Governors of the North Western, Indiana, and Mississippi territories, in their capacities as agents for Indian affairs, will in future consider themselves as having the superintendence of all business relating to the Indians in their respective territories, and will from time to time call upon such sub-agents as may be appointed by the President of the United States to reside among the Indian nations within their respective territories, for such information as may be necessary for ascertaining any facts or circumstances relating to the said Indians, or the conduct of any such sub-agents, and for any other information which may be useful and proper; and to give all such sub-agents such instructions and advice from time to time, as may be found necessary and not incompatible with the laws, or

instructions given by the immediate direction of the President of the United States.

“The sub-agents and agents of the territories, will, in future, correspond with the respective governors of the territories in which they may be placed, and communicate generally with the department of war through that channel, and consider themselves under the general direction of the governors respectively. And temporary or sub-agents, or agents of factories, will regularly make report, once, at least, in every three months to the governor and to the secretary of war, of all circumstances relating to the agencies, with a correct statement of all expenses incurred under their direction, which report should be made from a journal, regularly and correctly kept by the sub-agents, of all accounts worth noticing, relating to disputes, complaints, misfortunes, &c. including likewise, whatever may relate to the progress of civilization among the Indians, and such remarks as their knowledge may, from time to time, enable them to make, relating to the natural history of the country, the population and the particular manners of the inhabitants, and likewise of the increase or decrease of population.

“The agents of factories will make correct returns of the state of the factory, of the sales and receipts, &c. to the governor of the territory in which they shall respectively reside, once in three months, noticing all circumstances proper to communicate relating to the kind and quantities of goods wanted, from time to time, and will transmit a duplicate thereof to the secretary of war.

“Colonel Hawkins and the agents of the factories at Tellico in Tennessee, and in Georgia, will communicate immediately with the secretary of war as usual.

“I have the honor to be, with sentiments of esteem, your humble servant.

“H. DEARBORN.

“HIS EXCELLENCY, WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.”

This enlightened, just, and humane policy is also exemplified in the following extracts of two letters written to Governor Harrison by the venerable and venerated Jefferson, the wise statesman and profound philosopher. The first is dated 27th February, 1803, and the extract relating to Indian affairs proceeds as follows:

“You will receive herewith an answer to your letter as president of the convention; and from the secretary at war you will receive from time to time information and instruction as to our Indian affairs. These communications being for the public records are restrained always to particular objects and occasions; but this letter being unofficial and private, I may with safety give you a more extensive view of our policy respecting the

Indians, that you may the better comprehend the parts dealt out to you in detail through the official channel, and observing the system of which they make a part, conduct yourself in unison with it in cases where you are obliged to act without instruction.

“Our system is to live in perpetual peace with the Indians, to cultivate an affectionate attachment from them, by every thing just and liberal which we can do for them within the bounds of reason, and by giving them effectual protection against wrongs from our own people. The decrease of game rendering their subsistence by hunting insufficient, we wish to draw them to agriculture, to spinning and weaving: the latter branches they take up with great readiness, because they fall to the women, who gain by quitting the labors of the field for those which are exercised within doors. When they withdraw themselves to the culture of a small piece of land, they will perceive how useless to them are extensive forests, and will be willing to pare them off from time to time in exchange for necessaries for their farms and families. To promote this disposition to exchange lands, which they have to spare and we want, for necessaries which we have to spare and they want, we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to see the good and influential individuals among them in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands.

“At our trading houses we mean to sell so low as merely to repay us cost and charges, so as neither to lessen or enlarge our capital. This is what private traders cannot do, for they must gain; they will consequently retire from the competition, and we shall thus get clear of this pest without giving umbrage to the Indians. In this way our settlements will circumscribe and approach the Indians and they will either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States or remove beyond the Mississippi. The former is certainly the termination of their history most happy for themselves; but in the whole course of this it is most essential to cultivate their love; as to their fear we presume that our strength and their weakness is now so visible that they must see we have only to shut our hand to crush them, and all our liberality to them proceeds from motives of mere humanity only. Should any tribe be fool-hardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation.

“Combined with these views and to be prepared against the occupation of Louisiana by a powerful and enterprising people, it is important that setting less value upon exterior extension of purchases from the Indians, we bend our whole views to the pur-

chase and settlement of the country on the Mississippi from its mouth to its northern regions, that we may be able to present as strong a front on our western, as on our eastern border, and plant on the Mississippi itself, the means of its own defence.

“We now own from 31° to the Yazoo, and hope this summer to purchase from the Choctaws, from the Yazoo up to their boundary, supposed to be about the mouth of the Arkansas. We wish at the same time to begin in your quarter, for which there is at present a favorable opening. The Cahokias being extinct, we are entitled to their country by our paramount sovereignty. The Pionas we understand have all been driven from their country, and we might claim it in the same way; but as we understand there is one chief remaining who would, as survivor of the tribe, sell the right, it will be better to give him such terms as will make him easy for life, and take a conveyance from him. The Kaskaskias being reduced to a few families I presume we might purchase their whole country for what would place every individual of them at ease, and be a small price to us. Say, by laying off for each family, wherever they would choose it, as much land as they could cultivate, adjacent to each other; inclosing the whole in a single fence, and giving them such annuity in money or goods, for ever, as would place them in happiness, and we might take them under the protection of the United States. Thus possessed of the rights of these three tribes, we should proceed to the settlement of their boundaries with the Potawatamies and Kickapoos; claiming all doubtful territory, but paying them a price for the relinquishment of their concurrent claim—and even prevail with them if possible, to cede for a price such of their own unquestioned territory as would give us a convenient northern boundary. Before broaching this, and while we are bargaining with the Kaskaskias, the minds of the Potawatamies and Kickapoos should be soothed and conciliated by liberalities and sincere assurances of friendship. Perhaps by sending a well qualified character to stay some time in Ducoigne’s village, as if on other business, and to sound him and that of the other heads of families, inculcating in the way of conversation all those considerations which may prove the advantages they would receive by a cession on these terms, the object might be more easily obtained than by abruptly proposing it to them at a formal treaty. Of the means however, of obtaining what we wish, you will be the best judge; and I have given you this view of the system which we suppose will best promote the interests of the Indians and ourselves, and finally consolidate our whole country into one nation, only that you may be enabled the better to adapt your means to the object. For this purpose we have given you a general commission for treating. The crisis is pressing, whatever can now be obtained must be obtained quickly. The occupation of New Orleans,

hourly expected, by the French, is already felt like a light breeze by the Indians. You know the sentiments they entertain of that nation. Under the hope of their protection, they will immediately stiffen against cession of land to us; we had therefore better do at once what can now be done.

"I pray you accept assurances of my esteem and high consideration.

"THOMAS JEFFERSON."

This letter contains a lesson for the monarchs of Europe, who form the league called the holy alliance. When did, or when can we expect ever to find, such an article to emanate from the cabinet of any of them, or from that court which professes to even more humanity and magnanimity, the court of St. James itself. Let us compare this with the ukase of the autocrat of the Russias, who by a dash of his pen, has appropriated to himself those regions of our continent north of the 51st degree of north latitude, and has closed up from the navigation of the rest of the world, a sea 4000 miles wide, declaring all ships and cargoes of other nations forfeit, that dares to approach the coast of this usurped dominion, within 100 Italian miles. Let us compare this valuable document, from the President of the United States, with the proceedings of England upon the land, and upon the people, to which it relates, while she had the sovereignty of the country; or with her treatment of the unfortunate natives of the East Indies. Let us compare it with the manifesto of Louis XVIII. against the whole population of Spain, and who is the American, or who is the man, who has taken shelter under the protecting wings of the American eagle, who will not stand erect and give glory to that over-ruling Providence that has blessed him with such a country, and such a government, wherein, and under which, the rights of man are not only claimed but enjoyed; where the principles of eternal justice are not only professed but exercised, and made practical as well as acknowledged.

The other letter from which the following extract is taken, and which breathes the same spirit of pure philanthropy and wise policy, is dated 16th January, 1806—and proceeds in the following words:

"The British have clearly no right to trade with the Indians in Louisiana, it is therefore decided to keep that trade to ourselves as the only means of governing those Indians peaceably. This will render it important to be particularly friendly to the Sacks, Foxes, Kickapoos, Sioux, and other Indians residing on the borders between the British and us: and by taking their peltry and furs at higher prices, and selling them goods at lower prices, than the trade will bear without loss—to let them see their own interest in an exclusive adhesion to us. What we lose by them we must make up in some other quarter, our prin-

ciple being to neither gain nor lose upon the whole Indian trade taken together.

“The late stroke of the Potawatamies upon the Ossages must be strongly reprimanded, and no exertions spared to recover and restore the prisoners, and make satisfaction for the killed. The Indians on this side the Mississippi must understand that that river is now ours, and is not to be a river of blood. If we permit those of this side to cross it to war against the other side, we must permit the other side to come over to this for revenge. The safety of our settlements will not admit of this, and in the present case of the Potawatamies, they should be made to understand that unless they make to the Ossages every satisfaction in their power, and satisfy us that they will cease crossing the Mississippi to war on nations that never injured them, we may give a free passage and support to the Ossages and take such revenge as will glut them. Among the Mississippi Indians now here is one Potawatamie chief: nothing has yet been said to him on this subject, but some explanations will take place before he leaves us which will probably not be till late in February. Accept my friendly salutations, and assurance of great esteem and respect.

“THOMAS JEFFERSON.”

This letter must have given Governor Harrison a perfect impression of the liberal policy and humane intentions of the government towards the Indians; and that his own feelings and dispositions towards this unfortunate race, fully coincided with the orders and wishes of the government, the following account of the communications and conferences which he held with them will amply prove. As well therefore to put the reader in full possession of the circumstances relating to the Indians, to develop the character of Tecumseh and his brother the prophet,—as to shew that the Governor was perfectly consistent in his negotiations and his military proceedings with, and against them, true copies of the original transcripts of the talks and conferences, and extracts of the letter of the Governor written to the secretary at war upon Indian affairs, and his replies are given in this work.

In a conversation held by the Governor with Mr. Jefferson in the spring of 1800, the latter recommended a plan for a town, which he supposed would exempt its inhabitants from the ravages of those pestilences which had become so common in the large cities of the Atlantic states; and as the laws of the territory gave to the Governor the designation of the seats of justice for the counties, after consulting the citizens of Clarke county, a town was laid out for that purpose a little above the falls of Ohio, and in honor of the President, was not only laid out according to his recommendation, but was called by his

name. This town was laid out in the summer of 1802, and so well was it approved of that lots in it sold for 200 dollars in a few days after. At this time the Governor was aware of the vast advantage of having a canal cut round the falls, and such a project was then mentioned. It is worthy of remark that though the Governor had the power of naming the site of the county town in this case, as in many others, he gave the people of the county the choice of the ground on which Jeffersonville should be built, and only reserved to himself the plan which he made conformable to the ideas given by the President, with the exception of a range of squares which fronts the river.

This plan exactly represented the squares in a chess board, every alternate square to be built upon.

CHAPTER VI.

BY despatches from the Governor to the secretary at war, under date 3d and 4th June, 1803, we find that an attack had been made by a party of Indians on the Kaskaskia tribe—and from the best information which he could procure, it was composed of a lawless banditti, belonging to no particular nation, but of outcasts from many tribes—the greater part of them however of the Potawatamies; but those of the latter nation who resided on the banks of the Wabash and the waters which fall into the south end of Lake Michigan, those of the Kickapoos on the Vermillion river (a branch of the Wabash) were well affected towards the United States—but the Kickapoos of the Prairie, at the heads of Kaskaskia river, had acted in a manner to excite some suspicions, not having returned any answer to repeated messages sent to them respecting horses which had been stolen from the white people. This branch of the Kickapoo nation had not had any of their chiefs at the treaty of Greenville, nor had the Governor ever seen any of them: their character was daring and insolent in the extreme. The Governor thought himself fortunate in having attached to himself a chief

of the Wea tribe, whose father was of this tribe of the Kickapoos, and whose half brother was one of their principal chiefs—this man, Popequon, or the Gun, he sent among them with a speech, calculated to dissuade them from any hostile act against the United States; he was considered the greatest orator among the northern nations, and his integrity was undoubted by the Governor, he therefore had the utmost confidence in the success of his mission. It appears that there was also a branch of the Potawatamies who had had no chiefs at the treaty of Greenville, and that the other branches of those tribes having appropriated to themselves the annuities allowed by the United States, the Prairie Kickapoos and the Peoria Potawatamies did not consider themselves included in, nor bound by, the treaty of Greenville. This appears the more probable from the reason given by Mr. Parke, who was then on a mission from the Governor among them, for their then hostile intentions, viz: the murder of two of their warriors by the white people in 1794, the year before the treaty was made.

At this time the Governor was extremely anxious to have authority to have the Sack tribe attached to the United States by granting to them an annuity. They were a pretty strong nation, and capable of doing much mischief; and they had then set up a claim to the lands on the south side of the Illinois river, those on the north of that river being theirs without question. Governor Harrison was therefore much gratified at having permission from the President to make up to the Sacks an annuity of \$500 per year, part of which he expected to obtain from the Kickapoos, and others whom he considered to have had more than was sufficient for them, and in proportion to their numbers.

The Governor having employed Captain Prince to visit the Indian villages lying between the Wabash and Lake Michigan, received from him a letter, by which it was very evident that the British agents had been tampering with the Indians, and that a war with the United States by Britain was in contemplation by that government at the time of the short peace with France.

Blue Jacket, a Shawanese, who had always been in the British interest, and had been employed to circulate their speeches among the Indians, was at the time we treat of, on a visit to the tribes on the Illinois river, which being so remote from his own place of residence, that it excited strong suspicions that his object was mischievous to the United States.

Colonel Vigo, of Vincennes, reported a conversation which he had held with a gentleman named Pratt, of St. Genevieve, who was both respectable and intelligent, and who understood the language of several of the tribes. He, Pratt, observed that it was singular that the British, after having made peace with France and Spain, should now seek to embroil themselves with

the United States. And on Colonel Vigo's desiring to know whence proceeded this opinion, that such was their design, he answered, that he a few days before had seen a Shawanese chief, who resided west of the Mississippi, by whom he was informed that a war speech against the Americans had been sent from Canada, by way of the Grand river, to a village of the Chippewas on the Grand Portage, and by the Indians of the said village, sent to Abbercrosh (a village of the Ottowas, on the borders of Lake Michigan, near to Killikinic) and thence to the tribes on the Illinois river; and that he was further informed by the chief, that one of the chiefs of his tribe, who resides on White river (a branch of the Wabash) had observed to him, that he intended to move to the western side of the Mississippi, as soon as his corn should be ripe, that he might not be forced to engage in the hostilities which were likely to ensue between the British and Indians against the Americans.

The difficulties and embarrassments of the Governor were still further augmented by the intrigues of white people who lived among the Indians, who did not only deceive them by fabricated stories, but by misrepresenting those messages and speeches which had been sent among them by the Governor for the purpose of conciliating and quieting them. The chief, which it was stated above to have been sent by the Governor into the Indian country for this purpose, on his return, expressed much chagrin and disappointment. His speech to the Governor on his return was in the following words:—"My father," said he "you have always told me the truth, I relied entirely on you, I cannot tell you how much I was astonished to find that you have now deceived me. You sent me with a talk to the Kickapoos, that talk had nothing but good words in it: but you sent another man (Mr. Parke) round by the Illinois to carry a very bad talk. At every village that I visited, I was told that your young man had circulated bad talks; he told the Indians that the land they lived on was not theirs—it belonged to the white people, and that he had come to take possession of it. The chiefs answered him that they had never heard so before, and that General Wayne had told them no such thing. Upon which your young man said, that General Washington and General Wayne were both dead, and that if the land was not granted by the treaty of Greenville, the chiefs now in power were determined to have it, and he came there to tell them so." From this it was clear to the Governor that either Mr. Parke had unfortunately employed an unfaithful interpreter, or that some villain among the Indians had led them astray, and had found means to turn the whole of the talk delivered by Mr. Parke, into a meaning wholly opposite to its true sense and intention; and that gentleman not being then returned, nor having heard from him for a considerable time, the Governor entertained serious apprehensions for his

safety; from this uncertainty and solicitude, however, he was relieved in a short time, as Mr. Parke arrived in safety about a week after, and furnished him with a journal of his travels.

This gentleman had a very narrow escape with his life;—he was pursued down the Mississippi by a party of Indians with the intention of murdering him, and on their not finding him, they murdered two Frenchmen in his place, about 15 miles above Cahokia. He had left Cahokia the very day on which the murder was committed, but had no intelligence of it till his arrival at Kaskaskia, when he received a letter from a gentleman, who lived between Cahokia and Kaskaskia, announcing the event. The horrid deed was perpetrated by a Potawatamie, well known for his villainies, and called Turkey Foot, assisted by four others of the same nation.

On the Governor receiving this information, he immediately sent for the Sun, a great chief of the Potawatamies, who happened to be in the neighborhood of Vincennes,—and the moment he mentioned that a murder had been committed by some of his tribe on the Illinois river, he said he was sure it must have been done by the above-mentioned Turkey Foot, whom he declared to be a very bad man, and one whom his nation was extremely desirous to have punished for the numerous crimes he had committed, as well against Indians as white people: and he assured the Governor, that the murderers should be given up to be dealt with as he might think proper.

Though the Governor did not think a recurrence to arms would be necessary to obtain justice for the insult upon the laws, yet, lest he might be mistaken, he took the necessary steps to prepare the militia, having no doubt but that by a small force from Kentucky he would be enabled to take exemplary vengeance upon any of the tribes that should refuse to pay proper respect to his demands for justice and satisfaction.

On the 14th September in this year, a circular letter was addressed to each of the governors of territories on the frontiers by the secretary at war, interdicting the sale of ardent spirits among the Indians. This letter, it appears, was in consequence of an application from the chiefs of the Indians themselves for the suppression of the sale of spirits in their several nations—and congress authorised the President to comply with their request. Although, strictly speaking, this order and the law under which it was given, was only against the sale of spirits by the traders, yet Governor Harrison judging that to interdict the traders, and suffer other citizens to sell would be increasing the evil, instead of being for it a remedy;—he therefore took advantage of the ambiguity in which the clause of the law was expressed, and issued his proclamation prohibiting the sale of spirits by any person whatever. It is plain that the danger to the white people would have been considerably increased by the prohibi-

tion of the sale of spirits by the traders alone;—had this order have been given, the consequence would have been, to convert every farm house on the frontiers into a grog shop: and the Indians when they could not have spirits carried to them by the traders, would have come into our settlements for the purpose of procuring it and thus the danger arising from their intoxication would have been much greater to our own citizens.

The establishment of trading houses by the United States among the Indians about this time, created, not only the jealousy, but the most dire hostility in the minds of the British agents.—In this measure they viewed the destruction of the Indian trade which was to them immensely lucrative. They therefore used their utmost endeavors to alienate the hearts of the Indians from the United States. As the principles upon which the United States had established those trading houses were purely disinterested, and for the purpose of preventing the Indians being imposed upon by the rapacity or avarice of traders; and as the trade with them was to be merely charged with the expences incurred, and no profit expected on the purchase or sale of the goods, so much excepted, as would cover the expences of the establishment, it could not be expected that the profits of the British traders could continue to be what they had formerly been, and on this consideration, they made the utmost exertion to embroil the Indians with the citizens, and the government of the United States.

They were continually dinning in their ears, the violences which had, from time to time, been committed against them by the Americans; they conjured up in the most frightful figures the intention of the United States to extirpate their whole race, or at least to drive them far to the west and possess themselves of their lands, and they industriously inculcated upon them the idea, that the offers made by the Americans to introduce among them the arts of civilized life, were merely hollow pretexts to deprive them of their arms, which, they told them, they would no sooner exchange for the plough, but they would be fallen on and murdered without regard to age or sex. These wicked insinuations and arts, had an effect more or less upon almost all the tribes but the Potawatamies, who appeared to have resisted every attempt at weaning them from the interests of the United States; and this was at that time peculiarly fortunate, as they were much stronger than those who were acted upon by the intrigues of the British. They had for a length of time been in close alliance with the Ottawas, and the Chippewas, under the denomination of the Three Fires, and thus they were an overmatch for those tribes in the immediate vicinity of Vincennes, who were either opposed to, or hollow in their friendship for the United States.

. Turkey Foot, the Indian who headed the party which had

committed the murder above Kahokia, in St. Clair county, proceeded directly to M'Kee the British agent, with the scalps of the two murdered men; he reported on his journey that he expected to be handsomely rewarded by M'Kee for the scalps; but on his return to the Illinois river, he learnt that the Potawatomies of the St. Joseph's had been in pursuit of him, with the intention of giving him up to the United States, he therefore changed his route, crossed the Mississippi, and went into the Missouri country.

About this time, October 1802, a very barbarous murder was committed upon an Indian in Clarke county. The circumstance was related to the secretary at war in the following words by Governor Harrison: "The white man and the Indian were drinking together at a tavern, a quarrel ensued, and the Indian was taken off by another white man to a distant house till he would become sober. The man with whom the Indian disputed, after providing himself with a cudgel, proceeded to the house where the Indian was, and forced open the door of the room in which he lay, and beat him to death with the cudgel. He was apprehended, but there were strong doubts that a jury could not be procured that would convict him, although the evidence was indisputable; such was the delusion under which the white inhabitants labored with respect to the crime of murdering an Indian."

The doubts of the Governor upon this point were speedily settled into a certainty; for the man was brought to trial for the murder, and he was proved guilty by incontestible evidence, yet the jury brought in a verdict "not guilty" in a few minutes, nor did it appear that this unjust, this iniquitous verdict, could be founded on any sympathy for the culprit, as his character was most infamous; but upon that disgraceful prejudice to which we have alluded, that no white man ought in justice to suffer for the murder of an Indian.

The Governor in his account of this infamous transaction to the government impressed upon the executive, the absolute necessity there was for something being done to ensure to the Indians that protection which the laws promise indiscriminately to all persons of whatever color, nation, or religion. Indeed it does appear to have been the ardent wish of Governor Harrison, to have equal justice administered to all, and that the Indians should be, and were entitled to, the full protection of the laws and the government, as well wherein white men were parties, as Indians. It was certainly a moot point for the government of the United States to settle. To condemn a man by any other, than the constitutional tribunal, was not to be endured; but it was equally inadmissible, and inconsistent by, and with, that constitution, that the murderer should escape punishment. How far the circumstances would have justified a prisoner, proved

guilty, to the entire satisfaction of the court, but acquitted by the jury, being given up to the Indians themselves to be treated according to their laws, we leave to be judged of by casuists more learned in jurisprudence than we profess to be; but we have heard of a British law in Ireland shortly after its conquest by Henry II. that when an Englishman killed an Irishman, he was condemned to pay a fine, that being Irish law; but when an Irishman killed an Englishman, he was hanged. Now some modification of that law might perhaps have answered the ends of justice. In the same despatch the Governor endeavored to impress upon the executive the necessity of amending the law for prohibiting the sale of spirits among the Indians—and making it highly penal for any person, trader or others, to sell spirits to any Indian.

The remainder of this year was occupied in fixing the boundaries of the Vincennes tract, which had been obtained at the meeting of the council at Vincennes in September. Considerable difficulty was found by the real situation of the country being mistaken—and in order to include the lands settled on by citizens of the United States, it was found necessary to run the lines in a different direction to that intended—but fortunately the words of the instrument signed by the Indians were so vague as to admit of considerable deviations in the direction of those lines—and though the tract was somewhat less in extent than was contemplated, yet every purpose was answered so far as including the settlements.

It must be recollected by the reader, that the arrangement made by the council assembled in September, 1802, was not final but had to be settled by treaty, to be entered into at fort Wayne, and ratified by Governor Harrison under the authority of the President of the United States on the one part, and by the four Indian chiefs appointed by the Indians assembled at the council, or a majority of them, on the other part. We therefore proceed in the next chapter to give an account of the treaty, by the parties above mentioned, in the month of July, 1803.

CHAPTER VII.

ABOUT the middle of April, 1803, the Governor set out for Fort Wayne, and on his way he visited all the Indian villages on the Wabash, for the purpose of inviting the chiefs to meet him at that place, and also ascertain as far as possible, their views and dispositions. On his arrival at the Fort, he was much disappointed to find that the agents of the contractors had made no arrangements for supplying the Indians who were to attend the treaty with provisions; but a very few barrels of flour had been left for the troops, and the prospect of obtaining more was both precarious and distant. He also found, that the goods for the factory had not arrived, and although the navigation had been opened for a considerable time, there was no certainty that they were on the way. A few of the goods for the payment of the annuities for 1802, which had been stored at the rapids of Miami during the winter, had arrived, but in such a damaged state as to give him the most serious apprehensions for the safety of those for the factory; it was, however, remarkable, that in the same boat there were goods conveyed for private persons perfectly free from injury. Having understood that goods for payment of annuities due in 1801, and which had not yet come forward, were stored at Detroit, and no movement made or likely to be made to have them forwarded, that he had heard of, the Governor thought it necessary to go there immediately, whence he calculated he could return before the Indians could be all assembled.

On the Miami river he met the goods for the factory, and found them also in such a damaged state, as to confirm him in the opinion which he had begun to entertain, that the persons employed to transport them were included in that combination which had been formed by a majority of the traders against that institution. It was, however, fortunate that he met them before the commencement of a violent rain, that he might make such arrangements for their preservation as, in some degree, baulked the malevolence of those unprincipled men.

The Governor also found it necessary to procure flour at Detroit to be forwarded to Fort Wayne for the treaty; and on his return, instead of finding the chiefs all assembled and waiting his appearance, to his great surprize, only the Little Turtle and the chiefs of the Potawatamies had arrived, and from many

of the rest only evasive answers had been returned to the invitations which had been sent them. From the Turtle he learnt, that the Owl, or Long Beard, had been busily employed in dissuading the Indians from meeting him, and that his representations had been effectual in many cases. The Owl was as subtle and artful as he was mischievous and wicked, and found means to detach the Miami nation almost entirely from the interests of the Turtle and Richarville, who were the real chiefs of the tribe. This he effected by asserting that the Turtle had sold to the United States the whole country, and that it would be claimed as it would be wanted. He earnestly advised them not to accept any annuities in future, assuring them that the United States would at a future day, claim a large tract of land for every annuity which they might pay to the Indians.

Although the Governor was satisfied that the treaty would be effected and completely ratified by the four chiefs appointed for that purpose at Vincennes, yet he was anxious to have it signed by as many chiefs as could be procured, particularly by those who had not been at the council of Vincennes. And further, he conceived it necessary and proper to endeavor to remove as far as possible, the unfavorable impressions which had been made upon them by the Owl and such other evil disposed persons. To procure as large a meeting as possible, therefore, he sent messengers to inform them that if they did not attend him, he would deliver the goods to those tribes who did attend, and withdraw from those who held back, the friendship and protection of the United States. This had a considerable effect, and brought a deputation from the Delawares, Shawanese, and Kickapoos. The Miamis had been before represented by the Turtle and Richarville, although three fourths of them, with the Eel river Indians, were still kept back by the intrigues of the Owl.

As soon as the chiefs were assembled, the Governor explained to them the benevolent intentions of the United States; and recounted to them the numerous acts of kindness which they had received from them, contrasting them with the favors which they had received from other nations. He endeavored to impress upon them, that the benefits which the United States were desirous of conferring upon them were intended for their permanent advantage, whilst those which they received from other nations, afforded only temporary relief, which by increasing their wants without teaching them the method of relieving those wants by their own exertions, made them more miserable and dependant than they had been before their acquaintance with the white people. He reminded them of the length of time which they had been under the direction of the British, and requested them to show any advantage which they had derived from their connexion with that nation. Had it not, on the

contrary, been productive of the greatest misfortunes. What had become of the numerous bands of the Delawares, the Wyandotts, the Shawanese, and Miamis, and the multitude of villages which had covered the banks of the Miami, the Sciota, the Wabash, and Ohio, the remains of which are now only to be seen. Was not their destruction to be traced to the fatal advice which they had received from that nation upon whom they had bestowed the endearing name of fathers. And if these things were true, which they could not disprove, was it not necessary that some plan should be adopted.

The United States, he said, which had lately become their fathers, and who were desirous of fulfilling most sacredly the duties of that character, would participate with them in all the advantages which they themselves enjoyed. They were particularly anxious to teach them those arts by which effectual and certain subsistence would be afforded, and which, by enabling their women to raise a number of children, would in a few years make them more numerous and powerful than they had ever hitherto been.

These arguments seemed to have made a deep impression; but when the transactions at the council of Vincennes was mentioned, it called forth all the wrath of the Delawares and Shawanese. The respected Buckingohelos so far forgot himself that he interrupted the Governor, and declared with vehemence, that nothing that was done at Vincennes was binding upon the Indians; that the land which was there decided to be the property of the United States, belonged to the Delawares; and that he had then with him a chief, who had been present at the transfer made by the Piankishaws to the Delawares of all the country between the Ohio and White rivers more than 30 years before. The Shawanese went still further, and behaved with so much insolence, that the Governor was obliged to tell them that they were undutiful and rebellious children, and that he would withdraw his protection from them until they had learnt to behave themselves with more propriety. These chiefs immediately left the council house in a body.

Notwithstanding all those discouragements, however, the Governor succeeded: for by repeating to the chiefs in private conversation what he had urged in council; by being powerfully, though privately, aided by the Turtle, and boldly seconded in every proposition by the Potawatamies (who, as was well known to the other tribes, were entirely devoted to the Governor,) all opposition was finally silenced. The Shawanese indeed, made another effort to defeat the treaty, by proposing to the Indians to go to Philadelphia and treat with the President in person.

Finding at length that this object could not be accomplished they submitted; and one of the chiefs, in the name of the rest, assured the Governor "that his, and the other tribes, had but one

mind, and desired that they might be permitted to sign the treaty." Thus the Governor, notwithstanding all difficulties and impediments, gained the important point of having the arrangement made at Vincennes completely ratified by a formal treaty; which differed in nothing from the stipulations agreed upon at the council of Vincennes, excepting the alteration to be made on the boundaries, so as to include within their limits, the settlements and locations, which would otherwise have been left out, and the permission which was given to form certain settlements on the post roads leading through the territory; which permission, however, was subject to the consent of some of the Swallow tribes.

The Governor made every exertion in his power to discover the persons who had been employed in disseminating amongst the Indians, stories hostile to the interests of the country; but being unable to procure sufficient proof, upon which to found legal prosecutions, all he could do, was to deprive some persons of bad character, and of whom he had strong grounds for suspicion, of their licenses, and send them out of the Indian country.

On the Governor's return home from fort Wayne, he was informed by Mr. Rivet, that there had been a French spy in Vincennes in his absence. He appeared to be a man of education and address; he affected great poverty, and associated with the poorest and most ignorant of the French settlers; yet a man of veracity declared, that he had seen in his possession, a small box filled with French guineas: The accounts which he gave of himself were contradictory; to some he represented himself as a native of Paris, and a member of one of the committees of police; and to others, he said he belonged to one of the provinces, and had never been in Paris. This business, however, for so far, remained a secret, and he left Vincennes without any thing transpiring as to its nature and tendency.

The appearance of this person in that quarter was a strong corroboration of the information which had been received by government in the spring of this year, 1803, that there had, the autumn before, been "certain persons among the Indian nations, whose conduct induced a belief that they were agents from the French or Spanish governments, employed to engage them in favor of measures hostile to the United States." This information was obtained from an Indian called Long Beard, a Miami, and from a young man named Conner, who lived with the Delawares on White river. On receiving this information the secretary at war in the same letter by which he forwarded to the Governor a commission appointing him a commissioner on the part of the United States, for holding such treaties with the Indian nations, as the President might direct, gave orders that all such persons thus described as should be found in the Indian country should be secured.

On the 13th August, 1803, a treaty was signed by the chiefs of the Kaskaskia tribe and the Governor, by which was ceded to the United States, the whole of that extensive country formerly possessed by all the tribes of the Illinois Indians, with the exception of the Peorias. When we say the price fixed on was an annuity of \$396 66 cents, which in addition to a former annuity of \$500 made \$896 and 66 cents, for from 7 to 8,000,000 of acres of excellent land, we presume it will appear that the terms of the purchase were extremely low, and favorable to the purchasers. And we are satisfied that a claim obtained by this means was infinitely preferable to that used by other nations, who pretend to be civilized, but instead of purchase, would possess themselves of the tenth part of the land by brutal force, at perhaps ten thousand times the expense in warlike preparations.

It has been mentioned that the Indians had lent to the United States the saline spring near Shawanee town, with a tract of land four miles square surrounding it. Orders had been issued by the President of the United States to have the boundary lines of that tract run, and the property designated. This new treaty however precluded the necessity of that measure, as the saline and the lands contiguous to it, were included in this grant or treaty. There were, however, some doubts in the mind of the Governor, that the Piankishaws would lay claim to the lands upon that creek, and he accordingly took some steps towards prevailing upon them to give up their right to the land, between the southern boundary of the Vincennes tract, and the Ohio, and also to that which lies below the said tract, and between the Ohio and Wabash rivers, by which the Vincennes settlement would be connected with Kentucky, and would completely cut off the Indians from the Ohio, from Clarke's grant down to its mouth.

For paying the Indians the price stipulated by the treaty, the Governor drew upon the war department for \$396 66 cents, and with the two treaties of fort Wayne, and this latter one, he sent the receipt of the head chief of the Kaskaskias for the full amount.

It is here worthy of remark, that the Governor's plan of keeping accounts was as simple, as it was perfectly correct. He never held in his hands any of the public money; when any contract was made to which the government of the United States was a party, he always drew on the war department for the amount, and forwarded the account and receipt in the same letter, by which he advised the secretary of the draft; by this means he had no account to keep with the government, or with the persons with whom he had any transactions of a public nature; and it being a maxim with him, that an honest man cannot make any profit by the receipt and disbursement of public money, the best way to keep himself safe from loss, and to pre-

vent illiberal reflections, is to make every transaction tell for itself, by having the account and receipt to accompany the notice of the draft. This plan was probably well adapted to the situation of the western country at the time, as his drafts were an accommodation to persons in trade who had their remittances to make, and it saved to government the risk and expense of transmitting money from the seat of government westwardly, both of which, were very considerable. This plan we have reason to believe was invariably adhered to by the Governor, and thus he paid all the public engagements, except in one instance, where the secretary unadvisedly remitted to him, a sum of \$1500 in specie; and although the treasury was thrown entirely open to him, this was the only sum for contingencies that ever passed through his hands.

About this time, the Governor found means to prevail upon the Indian chief called the Owl, to give up his enmity to the United States, and he with several of the chiefs who were attached to his party came to Vincennes about one month before the last treaty was signed, and made the most solemn protestations of his friendship to the United States. This was a very fortunate circumstance, as this man had it in his power to thwart or obstruct any of the designs of the government, relating to the Indians in that quarter.

The benevolent intentions of the government by the law interdicting the sale of spirits among the Indians, appeared not only to be frustrated, but the evil was considerably augmented. The law forbade the sale of spirits by the traders in the Indian country, but did not prevent or forbid our citizens to sell them spirits within the dominion of the United States. The law therefore operated in a way to make things worse instead of better. When the Indians found that the whiskey could not be procured from the traders, some of themselves became traders in the article, and they purchased it from the settlers within the dominion of the United States by wholesale, and retailed out to their people at home at the same price by the mouthful, which they had formerly paid to the traders by the quart. And the want of whiskey inducing a greater intercourse with the American citizens than formerly, the mischiefs arising from intoxication were greatly increased.

Under these circumstances, the Governor earnestly called upon the executive to endeavor to have the law repealed, or to make it highly penal for any one under any circumstance, to sell spirits to an Indian.

In order to give a contrast between the policy pursued by the American Government towards the Indians, and that of the government of Britain, we request the reader to revert to page 22, and when he has read the speech of Governor Harrison to the council at Vincennes, let him observe with attention the fol-

lowing speeches, which were delivered by an agent of that king, who bears the title of defender of the faith, and who professes himself to be the great patron of bible and missionary societies for the conversion of heathens to christianity. The first was delivered by M^cKee to Five Medals, To-pan-a-pee, and other chiefs of the Potawatamies on account of 20 barrels of spirits which were destroyed by them at the mouth of the river St. Joseph's of lake Michigan in November, 1804:

"My Children, I am surprised that you should rob one of your father's traders; the man that you took the liquor from lately was an Englishman, and sent to trade among you by me; I told him to take some liquor with him to give to the chiefs among my children on the St. Joseph's a dram in cold weather when they came to see him, but not to sell any to you. My Children, it is true that the Americans do not wish you to drink any spiritous liquors, therefore they have told their traders that they should not carry any liquor into your country—but my Children, they have no right to say that one of your father's traders among you should carry no liquor among his children.

"My Children, your father King George, loves his red children, and wishes his red children to be supplied with every thing they want; he is not like the Americans, who are continually blinding your eyes and stopping your ears, with good words, that taste as sweet as sugar, and getting all your lands from you.

"My Children, should you yet have any of the liquor that you took from the Englishman, I wish you to return it to him immediately.

"My Children, I am told that Wells has told you, that it was your interest to suffer no liquor to come into your country; you all well know that he is a bad man, you all well know the injuries he done you before you made peace with the long knives, by taking and killing your men women and children."

M^cKee's talk sent among the Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatamies, Shawanese, Delawares, and Miamies, in April 1805.

"My Children, I have always told you that I would give you the earliest information of any danger that threatened you, that would come to my knowledge.

"My Children, there is now a powerful enemy of yours to the east, now on his feet, and looks mad at you, therefore you must be on your guard; keep your weapons of war in your hands, and have a look out for him."

The spirit and tendency of these latter communications were so obviously opposite to that of Governor Harrison, that it would be an insult upon the understanding of the reader to lose time in pointing out to him their moral turpitude, we shall therefore pass them over without further comment at this time.

In the month of March this year. (1803) congress enacted a

law appropriating \$3,000 for the purpose of working the salt spring near the Wabash, the cession of which, from the Indians, has been already mentioned: and in the month of November following, the President issued his warrant authorising Governor Harrison to take all proper measures for leasing the salt springs on such terms as should to him appear most advantageous to the United States. And in a short time he had from 20 to 25 kettles in operation; and the prospect of producing salt at 50 cts. per bushel, diffused a general joy over the territory, and the adjoining states of Kentucky and Tennessee.

There appears to have been a great lameness in the law for regulating the trade with the Indians. No person was authorised to reside as a trader in any Indian town or hunting camp, without a license; but it was supposed that a license was not necessary for those who carried on their trade upon any part of the territory to which the Indian title had been extinguished.—Great evil had resulted from this construction of the law; a great part of the trade was carried on by persons who had no license, and gave no bond for the observance of the regulations adopted by the government, and whose irregularities it was impossible to prevent or punish. This evil was much increased by the late extinction of Indian title to so large a tract of country, as it enabled them to penetrate into the heart of the country inhabited by the Indians, and gave them a decided advantage over the regular and licensed traders, as they could vend spirits with impunity, when the latter were interdicted from that privilege.

Another instance about this time occurred of the repugnance which jurors had to bringing to trial, or convicting persons, guilty of killing Indians. One of the Kaskaskia Indians had been killed by a white man, against whom examinations were sworn, but the grand jury refused to find the bill; and, though it was a case of self-defence, yet, there was good cause for them to present him, and have him put on his trial. This circumstance was a still further proof to the Governor, of the insufficiency of the laws as they then stood, for the protection of the Indians; and therefore, upon this point, as well as the sale of ardent spirits to that unhappy people, he remonstrated with the general government, and earnestly called for some strong measures to be resorted to, for the purpose of remedying the defect.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE enormities committed by the infamous Turkey Foot induced the Governor in the early part of 1804, to take some decisive steps towards having him arrested. He accordingly gave directions to the agent, Mr. Wells, to inform the chiefs of his tribe, the Potawatamies, that they must expect no favor from the United States in future, unless they would have this desperado taken, and surrender him up agreeably to the treaty of Greenville. But shortly after this, hearing that there was in the neighborhood of Vincennes the head war chief of the tribe, he sent for him, and remonstrated with him so warmly, that he promised that he would deliver him up either dead or alive.—The Governor however insisted that he should be taken alive, but it appears that was impracticable, as will appear by the following account of his capture.

The chief had procured a few young men to join him in the pursuit of the murderer, and they, one morning, unexpectedly fell in with him crossing a prairie with his rifle on his shoulder; the chief hailed him in a friendly voice, and taking him by the hand, was fully determined to hold him until he would surrender. Turkey Foot perceiving this, with great adroitness with the other hand brought his rifle from his shoulder, and presented it in such a position, as led a young man who was behind him to believe, he was about to shoot the chief, and therefore he to save the life of the chief, shot Turkey Foot dead on the spot.—Thus ended the career of one of the most desperate and blood thirsty villains with which the white people had ever been annoyed among the Indians. The chief and his party immediately proceeded to scalp him, and brought his scalp to the Governor.

By the treaty concluded with the Kaskaskia Indians in August 1803 it was stipulated that the United States should cause to be built, a house suitable for the accommodation of the chief, and to have enclosed a field not exceeding one hundred acres, with a good and sufficient fence, and the greater part of the tribe having been baptised, and received into the Catholic church to which they were much attached, it was agreed that the United States should give one hundred dollars per annum towards the support of a Catholic priest, who would agree to perform for the tribe, the sacerdotal duties of his office, and instruct their children in the rudiments of literature: and also

that they should give three hundred dollars towards the erection of a church.

Upon the strength of this treaty, Ducoigne, the chief of the Kaskaskias, came forward and importuned the Governor with great earnestness, to have his part of the treaty carried into effect; as he seemed to have an ardent desire to live in the same manner as the white people. His wishes and character, the Governor gave to the secretary at war in these words:—"It is his, Ducoigne's, wish that a part of the additional annuity should be laid out in the purchase of groceries, and a few articles of household furniture for himself—and the rest applied to the purchase of horses, provisions, and such other articles as would be necessary to fix his tribe comfortably in the new mode of life, which they are about to adopt. The old annuity furnished as many European goods as they wanted; much the greater part of what they did receive they were accustomed to sell for ardent spirits, and if 5,000 dollars worth of those goods were given them instead of 500 dollars they would not be the better for it. Ducoigne himself is a decent, sensible, gentlemanly man, by no means addicted to drink, and possessing a very strong inclination to live like a white man; indeed he has done so, as far as his means would allow. The prospect of being enabled to live comfortably, was the great motive with him, for selling his lands, and the greater part of the additional annuity could not be better applied than to this object. I am indeed extremely desirous of seeing him so well situated, as to attract the notice of the chiefs of the other tribes, many of whom may probably follow his example, if they see that his situation has been bettered by our means. I was asked this very day, by another, if I was not about to build a handsome house for Ducoigne, in such a manner as induced me to believe, that he wished for something in the same way for himself.

"Ducoigne's long and well-proved friendship for the United States, of which the President is well informed, has gained him the hatred of all the other chiefs, and ought to be an inducement with us to provide, as well for his happiness, as his safety. He wishes to have some coffee, sugar, and chocolate, sent to him, and is also desirous to have a ten gallon keg of wine, to shew, as he says, the other Indians how well he is treated by the United States, and how much like a gentleman he lives. I have published proposals for building his house and fence. Upon consulting with him we agreed, that it would be better to fence in a field of 15 acres, only, at first, which is full as much as his tribe will cultivate, and add to it occasionally so as to give the quantity of fencing promised in the treaty."

On the 19th and 27th August this year, 1804, the Governor concluded treaties with the Delawares, and Piankishaws, by which, the United States acquired all that fine country which

lies between the Ohio and Wabash rivers, as high up as the road leading from Vincennes to Louisville. This tract, independent of the fertility of the soil, which is rich—from its situation, possesses advantages perhaps superior to any in the western country. It has a front of three hundred miles upon the Ohio, and nearly half as much on the Wabash. Three fine rivers, which afford the means of exporting produce at almost all seasons of the year, enhance the value of the land which borders upon them, and promised a facility to the sale of the tract then purchased, that would bring more money into the treasury than three times the quantity without those advantages.

The Delawares and Piankishaws being the only tribes that could lay any claim to the land, and both these tribes laying claim to it, it became absolutely necessary that both should be satisfied, in order to prevent disputes in future. In this, however, the Governor succeeded, on terms, perhaps, more favorable than if the title had been vested in only one of these tribes; for, as both claimed, the value of each claim was considerably lowered in the estimation of both; and, therefore, by judicious management, the Governor effected the purchase upon probably as low, if not lower terms, than if he had been obliged to treat only with one of them.

As compensation to the Piankishaws, for the relinquishment of their claim to the above tract, they were to receive, in addition to the annuity (\$500) granted them by the treaty of Greenville, \$700 in goods, and \$200 per annum for ten years; and by this treaty the Piankishaws acknowledged the right of the Kaskaskias to sell the country which they had lately ceded to the United States, and which is separated from the lands of the Piankishaws by the ridge or high land which divides the waters of the Wabash from the waters of Saline creek, and by that which divides the waters of the Wabash from those which flow into the Auvase and other branches of the Mississippi.

The compensation to the Delawares was to be an additional annuity of \$300 for ten years, which was to be exclusively appropriated to the purpose of ameliorating their condition, and promoting their civilization—suitable persons to be employed, at the expense of the government of the United States, to teach them to make fences, cultivate the earth, and such domestic arts as were best suited to their situation—and a further sum of \$300 dollars to be allowed for five years for these objects. The United States to cause to be delivered to them, in course of the following spring, horses fit for draught, cattle, hogs, and implements of husbandry, to the amount of four hundred dollars.—The preceding stipulation, together with goods to the amount of 800 dollars, which were then delivered to the Delawares, a part of which was to be appropriated to the satisfying of certain individuals of the tribe, for horses taken from them by the

white people, was to be considered as full compensation for the land conveyed by them to the United States.

When the Delaware chiefs arrived for the purpose of negotiating the above treaty, they made a most pathetic speech upon the subject of the murder of the Gillaway family, which we have mentioned before, as well as of others of their nation who had been murdered by the white people. They said that "the tomahawk was still sticking in their heads, and that their father had never removed it, or covered up the bones of those who had been killed—that the relations and connexions of those people were continually reminding them that no sort of satisfaction had ever been made to them for the loss of their friends." And as it was not in the power of the Governor to tell them that the perpetrators of those murders had been given up to justice, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given them that it would be done, he was obliged to make up the matter in their own way, by a present of goods to the amount of \$233 62 1-2 cents. By this prudent arrangement the memory of this foul murder was buried in eternal oblivion, and the friends of the deceased prevented seeking for further vengeance, which they might have done, even at the lapse of forty years after the murder, had no such arrangement been made.

CHAPTER IX.

SOME time about the middle of the year 1804, three American citizens, who had settled above the Missouri, were murdered by a party of the Sack Indians; and the Governor having learnt this circumstance, as well as the hostile dispositions of the Sacks and Foxes towards the United States, sent them a message by Captain Stoddart in the month of October, requiring their chiefs to meet him at St. Louis; and on his arrival at that place, he learnt the circumstance of the murder, as well as the exertions which were making by some of the old chiefs among them to give up the perpetrators of it; but who were opposed by a

majority of the nation, who declared their satisfaction at what had been done, and their determination to protect the murderers at all risk. The Governor despatched another messenger to the Sack chiefs, to inform them of his arrival at St. Louis, and urge them to make every possible exertion to apprehend, and bring with them, the murderers; but if that could not be effected, he requested that they would come to him at any rate, assuring them of their being permitted to return in safety.

The Governor conceiving that if they could be prevailed upon to come to a conference, it would be easy to convince them of the necessity of preserving the friendship of the United States, had no doubt that he would prevail upon some of them to remain with him as hostages for the delivery of the murderers. But before his messenger had arrived, the petty chief who headed the war party had surrendered himself to the sachems or head men of the nation, and declared his willingness to suffer for the injury he had done. On the arrival of the chiefs at St. Louis, he was delivered up to the Governor, and a positive assurance given that the whole nation were sorry for the injury which had been done, and that they would never in future lift the tomahawk against the United States.

At this meeting with the chiefs of the Sack and Fox Indians, the Governor negotiated a treaty, by which the Indian title was extinguished to the largest tract of land ever ceded in one treaty by the Indians since the settlement of North America, as it includes all the country from the mouth of the Illinois river to the mouth of the Ouisconsin, on the one side, and from the mouth of the Illinois to near the head of the Fox river on the other side; and from the head of the latter a line is drawn to a point 36 miles above the mouth of the Ouisconsin, which forms the northern boundary, and contains upwards of 51 millions of acres. The greatest part of the country is extremely fertile and healthy; and the part which lies immediately below the Ouisconsin contains mines of copper and lead; the latter in such abundance, and so near the surface, that a person, imperfectly acquainted with the method in common use of extracting the metal from the ore, with the assistance of another equally ignorant with himself, obtained 16000 lbs. of lead by smelting it in log heaps.

It was first intended that the line should run from the mouth of the Ouisconsin to the Fox river, but the Governor having understood from some traders, that there was a valuable lead mine about 20 miles from the mouth of the Ouisconsin, prevailed upon the Indians to suffer it to run from a point 36 miles up that river, by which these mines were completely included in the tract granted by the treaty.

The terms on which this cession was made, were, the payment in goods to the amount of \$2234 50, and an annuity of \$1000, also in goods—\$600 to the Sacks and \$400 to the Foxes. The

United States to protect the tribes in possession of their lands—
 the tribes not to sell any lands to any other sovereign power, or
 to individuals—all revenge for private injuries prohibited—
 offending Indians against citizens of the United States to be deliv-
 ered up for punishment—American citizens to be punished for
 crimes committed against Indians—the chiefs to exert themselves
 to have property stolen from citizens restored; or, in case of not
 being restored, the value to be deducted from the annuity—
 stolen property from the Indians to be restored, or paid for by
 the United States—all intruders on the lands of the Indians to
 be removed on complaint being made to the superintendent of
 Indian affairs—the Sacks and Foxes to be allowed to hunt on
 the ceded lands so long as they continued in the possession of the
 United States—the Indians not to suffer unlicensed traders to
 reside among them, and that they should from time to time give
 notice of all such traders as may be in their country—that they
 should allow a fort to be built on the upper side of the Ouiscon-
 sining, or on the Mississippi, and grant a tract of two miles square
 for that purpose—that the United States should establish a fac-
 tory, or trading house, where goods could be had at a more
 reasonable rate than from private traders—that the tribes should
 make peace with the Osages; and for the purpose of burying
 the tomahawk, and renewing a friendly intercourse with the
 Osages, a meeting of the respective chiefs should be held at
 St. Louis, under the direction of the superintendent, and peace
 established upon a firm and permanent basis—that a free and
 safe passage should be given to traders and others passing
 through the country, under the authority of the United States;
 and that for such passage there should be no toll or other exac-
 tion taken.

In an additional article it was provided,

That the treaty should not affect individual claims under
 Spanish grants, not included within the boundary lines laid
 down in the treaty, provided that such grant had been known
 to and recognized by the Indians; which boundary lines are
 thus described in the treaty: Beginning at a point on the Mis-
 souri river, opposite the mouth of Gasconade river; thence in a
 direct course so as to strike the river Jeffreon, or, on the map,
 Jaufione, at the distance of 30 miles from its mouth; thence
 down the said Jeffreon to the Mississippi; thence up the Missis-
 sippi to the mouth of Ouisconsing river; and up the same to a
 point 36 miles in a direct line from its mouth; thence in a direct
 line to a point where the Fox river leaves the small lake Sakac-
 gan; thence down the Fox river to the Illinois; and down that
 river to the Mississippi.

In the beginning of this year, 1805, some intriguers, among
 whom was the celebrated Little Turtle, found means to excite
 among the tribes of the Potawatamies, the Miamies, and Eel river

Indians, considerable discontent and dissatisfaction with the treaty entered into by the Governor with the Piankishaws and Delawares in the month of August 1804. The ground which was assumed for this discontent was, that the Piankishaws and Delawares had no right to convey away the lands without having the consent of the other tribes. But upon the most mature consideration of the circumstances of this case, it appears evident that the Delawares were fully entitled to the land, which they had ceded to the United States, both by present occupancy, and by a grant which had been made to them by the Piankishaws, (whose prior claim, as will hereafter appear, was valid) above thirty years before the cession was made to the United States.

When the French discovered the Wabash, the Piankishaws were found in possession of the land on either side of that river from its mouth to the Vermillion river, and no claim had ever been made to it by any other tribe from that time till the period of its cession by the Delawares to the United States; nor would any claim have been set up then, had the Turtle been consulted when the treaty was made; but his pride was hurt that he was not consulted upon the transaction, and that the treaty was concluded without his assistance or interference; and his disappointed ambition combined with the more interested motives of another person, served to raise a clamor among the tribes who had no legitimate claim to the lands whatever.

That the Piankishaws are a tribe of the large confederacy which obtained the general appellation of Miamies from the superior size of the particular tribe to which that name more properly belonged, was not denied. The tie, however, which had for many years united them to their brethren became so feeble that the connexion was scarcely acknowledged. For a considerable time antecedent to the treaty of Greenville, the Piankishaws found it necessary to adopt a different policy from that pursued by the tribes their allies. Three considerable bodies of men led into the heart of the country by general Clarke, between the years 1779 and 1786, convinced them that their union with the Miamies could not afford them that safety and protection which were the object of that union. Several conferences were held between general Clarke and their chiefs, at which the Piankishaws solemnly promised to remain at peace with the United States. One of those conferences is preserved in Imlay's History of Kentucky, and in it no mention is made of the Miamies.

It had been reported to the government of the United States, by a certain agent of theirs, "that for twenty years anterior to that period, 1805, nothing of importance had been transacted by the Piankishaws and Kaskaskias, without the consent of the Miami chiefs." This assertion appears to have been unfounded, for a treaty was made at Vincennes in 1792 by general Putnam

with the Piankishaws and Weas, and peace established between those tribes and the United States. The Miamies were not parties to this treaty, and continued their hostilities against the United States until the treaty of Greenville. This circumstance could not be unknown to the person who asserted that they never had done any thing of importance without the consent of the Miamies, as he was present at the treaty made by Putnam, and was employed as an interpreter.

Although the language, manners and customs of the Kaskaskias make it sufficiently certain, that they derive their origin from the same source with the Miamies, the connexion had been dissolved before the French had penetrated from Canada to the Mississippi:—At that time a confederacy of five tribes existed in the Illinois country, viz, the Peorias, the Kaskaskias, Michigans, Cahokias, and Tamarois, which confederacy could then have brought 2000 warriors into the field. A long and unsuccessful war with the Sacks, in which they received no assistance from the Miamies, had reduced them to a small band who followed the chief Ducoigne, and a remnant of the Peorias, who procured a miserable subsistence by stealing and begging from the inhabitants of St. Genevieve, and even those wretched beings had been proscribed by those very Potawatamies who it had been asserted were closely united with the Miamies.

The Kaskaskias never lifted the hatchet against the United States; the fear of extirpation by the Potawatamies was one inducement for them to throw themselves entirely under the protection of the United States; they never thought of seeking that protection from the Miamies. On the other hand, the Miamies during the whole war with the northwestern Indians, were the most active enemies of the United States, and the most difficult to treat with. The Piankishaws, though they gave assistance to the other tribes at the commencement of the war, seceded from the confederacy, and made peace with the United States three years before the Miamies. If then, the Kaskaskias and Piankishaws were competent to the important concern of making peace and war, without the consent of the Miamies, they must have been equally so to sell a tract of land which was acknowledged to be theirs, and which was no longer useful to them. The treaty of Greenville contains nothing to authorise the supposition, that those two tribes were at that time dependent upon the Miamies; none of their chiefs were present, they did not think it necessary to go, as one of the tribes had never been at war, and the other had made peace three years before: but it was considered just, that they should receive equal advantages with the other tribes, and the Weas, not the Miamies, were requested to sign for them.

It must be plain to the candid reader, that nothing could be more unjust or unfounded, than those clamors raised against the

treaties of August 1804. The land in question had been granted to the Delawares about the year 1770, by the Piankishaws, on condition of their settling on it and assisting them in a war with the Kickapoos. These terms were complied with, and the Delawares remained in possession of the land, till finding that their numbers were greatly diminished, and that the possession of so large a tract was injurious to them in inducing their hunters to wander far from their towns, and thus obstruct the progress they were beginning to make in agriculture, they agreed to sell the land to the United States. But in consideration, that the Piankishaws had denied the right of the Delawares to sell, or dispose of the land, the treaty entered into with them was made subject to such arrangements as could be made with the Piankishaws, and, accordingly, a treaty was concluded with the latter tribe, wherein they relinquished to the United States all claim or title they had, or might have had, to the lands ceded to them by the Delawares.

The Little Turtle was the first to raise the cry against those treaties, and it is believed from no other motive but merely because he had not been consulted by either parties, and that they had been concluded without his interference or assistance. But in this as in many other cases, a seditious cry was raised for one purpose, and made subservient to another, and by those who had no agency in its origin. This clamor was raised by the disappointed ambition of the Turtle, and perhaps from the interested motive of *another* person, but was afterwards taken advantage of by the Prophet, and the mischievous agents of Britain; by the former, as a means of enabling him to form a confederacy against the United States, so as to circumscribe their dominion to the east of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and by the latter, to provoke a war between the parties, without reference to any particular object but mischief to both.

CHAPTER X.

BY a treaty between the United States and the Consular Government of France, concluded on the 30th April, 1803, the whole colony or province of Louisiana, with its islands and dependencies, was ceded to the United States for the sum of 60 millions of francs, to be paid to France, over and above all sums which might be due by France to America, which were to be settled by a future convention—this sum to be paid at the rate of 5 1-3 francs for every American dollar.

The payment of this sum was to be provided for by the creation of a stock amounting to \$11,250,000, bearing interest at 6 per cent. payable half yearly in London, Amsterdam, or Paris. The principal of the stock to be reimbursed at the treasury of the United States, in annual payments of not less than three millions of dollars each; the first payment to commence fifteen years after the date of the exchange of ratifications, and after Louisiana should be taken possession of by the United States—the ratifications to take place 6 months after the 30th April, 1803, or sooner if possible. This stock of \$11,250,000 was vested in the government of France, and we have understood that, to obtain immediate payment, it was sold to the Barings, of London, for 40,000,000 of francs, or 7,500,000 dollars.

After the cession of Louisiana, it was annexed to the territory of Indiana, and placed under the government of the then Governor of the latter, by which means Governor Harrison came to preside over the most extensive territory ever before committed to the charge of any one individual of the United States. And to show that he conducted himself to the entire satisfaction of the Louisianians, we insert the following addresses from the inhabitants of St. Louis, and the militia officers of the district of St. Louis:

"To his Excellency, William H. Harrison, Governor, and the honorable the Judges of the Indiana territory:

"GENTLEMEN—

"An arduous public service assigned you by the General Government of the United States, is about to cease. The eve of the anniversary of American Independence will close the scene: and on that celebrated festival will be organized, under the most auspicious circumstances, a government for the territory

of Louisiana. Local situations and circumstances forbid the possibility of a permanent political connexion. This change, however congenial to our wishes and conducive to our happiness, will not take effect without a respectful expression of our sentiments to you, gentlemen, for your assiduity, attention, and disinterested punctuality, in the temporary administration of the government of Louisiana.

“Accept our thanks, gentlemen, the tribute of sincerity due to you for your just and impartial administration of the government of this country during the period assigned to you by our national legislature. We wish you a long and happy administration of the government of the territory of Indiana, and that the citizens of that territory may justly appreciate your worth, talents, and services with the same unanimity that exists in Louisiana.”

Signed in behalf of the citizens of St. Louis, 2d July, 1805.

“To his Excellency, William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Territory of Indiana, and lately Governor of the District of Louisiana.

“WE, the officers of the militia, in the District of St. Louis, with the knowledge we have of your patriotic sentiments and private virtues, and convinced of the high esteem you entertain for our welfare, are desirous that, at the moment you cease to preside over us, the most lively expressions of our regret should reach you, especially as our zeal to support the Constitution of the United States has inspired your confidence. Permit us to observe, that you have, in part fulfilled our wishes; but the limited period of your administration has prevented the full completion of them; and whatever may be left unfinished by you, we are confident will be attended to, and completed, by the high and enlightened character that succeeds you.

“Accept, sir, these sentiments as the pledge of our affectionate attachment to you, and to the magnanimous policy by which you have been guided. May the Chief Magistrate of the American nation duly estimate your worth and talents, and long keep you in a station where you may have it in your power to gain hearts by virtuous actions, and promulgate laws among men who know how to respect you, and are acquainted with the extent of their own rights.”

St. Louis, 4th July, 1805.

The powers vested in the governors of our territories being so extensive, and so independent of the people, as to be the next thing to absolute, it must be difficult for them to preserve any great degree of popularity. Those territories have been generally settled by persons who have been accustomed to the republican institutions which prevail in the United States: they.

therefore, must feel the more impatient at being governed by a man in whose appointment they have had no agency; and though a governor may give no just cause of complaint, yet there may be a jealousy excited against, and a repugnance to, the man who is placed in authority over them, in whose election they have had no control, and whose reappointment they cannot prevent. The conduct of Governor Harrison appears never to have excited such hostile feelings in the hearts of those over whom he exercised the functions of government. He appears to have had the singular faculty of conciliating, not only the respect, but the warm affections of the people over whom he presided for so many years. In the appointment of all public officers, the judges only excepted, he appealed to the people; and he uniformly appointed those who had the confidence and the suffrages of their fellow citizens. This principle he acted under even to the sacrifice of private friendship and political feeling; as it is notorious that he has appointed men to office who were opposed to him in sentiment, both with regard to men and measures.—By this mode of action, then, the mere patronage of the government was not of the smallest value to him; and if the patronage was useless to him, the fees of office which had been taken by his predecessors were equally so; though to the latter, as superintendants of Indian affairs, they had, in the case of licenses for the Indian traders, been worth 1000 dollars per annum; and from which, it is said, that even his own deputy at Detroit derived an equal advantage. It also appears that this was a charge preferred against one of his predecessors in the year 1800, and Congress admitted its propriety by declaring that his conduct had been correct.

There being no absolute statute authorising the charge of fees by the Governor, and he, Governor Harrison, having condemned the practice upon his first entering the territory, always adhered to the resolution he then made, that he would never accept of any fee for the performance of any official duty.

The situation of the district of Louisiana was, however, different from that of Indiana; and he would have accepted the fees on licenses, \$25, which were allowed by law, but for one consideration. It appeared to him a matter of great importance to keep out of Louisiana, that band of unprincipled traders, who had done so much mischief among the Indians on the east side of the Mississippi; and by his construction of the treaty with Great Britain, the traders of that nation had no right to trade there at all. An investigation, therefore, became necessary, to determine who were British and who were not; and lest it might be thought that he would not be sufficiently minute in such investigation if he accepted of the fees, he rejected them altogether, and would not receive even that to which the law entitled him—an example of disinterestedness which, we

much fear, few persons in his circumstances would be inclined to follow. But by such conduct has he gained popularity, and we are confident that our readers will agree in saying, that such conduct was truly deserving of it.

About this time it appears to have been the intention of the government to sell the land about the neighborhood of Fort Wayne. This project the Governor disapproved of, and for these reasons: It was too far from the other settlements for American farmers to settle on it; and the few sections which would be sold, would have been purchased by the Indian traders, and thus be introduced into the heart of the Indian country, a number of people entirely out of the reach of the laws of the United States for regulating the trade and intercourse with the Indians. The President agreed with him in sentiment, and the land has not yet been sold.

About the middle of August, a convention of chiefs from the Indian tribes assembled at Vincennes, and all the difficulties were removed, which, by the manœuvres of the Little Turtle and the agent to whom we have before alluded, had agitated the Indians for about ten months previous. At this meeting a treaty was entered into and concluded, which not only settled the dispute respecting the purchase made of the Delawares the year before, but a further cession was made to the United States, of all that tract of land which lies to the south of the line drawn from the northeast corner of the tract ceded by the treaty of Fort Wayne, and striking the general boundary line running from the mouth of Kentucky river to Fort Recovery, at the distance of 50 miles from its commencement on the Ohio river. In consideration of which, it was agreed that the United States should pay to the Miamis an annuity of 600 dollars; to the Eel river tribe, \$250; to the Weas, \$250; to the Potawatamies, an additional annuity of \$500 for ten years and no longer, together with the sum of \$4000 then paid in goods and drafts upon the war department.

The United States agreed that the Miami, Eel river, and Wea Indians should henceforth be considered as one tribe, and that they would never purchase any land from any one of them individually without the consent of the whole; provided, however, that nothing contained in the treaty should weaken or destroy any claim that the Kickapoos who were not represented at that meeting might have to the land on the Vermillion river, which they then occupied. The Potawatamies, Weas, Miamis, and Eel river tribes acknowledging the right of the Delawares to sell the tract purchased of them the year before, which tract had been given by the Piankishaws to the Delawares about 37 years before. The Miami chiefs were extremely anxious to have the Piankishaws included in the treaty; but of this the Governor would not admit, nor would he give

up the right of the United States to purchase land of that tribe at any time that they could make an agreement with them.

This treaty may be found in the 1st volume of the laws of the United States, page 411; it is called the treaty of Grousland.

The Governor received a despatch from the executive of the United States, of date 20th June this year, 1805, desiring that he should proceed to St. Louis, and, in conjunction with general Wilkinson, endeavor to accommodate matters between those tribes eastward of the Mississippi, and the Osages; it having been reported to government, that they were upon the eve of a war. It was the desire of the President, that there should be a convention of the principal chiefs of the different nations at St. Louis, for the purpose of having their differences adjusted, and if possible to promote, not only pacific, but friendly dispositions among the nations on both sides of the river. The governors were to inform them, that it was the wish of the President that the nations eastward of the Mississippi, should not cross it with hostile intentions without his consent. That all his red children should live in peace with each other, and that he would be greatly displeased with any of them who should commence war upon their neighbors without first consulting him, and convincing him of the necessity and propriety of the war; and that if they wished to remain in friendship with him, they might not forfeit that friendship by rash or unjustifiable measures which might involve his red children in all the horrors and distresses of an unnecessary war.

The Governor, as directed, proceeded to St. Louis, and there, assisted by general Wilkinson, effected the purpose required, and brought about an apparently perfect reconciliation, between the Osages, Sacks, Kickapoos, Potawatamies, and the other tribes residing eastward of the Mississippi, and a treaty was concluded between them; but notwithstanding the cordiality which then appeared to subsist among them, hostilities soon after commenced, as may be seen below.

CHAPTER XI.

AT this period, by the exertions of Governor Harrison, the territory of Indiana entered upon the second grade of government. It may be proper in this place to explain the law on the case of a territory of the United States entering upon the first and second grade of government.

In the year 1787, a law was passed by the congress of the United States, for the government of the territory, northwest of the river Ohio. The provisions of which were as follow:

That the said territory, for the purpose of temporary government, be one district, to be divided into two, when the congress shall think proper.

That the estates of resident and non-resident proprietors, dying intestate, shall descend to their children in equal parts; and where there are no children or descendants, in equal parts to the next of kin—the widow to have a third of the real estate for life, and one third of the personal estate by way of dower.

That a Governor shall be appointed for three years, and a Secretary for four years, by congress: the Governor to reside in the district, and be possessed of 1000 acres of land in freehold estate; the Secretary also to be resident, and have like estate to the amount of 500 acres of land: the Secretary to keep and preserve the laws passed by the legislature, &c. and transmit copies of such acts and proceedings, once in six months, to congress.

That congress shall appoint a court, consisting of three Judges—any two to form a court—to have common law jurisdiction, and reside in the district—to have each a freehold estate therein, of 500 acres of land, while in the exercise of their offices—their commissions to be in force during good behaviour.

The Governor and Judges, or majority of them, to adopt and publish in the district, such laws of the original states, criminal and civil, as shall be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to congress from time to time; which laws to be in force, in the district, until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless disapproved of by congress—the legislature afterwards to have the power of altering them.

The Governor to be commander in chief of the militia, and to appoint and commission all officers in the same, below the rank of general officers; the latter to be appointed by congress.

The Governor to appoint all such magistrates and other civil officers, in each county or township, as he may think necessary, during the continuance of the territorial government; but on the organization of a general assembly, it shall have the power to regulate and define their powers and duties—the power of appointing still remaining with the Governor.

When the population of the territory shall be 5000 free male inhabitants of full age, and proof thereof being made to the Governor, they shall receive authority, with time and place, to elect representatives for their counties or townships, to represent them in a general assembly; provided there be one representative for every 500 free male inhabitants—the number to increase until they amount to 25; after which, the number and proportion to be regulated by the legislature. A representative to have been a citizen of the United States for three years, and to be a resident in the district, or be resident in the district, three years; and in either case, to hold in his own right, in fee simple, 200 acres of land within the district. Electors to have a freehold in 50 acres of land in the district—to have been citizens of one of the states; and to be resident in the district; or, the like freehold, and two years residence in the district.

Representatives to serve two years: in case of the death of a member, the Governor to issue a writ to the county or township for which he was a member, for a new election. The general assembly shall consist of the Governor, legislative council, and house of representatives. The legislative council, of five members, to continue in office five years, unless sooner removed by congress—three to be a quorum—and to be nominated and appointed in the following manner: As soon as the representatives shall be elected, the Governor shall appoint a time and place for them to meet together; when met, they to nominate ten persons, residents in the district, each possessed of a freehold in 500 acres of land, and return their names to congress; five of whom congress shall appoint and commission to serve as aforesaid: and whenever a vacancy shall occur by death or removal, the house of representatives shall nominate two persons for each vacancy, and congress choose one of the two to serve for the residue of the time. Every five years, four months at least before the expiration of the time of service of the council, the said house shall nominate ten persons, qualified as aforesaid, and return their names to congress, who shall appoint five of them to serve for five years, unless sooner removed. The Governor, legislative council, and house of representatives, to have power to make laws, not inconsistent with the principles of the ordinance, which constitutes them. All bills passed by a majority of both houses to be assented to by the Governor before becoming laws—no legislative act to have force without his assent: and he shall have power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve the general assembly.

All officers of the district, appointed by congress, to take an oath of fidelity and of office—the Governor before the President of congress, and all other officers before the Governor.

The council and house of representatives, in one room, by joint ballot, to elect a delegate to Congress, with the right of debating, but not of voting.

In the early part of the year 1805, it appears that the population of the territory of Indiana justified the measure of going into the second grade of government; and the house of representatives having been organized, they nominated ten persons, according to law, from whom were to be selected, by the general government, five, who were to compose the legislative council. The Governor having transmitted the names of those ten persons to Washington, received an instrument, through the hands of the President of the United States, designating the five who were to form the council, with blanks left for the names to be inserted by the Governor; for, as the President states, the characters being unknown to him, it would be substituting chance for choice were he to name the five. He however recommends him to be actuated by those principles which would have governed himself in making the selection, viz: 1st, to reject dishonest men—2d, those who, though honest, might suffer themselves to be warped by party prejudices—and 3d, land jobbers; as it would be difficult for them, though with honest intentions, to act without bias on questions having any relation to their personal interests.

On the first meeting of the legislature, the Governor delivered to them the following speech:

Address of William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the territory of Indiana, to the Legislative Council and House of Representatives, at their first meeting in their first session.

“The sincerity of the congratulations which I offer you, fellow citizens, upon entering on a grade of government, which gives to the people the important right of legislating for themselves, is sufficiently manifested by the ready sanction I have given to their wishes, and the promptitude with which the organization has been effected. The long and protracted investigation which preceded the first adoption of this measure, on the part of your constituents, proclaims it to be the result of deliberation and reflection, and exhibits a temper and judgment which do them great honor, and cannot fail to produce the most salutary effects. On you, however, it rests, gentlemen, to realize the wishes of those who were friendly to the second grade of government, to disappoint the fears of its enemies, and to show that every approximation towards a republican system is attended with a certain and solid advantage. Our means,

however, are far from being equal to the support of an expensive establishment; and it would be equally impolitic and unjust to tax the incipient exertions of the settlers with more than they could conveniently pay; and it would have the certain effect of diverting from us the tide of emigration, upon which are founded all our hopes of political emancipation.

“Upon a careful review of our situation, it will be found that we have great cause of felicitation, whether it respects our present enjoyments or our future prosperity. An enlightened and generous policy has for ever removed all cause of contention with our western neighbors. The mighty river which separates us from the Louisianians, will never be stained with the blood of contending nations, but will prove the bond of our union, and will convey upon its bosom, in a course of many thousand miles, the produce of our great and united empire. The astonished traveller will behold upon either bank, a people governed by the same laws, pursuing the same objects, and warmed with the same love of liberty and science. And if, in the immense distance, a small point should present itself where other laws and other manners prevail, the contrast it will afford will serve the useful purpose of demonstrating the great superiority of a republican government, and how far the uncontrolled and unbiassed industry of freemen excels the cautious and measured exertions of the subjects of despotic power.

“The acquisition of Louisiana* will indeed form an important epoch in the history of our country. It has secured the happiness of millions, who will bless the moment of their emancipation, and the generous policy which has secured to them the rights of man. To us it has produced immediate and important advantages. We are no longer apprehensive of waging an eternal war with the numerous and warlike tribes of aborigines which surround us, and perhaps being reduced to the dreadful alternative of submitting to their depredations, or of exterminating them from the earth.

“By cutting off their communication with every foreign power, and forcing them to procure from ourselves the arms and ammunition, and such of the European manufactures as habit has to them rendered necessary, we have not only secured their entire

* A splendid acquisition, indeed! When the manner in which it is obtained is taken into consideration, the mind of the philanthropist is inspired with a glow of reverential admiration for the venerable patriot who effected it; and he is ready to exclaim, Heavens! how unlike the policy of European potentates, who, to add a few acres to their domains, or a few hundreds to their slaves, rivers of blood must flow, thousands of women and children be left widows and orphans, and the sum of human misery augmented to its acme, among both, invaders and invaded. How different was the policy pursued by the respected, the venerated Jefferson, who, without the loss of a single life, obtained an immense accession of territory, as much to the advantage of its inhabitants as to the general interest of the United States.

dependence, but the means of ameliorating their own condition, and of devoting to some useful and beneficial purpose the ardor and energy of mind which are now devoted to war and destruction. The policy of the United States, with regard to the savages within their territories, forms a striking contrast to the conduct of other civilized nations. The measures of the latter appear to have been well calculated for the effect which has produced the entire extirpation of the unhappy people whose country they have usurped. It is in the United States alone, that laws have been passed not only for their safety and protection from every species of injury, but considerable sums of money have been appropriated, and agents employed, to humanize their minds, and instruct them in such of the arts of civilized life as they are capable of receiving. To provide a substitute for the chase, from which they derive their support, and which, from the extension of our settlements, is becoming daily more precarious, has been considered a sacred duty. The humane and benevolent intentions of the government, however, will be for ever defeated, unless effectual measures be devised to prevent the sale of ardent spirits to those unhappy people. The law which has been passed by congress for that purpose, has been found entirely ineffectual, because its operation has been construed to extend to the Indian country exclusively. In calling your attention to this subject, gentlemen, I am persuaded that it is unnecessary to remind you that the article of compact makes it your duty to attend to it. The interests of your constituents, the interests of the miserable Indians, and your own feelings, will sufficiently urge you to take it into your most serious consideration, and provide the remedy which is to save thousands of our fellow creatures. You are witnesses to the abuses; you have seen our towns crowded with furious and drunken savages, our streets flowing with their blood, their arms and clothing bartered for the liquor that destroys them, and their miserable women and children enduring all the extremities of cold and hunger. So destructive has the progress of intemperance been among them, that whole villages have been swept away. A miserable remnant is all that remains to mark the names and situation of many numerous and warlike tribes. In the energetic language of one of their orators, it is a dreadful conflagration, which spreads misery and desolation through their country, and threatens the annihilation of the whole race. Is it then to be admitted, as a political axiom, that the neighborhood of a civilized nation is incompatible with the existence of savages? Are the blessings of our republican government only to be felt by ourselves? And are the natives of North America to experience the same fate with their brethren of the southern continent?—It is with you, gentlemen, to divert from those children of nature the ruin which hangs over them. Nor can I believe that the

time will be considered as misspent, which is devoted to an object so consistent with the spirit of christianity, and with the principles of republicanism.

“In the examination of our statute laws, which you will naturally make, it will no doubt be found that there is much room for alteration and improvement. I presume, however, that the circumstances of the territory are not such as to authorize an entire change in the system which is in operation. The formation of a new code would be attended with an expense which our citizens are at present ill able to supply; and the advantages which would result from it would be, probably, more than counterbalanced by the many embarrassments which it might occasion. Some alterations are, nevertheless, necessary, and none more than in the organization of the inferior courts of judicature. As the judges of those courts derive little or no emolument from their commissions, in order to secure the attendance of a sufficient number for the business, I have been obliged to multiply them to an extent which precludes all hope of a uniformity of decision. It is, indeed, not unfrequent that the judges who determine the question are not those who have presided at its discussion. Limited as our means certainly are, and cautious as we must be of drawing from the people a single cent that can be dispensed with, it is indispensably necessary that an evil should be corrected which strikes at the root of one of the first objects of civil society.

“The militia law is much too complicated for the state of our society and population. A system which would unite simplicity with energy, would be highly desirable, and would leave us nothing to apprehend from a rupture with our Indian neighbors. The importance of this subject is so manifest that it cannot be necessary for me to press it upon your attention.

“Excepting in a single instance, horse stealing, to which there is not an adequate punishment affixed, our penal laws are as perfect as our situation will admit. A considerable accession of population and riches must accrue to us before we can be enabled to change the present sanguinary system for one equally preventive of crime, and which, by a just and humane discrimination, apportions the punishment to the offence.

“From the construction which I have put upon the ordinance of congress, the erection of new counties will rest with the legislature.* It is a power, however, which ought to be cautiously used, as the advantages produced by it are often illusive or partial, whilst the expense is certain and general.

* Some other governors of territories put a very different construction upon this ordinance, and decidedly refused to let this privilege be exercised by any one but themselves. This is another proof which is offered of the true republican spirit which actuated Governor Harrison in all his transactions of a political nature.—Ed.

“In the apportionment of representatives among the several counties, I have aimed at an impartial distribution; but as the documents from which my estimation is made are extremely defective, it is more than probable that some injustice may have taken place.

“Before another election be held, it is expedient that some plan should be adopted for ascertaining the number of free male inhabitants of the respective counties. It is believed that the militia returns, under proper regulations, might be made sufficiently accurate for the purpose, and this mode is also recommended by its superior cheapness.

“But the most difficult and delicate of your duties, gentlemen, will be to create a revenue which shall be adequate to the expenses of the government, without imposing too great a burthen upon your constituents, and to appropriate with the strictest frugality and economy the sums which must be chiefly drawn from industry and improvement. Few indeed are the objects of taxation in a newly settled country. In the commencement of our financial operations, some trifling embarrassments must be expected; however, I trust they will be of momentary continuance. The progress of our population, in spite of those difficulties which have impeded it, leaves no room to doubt that, when those impediments are removed, the settlement and improvement of our country will correspond with its fertility and its advantageous situation. A few months have already produced the most favorable change in the aspect of our affairs. Our possessions, circumscribed on all sides by the Indian territory, have been enlarged to the extent of an empire, and the most fertile and contiguous parts opened for sale and settlement upon terms which must give hopes of becoming a freeholder to the most indigent of our citizens. The wisdom and liberality of our government have been equally manifested in the disposition of their valuable salt springs on the Saline creek; as in the lease which has been granted, every idea of pecuniary advantage has been abandoned, and the reduction of the price of salt alone considered. It is with great satisfaction that I inform you, gentlemen, that the object of the government has been fully obtained, and that this indispensable article of domestic economy will never again be subject to the disgraceful and destroying monopoly which has hitherto prevailed.

“The treasurer will lay before you an account of all the receipts and expenditures, from the commencement of the government. If a considerable deficit is found, it will be also found that not a sixpence has been appropriated, which had not for its object some public and important purpose. Although our situation precludes us from a vote in the councils of the Union, and from many other advantages which are enjoyed by our fellow citizens, we must, nevertheless, rejoice in the unexampled

prosperity of our common country, and the elevated rank which she has attained among the nations of the earth. It is not, however, by that rank which we may hold in the scale of wealth and power, that the American citizen is so pre-eminently distinguished. The enjoyment of civil and religious liberty is exclusively his own. In vain shall we search through the world for another government whose only object is the happiness of the governed, whose only support is the affections of the people.

“By a compact, which is coeval with the establishment of government northwest of the Ohio, the right of being admitted, as soon as our population will justify, into the great family which composes the American Union, is firmly secured to us. Let us unite our exertions, fellow citizens, to hasten a consummation which is to restore to us all our political rights, and to place us in the elevated station of a free, sovereign, and independent state, equal to our sister states in dignity and rights. If wisdom and unanimity should preside in our councils, a very few years will accomplish this important object. But if, on the contrary, dissension and discord should spring up among us—if local prejudices and local politics should prevail, and banish from among us those liberal and expanded sentiments which can forego a partial advantage for the benefit of a community, then are we unworthy of the dignified station that awaits us, and the present colonial government is the best calculated for our happiness. I am, however, well persuaded, gentlemen, that your deliberations will produce a different result, and that the candor and liberality which marked your conduct in private life, and which pointed you out to the notice of your fellow citizens, will be equally manifested within these walls. You may with confidence rely upon my co-operation in every measure which is calculated to promote the interests of the territory, and I fervently supplicate the Supreme Ruler of the world to crown your labors with honor to yourselves and advantage to your constituents.”

Reply of the Legislative Council to the Governor's Speech.

“Sir—The legislative council have received the speech by you delivered to both houses of the legislature. They agree with you in opinion, that the government of the territory has assumed a milder form, and that our grateful acknowledgments are due to the Almighty Ruler of the universe for the blessings which we now enjoy.

“Although we are not as completely independent in our legislative capacity as we would wish to be, yet we are sensible that we must wait with patience for that period of time when our population will burst the trammels of a territorial government, and we shall assume a character more consonant to republicanism, and which alone will secure to the inhabitants of the territory a full participation of the rights now enjoyed by the

citizens of the United States. That period we hope is not far distant; and we have every reason to believe, from past experience, that your exertions will not be wanting for the attainment of the so much desired object.

“The confidence which our fellow citizens have uniformly had in your administration, has been such that they have hitherto had no reason to be jealous of the unlimited power which you possess over our legislative proceedings. We, however, cannot help regretting that such powers have been lodged in the hands of any one; especially when it is recollected to what dangerous lengths the exercise of those powers may be extended.

“The several subjects which you have particularly recommended, will engage our peculiar consideration; and we beg you to be assured that we shall concur with you in every measure that may tend to the welfare and happiness of the territory.”

Answer of the House of Representatives to the Governor's Speech.

“TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY:

“Accept, sir, the thanks of the house of representatives for the speech you made to both houses of the legislature on the opening of the present session. In it we discern the solicitude for the future happiness and prosperity of the territory which has been uniformly evinced by your past administration.

“We feel a pleasure, correspondent with that which you express, for the happy change that has taken place in our form of government. The system is still very imperfect; but we believe many solid and essential advantages will result to the territory from the representative grade.

“We consider the acquisition of Louisiana highly important, not only to the interests of the western people, but to the United States in general. While it has greatly enlarged our boundary, it has secured to us the peace and friendship of the neighboring Indian tribes, and removed a danger justly to be apprehended, from its being possessed by a powerful and ambitious European nation.

“We hope neither party animosity nor local prejudice will influence our proceedings. Although our settlements are widely dispersed, our respective interests are the same, and we know no cause that ought to excite disunion among us.

“To prevent the sale of ardent spirits among the Indians; to form a more perfect system of courts of judicature; to improve the militia system; to revise and correct, in part, the criminal laws; and to devise ways and means for raising a revenue, adequate to the exigences of the territory, without oppressing our fellow citizens, are objects of the utmost importance. These, with the other subjects recommended to our consideration, will receive all the attention to which they are entitled respectively;

and from your uniform zeal in whatever relates to the interests of the territory, we have no doubt of your cordial co-operation.

“We look forward with peculiar satisfaction to the period when our population will enable us to assume the dignity of a state government; as, from the measures that have been taken by the general government for the extinguishment of Indian claims, and for the settlement of the territory, we have the fairest prospects of a speedy and immense increase in our population; and we will readily concur in any measure that will have a tendency to promote our political emancipation.”

In procuring the second grade of government for the territory of Indiana, Governor Harrison was indefatigable in his exertions. Yet, notwithstanding every step he took towards that object was to abridge his own power, and to surrender up to a legislative body many of those privileges which are vested in a Governor of a territory under a first grade of government—notwithstanding the patriotism and disinterestedness which he evinced in that important business, he has been charged with being an ambitious man; and has brought upon himself the ire of the selfish land-jobbers among his neighbors, who did not hesitate to arraign his conduct, merely because they conceived their taxes would be raised to pay the expenses of a representative government.

Some time in the latter part of the year 1805, a war party of the Potawatamie tribe, who had crossed the Mississippi upon an excursion about the time, or shortly previous to the time, that the treaty was made at St. Louis between the Osages and their own tribe, and not being aware of the existence of that treaty, on falling in with a hunting camp of the Osages, attacked it, and massacred and carried off seventy-three women and children. This outrage was committed upon the camp when the Osage men were out upon a hunt, and the melancholy account of the transaction was brought to Governor Wilkinson, at St. Louis, by some of the men who had lost their families.

Such a circumstance would at any time have been considered an unfortunate and grievous affair; but it was more particularly so at that period, as the Osages had been induced to believe that the solemn treaty so lately concluded at St. Louis, under the immediate auspices of the United States, would have protected them, for some time at least, from the vindictive rage of their enemies.

The unhappy men who had lost their wives and children, accused the government of the United States of being the authors of the misfortune; by whom, they said, they were led into a false security, by repeated assurances that they might trust with confidence in the friendship of the other tribes. Yet they still entertained hopes, that, by the influence of the government, those of their women and children that remained alive,

might be restored to them; and to satisfy them on that head, they were informed by the Governor that every possible exertion would be made to realize their expectations.

On Governor Harrison's receiving information from Governor Wilkinson of the transaction, he gave immediate orders to Mr. Wells, the agent at Fort Wayne, to proceed without delay to the Potawatamie villages at St. Joseph's, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, to inform them of the circumstances, and insist upon their taking effectual measures to have the prisoners forthwith delivered up, either to Mr. Wells himself, or to Mr. Jouett at Chicago. He was also instructed to tell them that the violation of the treaty, so soon after it was made, would fill the heart of their great father, the President, and all other good men, with the utmost horror, and would cause their nation to be looked upon as a faithless and abandoned people, who pay no regard to the most solemn engagements, if they did not instantly make every possible reparation in their power, and give up the prisoners without delay. On obtaining the prisoners, Mr. Wells was instructed to have them sent to Vincennes, by water, under a military escort, to be had from the commanding officer at Fort Wayne; or if they should be given up to Mr. Jouett, the agent at Chicago, that they should be sent down the Illinois river to St. Louis.

It appears, by a letter from Mr. Jouett to the Governor, that the prisoners had all been given up, with the exception of one child that had been adopted by an Ottawa Indian, who, having none of his own, refused to listen to any terms for its ransom.

On the 30th of December this year, another treaty was entered into and concluded with the Piankishaws, and a further cession of land obtained. This grant contains all that tract of country which lies between the Wabash and the tract ceded by the Kaskaskia tribe in the year 1803, and south of a line drawn from the northwest corner of the Vincennes tract; north, seventy-eight degrees west, until it intersects the boundary line which has heretofore separated the lands of the Piankishaws from the said tract ceded by the Kaskaskia tribe, with this reservation, that so long as the land continues to be the property of the United States, or, in other words, till the sale of it could be made to settlers, the Piankishaws should have the privilege of living and hunting upon it, in the same manner in which they had done when it was their own property. And the Indians also reserved to themselves the right of locating a tract of two square miles, or 1280 acres; the fee of which remains with them for ever. In compensation for this tract, the United States agreed to pay to the Piankishaws an additional annuity of 300 dollars, and 1100 dollars down, the receipt whereof was acknowledged by the chiefs at the signing of the treaty.

This treaty is also to be found in the 1st volume of the Laws of the United States, page 394.

By the above treaty the United States take under immediate protection the Piankishaws; and they, on their part, agree never to make war upon any of the other tribes, but by and with the consent of the United States.

This was a very important grant indeed; and while it was highly advantageous to the United States, it was of great service to the Indians; as the annuity would always be a sure protection against want when they failed to procure a living by hunting and fishing. The following letter from the secretary of war, expresses the satisfaction of the executive government of the United States on the subject of the treaty entered into with the Miamis, &c. in August, and also the order to effect the treaty last quoted above:

War Department, October 11, 1805.

"SIR—Your letter, accompanying the treaty with the Miamis, &c. has been duly received. Its contents are highly satisfactory and pleasing. The amicable adjustment of all difficulties and uneasiness in relation, made by the Delawares and Piankishaws, is a desirable event, especially when connected with the subsequent cession, which gives us the whole margin of the Ohio above the mouth of the Wabash, and connects the state of Ohio with the Indiana territory for 50 miles in extent, free from Indian claims.

"I am directed by the President of the United States, to request you to close a bargain, as soon as it can be effected, with the Piankishaws, for their claim to the lands between the Wabash and the eastern boundary of the Kaskaskia cession, as proposed in your letter of August 26th, on such reasonable terms as have been usual in that quarter; and for any sums which may be necessary for the prompt payment, you will please draw on this department. I hope we shall soon hear of a favorable result from St. Louis.

"Your explanation with ——, resulting in a confident hope of future good conduct on his part, and mutual harmony hereafter, is not uninteresting. That he had been playing a foolish and what he thought a cunning game, I have no doubt.

"With sentiments of the highest esteem, I am

Your excellency's obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN."

In the letter to which the secretary alludes, of 26th August, the Governor had stated, that if it would be the pleasure of the President that he should close a bargain with the Piankishaws for the tract in question, he would engage to have the business concluded in a few days after he had his instructions, to that effect; and the event proved that he did not mistake in his calculation.

CHAPTER XII.

EARLY in the year 1806, the Governor received information from some confidential persons among the Indians, that a man belonging to the Shawanese tribe had set himself up for a prophet. He announced that he had been specially sent by the Great Spirit to reform the manners of the red people, and to revive all those old customs which had been discontinued by the too common and frequent intercourse of the Indians with the white people. All the innovations in dress and manners, which they had borrowed from the whites, were to be abolished; and they were promised all the comfort and happiness enjoyed by their forefathers, of which they had heard their old men so often speak, as the condition of their implicit obedience to the will and the orders of the prophet. He pretended to foretel future events—declared that he was invulnerable to the arms or shot of his enemies—and he promised the same inviolability to those of his followers, who would devote themselves entirely to his service. He preached up the superiority of the Shawanese* over all people under heaven; and he promised the smiles and approbation of the Great Spirit, to those who would devote themselves entirely to his service, and who would assist him in the cause which he had taken up. Thus, by his seductive speeches and other intrigues, he found means to draw after him a large party, consisting of about one hundred warriors of his own tribe; and with them he made an establishment at Greenville; but in course of a few months their number was reduced to forty or fifty of the Shawanese nation. His party, therefore, was chiefly composed of stragglers from other tribes; many of whom had fled for their crimes.

For some years the influence of the prophet in his immediate neighborhood was but trifling; but his fame was blazoned abroad among the more distant tribes; and miracles without number were attributed to him. The party attached to him, relying upon his specious promises, had neglected to provide for their own subsistence; and they were frequently starving for want of provisions, whilst reports prevailed at a distance that they were supplied to luxury by the supernatural power of the prophet. Those deluded people, who had no opportunity of testing the

* See note 1, at the end of the volume.

truth of those fabulous reports, firmly believed that he caused pompions to rise out of the earth as large as houses, and that corn was spontaneously produced so large that one ear would feed a dozen men. Thus were numbers of the lake Indians, and those between lake Michigan and the Mississippi, deluded by the reports which were industriously circulated among them by means of the emissaries of this impostor; one of whom, his brother, the celebrated Tecumse, or Tecumthe, (the latter being the Indian pronunciation of the name,) combined great cunning and subtilty with a considerable degree of natural talent, very superior to his brother the prophet. This man was kept in the back ground for a long time; and it was some years before he was known to the whites. He was, however, indefatigable in his intrigues and manœuvres. Whilst his brother remained at home, he was roving about among the distant tribes, endeavoring to make proselytes to their schemes; and no doubt it was principally by his means that the extravagant stories of the supernatural powers of the prophet were propagated.

The efforts of Tecumthe and the prophet to seduce the chiefs of their own tribe, the Delawares, the Miamis, and the Weas, were for a while unavailing. These chiefs seemed to be aware of the imposture attempted by the prophet, and they used their utmost endeavors to undeceive those Indians who came from a distance. They were, therefore, considered, by the brothers, insuperable obstacles to their bringing the tribes to which they belonged under their control. Something must therefore be done: they found they could not seduce them, and they resolved to have them destroyed. To effect this, they intrigued with the warriors of those tribes. They told them that they ought to take the authority into their own hands—that their chiefs were the cause of all their misfortunes—that to them they owed the loss of their lands—and that if they did not soon get rid of them, they would not have a foot of land to hunt upon. There was, at that time, no chief of extraordinary talent among the Indians. Had the great Buckongehelas* lived, he would not have suffered the schemes, projected by the prophet, to be matured; nor would he have allowed him so far to impose upon the people: he, however, had died shortly after the treaty of 1804.

Pursuant to this plan of the prophet, to get rid of those chiefs, which he thought inimical to his schemes, an accusation was preferred against the great chief of the Delaware nation, and three of his friends, for witchcraft; and as conviction always followed accusation for this crime, they were all brought to the stake and suffered accordingly. This is a crime which the Indians contemplate with so much horror, that to be accused of it is, in their minds, sufficient proof of guilt. When brought to the

* See note 2.

stake, the venerable Teteboxti, whose head had been bleached by upwards of eighty winters, was told that if he would confess his crime, and give up his medicine bag,* he would be pardoned. Upon this, he confessed, and said his medicine bag would be found under a certain stone which he described. The stone was examined, but nothing was found; other places were named in succession, and search made to as little purpose. It therefore became evident that he only wished to procrastinate. He was bound, and the fire about to be kindled, when a young man, more merciful than the rest, terminated his existence with the tomahawk.

Another of the accused was named Billy Patterson. He had resided many years with the whites, and learned so much of the business of a gunsmith, as to be enabled to repair the guns of the Indians: neither his usefulness nor his irreproachable life could save him. The same offer was made to him which was made to Teteboxti. He boldly answered that he had nothing to confess—that he was a christian, and had no connexion with the devil. “You have,” said he, “intimidated one poor old man, but you cannot frighten me; proceed, and you shall see how a christian and a warrior can die;” and, with a small hymn book in his hand, he continued to sing and pray till his voice was stifled by the flames.

As soon as the Governor heard of the accusation of these men, he despatched a special messenger with a strong remonstrance, which, though it did not arrive soon enough to save the unfortunate Teteboxti, arrested the fanatical fury which seemed to pervade the whole tribe, and no doubt saved the lives of many who had been marked out as the objects of the vengeance of the infamous prophet and his subtle relative.

Speech of Governor Harrison, delivered to the Delaware Indians, on the delusion which prevailed among them with respect to sorcery.

“MY CHILDREN—

“My heart is filled with grief, and my eyes are dissolved in tears, at the news which has reached me. You have been celebrated for your wisdom above all the tribes of red people who inhabit this great island. Your fame as warriors has extended to the remotest nations, and the wisdom of your chiefs has gained for you the appellation of grand-fathers from all the neighboring tribes. From what cause, then, does it proceed, that you have departed from the wise councils of your fathers, and covered yourselves with guilt. My children, tread back the steps you have taken, and endeavor to regain the straight road which you have abandoned. The dark, crooked, and thorny one which

* The medicine bag was supposed to contain tobacco, bones, and other simple matters necessary to the incantations of the sorcerers; and when they were deprived of them, they were supposed to be incapable of further mischief.

you are now pursuing will certainly lead to endless woe and misery. But who is this pretended prophet who dares to speak in the name of the Great Creator? Examine him. Is he more wise or virtuous than you are yourselves, that he should be selected to convey to you the orders of your God? Demand of him some proofs at least of his being the messenger of the Deity. If God has really employed him, he has doubtless authorised him to perform some miracles, that he may be known and received as a prophet. If he is really a prophet, ask of him to cause the sun to stand still—the moon to alter its course—the rivers to cease to flow—or the dead to rise from their graves. If he does these things, you may then believe that he has been sent from God. He tells you that the Great Spirit commands you to punish with death those who deal in magic, and that *he* is authorised to point them out. Wretched delusion! Is, then, the Master of life obliged to employ mortal man to punish those who offend Him? Has he not the thunder and all the powers of nature at his command?—and could he not sweep away from the earth a whole nation with one motion of his arm? My children! do not believe that the great and good Creator of mankind has directed you to destroy your own flesh; and do not doubt but that, if you pursue this abominable wickedness, his vengeance will overtake and crush you.

“The above is addressed to you in the name of the Seventeen Fires. I now speak to you from myself, as a friend who wishes nothing more sincerely than to see you prosperous and happy. Clear your eyes, I beseech you, from the mist which surrounds them. No longer be imposed upon by the arts of an impostor. Drive him from your town, and let peace and harmony once more prevail amongst you. Let your poor old men and women sleep in quietness, and banish from their minds the dreadful idea of being burnt alive by their own friends and countrymen. I charge you to stop your bloody career; and if you value the friendship of your great father the President—if you wish to preserve the good opinion of the Seventeen Fires, let me hear, by the return of the bearer, that you have determined to follow my advice.”

Notwithstanding the loss of two of their oldest and most respected chiefs, there were two causes which operated against the prophet's making any great progress in seducing the Delawares to his measures. In the first place, he was too well known to the Delawares, having lived a long time with them. Secondly, the Delawares claimed a superiority over the Shawanese in the confederacy; obliging all the other tribes, the Wyandots excepted, (who they themselves called uncles,) to give them the appellation of grandfathers; and their pride was hurt at their being controlled by a Shawanese of no fame and of no good character.

With the Miamis, also, the prophet was unsuccessful. The celebrated Little Turtle denounced him as an impostor from the commencement of his career. The Turtle, indeed, had lost much of his popularity, in consequence of a belief amongst the the Indians, that he was too much of a white man in his politics.* In the month of June, ten of the Shawanese chiefs applied to Mr. Wells, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne, and complained of the conduct of the prophet—stating that he had taken possession of the lands, the property of the United States, with the determination of holding the possession, and soliciting the government of the United States to drive him and his followers off their lands, and compel them to return to their own country, and live under their own chiefs; otherwise the peace and good understanding which then subsisted between the United States and the Indians might be disturbed in a short time.

There was no positive evidence that this fellow, the prophet, had been originally set up by the British; but many things combined to justify the idea that they took advantage of the circumstance, and that they made use of him as a tool for carrying on their intrigues and schemes against the peace of the United States, and the safety of the frontier settlers.

Shortly after the mission of Captain Prince, the prophet found means to bring the whole Kickapoos entirely under his influence. He prevailed on the warriors to reduce their old chief, *Joseph Renard's son*, to a private man. He would have been put to death but for the insignificance of his character.†

On the 19th June this year, 1806, the Governor, in a letter from Mr. Wells, at Fort Wayne, was informed that a French trader had told him of a plot formed by the Chippewas, Ottawas, and Potawatamies, for the surprise of Detroit, Mackinac, Fort Wayne, and Chicago. Though this report was not credited to the full extent, yet there was reason to believe that those tribes were in a state of great restlessness and jealousy; which perturbation they had been thrown into by the intrigues of British agents and other mischief makers, who held the citizens of the United States at enmity. These hostile feelings might have been further augmented by an unfortunate circumstance which had occurred about six months previous.

Some time in the month of November, 1805, a Delaware Indian called at a farmer's house, about twenty miles from Vincennes, at which was a certain James Red, who had emigrated

* See note 3.

† His father, old Joseph Renard, was a man of very different character—a great warrior, and perfectly savage—delighting in blood. He once told some of the inhabitants of Vincennes, that he used to be much diverted at the different exclamations of the French and Americans, while the Indians were scalping them—the one exclaiming, O Lord, O Lord, O Lord! the other, Mon Dieu, Mon Dieu, Mon Dieu!

a short time before from Tennessee. Red and the owner of the house were preparing to go to a corn husking in the neighborhood, and Red insisted on the Indian (who could speak English) to accompany them. The Indian declined going; and, upon his being very roughly importuned by Red, he took up his baggage and left the house. Red immediately seized his rifle, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the other man, he shot at and killed him on the spot. After some consultation with his brother and father, the owner of the house agreed to assist Red in burying the Indian, and promised to keep the secret—fearing the resentment of Red, whom he knew to be a savage, capable of any atrocity. Knowledge of the circumstance by some means reached a neighboring magistrate, who had him apprehended, and a special court was appointed for his trial. Considering the conviction and punishment of this man a matter of great importance, the Governor, in the absence of the attorney general, employed an eminent lawyer to conduct the prosecution, who came all the way from St. Louis for the purpose. But, though every precaution was used to prevent his escape, by having a guard of militia men upon the jail from the time he was committed, yet unfortunately something had prevented the guard from being mounted the night previous to the trial, and, by the assistance of tools handed him from without, the villain broke jail and escaped. As soon as this became known to the Governor, he caused diligent search to be made for him in the neighborhood, but to no effect; and hearing that he had reached the Ohio, he issued a proclamation, offering a reward of three hundred dollars for his apprehension.

The Governor, in his despatch to the secretary at war, deeply lamented the extreme difficulty there was in bringing to punishment the murderers of the Indians, and at the same time he bore testimony to the correctness of the several Indian tribes in strictly adhering to the treaty of Greenville, with respect to surrendering up to justice such of their people as were guilty of murder; and, though it appears that not one white man had been punished for a crime of that nature, two Indians had been hung about a week before for the murder of a white man, and two more had been surrendered for a similar offence, who had not then had their trial.

Some time after the account of the supposed plot, mentioned above, had been received by the Governor, he had, by means of a trader of undoubted veracity, a communication from an elderly squaw who resided in the principal village of the Wea tribe, which stated, that, about ten days before, a Kickapoo had arrived at that village with a war belt, inviting the Weas to join his nation and the Sacks in a war against the United States—that he belt and speech had been delivered to the Wea chief—and that she had herself conversed with the bearer, demanding

the reason why the Kickapoos wished to go to war with the United States, who were strong enough to destroy all the Indians in a short time. He answered that all this was well enough understood, but that they had received so many injuries from the Americans, that they were determined to perish to a man rather than not avenge them.

The Governor used every possible exertion to ascertain the truth of this report. He sent for the principal Wea chief, upon whose fidelity and attachment he had great reliance. This man told him that all the Kickapoo chiefs were sincerely disposed to keep upon friendly terms with the United States, and that it was only the young men of the tribe who were for war. He also stated that the tribes beyond them were disposed for war, and that they had solicited the Kickapoos to join them, and that a message from the British had recommended the same plan.

In order to take every step within his power to prevent hostilities, the Governor despatched an emissary to the Kickapoo tribe, to which messenger he gave the following instructions:

“As soon as you arrive at the Vermillion towns, you will deliver my speech to the chiefs, and cause it to be minutely interpreted to them; you will add to it such observations as may occur to you, to enforce upon them the belief that the United States are extremely desirous to preserve a friendly intercourse with them, and will not commence hostilities unless driven to it by the conduct of the Indians themselves. But if they should be forced into a war, after having done every thing in their power to avoid it, the Kickapoos must take the penalty of their own rashness. It will be of advantage to dwell upon the immense force of mounted militia which the United States can bring upon them from the neighboring states of Kentucky and Ohio, and the Louisiana and Indiana territories. It may also be suggested to them, that (a few stragglers excepted) there is not the smallest probability of their receiving any aid from the Potawatamies, Miamies, Weas, or Delawares, who have too just a sense of the danger of their situation, to engage in any such rash enterprise.

“After having delivered the speech to the chiefs at the Vermillion, if you should discover that there is no danger of proceeding to the villages on the Prairies, (and you are not on any account to expose yourself to any danger,) you will go there, and, if possible, prevail on Joseph Renard's son, their head chief, to accompany you to both places. You will omit no means of obtaining information, as to the general disposition of the Indians, as it relates to peace or war; and the resources which they calculate on for carrying on a war, particularly their means of procuring arms and ammunition, and the deposits they may have of either. Should time and other circumstances unite, to make it proper in your opinion, to proceed to the Potawatamie villages on the Wabash, you will do so; but, at any rate, I wish you to

go to the Delaware towns, on White river to deliver the speech which I have sent to them, for the purpose of explaining to them the circumstances relating to the escape of Red, who murdered one of their men. Whilst you are there, you will collect such information as you may think necessary or interesting.— You can also visit the establishments of the Eel river and Miami Indians, on White river, and Sugar creek. Your having been at St. Louis at the time the Kickapoo was killed by Mr. Hammond, which is given as the reason of their discontent, you will have it in your power to explain the circumstance, and convince them that it was purely accidental. You may also assure them that the presents to the relations of the deceased will not be withheld.”

“CAPTAIN WILLIAM PRINCE.”

The following is the speech alluded to in the above:

“*William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Indiana Territory, and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to his Children, the Chiefs and Warriors of the Kickapoo tribe.*

“MY CHILDREN,

“I lately sent you a message by one of your warriors, but I have not yet received an answer. The head chief of the Weas has however been with me, and has assured me that you still keep hold of the chain of friendship which has bound you to your father, since the treaty made with general Wayne.

“My Children, this information has given me great pleasure, because I had heard that you had suffered bad thoughts to get possession of your minds.

“My Children, what is it you wish for? have I not often told you that you should inform me of all your grievances, and that you should never apply to your father in vain?

“My Children, be wise; do not follow the advice of those who would lead you to destruction; what is it they would persuade you to?—To make war upon your fathers, the Seventeen Fires?—What injury has your father done you?—If he has done any, why do you not complain to him and ask redress?—Will he turn a deaf ear to your complaints?—He has always listened to you, and will listen to you still; you will certainly not raise your arm against him.

“My Children, you have a number of young warriors, but when compared to the warriors of the United States, you know they are but as a handful. My Children, can you count the leaves on the trees, or the grains of sand in the river banks? So numerous are the warriors of the Seventeen Fires.

“My Children, it would grieve your father to let loose his warriors upon his red children; nor will he do it unless you compel him; he had rather that they would stay at home and make corn for their women and children; but he is not afraid to make war;

he knows that they are brave. My Children, he has men armed with all kinds of weapons; those who live on the big waters and in the big towns, understand the use of muskets and bayonets, and those who live on this side the mountains use the same arms that you do.

“My Children, the Great Spirit has taught your fathers to make all the arms and ammunition which they use; but you do not understand this art; if you should go to war with your fathers, who would supply you with those things? The British cannot; we have driven them beyond the lakes, and they cannot send a trader to you without our permission.

“My Children, open your eyes to your true interests; your father wishes you to be happy. If you wish to have your minds set at ease, come and speak to him.

“My Children, the young man who carries this is my friend, and he will speak to you in my name; listen to him as if I were to address you, and treat him with kindness and hospitality.”

A few days after the departure of captain Prince and the Wea chief, the Governor received a letter from the former, stating, that shortly after the chief, Lapousier had left Vincennes, he received information that the Miamis, in the neighborhood of Fort Wayne, meditated some mischief to the whites. From the reiterated assurances which the Governor had received from Mr. Wells, he would have been led to discredit this report; but being aware of the deep dissimulation of which the Indians were capable, he received these specious declarations with caution, and took his measures so as to prepare against an actual commencement of hostilities, by organizing and disciplining the militia, and such other preparations as he considered requisite on the occasion.

By the report of captain Prince, on his return from his mission, it appeared that much of the rumor of the threatened hostilities of the Indians was unfounded. On an interview with the Kickapoo, Renard's son, to whom he had been recommended by the Governor, he discovered that the belt and speech, sent to the Weas by the Kickapoos, were concerning a young man of the Wea tribe, who had been murdered by a Kickapoo—that the latter tribe had deputed this young man, the son of Renard, to meet the Governor, and explain to him—that he told captain Prince, that the story of the intended hostile movement of his tribe was a fabrication of the Weas, and offered to point out to him the very persons who had raised the report, and that the same persons had told the Kickapoos that the United States were about to commence war upon them (the Kickapoos.)

Captain Prince also reported, that the Potawatamies of Shi-po and Tippecanoe, had received an invitation to join a war party on the Illinois river, against the Osages; but they declined

because their chiefs refused to go with them—that he also delivered the Governor's message to the Delawares, and explained to them the escape of James Red. They answered, that the Governor might do as he pleased—that he was in possession of the treaty of Greenville,* and he knew better how to proceed than they did. They also said that they had desired the agent at Fort Wayne to tell the Governor and the President, that they intended to extinguish the fire of the Osages, and to build one in its place. They hoped the Governor would not try to prevent them. If he did, they would shut their ears against every thing he could say to them. Upon the whole, this report was of a pacific nature; and captain Prince expressed his confidence in the fidelity and the friendly disposition of the Kickapoos.

This report was fully corroborated by a visit made to the Governor shortly after, by about 120 of the Kickapoos, including all their chiefs; at which interview all differences were settled, and every unfavorable impression removed from the minds of the Indians, so as to restore the utmost confidence to the parties.—The principal ground of complaint was the death of the young man at St. Louis; but this was done away, when they were told that he met his death by his own imprudence, in a drunken frolic, when he made the most furious attacks upon the lives of several citizens; and the usual presents being made to his relations, the matter was settled to the satisfaction of all parties.

It appears, by a letter from the agent at Chicago, that he had an interview with the Potawatamies of Illinois, and with all the party that had gone against the Osages, with the exception of the two chiefs who led them; in which he succeeded in obtaining from them the most positive assurances of their future adherence to peaceable measures; agreeing to submit all differences to the President of the United States, and that he should be viewed as their only father. He also mentioned, that a most cruel murder had been committed on an unfortunate Frenchman, by a son of the infamous Turkey Foot, on his, the Frenchman's passage down the Illinois river. He, the agent, demanded, and was promised, the murderer, by the chiefs, as soon as it was possible to have him taken.

*At the treaty of Greenville, it was agreed that murderers on both sides should be given up and punished. With this part of the treaty the Indians complied much better than the whites; the latter always showed the greatest repugnance to giving up those who had committed murders or robberies upon the Indians.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN June this year, 1807, the Governor received a letter from the agent at Fort Wayne, stating that the Indians, for some months past, had been religiously mad; and, on the 7th April, vast numbers of them had passed through that place to hear the preachings of the Shawanese prophet. He represented that, up to the 25th of May, not fewer than fifteen hundred had passed and repassed upon that occasion; and as the prophet had given out, that he would have another preachment in August or September following, he strongly recommended that he should be removed from the lands of the United States; and he also represented, that he had found it absolutely necessary to give to them a considerable quantity of provisions.

In another letter, bearing the same date with that abovementioned, he informed the Governor of a circumstance which gave still further proof of the care and solicitude of the President for the unfortunate Indians. It appears that a man named William Kirke, had been sent by the Quakers of Baltimore on a mission to the Indians on the Wabash, and that he, observing in them an inclination towards adopting the manners and arts of civilized life, returned to Baltimore, and made such reports and representations as induced some of the most respectable men among the Quakers to make application to the President for some aid from the government, to introduce among the Indians agriculture, and some of those domestic arts which might tend towards their civilization. With this the President most cheerfully complied, and Mr. Kirke was again sent westward, being appointed agent of civilization, and authorised to expend 6000 dollars per year in the business, and to be under the control of no other person but the President. He, therefore, immediately on his passage through Maryland and Pennsylvania, engaged such persons as he thought suitable for his purpose, and took them with him. On his arrival at Fort Wayne, having shown his credentials to the agent, he called a meeting of the chiefs of the neighboring tribes, and laid before them the projected plan.— They took the matter into consideration, and their reply was unfavorable; but whether that reply was dictated by the wishes of the Indians themselves, or was produced by one of those intrigues, for which the agent was noted, will be left to the judgment of the reader, when he reads an extract from his letter.

giving an account to the Governor. The Indian chiefs said that they had received another proof of the paternal care of their great father, the President, and the love he had for them; that they were convinced Mr. Kirke was a friend to them; but that, as he was a stranger to them, they were confident he would not be able to fulfil the views of their father, the President, towards them; and that the money appropriated for their use would be wasted, and of little or no service to them. Under all these circumstances, they were determined not to accept of Mr. Kirke's services.

It was certainly a very curious reason given by the Indians for Mr. Kirke's incapacity to carry the intentions of the President into effect—that of his being a stranger; for who but strangers could they expect to do such business for them? But perhaps, when an extract from the agent's letter appears below, the source of that curious reason may be guessed at.

He says, "Mr. Kirke is now about to retire from this place, and form a settlement at the Ottawa towns, among the Shawanese, and there wait the orders of the government.

"I have done every thing in my power to carry the views of the President into execution among the Indians, under Mr. Kirke, but to no purpose. The Indians too plainly see, that he cannot fulfil the views of the President, and say they will not acknowledge the receipt of a thing they never received.

"Now, sir, as I firmly believe that the Indians are very anxious to receive what the President has offered them—as I am convinced that it would add much to the welfare of the Indians, and believing that I could come nearer executing the views of the President among the Indians of this agency, than any other person he could appoint for that purpose, I now offer him my services through you, and beg that you will assure him that any money that may be appropriated for this purpose, will not be misapplied, but will be at all times faithfully and honestly accounted for to his satisfaction.

"I declare to you that I am not actuated by any personal views. I do not wish the President to add one cent to my salary, unless it is his opinion I deserve it. I am afraid that a wrong construction will be put upon the conduct of the Indians in rejecting Mr. Kirke, and discourage the President in his benevolent intentions; and I will exert myself to the utmost to forward the views of the President among the Indians of this agency, should he think proper to trust them to my care. And I trust you will advocate the cause of the Indians on this occasion.

"&c. &c. &c."

During the whole course of this summer, 1807, it appears that the intrigues of the Shawanese prophet and his brother, had operated powerfully upon the Indians; not only in the immediate neighborhood of Fort Wayne, but upon those at a very consider-

able distance; those of the lakes particularly. They were assembling in council day and night, and belts of wampum, and pipes, were sent in all directions; the object of which appeared to be a general confederacy among the different tribes for some purposes which could not be fully developed at the time; but which, it has evidently appeared, by the circumstances which followed, was against the United States. The proceedings and speeches at those councils, and the messages sent to distant tribes, were carefully concealed from the agents of the United States; and even those Indian chiefs, who were thought to be too favorable to the interests of the white people, were most studiously kept in the dark with respect to them. An extensive correspondence and communication was held with the British agent, M^r Kee, and a vast variety of presents were distributed among the different tribes by that subtle and subservient tool of British craft and despotism, whose activity, in this respect was so true an indication of the sentiments of his government, that Governor Harrison, in one of his despatches to government, said that he was, on the banks of the Wabash, in possession of a political barometer, by which he could ascertain the disposition of the British government towards the United States, better than our ambassador at London; for it appeared, that whenever the affairs of that Government either prospered or failed in Europe, the effects were soon discovered by the conduct of its agents among the Indians on our frontiers.

The Governor's speech, delivered to the legislature at its meeting in session in the month of August this year, which will be found below, gives not only a luminous account of the state of the territory, and the clouds and darkness which began to obscure the political horizon, but shows, in a very favorable point of view, the character of his government.

It must have been highly flattering to the feelings of the Governor at the time, and there can be no doubt but it must be extremely gratifying to him, to the latest hour of his existence, so fully to have possessed the confidence of the people over whom he ruled, and to have had the entire approbation of their representatives so unanimously and so warmly expressed. It is so difficult for a man to wield extensive powers to the satisfaction of those he governs, that the reply to his speech, on the occasion alluded to, must be taken as the strongest possible proof of his extreme moderation in the exercise of those powers, as well as his great solicitude for the honor, the safety, and the interests of the territory.

Without further preface, the speech delivered by Governor Harrison to both houses of the legislature of the territory of Indiana, on the 18th August, 1807, shall be laid before the reader; which speech and reply have both been taken from the original documents.

“Gentlemen of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives,

“The existence of difficulties in the execution of our revenue law, which could not be overcome but by the interposition of the legislature, has occasioned your convention at an earlier period than that which was assigned by the prorogation which terminated your last meeting. I regret the inconvenience which this measure has probably occasioned to some of you, gentlemen; but the public exigences could not, in my opinion, admit of delay, and I was moreover persuaded that you would think with me, that the calls of official duty were paramount to every private or personal consideration.

“I have directed the auditor to lay before you, gentlemen, a statement of the causes which have produced the embarrassments in the collection of the taxes for the present year, which will enable you to determine more correctly on the remedy which is to be applied. An amendatory act to the one which is now in force, may answer for the present; but nothing less, in my opinion, than a total change in the whole system, will save us in future from the disagreeable consequences of a deficient revenue and an empty treasury. The defects in the present system were early foreseen; and at the opening of the last session, I strongly recommended to the two houses the adoption of a different plan. The combination of so many circumstances such as this law requires, must always render the execution of it uncertain and precarious. It appears to me, also, that it is bottomed upon an improper principle. The quantum and the ratio of the tax should be fixed by the legislature alone, and not by an executive officer. This important subject, gentlemen, claims your earliest attention. It will require the exercise of much industry and patience to remedy the evils which have arisen from the present unfortunate system, and to provide one which shall give certainty and stability to your revenue. In affairs of this kind, experience is the best guide that the legislator can follow. He will seek out cases that are parallel to the one on which he is called to act, and will thus possess himself of sure land-marks to guide him to his object. In the present instance, there is no necessity for a recurrence to foreign or distant examples; the neighboring states affording precisely what we seek—a people similar in manners, in habits, and in the state of information, raising their revenue from the same object. Notwithstanding the embarrassments which have hitherto attended our financial operations, gentlemen, there is one consolatory circumstance which has been fully established: that a revenue, equal to all our necessities, can be raised; and that, too, without oppression or inconvenience to the people.

“The organization of the inferior courts, which was adopted at the first session, continues, as far as I am informed, to produce all the good effects which was expected to flow from it.

“No session of the court of chancery has yet been held.— Whether the blame is attributable to the chancellor, or to the legislature in not providing him a compensation, I shall not attempt to determine. It is, however, a state of things which cannot but produce great inconvenience and distress to the suitors in that court, and a speedy remedy ought certainly to be applied. If, in the review, gentlemen, which you shall take of the other parts of the judiciary system, it should appear susceptible of improvement, in the important points of facilitating the operations of justice, and lessening the burdens to its attainment, the adoption of it would no doubt be grateful to your constituents.

“The law which was passed at the last session of the legislature, for regulating marriages, does not authorise the clerks, who are to issue the licenses, to demand security of the applicant that there exists no lawful impediment to the proposed union. This omission, which I suppose was accidental, occasions a very glaring inconsistency in our code. Conforming to the practice in most of the United States, our laws consider and punish bigamy as a capital offence. The facility with which licenses may be procured, and the want of authority in the person who issues them to ask a single question of the applicant, seems to invite to the commission of an offence which is deemed sufficiently heinous to merit the punishment of death. It is certainly better, where it is practicable, to prevent crimes, by regulations which the unprincipled and wicked cannot evade, than by the infliction of punishments. An amendment to the law in question, which should direct the applicants for licenses to give bond and security, in a small amount, of their legal ability to marry, would probably save many unsuspecting females from being made the victims of their credulity.

“Connected, in some measure, with this subject, is the law authorising the general and circuit courts to grant divorces.— The propriety and policy of a law of this kind, has been strongly contested in many parts of the United States; and it is believed that the principle has been every where condemned, save in one or two states only. It cannot be denied that the success of one applicant for a divorce has always the effect of producing others, and that the advantages which a few individuals may derive from the dissolution of this solemn contract, are too dearly purchased by its injurious effects upon the morals of the community. The scenes which are frequently exhibited in trials of this kind, are shocking to humanity. The ties of consanguinity and nature are loosened—the child is brought to give testimony against his parent—confidence and affection are destroyed—family secrets disclosed—and human nature is exhibited in its worst colors. In the time of the Roman republic, divorces might be obtained by a summary and easy process; but so great was their abhorrence of them amongst those enlightened people.

that, in a period of five hundred years, but one person had been found to take advantage of the privilege which the law allowed. But when their manners became corrupted by luxury, divorces were so common that applications were frequently made to the college of augurs to ascertain the father of a child born in legal wedlock. A few years ago, there were but two instances on record in the state of Virginia, of applications for divorces.— One only of these had been successful; and although that was acknowledged to be a case which had as strong claims to indulgence as any that could happen, it was, nevertheless, opposed by some of the most enlightened patriots of that state, upon the principle that it was better for an individual to suffer some inconvenience, than that an example should be established so injurious, as they supposed, to the morals of the community.— There ought certainly, however, to be some tribunal for granting divorces; but I am decidedly of opinion that this power can no where be so properly lodged as with the legislature.

“ The perfection of the militia system, gentlemen, is an object of the first importance. To render an efficient and competent protection to our country in time of war, it is requisite that its organization and discipline should be attended to in time of peace. I fear, however, that our progress in these essential points, will fall far short of the public expectations and my wishes, unless the state of our treasury will authorise the disbursement of a small sum as a compensation for a staff officer in each county, to attend to the disciplining the men and regulating the returns. It gives me pleasure to state that some degree of military spirit begins to manifest itself in some parts of the territory, and that there is a probability that we shall at least furnish our quota of volunteers to serve upon the terms of a late act of congress. The deficiency of arms and accoutrements throughout every corps of the army, is, however, truly alarming and disgraceful. Men in easy circumstances are not ashamed to appear upon the parade without a firelock, or bearing one which would be more harmless to an enemy than the sticks carried by others. Whilst we should pity, and endeavor from the public purse to furnish those who are unable to supply themselves, those who are able, and neglect to equip themselves, should be denied the honorable appellation of defenders of their country. One of the principal characteristics which distinguish the citizens of a free government from the subjects of a despotic one, is the right of keeping arms; and that any American should neglect to avail himself of this valuable privilege, manifests a supineness which is highly censurable.

“ It is probable, gentlemen, that the moment is not far distant when every capable man will be called on to assume the character of a soldier. The situation of our affairs on the Atlantic coast, as well as on this frontier, makes it necessary that there

should be no delay in preparing ourselves for the worst that may happen. A restless and dissatisfied disposition has manifested itself amongst some of the neighboring tribes, and a few individuals are believed to be decidedly hostile. It gives me pleasure, however, to state that I have, within a few days, received, from two of the tribes, the most positive assurances of friendship, and their unalterable determination to submit themselves entirely to my direction. These assurances, although in my opinion sincere, ought not entirely to be relied upon; and the preparations for defence ought still to go on, until the real disposition of all the tribes is perfectly ascertained. Although the agency of a foreign power, in producing the discontents amongst the Indians, cannot be questioned, I am persuaded that the utmost endeavors to induce them to take up arms would be unavailing, if one only, of the many persons who have committed murders on their people, could be brought to punishment. Whilst we rigorously exact of them the delivery of every murderer of a white man, the neglect on our part to punish similar offences committed on them, forms a strong and just ground of complaint, for which I can offer no excuse or palliation. A powerful nation rendering justice to a petty tribe of savages, is a sublime spectacle, worthy of a great republic, and worthy of a people who have shown themselves as valiant in war, as in peace moderate and forbearing. I do not know, gentlemen, whether it will be in your power to remedy the evil complained of, as the defect seems to be not so much in the laws as in their execution. But if any means can be adopted which would insure the execution of justice in cases in which the Indians are concerned, the measure would reflect honor on yourselves, and be of undoubted advantage to your country.

“The sale of the public lands in the district of Vincennes, since the last session of the legislature, and the preparations for opening other land offices, give us a nearer prospect of the accomplishment of our hopes and wishes by the formation of a state government. An event of so much importance to the prosperity and character of the country, ought to be accelerated by every means within our reach.

“I should not do justice to my own feelings, and perhaps disappoint your expectations, gentlemen, should I neglect, on this occasion, to mention a subject which has greatly agitated our country, and called forth the warmest expressions of patriotic ardor from every class of its citizens.

“The United States, true to those principles which ought to prevail in every republic, preferring happiness to splendor, and safety to glory, have endeavored to abstract themselves from the entangling politics of Europe, and, by practising the most perfect neutrality, to keep clear of those bloody wars which have so long desolated the finest quarter of the globe. The justice

and impartiality of her conduct towards the belligerents, have not, however, been reciprocated; and from one of those powers, insult and injury have followed each other in quick succession, and promised satisfaction been anticipated by further outrage. The ships of our merchants, pursuing a legal commerce upon that ocean to which all have an equal right, have been captured and plundered, and their men impressed to serve a foreign tyrant, and shed their blood in battles in which they have no interest. For these aggressions, our government, without mingling with its politics those passions which agitate the breasts of monarchs, and which produce the greater part of those wars which overwhelm their unhappy subjects in misery and ruin, have demanded redress, but have demanded it in vain. Still calculating, however, upon the existence of a better disposition on the part of the power which had injured us, that *last resort*, which is literally "a trial of who can do the other the most harm," was deprecated by the people as well as by the government. And as long as there remained the most distant hope of an amicable adjustment, argument and negotiation were thought preferable to war. This delusion has, however, passed away, and has given place to the opinion that moderation and forbearance have been mistaken for timidity and fear. Some nations, like some individuals, will not profit by the lessons of experience. Great Britain might have remembered that the arms of America were not palsied by the previous use of remonstrance. A blind fatality hurries her on to that destruction which America had no wish to accelerate; and an act of tyranny and injustice, surpassing any thing that can be found even in the history of her depredations upon neutrals, has converted an useful friend into a foe, able to punish her for her multiplied aggressions. The blood rises to my cheek when I reflect on the humiliating, the disgraceful scene of the crew of an American ship of war mustered on its own decks, by a British lieutenant, for the purpose of selecting the innocent victims of British tyranny. But an act of this kind was perhaps necessary to convince *all* our fellow citizens that they had nothing to expect from British generosity or justice, when these were opposed by British interest. The unheard-of outrage has made a deep impression upon the American mind. Citizens of every political denomination are rallying round the standard of their country, and pledging their lives and fortunes in support of their rights.

"I should do injustice to the well known patriotism of our territory, to suppose that either yourselves or your constituents, gentlemen, felt less on this interesting occasion than the rest of your countrymen.

"We are, indeed, from our situation, peculiarly interested in the contest which is likely to ensue; for who does not know that the tomahawk and scalping knife of the savage are always

employed as the instruments of British vengeance? At this moment, fellow citizens, as I sincerely believe, their agents are organizing a combination amongst the Indians within our limits, for the purposes of assassination and murder. And if these, their worthy allies, are not let loose to slaughter our women and children, it will not proceed from the humanity and mercy of a nation which vainly boasts of her attainments in every art and science.

“At this important crisis, but one sentiment should animate the breast of every true American. Disregarding every personal consideration, he should think only of the tie which binds him to his country; and confiding in the wisdom and firmness of his government, he should patiently wait the signal which calls him to the field. How deep the humiliation, how lasting the disgrace, how injurious to the cause of republicanism, should the blood of our murdered fellow citizens remain unsatisfied or unrevengeed. But it cannot be. Americans must prize too highly their dear bought rights tamely to surrender them to the proud nation from whom they were wrested. A beneficent and discriminating Providence will make us the object of its peculiar care.” Another Washington will arise to lead our armies to victory and glory, and the tyrants of the world will be taught the useful lesson that a nation of freemen are not to be injured with impunity.”

“*His Excellency, William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory:*

“Accept, sir, the merited thanks of the house of representatives, for the speech which you delivered to the two branches of the legislature, on the 18th instant, in which we discover nothing more than those *true* and independent principles which compose the *patriotic heart*.

“The subjects which you have taken notice of in your speech, the injurious consequences resulting from them, and the impropriety of their continuance, are, we are assured from experience, far from being chimerical.

“We have seen, sir, and, with you, regret, the *insufficiency* of our militia system; and, by every constitutional exertion in our power, will endeavor to avert the great calamity of immediately falling a sure prey to any and every savage or dastardly foe; which would surely and inevitably be the case under our present military or defensive arrangements.

“The recent lawless and piratical conduct of some of the officers of the British navy, upon one of the United States’ vessels, riding at anchor in the waters of peace, and near the shores of honest content, and she, too, in an unprepared state of defence, harrows up our very souls, and fires our just indignation. We are assured that nothing but unpunished *example* dared them to

the commission of a deed so unwarrantable, base, and truly despicable; highly *honorary* and *imitative* of the nation and government under which they serve. Suffer us, sir, to assure you, that but one sentiment animates the representatives of the sons of Indiana, who esteem themselves heirs to freedom; and until the last drop of *blood* shall be drained from our *hearts*, we will defend* ourselves, our rising posterity, and the freedom of America.

“With equal pleasure with yourself, we view our progressive population, which is, as it were, the key stone of that desirable arch, (we mean a free and independent state,) in the completion of which alone, we will ever be useful or ornamental to our general government. And we most ardently pray that our superstructure may have the three necessary and inestimable qualities of *beauty*, *strength*, and *wisdom*, which will secure us our true standing amongst the states of the Union.

“It is with heartfelt pleasure and real satisfaction, that we unanimously acknowledge, sir, our firm belief that we shall receive your co-operation in any measures that may be deemed for the general good.

“JESSE B. THOMAS,

“*Speaker of the House of Representatives!*”

“St. Vincennes, August 19, 1807.”

CHAPTER XIV.

REPORTS of the dark and midnight councils held among the Indians, through the influence of the Shawanese prophet, and the intrigues of the British agents, showered in upon the Governor in such alarming numbers, that he found it absolutely necessary that something should be done to prevent, or circumvent, their effects. He, therefore, sent to the head chiefs of the Shawanese tribe, the following speech, or talk, to be delivered to them by John Conner, one of the agents of the United States.

This speech, it appears, was delivered to the tribe in the presence of the prophet; but as the principal chiefs were absent, all the reply he got was from the impostor himself. Here follow the speech and reply, as given before the tribe:

William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Indiana Territory, and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to the chiefs and head men of the Shawanese tribe of Indians:

“MY CHILDREN,

“Listen to me, I speak in the name of your father, the great chief of the Seventeen Fires.

“My Children, it is now twelve years since the tomahawk, which you had raised by the advice of your father the king of Great Britain, was buried at Greenville in the presence of that great warrior, general Wayne.

“My Children, you there promised, and the Great Spirit heard it, that you would in future live in peace and friendship with your brothers, the Americans. You made a treaty with your father, and that contained a number of good things, equally beneficial to all the tribes of red people, who were parties to it.

“My Children, you promised in that treaty to acknowledge no other father than the chief of the Seventeen Fires, and never to listen to the proposition of any foreign nation. You promised never to lift up the tomahawk against any of your father's children, and to give him notice of any other tribe that intended it: your father also promised to do something for you, particularly to deliver to you every year a certain quantity of goods, to prevent any white man from settling upon your lands without your consent, or to do you any personal injury. He promised to run a line between your land and his, so that you might know your own; and you were to be permitted to live and hunt upon your father's lands, as long as you behaved yourselves well. My Children, which of those articles has your father broken? You know that he has observed them all with the utmost good faith. But, my Children, have you done so? Have you not always had your ears open to receive bad advice from the white people beyond the lakes?

“My Children, let us look back to times that are past. It has been a long time since you called the king of Great Britain father. You know that it is the duty of a father to watch over his children, to give them good advice, and to do every thing in his power to make them happy. What has this father of yours done for you during the long time that you have looked up to him for protection and advice? Are you wiser and happier than you were before you knew him; or is your nation stronger or more respectable? No, my Children, he took you by the hand when you were a powerful tribe: you held him fast, supposing

that he was your friend, and he conducted you through paths filled with thorns and briars, which tore your flesh and shed your blood. Your strength was exhausted, and you could no longer follow him. Did he stay by you in your distress, and assist and comfort you? No, he led you into danger, and then abandoned you. He saw your blood flowing, and he would give you no bandage to tie up your wounds. This was the conduct of the man who called himself your father. The Great Spirit opened your eyes, you heard the voice of the chief of the Seventeen Fires, speaking the words of peace. He called to you to follow him—you came to him, and he once more put you on the right way, on the broad smooth road that would have led you to happiness. But the voice of your deceiver is again heard; and, forgetful of your former sufferings, you are again listening to him.

“My Children, shut your ears, and mind him not, or he will lead you to ruin and misery.

“My Children, I have heard bad news. The sacred spot where the great council fire was kindled, around which the Seventeen Fires and ten tribes of their children smoked the pipe of peace—that very spot where the Great Spirit heard his white and red children encircle themselves with the chain of friendship—that place has been selected for dark and bloody councils.

“My Children, this business must be stopped. I will no longer suffer it. You have called in a number of men from the most distant tribes, to listen to a fool, who speaks not the words of the Great Spirit, but those of the devil, and of the British agents. My Children your conduct has much alarmed the white settlers near you. They desire that you will send away those people, and if they wish to have the impostor with them, they can carry him. Let him go to the lakes; he can hear the British more distinctly.”

This talk seemed to have a great effect upon the prophet, and he requested the agent, Conner, to write down the following words in reply:

“FATHER,

“I am very sorry that you listen to the advice of bad birds.—You have impeached me with having correspondence with the British; and with calling and sending for the Indians from the most distant parts of the country, “to listen to a fool that speaks not the words of the Great Spirit, but the words of the devil.” Father, those impeachments I deny, and say they are not true. I never had a word with the British, and I never sent for any Indians. They came here themselves to listen and hear the words of the Great Spirit.

“Father, I wish you would not listen any more to the voice of bad birds; and you may rest assured that it is the least of our idea to make disturbance, and we will rather try to stop any such proceedings than encourage them.”

It appears by the report of Coaner, that it was then the intention of the Delaware tribe to go off about the following spring, and settle in the Missouri territory, as they had given orders to their young men to hunt but for three months, and then to return, and make preparations for removal, about the sugar making season.

The agitation among the Indians at this time, by some of them was accounted for by saying, that they were endeavoring to effect what had frequently been recommended to them by the United States; viz: A more effective and cordial union among the various tribes. This attempt at deception could not pass with the Governor, as many circumstances conspired to prove to him, that they were actuated by other and very different motives; and that if union was really their object, the interest or the safety of the United States was not intended to be promoted by that union. He was well informed that British agents were the real agitators; and he discovered that the Shawanese tribe in particular, was entirely devoted to the British interest; and that part of the Potawatamies, Chippewas, and Ottawas, had similar propensities toward Britain. In fact, it appeared by depositions, sent to him by Mr. Jouett, an Indian agent, that the latter tribes were fully prepared for, and determined on hostilities.

In order, however, the better to ascertain the intentions of the British, so far as they came to the knowledge of the Indians, he sent among them such emissaries as he could depend on for fidelity and address; and to prepare for the worst, he exerted himself to the utmost to organize and discipline the militia.—This he found to be an arduous task, indeed. It being next to impossible to procure persons who were acquainted with even the rudiments of tactics, he was himself obliged alternately to perform the duties of commander in chief, adjutant, and drill corporal. But this was a difficulty which industry and perseverance enabled him to overcome. Not so another one, which, without the assistance of others, it was out of his power to surmount; and that was a miserable deficiency in arms and accoutrements. He had cavalry without swords—light infantry without bayonets or cartouch boxes—and he had battalions armed with a mixture of rifles, fowling pieces, broken muskets, and sticks.

To an officer accustomed to the uniformity of a regular and a disciplined army, nothing could be more grating or perplexing: but under these circumstances, discouraging as they were, the

Governor acted with his usual patience and perseverance. He wrote a most pressing and energetic letter to the war department, pointing out, in the strongest manner, the necessity for an immediate and ample supply of arms and accoutrements, and pointing out the different places where depots should be made.

Shortly after the melancholy affair of the Chesapeake,* the Governor convened a meeting of the French inhabitants of Vincennes, for the purpose of declaring their sentiments upon the abominable outrage and insult committed upon the flag of the United States, and the murder of one of their citizens, as well as to express their attachment to the government of their country, and their determination to fight for and support it. In his address to the meeting, he informed them of the attempts made by the emissaries of the British government to prejudice the Indians against the Americans, and strongly urged them to detect, and to communicate to him, the names of any persons of that description which might come to their knowledge. He also expressed some apprehensions that some attempts might be made to weaken their own attachment to the government of the United States, and seriously warned them to be on their guard against any insidious observations having that tendency: which latter remark was made in consequence of one of the oldest and most respectable of their number having said, that he would have no objections to fight against the Indians, but he could not think of taking up arms against the king of Great Britain; to whom he had once sworn allegiance.

This observation of the Governor called forth the ire of a Scotchman, notorious for his tory principles; and he, having considerable influence among the persons composing the meeting, by being employed in transacting their business, and having a good knowledge of their language, procured himself to be chosen secretary to the meeting; and supposing himself to be alluded to as a British emissary, he induced them to step forward in his vindication; and he the better succeeded in this, as he contrived to impress them with the belief that the Governor had questioned their own patriotism, which induced them to make common cause with him. But this delusion was soon dissipated, and appropriate resolutions were entered into and handed over to the Governor, in order to have them transmitted to the President of the United States.

* This alludes to the murder of Pearce, by a British man of war firing into the Chesapeake.

CHAPTER XV.

THE year 1808 opened with immense numbers of Indians from the lakes crowding round the neighborhood of Fort Wayne. Their attendance on the prophet the year previous, had induced them to neglect raising corn, and they now found themselves in a state of starvation. It was considered necessary, by the Governor, to supply them with provisions, lest hunger might drive them to extremities, and to marauding upon the frontier settlers of the United States; and therefore he sent orders to the agent at Fort Wayne to supply them with provisions from the public stores.

The agent at Fort Wayne, in his letter to the Governor, appeared to have the fullest confidence that they had no hostile intentions against the United States; and he took great credit to himself for having detached from the interest of the prophet, the great Potawatamie chief, who had taken the Osages in 1805.

He had been two months with the prophet, and left six of his warriors with him, to accompany him in March to the British, in order to receive from them arms and ammunition; and he, the agent, thought he could discover that it was this chief who was to direct the blow which was intended, by the prophet, to be struck against the white people in the spring. Upon the whole, however, he expressed confidence that there was nothing to fear from the Indians, but their stealing horses and other property from the settlements on the frontiers.

The prophet, it appears by this letter, had the intention of removing to Tippecanoe; and he had declared his intention to put the tomahawk into the hands of his followers, to destroy all the Indians who would not listen to him; so that this modern Mahomet was now beginning to speak out boldly.

By a letter received from another agent, Mr. Jouett, it appeared that a scarcity of provisions also prevailed among the Indians in the neighborhood of Chicago, and that, though they said they were inclined for peace, yet they would visit the prophet, on the Wabash, in June next, when he had appointed to meet them. From this meeting, Mr. Jouett seemed to apprehend serious consequences, either in a war with the United States, or among themselves; and he, therefore, advised that the prophet should be taken up, by which he conceived that the delusion would have ended, as he, the prophet, had impressed upon the minds of the Indians that his person was as invulnerable as it was sacred.

A treaty having been entered into and concluded at Detroit, and a cession of lands made to General Hull, the agent at Fort Wayne took occasion to doubt its policy at that time, and insinuated that it might have been dictated by the British, in order to irritate the Indians; who, it appears, had declared their intention of murdering the first chief who would put his hand to paper for the sale of lands; and he mentioned the rumors of the Ottawas, Wyandots, Chippewas, and part of the Potawatamies, being in council at that time, the objects of which were, not to acknowledge the treaty of Detroit, and to murder the chiefs who signed it.

In the month of May, this year, 1808, it became evident to the Governor that the prophet had gained such an ascendancy over the minds of the Indians, that there could be little doubt of their pursuing any course which he might dictate to them; and that his views and intentions were hostile to the United States, he considered very certain. Though he had great confidence in the firmness of the Delawares and Miamis to resist his schemes, a circumstance occurred which convinced him, that, though they might not be converts to his divine mission, they were under the greatest apprehensions for his temporal power.

The prophet had selected a spot, on the upper part of the Wabash, for his future and permanent residence, and had engaged a considerable number of Potawatamies, Ottawas, Chippewas, and other northern Indians, to settle there under his auspices. This circumstance so alarmed the Miamis and Delawares, that they resolved to defeat the measure at any risk; and the chiefs of the latter set out to inform him of their determination. The prophet would not, however, deign to give them an interview, but despatched his brother to them, whose threats or persuasions were sufficient to drive back the chiefs, with strong indications of apprehension and terror; and the Delawares appeared to be in considerable alarm, though the council of their chiefs had directed their warriors to prevent the prophet from approaching the Wabash. It was observed, at the same time, that the Potawatmies, who were under the influence of the prophet, were continually engaged in what they termed religious duties; but that their prayers were always succeeded by, or intermixed with, warlike sports, shooting with bows, throwing the tomahawk, and wielding the war club. This combination of religious and warlike exercises, and the use of weapons of their own manufacture, strongly indicated the designs of the prophet and his adherents.

Notwithstanding all the opposition given by the Indians and others to the prophet's settling on the Wabash, he appears to have carried that measure into effect; for we find him in the month of June in that situation, where he was applied to by John Conner, an Indian interpreter, for some horses which had

been taken from the white people. Conner's mission, however, seems to have been unsuccessful, as he was obliged to return without the horses—though he appears to have been impressed with an opinion, that the prophet's people had at least twenty horses belonging to the whites. He, Conner, reported that from the best information which he could collect, the prophet had from 30 to 40 of his own nation with him, and about ninety of other tribes, viz: Potawatamies, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Winebagoes. They were at that time very scarce of provisions, and he understood that it was the intention of the prophet to visit the Governor at Vincennes, to beg of him assistance in provisions, from whom he expected relief, as he said the white people had always encouraged him to preach the word of God to the Indians.

On his way down the Wabash, Conner met four Shawanese Indians belonging to the prophet's band, and was informed that they had just arrived from the state of Ohio, and had with them twelve horses belonging to the whites. On his enquiring of them as to this fact, they stated that they had the horses, but that they had found them. The prophet had told him of these men before he left him, and said he believed they would bring with them the white people's horses.

In the month of July we find that a deputation had been sent to the Governor, from the prophet, with a very pacific and conciliatory speech. The bearer of the message complained bitterly of the misrepresentation which had been circulated relative to the prophet's views and dispositions towards the citizens of the United States. He had promised to visit the Governor himself; and from the complexion of the message, the Governor thought it probable that he might be made a useful instrument in effecting a radical and salutary change in the manners and habits of the Indians.

He had then gained two important points towards the accomplishment of that desirable object; his followers drank no whiskey, and were no longer ashamed to cultivate the earth.

In the month of August, the Shawanese prophet made his promised visit to the Governor, with whom he continued for more than two weeks.

During this visit, the Governor discovered him to be possessed of considerable talents, and his astonishment was considerably excited, by the address and art with which he managed the Indians. He could not, however, discover whether or not he had been, as he first thought him to be, a tool of the British.—His denial of his being under any such influence, was strong, and apparently candid. He said that his sole object was to reclaim the Indians from the bad habits which they had contracted, and to cause them to live in peace and friendship with all mankind, and that he was particularly appointed to that

office by the Great Spirit. He frequently, in presence of the Governor, harangued his followers, and his constant theme was the evils arising from war, and from the immoderate use of ardent spirits. The event showed, that he was not successful, nor was it probable that he was sincere in his persuading them against war; but the experiments made by the Governor, to determine whether their refusal to drink whiskey proceeded from principle, or was only mere affectation, established the former beyond all question. In a word, it appears that the subtlety and address of this fellow was so profound, that he completely deceived the Governor, and impressed him with the opinion, that the influence which he had obtained over the Indians, would be advantageous to the cause of humanity, rather than be of a mischievous tendency.

Speech of the Prophet LOLAWAWCHICKA, or the Loud Voice, to the Governor of the Indiana Territory.

“FATHER,

“It is three years since I first began with that system of religion which I now practise. The white people and some of the Indians were against me; but I had no other intention but to introduce among the Indians, those good principles of religion which the white people profess. I was spoken badly of by the white people, who reproached me with misleading the Indians; but I defy them to say that I did any thing amiss.

“Father, I was told that you intended to hang me. When I heard this, I intended to remember it, and tell my father, when I went to see him, and relate to him the truth.

“I heard, when I settled on the Wabash, that my father, the Governor, had declared that all the land between Vincennes and Fort Wayne was the property of the Seventeen Fires.

“I also heard that you wanted to know, my father, whether I was God or man; and that you said, if I was the former, I should not steal horses. I heard this from Mr. Wells, but I believe it originated with himself.

“The Great Spirit told me to tell the Indians, that he had made them and made the world—that he had placed them on it to do good, and not evil.

“I told all the red skins that the way they were in was not good, and that they ought to abandon it.

“That we ought to consider ourselves as one man, but we ought to live agreeable to our several customs, the red people after their mode, and the white people after theirs; particularly, that they should not drink whiskey, that it was not made for them, but the white people, who alone know how to use it; and that it is the cause of all the mischiefs which the Indians suffer; and that they must always follow the directions of the Great Spirit, and we must listen to him, as it was he that has made us.

“Determine to listen to nothing that is bad. Do not take up the tomahawk, should it be offered by the British, or by the long knives. Do not meddle with any thing that does not belong to you, but mind your own business, and cultivate the ground, that your women and your children may have enough to live on. I now inform you that it is our intention to live in peace with our father and his people for ever.

“My father, I have informed you what we mean to do, and I call the Great Spirit to witness the truth of my declaration.—The religion which I have established for the last three years, has been attended to by the different tribes of Indians in this part of the world. Those Indians were once different people; they are now but one; they are all determined to practise what I have communicated to them, that has come immediately from the Great Spirit through me.

“Brother, I speak to you as a warrior. You are one. But let us lay aside this character, and attend to the care of our children, that they may live in comfort and peace. We desire that you will join us for the preservation of both red and white people. Formerly, when we lived in ignorance, we were foolish; but now, since we listen to the voice of the Great Spirit, we are happy.

“I have listened to what you have said to us. You have promised to assist us. I now request you, in behalf of all the red people, to use your exertions to prevent the sale of liquor to us. We are all well pleased to hear you say that you will endeavor to promote our happiness. We give you every assurance that we will follow the dictates of the Great Spirit.

“We are all well pleased with the attention that you have showed us; also with the good intentions of our father, the President. If you give us a few articles, such as needles, flints, hoes, powder, &c. &c. we will take the animals that afford us meat with powder and ball.”

This speech was well calculated to obtain confidence; and it would indeed have been astonishing, if the Governor had not been deceived by it; and of the success of the deception there can be no doubt; for though he had been greatly prejudiced against this impostor, by the reports of many, both white people and Indians—though he had heard of the communication kept up between his adherents and the British, the apparent sincerity and candor which pervades his speech, were sufficient to lead him astray with respect to the true character and intentions of this artful savage; for who could expect such a speech could be had from an untutored son of nature, for any other purpose but that which it appeared to express? For deception and stratagem in war, the Indians are noted; but in their speeches, they are as remarkable for candor and sincerity. This reflection was fully sufficient to allay the suspicions of the Governor in the present case.

For some cause, which has not been explained, the Osage* tribe of Indians, had got the displeasure of several of the other tribes, who resided on the east side of the Mississippi, and a confederation was formed against them. This appears as well by a speech which was sent to the Governor, by the Delawares, on the White river, in the month of September, the year 1807, as by the speeches delivered by the President of the United States, to the chiefs of several nations who had visited the seat of government in December following; copies of some of which shall be given. In the following speech to Governor Harrison, no cause is given for the hostility which* existed against the Osages, but strong expressions of enmity against them.

“ *His Excellency, Governor Harrison:*

“ FATHER—

“ Attend to the advice of your children, the head warriors of the Delaware nation, who reside along this river. We think it our duty to inform you (*of*) the business which we lately undertake (*undertook*) with regard of (*to*) the tomahawk. We have consulted (*consulted*) with the head warriors of the Miamis, who seem afraid to take (*up*) the tomahawk, and would rather act as little children, only looking on their grandfathers. They are waiting till all the other nations take it up, then they must of course take it up too. The head warriors of (*the*) Potawatamies have sent word to us that they are preparing for (*to*) march against (*the*) Osages.

“ We have been carry (*carrying*) the tomahawk to the Shawanese and Wyandots, who (*are*) fond of war. They both took it up and would sharpened, (*sharpen it,*) but could not started (*start*) this fall, and finally agreed to put it off till next spring; at which time the whole confederate nations will be ready to march, that we may cut off our enemy with one stroke.

“ The Wyandots undertake to send runners to notify (*the*) Chippewa, Ottawa, and the rest of the nations.

“ Father, our friend, the bearer, from beyond (*the*) Mississippi, will deliver this letter to you. We wish you to furnish him with provisions, powder and lead, and some clothing.

“ Father, one word yet. All our allies in this part of the country have jointly request (*requested of*) you this one thing—that is, we wish you to prohibit all your traders along the Mississippi from selling arms and ammunition to our common enemy, (*the*) Osages; for we have been inform (*informed*) that they have frequently come to those French traders, and beg for such articles, whereby they have been enabled to do more mischief; and

* See note 4.

† The words in italics are not in the original, but have been introduced to complete the sense.

if your traders should furnish them with such articles since we proclaim (*proclaimed*) war against that nation, it will, of course, as it were, strengthen our enemy, while we profess to be friends of the United States; therefore we entreat you to listen, and consider what we have to say.

TOMMAQUA BEAVER, ✕
 WENAVAKHENON KILLBUCK, ✕
 WOQUICKGUCKHOMMAN, ✕
 PHROAKHUG, ✕

In behalf of the rest.

“White River, 9th September, 1808.”

About the end of October, the Governor, in common with the other executive officers of the different states and territories, received orders from the general government, to organize, arm, and equip, according to an act of congress passed in March previous, and to hold in readiness, to march in a moment's warning, their respective proportions of one hundred thousand militia, officers included.

In the month of December, the Governor received the following letter from the President of the United States, respecting the fixing of the boundaries between the lands of the United States and some of the Indian tribes; and, soon after, this letter was followed by another, on the subject of spirituous liquors. The letters of this venerable and worthy patriot always breathe so much of the spirit of genuine philanthropy, and paternal regard for the true interests of the unfortunate aborigines of this country, that we cannot resist the temptation of giving them entire. Though it may have a tendency towards swelling the work to more than its projected size, yet their insertion is considered full compensation, as indulging those feelings of profound respect and veneration for the character of the man who has borne so distinguished a part in obtaining the liberties of his country, and who has raised her to a pitch of enviable eminence above the nations of the earth by his wise and prudent direction of her councils. Under these impressions the following letters are given, verbatim, together with three speeches, delivered by the President to the chiefs of the Indian nations who had visited him at the seat of government, in December, 1808.

“Washington, December 22, 1808.

“SIR,

“By the treaty of 1803, we obtained, from the Kaskaskias, the country as far as the ridge dividing the waters of the Kaskaskia from those of the Illinois river. By the treaty of 1804, with the Sacks and Foxes, they ceded to us from the Illinois to the Ouisconsin. Between these two cessions is a gore of country, to wit, between the Illinois river and Kaskaskia line, which

I understand to have belonged to the Peorias, and that that tribe is now extinct. If both these facts be true, we succeed to their title by our being proprietors paramount of the whole country.

In this case, it is interesting to settle our boundary with our next neighbors, the Kickapoos. Where their western boundary is I know not; but they cannot come lower down the Illinois river than the Illinois lake, on which stood the old Peoria fort, and perhaps not so low. The Kickapoos are bounded to the S. E. I presume, by the ridge between the waters of the Illinois and Wabash, to which the Miamis claim; and N. E. by the Potawatamies. Of course it is with the Kickapoos alone we have to settle a boundary. I would therefore recommend to you to take measures for doing this. You will, of course, first endeavor, with all possible caution, to furnish yourself with the best evidence to be had of the real location of the S. W. boundary of the Kickapoos, and then endeavor to bring them to an acknowledgment of it, formally, by a treaty of limits, if it be nothing more; the ordinary presents are all that will be necessary; but if they cede a part of their own country, then a price proportioned will be proper. In a letter to you of Feb. 27, 1803, I mentioned that I had heard there was still one Peoria man living, and that a compensation, making him easy for life, should be given him, and his conveyance of the country by a regular deed be obtained. If there be such a man living, I think this should still be done. The ascertaining the line between the Kickapoos and us is now of importance, because it will close our possessions on the hither bank of the Mississippi, from the Ohio to the Ouisconsin, and give us a broad margin to prevent the British from approaching that river, on which, under color of their treaty, they would be glad to hover, that they might smuggle themselves and their merchandize into Louisiana.— Their treaty can only operate on the country so long as it is Indian; and in proportion as it becomes ours exclusively, their ground is narrowed. It makes it easier, too, for us to adopt, on this side of the Mississippi, a policy we are beginning on the other side—that of permitting no traders, either ours or theirs, to go to the Indian towns, but oblige them all to settle and be stationary at our factories, where we can have their conduct under our observation and control. However, our first object must be to blockade them from the Mississippi; and to this I ask the favor of your attention, and salute you with great friendship and respect.

“THOMAS JEFFERSON.”

“GOVERNOR HARRISON.”

“Washington, December 31, 1808.”

“SIR,

“The general government of the United States has considered it their duty and interest to extend their care and patronage

over the Indian tribes within their limits, and to endeavor to render them friends, and, in time, perhaps, useful members of the nation. Perceiving the injurious effects produced by their inordinate use of spirituous liquors, they passed laws authorising measures against the vending or distributing such liquors among them. Their introduction by traders was accordingly prohibited, and for some time was attended with the best effects. I am informed, however, that latterly the Indians have got into the practice of purchasing such liquors themselves, in the neighboring settlements of whites, and of carrying them into their towns, and that, in this way, our regulations, so salutary to them, are now defeated. I must, therefore, request your excellency to submit this matter to the consideration of your legislature. I persuade myself that, in addition to the moral inducements which will readily occur, they will find it not indifferent to their own interests to give us their aid in removing, for their neighbors, this great obstacle to their acquiring industrious habits, and attaching themselves to the regular and useful pursuits of life.—For this purpose it is much desired that they should pass effectual laws to restrain their citizens from vending and distributing spirituous liquors to the Indians. I pray your excellency to accept the assurances of my great esteem and respect.

“THOMAS JEFFERSON.

“HIS EXCELLENCY, GOVERNOR HARRISON.”

“*My Son, the Beaver, the Head Warrior of the Delawares,*

“I am glad to see you here, and to take you by the hand. I am the friend of your nation, and sincerely wish them well.—I shall now speak to them as their friend, and advise them for their good.

“I have read your speech to the secretary at war, and considered it maturely. You therein say that, after the conclusion of the treaty at Greenville, the Wapanahies, and other tribes of Indians, mutually agreed to maintain peace among themselves and with the United States. This, my son, was wise, and I entirely approve of it. And I equally commend you for what you further say, that yours and the other tribes have constantly maintained the articles of peace with us, and have ceased to listen to bad advice. I hope, my son, you will continue in this good line of conduct, and I assure you that the United States will forever religiously observe the treaty on their part; not only because they have agreed to it, but because they esteem you. They wish you well, and would endeavor to promote your welfare, even if there were no treaty; and, rejoicing that you have ceased to listen to bad advice, they hope you will listen to that which is good.

“My Son, you say that the Osage nation has refused to be at peace with your nation or any others. That they have refused

the offers of peace and extended their aggressions to all people. This is all new to me. I never heard of an Osage coming to war on this side of the Mississippi. Have they attacked your towns, killed your people, or destroyed your game? Tell me in what year they did this, or what is the aggression they have committed on yours and the other tribes on this side the Mississippi. But if they have defended themselves and their country, when your tribes have gone over to destroy them, they have only done what brave men ought to do, and what just men ought never to have forced them to do. Your having committed one wrong on them gives you no right to commit a second; and be assured, my son, that the Almighty Spirit which is above, will not look down with indifference on your going to war against his children on the other side the Mississippi, who have never come to attack you. He is their father as well as your father, and he did not make the Osages to be destroyed by you. I tell you that if you make war unjustly on the Osages, he will punish your nation for it. He will send upon your nation famine, sickness, or the tomahawk of a stronger nation, who will cut you off from the land. Consider this thing, then, well, before you strike; his hand is uplifted over your heads and his stroke will follow yours. My son, I tell you these things because I wish your nation well. I wish them to become a peaceable, happy, and prosperous nation. And if this war against the Osages concerned yourselves alone, I would confine myself to giving you advice, and leave it to yourselves to profit by it.— But this war deeply concerns the United States. Between you and the Osages is a country of many hundred miles extent belonging to the United States. Between you, also, is the Mississippi, the river of peace. On this river are floating the boats, the people, and all the produce of the western states of the union. This commerce must not be exposed to the alarm of war parties crossing the river, nor must a path of blood be made across our country. What we say to you, my son, we say also to the Osages. We tell them that armed bands of warriors, entering on the lands or waters of the United States, without our consent, are the enemies of the United States. If, therefore, considerations of your own welfare are not sufficient to restrain you from this unauthorised war, let me warn you on the part of the United States to respect their rights, not to violate their territory.

“ You request, my son, to be informed of our warfares, that you may be enabled to inform your nation on your return. We are yet at peace, and shall continue so, if the injustice of other nations will permit us. The war beyond the water is universal; we wish to keep it out of our island; but should we go to war, we wish our red children to take no part in it. We are able to fight our own battles; and we know that our red children cannot

afford to spill their blood in our quarrels. Therefore, we do not ask it, but wish them to remain at home in quiet, taking care of themselves and their families. You complain that the white people in your neighborhood, have stolen a number of your horses. My son, the secretary at war will take measures for enquiring into the truth of this; and if it so appears, justice shall be done you.

“The two swords you ask shall be given to you; and we shall be happy to give you every other proof that we esteem you personally, my son; and shall always be ready to do any thing which may advance your comfort and happiness. I hope you will deliver to your nation the words I have spoken to you, and assure them that, in every thing which can promote their welfare and prosperity, they shall ever find me their true and faithful friend and father—that I hold them fast by the hand of friendship, which I hope they will not force me to let go.

“(Signed)

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

“December, 1808.”

“*My Son, Captain Hendrick, and my Children, the Delawares, Moniccons, and Munsics.*”

“I am glad to see you here, to receive your salutations, and to return them, by taking you by the hand, and renewing to you the assurances of my friendship. I learn, with pleasure, that the Miamis and Potawatamies have given you some of their lands on the White river to live on, and that you propose to gather there your scattered tribes and to dwell on it all your days.

“The picture which you have drawn, my son, of the increase of our numbers, and the decrease of yours, is just; the causes are very plain, and the remedy depends on yourselves alone.—You have lived by hunting the deer and buffalo; as these have been driven westward, you have sold out on the sea board, and moved westwardly in pursuit of them. As they became scarce there, your food has failed you; you have been a part of every year without food, except the roots and other unwholesome things you could find in the forests. Scanty and unwholesome food produce diseases and death among your children, and hence you have raised fur, and your numbers have decreased. Frequent wars, too, and the abuse of spirituous liquors, have assisted in lessening your numbers. The whites, on the other hand, are in the habit of cultivating the earth, of raising stocks of cattle, hogs, and other domestic animals in much greater numbers than they could kill of deer and buffalo; having always a plenty of food and clothing, they raise abundance of children; they double their numbers every twenty years. The new swarms are continually advancing upon the country like flocks of pigeons, and so they will continue to do. Now, my children, if we wanted to diminish our numbers, we could give up the

culture of the earth, pursue the deer and buffalo, and be always at war. This would soon reduce us to be as few as you are; and if you wish to increase your numbers, you must give up the deer and buffalo, live in peace, and cultivate the earth. You see, then, my children, that it depends on yourselves alone, to become a numerous and great people. Let me entreat you, therefore, on the lands now given you, to begin to give every man a farm; let him enclose it, cultivate it, build a warm house on it, and when he dies let it belong to his wife and children after him. Nothing is so easy as to learn to cultivate the earth; all your women understand it; and to make it easier, we are always ready to teach you how to make ploughs, hoes, and other necessary utensils. If the men will take the labor of the earth from the women, they will learn to spin and weave, and to clothe their families. In this way you will also raise many children. You will double your numbers every twenty years, and soon fill the land your friends have given you; and your children will never be tempted to sell the spot on which they have been born, raised, have labored, and called their own. When once you have property, you will want laws and magistrates to protect your property and persons, and to punish those among you who commit crimes. You will find that our laws are good for this purpose. You will wish to live under them; you will unite yourselves with us, join in our great councils, and form one people with us, and we shall all be Americans. You will mix with us by marriage. Your blood will run in our veins, and will spread with us over this great island.

“Instead then, my children, of the gloomy prospect you have drawn of your total disappearance from the face of the earth, which is true, if you continue to hunt the deer and buffalo and go to war, you see what a brilliant aspect is offered to your future history. If you give up war and hunting, adopt the culture of the earth, and raise domestic animals. You see how, from a small family you may become a great nation, by adopting the course, which, from the small beginning you have described, has made us a great nation.

“My Children, I will give you a paper declaring your right to hold against all persons the lands given you by the Miamis and Potawatamies, and that you never can sell them without their consent. But I must tell you, that if ever they and you agree to sell, no paper which I can give you can prevent your doing what you please with your own. The only way to prevent this, is to give to every one of your people a farm, which shall belong to him and his family, and which the nation shall have no right to take from them and sell. In this way alone, can you ensure the lands to your descendents, through all generations, and that it shall never be sold from under their feet. It is not the keeping your lands which will keep your people alive on

them, after the deer and buffalo shall have left them. It is the cultivating them alone which can do that. The hundredth part in corn and cattle, will support you better than the whole in deer and buffalo.

“My son Hendrick, deliver these words to your people. I have spoken to them plainly, that they may see what is before them, and that it is in their own power to go on dwindling to nothing, or to become again a great people. It is for this reason I wish them to live in peace with all people; to teach their young men to love agriculture, rather than war and hunting. Let these words sink deep in their hearts, and let them often repeat them and consider them. Tell them that I hold them fast by the hand, and that I will ever be their friend, to advise and assist them in following the true path to their future happiness.

“(Signed)

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

“December, 1803.”

“*To my Children, the Miamis, Potawatamies, Delawares, and Chippewas:*

“Some of you are old enough to remember, and the younger have heard from their fathers, that this country was formerly governed by the English. While they governed it, there were constant wars between the white and the red people. To such a height was the hatred of both parties carried, that they thought it no crime to kill one another in cold blood whenever they had an opportunity. This spirit led many of the Indians to take side against us in the war; and at the close of it, the English made peace for themselves, and left the Indians to get out of it as well as they could. It was not till twelve years after that we were able, by the treaty of Greenville, to close our wars with all our red neighbors. From that moment, my children, the policy of this country towards you, has been entirely changed. General Washington, our first President, began a line of just and friendly conduct towards you. Mr. Adams, the second, continued it; and from the moment I came into the administration, I have looked upon you with the same good will as my own fellow citizens, have considered your interests as our interests, and peace and friendship as a blessing to us all. Seeing, with sincere regret, that your people were wasting away, believing that this proceeded from your frequent wars, and the destructive use of spirituous liquors, and the scanty supplies of food, I have inculcated peace with all your neighbors, have endeavored to prevent the introduction of spirituous liquors among you, and have pressed on you to rely for food on the culture of the earth more than on hunting. On the contrary, my children, the English persuade you to hunt. They supply you with spirituous liquors, and are now endeavoring to engage you to join them in the war against us, should a war take place.

You possess reason, my children, as we do, and you will judge for yourselves which of us advise you as friends. The course they advise, has worn you down to your present numbers; but temperance, peace, and agriculture, will raise you up to what your forefathers were, will prepare you to possess property, to wish to live under regular laws, to join us in our government, to mix with us in society, and your blood and ours, united, will spread again over the great island.

“My children, this is the last time I shall speak to you as your father; it is the last counsel I have to give. I am now too old to watch over the extensive concerns of the seventeen states and their territories. I have, therefore, requested my fellow citizens to permit me to retire to live with my family, to choose another chief and another father for you, and in a short time I shall retire, and resign into his hands the care of your and our concerns. Be assured, my children, he will have the same friendly disposition towards you which I have had, and that you will find in him a true and affectionate father.—Entertain, therefore, no uneasiness on account of this change, for there will be no change as to you. Indeed, my children, this is now the disposition towards you of all our people. They look upon you as brethren, born in the same land, and having the same interests. In your journey to this place, you have seen many of them. I am certain they have received you as brothers, and been ready to show you every kindness. You will see the same on the road by which you will return; and were you to pass from north to south, or east to west, in any part of the United States, you would find yourselves always among friends. Tell this, therefore, to your people on your return home. Assure them that no change will ever take place in our dispositions towards them. Deliver to them my adieus, and my prayers to the Great Spirit for their happiness. Tell them, that during my administration, I have held their hand fast in mine, that I will put it into the hand of their new father, who will hold it as I have done.

“(Signed)
“December 1808.”

THOMAS JEFFERSON.

CHAPTER XVI

THE unjustifiable aggressions of the British government becoming every day more and more provoking to the United States, and the attention of the government being turned seriously to the organizing and disciplining the militia, Governor Harrison, as usual, perfectly alive to every thing which had for its object the prosperity or the defence of his country, gave much attention to the subject of the militia. He, in common with other military characters, even the great Washington himself, could not but perceive the glaring defects in the militia system. He therefore wrote a long and interesting letter to Governor Scott, of Kentucky; and as there has been but little improvement, if any, in the militia system from that time to the present, it has been deemed not only proper, but important, that his letter should, in this work, be laid before the public. Without further preface, therefore, it shall be quoted below.

“ Vincennes, 10th March, 1809.

“ DEAR SIR,

“ Since it appears probable that our government will not be able much longer to pursue that system of accommodation and forbearance from which it has derived so much honor, and the people so much prosperity, it is not surprising that more than common solicitude should be manifested to effect a more perfect and effective organization and discipline of the militia. I have accordingly observed, that in all the communications which have been lately made by the executives of the states and territories to their respective legislatures, the subject has been pressed with more than common earnestness. The manner in which you noticed it to the general assembly of Kentucky, particularly engaged my attention, because I always calculated that the weight of your character and influence, added to the authority of chief magistrate, would do much in the removal of those errors which unfortunately pervade all our militia systems; and that, under your auspices and guidance, the hardy sons of Kentucky would afford an example of military discipline, as they frequently have of military ardor, which would produce the most beneficial effects to our country. I knew, indeed, that ignorance, obstinacy, and deep rooted prejudices, were to be overcome; but I flattered myself that your fellow citizens would

listen to the advice of an old and faithful friend, whose military experience had been acquired in many a bloody field, and whose patriotism and disinterestedness had been manifested through a long life devoted to their service. In the list of acts passed at the last session of your legislature, I observe one to amend the militia laws. I am not informed in what those amendments consist; but to answer any valuable purpose, they must be such as would leave few features of your former system. I have never seen any of the militia laws of the eastern states; but those of the southern, middle, and western states, so nearly resemble each other, that the objections I shall make, will apply to all; and that these are radically defective, one melancholy fact sufficiently demonstrates. With the exception of large towns, where there are volunteer military associations, entirely independent of the militia law, is there a single brigade, from the St. Mary's to the Hudson, and from the Potomac to the Mississippi, so well disciplined as to perform the common evolutions, which the laws direct them to be taught, with sufficient precision to satisfy a military man? If such a one there is, it has escaped my observation and enquiry. And what, my dear sir, is the fact with regard to our own section of the Union? Our able bodied men have been embodied and formed into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, and the proper number and grade of officers appointed to command them; but after making the allowance for the increase of numbers, do they form a better defence for the country than she possessed fifteen or twenty years ago, when there was scarcely any organization at all? From a knowledge of the ardent patriotism which pervades the western country, I am confident that an army of volunteers might be raised whenever the government may call for one; but would it be composed of men better disciplined, or better calculated for immediate service, than those who composed the various expeditions undertaken in the course of the Indian war, when no attempt to train them to regular discipline had been made. No one, who is in the least acquainted with what the militia were, and what they are now, can answer the question affirmatively. It follows, then, that our militia laws have been of no use, and that the time which has been spent by our citizens in days of muster, is just so much lost to themselves and the community; or rather worse than lost, for it is too well known that they are generally devoted to riot and intemperance.

“I have never met with a single individual, who would affirm that he had derived any benefit from the militia musters. The industrious man and the good citizen attend them because the laws direct them to do so, and to save their fines; but they make their escape as soon as possible, with the conviction that they have lost a day, which might have been usefully employed at home, without having benefitted their country. It is the lazy and

Intemperance alone who rejoice at the approach of the muster day, because it affords an opportunity of gratifying their vicious propensities. These observations apply more particularly to the company musters, where, I believe, in nineteen out of twenty instances, little else is done, that relates to military duty, than barely calling the rolls. At battalion or regimental musters, there are generally, indeed, some awkward attempts made to perform the manual exercise, and some few of the evolutions directed by the Baron de Steuben. In the few instances where these happen to be commanded by old revolutionary officers, or others who have in some degree attended to their duty, the progress that they might make in discipline is entirely prevented by the great length of time which intervenes between the days of training. Our laws generally prescribe a battalion muster in the spring, and a regimental one in the fall. It rarely happens that more than one of these take place; but in the few instances where punctuality is observed, and where the commanding officer is capable, and really attempts to instruct his men, it must be evident that the lesson given in the spring will be totally obliterated before the fall; and of that which is given in the latter season, not a trace will remain at the expiration of the seven months which brings about the vernal meeting. How it could be supposed that the science of war could be learnt in this manner, is most surprising; and yet, bad as it is, this is the best side of the picture; for it is very certain, that, throughout the western country, of those who command the various militia corps, there are very few who are better informed than the men whom they attempt to teach. Our legislatures appear to be well apprised of the importance of a well disciplined militia; the preamble to many of the laws express this conviction. But they seem to have supposed that nothing was necessary to effect their wishes, more than to cause the men to be enrolled and formed into companies, regiments, &c. and occasionally to meet together. They did not recollect that, to make men soldiers, instructors were necessary; and to procure these, sufficient encouragement should be given to induce persons to qualify themselves for the task. This is not so easily attained as is generally supposed. To form a complete disciplinarian upon the system of modern tactics, requires preparation, and as much knowledge and science as for either of those professions to which the appellation of learned has been applied. Nor is the skill necessary for manœuvring a regiment or brigade, to be acquired without considerable attention and practical instruction. It is impossible to acquire it by reading alone. A man may, indeed, make himself acquainted with the manner of performing certain manœuvres in this way; but the grace, the harmony, and precision of movement, so necessary in all military evolutions, can only be acquired by practice. If our legislatures are

really desirous to have the militia so well disciplined as to form an effectual defence to our country against every invader—if they wish to bring it to such a state of perfection as entirely to supercede the necessity of a standing army, the system heretofore in use must be entirely changed. Instead of the few days now appropriated to the purpose of training, and the very few hours of those days actually employed, some weeks, at least, must be devoted to the purpose, and the men must be taught, in camps of discipline, those duties which, representing a faithful image of actual war, form the best school in which it can be taught. For the accomplishment of an object so desirable, no pains or expense should be spared. Able officers should be sought after and employed, and every stimulus should be used to engage our youth to enter with ardor on a course of discipline which is to qualify them to defend their country. Occasional military orations should teach them the necessity of subordination and obedience, and by placing before them the illustrious examples of military virtue with which the history of the Grecian and Roman republics abound, impress on their minds that the temporary sacrifice of personal liberty, which the military life imposes, have been cheerfully submitted to by the purest patriots and the most zealous republicans. At the frequent reviews which should take place, particularly that by the commander in chief, every thing that is fascinating in military array, the “whole pomp of war,” should be introduced, to keep up the ardor of the youth, and excite the emulation of the several corps. Nor ought rewards and distinctions to be withheld from those who excel; the latter to be such only as accord with our republican institutions. However trifling would be the intrinsic value of the former, opinion would soon render them as precious to the receiver, as the oak or laurel crowns which were formerly the rewards of successful skill or valor. By a steady pursuit of this plan for a few years, our militia would become formidable to any enemy which should land upon our shores; for it is very certain that it is discipline alone, or the facility of performing evolutions with rapidity and precision, which makes one body of troops superior to another. Of this, numerous instances might be adduced from modern as well as ancient history. The Thebans were indebted for their victories over the then unconquered Spartans, as much to some new manœuvres which had been introduced into their tactics, and which they had practised with unwearied assiduity, as to the abilities of their generals, Epaminondes and Pelopidas. That unexpected and rapid movement, which decided the battle of Leuctra, could never have been executed in the face of such an enemy, if it had not been familiar to them from long previous practice; and at Mantinea, although their operations were directed by a perfect master of the art of war, who did every thing that depended

on him, by putting the wing of the enemy, composed of Athenians, *in the air*,* and bringing his Thebans to act hand in hand with the Spartans, the event still depended upon superior valor or superior discipline. Valor was no more predominant with the Thebans than with the Spartan infantry, and their evolutions were as well understood by the soldier as the general; but the superior compactness of the military wedge, composed of the proverbially stupid Boetians, the scorn of Greece, which practice had enabled them to preserve, triumphed over the descendants of Leonidas and the pupils of Agesilaus.

"The troops with which the great Frederick commenced the Silesian war, had never heard the report of a hostile gun; but in the battles of Molwitz, of Prague, and of Roseback, they practised those lessons which they had been taught in the peaceful fields of Berlin and Potsdam. When he was preparing for his first campaign, the Austrian minister wished to dissuade him from the enterprise, by inspiring him with fears for a contest, where his *parade battalions* would have to encounter the veteran troops of his mistress, the empress queen, whose valor and discipline had been proved in fields of actual danger. "Your majesty's troops are very fine," said he, "but you must recollect that ours have seen the wolf." "You think my troops are fine," said Frederick, "I will convince you that they are good." The succeeding battle of Molwitz showed that troops which can manœuvre well, though they have never seen an enemy, are able to cope with veterans, and to conquer, in spite of the blunders of their generals. The King had committed a mistake, which could not have been remedied if the discipline of the troops had been less perfect.

"I have recommended camps of discipline for instruction those who are already capable of bearing arms; but the career of military instruction for our youth, should commence as soon as their mental and bodily powers have acquired sufficient strength. Professorships of tactics should be established in all our seminaries, and even the amusements of the children should resemble the gymnasia of the Greeks, that they may grow up in the practice of those exercises, which will enable them to bear with the duties of the camp and the labors of the field.

"It will, no doubt, be urged as a reason for continuing the old plan, that the poorer class of our citizens cannot spare five or six weeks in a year from their farms to learn military duty. I know that they cannot without being paid. But is not our

* A body of troops in action, are said to be *in the air*, when they are placed in such a situation, either by the blunders of their own general, or by the talents of his adversary, as to be useless. Thus, in the battle above referred to, Epaminondas posted five thousand men so advantageously as completely to keep in check the whole Athenian wing, which could not move to the assistance of the Spartans without exposing their flanks, and thereby subjecting themselves to destruction.

government able to pay them? If not, they ought to make themselves so by laying on additional taxes. But I am persuaded that the money which is devoted to other objects, might be more usefully, and certainly more consistently, applied to this purpose. Under our present circumstances, the six thousand regular troops we have, are very proper; but I think that one hundred thousand disciplined militia would be better, and that the money which is spent in the former, would soon effect the discipline of the latter. I am far from thinking a fleet unnecessary, and there is no man who attaches more importance to the improvement of our country by canals and roads. I do not think, however, that these should be the first objects on which our revenue should be expended, and I recollect to have read, that every man in Rome was a soldier before they had a fleet, or an Appian or Flaminian way. The defence of every despotic government is a standing army. Despots, therefore, make it the first object of their care and expense. The safety of a republic entirely depends on the discipline of its militia, and we very inconsistently make it the last object of our attention.—The general government have lately turned their thoughts to the militia, and have resolved to arm the whole of them. You, my dear sir, need not be told that a system of instruction should be commenced as soon as the arms are delivered; and that, even with this system, the arms should only be put into the hands of the men when they had learnt to value and take care of them. Unless this precaution should be used, the millions of dollars which the arms would cost, would be much better expended upon gunboats, on which the eloquent author of the “attempt to arm the whole of the militia,” has lavished so much bitter invective and sarcasm.

“It would certainly be better to apply the money that is intended to arm the whole, to discipline and arm a part of the militia. And it ought to have occurred to Mr. Randolph, than whom no man is better acquainted with history, that Carthage possessed arms as well as Rome, but not, like the latter, a disciplined militia. Rome, therefore, survived the defeats of Trebiæ, of Theopœmane, and Cannæ, whilst the fate of Carthage was determined by the single defeat of Zama. The loss of men, compared with her population, was nothing. Men in abundance were left, but no soldiers. Let her militia be disciplined, and the independence of America would be preserved against a world united. The loss of her capital and successive defeats might distress, but would not ruin her: as long as she had men enough to form an army, liberty would have a temple. In Greece, (as long as Greece was free,) every man was a soldier. Hence it happened that those small republics could be conquered only by extirpation. In the disastrous Sicilian expedition, a third of the citizens of Athens perished, and yet she

survived to reap new laurels, whilst the proud empire of Carthage was humbled in the dust by a single defeat. The immortal victories of Marathon, Salamis, and Platea, were achieved by a disciplined militia; and the Roman legions, which conquered the world, were nothing more. Among those hardy republicans, nothing could be more disgraceful than to be thought ignorant of the tactics then in practice, or to be unable to manage with skill and dexterity, the spear and the shield.*

“WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“GOVERNOR SCOTT, KENTUCKY.”

CHAPTER XVII.

ON the 3d of March, 1809, the venerable Jefferson retired from office, “with all his blushing honors thick upon him;” and on the 4th, Mr. James Madison acceded to the Presidential chair. The secretary at war, General Dearborn, also retired, and was succeeded by Mr. William Eustis.

The period of Mr. Jefferson’s service, (eight years,) was a most important era in the government of the United States.— During the presidency of his immediate predecessor, John Adams, there were not only strong symptoms of that government merging into the most tyrannical and mischievous of all governments, an oligarchy, but there had been giant strides made to the actual perfecting of such a government. An alien and sedition law had been passed, and many steps taken towards strengthening the hands of the general government, not only at the expense of the state governments, but almost to their entire extinction. In fact, it was evident that the intention of the ruling powers, at that time, was, to consolidate all the powers of government in one grand party, at the capital of the Union, which was to give laws to the states, without leaving to their own legislatures the shadow of sovereignty. But at this critical

* A copy of this letter was forwarded to government.

period, the jealousy of the democracy was completely awakened, and, with Jefferson at their head, they soon found means to stifle the hydra in its infancy. The period, therefore, which raised this philosopher and philanthropist to the head of affairs, ought to be looked up to as the age of a second revolution—a revolution which extricated the people of these United States from a thralldom not less galling, if not more oppressive, than the domination of Britain herself.

All the measures of Mr. Jefferson's administration, tended to republicanise the whole Union. And while the general government at Washington, had all the power, and all the respectability, necessary to a federal government, or the head of a confederacy of independent states, every measure was promoted towards the complete establishment of national sovereignty in each of those states, and every thing discouraged which had the semblance of aristocratical power. The alien and sedition laws were repealed immediately, and other salutary measures adopted. In the relations with European nations, also, the Jefferson administration was remarkable for its wisdom, moderation and firmness. By the wise measures he pursued, the United States were enabled to stand aloof from being involved with any of the belligerents; by which means, wise and energetic as they were, the citizens of the United States were gainers, not losers, by the European contests—a circumstance highly favorable to the country, in its then state of infancy; as it must be acknowledged that, if those pacific measures had not prevailed, it could not have arrived at that state of maturity in which we found it at the commencement of the war with Britain; which war we may fairly attribute to the jealousy of that maturity in the minds of those who exercised the powers of government in England. Mr. Jefferson, therefore, retired, with the blessings of republicans upon his head: and even his most violent opponents—those who deprecated, at the commencement of his administration, “the destruction he was to bring upon the country,”—were not only silenced, but approbation was extorted from them.

We regret extremely that our limited talents, as well as space, precludes our further enlarging upon this grateful theme, and expressing, in terms suitable to, and worthy of, the subject, the high sense we entertain of the mighty and important services which have been rendered by this truly great man, to the cause of republicanism, and to the cause of mankind at large. With a deep sense of inadequacy to the task, therefore, we take leave of the subject, and proceed with our history.

Early in April 1809, the Governor received a despatch from the agent at fort Wayne, stating that it had been reported to him, that the Chippewas, the Ottawas, and Potawatamies, were hurrying away from the prophet, and that the reason which they had assigned for their deserting him, was, that he had required

them to take up the hatchet against the white people, to destroy the inhabitants of Vincennes, and those who lived upon the Ohio, so low down as its mouth, and up as high as Cincinnati—that the Great Spirit had ordered them to do this, and that their own destruction would be the consequence of their refusal.— Though this information had been given to the agent by two very respectable men, and men who were of unquestionable integrity and strict veracity, he affected to think that it was by no means the intention of the Indians to commence hostilities. He said that he understood there were but about eighty to one hundred warriors with the prophet, and that, though he did not doubt his inclination to do mischief, if he had power, yet it was not likely that, with so small a force, he would attempt any thing against the whites. He also was of opinion that those few who did adhere to the prophet, would not long remain with him for want of provisions. It appears, however, that he had given but a very imperfect report of the information he had received; and, also, that he had but slender grounds on which to form his opinion, as he had been absent during the winter, when many arrangements were made by the prophet, of which he had no knowledge. The Governor himself had information from other sources, and, among others, from the two gentlemen mentioned by the Fort Wayne agent; by which it appeared that, though there might be but about eighty to a hundred warriors with the prophet, yet, within the distance of forty or fifty miles from his village, he had four or five times that number who were devoted to him. He had also reason to believe that the story circulated of the determination of the Chippewas, and the Ottawas of lake Michigan, to fall in with the prophet, was a mere pretext, suggested by the British to cover the real designs of the former; and that, when they would reach the Wabash, they would, instead of attacking, join the prophet and the Winebagoes, and attack the Americans. Under these circumstances and considerations, he determined to organize two companies of volunteer militia, agreeably to the instructions contained in the letter of the secretary at war, dated 17th September, 1807. With this force he intended to reinforce the garrison of Fort Knox, the general depot of the arms and ammunition for the use of the militia—a post about two miles from Vincennes, and which, from its being garrisoned with only fourteen or fifteen men, under lieutenant Whitlock, was liable to be surprised by a small party of Indians, without risk to themselves, as there was not a single family settled to the north or northeast, to give notice of their approach. By this arrangement the post of Fort Knox would be defended, and Vincennes itself covered. A detachment of twelve or fifteen men, from Fort Knox, was posted in the settlement of Bussaron, from which scouts were constantly kept out for some distance round the settlements. He also directed the

agent at Fort Wayne, to call upon the Delaware, Miami, and Potawatamie tribes to fulfil that article of the treaty of Greenville, by which they were bound to prevent any party, with hostile intentions, from passing through their country. This was, indeed, essential to their own safety; for, as the Americans would pursue the attacking party, it would be impossible to distinguish the different tribes, and therefore the innocent in all probability would suffer for the guilty; at any rate, it would always be in the power of the hostile tribes so to manage their attack as to make it appear the act of our friends; and the war, commenced by a few of the most feeble and insignificant, would gradually extend to all the rest.

Corroborative of the information contained in the agent's letter, and that received from Messrs. Dubois and Lafontaine, alluded to above, the Governor received a letter, by express, from governor Lewis, relative to the hostile designs of the Indians resident on the upper parts of the Mississippi. From all these circumstances, he could no longer doubt the hostile intentions of the savage tribes on the Mississippi and Illinois rivers—those attached to the prophet on the Wabash included. Mr. Lafontaine and Mr. Dubois seemed to be much better informed of the real views of the Indians, than Mr. Wells, the fort Wayne agent. The latter knew nothing of the combination of the Indians of the Mississippi and Illinois; but Mr. Lafontaine had more knowledge of the Indians than any other of the traders. He had a general knowledge of their language, and had been among them for thirty years, and he was a man of strict honor and veracity.

In a few days after the above intelligence had been communicated to the Governor, he received some information from two Indian traders, which served to dissipate his anxiety in regard to an immediate rupture with the Indians—at least so far as related to those on the Wabash and its waters. Those two men had spent the winter at the Potawatamie town, a few leagues below the station of the prophet. They positively asserted, that the prophet was feared and hated by all the tribes in the neighborhood, the Kickapoos alone excepted; and that it was only the dread of his supernatural powers which prevented them from falling on him, such is the dominion held by superstition over the minds of ignorant and untutored savages; but that was in a great measure destroyed by an accident which had occurred a few days previous. The prophet had always declared, that the least violence which should be offered to him or his followers, would be punished by the immediate interposition of the Great Spirit, who would not fail to destroy the perpetrator of so great a crime. Three young men of the Ottawa or Chippewa tribe, were determined, however, to put this matter to the proof, and, by the direction of their chiefs, entered the prophet's camp,

and murdered a squaw within two steps of his hut, effecting their escape to the camp of their friends, above forty miles distant. And those traders were of opinion that they would not fail to attack the prophet as soon as they should be prepared for it.

This information was likely to induce the Governor to disband the two companies of militia; but having gone through the difficulty of having the organization perfected, he thought it better to defer that measure till he should hear something decisive from governor Lewis; and he was the more confirmed in the resolution, when he reflected, that, if an attack by the Indians was seriously meditated, they were capable of the deepest dissimulation, in order to strike the blow the more effectually.— Instead, therefore, of disbanding them he paid the most marked attention to their discipline, teaching them those evolutions which were suitable to the nature of the service in which they were likely to be employed. In the middle of May, however, all apprehension of attack from the Indians was completely done away, as the party with the Shawanese prophet dispersed, with evident indications of terror and dismay. Whether to attribute this unexpected movement to the military preparations made by the Governor, to the want of provisions, to disappointment on the part of the prophet with respect to the force which he expected to raise, or to a combination of all these causes, the Governor seemed uncertain; but in order, as far as possible, to come at the truth, and further to develop the character of the impostor, he engaged a confidential Frenchman who was well acquainted with the Indian languages, to reside for some weeks at the prophet's town, to watch his motions and discover his politics.

The Governor had, for some years, considered a further extinguishment of Indian title to the north east of the Vincennes settlement, and extending from the Wabash to the purchase made at the treaty of Greenville, as a most desirable object; and conceiving that a favorable opportunity then offered for such a purchase, he wrote to government for instructions to that effect.

To this he had a prompt reply, authorising him to take advantage of the most favorable moment for extinguishing the Indian title to the lands on the east of the Wabash, and adjoining south on the lines established by the treaties of Fort Wayne and Grousland, and to prevent any future dissatisfaction, all the chiefs of the nations, who had, or pretended to have, any right to these lands; were desired to be present at the treaty, and, if practicable, to obtain the cession without leaving any reservation.— It was left discretionary with the Governor to stipulate in what manner the consideration should be paid, whether in a gross sum, payable after the ratification of the treaty, or an annuity for years, or in perpetuity, or partly of both these modes.

Such was the perfect satisfaction given to the government of the United States (under both the former and present administration,) in all his negotiations and treaties with the Indians hitherto, that Governor Harrison seems to have had the entire confidence of the present executive as well as the former, and every possible dependence was placed in his prudence and integrity. He received a letter from the secretary at war, expressive of the fullest approbation of his conduct, and requesting of him his opinion as to the best mode of defence for the western country in case of war; to which he made the following reply, which, containing much important information, as well on the subject of the Shawanese prophet, as on the proper disposition of troops and the erection of forts, &c. for the protection of the western frontier, is given entire. It is dated Vincennes, 5th July, 1809.

"To the Honorable William Eustis, Secretary at War.

"SIR,

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 5th ultimo. The President's and your own approbation of my conduct is highly gratifying to me, and permit me to assure you, sir, that no exertions shall be wanting on my part, to merit a continuation of the confidence of the administration.

"The Shawanese prophet and about 40 followers arrived here about a week ago. He denies most strenuously any participation in the late combination to attack our settlements, which he says was entirely confined to the tribes of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers; and he claims the merit of having prevailed upon them to relinquish their intentions.

"I must confess that my suspicions of his guilt have been rather strengthened than diminished at every interview I have had with him since his arrival. He acknowledges that he received an invitation to war against us, from the British, last fall, and that he was apprised of the intentions of the Sacks, Foxes, &c. early in the spring, and warmly solicited to join in their league. But he could give no satisfactory explanation of his neglecting to communicate to me circumstances so extremely interesting to us, and towards which, I had, a few months before, directed his attention, and received a solemn assurance of his cheerful compliance with the injunctions I had impressed upon him.

"The result of all my enquiries on the subject, is, that the late combination was produced by British intrigue and influence, in anticipation of war between them and the United States. It was, however, premature and ill judged, and the event sufficiently manifests a great decline in their influence, or in the talents and address, with which they have been accustomed to manage their Indian relations.

"The warlike and well armed tribes of the Potawatamies, Ottawas, Chippewas, Delawares and Miamis, I believe neither

had, nor would have joined in the combination; and although the Kickapoos, whose warriors are better than those of any other tribe, the remnant of the Wyandot excepted, are much under the influence of the prophet. I am persuaded that they were never made acquainted with his intentions, if these were really hostile to the United States.

“As you do me the honor to request my opinion with respect to the troops destined to protect the western frontiers, I will communicate the result of my reflections with great pleasure.

“Such is the nature of Indian warfare, that I am persuaded that one hundred thousand men would not be able to form a cordon along the frontiers of this territory, Michigan, and the state of Ohio, sufficiently compact to preserve our settlements from their desultory attacks in case of a general combination of the north-western tribes against us; and any fort, which is built with a view to form any part of such a line of defence, would, in my opinion, be useless. The chain of forts began by general St. Clair, and completed by general Wayne, extending into the Indian country from the Ohio, and which were so situated as to cover the settlements from any attack but that of Indians, afforded not the least security to the inhabitants, and were no further useful than as resting places for the small convoys which were employed to throw in provisions for the campaign at the head of the line. As we have no elevation in the whole of what was the north-western territory, that could be designated by the name of mountain, we have consequently no difficult passes, such as the ancient world, and some of the Atlantic states afford; the securing of which, would necessarily command the country for a considerable extent. There are, however, military positions to be found, which, if properly improved, would not only prevent the ingress of any regular force, but would effectually keep the Indians in check. These are to be sought for along the great water courses which bound the country on either sides, and in those excellent channels of communication which nature has provided to unite them. Without the aid of these the bulky articles which make up the returns of the Indian market, could never be taken out. The country being remarkably flat, the roads are excessively bad in winter; and in the summer, the immense prairies to the west and north of this, produce such myriads of flies as to render it impossible to make use of pack horses. Hence it follows, that a few well situated positions on the straits which unite the lakes on the Mississippi, and on the communications which connect the latter with the former, would completely control the Indian trade, and consequently the Indians themselves. I suppose that the forces to be stationed at Detroit, ought, in some measure, to be regulated by that kept by the British, in the neighboring fortress of Malden. This has, I believe, for several years, not exceeded two weak companies, and is at present reduced to one.

“The fort at Detroit can have little or no influence in controlling the Indian trade, because it does not command the strait; and if it did, much the greater part of the trade is now, and the whole could be carried on by the land route of the Grand river. The proper position for our object is, therefore, to be sought for higher up. In case of a war between the United States and Great Britain, she could never think of defending Upper Canada, and no valuable purpose could be answered by a temporary possession of Detroit and the neighboring settlements. I can, therefore, see no good reason for an accumulation of force at this point.

“A strong regular work, to be garrisoned by two companies, but capable of accommodating a battalion, would, I should imagine, be amply sufficient. It would be highly desirable to have the fort to command the ship channel of the strait.

“When I was at Detroit in 1803, the British had, and I believe still have, six or seven armed vessels, carrying from eight to twenty-two guns, on lake Erie. With a part of this force, and with the assistance of the Indians, Mackinac would be easily reduced; as, from its insular situation, no reinforcements or supplies could reach it if the enemy should possess the superiority of naval force on the upper lakes; to prevent this, it will be necessary either to build a number of vessels equal to theirs, or, by fortifying the river of Detroit, confine them to lake Erie. A situation proper for this was the object of my enquiry, and Hog island, two miles above Detroit, was pointed out as the most eligible; there is, also, another favorable situation for commanding the navigation on the strait below lake St. Clair and lake Huron.*

“As the canoe route of the Grand river and lake Nepissin, to its entrance into lake Huron, is entirely within the British territory, the post of Mackinac is of considerable importance. It is here, and at the neighboring British post of St. Joseph's, that the valuable trade which is borne along the route above mentioned, and that which comes by the way of Detroit, is parcelled out for the various directions which it afterwards assumes. In the event of a war with the British, it will be their first object to furnish the tribes who espouse their cause, with a sufficiency of arms and ammunition, to render them independent of any supply from us for several years.

“The post of Mackinac, with the aid of one or two small armed vessels, would be a great check to the throwing in these supplies; but it could only be stopped entirely by erecting a work at the rapid of St. Mary's, the pass leading into lake Superior. This route into the Mississippi is not so good a one as that by Green Bay, Fox river, and Ouisconsin; but the one being

*This is the site of Fort Gratiot, erected during the War.

secured, and the other open, would expose us to the same mischiefs as if neither were guarded.*

“For the peace establishment of Mackinac, one disciplined complete company, under a vigilant officer, would be sufficient. Of all the communications between the lakes and the Mississippi, that from lake Michigan by the Fox and Ouisconsin rivers, is the most used, and the most interesting and important. It is through this channel, that nine tenths of the goods for the supply of the Indians above the Illinois river and Louisiana are conveyed, and until we have a military force upon it, we can never control either the traders or the Indians. I was so sensible of this, that in a treaty which I made at St. Louis, in 1804, with the Sacks and Foxes, I inserted a clause authorising the United States, to build a fort on either side of the Ouisconsin, or on the opposite bank of the Mississippi, as the one or the other should afford the best site.

“I am convinced that great advantage would arise from a company being stationed there. The village of Prairie du Chien, consisting of about thirty French families, is three miles above. The fort lately erected on the Mississippi, near the mouth of Desmoine, will serve as an intermediate post as support to that on the Ouisconsin. The site of the latter is, I am informed, extremely bad, being commanded by higher ground within musket shot.

“The post of Chicago is an important one. From its position, it secures the communication between lake Michigan and the Mississippi by means of a short creek on which the fort stands, and which actually takes rise in the same lake or swamp with the Illinois river; so that, in the spring, boats with their loading pass freely from one to the other. The site of Fort Wayne was selected by General Washington. To erect a fort there was the object of General St. Clair’s campaign. Its accomplishment by General Wayne, and a further knowledge of the country, sufficiently evinced the wisdom of the choice. Proceeding from Fort Wayne to the Wabash, and down that river at the distance of 150 miles from Fort Wayne, and 180 from this place, is the site of the old Wea towns, where there is a considerable reservation of lands, made by the treaty of Greenville, for a fort. The situation is beautiful, and, besides commanding the Wabash, is near the mouth of the Tippecanoe, which, discharging itself into the former, has its source in the neighborhood of the Illinois and St. Joseph’s of lake Michigan; to each of which there is a portage of nine to fourteen miles, much used by the Indians, and sometimes by traders. Notwithstanding these advantages, I would not recommend the building of a fort there. I think, however,

*Both these positions have been occupied since the peace. At St. Mary’s a strong work has been erected, and a still stronger one at Green Bay, which is the head quarters of a regiment.

that one other is necessary on the Wabash; but I should prefer it to be lower down, as near our boundary line as possible. The Indians would be greatly dissatisfied at our occupying the Wea towns; and the giving up the reservation at that place, would be a great inducement with the Weas to cede the country on which they now live, between this place and the Vermillion river.— There is no part of the Western country so much exposed as this. The tribes in our neighborhood, who were confederated in the war terminated by General Wayne, are numerous, war-like, and well armed, and are more than a match for all the others united, with whom we have intercourse. I believe, however, that they have no idea of again measuring their strength with ours. No other influence but that of the French could induce them to do it. But in the event of a French war, if they could be led to believe that there was even a possibility that their efforts, united to those of the French, would again put the latter in possession of this country, the remembrance of all the calamities which their frequent wars with us have brought upon them, and the justice and benevolence with which they have been treated since the peace, would be insufficient to prevent their taking part against us.

“The happiness which they enjoyed from their intercourse with the French, is their perpetual theme—it is their golden age. Those who are old enough to remember it, speak of it with rapture, and the young ones are taught to venerate it as the ancients did the reign of Saturn. “You call us your children,” said an old chief to me, “why do you not make us as happy as our fathers, the French, did? They never took from us our lands; indeed, they were in common between us. They planted where they pleased, and they cut wood where they pleased, and so did we; but now, if a poor Indian attempts to take a little bark from a tree to cover him from the rain, up comes a white man and threatens to shoot him, claiming the tree as his own.”

“When the first information of the cession of Louisiana to France reached them, they could not conceal their joy; and I sincerely believe that the appearance of the first French uniform at St. Louis, would have been the signal for revolt with all the tribes in this quarter, the Delawares excepted.

“The present garrison of Fort Knox is too near this town to be of as much advantage as if placed some distance above. A good situation could be found near our present boundary line; but if the further extinguishment of title, which I had the honor to propose, shall be accomplished, it might with more propriety be placed still further up. It appears to me, however, proper to have a company stationed somewhere in this neighborhood.

“I can see no advantage in keeping up the garrison of Fort Mossac, excepting as a depository of the stores, &c. destined for

Louisiana. This purpose would as well be answered by a careful non-commissioned officer and six men, as by the present garrison.

"A show of force in the neighborhood of St. Louis, would certainly contribute to awe the neighboring tribes; and if a whole regiment of infantry, and one or two companies of artillery, could be spared for the protection of upper Louisiana, and for garrisoning the posts of this and the Illinois territories, the field and staff officers of the regiment, with the remainder of the companies, might with propriety be placed there. An arrangement of this kind would have a great tendency to preserve discipline and subordination. Permit me to recommend that, in the forts which are far advanced in the Indian country, beside the deposite of six months provisions by the contractor, there should constantly be kept two or three hundred bushels of kiln dried corn, to be annually renewed. No loss could arise from this measure, as the old deposite could be sold to the traders or the Indians when the new should arrive.

"Contractors are so often negligent, and convoys of provisions, for a considerable distance through a wilderness, are subject to so many accidents, that I have known more than one instance where a garrison was upon the point of being forced to abandon its charge for want of food.*

"Should my recommendation, to place a company on the Wabash, near this place, be adopted, I should be much gratified to have lieutenant Whitlock, who at present commands Fort Knox, and is the paymaster of the district, continued. He served under my immediate command for several years; and I will venture to pronounce, that there is not a more zealous or attentive officer, or one possessed of better qualifications, in the service. He is now the oldest lieutenant of his regiment, if there be not already a vacancy for him. There is also a surgeon's mate to whom it would be very convenient to remain, as his connexions reside in this neighborhood.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON."

Previous to the Governor's entering into treaty with the Indians for the further extinguishment of title, which has been mentioned in page 129, it occurred to him that the county of Dearborn, in the territory of Indiana, was left in an awkward predicament, and that, to make all things straight and correct, an extinguishment of title to a tract of land as hereafter described, was absolutely necessary. This tract he had introduced into

* If this recommendation had been attended to, it would have been the salvation of the important post of Chicago and its garrison, which yielded to the Indians for no other cause but want of provision; and hence the massacre which ensued, which will be more particularly noticed in the history of the war.—EJ

the treaty of 1805, but in consequence of some of the chiefs refusing to sign it upon other terms, the article which related to it was expunged. The tract in question is thus described in the Governor's letter to the secretary at war, previous to the conclusion of the treaty: "It consists of three or four hundred thousand acres, adjoining Dearborn county on the west, the line running from the mouth of the Kentucky river so far south, as the line which was to form the north boundary of the other purchase made by the treaty of Grousland, and south by the said line."

Impressed with the great value of this tract under present circumstances, the Governor proceeded to Fort Wayne to meet the chiefs, and there to have it included in the treaty about to be made with them for the extinguishment of title to lands in another quarter. In the whole of this very important business he was completely successful, having, on the 30th of September, 1809, concluded with the Miami, Eel river, Delaware, and Potawatamie tribes, a treaty, in which was ceded all that tract of country which shall be included between the boundary line established by the treaty of Fort Wayne, the Wabash, and a line to be drawn from the mouth of Rackoon creek, emptying into the Wabash on the southeast side, about twelve miles below the mouth of Vermillion river, so as to strike the boundary line established by the treaty of Grousland, at such a distance from its commencement at the northeast corner of the Vincennes tract, as would leave the tract, then ceded, thirty miles wide at the narrowest place; and, also, all that tract included between the following boundaries, viz: beginning at Fort Recovery, thence southwardly along the boundary line established by the treaty of Greenville to the intersection of the line established by the treaty of Grousland; thence with said line to a point, from which a line, drawn parallel to the first mentioned line, will be twelve miles distant from the same, and along the said parallel line to its intersection with a line to be drawn from Fort Recovery parallel to the line established by the treaty of Grousland, and along the said parallel line to the place of beginning.

With the Kickapoos a separate treaty was made, by which they not only confirmed and gave their sanction to the above treaty, but also ceded another tract of land, which lies between the tract above ceded, the Wabash, the Vermillion river, and a line drawn from the north corner of the said ceded tract, so as to strike the Vermillion river at the distance of twenty miles from its mouth.

In the forming these treaties, the consent and sanction of all the tribes who had any claim, or the shadow of claim, was obtained, and the following sums, in goods and annuities, were agreed to be given, in compensation for the land ceded: To the

Delawares, a permanent annuity of 500 dollars; to the Miamis, a like annuity of \$700; to the Eel river tribe, a like annuity of \$350; to the Potawatamies, a like annuity of \$500; to the Weas, \$500, and a present sum of \$1500 dollars; to the Kickapoos, a like annuity of \$500, and a present sum of \$1500; to the Miamis, domestic animals to the amount of \$500, for that and the two following years; and to the Miamis, Eel rivers, Delawares, and Potawatamies, goods to the amount of \$5,200. The number of acres contained in those cessions, was 2,900,000.

With respect to the compensation, the Governor sounded them on the score of taking a present sum instead of an annuity; but he found that they were generally more inclined to have the long annuity than one for a shorter period, though larger, or to having the whole paid down. Thus far, they had departed from the usual policy of savages, to provide for the present moment, without caring for the future. This, however, was a principle inculcated on them by Mr. Jefferson himself, who told them that he considered it the duty of the United States to purchase their lands from them in this manner, when they wished to sell, even if the United States had no immediate use for the land.

Pending this treaty, a mischievous report had been made to the Indians that the President of the United States did not want their lands, and that Governor Harrison was about to purchase them on his own account. This evil insinuation was likely to be productive of much injury, which could not be got over otherwise than by the Governor's proposing to them to make a visit to the President, and have it from his own mouth, that he sanctioned the bargain. Of this they readily accepted, and he was obliged to send them forward at the expense of government, under the care and guidance of Mr. John Conner, one of the interpreters, to whom he gave strict charges as to the economy which he ought to use in his journey.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THUS closed the year 1809, and nothing material occurred till the latter part of April 1810, when the Governor received information that the Shawanese prophet was again exciting the Indians to hostilities against the United States. A trader, of the most undoubted veracity, who had been for some time at the residence of the impostor, assured him, the Governor, that the prophet had at least 1000 souls under his control, (perhaps 350 to 400 men,) principally composed of Kickapoos and Winebagoes, but with a considerable number of Potawatamies and Shawanese, and a few Chippewas and Ottawas.

The friends of the French traders among the Indians, advised them strongly, to separate themselves from the Americans in Vincennes, lest they should suffer in the attack which was meditated against the latter. It was plain that the hostile disposition of the prophet and his adherents, had been produced by the interference and intrigues of the British. There could be no doubt that they had received a considerable supply of ammunition from them, as they had refused to buy any from the American traders; saying that they had a plentiful supply, and that, when they wanted more, they could have enough without paying for it. And this appeared to the traders true enough, as they could observe that, at that time, they were in possession of great abundance of it.

At this time, the exposed and naked situation of Vincennes was such as to excite considerable apprehension in the mind of the Governor. He, therefore, recommended to government to have a fort built where he had mentioned some time before, which might induce settlers to fix themselves under cover of it; and thereby a sufficient militia force could be obtained to protect the town from any sudden surprise that might be projected by the Indians.

About the middle of May, the Governor received further information of the force, as well as the designs of the prophet. It appeared that the force then with him, consisted of from 600 to 800 men; and if, as it was reported, and was probable, the defection extended to all the tribes between the Illinois river and lake Michigan, the number might be doubled. However contemptible that number may appear to be, yet it was capable, from the nature and situation of the French settlements, of spreading devastation and slaughter to an immense extent.

It appears there was to have been held a large meeting some where about the St. Joseph's. To this meeting the Governor understood that the Delawares had sent a deputation, who had been instructed to dissuade the other tribes from listening to the prophet.

The Governor despatched Mr. Conner with a speech to the Delawares, in which he pointed out to them the inevitable destruction which awaited all those tribes which should dare to take up the hatchet against their fathers, and the great danger that the friendly tribes would incur, if war should be kindled, from the difficulty of discriminating friends from foes. He also desired the chiefs to send some faithful man after their deputies, with fresh instructions, which he dictated, and promised to compensate him for his trouble. He also sent for the leading member of the Shaker society, who resided about twenty miles from Vincennes, and endeavored to prevail on him to take a speech to the prophet, who affected to follow the Shaker principles in every thing but the vow of celibacy; and this leader of the Shakers had no hesitation in asserting that the Shawanose prophet was under the same divine inspiration that he himself was, but that, for reasons growing out of his situation as a savage, he and his immediate followers were permitted to cohabit with their women.

In conformity with the recommendation of the Governor respecting a detachment of men, as well as the establishment of a post on the Wabash, he received a letter from the secretary at war, of which the following is the extract which relates to the subject:

"If it shall be, in your judgment, necessary to establish a post on the Wabash, and within the late purchase, I shall confide in the knowledge of the country, of the objects to be embraced, and of service, peculiar to Governor Harrison, to give such instructions to the commanding officer as may be necessary." In another letter, of the same date, he informs him that "Captain Posey had been directed to move with a company, as full as the detachment at Newport, Ky. would admit, and, on his arrival at Vincennes, to report himself to the Governor." And in a subsequent letter, July 5, he was informed that 120 men, under the command of Captain Cross, were also descending the Ohio from Pittsburgh. Their destination had been Bellefontaine, near St. Louis; but they had orders to halt at Newport, and were put at the disposal of the Governor, provided he might think their presence necessary at Vincennes. It was also stated, that a part of the 6th regiment would be ordered to Pittsburgh, to be reinforced as circumstances might require; and that it was expected an accommodation would be effected between the government of the United States and that of Great Britain, as far as that hostilities were not to be apprehended. Captain

Floyd was ordered to Vincennes, to take command of the troops on their arrival; he being represented, by the secretary at war, as "a brave and capable officer."

The transactions of the prophet and his adherents, appeared every day to assume more consequence, and threaten more danger to the frontier settlers. It appears by the Governor's despatch to the secretary at war, that he had succeeded in gaining over to his party, the Huron or Wyandot tribe. This tribe, although inferior in numbers to most of the others, had always had great influence in the Indian councils. The other tribes called them their uncles, and venerated them for their superior talents and valor. To them was committed the custody of the great belt, which was the symbol of union between the tribes in their late war with the United States, and likewise the original duplicate of the treaty of Greenville. The prophet, knowing the great advantage he would derive from gaining over this tribe to his interests, attempted it, and succeeded. He sent to them a deputation, expressing his surprise that the Wyandots, who had directed the councils of the other tribes, as well as the treaty with the white people, should sit still, and see the property of the Indians usurped by a part—that he was desirous of seeing those treaties, to know what they contained.

The Wyandots answered, that they had preserved, with care, the belt which had formerly united all the tribes as one nation; but that it had remained so long in their hands without an enquiry being made after it, that they had supposed it was forgotten. They were glad, however, that it was at length called for. As for their own part, they were tired of their situation—that they had nothing nearer their hearts, than to see all the various tribes united again as one man—that they looked upon every thing that had been done since the treaty of Greenville, as good for nothing—and that they would unite their exertions with those of the prophet, to bring together all the tribes, and to get them to unite to put a stop to the encroachments of the white people, and endeavor to recover what had been unjustly taken from them—that they had been driven back until they could go no farther, and that they might as well die where they were, as be driven back upon those Indians who would probably kill them.

This answer the prophet had immediately circulated through all the tribes; and the effect of it was, that those who were before indifferent or inimical to the views of the prophet, hastened to him from every direction. The Wyandots passed through the village of Mississinaway, on their way to the prophet; and, at a conference with the Miami chiefs, they produced the great belt before mentioned, and reproached the Miamis with having deserted their Indian friends, and uniting themselves with the white people. The Miamis were so intimidated, that they consented to attend the meeting at the prophet's town, and sent for

the Weas to join them at Mississinaway, whence they would proceed together to the prophet's town. A chief of the Weas came to the Governor, and communicated to him the object of the journey; and from him, and two others of the same tribe, the above information was all obtained.

A few days before this period, a Piankishaw Indian called at the house of Mr. Dubois, (a French gentleman, who lived about a mile from Vincennes,) after his family had retired for the night, and told him by all means to remove beyond the Mississippi, as he might expect troublesome times soon, if he remained where he was.

An old Piankishaw, named Grosble, who was particularly attached to the United States, and personally to the Governor himself, asked his permission to remove over the Mississippi, alleging that he heard nothing among the Indians but the news of war, and as he intended to take no part in it, he wished to be out of danger. He told him that the prophet had actually formed a plan to surprise the town. He intended, in the guise of friendship, to come there with a large body of men; that four or five should be assigned to each house; and himself, with twelve or fifteen would enter the Governor's, and, when they had murdered him, a signal would be given by a person, posted for that purpose, to commence a general massacre. He boasted that he would follow the footsteps of the great Pontiac.* The Governor also received information from the person whom he had stationed at the prophet's town, that, as far as he could ascertain, there were about three thousand men within about thirty miles of the prophet's town, who were constantly counciling, but that they were extremely secret in their proceedings; but he had been informed by his friends, that it was at least determined to prevent the surveyors running any lines west of the Wabash.

From all the circumstances of the case, the Governor was fully impressed with the belief that it was by means of British influence that this combination was formed, and that, to augment the difficulties and embarrassments of the United States, they might have urged the Indians on to commence hostilities, though they had not the intention of declaring war themselves; and that a large party of the Indians was ripe for such an event he made no question.

Here a question may naturally arise, and it may very properly be asked. If the United States have, upon all occasions, manifested the strictest justice in their transactions with the Indians, how did it happen that they were not sensible of this, and that they should be governed by a power that had so often deceived them, and from whose intrigues and bad advice they had formerly suffered so much? It may be answered, that there is

*Pontiac, a celebrated Indian chief, who distinguished himself in the wars with the British, previous to the revolutionary war.

nothing about which nations are more divided, than the source of their misfortunes. We frequently find them attributed to causes the most opposite. The Indians in the western territory, were, in fact, miserable. The game which was formerly so abundant, was become so scarce as barely to afford subsistence to the most active hunters, the greater part of each tribe were actually in a state of starvation; and, astonishing as it might seem, those remote savages had felt their full share of the misfortunes which the European war had brought upon the greater part of the world. The exclusion of the English from the continent of Europe, where they were accustomed to dispose of the greater part of their peltry which they imported from Canada, had reduced the price of those articles to almost nothing. The Indians could scarcely procure for them the necessary ammunition; and they were so often induced to forego the purchase of that article to gratify their passion for ardent spirits, that it was not at all surprising that the British agents should have been able to persuade them that their misfortunes were produced by the extension of the American settlements. A portion of the enlightend American people themselves, at that period, had been taught to believe, by the emissaries of that government, that the embarrassments the country labored under, had grown out of the measures of its government, rather than from the unjust and iniquitous decrees of the British government. When men of education, talents, and intelligence were thus deceived, it could not be wondered at, that ignorant half starved savages were seduced by those who so well understood the arts of deception.

On the 15th of June, a boat, which had been sent up the Wabash with salt, in payment of annuities due to the Indians, returned. The person in whose charge it had been, reported that the prophet, and the Kickapoos with him, refused to accept of that part of it which he was directed to deliver to them. On his way up, he was directed, by the prophet, to leave the salt on the bank of the river, as he could not determine until his brother, the war chief, whom he had sent to Detroit, and whom he daily expected, would arrive. Upon the return of the boat, the master was directed to take the salt on board, as they were determined to have nothing to do with it. Whilst the hands were rolling in the barrels, the brother of the prophet seized the master and several others by the hair, and, shaking them violently, asked them if they were Americans. They, however, were all young Frenchmen. They also insulted Mr. Brouillette, and called him an American dog, and a young Potawatamie chief directed his men to plunder his house, which was immediately done, depriving him of all his provisions, tobacco, &c.

This man, Brouillette, was not known as an agent of the Governor. In order to disguise his real character, he kept a few articles to trade in.

It appeared, by the report of the boatmen, that the conduct of the young chief above mentioned, was highly displeasing to his tribe, and the chief, Winemack, was an open and avowed friend of the United States. He was much esteemed by the Governor, who had the utmost confidence in his integrity and attachment. On the same day a party of the Kickapoos, twenty in number, arrived at Vincennes. They parted between that and the Illinois river, with a large party of Sacks, Foxes, and Winebagoes, amounting, as they said, to eleven hundred, all going to the prophet and to the British. They also reported that Marpoc the Potawatamie chief of the Illinois river, had taken the same direction with his people.

About this time the Governor received the following letter from the agent at Fort Wayne.

“ *Fort Wayne, June 24, 1810.*

“ DEAR SIR,

“ A person just arrived, who, it appears, has lost himself on his route to Vincennes, affords me an opportunity of announcing to you my return to this post. I was delayed on my journey, in attending to the transportation of the public goods; and on my arrival in the state of Ohio, I had learned that the prophet's brother had lately been at work among the Shawanese on the Au-glaize, and, among other things, had burned your letter delivered to the chiefs at this place last fall. I accordingly took Wapaghkonetta in my route home, assembled the chiefs, and demanded the reason why they had suffered such an improper act to be committed at their door. They disavowed all agency in the transaction; and their entire disapprobation of the prophet's conduct, and concurring circumstances, satisfied me that they were sincere. The white persons at the town, informed me that not one of the chiefs would go into council with the prophet's brother, and that it was a preacher, named Riddle, who took the letter, to have it interpreted, and that the brother of the prophet took it from his hand, and threw it into the fire; declaring, that if Governor Harrison was there, *he would serve him so.* He told the Indians that the white people and the Government were deceiving them, and that, for his part, he never would believe them, or put any confidence in them—that he never would be quiet until he effected his purpose, and that, if he was dead, *the cause would not die with him.* He urged the Indians to move off to the Mississippi with him, and that there he would assemble his forces. All his arguments seemed to be bottomed on the prospect of hostilities against our people. He made no impression on the Shawanese, and went away much dissatisfied at their not coming into his views. I consider them among our best friends. I indirectly encouraged their emigration westward, and told them that their annuity should follow them. They

appear determined to remain, and are much attached to the town and the improvements, which are considerable.

“I am very sorry that I was not here when Mr. O’Neill passed. I agree, from all the information I can collect, that the prophet is endeavoring to form a combination among the Indians hostile to us. I shall be on the alert, and will take special care to apprise you of every thing that may be material, until the crisis passes away. The Indians, in any numbers, you know, cannot subsist long in one place. We may, therefore, calculate on hearing of their dispersing soon, or doing something worse.—Hendricks writes that a deputation from White river is gone to the prophet, and he thinks it will have the desired effect. I hope to hear the result soon. If this incendiary is not silenced in an amicable manner, I think forbearance on our part is no longer prudent. It is not for me to say what steps ought to be taken; but one thing is certain; if he is not put down soon, some district of our country will receive a blow. The information contained in the enclosed paper, procured from my interpreter’s wife, although it is in some respects improbable, taken in connection with the prophet’s conduct, deserves some consideration. It is sent to you as we received it. There is no possible inducement with the woman to contrive a falsehood.

“I have read your communication on the subject of the Indians going to the seat of government, and shall pay particular attention to it. I have seen none of the chiefs since my return, but I learn that many of them intend coming in when they understand I am here. I have sent for the Turtle, but he is unwell. I believe no difficulties exist with the Miamis, on the subject of the treaty with the Kickapoos, except with the Turtle; and that originated, like all other mischiefs of the kind, with ——. I will converse with the Turtle on the subject, and ascertain his objections. I do not apprehend much difficulty with him; *I have money to pay him.* I will be answerable, that not another soul of the Miamis makes a single objection, if —— lets them alone. I shall, in future, cherish the Mississinaway chiefs; for there is our strong hold. The Turtle is contemptible, beyond description, in the eyes of the Indians. I shall not suffer him to go to the President, nor the Five Medals either. They have been there too often already. If the deputation goes at all, it must be late in the season, as the President, during the warm weather, will be at his seat in Virginia, and the secretary of war probably in Massachusetts. I will have time enough to write you again on this subject.

“I think you will have to give up all idea of taking up — again. He is too unprincipled to be employed any where, except as an interpreter, and under your own eye, where you might watch him. I could detail to you a thousand instances of his total disregard of every thing that is held sacred by honest

and honorable men. Admitting he was restored here again (which in my opinion never can take place,) he would be useless to you and the government; for the latter never would put any confidence in his representations, and the public interest would thereby suffer. He has so long travelled in the crooked, miry paths of intrigue and deception, that he never could be made to retrace his steps, and pursue a straight, fair, and honorable course, such as might be creditable to himself and useful to his country. My opinion of him is made up from a long residence at this post, and an intimate knowledge of his character, both public and private. I think I know him as well as any man can know him, and it is my decided opinion, that he will never suit your purposes here; and the sooner all hope of his re-establishment is at an end, it will be the better; for he is becoming a pest here, and will move off if he finds he cannot be reinstated.

"I have the honor to remain, with very great respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,*

"JOHN JOHNSTON.

"HIS EXC'Y. WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, GOV. OF INDIANA."

The greater part of the information received by the Governor, as stated above, had been communicated by him to two or three confidential persons only, he being much averse to creating any alarm until the necessity for it should appear unequivocal. But after the return of the salt boat, the report of the great number of Indians collected round the prophet, and the violence of his conduct, had created so much apprehension among the citizens, that he deemed it necessary to assemble the public officers, merchants, and other respectable persons, to take their advice upon the subject of putting the country into a state of defence. To those gentlemen, the danger appeared so imminent, that they unanimously urged and advised him to call two companies into actual service, and to put the rest of the militia upon the alert. With this the Governor complied, and alarm posts were established, and such other measures adopted as the occasion required, and his means would allow.

The inconvenience to the men, of being called out at the season of the approaching harvest, being considerable, and the expense of the measure generally, would have prevented him adopting it, if he had had the least room to doubt the correctness of his information of the hostile designs of the prophet. But his having understood that the town of Vincennes had been marked out as the first object of the prophet's attack, and the consideration that the appearance of so much vigilance and military preparation might have the effect of deterring the impostor from

*The money mentioned by Mr. Johnson in the above letter, was the annuity which was allowed to the Turtle by the United States, as an encouragement for him to adopt the habits of civilized life.

persevering in his schemes, and would also powerfully operate upon the grand council which was to be held at Tippecanoe. The Governor well knew, that, although there are no people more brave in the field of action than the Indians, yet, like all undisciplined warriors collected together in large bodies, they are subject to unaccountable paroxysms of terror, the effects of which no reason or argument can control. Whilst wavering in their determination, whether to receive or reject the proposition of the prophet, a sensation of this sort might be easily excited by a simultaneous feint of the militia from some points on the Ohio and the Great Miami, and from Vincennes, which would probably break up the meeting. Though the Governor had it not in his power to make such movements, yet he resolved to have a report circulated at a proper moment, that troops were actually assembling at those points, in the hope that it might produce as much effect as if it had really been the case.

It appeared to the Governor all important to act with the utmost vigor at the commencement of an Indian war. He was persuaded that, when the first act of hostility would take place, several of the tribes, and many individuals, of those actually engaged in it, would be opposed to it, and many more would be politic enough to keep in the back ground for a while, for the purpose of observing its progress. Any success on the part of the hostile Indians, would have the certain effect of strengthening their party, and of discouraging those friendly to the United States; and a confederacy, which, in the beginning, would be but feeble and discordant, would become cemented and extended to a degree that would make it a work of time and difficulty to dissolve or crush.

By experience, the Governor found that mounted militia was the most efficient force that could be brought to act against Indians. Celerity of motion he considered to be essential to their success. He, therefore, gave particular attention to having a corps of that description organized, and properly disciplined for service, in the present case.

About the end of June, a deputation of Potawatamies, headed by the chief Winemack, arrived at Vincennes; having been sent to inform the Governor of the decision of the council held at the St. Joseph's of lake Michigan, which had been attended by all the Indians of that quarter, and by a deputation from the Delaware tribe; the object of whose mission was, as has been already stated, to dissuade the Indians from falling in with the schemes of the prophet. It appeared that the last mentioned tribe had faithfully performed their duty to the United States, and their promises made to the Governor. At the council above-mentioned, they made the most forcible representations against the schemes of the prophet, and succeeded entirely in detaching them from his interests. They did not deny that they had had

hostile intentions, and acknowledged that they had received the tomahawk; but that they had buried it on the 28th of the preceding month, never more to take it up. Winemack was sent to inform the Governor of all they knew of the prophet's plans.— Detroit, Fort Wayne, Chicago, St. Louis, and Vincennes, were all to be surprised; and every exertion was to be made to induce all the tribes on the Mississippi to join in the confederacy. It could not, however, be discovered that any of the sachems or village chiefs of the Potawatamies had given their sanction to the prophet or his schemes. His supporters were generally confined, among all the tribes, to the war chiefs, or those who were heads of small bands. The true character of this man cannot be better delineated, than by relating a circumstance which was communicated to the Governor by the chief Winemack. He proposed, not long before the time treated of, to the young men, to murder all the principal chiefs of all the tribes; observing that their own hands would never be untied till this should be effected. He said that they were the men who sold their lands, and who would prevent them opposing the encroachments of the white people. This was not only an atrocious, but an artful proposition; for, if a few of the old chiefs, such as the prophet could select, should have been taken off from each tribe, the rest could have been easily persuaded to undertake any enterprise which that artful savage could suggest.

An Iowa Indian informed the Governor, that, two years before, an agent, from the British, arrived at the prophet's town; and in his, the relator's presence, delivered the message with which he was charged; the substance of which was, to urge the prophet to unite as many tribes as he could against the United States; but not commence hostilities until he had the signal from them. From this same man, and others of his nation, the Governor understood that the prophet had been soliciting their own tribe, and others of the Mississippi, to join him against the United States. He represented to them that the white people had been constantly encroaching upon the Indians, and driving them back—that those who had suffered most, were determined to make a stand, and go no further—and that the distant tribes, who had not lost their lands, ought to assist those who had, or they would shortly experience a similar fate—that he was commissioned by the Great Spirit of the Indians, (who was himself an Indian, and quite different from the Great Spirit of the whites,) to tell them this, and that he would destroy them if they did not believe the words of his prophet.

Winemack passed through the prophet's town on his way to Vincennes, and the latter was so enraged at the decision of the council, that he attempted to have him assassinated. He, the prophet, declared that, though so many of his followers had fallen

off from him, he had still enough left to carry his designs into execution, but that he would take a longer time to effect them.

It was Winemack's opinion, that the impostor would endeavor to raise the southern Indians, the Choctaws and Creeks particularly; (his mother was a Creek;) and so firmly was he impressed with this opinion, that he said, if the prophet did not go to the southward sometime that summer, he would submit to be considered a man of no truth.

The Governor was for a long time incredulous, with respect to the probability of a war between the Indians and the United States. He supposed that the former had suffered too severely in their former attempts to be again willing to measure their strength with a people whose numbers were so immensely superior to their own, and who had it so much in their power to deprive them of arms and ammunition, and of many other articles which habit had rendered altogether necessary. He was, however, from the many circumstances which have been related, perfectly convinced that war was not only thought of, but that it would have been actually commenced but for the active interposition of the Delaware tribe; which, having suffered more than any other in the former wars, were better able to judge of the evils that a recommencement of hostilities would bring upon them.

There can be little doubt, however, that considerable merit was due to the Governor himself, not only for the active preparations he made to repel the attacks of the Indians, which, there is good reason to believe, had its effect upon the council at the St. Joseph's, but for his address in managing the Delawares, and for putting into their mouths the very words and arguments which they used at the council, But we are writing a history, and not a panegyric, and, therefore, shall return to that plain matter of fact path which was first assumed, and which shall be steadily persevered in.

From many of the circumstances already related, as well as some which yet remain unfolded, there cannot be the shadow of doubt that the plan of the combination originated with the agents of England; and that there was much more probability that the prophet was inspired by the superintendent of Indian affairs for Upper Canada, rather than by the Great Spirit, from whom he pretended to derive his authority. It might not have been their intention that the Indians should commence hostilities, before a declaration of war, by England, against the United States; but it is very probable, that, after having given the impetus, they found it difficult to regulate the after movements of their tawny allies. However desperate might have been the circumstances under which the Indians might have commenced a war with the United States, history abounds with numerous

instances of war having been undertaken under circumstances even more sinister and untoward. It has been hinted, that at the period treated of, the Indians were become more miserable than they had ever been at any period of their history. It cannot be denied that this misery was produced by the encroachment of the whites upon their lands, as well as by their introduction among them of that liquid poison, which is no less destructive to themselves than to the unfortunate Indians. Can it, then be surprising, that they should view their own situation with discontent, and that of their neighbors, the whites, with jealousy, and that this should ripen into hatred. The prophet told them that the Great Spirit did not mean that the white and red people should live near each other—that the whites had poisoned the land, and prevented it producing such things as they found necessary to their subsistence. This was a specious argument, and experience confirmed them of its truth; for it could not be denied, that, in proportion as the whites increased in population, and spread over the land, the deer and buffalo became diminished in numbers, or entirely disappeared. Under such circumstances, and by such artifices, untutored savages may be induced to adopt any measures, however desperate, that promises to better their situation.

The accounts of the change in the disposition of the Indian tribes being entirely had from Indians, the Governor was far from placing in them such implicit confidence as to induce him to relax in those military arrangements which were found necessary. He therefore despatched two trusty, active, and intelligent men into the Indian country, to learn the real state of the case, and to sound the disposition and inclinations of the Indians; and it will hereafter appear that such precaution was absolutely necessary.

The following letter, from the Governor to the secretary at war, will give a full account of the mission, to the prophet, of Mr. Dubois, one of the confidential persons sent by the Governor, in order to learn the real state of the affairs of the impostor, and to find whether the information received from so many other sources had been correct.

“Vincennes, 4th July, 1810.

“SIR,

“Mr. Brouillette arrived here from the prophet’s town, on the 1st instant, and Mr. Dubois yesterday. I have the honor to inclose you a copy of the deposition of the former. Mr. Dubois was received by the prophet with much apparent satisfaction. He told him that he had been sent by me, to know what was the reason of his hostile preparations, and enmity to the United States—that his conduct had excited so much alarm, that the warriors, both here and in Kentucky, were preparing themselves

for service—and that a detachment of regular troops were actually on their way to Vincennes—but that he was directed to tell him that their preparations were only intended for defence, and that no attempt whatever would be made against him, until his disposition to commence hostilities could no longer be doubted. The prophet denied most strenuously, that he intended to go to war against the white people, and intimated that the Delawares and other Indians had been bribed with whiskey by me to accuse him—that it was by the express order of the Great Spirit, that he had fixed himself there, and that he was likewise ordered to assemble as many Indians as he could collect at that spot. When pressed by Mr. Dubois to state the grounds of his complaint, if he had any, against the United States, he said that the Indians had been cheated of their lands—that no sale was good unless made by all the tribes. He was told that the Government would listen to any statement he might make, and that it would be as well for him, perhaps, to go to Vincennes and see the Governor. This, however, was declined, alleging that he had been ill treated when he was there before. Mr. Dubois found, at the prophet's town, some old friends of his of the Kickapoo tribe, with whom he had much conversation. They appeared, to him, to be alarmed, and to regret their having joined the prophet. He asked them whether the prophet really had a disposition to go to war with the United States. They said that they had long known that war was his intention; but they were never informed whether he designed to attack the United States or the Osage nation. Mr. Dubois passed through the Wea and part of the Eel river tribes. They were all under the impression that there would be a war, and were apprehensive that they might be involved in it. Mr. Dubois, however, agrees with me in opinion, that, at present, there is not the least danger. The defection of the Chippewas, Ottowas, and Potawatamies, at the council held at the Pou-a-Vash, has, for the present, entirely frustrated the prophet's designs. He thinks, too, with Mr. Brouillette, that the chief, Winemack, will be assassinated by the prophet's party, for the active part he has taken against them. However painful it may be to entertain such an opinion, I am, nevertheless, convinced of the fact, that there is a constant communication between some persons in this place and the prophet; and, although they may not have urged him to make war upon the United States, they foment his discontent, and encourage him to set up pretensions which the policy of our government has always opposed, and which can never be admitted without shutting the door to every future extinguishment of title upon any terms that would be beneficial to our treasury. The subject of allowing the Indians of this country to consider all their lands as common property, has been frequently and largely discussed in my communications with your

predecessor, and in a personal correspondence with the late President. The treaties made by me last fall, were concluded upon principles as liberal towards the Indians as my knowledge of the views and opinions of the government would allow.— For, although great latitude of discretion has been always given me, I knew that the opinion of Mr. Jefferson on the subject, went so far as to assert a claim of the United States as lords paramount to all extinguished or decayed tribes, to the exclusion of all recent settlers. Upon this principle, the Miami nation are the only rightful claimants of all the unpurchased lands, from the Ohio to the Illinois and Mississippi rivers. But, sir, the President may rest assured, that the complaints of injury, with regard to the sale of lands, is a mere pretence, suggested to the prophet by British partizans and emissaries.

“The parties to the late treaty, were never better satisfied than they are at this moment, with the exception of the Kickapoos. Mr. Dubois thinks that they repent of having made sale of the small tract above the mouth of Rackoon creek, and that a relinquishment of it would tend to alienate them from the prophet. This is a step which I have informed him will never be taken by the government; but there may be great propriety in suffering them to occupy them for some years.

“On this subject, and on some others which I deem important, I shall do myself the honor to make you a further communication by the next mail.

“Captain Posey has not yet arrived. As soon as he comes, I shall dismiss the two companies of militia.

“I have the honor to be, &c.

“WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“THE HON. WM. EUSTIS, Esq. SEC. AT WAR.”

CHAPTER XIX.

THE following circumstance alarmed the Governor, and impressed him with an opinion, that every thing which had been said and done by the prophet, to convince him that he had no hostile intentions towards the United States, were mere hypocritical

evasions, calculated to deceive, that he entertained the most rancorous hatred towards our citizens, and that he had serious intentions of commencing hostilities the moment he had it in his power to take the Governor by surprise, and to strike an effectual blow.

On the 4th of July, four canoes passed the Wea village of Terre Haute, with four or five men of the prophet's followers in each. They were supposed to be going to Vincennes.— Having received this information on Saturday, by a Wea chief, who came to Vincennes by land, and, seeing nothing of them in the course of that day, the Governor despatched a sergeant of militia and six men to see what had become of them. At a settlement about sixteen miles above Vincennes, they learned that one canoe had come down so low as that place, with four Kickapoos—that they had left their canoe there, and had gone to a meeting of the Shakers on Sunday. They returned late in the evening of that day, and went up the Wabash about half a mile, where they left the canoe, after cutting a hole in her, and in the night stole five horses. They were completely armed, had no skins to trade with, nor did they profess to have any other business than to visit the Shakers. That they were spies from a larger party, there can be little doubt; and the manner in which the horses were stolen, was the strongest indication of a hostile disposition that they had ever before discovered. Far from wishing to disguise the transaction, their canoe paddles, and a small fish gig, were left on the shore, within a short distance of the place whence they stole the horses. The people in that neighborhood were so much alarmed, that they immediately assembled together for mutual defence. The Governor, however, forbid them to pursue the thieves, conceiving that, from the little pains taken to conceal the tracks of the horses, the pursuit was desired by the Indians, and having no doubt but the large party were lying in ambush, for the purpose of taking off any of the pursuers. The Governor had been informed, some time before, that one of their plans to bring on the war, was, to send out parties to steal horses, and, if they were pursued, to kill their pursuers.

No blood, however, having been spilt on this occasion, the Governor still entertained hopes that he would bring the prophet to reason; but he had serious apprehensions that the people would not submit to have their property stolen, and that, when their patience would be exhausted, they would retaliate upon the Indians; and, in this, that they would not be over careful in discriminating between the innocent and the guilty; in consequence of which, he expected that, in six months after the commencement of hostilities, the whole Indian tribes would be confederated against the United States.

On the 5th of this month, Captain Posey and his detachment arrived. The two companies of militia were dismissed; not, however, under the idea that they were unnecessary, but to

let the people go home to their harvest; their absence from which, would have been attended by serious consequences from the loss of their grain.

From some Indians who were at Vincennes, the Governor learnt that the Sacks and Foxes had actually received the tomahawk, and declared themselves ready to strike whenever they had the signal from the prophet. It also appeared that a considerable number of the Sacks had been on a visit to the British superintendant; and, on the 1st of this month, July; fifty men passed Chicago on the same destination. A Miami chief, who had just returned from his annual visit to Malden, after having received the accustomed donation of goods, was thus addressed by Elliot, the British agent: "My son, keep your eyes fixed on me—my tomahawk is now up—be you ready, but do not strike till I give the signal."

The Governor despatched one of his interpreters with a speech to the prophet,* in the hope that the knowledge which he would acquire of the strength and resources of the United States, would prevent his commencing hostilities; and a further inducement to this measure was the better to enable the government of the United States to form a judgment of his character, by a personal interview.

This speech was delivered to the prophet by the Interpreter, in the presence of his brother, Tecumseh, who was the efficient man, the real Moses of the family. No particular answer was made, *that* was promised to be sent by this brother, the interpreter, however, having lodged with him, much conversation ensued. He denied having intended to make war, but declared most solemnly, that it was not possible to remain friends with the United States, unless they would abandon the idea of making settlements further to the north and westward, and explicitly acknowledge the principle that all the lands in the western country was the common property of all the tribes.—"The Great Spirit" said he "gave this great island to his red children, he placed the whites on the other side of the big water; they were not contented with their own, but came to take ours from us. They have driven us from the sea to the lakes, we can go no further. They have taken upon them to say this tract belongs to the Miamis, this the Delawares and so on; but the Great Spirit intended it as the common property of all. Our father tells us, that we have no business upon the Wabas^h, the land belongs to other tribes; but the Great Spirit ordered us to come here, and here we will stay." He was, however, pleased with the Governor's speech, he had never been to see him, he only recollected him a very young man sitting at the side of general Wayne. He never had troubled the white people

*See note 5.

much, but, he would now go to Vincennes and convince the Governor that he had listened to bad men, when he was told, that they meditated war against the United States.

From the conversation which Mr. Baron held with the Kickapoos, and other Indians at the prophet's town, they appeared to be greatly displeased with the impostor. They were very apprehensive of an attack, and were much alarmed at the arrival of the interpreter, whom they supposed had been sent in advance of an approaching army, to see what situation they were in. A Potawatamie chief told Baron, in the presence of the prophet, that they had been told by him, (the prophet) that no more should die at his town, but, that three Kickapoos had been buried in as many days.

The prophet imperfectly understanding his language, asked Baron what he had said; and upon his repeating it to him, he observed, that the Potawatamie had lied, for none had died. "I will not say," answered the chief "that any have died, but I know that you promised that none should die, and I have seen three bodies buried within three days, but they may have been dogs, or persons long since dead, and have been taken to be buried over again."

The prophet's brother, told Mr. Baron, that he would bring with him about thirty of the principle men, and as he knew the young men were fond of attending upon such occasions, there would probably be one hundred in all; but the prophet said that he might expect to see a great many more.

Besides the expense of supporting such a number for ten or fifteen days; there were other inconveniencies attending the admission of such a retinue. The Governor therefore despatched a messenger, (an Indian) to request that the chiefs only would come, attended by a few of their young men, and next day, he sent captain Wilson to enforce compliance with the order.

The settlers upon the Embarrass Fork of White river, had been alarmed by a party of Creeks and stragglers from other tribes; and the Governor had despatched colonel Jordon to know the cause. Upon his return, he reported that the insult had consisted in killing some hogs and cattle, and taking provisions by force out of some of the houses, and threatening to scalp the men if they did not move off. Before colonel Jordon arrived, the commanding officer of the militia of Clarke county, had been over with fifty mounted riflemen, for the purpose of protecting the settlement, or if necessary bring off the inhabitants. He found that the marauding party had dispersed; a few hunters of the Delaware tribe, only remained in the neighborhood, and they were so frightened by the appearance of the militia, and so completely spread the alarm, that colonel Jordon was unable to discover an Indian, or the recent track of one for many miles round. Ten or twelve families had moved off, but the rest had

got the better of their fears, and sent to recall such of the runaways as had not entirely left the territory.

About this time, the new purchase had been explored by some persons from the two Carolinas, who gave it a high character, and nothing could prevent a considerable emigration from these two states but the alarm created by the Indians. The Governor, therefore, recommended the establishment of military posts upon the Wabash, as a means of giving confidence to settlers, by which he had no doubt but the treasury of the United States would be greatly benefited.

On the 12th August, the prophet's brother, Tecumseh, arrived at Vincennes, and a council was held by the Governor, in which mutual explanations were made by the parties. It appeared, plainly, however, that the principle parts of the information which had been received by the Governor, with respect to the views and intentions of this renowned pair of brothers, was well founded, as the facts avowed by Tecumseh in the broadest manner were—that it was the object of his brother and himself, from the commencement, to form a combination of all the Indian tribes in this quarter, to put a stop to the encroachments of the white people, and to establish a principle, that the lands should be considered common property, and never be sold without the consent of all. That it was their intention to put to death all the chiefs who were parties to the late treaties, and never more to suffer any of the village chiefs to manage the affairs of the Indians; but that every thing should be put into the hands of the warriors. That the Americans had driven them from the sea coasts, and that they would shortly push them into the lakes, and that they were determined to make a stand where they were. But still with strange inconsistency, he persisted in the assertion that they had no intention of making war; and that the persons who had given the Governor that information were liars. On Winemack, who was present, he poured a torrent of abuse, and threatened him in such a manner, that Winemack expecting personal violence, charged his pistol, and seemed well prepared to stop the insolence of the Shawanese forever.

Every instance of injustice or injury which had been committed by citizens of the United States, upon Indians, from the commencement of the revolutionary war, was exaggerated, and every thing said that was likely to enflame the minds of the Indians against the United States. When he finished his harangue, the Governor began to answer him, when a scene took place which caused the council to break up in confusion, and which it may be necessary particularly to describe.

It has already been premised that the Governor had invited the prophet and his brother, Tecumseh, to exhibit their own claims, or that of any of their followers, to the lands which had been purchased the year before. In the decision of this

question, he deemed it important that those who had affected to believe that there had been some improper conduct on the part of the Governor, in effecting the treaty, should be present, and hear the evidence that could be adduced in support of it, as well as the grounds upon which the claims of Tecumseh rested. A general invitation was therefore given to all those who chose to attend. The judges, of the supreme court, the secretary of the territory, many officers of the army, and a large number of the citizens, were accordingly present. They were all seated, many of them upon chairs and benches, around the Governor, and Tecumseh, with the Indians upon the grass, immediately before him. At a small distance to the left the Potawatamie chief, Winemack, lay extended on the grass with one of his young men near him. To this chief the Governor had a few days before presented a pair of pistols, which he had asked for, to defend himself, as he said, against the assassination which was meditated upon him by Tecumseh and his followers. At the commencement of the council, the Governor had been attended by a sergeant and twelve men from the garrison of fort Knox; but as they were exposed to the sun in the position in which they were first placed, the Governor had sent them to a shade at some distance. In councils composed of different tribes, who understand each others language, either very imperfectly or not at all, it is necessary that whatever is spoken to them, should be interpreted to each tribe; this process takes up much time.

When the Governor began his speech, as above stated, he was replying to that part of Tecumseh's harangue, which asserted that the Great Spirit had intended that all the red people should form one nation. He observed that the white people, when they arrived upon this continent, had found the Miamis in the occupation of all the country on the Wabash, and at that time the Shawanese were residents of Georgia, from which they were driven by the Creeks—that the lands had been purchased from the Miamis, who were the true and original owners of it—that it was ridiculous to assert that all the Indians were one nation. If such had been the intention of the Great Spirit, he would not have put different tongues in their heads, but have taught them all to speak a language that all could understand. That the Miamis found it for their interest to sell a part of their lands, and receive for them a further annuity, the benefit of which they had long experienced, from the punctuality with which the Seventeen Fires complied with their engagements, and that the Shawanese had no right to come from, a distant country and control the Miamis in the disposal of their own property.

Having said the above, the Governor took his seat to give time to the interpreter to explain it. This he had done to the Shawanese, and had began to interpret to the Potawatamies, when Tecumseh arose, and began to speak with great vehemence.—

The Governor was surprised at his violent gestures, but, as he did not understand him he thought he was making some explanation, and his attention was drawn towards Winemack, whom lying upon the grass before him, he observed to be renewing the priming of his pistol, which he had kept under him, concealed from the Indians, but in full view of the Governor. His attention, however, was again diverted towards Tecumseh, by hearing general Gibson, who was intimately acquainted with the Shawanese language, say to lieutenant Jennings, those fellows intend mischief; you had better bring up the guard. At that moment, the followers of Tecumseh all seized their arms, tomahawks and war clubs, and sprung upon their feet, their eyes all bent upon the Governor. As soon as he could disengage himself from the armed chair in which he sat, he rose, drew a small sword which he had by his side, and stood on the defensive. Major G. R. Floyd, of the army, who stood near him, drew a dirk, and the chief, Winemack, cocked his pistol. The citizens, who were more numerous than the Indians, were, however, entirely unarmed, and some of them armed themselves with brick bats, and also stood on the defensive. The Reverend Mr. Winans, of the Methodist Church, ran to the Governor's house, got a gun, and posted himself at the door to defend the family. During this singular scene, no one spoke until the guard came running up, and appearing to be about to fire, the Governor ordered them not to do so. He then demanded of the interpreter, an explanation of what had happened. He replied, that Tecumseh had interrupted him, declaring that all the Governor had said was false, and that he and the Seventeen Fires had cheated and imposed upon the Indians.

The Governor then addressing Tecumseh, told him that he was a bad man and that he would hold no further communication with him—that, as he had come there under the protection of the council fire, he might go in safety, but he must immediately leave the neighborhood.

In the course of the night two companies of militia were brought in from the country, and the militia of the town embodied; no disturbance, however, happened through the night. In the morning, Tecumseh sent for the interpreter, and earnestly entreated that the Governor would give him an opportunity of explaining his conduct of the day before—declaring that he did not intend to attack the Governor, and that he had acted under the advice of white people. After some hesitation, the Governor consented to receive him. It was agreed that each party should have the same armed force which they had the day before.

The Governor, however, and some of his friends, thought it proper to be better provided with small arms.

The behaviour of Tecumseh at this interview, was very different from what it was the day before. His deportment was

dignified and collected, and he showed not the least disposition to be insolent. He denied having any intention of attacking the Governor, but said he had been advised by white men, to take the course he had adopted. That he had been visited at his town by two white men, who informed him, that one half of the white people were opposed to the Governor, and willing to restore the land which had been purchased; and advised him to prevail on the tribes of which the purchase was made, not to receive the annuity which had been stipulated by the treaty; and that the Governor would be soon put out of office, and a good man sent to replace him, who would restore the lands to the Indians. When asked by the Governor whether it was his intention to prevent the surveying of the land, he answered, that himself, and those who were joined with him, were determined that the old boundary should continue.

When Tecumseh had done speaking, a Wyandot, a Kickapoo, a Potawatamie, an Ottawa, and a Winebago, severally spoke, and declared that their tribes had entered into the Shawanese confederacy, and would support the principles laid down by Tecumseh, whom they had appointed their leader.

At the conclusion of the council, the Governor informed Tecumseh, that, as he had been candid enough to avow his intentions, he would be equally so with him—that he would faithfully transmit to the President, a statement of the pretensions which he had set up to the lands in dispute, and communicate his answer when it should be received; but, that he was perfectly convinced that the President would never admit that the lands on the Wabash, were the property of any other tribes than those who had occupied and lived upon them, since the white people first arrived in America; and as the title to those lands was derived from those tribes by fair purchase, he might rest assured that the right of the United States, would be supported by the sword. The council was then adjourned.

The Governor being extremely anxious to discover the real sentiments of Tecumseh, and supposing it probable that in a private interview, this discovery would be better made. On the following day he paid him a visit in his camp, attended by Baron the interpreter alone. He was very politely received, and conversed with the chief for a considerable time. Upon being asked by the Governor, whether his intentions were really such as he had avowed in the council; he said they certainly were—that it was with great reluctance he would make war with the United States, against whom he had no other complaint, but their purchasing the Indians' lands; that he was extremely anxious to be their friend, and if he, the Governor, would prevail upon the President to give up the lands lately purchased, and agree never to make another treaty without the consent of all the tribes, he would be their faithful ally, and assist them in

all their wars, with the English. He said he knew that the latter were always urging the Indians to war for their own advantage, and not to benefit his countrymen; and here he clapped his hands, and imitated a person who halloos at a dog, to set him to fight with another, thereby insinuating that the British thus endeavored to set the Indians on the Americans. But he continued, he would rather be the friend of the Seventeen Fires; but that if they did not comply with his terms, he would be obliged to unite with the English.

The Governor again assured him that he would communicate his propositions to the President, but informed him, there was not the least probability that he would accede to the terms proposed. "Well" said Tecumseh, "as the great chief is to determine the matter, I hope the Great Spirit will put sense enough into his head, to induce him to direct you to give up this land. It is true, he is so far off, he will not be injured by the war; he may still sit in his town and drink his wine, whilst you and I will have to fight it out."

The Governor then told him, that on the event of a war, he had one proposal to make to him, to which he hoped he would accede, and that was to put a stop to that disgraceful, and cruel mode of warfare which the Indians were accustomed to wage against women and children, and against those who were no longer in a situation to resist—to this proposition he readily gave his assent, and promised to adhere.

It is very difficult to determine, whether it was really the intention of Tecumseh to commit any violence upon the Governor. There are certainly some circumstances tending to shew that he had meditated some improper act. He had violated his positive promise, made to captain Wilson, to bring but a small number of warriors with him to the council, and it was remarked that all those he did bring with him, were uncommonly well armed. His refusal to hold the council in the portico of the Governor's house, which had been prepared for the occasion, was evidence that he either meditated or feared some fraud or treachery. He said, indeed, that the earth was the most proper place for the Indians, as they liked to repose upon the bosom of their mother; but no such objection had ever been made before, nor did he make it upon a subsequent occasion, but used the benches which had been provided for them. It is probable that some mistake had been made, in giving the signal for the rising of his men; or, that they had been intimidated after rising, by seeing the guard at a short distance, which they could not see before they rose. If it is asked, why they did not assassinate the Governor, when they had him in their power in their camp, after the adjournment of the council; if such had been their object and intention, the answer is obvious; the killing the Governor, was not probably their sole object, but the commencement of a general massacre and

plunder in the town; on the day which the Governor visited their camp, they knew the town was well secured by the militia, which had been got in from the country.

CHAPTER XX.

THE Governor, immediately upon the breaking up of the council, wrote for captain Cross' detachment to come on to Vincennes. It had remained at New-Port, waiting his orders, whether to proceed to Vincennes or to Bell Fontaine, the original place of destination. He also wrote to the surveyor general to have the survey made; and the line run under the protection of the soldiers, under the orders of Captain Cross.

During the whole of the conferences held with Tecumseh, and his party, the Wea tribe was present. The principal chief had several times informed the Governor, that it was his intention to tell the Shawanese in presence of the Governor, that neither himself nor any of those tribes which were united with him, had any right to interfere with the sales of land, which the native tribes of the Wabash might make to the United States. When the day arrived, however, on which he was to speak, he declined saying any thing. This change in his determination, could have been produced only by fear of the Shawanese, or by the intrigues of the faction opposed to the Governor. The latter was the most probable, for the chief told the Governor, that since he had arrived, he had received a message from the Miami chiefs, requiring him to attend a council at Mississinaway, for the purpose of considering a speech which had been sent them from the President, through Mr. Johnston of fort Wayne, the purport of which was a request from the President to be informed whether the treaties made last fall, were entered into by them voluntarily or not, and a declaration that they were made without his knowledge or consent. This circumstance is mentioned merely to shew the disposition of the faction, which were opposed to the measures of Governor Harrison, and how easily those unfortunate people the Indians, were to be imposed

upon by those persons who to embarrass the Governor, or render abortive his measures, used every means in their power to agitate their minds and delude their judgment. The reader must well recollect, that before the Governor proceeded a single step in the business of the treaties, he had positive orders from government to embrace the first opportunity that offered to effect the purchase of the lands in question; and he also received a reply to the letter which accompanied the treaty, written in the most flattering and complimentary style.

The Weas, gave the Governor the names of four persons in Vincennes, who had advised them to unite with the prophet, and to insist upon the land last ceded, being surrendered up to them. Indian testimony not being sufficient to bring on those persons, the punishment they so well deserved, they escaped.

A young Iowa chief, whom the governor had employed to go to the prophet's town to gain information, reported on his return, that he had been told by an old Winebago chief, who was his relation, that the great belt which had been sent round to all the tribes for the purpose of uniting them, was returned, and he mentioned a great number who had acceded to the confederacy, the object of which was "to confine the great water and prevent it from overflowing them." That the belt, since its return, had been sent to the British agent, who danced for joy at seeing that so many tribes had joined against the United States. That the prophet had sent a speech to his confederates, not to be discouraged at the apparent defection of some of the tribes near him; for that it was all a sham intended to deceive the white people—that these tribes hated the Seventeen Fires, and, that though they gave them sweet words, they were like grass, plucked up by the roots, they would soon wither and come to nothing. The old Winebago chief told him with tears in his eyes, that he himself and all the village chiefs had been divested of their power, and that every thing was managed by the warriors, who breathed nothing but war against the United States.

Early in the month of November, a party of the Kickapoo chiefs arrived at Vincennes, and demanded of the Governor, their annuity. The Governor in the most positive manner, refused to give them any, until all, or a majority of the chiefs, would come forward and put themselves under the protection of the President of the United States. They seemed much disappointed, and left Vincennes, execrating the prophet and the British. Nothing could have been better applied than this refusal, as they were at the time, literally naked, nor could any thing come so directly home to their feelings, as they must have reflected that justly, they could not expect or demand support

from that government, against which, they had associated themselves with its avowed enemies.

The relation of the above interesting occurrences, in the Indian department, has interrupted us in the ordinary course of the history, and we have passed over the other affairs of the territory, though prior in point of time, to which we shall now recur.

It has been before stated, that the governors of territories are always appointed by the President, with the concurrence of the senate of the United States. In the spring of this year, therefore, Governor Harrison, whose term of office had expired, was re-appointed by the President, with the unanimous approbation of the senate of the United States; and, that the re-appointment was with the approbation of his fellow citizens of the territory, the following documents will most fully testify:

From the Western Sun of November 4th, 1809.

“The following resolution has been sent on to the general government by our legislature, on the subject of Governor Harrison’s re-appointment. It passed the house of representatives unanimously, and the council, three to one.

“Whereas, from the collision of laws, and other circumstances, doubts are entertained by the minority of the legislature on the constitutionality of its organization, and the majority from a spirit of conciliation, having thought it most prudent, not to proceed to any other act of legislation than the apportionment of their members under the last act of congress—but from a knowledge of the wishes of their constituents by petitions, as well as from other sources of information, and from a wish to express their own sentiments on the crisis in their government, which is now approaching, viz: the appointment of governor of our territory, whilst they are anxious to avoid the appearance of inconsistency, by doing any act which might bear the shadow of a legislative act, they cannot forbear from recommending to, and requesting of the President and senate, most earnestly, in their names and in the names of their constituents, the re-appointment of their present Governor, William Henry Harrison;—because, they are sensible he possesses the good wishes and affection of a great majority of his fellow citizens;—because they believe him sincerely attached to the union, the prosperity of the United States, and the administration of its government;—because they believe him in a superior degree capable of promoting the interest of our territory, from long experience, and laborious attention to our general concerns—from his influence over the Indians, and his wise and disinterested management of that department—and because they have confidence in his virtues, talents, and republicanism. Therefore, they earnestly request the concurrence of the members of the council to this recommendation.

Resolved, That three copies of the above recommendation be made out by the clerk, which shall be signed by the speaker of this house, and by the president of the legislative council, one whereof, shall be by the speaker, forwarded to the President of the United States, another to the president of the senate of the United States, and the other to our delegate in congress.

("Signed,) "GENERAL W. JOHNSTON,
"SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
("Signed,) "THOMAS DOWNS,
"PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, PRO. TEM."

"From the Western Sun of same date as the preceding.

"At a meeting of the officers of the militia for the county of Knox, held at Vincennes, in the Indiana territory, on the 28th day of October 1809. Colonel Vigo was appointed president, and captain David Robb, secretary.

"On motion of major Jordan—ordered, that a committee be appointed to draft a resolution, expressive of the confidence this meeting have in the conduct of Governor Harrison, and praying that he may be re-appointed to the government of this territory. Whereupon, major Jordan, captains Wilson, Purcell, Jones, and Bruce, were appointed that committee, who returned after a short time, and reported the following, which were unanimously concurred in.

"Resolved, That from the exposed situation of the territory, surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, it is of the utmost importance to the safety and prosperity of the country, that the governor thereof, who is ex-officio commander in chief of the militia, should be a man of military talents and information.

"Resolved, That the attention paid to, and the unremitting exertions used by William Henry Harrison, to organize and discipline, by frequent trainings, the militia of the territory, and the masterly skill, and great military talents displayed in such, his exertions, together with the anxious solicitude with which he has ever watched over the peace and happiness of the territory, to which may be added, the confidence reposed in him by the neighboring tribes of Indians, and the great facility and ease with which he manages their affairs, induced this meeting to have the utmost confidence in him, as eminently qualified to govern the territory, not only because of his superior military talents, but also his integrity, patriotism, and firm attachment to the general government.

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this meeting, that they have herein expressed the sentiments of the regiment they command. Therefore,

"Resolved, That the President be requested to re-appoint, William Henry Harrison, to the Government of the territory.

"Resolved, That the proceedings be signed by the president of this meeting, and countersigned by the secretary, and transmitted to the President of the United States.

("Signed,)

"F. VIGO,

"COLONEL KNOX COUNTY MILITIA.

"DAVID ROBB, *Captain,*

"SECRETARY TO THE BOARD."

We request the particular attention of the reader, to these documents, they speak volumes as to the character and conduct of this man, in all his multifarious avocations and transactions—not only as Governor of the territory, superintendent of Indian affairs, and commissioner for treating with the Indians; but as a magistrate, a military commander, a republican, and a private citizen. He had now been in the government of the territory for nine years. The territory in his time had assumed the second grade of government, in which he himself, had been mainly instrumental, although that grade, abstracted greatly from his power, and his patronage. In fact, it must appear that his management of the government affairs, were not only truly paternal; but, that the people entertained the deepest sense of his wisdom and patriotism. In few other cases of a similar nature, do we find the people ask for a second appointment of the same governor, but in this we find, that experience of nine years, induced the unanimous call for a fourth reappointment.

The territorial legislature met this year, in November, when the following address was delivered by the Governor. It gives such a perspicuous and interesting view of the then state of the territory, and its affairs, both as to its internal and Indian relations, that giving it, precludes the necessity of dilating upon those circumstances which are the Subject of it; nor is it possible, by other means, better to show the harmony which subsisted between the members of the legislative body, and the Governor, and the unbounded confidence placed in him by the executive government of the United States.

"William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Indiana Territory, to the Legislative Council, and House of Representatives of said Territory.

"GENTLEMEN,

"The length of time which has elapsed since the territory has had the advantage of a legislature, makes a meeting with you at this time, particularly agreeable to me. I know not indeed, of any great injury which our citizens have sustained for the want of legislative aid; but there are some subjects, which could not much longer remain unattended to, without producing inconveniences. Some of these I shall notice in my present address, and others will form the subjects of future special communications.

"Presenting as we do a very extended frontier, to numerous and warlike tribes of the aborigines; the state of our relations with them, must always form an important and interesting feature in our local politics. It is with regret that I have to inform you that the harmony and good understanding, which it is so much our interest to cultivate, with those our neighbors, have for some time past, experienced a considerable interruption, and that we have indeed been threatened with hostilities, by a combination, formed under the auspices of a bold adventurer, who pretends to act under the immediate inspection of the Deity. His character as a prophet, would not, however, have given him any very dangerous influence, if he had not been assisted by the intrigues and advice of foreign agents, and other disaffected persons, who have for many years omitted no opportunity of counteracting the measures of the government, with regard to the Indians, and filling their naturally jealous minds with suspicions, of the justice and integrity of our views towards them. The circumstance which was laid hold of to encourage disaffection on the late occasion, was the treaty made by me at Fort Wayne in the autumn of the last year. Amongst the difficulties which were to be encountered, to obtain those extinguishments of title which have proved so beneficial to the treasury of the United States, and so necessary, as the means of increasing the population of the territory, the most formidable, was that of ascertaining the tribes which were to be admitted as parties to the treaties. The subject was accordingly discussed in a long correspondence between the government and myself, and the principles which were finally adopted, were made as liberal towards the Indians, as a due regard to the interests of the United States would permit. Of the tribes which had formed the confederacy in the war, which was terminated by the peace of Greenville, some were residents upon the lands which were in the possession of their forefathers, at the time that the first settlements were made in America by white people, whilst others which were emigrants from distant parts of the country, had no other claim to the tracts they occupied, than what a few years residence by the tacit consent of the real owners could give. Upon common and general principles, the transfer of the title of the former description, would have been sufficient to vest in the purchaser the legal right to lands so situated. But in all its transactions with the Indians, our government have not been contented with doing that which was just only. Its savage neighbors have, on all occasions experienced its liberality and benevolence. Upon this principle, in several of the treaties which have been made, several tribes have been admitted to a participation of their benefits, who had no title to the land ceded, merely because they have been accustomed to hunt upon, and derive part of their support from them. For this reason, and

to prevent the Miamis, who were the real owners of the land, from experiencing any ill effects from their resentment, in case they were excluded; the Delawares, Potawatamies and Kickapoos, were made parties to the late treaty of fort Wayne. No other tribe was admitted because it never had been suggested that any other could plead even the title of use or occupancy of the lands, which at that time, were conveyed to the United States. It was not until eight months after the conclusion of the treaty, and after his design of forming a hostile combination against the United States, had been discovered and defeated, that the pretensions of the prophet with regard to the lands in question, were made known. A furious clamor was then raised by the foreign agents amongst us, and other disaffected persons, against the policy which had excluded from the treaty, this great and influential character, as he was termed; and the doing so, expressly attributed to personal ill will, upon the part of the negotiator. No such ill will did in fact exist. I accuse myself indeed of an error in the patronage and support which I afforded him upon his first arrival on the Wabash, before his hostility to the United States had been developed; but upon no principle of propriety or policy, could he have been made a party to the treaty. The personage called the prophet, is not a chief of the tribe to which he belongs, but an outcast from it, rejected and hated by the real chiefs, the principal of whom was present at the treaty, and not only disclaimed upon the part of this tribe, any title to the lands ceded, but used his personal influence with the chiefs of the other tribes, to effect the cession. As soon as I was informed that his dissatisfaction at the treaty, was assigned as the cause of the hostile attitude which the prophet had assumed, I sent to inform him, that whatever claims he might have to the lands which had been purchased for the United States, were not in the least effected by that purchase; that he might come forward and exhibit his pretensions, and if they were really found to be just or equitable, the lands would be restored, or an ample equivalent given for them. His brother was deputed and sent to me for that purpose; but, far from being able to show any color of claim, either for himself or any of his followers, his objections to the treaty, were confined to the assertion, that all the lands upon the continent, was the common property of all the tribes, and that no sale of any part of it could be valid without the consent of all. A proposition so extremely absurd, and which would forever prevent any further purchase of lands by the United States, could receive no countenance from any friend to his country. He had, however, the insolence to declare, that by the acknowledgment of that principle alone, could the effects of his resentment be avoided. No person who is in the least acquainted with the history of Indian affairs upon our north western frontier for some years past,

can be at any loss for the source of all this mischief, or will hesitate to believe, that the prophet is a tool of British fears, or British avarice, designed for the purpose of forming a combination of the Indians; which, in case of war between that power and the United States, may assist them in the defence of Canada, or as the means of keeping back our settlements, and by rendering us suspected and hated by the natives, secure to themselves, a continuance of the valuable fur trade which they have so long engrossed.

“It gives me great pleasure, however, to state to you, gentlemen, that the greater part of the neighboring tribes, have continued firm in their attachment to the United States, in despite of the artful and malicious stories which have been circulated, and the goods distributed amongst them, for the purpose of producing a contrary disposition. I have every reason to believe that the prophet and his party have been for some time losing ground; nor do I believe that he will ever be able to form a confederacy strong enough to commence hostilities. As long, however, as he continues in his present position, it may be in his power to raise those alarms which have so mischievous an effect in retarding the population of our country.

“I have been thus particular, gentlemen, in giving you information upon the present state of our affairs with the neighboring Indians, that you may have them fully before you, in case you should think proper to make them in any shape the subject of your deliberations. Although the management of the Indian affairs, in relation to their character as an independent people, and to trade with them in their own country, is entirely and exclusively under the control of the United States, it has been determined that the regulations, for the government of the latter are of no force in our settlements. Every person has been allowed to trade with them that pleases, which proves a source of numberless abuses, of mischievous effects, both to the Indians and ourselves.

“Should you think proper to pass a law, either prohibiting the trade of Indians within our settlements altogether, or confining it to the frontiers, and obliging those who follow it to take out licenses, I am persuaded that your constituents would receive from it much benefit. It will be worthy of your consideration, also, whether some penalty might not be advantageously imposed upon those who by improper interference, and by circulating falsehoods amongst the Indians, counteract the intentions of the government, and lay the foundation for distrust and enmity which may produce the most serious consequences. It is believed that to intrigues of this kind, we are indebted for much of the uneasiness and dissatisfaction which has prevailed in the Indian country, for the last six months. The brother of the prophet expressly declared in the

presence of a large audience, that two secret visits had been made to his town by different white men who urged him to oppose the execution of the late treaty, and who assured him that his pretensions would be supported by a considerable portion of our citizens. No treaty was ever concluded with Indians under happier auspices, than that of fort Wayne. A number of highly respectable characters were witnesses to its progress and final termination; and to the satisfaction with which the chiefs and whole body of warriors assented to its conditions. For upwards of three months from its date, not a lip of discontent was heard from any of those who were parties to it. So late as the month of July last, a worthy and patriotic citizen of this neighborhood, was sent to the Miamis to obtain their consent to a conditional article in the Kickapoo treaty. This gentleman was received at the principal village with great cordiality and respect, and assurances given him, not only that the original treaty would be cheerfully complied with; but, that the article in that with the Kickapoos, which was the particular object of his mission, (and with which they were under no obligation to comply) would be ratified as soon as they could assemble all the chiefs of their tribe. But by a communication which has just been received from the agent at Fort Wayne, it appears that the chiefs which at that time were so cordial in their feelings towards the treaty, have been since convinced that the treaty was forced upon them, contrary to their inclination, and that it was necessary for them to petition the President to annul the treaty, and to remove from office, the person who negotiated it. It is very remarkable that the words by which the Indians convey their complaints, are almost the same that were used in the conversation of some persons within our settlements. Gentlemen, I think I may venture to assure you, that as soon as the Indians are convinced that our government is not to be trifled with, that we shall hear no more of opposition to the execution of the treaty. The disaffection of those who were parties to the treaty I spoke of, is confined to a part of the tribe only, but the effects which these intrigues may produce, upon any future attempts to treat with the Indians, for their lands ought, if possible, to be avoided. Although much has been done towards the extinguishment of Indian title in the territory, much still remains to be done. We have not yet a sufficient space to form a tolerable state. The eastern settlements are separated from the western, by a considerable extent of Indian lands, and the most fertile tracts that are within our territorial bounds, are still their property. Almost entirely divested of the game from which they have drawn their subsistence, it has become of little use to them; and it was the intention of the government to substitute for the precarious and scanty supplies which the chase affords; the more certain support which is

derived from agriculture and the rearing of domestic animals. By the considerate and sensible amongst them, this plan is considered as the only one which will save them from utter extirpation. But a most formidable opposition has been raised to it by the warriors, who will never agree to abandon their old habits, until driven to it by absolute necessity. As long as a deer is to be found in their forests, they will continue to hunt; it has therefore been supposed that the confining them to narrow limits, was the only means of producing this highly desirable change, and averting the destiny which seems to impend over them. Are then those extinguishments of native title, which are at once so beneficial to the Indians, the territory, and the United States, to be suspended upon account of the intrigues of a few individuals? Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined by the Creator to give support to a large population, and to be the seat of civilization, of science and true religion. It may perhaps be asked, how those effects can be produced by a few persons whose opportunities of intercourse with the Indians are so very limited. Nothing is more easy than to excite jealousy and suspicion in savages, and to make them believe that they are imposed upon; and upon no subject are their passions more easily raised than on that of their lands. Every treaty that has been made with them has proved a work of difficulty; besides their natural prejudices, the clashing interests of the several tribes were to be accommodated—the injuries which they have received from the white people, palliated and excused, and their fears excited by seeing so many tribes driven from their ancient seats by the progress of our settlements, lulled or diverted by opening brighter prospects, as the reward of their fidelity. A single artful or imprudent observation from a designing or careless individual is, however, frequently sufficient to destroy the labor of weeks, and to induce the Indians to abandon an intention which they seemed to have adopted after the maturest deliberation. Although I am fully persuaded that the blackest treachery and hatred towards our government and nation have produced some of the intrigues of which I complain, I am also convinced that much mischief has been done by others, who, actuated by no views that were inimical to their country, have suffered their passions, prejudices, and personal animosities to lead them astray, and to do that which their cooler judgments must condemn. Whilst a penal law would, perhaps, deter the former, it would be the means as an expression of the public sentiment of reclaiming the latter to their duty. Should you think proper to take the subject under your consideration, gentlemen, the original documents in my possession, in support of what is here advanced will be submitted to you.

“ There is still, gentlemen, some defect in our revenue laws. Although it is ascertained that the taxes which are due, are more than sufficient to answer all the expenses of the government, a number of old claims still remain unsatisfied, nor is there a dollar in the treasury belonging to the contingent fund. As a measure tending to the great relief of the poor, the legislature two years ago, upon my recommendation, took off the tax upon neat cattle, and single young men, and substituted an additional tax upon lands for county purposes in lieu of it. I recommended at that time, also, to lower the tax upon horses, particularly those that are employed in agriculture. It appears to me that a tax of fifty cents per head, must be very oppressive to the poorer class of our citizens.

“ The court of chancery, gentlemen, is still in the situation which the law that created it, left it. No provision has yet been made for the compensation of the chancellor, and the other officers of the court. The opinion given by me to the legislature on this subject, still continues the same, “ that if there ever was a country where such a court was necessary, this is one.”

“ The judiciary system may also perhaps be susceptible of improvement. Should it be thought from the number of new counties which are in contemplation, that a supreme court cannot be held in each; a district might be composed of several contiguous counties.

“ With respect to the militia, gentlemen, I am at a loss what to recommend, because our finances are so limited, that I fear we could not easily provide the means of supporting them in those camps of discipline, which I have formerly recommended, and in which alone military duty can be properly taught. If you should think, however, that the treasury could bear the expense, or that it would not impose on the men too great a burthen to oblige them to furnish their own provisions, I am persuaded that the muster days directed by the present law would be most usefully commuted, for even the same number of days, successively devoted to military improvement in a camp. Although I almost despair, from the scantiness of our means, of seeing our militia arrive at that high state of perfection which they ought to attain. Much may, nevertheless, be done towards keeping up the spirit of improvement, until the general government shall provide an uniform system for the whole continent, and the means of carrying it into effect. But your attention, gentlemen, may in the mean time, be most usefully directed to the rising generation. Military discipline consists in a number of minute observances, which collectively, form a beautiful and connected system, but considered individually, appear trifling and even ridiculous. Hence it happens that so many persons become disgusted with military duty, before the application of those apparently frivolous orders which are given to the novice

in arms. Youth being more docile, is, therefore, the proper period for military, as well as every other species of instruction. And next to that study which will lead our youth to a knowledge of their rights when they become men and citizens, what is more necessary than to teach them the art by which these rights are to be defended? Ours is, I believe, the only republic that ever existed that neglected this important part of education. In the republics of Greece, the exercises of the Gymnasium always succeeded the studies and lectures of the Lyceum, and in that of Rome, a strict attention to the duties of the Campus Martius, was exacted of every youthful candidate for citizenship.

“The liberality of congress, gentlemen, has committed to your control a section of land in each township, for the use of schools, and the seminary at this place is supported, also, by a considerable benefaction in the same species of property. Let me earnestly recommend to you, that in the system of education which you may establish in those schools, the military branch may not be forgotten. Let the masters of the inferior schools be obliged to qualify themselves, and instruct their pupils in the military evolutions, whilst the university, in addition to those exercises, may have attached to it a professorship of tactics, in which all the sciences connected with the art of war may be taught. I can see no reasonable objection to this plan; it will afford healthful exercise and amusement to the youth; inspire them with patriotic sentiments—furnish our militia with a succession of recruits, all of them habituated to the performance of military evolutions, and some of them with considerable attainments in the higher branches of tactics. The sole additional expense to the ordinary mode of education, independent of the additional professorship in the University, will be the procuring for each subordinate school, a number of mock firelocks of wood, a few martial instruments, and for the higher schools, a few hundred real guns of the cheapest manufacture.

“Since the last session of the legislature, gentlemen, I have received, for the fourth time, from the President and senate of the United States, an appointment to the executive duties of this territory. I hope that I duly appreciate this mark of continued confidence in the government of my country. I will not attempt to deny that the circumstance connected with the appointment from which I have derived most satisfaction, is the zeal and anxiety which was manifested in my favor by the great majority of your constituents, expressed, as well by themselves as their representatives to the last general assembly. Will you be pleased, gentlemen, to bear to them my most sincere thanks for the confidence and support with which they have honored me for so many years. Assure them that their interests and happiness, will ever be the great objects for which I shall labor, and that I shall always consider their approbation as my

greatest reward for any services, which, through the assistance of Divine Providence, I shall be able to render them."

It has been before mentioned that the Governor had upon every occasion, when it could be done with propriety, appointed to the different offices of the territory, such persons as were recommended by a majority of the people, and so generally has this liberal principle been acted upon, that there were few of the states wherein the public affairs were more under the control of the people, than in the territory of Indiana, though in all the territories of the United States, the power of appointing public officers was vested in the Governor.

About this time, however, some dissatisfaction was manifested in the county of Clarke on account of the appointment of a judge who was rather unpopular. On this occasion the Governor addressed the citizens of that county, in order to the explanation of the principles by which he was governed in making the appointments. In this address, he stated that the people should have the choice of all the officers who were generally elected by popular suffrage in the states, although the ordinance for the government of the territories, vested the appointing power in the governor alone. He was, notwithstanding, willing to receive and consider all petitions presented to him, relative to any kind of appointment; yet in cases of judges and officers of that character, after hearing all that could be said on the subject, he would reserve the ultimate decision to himself.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE threats of Tecumseh and his brother against those chiefs who would accept of their annuities appear to have had but little effect, as the greatest number of them came in and received them, even the Kickapoos, who appeared to be more generally attached to the prophet than any other tribe, came in and

received their's in part; but as the number who came in, was not considered a complete representation of the tribes, only one half the annuity was paid, and the other half reserved until those who had hung back should come forward and claim it.— Though the Governor did not apprehend any immediate danger of an Indian war, yet the affairs of that department were not by any means in such a situation as he wished them. The Indians appeared to be more dissatisfied than he ever before saw them, and he had reason to believe that the prophet's principle, that their lands should be considered common property, was either openly avowed, or secretly favored by all the tribes west of the Wabash.

A Wea chief who had attended a council at Brownstown, reported to the Governor, that a resolution to prevent the sale of any more lands to the United States, was entered into—that the British agent, Elliot, had informed them that the English and French had made peace, and would soon unite their arms to dispossess the Americans of the lands which they had taken from the Indians. Such was the dupes made of the unfortunate Indians by the corrupt agent of a still more corrupt government. That cruel and bloodthirsty faction that ruled the British isle, could not be satisfied with the oceans of blood which they had caused to be shed on the other side the Atlantic in fighting against the liberties of the world, but they must excite amongst poor naked and untutored savages, in the western wilds of America, that hatred to the only rational and free government on the face of the globe, which they themselves entertained against every thing in the shape of rational liberty. But happily for mankind in general, and for the United States in particular, in this latter case, at least, they failed, and fate had decreed that upon American land, and upon American lakes and seas, their arrogance should be curbed, their armies defeated, and their naval flag disgraced by a young and aspiring nation of freemen, against whom their miserable mercenaries were but as snow before the summers sun! as pigmies before the mighty giants of the earth!

In the month of November, the Governor received instructions from the President of the United States, to defer making the military establishments upon the Wabash, which he had recommended in his letter to government of 10th October.— The reasons given, were the lateness of the season, and the situation of affairs in West Florida,—at the same time allowing that captain Posey's and captain Cross' detachments might winter in Indiana, and that in spring, a favorable opportunity might offer to establish a strong post, and display a respectable force on the Wabash. This letter highly approved of the Governor's conduct, and agreed exactly with him in sentiment, that the best possible way of preserving peace, was to be well prepared for war. "It has indeed occurred to me"

said the secretary "that the surest means of securing good behaviour from this conspicuous personage and his brother," meaning Tecumseh and the prophet "would be to make them prisoners, but at this time more particularly, it is desirable, that peace with all the Indian tribes should be preserved, and I am instructed by the President to express to your excellency his expectations and confidence that in all your arrangements, this may be considered (as I am confident it ever has been) a primary object with you."

Agreeably to the recommendation in the speech of the Governor to the legislature of the territory, a law was passed interdicting the sale of spirits to the Indians; but as this law would have been in a great measure nugatory, so long as there was no such law in the other adjoining territories, and as those territories were only in the first grade of government, consequently could not pass any law which had not existed in any state in the union, Governor Harrison requested government to have the matter brought before congress, which was only competent to make such a law.

However acceptable to the people of the territory the conduct of the Governor might have been, both in relation to the affairs of the territory, and those of the Indian department, there was a small but extremely active party diligently employed in counteracting or embarrassing all his measures, even at the expense of their duty to their country.

At all times willing that his conduct should be open to a full and fair investigation; it has been seen that the attention of the legislature had been particularly invited to it, and all the original documents in his possession, offered for their inspection. He was sensible that not only his own reputation; but that the character as well as the interests of the general government were deeply interested in silencing the calumnies which were circulated, in relation to the manner in which the late treaty had been conducted. In the territory, where the motives and characters of the men by whom those reports were circulated, were well known, little mischief could be done, but it will be perceived, that they were not confined to the territory, but that the opposition in congress introduced the subject in a debate in that body, as constituting a serious charge as well against the administration as against the Governor.

In a debate which took place in the house of representatives of the United States,

"The great cause of Indian hostilities," Mr. Gaston said, "was to be found, where experience and history would prompt us to look for it—in our cupidity for the lands, and their jealousy and distrust of our superior intelligence and force. Indian wars have been, until a few years back, almost uninterrupted in this country, both before and since the revolution. They need no

other instigations than are to be found in the inconsistent views, interests, claims, passions, and habits of neighboring, yet distinct races of people. Sir, General Harrison's treaty of November, 1809, was the mine of the great Indian explosion. The Indians complained, I know not how justly, that in that treaty they were cheated of lands which the parties to it had no right to convey, and never meant to convey. There are gentlemen in this legislature who know that Tecumseh, immediately afterwards, avowed his fixed purpose to vindicate by force, and by an union of the red men, the rights of his tribe and the menaced independence of the whole race. And we all know (the fact is on record) that shortly after this treaty the British governor-general of Canada, caused it to be officially communicated to the government of the United States, that the Indians were meditating hostile designs."

Believing that a decision in a court of justice would be the most effectual means of shewing the correctness of his conduct, and at the same time the fairest towards his opponents, he commenced a suit against a certain Wm. M^cIntosh, a Scotchman of large property, at Vincennes, who had been for many years hostile to the Governor, and who was not believed to be very partial to the government of the United States.

It appears by a deposition made in 1811 by colonel John Small, that prior to the year 1805, this M^cIntosh had been upon the best terms with Governor Harrison; but, that in that year, the Governor gave him great offence by his advocating and promoting the measure of the territory, going into the second grade of government; from which circumstance, Mr. Small believed and asserted on his oath, that M^cIntosh bore the greatest enmity towards Governor Harrison. A copy of this deposition we have now before us; it appears to have been made before judge Park.

It thus appears that the Governor's exertions to improve the condition of the territory, by giving to it a representative government, had drawn down upon him the enmity of this man who strictly adhered to the declaration he had made, to do him all the injury in his power.

Against this M^cIntosh, suit was brought by the Governor, in the supreme court of the territory, for having asserted that he had cheated the Indians, in the last treaty which had been made with them at fort Wayne. The suit was about this time brought to issue, and was from its character, well calculated to draw the attention, and excite a strong interest in the minds of the people of the territory. Every means was taken to insure an impartial trial. Of the three judges, one was the personal friend of the Governor, and another of M^cIntosh; both those gentlemen, when the suit was called, left the bench, and the honorable, Waller Taylor then recently arrived in the territory, left to preside alone in

the suit. To insure an impartial jury, the court named two Elizers, who chose forty eight as a pannel from which the jury were to be taken; from this forty eight the plaintiff and defendant each struck twelve, and from the remaining twenty-four, the jury was drawn by lot,

Before a crowded audience, this interesting trial was continued from 10 A. M. till one o'clock at night. Every person concerned in the Indian department, or who could know any thing of the circumstances of the late treaty at fort Wayne, was examined, and every latitude that was asked for, or attempted by the defendant in the examination permitted. Finding that the testimony of all the witnesses, went to prove the justice and integrity of the Governor's conduct in relation to every thing connected with the Indian department; the defendant began to ask questions relating to some points of his civil administration. To this the jury as well as the court objected, the latter observing that it was necessary that the examination should be confined to the matter at issue. But at the earnest request of the Governor, the defendant was permitted to pursue his own course, and examine the witnesses upon every point which he might think proper. The defendant's council abandoning all idea of justification, pleaded only for a mitigation of damages. After a retirement of one hour, the jury returned a verdict of \$4000 damages. To pay this sum, a large amount of the defendant's lands were exposed to sale, and in the Governor's absence in the command of the army the ensuing year, was bought in by his agent. Two thirds of this property has since been returned to M^rIntosh, and the remaining part given to some of the orphan children of those distinguished citizens, who fell a sacrifice to their patriotism in the last war.

In the fall of 1810, a party of Indians who had stolen some horses, were pursued by five white men near the Missouri; the latter got in sight of the Indians in a large prairie, but their horses became so much exhausted that they were obliged to give up the pursuit, which the Indians perceiving, turned on and surprised them in their camp and killed four, and badly wounded the fifth. Of this circumstance the Governor was informed by the acting governor of Louisiana, who sent him a number of documents relating to the subject, and requested that he would cause the murderers to be apprehended, as he had been informed that they were within the limits of the territory of Indiana. It was found that the information was correct, and that they had wintered between the Wabash and lake Michigan, at a short distance from the prophet's town. Four of the same tribe, and from the same place, went to a settlement about twenty miles from Vincennes, and stole twelve horses; they were supposed to be the same banditti who had been formerly led by the chief called Turkey Foot, of whom some account has already been given.

The Governor despatched a messenger to endeavor to have them given up, and, at least, to find out by what chief they were protected; but he had only slender hopes of having them surrendered up to him. This messenger having, however, in about two months made a report on the subject: four of the horses were delivered up, Tecumseh and the prophet both disclaiming having any agency in the taking of them, although they acknowledged that it was done by that part of the Potawatamie tribe, which was under their influence—the rest they promised to have sent in, but in this they failed—and they said that the murderers had left that part of the country, and had gone to reside on the Illinois river. The messenger did not make a formal demand of them, but he was told that they would not be given up. He had much conversation with Tecumseh, who openly avowed his determination to resist the encroachments of the white people, and upon his being told that he never would be able, he told the messenger that he would live to see the contrary.

A few weeks before the period we treat of, a Kickapoo chief came to the Governor of his own accord, and told him that, as he had always treated him with kindness, he was determined to put him upon his guard against the prophet and his brother. He said that their pacific professions were not to be relied upon, that for several years he had heard them speaking to the Indians, and in that time he had heard nothing but war and hatred to the United States. That their giving up horses which were occasionally stolen, was merely to lull them into security, and to prevent their designs being discovered until they were ripe for execution; that they had frequently cautioned their young men, and reproved them, saying that they would defeat their plans by their precipitancy. That in their harangues to the Indians, they always requested those who would not join their confederacy, to keep their secrets; that they always promised a rich harvest of plunder and scalps, and that the first stroke would put them in possession of an ample supply of arms, ammunition and provisions.

From general William Clark of St. Louis, the Governor received information that the prophet had sent belts to the Mississippi tribes, inviting them to war against the United States, and declaring that he would begin the war by an attack on Vincennes. By accounts received from the interpreter at Chicago, the Indians in that quarter had fully determined on war; and by another letter from general Clarke, it appeared that the Sacks had absolutely acceded to the confederacy, and a party of them had gone off to Detroit, no doubt for arms and ammunition.

One of the surveyors who had been employed to divide the new purchase into townships, was frightened off the lands by the Wea tribe, who took two of his men prisoners and took from

them a rifle and some other things, and kept them tied all night, but they were liberated in the morning. The surveyors fled to Cincinnati.

The Governor had often occasion to lament that the Indians were not always treated with justice and propriety by American citizens. About this time, a Creek, or Muscogee Indian was killed by an Italian trader in Vincennes. The Indian was drunk, and the white man believing, or effecting to believe that the Indian intended some violence to him, shot him. The Governor caused the Italian to be arrested and tried; but, as in too many other cases, acquittal was the consequence. Two Indians were wounded by a white man about twenty miles from Vincennes; a surgeon was sent out to them by the Governor, and they both recovered.

The occurrence of circumstances of this nature, was a source of great embarrassment and vexation to the Governor; he determined, however, that nothing on his part should be omitted to render strict justice to the Indians, but this, as has been formerly shown, could not always be obtained from the prejudices and partiality of juries. No tribe, however, had any cause of complaint but the Delawares, and the Governor now began to experience the evils arising from the unredressed injuries which that faithful tribe had suffered, as narrated in a former part of this work. The house of a Mr. Vawter had been robbed by one of that tribe; upon the robber being demanded, the chiefs declared they would never give up another man, till some of the white people were punished who had murdered their people; they would however punish him themselves, and they did accordingly put him to death.

The Governor had sent a boat up the Wabash with salt for the Indians, as part of their annuity. He ordered five barrels to be left with the prophet, two for the Kickapoos, and three for the Shawanese, and other Indians. The prophet informed one of the Governor's men who left the town the day before the arrival of the salt, that he would not accept of any of it. When it arrived, however, he immediately called a council, and the result of their deliberations was, that the whole should be seized, which was done accordingly. He desired the man to tell the Governor not to be angry at his seizing the salt, as he had got none last year, and he had more than two thousand men to feed.

The messenger which the Governor had placed at the prophet's town, to give him information of his proceedings, sent him word by the salt boat, that there were about six hundred men with the prophet then, and that Tecumseh was expected with a large reinforcement from the lakes. From all these circumstances it became evident to the Governor, that they were rapidly advancing towards a crisis, and that there was a strong probability that he would soon march upon Vincennes,

with a force of eight hundred or one thousand men. The Governor was, therefore, at this period in a considerable embarrassment. All the troops he could collect for many miles, would not equal Tecumseh's number; and at that season of the year, the end of June, it would have been ruinous to have brought the men from their farms, nor would they have been willing to abandon their wives and children. He, therefore, wrote to government, recommending that the troops in Pittsburg, under the command of colonel Boyde, should be ordered to Vincennes immediately, and, also, for authority to commence offensive operations, so soon as he found that the prophet was decidedly hostile. So well convinced was he of his hostile intentions, that he would not have hesitated a moment to attack him on his way to Vincennes, had he had any discretion on the subject.

On the 2d of July, Governor Harrison received an account from governor Edwards, of several murders having been committed in the Illinois territory, information of which, he, governor Edwards, had sent off to the general government, and he also received intelligence of the massacre of another family, of which governor Edwards had not heard when he sent off his despatches to the government of the United States.

It was supposed, upon tolerably good grounds, that these enormities had been committed by a party of Shawanese. The Governor had been informed four weeks before, that the prophet had intended to commence hostilities in Illinois, in order to cover his principal object, which was an attack on Vincennes. From all the circumstances it was clear, that some decisive measures were absolutely necessary. The territory of Illinois, as well as that of Indiana, was in the highest degree of alarm; and the letters of Governors Harrison and Edwards to the secretary at war, stated, that if the government would not, the people were determined to protect themselves.

About this time, Tecumseh returned to his village from an excursion which he had been on, among the Iroquois and Wyandots; but he did not bring with him the number of them which he expected; and he said they were to come on in September. It is probable that this disappointment had prevented their attack on Vincennes so soon as they intended.

On the 24th June, the Governor sent to the prophet and his brother the following speech, which is immediately followed by the answer of Tecumseh.

“The Governor of the Indiana Territory, to Olliwayshica and Tecumseh, Chiefs of the Confederation of various tribes residing at Tippecanoe, on the Wabash.

“BROTHERS,

“Listen to me, I speak to you about matters of importance, both to the white people and yourselves; open your ears, therefore, and attend to what I shall say.

“Brothers, this is the third year that all the white people in this country have been alarmed at your proceedings, you threaten us with war, you invite all the tribes to the north and west of you to join against us.

“Brothers, your warriors who have lately been here, deny this; but I have received the information from every direction; the tribes on the Mississippi have sent me word that you intended to murder me, and then to commence a war upon our people. I have also received the speech that you sent to the Potawatomies and others, to join you for that purpose; but if I had no other evidence of your hostility to us, your seizing the salt which I lately sent up the Wabash is sufficient.

“Brothers, our citizens are alarmed, and my warriors are preparing themselves; not to strike you, but to defend themselves and their women and children. You shall not surprise us as you expect to do; you are about to undertake a very rash act; as a friend, I advise you to consider well of it; a little reflection may save us a great deal of trouble, and prevent much mischief; it is not yet too late.

“Brothers, what can be the inducement for you to undertake an enterprise where there is so little probability of success; do you really think that the handful of men that you have about you are able to contend with the power of the Seventeen Fires, or even that the whole of the tribes united could contend against the Kentucky Fire alone.

“Brothers, I am myself of the long knife fire; as soon as they hear my voice, you will see them pouring forth their swarms of hunting shirt men, as numerous as the mosquitoes on the shores of the Wabash, brothers, take care of their stings.

“Brothers, it is not our wish to hurt you; if we did, we certainly have power to do it; look at the number of our warriors to the east of you, above and below the Great Miami, to the south, on both sides of the Ohio and below you also. You are brave men, but what could you do against such a multitude; but we wish you to live in peace and happiness.

“Brothers, the citizens of this country are alarmed, they must be satisfied that you have no design to do them mischief, or they will not lay aside their arms. You have also insulted the government of the United States, by seizing the salt that was intended for the other tribes; satisfaction must be given for that also.

“Brothers, you talk of coming to see me, attended by all your young men; this, however, must not be so, if your intentions are good, you have no need to bring but a few of your young men with you. I must be plain with you; I will not suffer you to come into our settlements with such a force.

“Brothers, If you wish to satisfy us that your intentions are good, follow the advice that I have given you before; that is, that one or both of you should visit the President of the United States, and lay your grievances before him. He will treat you

well, will listen to what you say, and if you can shew him that you have been injured, you will receive justice. If you will follow my advice in this respect, it will convince the citizens of this country and myself that you have no design to attack them.

"Brothers, with respect to the lands that were purchased last fall, I can enter into no negotiation with you on the subject; the affair is in the hands of the President, if you wish to go and see him, I will supply you with the means.

"Brothers, the person who delivers this, is one of my war officers; he is a man in whom I have entire confidence, whatever he says to you, although it may not be contained in this paper, you may believe comes from me.

"My Friend, Tecumseh, the bearer is a good man and a brave warrior; I hope you will treat him well, you are yourself a warrior, and all such should have an esteem for each other."

"Tecumseh to the Governor of Indiana.

"BROTHER,

"I give you a few words until I will be with you myself.

"TECUMSEH.

"Brother, at Vincennes, I wish you to listen to me whilst I send you a few words, and I hope that they will ease your heart; I know you look on your young men and your women and children with pity, to see them so much alarmed.

"Brother, I wish you now to examine what you have from me, I hope that it will be a satisfaction to you, if your intentions are like mine, to wash away all these bad stories that have been circulated. I will be with you myself in eighteen days from this day.

"Brother, we cannot say what will become of us, as the Great Spirit has the management of us at his will. I may be there before the time, and may not be there until the day. I hope that when we come together, all these bad tales will be settled; by this I hope your young men, women and children will be easy. I wish you, brother, to let them know when I come to Vincennes and see you, all will be settled in peace and happiness.

"Brother, these are only a few words to let you know that I will be with you myself, and when I am with you, I can inform you better.

"Brother, If I find that I can be with you in less time than eighteen days, I will send one of my young men before me, to let you know what time I will be with you.

"July 4th, 1811."

Notwithstanding the promise made in the answer of Tecumseh, to meet the Governor in eighteen days, he did not arrive till the 27th of July. This delay was occasioned by a disappointment in

meeting with the several detachments which came by land, and were not at the rendezvous he had appointed at the time of his arrival.

On the 25th, captain Wilson met him twenty miles from Vincennes, and delivered to him a message from the Governor, expressive of his astonishment at his bringing with him a force so large, notwithstanding his positive injunction, and his own promises to the contrary. After some equivocation, he said he had with him but twenty four men, and the rest had come of their own accord; but that every thing should be settled to the satisfaction of the Governor on his arrival at Vincennes.

The preparations made by the Governor to repel an attack, if such should be made, were as follows. He stationed two companies of militia infantry and a detachment of fifteen dragoons on the borders of the town, to be relieved every three days, and the whole of the remaining militia were put on the alert.

On the 27th, Saturday, Tecumseh arrived with those that came by water, and the next day, all those that came by land also arrived; the whole of them amounting to three hundred, twenty or thirty of them women and children.

That he might be sent off soon, the Governor endeavored to have an interview as early as possible, and mentioned Monday for that purpose, but to this he would not agree, and it was late on Tuesday before he made his appearance at the harbour that had been prepared for the occasion. An hour before his arrival he sent to know, whether or not the Governor was to be attended by armed men at the council; for if the former, his young men would be armed also. He was told that he had his choice, if his men were armed, those whom the Governor had on duty would be armed too; he preferred the latter, and came attended by about one hundred and seventy or eighty men without guns, but armed with knives and tomahawks, or war clubs, and some with bows and arrows.

The Governor was attended by captain Parke's fine troop of dragoons, about seventy strong, dismounted, and completely armed with sabres, and two pistols stuck in their belts. The Governor took his station in front of them, and Tecumseh and his brother, the prophet, placed themselves in front of their followers.

In the Governor's address, he mentioned the great alarm which the late murders in the Illinois had created, as well as his appearance with so large a force on the present occasion; and that he was ready to listen to what he had to say, but that he would enter into no negotiation on the subject of the late purchase, the affair being entirely in the hands of the President, who had not sent any answer to the claim which he had made last year in behalf of all the tribes on the continent. That he might, if he pleased, go and see the President and hear from

his own mouth, his determination; he also required an explanation of the seizing of the salt.

In his reply, he began with this latter subject; admitted that it had been taken, but said he was not at home, either this spring, or the year before when the salt had arrived; that it was impossible to please him, the Governor; that last year he was displeased because the salt had been refused, and this year he was equally so, because it was taken; and after a few more observations, he requested that the council might be adjourned till next day. With this the Governor had to comply, on account of a heavy rain which came on at that time.

The next day, he was waited for till near two o'clock, when at length he arrived, and the Wea chief began a long unanimated speech, in which he attempted to give a history of all the treaties made by the Governor on the part of the United States, with the different tribes. He concluded with saying, that he had heard, that the Miami chiefs had been forced by the Potawatamies, to make the last treaty of fort Wayne, and that it would be proper to institute an inquiry to find out the person who held the tomahawk over their heads. The allusion was to Winemack whose uniform attachment to the United States, had drawn upon him the hatred of the prophet and his party.

The statement was immediately contradicted by the Governor, and the Miami chiefs, who were present, were appealed to for its falsehood. Being anxious to bring the council to a close, the Governor told Tecumseh, that he then had it in his power, by a single act, to manifest the truth of his professions of friendship to the United States, and his desire to preserve peace, by delivering up the two Potawatamies who murdered the four white men on the Missouri last fall, and whom it was known were in his town. His reply was long and artful, but his designs were by it more completely developed than by any thing that had ever fallen from him. He said, that after much trouble and difficulty, he had at length brought all the northern tribes to be united, and to place themselves under his direction; that the white people were unnecessarily alarmed at his measures; that they really meant nothing but peace. The United States had set the example of forming a strict union among all the fires that compose the confederacy, that the Indians did not complain of it, nor should his white brothers complain of him for doing the same thing with regard to the Indian tribes. As soon as the council was over, he was to set out on a visit to the southern tribes, to get them to unite with those of the north. To the Governor's demand of the murderers, he observed, that they were not in his town, as he had been informed, and if they were he could not deliver them up. That it was not right to punish those people; that they ought to be forgiven *as well as those who lately murdered his people in the Illinois.* That he had set the

white people an example of forgiveness of injuries, which they ought to follow. The Ottaways had murdered one of his warriors, and the Osages one of his relations, and yet he had forbore to avēnge them; that he had even taken the tomahawk out of the hands of the people who were ready to march against the Osages. To the Governor's inquiry whether he was still determined to prevent the settlement of the new purchase, he replied, that he hoped no attempts would be made to settle it, till his return next spring. That a great number of Indians were to come and settle at his town this fall, and that they must occupy that land as a hunting ground, and if they did no further injury, they might kill the cattle and hogs that would produce disturbance; that he wished every thing to remain in its present situation till his return. That no settlements should progress further, and no revenge sought for any injury that had been, or should be done till his return; that he would then go and see the President, and settle every thing with him; that the affairs of all the tribes in this quarter were in his hands, and that nothing could be done without him; that he would despatch messengers in every direction to prevent the Indians doing more mischief, and that he made full atonement for the murders which had been committed by the wampum which he delivered.

To this the Governor made a short reply, telling them, that the moon which they beheld (for it was then night) would sooner fall to the ground than the President would suffer his people to be murdered with impunity, and that he would put his warriors in petticoats* before he would surrender up lands which he had fairly and honestly purchased from the rightful owners.

The meeting was then broke up, and Tecumseh, himself, in a few days *went off* down the Wabash, accompanied by twenty men on his way to the southward. The day before he *went off* he made the Governor a visit, and labored hard to make him believe, that he had no other intention by the journey, than to prevail on all the tribes to unite in the bonds of peace; he said that after visiting the Creeks, Chickasaws, and Chocktaws, he would go to the Osages, and return by the Missouri.

It must be evident, that the object of Tecumseh in this southern expedition of his, was to form an alliance with the southern tribes against the United States; and that the whole of his speech was an artful evasion, but easily seen through.

It appears that his mother was of the Creek nation, and he built much upon that circumstance in forwarding his schemes. The time that he had given out for his return, was the following spring, but the Governor had information that he intended to be not longer than three months absent. A Potawatamie

*The greatest offence that could be put upon an Indian Warrior, would be to put him in petticoats.

chief who was called the deaf chief, from his not hearing well, told him that he was present, when a message was delivered to the prophet from the British agent, telling him that the time had arrived for taking up arms, and inviting him to send a party to Malden, to receive the necessary supplies.

This man, it appears, was one of the few who had preserved their independence. He was in the council when Tecumseh had denied any hostile intentions, but not understanding the Shawanese language, or not hearing it well, he was not informed of what had passed until the following day. He then came to the Governor, and asked him why he had not been called upon to confront Tecumseh, in relation to those charges. He said he would have been very willing to assert the truth in the presence of the brothers and their followers. This declaration being made in the presence of several Indians, soon came to the knowledge of Tecumseh, who gave directions to his brother, to have the Potawatamie killed on his return home. A friend of the latter, informed him of his danger, but, no way alarmed, the intrepid chief returned to his family, who were encamped on the bank of the Wabash opposite Vincennes, and having put on his war dress and painted himself in the best stile of a warrior, he seized his rifle, his tomahawk, war club and scalping knife, and thus equipped, paddled over in his canoe to the camp of Tecumseh. The Governor's interpreter, Mr. Baron, was at that time in the tent of the latter. As soon as the Potawatamie came near it, he upbraided Tecumseh for having given the order to assassinate him, as cowardly, and unworthy of a warrior; "but here I am now," said he "come and kill me." Tecumseh made no answer; "you and your men" said he "can kill the white people's hogs, and call them bears, but you dare not face a warrior." Tecumseh still remaining silent, he heaped upon him every insult that could provoke him to fight him, reproached him with being the slave of the red coats, (the British) and finally applied to him a term of reproach which can never be forgotten by an Indian.—During the whole time, Tecumseh seemed not in the least to regard him; but continued to converse with Mr. Baron. Wearied, at length, with his useless efforts to draw out Tecumseh, he gave the war whoop of defiance and paddled off in his canoe. There is reason to believe that the order of Tecumseh was obeyed, as the deaf chief was no more seen at Vincennes.*

The implicit obedience and respect which was paid to Tecumseh by his followers, was astonishing, and, more than any other circumstance, proved him to be one of those extraordinary geniuses which occasionally arise to produce revolutions, and overturn the established order of things. But for the

*See note 6.

United States, it is not at all improbable, that this man might have been the founder of a mighty empire not inferior to that of Mexico or Peru. He was deterred by no difficulties. His activity, industry and perseverance, supplied the want of a knowledge of letters. For four years he had been in constant motion; one day he might be seen on the Wabash, and in a short time he would be heard of being on the shores of Erie or of Michigan, or on the banks of the Mississippi; and wherever he went, he made an impression favourable to his purposes.—In fact, to take him for all in all, he may be justly said to have been the Bonaparte of the West.

Notwithstanding all this, however, the Governor had strong hopes that the fabric which he and his fanatical brother had reared, and which Tecumseh expected to finish by this last trip of his, would be demolished, and its foundation rooted up before his return; and the event proved that he was, at least nearly, correct.

Though many of his followers were attached to him from principle and affection, yet there were many who adhered to him through fear; as he was scarcely a mile from Vincennes before they indulged themselves in the most virulent invectives against him.

The prophet was a very different character; he was arrogant and audacious, but was deficient in talent, judgment and firmness.

What could have been the object of Tecumseh's visit to Vincennes with so large a force, it was difficult to determine. If it was with the intention of attacking the town in an unguarded moment, there was good reason to believe that the Miami chiefs who accompanied him knew nothing of the matter. The spies said that he intended demanding a retrocession of the late purchase and if it could not be obtained to seize some of the chiefs who were active in making the treaty and put them to death in presence of the Governor, and, should he have interfered, to make him share the same fate—and no doubt if he had found the Governor unprepared, he would readily have picked a quarrel to give colour to his design.—That he had some design in view which he thought proper to abandon, there could be no question—it was evident from a variety of circumstances. At the moment that he was promising to captain Wilson to bring with him but a few men, he was sending in every direction to collect his people. Besides those who were encamped with him and drew provisions, there were considerable numbers hanging about the settlements in small parties, and at one time upwards of one hundred within two miles of the town north-west of the Wabash. His manner throughout the council was so embarrassed that it was plain to all that he had been put out of his track, and that the speech he made was not the one he

had prepared for the occasion.—It was believed by all the neutral Indians that he meditated a blow at that time; and the information given to general Clarke by the Mississippi tribes, and to the Governor by many individuals, both Indians and white people, agreed in almost every particular.

To intimidate and to prevent him from attempting any hostile enterprise, the Governor made as great a display of force as possible. On the day of his arrival he had a review of the militia of the whole county of Knox, at which there were between seven and eight hundred men under arms—the two infantry companies on duty were increased to three, and these being relieved on different days by some management in marching and changing of quarters, it appeared to the Indians that four or five companies were on constant duty; the elegant troop of dragoons commanded by captain Park, who was also one of the supreme judges, was exhibited to the greatest advantage, and nightly patrols both of horse and foot demonstrated a vigilance which defied surprise.—They were in astonishment and terror while they were in the town, and there was good reason to believe that they left it under the impression that Vincennes could not be so easily taken as their chief had conceived.

The circumstances which attended the visit of Tecumseh to Vincennes, and others which were daily occurring on different parts of the frontier had produced a great alarm amongst the citizens generally. On the 31st of July a large meeting was held by the citizens of Vincennes and the neighbouring country to consider of their situation, and the following resolutions and address were agreed upon:

“ At a meeting of a very considerable number of the citizens of the county of Knox, at the seminary in Vincennes, on Wednesday the 31st of July, 1811, when colonel Ephraim Jordon was appointed President, and captain James Smith, Secretary: Thereupon general W. Johnston addressed the meeting, in which he informed them of the present situation of the inhabitants of not only the town, but country, in regard to the Shawanese prophet, his brother Tecumsch, and their confederacy of Indians, and advised, that for the safety of the citizens, some resolutions should be fallen into; and, therefore, adjutant Daniel Sullivan introduced the following resolutions, which being read and explained in an audible voice, both in the English and French languages, were unanimously adopted as follows, viz:

“ 1st. *Resolved*, That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the safety of the persons and property of this frontier, can never be effectually secured but by the breaking up of the combination formed by the Shawanese prophet on the Wabash.

" 2d. *Resolved*, That we consider it highly impolitic and injurious, as well to the inhabitants of the United States, as to those of the territory, to permit a formidable banditti, which is constantly increasing in number, to occupy a situation which enables them to strike our settlements without the least warning.

" 3d. *Resolved*, That we are fully convinced that the formation of this combination headed by the Shawanese prophet, is a British scheme, and that the agents of that power are constantly exciting the Indians to hostility against the United States.

" 4th. *Resolved*, That the assemblage of Indians at this place, at this time, and under the circumstances which attended it, was calculated to excite the most serious alarm, and but for the energetic measures which have been adopted by our executive, it is highly probable that the threatened destruction of this place and the massacre of the inhabitants, would have been the consequence.

" 5. *Resolved*, That a temporising policy is not calculated to answer any beneficial purpose with savages, who are only to be controlled by prompt and decisive measures.

" 6th. *Resolved*, That we approve highly of the prompt and decisive measures adopted and pursued by the Governor of the territory. We are convinced that the situation in which we stand with the prophet and his adherents, rendered them necessary for our safety, and from them we confidently expect such a termination of the presumptuous pretensions of this daring chief, as must be pleasing to every patriot, and honorable to himself.

" 7. *Resolved*, That a committee to consist of the Rev. Samuel T. Scott, the Rev. Alexander Devin, colonel Luke Decker, colonel E. Jordan, Daniel McClure and Walter Wilson, esqs. and colonel Francis Vigo, or a majority of them, be, and they are hereby appointed to prepare and forward to the executive of the United States, a respectful address on the behalf of this meeting, assuring him of our attachment to his person and administration, and requesting him to take such measures as his wisdom may dictate, to free the territories in this quarter from future apprehensions from the prophet and his party; and that he be also requested to insist upon the surrender, by the Indian tribes, of those who have murdered our fellow citizens, and provide compensation for such as have lost their property.

" 8th. *Resolved*, That these resolutions be printed in the Western Sun, and also the address which may be prepared, and forwarded to the President in pursuance of them.

" (Signed)

" E. JORDAN, *President*.

" (Counter-signed,)

" JAMES SMITH, *Secretary*."

To James Madison, President of the United States.

"SIR,

"In obedience to the wishes of a numerous meeting of our fellow citizens, assembled for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the country in relation to Indian affairs, we have the honor to address you. In approaching the chief magistrate of our country, who is so deservedly celebrated for the talents which distinguish the statesman, and the virtues which adorn the man, we should not do justice to our own feelings, and the feelings of those whom we represent, if we neglected to express our confidence in his administration, and our sincere respect and esteem for his person.

"In fulfilling the duty which has been assigned to us, sir, it is scarcely necessary that we should do more than to refer you to the resolutions which are enclosed; they contain a true statement of facts, and a true picture of the feelings of the citizens of this part of the country. It is impossible to doubt but that the combination which has been formed on the Wabash, is a British scheme; and it is equally certain that this banditti is now about to be let loose upon us, and that nothing but vigorous measures will prevent it. In this part of the country we have not as yet lost any of our fellow citizens by the Indians; but depredations upon the property of those who live upon the frontiers, and insults to the families that are left unprotected, almost daily occur.

"The impunity with which these savages have been so long suffered to commit crimes, has raised their insolence to a pitch that is no longer supportable. We are not, sir, advocates for unnecessary rigor towards our Indian neighbors. The character which some of us sustain as ministers of the gospel of Christ, will shield us from the supposition that we wish to plunge our country in an unnecessary war—our object is peace—but we are fully persuaded that that blessing can now only be secured to us by the exertion of some rigor.

"Let the savages be made sensible that every aggression from them will meet with correspondent punishment, and Indian depredations will seldom be heard of.

"Since the adoption of the resolutions under which we act, we have listened to the speech delivered by the brother of the prophet to Governor Harrison, and if a doubt remained upon our minds as to the designs of the confederacy he has formed, it has been completely removed. Shall we then quietly wait the stroke, when we see the weapon is suspended over us; we hope and trust that this will not be expected, and that the general government will take effectual measures to avert the danger. What these measures shall be we will not presume to dictate; but we beg leave most respectfully to observe, that we conceive that the country will forever be exposed to those

alarms, which are at once so injurious to its settlement, and the interest of the United States, as long as the banditti under the prophet are suffered to remain where they now are. The people have become highly irritated and alarmed, and if the government will not direct their energies, we fear that the innocent will feel the effects of their resentment, and a general war be the consequence. The western country, sir, is indebted to your predecessor for an undeviating attention to its prosperity, and the gratitude and attachment which they feel towards that distinguished patriot, can never be effaced. With equal confidence they look up to his successor, who, pursuing the same course of politics with regard to European powers, is to them sufficient proof of coincidence of sentiment in that which relates to the continent.

“That you may be the means under providence of establishing the affairs of your country, and settling its interests in every quarter of the globe upon a secure and lasting foundation, and that you may long live to enjoy the blessings of your countrymen for the happiness you procure for them, is the sincere prayer of your

“Fellow citizens,
 “(Signed,) SAMUEL T. SCOTT,
 ALEXANDER DEVIN,
 LUKE DECKER,
 EFHRAIM JORDAN,
 DANIEL M'CLURE,
 WALTER WILSON,
 T. VIGO.”

Before these documents, however, had time to reach the executive of the United States, measures had been taken to place a force at the disposal of Governor Harrison not only for defence of the inhabitants, but, if in his opinion their safety required it, he was authorised to commence offensive operations. The fourth regiment of United States infantry under the command of colonel John P. Boyde, had been for some time placed at Pittsburgh as a position from which they could be easily sent to our northwestern frontier in the event of a rupture with England, which, even at that time, was considered extremely probable.

On the 17th of July the following letter was addressed to the Governor from the war department.

“War Department, July 17th, 1811.

“SIR,

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of the 2d instant.

“The fourth regiment, with a company of riflemen, making in the whole 500 men, is ordered to descend the Ohio from

Pittsburg, with all possible expedition. Captain Piatt of the second regiment, who will be in advance, will advise you of his approach. A letter addressed to him or colonel Boyde, at Louisville, will be immediately respected. Colonel Boyde is ordered to follow the advice and directions of your Excellency, respecting his movements and the positions he is to take.

“ Letters from governor Edwards, announce several murders, and a state of general alarm on the frontier of the Illinois territory: Your Excellency, it is presumed, will consult with him, and make such arrangements of the military force, as may be best calculated to afford protection.

“ The authority of the executive, to call out the militia in a case like this, notwithstanding an expression in my last, is considered entirely competent: and in case circumstances shall occur which may render it necessary or expedient to attack the prophet and his followers, the force should be such as to ensure the most complete success. This force will consist of the militia and regular troops. Those under colonel Boyde are well officered, and well diciplined in the common tactics of infantry; but have no knowledge or experience in Indian warfare: Your excellency will therefore, in such an event, assign to them such duties as they are calculated to perform.

“ If the prophet should commence, or seriously threaten, hostilities, he ought to be attacked; provided the force under your command is sufficient to ensure success.

“ Very respectfully,

“ Your excellency’s obedient servant,

“ W. EUSTIS.

“ HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. HARRISON, *Vincennes.*”

This was, however, quickly followed by another in the following words:

“ *War Department, July 20th, 1811.*

“ SIR,

“ Since my letter of the 17th instant, I have been particularly instructed by the President, to communicate to your excellency his earnest desire that peace may, if possible, be preserved with the Indians, and that to this end every proper means may be adopted. By this it is not intended that murder or robberies committed by them should not meet with the punishment due to those crimes, that the settlements should be unprotected, or that any hostile combination should avail itself of success, in consequence of a neglect to provide the means of resisting and defeating it; or that the banditti under the prophet should not be attacked and vanquished, provided such a measure should be rendered absolutely necessary. Circumstances conspire at this particular juncture to render it peculiarly desirable that

hostilities (of any kind or to any degree not indispensably required) should be avoided. The force under colonel Boyde has been ordered to descend the Ohio. Instead of Louisville, they will make their first halt at Newport, Kentucky, where they will await your orders. Captain Piatt, who will be in advance, will receive your first instructions. And although the force is at the disposal of your excellency, I am instructed to inform you, that the President indulges the hope and expectation that your exertions and measures with the Indians, will be such as may render their march to the Indiana territory unnecessary, and that they may remain liable to another disposition.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

"Your excellency's most obedient servant,

"W. EUSTIS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,

"*Vincennes, I. T.*"

The great responsibility which was laid upon the Governor by these letters somewhat embarrassed him. On the 1st of August he addressed the the following letter to the secretary at war:

"Under the strong injunction contained in your letter against employing the troops under colonel Boyde, but in case of absolute necessity, I shall forbear to call on him for any other part of them than the company of infantry of the second regiment commanded by captain Piatt.

"The outlines of my plan are, to call upon all the tribes in the most peremptory manner to deliver up such of their people as may have been concerned in murdering our citizens; to require them to fulfil that article of the treaty of Greenville which obliges them to give information of, and to stop any parties passing through their district with hostile intentions, and that all such as are marching to join the prophet are considered by us as of that description; to require them to cause such of their people as may have joined the prophet, immediately to return to their respective tribes, or to put them out of their protection.— From the Miamies, I will require an absolute disavowal of all connexion with the prophet, and as they are the owners of the land which he occupies, I will endeavor to prevail upon them to express to him their disapprobation of his remaining there.— To all the tribes I will repeat a declaration which I was instructed to make to them by the then secretary at war—That the United States have manifested through a series of years, the utmost justice and generosity towards their Indian neighbors, and had not only fulfilled all the engagements which they entered into with them, but have spent considerable sums to civilize them and promote their happiness. But if under those circum-

stances, which they all had an opportunity of knowing, any tribe should dare to take up the tomahawk against their fathers, they must not expect that the same lenity would be shown them as they experienced at the close of the former war; but that they would be absolutely exterminated or driven beyond the Mississippi.

“I believe, sir, that by the employment of proper agents to disseminate speeches which shall contain the above demands and declaration, and by using some management to secure the exertions of influential chiefs in support of them, that the combination formed by the prophet will be dissolved. But to ensure success, some military force must be brought into view for this purpose, if it meet your approbation, and there will be time enough to obtain your answer.

“I shall, about the middle of September, move up to the upper line of the new purchase with the two companies of regulars, fourteen or fifteen companies of militia and two troops of dragoons, the latter composing about one hundred men. Should circumstances render it necessary to break up the prophet's establishment, and I should discover that this force is not sufficient, I shall add to it by two or three other companies from this county, and as many volunteers as I choose to accept from Kentucky, provided they are suffered to be mounted. Indeed, sir, they ought all to be mounted. The militia of the western country are most formidable when they are acting as infantry: and in this way, from the activity of their movements, they are formidable indeed, undisciplined as they are. I have taught a few companies around this place to form a line or lines of battle from a line of march in the manner practised by general Wayne; but excepting this there is nothing like discipline in the infantry. Let me beg your attention to this subject, and request that I may be allowed to use mounted militia, upon any expedition that may be thought necessary. If circumstances should render colonel Boyde's regiment unnecessary at the point to which they were originally destined, I would much rather have them than militia. The event of general Wayne's action, proved that disciplined infantry, with their flanks secured by dragoons and mounted riflemen, are the best troops ever brought against Indians. Infantry disciplined in the common manner, can easily be formed for woods fighting; it requires only the observance of very open order, and doubling instead of wheeling.

“I have the honor to be, &c.”

Pursuant to the plan now laid down, speeches were sent to the Indian tribes, and instructions to the Indian agents. It will be observed too, that at the time this letter was written, the Governor had determined not to employ the 4th regiment, in the proposed operations, in consequence of the urgent advice of the

secretary at war, to dispense, if he could possibly do without them. On further consideration, however, he was induced to abandon this determination, and colonel Boyde, who had fallen down the river to Newport, was ordered to proceed immediately to Vincennes with the whole force.

The difficulty and inconvenience of consulting the war office upon every military movement and arrangement, from the great distance between the principal officer of the war department and the Governor, induced him to take no step of importance without the advice and approbation of Governors Howard and Edwards; between whom and himself, subsisted the most confidential understanding, and though their united councils and exertions tended towards the preservation of peace with the Indians, yet they all agreed upon the propriety, nay, the necessity of breaking up the prophet's establishment upon the Wabash, and at all events, to stop the further accumulation of force at that point; and though it was intended to attempt that measure by calling upon the contiguous tribes to conform to their engagements made at the treaty of Greenville, and prevent reinforcements marching through their several countries towards the prophet's town; yet they were sensible that such demands and remonstrances could not be made with proper effect without the appearance of such a military force as would enable them to enforce them, and to show that they were not only willing, but able to chastise delinquency. They well knew that to convince a savage of his danger, it was necessary to place it before his eyes. Even the gallant Tecumseh himself, had been more acted upon by the gleaming and clangor of arms, and the frowns of a body of hunting shirt men, who had accidentally lined a road by which he approached the council house, than by the arguments of the Governor.

The Governor felt most powerfully the responsibility imposed upon him by the President's directions to preserve peace if possible, and that recourse should only be had to actual hostilities, when every other means should have failed to effect the dispersion of the prophet's force. He was fully impressed with the conviction that nothing could preserve the tranquility of the frontiers for two months, but, by effecting that important purpose; and he was, also, well assured that the pecuniary interests of the United States were as much concerned in effecting it, as their honor and dignity, and the peace and prosperity of the citizens of the frontiers. As to the means of accomplishing it, the appearance of a considerable force was essential, whether he applied to the prophet himself, or through the medium of the other tribes.

Backed by the appearance of a formidable force, the friends of the United States among the Indians, would speak with firmness and decision, the timid would be overawed, and the

wavering, of whom the majority was composed, would be induced to abandon the cause of the prophet.

The Governor appeared to have some doubts respecting the extent of his command. Within the territory, he had no doubt of his competency, but he was uncertain how far he could with propriety proceed in the command if the army should cross the boundaries. All these doubts and uncertainties, however, were satisfied and put to rest by a letter from the secretary at war, of date 29th August, which is inserted here.

“ War Department, August 29th, 1811.

“ SIR,

“ Your Excellency’s letters of the 13th and 14th instant, have been received.

“ My letters of the 22d, advised, that colonel Boyde had been ordered to descend the Ohio to Louisville, and await your instructions. In case of his being required to march to the Indiana territory, he was authorised to purchase pack horses, on a presumption that the movement required despatch.

“ The proposal of your Excellency, that the colonel should move in his boats by the Wabash, will save the expense of the horses, and accommodate the troops with baggage. But it appears from the returns, that the regiment is becoming sick; and, as the fatigue and exposure on the water, may increase the propensity to disease, I have left it to the judgment of the colonel, to take the route by land or by water, as shall appear to him to be most advisable.

“ The reduction of this regiment by sickness, may render it necessary to employ an additional number of companies from the militia, of which, you will judge.

“ As the expedition will be commanded by your Excellency, it is presumed, no objection or difficulty will arise from crossing the boundary of the territory, if circumstances should require it.

“ I am respectfully, your Excellency’s obedient servant,

“ W. EUSTIS.

“ HIS EXCELLENCY, WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“ Vincennes, I. T.”

CHAPTER XXII.

ON the 3d of September, colonel Boyde, with his regiment, arrived at Jeffersonville, the Governor being then in person waiting his arrival for a week before. Previous to his leaving Vincennes, he had despatched messengers to the different tribe with speeches, such as have been before *hinted* at. It was his intention to make a demonstration of force upon the Wabash, and if that did not effect the purpose of dispersing the prophet's band, to march to his town and demand hostages for the compliance with the demands. He also suggested the idea of building a fort within fifteen miles of the prophet's town.

About the 25th September, the speeches sent to the Indian tribes, and the report of the assemblage of troops to be made at Vincennes, brought forward a deputation from the prophet's town full of professions of peace, and a promise that all the demands should be complied with. But the following circumstance, which occurred a few days previous, was of a very different character and tendency.

As captain Piatt was travelling towards Vincennes from Louisville, his horse and that of another traveller, were stolen out of a stable about thirty five miles from Vincennes; and the next night, four other horses were taken from the Bossoron settlement. The trail of the horses from the latter place was very visible, and two white men and a free negro who *speaks* some of the Indian languages were sent in pursuit of them; they crossed the Wabash, and on the second day they came to the Indian camp. They found the Indians in the camp, and they soon discovered their own horses, captain Piatt's and a number more. After some conversation, they agreed to give up the four horses which had been taken from Bossoron, and the men proceeded to return home; but they had been but a few miles on the road, when they perceived themselves pursued by the same party; having but one gun among them, they endeavored to escape; but the two foremost Indians soon came so near as to fire on them, and the negro would have been killed if he had not thrown himself off his horse; they were therefore obliged to abandon all the horses, even those which they rode, and to betake

themselves to a swamp which luckily was near them, and there they separated, and after having suffered severely from hunger and fatigue, they all reached home.

The hostility and spirit of determined aggression manifested in this transaction, gives a very different color to their intentions, to that contained in the profession of the deputation to the Governor.

On the 5th October, we find the troops under the command of Governor Harrison on the Wabash, about sixty five miles above Vincennes; they were all in very tolerable health and in good spirits. The Governor pronounced them to be a fine body of men, and the proportion of regulars, irregulars, infantry and dragoons, such as he could have wished; and he had no reason to doubt the issue of a contest with the savages, and had the greatest confidence that the greater part of the officers and men were desirous of coming in contact with them.

At this point, after reconnoitering the country even to the boundary line, the governor determined on building the fort,* and set the men immediately to work on it. He then expected a deputation from the prophet, and resolved that if he did not hear from him within six days, he would send one to him and make a movement with the army in that direction. Here he obtained further accounts of the depredations committed by the Indians. They had stolen eight horses from a settlement about thirty miles above Vincennes in open daylight. These depredations, however, were soon followed by more audacious proceedings. On the 10th October his parties were in the vicinity of the Governor's camp, and in that night one of the centinels was fired at, and severely, but not dangerously, wounded.

The army was immediately turned out, and gave infinite satisfaction to the Governor by its promptness and good order. Patrols were despatched in all directions, but the night was so dark that pursuit of the enemy was impracticable; but the alertness of the troops in taking their position was highly gratifying to their commander and honorable to themselves.

Before the Governor left Vincennes he sent a deputation to the Delaware tribe to request some of their chiefs to meet him upon the march that he might employ them in missions to the several tribes which had a part of their warriors with the prophet. All the chiefs of this faithful tribe who were able to march set out from their towns on the 6th October. They had proceeded but a few miles when they were met by a deputation from the prophet, requiring a categorical answer to the question "whether they would or would not join them in the war against the United States ? that they had taken up the tomahawk and

*This fort, at the unanimous request of the officers, was called Fort Harrison.

would not lay it down but with their lives: they had, however, positive assurances of victory, and when they had beaten the Americans, those tribes which refused to join them would have cause to repent it."

The Delaware chiefs immediately despatched Mr. Connor, the interpreter, and four of their men to inform the Governor of the circumstance, that they had determined to go immediately to the prophet's town to endeavor to divert him from his purpose, that they would be with the Governor in a few days and communicate the result of their mission; and that if they were unsuccessful in their endeavors to prevent the prophet from striking a blow, they would abandon him to his fate.

With these evidences of determined hostility, he could not hesitate to resolve that the safety of his fellow citizens, which had been committed to his charge, could only be secured by the destruction of the prophet's establishment. He was, however, much mortified to find that some delay, proceeding from causes which he could not control must take place before he could move from his present position.

The contractor's arrangements for the supply of provisions for the troops were extremely defective. The water route by the Wabash had hitherto been relied on, but the quantities obtained were so small, particularly of bread stuff, that failure of a single convoy would leave the troops entirely without flour. Independently of other causes of miscarriage, the Governor was apprehensive that the Indians would not overlook the facility with which the ascending boats might be taken. The winding course of the river and the thick brush wood with which its banks were in many places covered, making it almost impossible to protect them by a force on them. Measures were taken to procure a supply by land, and the strictest economy in the expedition was used, for the purpose of procuring a sufficient quantity in advance of the daily consumption to authorise the march upon the enemy. Early in October, by a general order, the troops had been put upon half allowance, and this order was extended as well to the family of the General as to the other officers; no person in the army of any rank being allowed more than an half ration of bread. While waiting for provisions and the expected reinforcements, the Governor diligently employed himself in disciplining his troops. Besides the occasional field days, the guards were daily exercised by the Governor in person in that species of formation which had been adopted with such success for the army commanded by general Wayne. This instruction was equally necessary for the regular troops as the militia; this kind of manœuvring being entirely new to the former, as they had been disciplined only in the common evolutions which are taught to regular infantry.

Though the advance of the army had not had the desired effect upon the prophet and his immediate followers, it was certain that it had made the proper impression upon the Weas and Miamies.

The chiefs of the Weas collected their women and children, who had fled at the approach of the army, and had them at their village, about two miles from the encampment. The Miami chiefs were also on their way to visit the Governor; and the Weas said that the Wyandots had opened the eyes of them all, and that they would never again return to the prophet.

On the 27th October the Delaware chiefs, who had gone upon a mission to the prophet, to induce him to lay aside his hostile designs, arrived in camp. They reported that they had been badly received, ill treated, insulted, and finally dismissed with the most contemptuous remarks upon themselves and the Governor.

The party who had fired upon the centinels arrived at the time the Delawares were there. They were Shawanese, and the prophet's nearest friends. The party remaining with him appear to have been desperadoes wound up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. The Delawares left him practising his *infernal rites*, and they understood he had his deluded followers performing the war dance day and night.

On the 29th, the day after the army left Fort Harrison, the Governor remained for some hours behind, for the purpose of holding a conference with the Delaware and Miami chiefs. As he had no reason to doubt the information he had received of the intentions of the prophet to burn the first persons he should take, and had apprehensions that he would find much difficulty in opening a communication with him, as the interpreters had become so alarmed that he could scarcely get them to the front of the army, he proposed to the Delawares that they should send three or four of their young men to be the bearers of another speech to the prophet. They agreed to the proposal, and then the Miamies proposed to go with all their chiefs and young men, to make another effort to induce the prophet to comply with the demands of the Governor. He accepted of the offer, excepting as to the number of persons to be employed. He wanted only a few to go, but they were extremely desirous of going *en masse*; and he was obliged to declare that not more than twenty-four should go, and this number was at length agreed on.

The demands which they were to make to the Shawanese were, that the Winebagoes, Potawatamies and Kickapoos who were with him, should return to their respective tribes; that all the stolen horses in his possession should be delivered up; that the murderers of our citizens should either be given up or

satisfactory proof given that they were not, nor had lately been, under his control. He did not, at that time, think proper to say any thing on the subject of hostages.

These emisaries never returned, and there is good reason to believe that the Miamies, who acknowledged that they were but a short distance from the scene of action which was fought on the 7th November, were not idle spectators of the contest.

From the known character of the citizens of Kentucky, it is not to be supposed that they would suffer an expedition against their old enemies to be carried on without giving their assistance. Some time before the march of the troops from Vincennes, the Governor had received a letter from Joseph H. Davis, esq. a distinguished member of the bar of that state, requesting permission to join him. In that letter, which was written on the 24th of August, he expresses the following flattering opinion of the Governor:

“SIR,

“By Mr. Stout, the printer, I was yesterday informed that you were organising an army of militia and colonel Boyde’s regiment, to march against the Indians.

“The object of this letter is to say, that I am very desirous to be with you in this service, and certainly will attend if I am duly informed of the day of rendezvous. It is but rare that any thing of the military kind is done—it is still more extraordinary that a gentleman of military talents should conduct matters of this kind when they *are* to be done, since the land is infested with generals so grossly incompetent. Now, under all the privacy of a letter, I make free to tell you, that I have imagined there were two men in the west who had military talents: And you, sir were the first of the two. It is, thus, an opportunity of service much valued by me. I go as a volunteer, leaving to you, sir, to dispose of me as you choose. No commission, I know, can be had; so I shall be a soldier. Perhaps some few young men here may join me and go on: If I had a full troop, I should like to be in the van-guard, very willing to be responsible for the good look out.

“I am not so sure, sir, how your regulars will do. There are two ways of doing this business: one depends for its success upon the suddenness of the blow; and for this, four, five; or six hundred will do very well. The other moves slow, with heavy foot and train of baggage; and this ought to be fifteen hundred or two thousand, since it gives full time to the enemy to fix time, place, &c. and because of its slowness, very subject to be harrassed.

“You see, sir, I am a true militia-man, ready to offer advice, unasked, to my officer.

"I have been deliberating whether this army wish to carry on war absolutely, or whether the drawing of the sword was to be determined by the language and behaviour of the enemy after we arrived in their country.

"I would gladly receive a letter from you on this matter.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

"J. H. DAVEISS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. HARRISON.

"August 24th, 1811."

Colonel Daveiss (he at that time commanded a regiment of Kentucky militia) was constantly invited to come over; the invitation was immediately accepted, and he came accompanied by Messrs. Croghan, O'Fallen, Ship, and Meade, and a few others as volunteers. These gentlemen distinguished themselves not only in the action which ensued, but performed a brilliant career as officers in the army in the war which followed. To colonel Daveiss, the Governor gave the command of his squadron of dragoons with the rank of major, consisting of the Vincennes troops already mentioned, under the command of captain Parke, a troop from Clarke county Indiana, commanded by captain Biggs, and a small troop from Jefferson county Kentucky, commanded by captain Funk. The aggregate amount being about one hundred and thirty.

This arrangement was not at all pleasing to the Indiana troops, but the Governor's influence induced them to submit. Two days after the march of the army to fort Harrison, the Governor was also joined by colonel Guiger with a small company of mounted riflemen, raised in the neighborhood of Louisville; and also by major general Wells and colonel Abraham Owen. Both of those gentlemen had distinguished themselves in the Indian wars which were incident upon the settlement of Kentucky; and Owen was at that time a senator of that state. The latter, the Governor appointed his aid-de-camp, and to general Wells he assigned the command of the three companies of mounted riflemen commanded by captains Spencer, Robb, and Guiger.

The Governor having arranged his business with the Indians, and given the necessary instructions to lieutenant colonel James Millar* (to whom, with a garrison consisting of invalids, he had assigned the command of Fort Harrison,) set off with his quarter master general, colonel Piatt, his adjutant general Adams, and his aids de camp, to overtake the army. He had directed colonel Boyd to proceed across the large prairie and encamp the troops about twelve miles from the fort, in a situation

*This was the colonel Millar who so highly distinguished himself upon the Niagara frontier. He had been extremely ill with a bilious fever when the army marched, and was scarcely able to walk.

favorable for wood and water. Upon the arrival of the Governor he found the troops in the utmost confusion. Some mistake had been made by colonel Boyd in forming the hollow square, which was the order of encampment, and he was unable to disentangle them.

Before his departure from fort Harrison, the Governor had determined upon the route which he was to take in his advance upon Tippecanoe. Two were presented to his choice; the shortest was that used by the Indians on the southeast side of the Wabash—on which side it continued to the old Wea towns, twelve miles below Tippecanoe; but it passed through an uneven and woody country, entirely favorable to Indian warfare. The northwest side of the river was of a different character; with the exception of the vicinity of the Wabash and its tributary streams, the country presented one uniform face of level prairie. This was the route, then, though the distance was greater, which he determined to take. To deceive the enemy, however, and to prevent him whilst the troops were necessarily divided in crossing the Wabash, or give him time to form a plan for attacking him in one of those difficult passes which even the route on the prairie afforded, he had caused the other route to be reconnoitered and a road marked out for a considerable distance, as he was convinced, too, that the enemies' spies were constantly around him, and would convey to their leader information of his first movement. In order further to conceal his intentions, the army was directed to proceed for one day's march by the route first mentioned. From this point, on the 30th October, the direction of the march was suddenly changed, and having gained the Wabash at the mouth of Rackoon creek, the army was safely passed over by the boats ordered up from Fort Harrison for that purpose, and to convey the provisions and baggage.

In advancing to such a distance in the enemy's country, and with a considerable portion of the effective militia of Vincennes and its vicinity, the Governor was well aware that a vigilant enemy might have a chance to give him the slip, and make an attack upon the settlements in his absence. To prevent this, every precaution in his power had been taken. The whole body of the remaining militia had been put on the alert, and spies had been employed among the friendly Indians to give notice, both to himself and the people of Vincennes, of any movement of the enemy upon his flanks. As no absolute dependence could be placed in them, and as he had now intervened the Wabash river between his army and the settlements, he thought it advisable, in the night of the 30th October, (notwithstanding his perfect conviction that for the severe contest which he anticipated, he would not have a single man to spare,) to detach colonel Ephraim Jordan with a small body of mounted riflemen, for the security of the settlements.

This officer, in whom the Governor had great confidence, was directed to assume the command of all the militia of the county of Knox, to call whatever number he might think proper into actual service, to cause a number of mounted men constantly to reconnoitre the country as high up as Fort Harrison, and to give him, the Governor, information by expresses sent by different routes, of the advance of any body of the enemy towards the settlements.

On the 31st of October the army proceeded up the Wabash, and encamped at night on its banks a few miles from the mouth of the Vermillion river.

From this place the route through the prairies, leaving the Wabash for a considerable distance, it was no longer practicable to give protection to the boats; the Governor, therefore, determined to leave them at this place, and a blockhouse partly jutting over the river was erected for their protection. This work employed the troops the 31st October and part of the following day. A confidential sergeant and eight men were left to protect it, and the troops again took up the line of march.— Upon crossing the Vermillion river, they entered those immense prairies which are said to continue with very little intervention of wood land to the Illinois river. Islands of wood are occasionally to be met with; but a continuous growth of timber is only to be found along the water courses. In passing through this prairie country, the army was frequently made to practise all those formations which it was probable they would have to assume in action. The different corps consisting of different arms, were made to change position with each other as the face of the country changed; for, although generally open, as has been said, a water course sometimes on one flank, sometimes on the other, would present a wood unfavorable to cavalry; but, in which riflemen as well as infantry might act with effect. In passing through a wood of that description, the whole of the cavalry was thrown to the rear.

The determinations made by the Governor to march upon the southwest side of the Wabash, had had the effect of completely deceiving the Indians. For the three first days march, often crossing the Wabash, not an Indian or the recent sign of one was to be seen; this did not, however, abate the vigilance of the Governor. On the 4th November, he approached the very difficult pass of Pine creek. This stream presents a curious spectacle in that country. For many miles, before it discharges itself into the Wabash, its course is through an immense mass of rocks, the sides of which are in some instances perpendicular. Few places can be found where it can be crossed with facility. The Indian path, upon which the army was then marching, led to a defile extremely difficult of passage, and affording the enemy an opportunity of making an attack very unfavorable to the

troops. The Governor knew that it had been selected for an ambuscade by the Indians, once in the year 1786, when general George R. Clarke commanded an expedition against the Indians of the Wabash, which failed from a mutiny of the troops 8 miles above Vincennes, and a second time in 1790, when colonel Hamtramck of the army of the United States, marched with a body of troops up the Wabash, to make a diversion in favor of General Harrison; who at the same time was advancing at the head of an army from fort Washington on the Ohio, to destroy the Miami villages on the Miami of the lake. With a knowledge of this fact, the Governor had no inclination of leading them into this defile; he, therefore, in the course of the night of the 4th dispatched captain Prince, (now, 1824, a member of congress from Indiana) with a reconnoitring party to endeavor to find a passage higher up.

About 10 o'clock the following day the captain returned, and reported that a few miles higher up, a good passage might be had at a place where the prairies on each side skirted the creek.*

"On the evening of the 5th November, the army encamped at the distance of nine or ten miles from the prophet's town. It was ascertained that the approach of the army had been discovered before it reached Pine creek. The traces of reconnoitring parties were very often seen, but no Indians were discovered until the troops arrived within five or six miles of the town on the 6th November. The interpreters were then placed with the advanced guard, to endeavor to open a communication with them. The Indians would, however, return no answer to the invitations that were made to them for that purpose, but continued to insult our people by their gestures. Within about three miles of the town, the ground became broken by ravines and covered with timber. The utmost precaution became necessary, and every difficult pass was examined by the mounted riflemen before the army was permitted to enter it.—The ground being unfit for the operation of the squadron of dragoons, they were thrown in the rear. Through the whole march, the precaution had been used of changing the disposition of the different corps, that each might have the ground best suited to its operations. Within about two miles of the town the path descended a steep hill, at the bottom of which was a small creek running through a narrow wet prairie, and beyond this a level plain partially covered with oak timber, and without under-brush. Before the crossing of the creek, the woods were

*As some of the documents which we shall be obliged to insert, refer particularly to the statement made of the event of the 6th November, as given in the history of the late War, published in Kentucky in 1816, and which could not be so well understood, we have taken the liberty to quote from that work an account of the events which follow, until the army reached its encampment on that night.

very thick and intersected by deep ravines. No place could be better calculated for the savages to attack with a prospect of success, and the Governor apprehended that the moment the troops descended into the hollow, they would be attacked. A disposition was therefore made of the infantry, to receive the enemy on the left and rear. A company of mounted riflemen was advanced a considerable distance from the left flank to check the approach of the enemy; and the other two companies were directed to turn the enemy's flanks, should he attack from that direction. The dragoons were ordered to move rapidly from the rear and occupy the plain in advance of the creek, to cover the crossing of the army from an attack in front. In this order the troops were passed over; the dragoons were made to advance to give room to the infantry, and the latter having crossed the creek, were formed to receive the enemy in front in one line, with a reserve of three companies—the dragoons flanked by mounted riflemen forming the first line. During all this time, Indians were frequently seen in front and on the flanks. The interpreters endeavored in vain to bring them to a parley. Though sufficiently near to hear what was said to them, they would return no answer, but continued by gestures to menace and insult those who addressed them. Being now arrived within a mile and a half of the town, and the situation being favorable for an encampment, the Governor determined to remain there and fortify his camp, until he could hear from the friendly chiefs, whom he had dispatched from fort Harrison, on the day he had left it, for the purpose of making another attempt to prevent the recurrence to hostilities. These chiefs were to have met him on the way, but no intelligence was yet received from them.—Whilst he was engaged in tracing out the lines of the encampment, major Daveiss and several other field officers approached him, and urged the propriety of immediately marching upon the town. The Governor answered that his instructions would not justify his attacking the Indians, as long as there was a probability of their complying with the demands of the government, and that he still hoped to hear something in the course of the evening from the friendly Indians, whom he had dispatched from fort Harrison.

To this it was observed, that as the Indians seen hovering about the army, had been frequently invited to a parley by the interpreters, who had proceeded some distance from the lines for the purpose; and as these overtures had universally been answered by menace and insult, it was very evident that it was their intention to fight; that the troops were in high spirits and full of confidence; and that advantage ought to be taken of their ardour to lead them immediately to the enemy. To this the Governor answered, that he was fully sensible of the eagerness of the troops; and admitting the determined hostility of the

Indians, and that their insolence was full evidence of their intention to fight, yet he knew them too well to believe, that they would ever do this, but by surprise, or on ground which was entirely favorable to their mode of fighting. He was therefore determined not to advance with the troops, until he knew precisely the situation of the town, and the ground adjacent to it, particularly that which intervened between it and the place where the army then was—that it was their duty to fight when they came in contact with the enemy—it was his to take care that they should not engage in a situation where their valor would be useless, and where a corps upon which he placed great reliance would be unable to act—that the experience of the last two hours ought to convince every officer, that no reliance ought to be placed upon the guides, as to the topography of the country—that relying on their information, the troops had been led into a situation so unfavorable, that but for the celerity with which they changed their position, a few Indians might have destroyed them: he was therefore determined not to advance to the town, until he had previously reconnoitred, either in person, or by some one, on whose judgment he could rely. Major Daveiss immediately replied, that from the right of the position of the dragoons, which was still in front, the openings made by the low grounds of the Wabash could be seen; that with his adjutant D. Floyd, he had advanced to the bank, which descends to the low grounds, and had a fair view of the cultivated fields and the houses of the town; and that the open woods, in which the troops then were, continued without interruption to the town. Upon this information, the Governor said he would advance, provided he could get any proper person to go to the town with a flag. Captain T. Dubois of Vincennes having offered his services, he was dispatched with an interpreter to the prophet, desiring to know whether he would now comply with the terms, that had been so often proposed to him. The army was moved slowly after in order of battle. In a few moments a messenger came from captain Dubois, informing the Governor that the Indians were near him in considerable numbers, but that they would return no answer to the interpreter, although they were sufficiently near to hear what was said to them, and that upon his advancing, they constantly endeavored to cut him off from the army. Governor Harrison during this last effort to open a negotiation, which was sufficient to show his wish for an accommodation, resolved no longer to hesitate in treating the Indians as enemies. He therefore recalled captain Dubois, and moved on with a determination to attack them. He had not proceeded far, however, before he was met by three Indians, one of them a principal counsellor to the prophet. They were sent, they said, to know why the army was advancing upon them—that the prophet wished if possible to avoid hostilities; that he had sent a

pacific message by the Miami and Potawatamie chiefs, who had come to him on the part of the Governor—and that those chiefs had unfortunately gone down on the south side of the Wabash. A suspension of hostilities was accordingly agreed upon; and a meeting was to take place the next day between Harrison and the chiefs, to agree upon the terms of peace. The Governor further informed them, that he would go on to the Wabash, and encamp there for the night. Upon marching a short distance further he came in view of the town, which was seen at some distance up the river upon a commanding eminence. Major Daveiss and adjutant Floyd had mistaken some scattering houses in the fields below, for the town itself. The ground below the town being unfavorable for an encampment, the army marched on in the direction of the town, with a view to obtain a better situation beyond it. The troops were in an order of march, calculated by a single conversion of companies, to form the order of battle, which it had last assumed, the dragoons being in front. This corps, however, soon became entangled in ground, covered with brush and tops of fallen trees. A halt was ordered, and major Daveiss directed to change position with Spencer's rifle corps, which occupied the open fields adjacent to the river. The Indians seeing this manœuvre, at the approach of the troops towards the town, supposed that they intended to attack it, and immediately prepared for defence. Some of them sallied out, and called to the advanced corps to halt. The Governor upon this rode forward, and requested some of the Indians to come to him, assured them, that nothing was farther from his thoughts, than to attack them—that the ground below the town on the river, was not calculated for an encampment, and that it was his intention to search for a better one above. He asked if there was any other water convenient besides that which the river afforded; and an Indian with whom he was well acquainted, answered, that the creek, which had been crossed two miles back, ran through the prairie to the north of the village. A halt was then ordered, and some officers sent back to examine the creek, as well as the river above the town. In half an hour, brigade major Marston Clarke and major Waller Taylor returned, and reported that they had found on the creek, every thing that could be desirable in an encampment—an elevated spot, nearly surrounded by an open prairie, with water convenient, and a sufficiency of wood for fuel. An idea was propagated by the enemies of Governor Harrison, after the battle of Tippecanoe, that the Indians had forced him to encamp on a place, chosen by them as suitable for the attack they intended. The place, however, was chosen by majors Taylor and Clarke, after examining all the environs of the town: and when the army of general Hopkins was there in the following year, they all united

in the opinion, that a better spot to resist Indians, was not to be found in the whole country.

The army now marched to the place selected, and encamped late in the evening, on a dry piece of ground, which rose about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in front towards the town, and about twice as high above a similar prairie in the rear; through which, near the bank, ran a small stream clothed with willows and brush wood. On the left of the encampment, this bench of land became wider; on the right it gradually narrowed, and terminated in an abrupt point, about one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank. The two columns of infantry occupied the front and rear. The right flank being about eight yards wide, was filled with captain Spencer's company of eight men. The left flank, about one hundred and fifty yards in extent, was composed of three companies of mounted riflemen, under major general Wells, commanding as a major. The front line was composed of one battalion of United States' infantry, under the command of major Floyd, flanked on the right by two companies of militia infantry, and on the left by one company of the same troops. The rear line consisted of a battalion of United States' infantry, under captain Bean, commanding as a major; and four companies of militia infantry, under lieutenant colonel Decker; the regulars being stationed next the riflemen under Wells, and the militia on the other end of the line adjoining Spencer's company. The cavalry under Daveiss were encamped in the rear of the front line and the left flank. The encampment was not more than three fourths of a mile from the town.

The order given to the army, in the event of a night attack, was for each corps to maintain its ground at all hazards till relieved. The dragoons were directed in such a case, to parade dismounted, with their swords on and their pistols in their belts, and to wait for orders. The guard for the night consisted of two captains' commands of twenty four men and four non-commissioned officers; and two subalterns' guards of twenty men and non-commissioned officers—the whole under the command of a field officer of the day."

We here introduce the certificates of general Taylor and colonel Snelling, above alluded to, the former at present of the senate of the United States, the latter a distinguished officer of our army, proving the correctness of the above narration in relation to the choice of the camp. These statements are taken from the National Intelligencer of the 4th of March, 1817.

“ The above account, taken from M'Affee's History of the War in the Western Country, as it relates to the situation of the camp occupied by the army under the command of Governor Harrison,

on the night between the 6th and 7th of November, 1811, is entirely correct. The spot for encampment was selected by colonel Clarke, (who acted as brigade-major to general Boyd) and myself. We were directed by Governor Harrison to examine the country up and down the creek until we should find a suitable place for an encampment. In a short time we discovered the place on which the army encamped, and to which it was conducted by us. No intimation was given by the Indians of their wish that we should encamp there, nor could they possibly have known where the army would encamp until it took its position. The only error in the above extract is, in saying that major Clarke and myself were sent *back*, by which it would appear that the army retrograded to take up its encampment; this is not the fact; the army filed off in front of the town at right angles to the Wabash, to reach its encampment. It has ever been my belief that the position we occupied was the best that could be found any where near us, and I believe that nine-tenths of the officers were of that opinion. We did not go on the Wabash above the town, but I am certain that there was no position below it that was eligible for an encampment.

“WALLER TAYLOR.

“February 22, 1817.”

“My situation as a platoon officer prevented my having a personal knowledge of the transactions above related, so far as respects the selection of the encampment of the army under General Harrison by his staff officers: but having carefully perused the extract from M’Afee’s history, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe it to be substantially correct; and that, in my opinion, the ground on which the army encamped combined the advantages of wood, water, and a defensible position, in a greater degree than any other ground in that section of the country; the ground on the Wabash was wholly unfit, the highland being destitute of water, and the interval (or bottom land as it is called) being without wood, and incapable of being defended.

“J. SNELLING, *

“Lieutenant-Colonel 6th Infantry.

“Washington, February 28th, 1817.”

Whilst the troops were taking their positions for the night, the Governor was informed that three Indians had followed them from the town, and were then within the lines. Adjutant Davis Floyd was ordered to remove them. This was immediately done, and a message sent by them to the prophet to send back a negro belonging to the army, who had either voluntarily gone or been taken into the town as the army was passing it.

As the circumstances attending this negro's conduct are somewhat extraordinary, and as the evidence of his treacherous intentions was so clear as to induce a court-martial to sentence him to suffer death, after the action had terminated, it will be necessary to relate them. This fellow, whose name was Ben, was employed as a bullock driver by the contractor. It was said that he had formerly resided at Detroit. When the troops were marching by the town, Ben was in company with a negro, who was the servant of the Governor and another, the servant of his aid-de-camp major Taylor. Ben enquired of the others whether they would be afraid to go into the town. Being answered in the affirmative, he said he was not, and proposed to bet with them that he could immediately go in. The other negroes supposed that he was joking; but he immediately marched off, and he had advanced but a short distance before two Indians advanced to meet him and conducted him in. As soon as the Governor was informed of this, he directed an interpreter to call to the Indians and inform them that the negro should be sent back; this was promised. The three Indians who followed the army denied that they knew of the negro's having gone into the town, but said that he would immediately be sent out upon their return. Nothing, however, was seen of him until some time after dark, when captain Wilson (now major-general Wilson of Indiana) going to the Governor's marquee, discovered the negro at a short distance, apparently examining its situation. The captain immediately seized him, and some of the officers at the Governor's quarters going to the assistance of the captain, he was brought up to the fire. Upon being interrogated he said that he had been taken into the town by force, and that he had been sent out by the Indians in consequence of the message of the Governor, that he had just arrived and was coming to report himself to the Governor, and that he had passed the sentinels without being hailed. Whilst this examination was going on, captain Wilson, recollecting that he had seen him, when he was first discovered, throw something from his hand, went to the place, and found a cap made of the whitish colored skin of some animal, very high, and covered like the cap of a grenadier. Upon being asked what had become of his hat and where he got the cap, he answered that the hat had been taken from him by an Indian, and that another Indian had given him the cap. He acknowledged that he had not been at the quarters of the contractor's men, and that he had spoken to no one since his arrival in camp. From these circumstances it appeared evident that he had some view favorable to the enemy.

It was the constant practice of the Governor, as soon as the troops had arrived on the spot chosen for their encampment, to reconnoitre its environs for a considerable distance, and particularly examine the nature of the ground, and the facility which

it afforded for manœuvring his own troops, or the mode of fighting adopted by the enemy. Having done this, and the troops being placed in their positions, a signal was given by the orderly drum to bring together all the commanding officers of corps to head quarters. The nature of the ground upon which each corps was posted, and that upon which it might be formed on the event of an attack, was particularly explained, and each officer received the orders which were to govern him under all the circumstances which were likely to occur. Sometimes, in order to occupy the whole of a favorable piece of ground, all the infantry as well as the mounted riflemen were necessary to fill up the lines. This was the case, on the night of the 6th November. There was then no reserve but the dragoons, which on every occasion was held as a disposeable corps. *Generally*, the order of encampment was the order of battle; but on some particular occasions, when the ground suited, some of the corps was ordered to occupy another position than that upon which they were encamped. In general, no change of position was made without the Governor's direction, and in all cases, unless otherwise particularly ordered, a corps or company moving out of the line, the vacancy occasioned by it was to be filled up by a part of the reserve. In some cases where the ground was favorable for the operation of cavalry, the dragoons were directed to be mounted on a night alarm; but the common arrangement was, on such an event, to parade dismounted, as has been stated above.

At the accustomed hour, the officers, having been previously called to head quarters and received their orders, on the event of an attack, to defend the ground they occupied and wait for further orders, retired to rest much dissatisfied with the prospect of returning home without a battle. Major Daveiss, who had been induced to leave his business, from the prospect of gaining military reputation, was particularly dissatisfied. In a conversation with major Taylor, he said "that a peace would be patched up, the army would return, and as soon as they reached Vincennes the Indians would commence their depredations with greater activity than before. That the Governor ought to have disregarded his orders and attack them, notwithstanding their peaceable professions."

It appears, indeed, that there was not a single individual in the camp who believed there would be an attack made by the Indians on that night. Neither the Governor, colonel Wells, nor colonel Owen, all of whom were well acquainted with the Indian mode of fighting, had any suspicion that such would be the case.— Their opinions were formed from the belief that they would not dare to attack, at night, an army so favorably posted, and the greater part armed with muskets and bayonets. In the dark, Indians lose the peculiar advantage which they possess in the day over our troops, from the accuracy of their shooting, and

the facility of covering themselves with trees, logs and bushes. These are the circumstances which make the north-western Indians so terrible in battle, and which advantage they lose entirely in a night attack against muskets, buck-shot, and bayonets. In such a combat, troops armed with those must prevail, if they be well disciplined and are firm.

The Governor was perfectly convinced of the hostility of the prophet and his followers, and that it was their intention to attack him by treachery. He believed, however, that this would not take place until after they had endeavored to lull his suspicions by entering into an engagement to comply with the demands of the government. It will be hereafter seen that this was their first intention. But whatever might have been the opinion of the Governor and his officers, with regard to the probability of the attack on that night, ample evidence will be produced that every precaution that could be taken to resist it with effect was taken, and that the troops could not have been better prepared, unless they had been made to remain under arms all night. All the guards that could be used in such a situation, and all such as were used by general Wayne, were employed on this occasion. That is, camp guards, furnishing a chain of centinels around the whole camp, at such a distance as to give notice of the approach of an enemy, time enough for the troops to take their position, and yet, not so far removed as to prevent their retreat on the event of their being overpowered by numbers.

In civilized warfare, picquets, or detached guards, are used, and frequently posted at a considerable distance from the army to which they belong, upon the roads leading to it. These would be useless in warring against Indians, because they do not require a road to move on, and because these guards would always be cut off by the adroitness of the Indians in partizan war.

In conformity with a general order, the troops went to rest with their clothes and accoutrements on, and their arms loaded and by their sides, and their bayonets fixed. The officers were ordered to sleep in the same manner, and it was the Governor's invariable practice to be completely ready to mount his horse at a moment's warning.

On the morning of the 7th November, he arose at a quarter before four o'clock, and sat by the fire conversing with the gentlemen of his family, viz. General Wells, Major Taylor, Colonel Owen, and Major Hurst, the three latter his aids-de-camp, and the former commanding the mounted riflemen, with the rank of Major. These gentlemen, as well as the Adjutant-general, Captain Adams, who slept in an adjoining tent, had been awakened by the Governor, but finding the hour for rising had not arrived, were reclining on their blankets; a few minutes were passed in this way, and in eight or ten more, the signal

would have been given for the troops to turn out, as the orderly drum had been roused for that purpose. The moon had risen, but afforded little light in consequence of being overshadowed by clouds, which occasionally discharged a small drizzling rain.

Things were thus situated when the attack commenced. "The treacherous Indians had crept up so near the sentries as to hear them challenge when relieved. They intended to rush upon the sentries and kill them before they could fire : but one of them discovered an Indian creeping towards him in the grass, and fired. This was immediately followed by the Indian yell, and a desperate charge upon the left flank. The guard in that quarter gave way, and abandoned their officer without making any resistance. Captain Barton's company of regulars, and Captain Keiger's company of mounted riflemen, forming the left angle of the rear line, received the first onset. The fire there was excessive ; but the troops who had lain on their arms, were immediately prepared to receive, and had gallantry to resist the furious savage assailants. The manner of the attack was calculated to discourage and terrify the men ; yet as soon as they could be formed and posted, they maintained their ground with desperate valour, though but very few of them had ever before been in battle. The fires in the camp were extinguished immediately, as the light they afforded was more serviceable to the Indians than to our men.

"As soon as the Governor could mount his horse, he proceeded towards the point of attack, and finding the line much weakened there, he ordered two companies from the centre of the rear line to march up and form across the angle in the rear of Barton's and Keiger's companies. General Wells immediately proceeded to the right of his command ; and Colonel Owen, who was with him, was proceeding directly to the point of attack, when he was shot on his horse near the lines, and thus bravely fell among the first victims of savage perfidy. A heavy fire now commenced all along the left flank, upon the whole of the front and right flank, and on a part of the rear line.

"In passing through the camp, towards the left of the front line, the Governor met with Colonel Daveiss and the dragoons. The colonel informed him that the Indians, concealed behind some trees near the line, were annoying the troops very severely in that quarter ; and he requested permission to dislodge them, which was granted. He immediately called on the first division of his cavalry to follow him, but the order was not distinctly heard, and but few of his men charged with him. Among those who charged were two young gentlemen who had gone with him from Kentucky, Messrs. Meade and Sanders, who were afterwards distinguished as captains in the United States' service. They had not proceeded far out of the lines, when Daveiss was mortally wounded by several balls and fell. His

men stood by him, and repulsed the savages several times, till they succeeded in carrying him into camp.

“In the mean time the attack on Spencer’s and Warwick’s companies on the right, became very severe. Captain Spencer and his lieutenants were all killed, and captain Warwick was mortally wounded. The Governor in passing towards that flank, found captain Robb’s company near the centre of the camp. They had been driven from their post; or rather, had fallen back without orders. He sent them to the aid of captain Spencer, where they fought very bravely, having seventeen men killed during the battle. Captain Prescott’s company of United States’ infantry had filled up the vacancy caused by the retreat of Robb’s company. Soon after colonel Daveiss was wounded, captain Snelling at the head of his company charged on the same Indians and dislodged them with considerable loss. The battle was now maintained on all sides with desperate valor. The Indians advanced and retreated by a rattling noise made with deer hoofs: they fought with enthusiasm, and seemed determined on victory or death.

“As soon as daylight appeared, captain Snelling’s company, captain Posey’s, under lieutenant Albright, and captain Scott’s, were drawn from the front line, and Wilson’s from the rear, and formed on the left flank: while Cook’s and Bean’s companies were ordered to the right. General Wells took command of the corps formed on the left, and with the aid of some dragoons, who were now mounted and commanded by captain Parke, made a successful charge on the enemy in that direction, driving them into an adjoining swamp through which the cavalry could not pursue them. At the same time Cook’s and lieutenant Laribie’s companies, with the aid of the riflemen and militia on the right flank, charged on the Indians and put them to flight in that quarter, which terminated the battle.

“During the time of the contest, the Prophet kept himself secure, on an adjacent eminence, singing a war song. He had told his followers, that the Great Spirit would render the army of the Americans unavailing, and that their bullets would not hurt the Indians, who would have light, while their enemies were involved in thick darkness. Soon after the battle commenced, he was informed that his men were falling. He told them to fight on, it would soon be as he had predicted, and then began to sing louder.

“Colonel Boyd commanded as a brigadier-general in this engagement; and the Governor in his letter to the war department, speaks highly of him and his brigade, and of Clarke and Croghan who were his aids. Colonel Decker is also commended for the good order in which he kept his command: and of general Wells, it is said, he sustained the fame which he had acquired in almost every campaign since the first settlement of Kentucky.

“The officers and soldiers generally, performed their duties well. They acted with a degree of coolness, bravery, and good order, which was not to be expected from men unused to carnage, and in a situation so well calculated to produce terror and confusion. The fortune of war necessarily put it in the power of some officers and their men, at the expense of danger, wounds, and death, to render more service and acquire more honors than others; but to speak of their particular merits, would be to detail again the operations of the conflict.

“Of Colonels Owen and Daveiss, the Governor speaks in the highest terms. Owen joined him as a private in Keiger’s company at fort Harrison, and accepted the place of volunteer aid. He had been a representative in the legislature of Kentucky. His character was that of a good citizen and a brave soldier. He left a wife and a large family of children to add the poignancy of domestic grief to the public regret for his loss.

“Colonel Daveiss also joined the army as a private, and was promoted on the recommendation of the officers of the dragoons; his conduct as their commander fully justified their choice.—Never was there an officer possessed of more military ardor, nor more zeal to discharge all his duties with punctilious propriety: and never perhaps did any man, who had not been educated for the profession of arms, possess a richer fund of military information at his entrance on a military life. All that books could furnish, all the preparation the closet could make for the field, was his. He was a man of great talents—of genius—and indefatigable industry. In Kentucky he stood among the foremost in the profession of the law. His elocution was singularly attractive and forcible. Wit and energy, acuteness and originality of thought, were the characteristics of his eloquence.—But as an orator he was very unequal. Sometimes he did not rise above mediocrity, whilst some of his happiest efforts were never surpassed in America—never perhaps in any age or country. Such at least was the opinion of men, whose talents, acquirements, and taste, had qualified them to judge. He had much eccentricity in his manners and his dress. In his disposition he was generous; and in his friendship he was ardent. His person was about six feet high, well formed and robust—his countenance open and manly. He had acquired fortune and fame by his own exertions—neither his patrimony nor his education having been very ample. Being in the prime of life, and possessing great military ambition and acquirements, he was destined perhaps, had he lived, to become one of the first military characters of America. He died a few hours after the battle had closed. As soon as he was informed that the Indians were repulsed, and the victory was complete, he observed, he could die satisfied—that he had fallen in defence of his country. He left a wife but no children.

“Captain Bean, who fell early in the action, had the character of an able officer and a brave soldier. Captain Spencer was wounded in the head—he exhorted his men to fight on. He was then shot through both thighs and fell—still he continued to encourage his men. He was then raised up, and received a ball through his body which immediately killed him. His lieutenants, M^r Mahan and Berry, fell bravely encouraging their men. Warwick was shot through the body, and was taken to the surgery to be dressed: as soon as it was over, being a man of much bodily strength and still able to walk, he insisted on going back to his post, though it was evident he had but a few hours to live. Colonel White, formerly United States agent at the Saline, was also killed in the action. The whole number killed, with those who died soon of their wounds, was upwards of fifty: the wounded were about double that number. Governor Harrison himself narrowly escaped, the hair on his head being cut by a ball.

“The Indians left thirty-eight warriors dead on the field, and buried several others in the town, which with those who must have died of their wounds, would make their loss at least as great as that of the Americans. The troops under the command of Governor Harrison of every description amounted, on the day before the battle, to something more than 800. The ordinary force, that had been at the Prophet’s town, through the preceding summer, was about 450. But they were joined a few days before the action by all the Kickapoos of the prairie, and by many bands of Potawatamies from the Illinois river, and the St. Josephs of lake Michigan. They estimated their number after the battle, to have been 600; but the traders who had a good opportunity of knowing, made them at least 800, and some as many as 1000. However, it is certain, that no victory was ever before obtained over the northern Indians, where the numbers were any thing like equal. The number of killed too was greater than was ever before known. It is their custom always to avoid a close action, and from their dexterity in hiding themselves, but few of them can be killed, even when they are pouring destruction into the ranks of their enemy. It is believed that there were not ten of them killed at St. Clair’s defeat, and still fewer at Braddock’s. At Tippecanoe they rushed up to the bayonets of our men, and in one instance, related by Captain Snelling, an Indian adroitly put the bayonet of a soldier aside, and clove his head with his war-club, an instrument on which there is fixed a triangular piece of iron, broad enough to project several inches from the wood. Their conduct on this occasion, so different from what it usually is, was attributed to the confidence of success, with which their prophet had inspired them, and to the distinguished bravery of the Winebago warriors.

“The Indians did not determine to attack the American camp till late at night. The plan that was formed the evening before, was to meet the Governor in council the next day, and agree to the terms he proposed. At the close of the council, the chiefs were to retire to the warriors, who were to be placed at a convenient distance. The Governor was then to be killed by two Winebagoes, who had devoted themselves to certain death to accomplish this object. They were to loiter about the camp, after the council had broken up; and their killing the Governor and raising the war whoop, was to be the signal for a general attack. The Indians were commanded by White Loon, Stone Eater, and Winemac, a Potawatamie chief, who had been with the Governor on his march, and at fort Harrison, making great professions of friendship.

“The fourth regiment was about 250 strong, and there were about 60 volunteers from Kentucky in the army. The rest of the troops were volunteers from the Indiana militia. Those from the neighborhood of Vincennes had been trained for several years by the Governor, and had become very expert in the manoeuvres which he had adopted for fighting the Indians. The greater part of the territorial troops followed him as well from personal attachment as from a sense of duty. Indeed a greater degree of confidence and personal attachment has rarely been found in any army towards its commander, than existed in this; nor has there been many battles in which the dependence of the army on its leader was more distinctly felt. During the whole action the Governor was constantly on the lines, and always repaired to the point which was most hardly pressed. The reinforcements drawn occasionally from the points most secure, were conducted by himself and formed on the spot where their services were most wanted. The officers and men who believed that their ultimate success depended on his safety, warmly remonstrated against his so constantly exposing himself. Upon one occasion, as he was approaching an angle of the line, against which the Indians were advancing with horrible yells, lieutenant Emmerson of the dragoons seized the bridle of his horse, and earnestly entreated that he would not go there; but the Governor, putting spurs to his horse, pushed on to the point of attack, where the enemy were received with firmness and driven back.

“The battle of Tippecanoe has been the subject of much speculation, both as to its object, and the manner of its execution and final issue. Governor Harrison was censured by some, for not making an attack upon the Indians, on the evening of the 6th November, and for not fortifying his camp with a breast-work. It was erroneously said by some, that indulging a false security, he had suffered his camp to be surprised. He was also blamed by the friends of colonel Daveiss, for directing him with his dragoons only, to dislodge the Indians, who were shel-

tered near the line, and doing much execution in safety. Many other complaints of less magnitude were also made by men, who were wise after the transaction was over. There were indeed more able generals in the United States, who could tell what ought to have been done after the battle was fought, than the Governor had soldiers in his army to fight it. Colonel Boyd who commanded the regulars, wishing to monopolize all the honor to himself and his regiment, concluded that the Governor had not sufficiently noticed him in his report; and he therefore made a separate communication to the war department; and also made many round assertions respecting the conduct of the militia—which was promptly explained, and the charges in general disproved by Governor Harrison. Colonel Boyd, however, had his partizans, and some of them still persist in attributing the salvation of the army to him, though all the troops, regulars as well as militia, with the exception of only three or four individuals, united in attributing the victory to the Governor. Most of the officers publicly united in attesting his merits. Without intending to impeach colonel Boyd with any dereliction of duty, we can positively aver, that he did not give a single order, nor perform a single act, that contributed in any perceptible way to the issue of the contest. All the arrangements and orders before the action and during its continuance, came direct from Governor Harrison.

“After much altercation by which the battle of Tippecanoe was fought over again and fully investigated, in all the public circles of the western country, the public opinion preponderated greatly in favor of the Governor. All the material accusations of his enemies were disproved; and after all the testimony had been heard, the common opinion seemed to be, that the army had been conducted with prudence, and that the battle had been fought as well as it could have been by any general, considering the time and manner of the attack. If the Governor had made the attack himself on the evening of the 6th, after a chief had informed him, that the Indians were desirous of an accommodation, and had sent a messenger three days before to meet him for that purpose, his conduct would have had the appearance of rashness and cruelty. His enemies, and the opposition in general, would have vilified him and the executive as murderers, who had first provoked, and then massacred those “*innocent people*” in their own dwellings. Hence a regard for his own character and for the dictates of humanity required, that he should not make an attack while any prospect of accommodation remained. The principal error consisted in not fortifying his camp, when so near the enemy and so likely to be attacked; but this he excuses by stating, that the army had scarcely a sufficient number of axes to procure firewood. It is not the object of this history, however, to justify or condemn,

but to relate facts correctly and leave the reader to judge for himself.

“In December, the month after the battle, the legislature of Kentucky, on the motion of J. H. Hawkins, esq. went into mourning for the loss of colonel Daveiss, Owen, and others, who had fallen at Tippecanoe; and in the same session, while this battle was the subject of much discussion, the following resolution, moved by J. J. Crittenden, esq. was adopted with only two or three dissenting votes—“*Resolved, &c.* That in the late campaign against the Indians on the Wabash, Governor W. H. Harrison has, in the opinion of this legislature, behaved like a hero, a patriot, and a general; and that for his cool, deliberate, skilful, and gallant conduct in the late battle of Tippecanoe, he well deserves the warmest thanks of the nation.”

“The veteran soldier, governor Charles Scott, approved this resolution, which at once gave tone to the popularity of Harrison, effectually turning the tide in his favor, and reducing the clamor of his enemies to private murmurs.”

We now introduce a number of original documents in support of the facts above stated. Perhaps we owe an apology to our readers for the insertion of so many—but we hope to be justified in the minds of every lover of truth and justice, when our motive has been to rescue the fame and character of a brave man, and a worthy patriot from that unmerited obloquy attempted to be cast upon him by the worthless and the cowardly.

No. I.

“The battle of Tippecanoe having terminated a campaign which led us to victory and honour, it is with pain we behold aspirations in the public prints aiming to destroy the confidence of our country in our late commander-in-chief.

“Governor Harrison having relinquished the command of the army lately employed against the Indians, and probably as an officer left us for ever, the present statement cannot be attributed to servile flattery, but to the true and honest expression of our real sentiments, in favour of a general whose talents, military science, and patriotism, entitle him to a high rank among the worthies of the union; and whom we consider injured by the gross misrepresentations of the ignorant or designing, who are alike inimical to the best of governments and the best of men.

“We therefore deem it our duty to state as incontestable facts, that the commander-in-chief throughout the campaign, and in the hour of battle, proved himself the soldier and the general; that on the night of the action, by his order, we slept on our arms, and rose on our posts; that notwithstanding the darkness of the night, and the most consummate savage cunning of the enemy in eluding our sentries, and rapidity in rushing through

the guards, we were not found unprepared : that few of them were able to enter our camp, and those few doomed never to return; that in pursuance of his orders, which were adapted to every emergency, the enemy were defeated with a slaughter almost unparalleled among savages. Indeed, one sentiment of confidence, respect, and affection towards the commander-in-chief pervaded the whole line of the army, which any attempt to destroy we shall consider as an insult to our understandings, and an injury to our feelings.

“Should our country again require our services to oppose a civilized or savage foe, we should march under the command of Governor Harrison, with the most perfect confidence of victory and fame.

JOEL COOK, capt. fourth infy.
 JOSIAH SNELLING, capt. 4th U.S. infy.
 R. C. BARTON, capt. 4th infy.
 O. G. BURTON, lieut. 4th infy.
 NATH. F. ADAMS, lieut. 4th regt. infy.
 CHARLES FULLER, lieut. 4th regt.
 A. HAWKINS, lieut. 4th infy.
 GEORGE GOODING, 2d lieut. 4th infy.
 H. BURCHSTEAD, ensign 4th regt. U.S. infy.
 JOSIAH D. FOSTER, surgeon 4th infy.
 HOSEA BLOOD, act. assist. surg. 4th infy.”

No. II.

“*Vincennes, Jan. 8, 1812.*

“At the close of the late campaign, such a general sentiment of respect and confidence in the commander-in-chief pervaded the whole army, that I did not expect any measures would be necessary to support his reputation, or vindicate his conduct; but since my arrival in town, I have been informed that persons actuated by sinister motives have attempted, like assassins who walk in the dark, and stab unseen, to blast his character, and destroy the confidence placed in him by government and the people. As no defence on his part can avail against accusers who shun the light, and who, while they do the injury, are studiously careful to conceal the quarter from whence it comes, it becomes the duty of every friend to Governor Harrison, to *honor* and *justice*, to come forward with such statements of facts within their knowledge as will tend to make the truth appear, and silence the tongue of slander.

“On the night of the sixth of November, preceding the late action, the company under my command slept on their arms, with their cartridge boxes on, in obedience to a general order I had received some nights before, and which had not been countermanded; I was awakened by the firing of the first gun, seized my sword, and ran to the door of my tent, where I met the or-

derly serjeant of my company, who asked me if the company should form in front or rear of the tents; the men were then in rear, and recollecting that the light of the fires in front would expose them to the fire of the enemy, and probably occasion some confusion, I directed them to form in rear, and counter-march to the front: the whole time occupied in forming could not have exceeded four minutes, and I had faced to the right for the purpose of marching them to their post in the line, when Governor Harrison rode up and ordered me to cover the left flank of the encampment, where the riflemen of major Robb had fallen back; not perfectly knowing the position, I requested him to show me the ground; he accordingly rode with the company, and pointed out to me the post I should occupy, and it was not until formed in this position that we received the first fire of the enemy. In this situation I had an opportunity of hearing the order given major Daveiss to charge the enemy, and saw the unfortunate issue of it; the fire growing warmer, I called to colonel Boyd who was near, and asked his permission to charge; he authorised me to do it, but seeing the Governor approach I repeated the question to him, and received his orders before I moved the company, and I am fully confident that every movement of my company during the action was made by his orders, given in person.

“Unbiased by hope of favor, and perhaps acting in a manner by some thought not so favorable to my personal interests, I have thought fit to make the above statement from a sense of duty, and a love of justice, and I trust that while I retain a consciousness of having acted from such motives, it will fully compensate me for any personal inconvenience I may sustain.

“J. SNELLING, *capt. 4th regt. U. S. infy.*”

No. III.

“*Fort Knox, January 8th, 1812.*”

“HONORED SIR,

“Agreeably to your wish, and a duty I owe to my commander, and the rest of my brother officers, I shall give you a correct and impartial statement of the position of the company under my command on the night of the 6th, and morning of the 7th of November.

“The situation of my company being in the centre of the left line, as it happened to be the most secure place in the line, at or near four o'clock in the morning, I was alarmed by the discharge of a gun, on which I immediately repaired to my company, where I found my men all paraded at their posts; the position of the men during the night, together with myself while at rest, was lying on our arms with our clothes on; as for myself, I lay with my boots on, great-coat, and accoutrements buckled

around me, with my rifle in my arms. At the report of the gun, I had no more to do than to throw off my blanket, put my hat on, and go to my company, which was eight or ten steps from my tent; the time might possibly be one or two minutes, and I found my men as above mentioned. In this situation I remained a few minutes, when I received orders from the commander-in-chief, or one of his aids, I am not certain which, to march my company up to the right of the left line to reinforce, which I immediately obeyed: In this position I remained, be the time more or less, until daylight, when I received the second order from the commander to march my company to the extreme left, to support that place, which I immediately did, and on my arrival I found it necessary to make a charge, which was done with success; immediately after this, the fire ceased, three cheers were given by the army, and that closed the battle.

"I have the honor to be, with great respect, your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

"JOEL COOK,

"*Capt. 4th regt. infantry.*

"HIS EXCELLENCY, W. H. HARRISON."

No. IV.

"*Fort Knox, Jan. 8, 1812.*

"SIR,

"I have the honor to state, agreeably to your Excellency's request, the situation of the company under my command, on the night of the sixth of November, 1811, and at the commencement of the action on the morning of the seventh.

"At the commencement of the action, the company were at rest in their tents, with their clothes and accoutrements on, their guns lying by their side, loaded, and bayonets fixed, and were by my order paraded in line of battle, ready to meet the enemy within forty seconds from the commencement of the action, all of which was performed one or two minutes before a man of the company was wounded. I am, very respectfully, Sir, your Excellency's obedient servant,

"C. LARRABEE,

"*lieut. 4th infy. commanding compy.*

"HIS EXCELLENCY, W. H. HARRISON."

No. V.

"I certify, that on the night of the action of Tippecanoe, the company under my command, (composed of my own, and late Welsh's) lay on their arms completely prepared for battle.

"That at the moment of the alarm, one sergeant and two privates were up renewing the fires, and that the word was instantly passed to turn out, which was readily obeyed.

“ That while in the act of forming, the Indians, who had gained the brow of a hill about 12 or 15 paces on my right, commenced a fire upon us.

“ That one corporal was killed as he stepped from the right tent. One corporal and one private killed, and one sergeant wounded in the act of forming.

“ The remainder of the wounded in my company, (say seventeen) occurred after we were completely formed, and had opened a heavy fire upon the Indians.

“ ROBERT C. BARTON, *capt. 4th infy.*

“ *Fort Knox, January 8, 1812.*”

No. VI.

“ I, George Gooding, lieutenant of the fourth regiment, and commanding the late captain Welsh’s company, while in the action of the seventh of November, was attached to captain Barton’s company, do certify, on honor, that the above statement of captain Barton’s contains precisely my opinion of the situation of the company when the attack was made upon it. I also certify that I saw the first fire that was made by the Indians on captain Guiger’s company, which was next to ours, and that the fire was immediately returned by that company.”

No. VII.

From the Western Sun of December 14th, 1811.

“ At a numerous meeting, (public notice for that purpose being given) of the officers, and non-commissioned officers or privates of the militia corps, (Hargrove’s company excepted) of the county of Knox, who served in the late campaign under Governor Harrison, met at Becke’s Inn, in Vincennes, on the 7th December, 1811, colonel Luke Decker was appointed chairman, and major Benjamin Parke, clerk.

“ A paper, purporting to be an address from “ a number of citizens of Vincennes and its vicinity,” and signed by ———, as chairman, to colonel John P. Boyd, being read, the following resolutions were thereupon unanimously agreed to.

“ 1st, *Resolved unanimously*, That we cannot consider the said address in any other light, than as *one* amongst the *many* attempts which have flowed from the same source to wound the feelings and injure the character of Governor Harrison.

“ 2d, *Resolved*, That the said address, in attempting to bestow the merit of the masterly conduct in the direction and manœuvring of the troops in the late action to any other than the commander-in-chief asserts a notorious untruth, which will be acknowledged by the whole army.

“ 3d, That our indignation is justly excited at the false and contemptuous manner in which the militia, who served under Governor Harrison are treated, in the said address; being there

represented as an *untutored, undisciplined* band, possessing indeed courage, but none of the other requisites of soldiers; and owing eternal gratitude to colonel Boyd and his regiment, for the preservation of their lives.

“ 4th, that the militia who served under Governor Harrison were neither *untutored* nor *undisciplined*, but in common with the regular troops, they shared the attention of the commander-in-chief, and that by his *personal exertions*, both the militia and regulars were brought to a state of perfection in that kind of manœuvring calculated for Indian warfare, and that they were enabled to perform all the directions of the commander-in-chief, with promptness, facility, and precision.

“ 6th, That it is a notorious fact, known to the whole army, that all the changes of position made by the troops during the action of the seventh ult. and by which the victory was secured, were made by the direction of the commander-in-chief, and generally executed under his immediate superintendance.

“ 7th, That we cannot but view as a most dangerous usurpation, the meeting of a few individuals, not more than from seven to ten, in a private house, without any previous or public notice being given, and to pass resolutions and addresses in the name of a neighbourhood; and we do further view the conduct of said individuals (almost every one of whom are the avowed enemies of the commander-in-chief, and several of whom have uniformly discountenanced and opposed every measure of the government, in respect to the Shawnee prophet and his party, and none of whom were on the campaign) in daring to speak in the name of the militia, as highly presumptuous and unwarrantable.

“ 8th, That it was owing to the skill and valor of the commander-in-chief that the victory of Tippecanoe was obtained.

“ 9th, That we have the most perfect confidence in the commander-in-chief, and shall always feel a cheerfulness in serving under him whenever the exigencies of the country may require it.

“ 10th, That we would prefer serving under him to any person that could be designated by the government for that purpose.

“ 11th, That when commanded by him, honor will be achieved; and we have every confidence that victory will be obtained.

“ 12th, That in expressing the above opinions in respect to the reprehensible conduct of the addressers, we desire it to be distinctly understood, that we have no idea of wounding the feelings or injuring the character of colonel Boyd, but we are free to declare that we believe his conduct during the action to have been that of a gentleman and a soldier.

“ 13th, That we feel the highest respect, and shall always recollect with gratitude, our brothers in arms, the officers and *privates* of the United States' troops. We have often heard, we have now *seen* what Yankees can do!

" 14th, That in obeying our country's call, we shall feel a proud satisfaction in being associated with *Kentucky volunteers*.

" 15th, That the above resolutions be inserted in the *Western Sun*, and that such printers as may give publicity to the address above mentioned, be requested to publish also the aforesaid resolutions.

(signed) "LUKE DECKER, Chairman.
"B. PARKE, Clerk."

No. VIII.

From the Western Sun of January 4th, 1812.

The mounted volunteer riflemen, met at General Samuel Wells', on the 27th. December, 1811, for the purpose of partaking of a dinner with the general. After appointing captain James Hunter chairman, and major Isaac R. Gwathmay secretary, a letter addressed to colonel Boyd, with _____ as signed,* and also the resolutions adopted on the seventh of December, 1811, by the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the militia corps of Knox county, Indiana territory, were then read to captain Geiger and his company, when the following resolutions were unanimously agreed to:

" 1st. Resolved, that we the volunteers, who fought in the late battle on the Wabash, under the command of colonel Frederick Geiger, do, with heartfelt satisfaction, highly approve of the resolutions adopted by our brother officers and soldiers, at Vincennes, on the seventh of December, 1811.

" 2nd. Resolved, that that part of the letter of _____, which says that the militia were an untutored and undisciplined band, is considered by us as a groundless and malicious falsehood, and is calculated to take from them, (the militia) the never-fading laurels they won by their heroism, their bravery, and their firmness.

" 3d. Resolved, that we view the address of _____ as an unjustifiable attempt to wound the feelings of the commander-in-chief of the late expedition: and that we are ready and willing whenever our country calls, to volunteer under the same commander.

" 4th. Resolved, that the editor of the *Western Courier* be requested to give the proceedings of this meeting publicity in his paper.

(signed) "JAMES HUNTER, Chairman.
"I. R. GWATHMAY, Secretary."

It would appear almost unnecessary to add any further evidence of the truth of the narrative of the battle of Tippecanoe which we have given. But those who recollect the rancour

* As the gentleman who signed this letter, as chairman of the meeting, is now dead, it was thought unnecessary to mention his name.

with which Governor Harrison has been assailed, not only immediately after that event took place, but repeatedly since, will readily excuse us for introducing the following documents—they are letters directed to the author of this work since its commencement, in answer to certain queries proposed by him.

The first is from general Waller Taylor, of the senate of the United States, who served as aid-de-camp to General Harrison: The "Wm. Piatt" who certifies that general Taylor's statement is in accordance with his own recollection of the circumstance as mentioned, was quarter-master-general, first to General Harrison, and afterwards to general Jackson, in both of which situations he greatly distinguished himself; the second from brigadier-general Scott, of the Indiana militia, and who with the rank of captain, behaved with great gallantry in the action of Tippecanoe.

Cincinnati, July 15, 1823.

"SIR,

"Your letter, which you handed to me last evening, containing certain queries relative to the affairs on the Wabash, in November, 1811, I have perused, and will proceed to give you concise answers to each of them, without going much into detail, which my recollection at this late period will not admit of.

"To your first question, I answer, that I was aid-de-camp to Governor Harrison, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a major, upon the expedition on the Wabash in 1811."

"To your second, I state positively, that the Indians did not dictate to the Governor the position to encamp the army the night before the battle of Tippecanoe. When the army reached the Indian town in the afternoon, perhaps about sunset, the Governor ordered major Clark and myself to proceed to the left, and endeavor to find a suitable place for an encampment; we did so, and discovered the place upon which the battle was fought the next morning; upon our return to the army, we reported to the Governor our opinion about the place, which we stated to be favorable for an encampment.

"He had, at the time he despatched major Clark and myself upon this service, sent captain William Piatt, who was the chief of the quarter-master department, above the town to look for a suitable situation for an encampment; his report was unfavorable, and the Governor determined to occupy the ground selected by Clark and myself.

"To your third query, I answer, that both major Clark and myself considered the ground upon which the army encamped to be favorable, and I believe the same opinion was entertained by every officer in the army.

"To your fourth, I answer, that the plan of preparing the troops, to be ready upon the march or in camp, to engage the enemy, appeared to me to be judicious; and fifth, I understood

it to be the plan of general Wayne, adopted by Governor Harrison, with an improvement by the latter in marching in single files by columns, instead of double files, as practised by general Wayne; of this, however, I can speak with no degree of certainty.

"To your sixth, I answer, that the changes in the position of the troops during the action, were made by the Governor himself, or by his orders, as far as my observation extended, or I have understood from others.

"To your seventh, I recollect only one instance in which I was ordered to conduct any of the changes of position, and that was in a detachment commanded under captain Robb, from the right flank to the relief of Spencer's on the left.

"To your eighth, I answer, that Governor Harrison on the march, was active, vigilant, and prudent; in the action, he appeared to be firm, cool, and collected, and upon the *return* of the army to Vincennes, he did every thing in his power for the comfort of the wounded, and to be prepared to repel an attack, should one be made by the Indians.

"To your ninth, I answer, that no officer was killed or wounded upon either of Governor Harrison's horses, he having two.

"To your tenth, I answer, that I understood and believe (for I was not present) that major Daveiss was killed in charging the enemy with a few dismounted dragoons; others can give more correct information upon this subject than I can, and to those I refer you.

"I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WALLER TAYLOR."

"Having examined the foregoing queries put to general Waller Taylor, which are the same proposed to me by Mr. Dawson, and the answers which have been made to them by general Taylor, they appear to me to be correct. W. PIATT."

"Vincennes, July 25, 1823.

"MOSES DAWSON, Esq.

"Sir,

"You request my opinion of General William Henry Harrison, as a citizen, a soldier, and a general.

"I have had the pleasure of an acquaintance, intimately, for many years, with General Harrison, and ever considered him a man of honor, one who sought to do justice, and who was always willing to assist and benefit the condition of those with whom he was acquainted and associated; and know him to be the friend of the oppressed and injured. Hospitality without ostentation was always to be found within his doors, and his household was ever ready to extend charity to the sick and needy.

"As a soldier and an officer, I can speak from an acquaintance formed with him as such, that I shall ever be proud of. I

served under him in the campaign of 1811 upon the Wabash, and captain, and shared with him the danger in the action of Tippecanoe, in the night on the 7th November, 1811; no one on the march, or in the return, did I hear murmur a complaint of the General's conduct; he possessed the confidence, and was the pride of the army; his absence even for one day was felt by the army.

"I have thought, and still think, that few generals would have faced danger at so many points as General Harrison did in the action of Tippecanoe. Wherever the action was warmest, was General Harrison to be found, and heard encouraging, and cheering the officers and soldiers. His humanity, his attention, and his care to the wounded, after the action, from the battle ground to the hospital in Vincennes, was that of a benevolent christian, and was evidence of the goodness of his heart.

"I cannot but say, that I consider General Harrison's conduct on the campaign, and in the action of Tippecanoe unexceptionable, as a soldier, and as a general, and will be so considered by every soldier and officer of the United States, when correctly informed, who was a friend to the late war, an enemy to Indian warfare, and who returned from the army with clean garments.

"I am, sir, yours, &c.

"THOMAS SCOTT."

Whilst the author was engaged in the composition of this work, he was waited on by an officer of the army, of commanding manners and address, who put into his hands the following paper.—It was major Charles Larrabee, who has been previously mentioned, and who in the battle of Brownstown, distinguished himself, and lost one arm at the head of the same company which he had commanded with so much honor at Tippecanoe. The testimony of such a man cannot be read with indifference.

"Cincinnati, Ohio, 13th October, 1823.

"SIR,

"I have a desire to place in a true light, (as far as I am able) several circumstances attending Tippecanoe battle, which have gone abroad to the people in a wrong view, and from which they have drawn erroneous impressions towards the conduct of the commanding General.

"1st. It is understood that the encampment occupied at Tippecanoe, was made choice of by the General from a report of the Indians in favor of it.

"Three officers, well able to judge, went out in search of a place, and they reported the one taken up. The situation was such, that if the army had been called upon to make choice of a place to fight Indians, I venture to say nine-tenths would have made that their selection. There was but one encampment

during the whole campaign, to which a preference could be given, and this was a cluster of trees, surrounded by prairie, while the one at Tippecanoe had only three sides prairie, the other being woods. ^a

"2d. The impression prevails, generally, that the army were surprised in the attack.

"At the time the army left Vincennes, they were formed in the order of battle against the attack of Indians, and were never out of this situation till they returned; each one occupied the ground he would defend himself upon, whether marching or at rest upon it. This all-daring idea was instilled into the army collectively and individually by the General, from the time we entered the wilderness, till a trial was had of the effect. The army was trained to be prepared to receive the attack, and nothing but the unremitting attention of General Harrison to enforce the necessary discipline, could have brought the troops to such a state of perfection and order as the result of the battle proved. The fact of the army rising from rest, and being ready to receive the Indians in two minutes (of which there ought not to be a doubt) after the report of the first fire, is sufficient to satisfy all persons capable of judging, as well as all unprejudiced minds, that it was not a surprise; the officers and soldiers slept with their clothes and accoutrements on, with drawn swords, muskets loaded, and bayonets fixed, laying by the sides of those who were to use them in a night attack. In this situation, on the morning of the 7th November, 1811, about fifteen minutes before the usual time of rising, the Indians attacked us by firing upon the guard three hundred paces from the lines; they then rushed upon the camp. The troops, although at rest at this moment, were in line and ready to receive them as they came up. An army marching against Indians in their country, (the wilderness) is differently situated than when going against civilized enemies. The sending out scouts and spies, cannot be done with the most distant prospect of their returning. The army is thus compelled to keep compact, and their authority or knowledge of the Indians, extended no further than the ground they occupy; the first that is known of them is the report of their fire.—Such attacks from a civilized force would be considered as a surprise, while by Indians it cannot, except the army is unprepared for them. At the battle of general Wayne, the Indians got the first fire; at the battle of Brownstown the Indians got the first fire, and they got no further advantage at Tippecanoe. These battles and their results were similar, except the Indians engaged more desperately in the latter. If the army had been surprised, according to the general understanding upon such attacks, I may conclude by saying not one would have ever returned to tell the tale. The mistake which is prevalent amongst the people, in regard to this attack, is not attributable to the

General or to the army, but to themselves; and the cause is very obvious, they rarely being qualified to judge of the circumstances. The General has been condemned for not attacking the Indians on the 6th; when he marched up in point of their town, his orders were to act on the defensive. This is enough to satisfy common sense, and it would be useless to multiply words with a view to appease stubborn prejudice upon this point.

"I am, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

"C. LARRABEE.

"M. DAWSON, Esq."

We have now to introduce an evidence of a different kind, that of a private soldier. In the year 1816 a "Journal of two Campaigns of the fourth regiment of United States' infantry, in the Michigan and Indiana territories," was published at Keene, in the state of New Hampshire, by "Adam Walker, late a soldier of the 4th regiment." For this latter work we are indebted to the politeness of that distinguished officer, General James Miller. From the 31st page of this book we extract the following, which closes Mr. Walker's account of the battle.

"General Harrison received a shot through the rim of his hat. In the heat of the action his voice was frequently heard, and easily distinguished, giving his orders in the same calm, cool, and collected manner with which we had been used to receive them on a drill or parade. The confidence of the troops in the General was unlimited, and his measures were well calculated to gain the particular esteem of the fourth regiment. All kinds of petty punishments, inflicted without authority, for the most trifling errors of the private soldier, by the pompous sergeant, or the insignificant corporal, were at once prohibited. A prohibition of other grievances which had too long existed, in this regiment, at once fixed in the breast of every soldier an affectionate and lasting regard for their General. The benefit of which was fully realized in the conduct of the troops in the engagement, as well as throughout the campaign."

Speaking of some dissatisfaction which took place among the militia before their departure from fort Harrison, Mr. Walker says, "Some murmuring* took place among them, being heartily sick of the camp, and desirous of returning to their homes. Many, indeed, threatened to leave us at all hazards, which caused the Governor much anxiety and trouble. He appeared not disposed to detain any man against his inclination; being endowed by nature with a heart as humane as brave, in his frequent addresses to the militia, his eloquence was formed to persuade; appeals were made to reason as well as feeling, and ne-

* It is but justice to say that it appears from the Governor's official letters, that the murmuring here spoken of was confined to a very small part of the militia.

ver were they made in vain: when the militia, unused to military restriction, threatened a desertion, his eloquence calmed their passions, and hushed their discontented murmurings, and in a short time all became tranquil, and unanimity reigned throughout the army."

The above documents will, it is believed, satisfy every unprejudiced mind, that the charges which have been so industriously circulated by the enemies of General Harrison, in relation to the battle of Tippecanoe, are entirely without foundation. The story of his having encamped on a spot selected by the Indians may possibly, however, have originated from a misunderstanding of a passage in the Governor's official account. He there says that he received from the Indians information that there was a creek to the north of the town, which would afford water. But it was in answer to an enquiry made by himself. Finding that there was no possibility of encamping below the town, on the Wabash, because the first bottom on the river being without wood, and commanded by the second bank, and that upon the latter there was wood and no water, he had sent colonel Piatt above the town to see whether a situation could there be obtained. It was during the absence of this officer that the Governor made the inquiry where water was to be found other than on the Wabash, and received the answer given above, which induced him to send majors Taylor and Clark to examine it up and down, until they should find a spot proper for the encampment. It has been shown that the place chosen by those gentlemen was, in the opinion of the army, as well as those who have visited it since, extremely well calculated for their purpose.

It is, however, proper to remark, that Governor Harrison thought less favourably of it than any other person, and this opinion is expressed in his official letter to the secretary of war. Why then, it may be asked, did he not seek another?—the answer is easy; because although not free from objections, it was the very best that the whole country above the town afforded. Wood, water, and grass were convenient, and covered from the camp; it was entirely open on two sides, and was in every respect well calculated for the operations of the infantry. And this accounts for the high commendations bestowed upon it by all the officers of that corps. The objections of the Governor were two, first, that the left flank and rear afforded a favorable approach for the Indians, and secondly and principally, because the wet prairie in front of the encampment, and immediately between it and the town, and the creek and brushwood in the rear would not allow him to use his cavalry in either of those directions; this inconvenience was felt during the action, for the Governor had at one time in the night caused the dragoons to be mounted for the purpose of breaking through the enemy in one direction, and attacking their rear on the other, or attacking the

town. Upon asking captain Parke, (now the district judge of the United States for Indiana, and who succeeded to the command of the squadron when major Daveiss was wounded,) if he thought he could accomplish it; the latter replied, that he could try, and that he could pass the prairie in files, but not in squadron. This being the Governor's own opinion, from the examination which he had made on the day before, and believing that the prairie was still more swampy towards the east, the idea was abandoned, and the dragoons dismounted.

In the account of the battle of Tippecanoe which we have quoted from that excellent work, "The History of the late War in the Western country," there are two errors, one in relation to the persons who commanded the Indiana forces, and the other with respect to the number of wounded. The Governor never believed that either Stone Eater or Winemac was in the action, as is stated in the quotation from that work. He believed that both of those chiefs were at that time friends of the United States, and continued so for some time after. The returns of killed and wounded after the battle amounted to one hundred and eighty-eight. An unusual portion of the wounded died or lost their limbs. This was attributed by the surgeons to the circumstance of the Indians having chewed their balls, which caused them to tear and lacerate the flesh to a greater degree, and make a more ragged wound than balls whose surfaces are smooth.

Towards the close of the action, the troops in charging passed over major Baen, who was mortally wounded, and who was lying on his face; being in person very much like the Governor, and having a pair of sherevallys on exactly resembling a pair worn by him, the Governor having been seen near that spot but a few moments before, a report was immediately circulated along the line in the opposite direction, to that in which he was, that he was killed. A moment after, however, brought the best evidence of the falsehood of the story, as the Governor appeared in person riding along the front of the line. The shout of joy and exultation with which he was received by the men, afforded the best evidence of their attachment, and the deep interest they took in the fate of their commander.

When the troops were forming for the last charge on the left flank, a circumstance occurred of a character somewhat ludicrous, and calculated to relieve the solemnity of the narration. The Governor, in passing along the front of the line, discovered an ensign —, of the 1st United States regiment, standing behind a tree on the left of his company; the Governor immediately called to him, and ordered him to get from behind the tree, asking him if he was not ashamed to be under cover when his men were exposed; the ensign, who was a Frenchman, complained bitterly when the action was over of the injustice which had been done him. "I was not behind de tree," said he, "de tree was before me, here was my position, dere de tree; how I can help, I

cannot move de tree, I cannot leave my position." It is but justice to add, that this gentleman acquitted himself well at the battle of Niagara, where he was wounded. The first care of the General, after the battle was over, was the relief of the wounded; they were attended by skilful surgeons, and every comfort which could be procured was afforded: the hospital had, indeed, but few necessaries, and the whole camp could furnish but a very small quantity of flour, and no meat: the few beeves which had been brought up with the army had been either driven away by the Indians, or had been frightened off by the noise of the action. The Governor's own stores were put in requisition, for the use of the wounded, and colonel Boyd generously contributed also for the same purpose. But this was not the only care which pressed upon the mind of the Governor. His situation was by no means a pleasant one. A victory had indeed been gained, but it had been purchased by the blood of many of his best officers and soldiers, who lay dead or dying around him. His effective force, after deducting those who were necessary to take care of the wounded, was diminished more than one-fourth. He had at that time no means of judging what effect the late defeat would have upon the Indians: if they were determined to try their fortune in another battle, *they* might obtain reinforcements, but *he* could not. He was more than 170 miles from Vincennes, and even from thence he could draw no more men, without endangering the safety of that place, and the surrounding settlements.

Encumbered with wounded, his march on the return must be necessarily slow, until he reached the block-house, where the boats had been left. Reflections of this kind did not fail to present themselves to the army. It produced, however, no other effect than that of making them remarkably obedient to the orders of their commander. As it was evident that the wounded could not be in a situation to be moved on that day, a large fatigue party were turned out, and the angles of the camp fortified; this exercise gave a better appetite for the broiled horse flesh, of which alone their dinners were composed.

Whilst this work was progressing, a drum-head court-martial was ordered for the trial of the negro Ben, whose desertion and apprehension we have mentioned. The following is the sentence of the court:

"The drum-head court-martial, held for the trial of Ben, a negro, charged with desertion to the enemy, are of opinion that the prisoner is guilty, and that he suffer immediate death.

"JOHN P. BOYD,

"Col. 4th regt. infy. acting B. G."

The sentence was approved by the Governor, and the execution was intended to take place an hour after, but the sentence was not put in force.

In a letter from the Governor to his friend doctor John M. Scott, of Frankfort, the following account of the circumstances attending the pardoning of Ben, as well as some other interesting particulars, are given. "You say that you are astonished at my escape, and that you had calculated with certainty upon my fall in the event of an action with the Indians, from the circumstance of my being known to every Indian who was opposed to us. It is really astonishing to myself, and I consider my life as having been most providentially preserved. I had, indeed, many more chances to run than any other individual, as well from the circumstance which you mention as from the attempts of treachery, the first efforts of which would unquestionably have been directed against me. The first plan laid by the prophet and his chiefs was that which you have heard, of meeting me in council and procuring my assassination by means of two Winebagoes who had devoted themselves to that object. Had this plan been persevered in, whatever might have been the fate of the army, I, at least, should have fallen. When this scheme was abandoned and an attack determined on, I am perfectly convinced that they intended to have first despatched me by means of the above mentioned negro, who was either to have done it himself, or conducted some of the Indians into camp for the purpose of effecting it. The latter is most probable, and would not have been very difficult of execution. A few Indians might have passed undiscovered between the militia centinels, who, you know, are not very remarkable for their vigilance, as the negro himself did; and being once within the lines, there was scarcely any further obstacle. For instead of the officer's guard to which my rank entitled me, I had contented myself with a single dismounted dragoon centinel, and that more for the purpose of overlooking the horses and baggage wagon than any security to myself. Ben had escaped all notice and was within a few yards of my quarters, making his observations, when captain Wilson *providentially* approached him from behind and secured him. Had it not been for the captain's visit to me at that late hour, or had it been delayed but for a few moments, he would no doubt have escaped. He was tried the next morning, and the court unanimously sentenced him to suffer death. I approved of the sentence and intended to have had it executed in an hour; but the hour elapsed and another passed by. I excused the delay to my own mind from the circumstance of the troops being engaged in fortifying the camp, and could not be called out to witness the execution. But the fact was that I began to pity him, and I could not screw myself up to the point of giving the fatal order. If he had been out of my sight he would have been executed. But when he was first taken, general Wells and colonel Owen, who were old Indian fighters, as we had no irons to put on him, had

secured him *a-la-mode de savage*. This is done by throwing the person on his back, splitting a log and cutting notches in it to receive the ankles, then replacing the severed parts and compressing them together with forks driven over the log into the ground; the arms are extended and tied to stakes secured in the same manner. The situation of a person thus placed is as uneasy a one as can possibly be conceived. The poor wretch thus confined lay before my fire, his face receiving the rain which occasionally fell, and his eyes constantly turned upon me as if imploring mercy. I could not withstand the appeal and I determined to give him another chance for his life. I had all the commissioned officers assembled and told them that his fate depended on them. Some were for executing him, and I believe that the majority would have been against him but for the interference of the gallant Snelling. 'Brave comrades,' said he, 'let us save him. The wretch deserves to die; but as our commander, whose life was more particularly his object, is willing to spare him, let us also forgive him. I hope, at least, that every officer of the fourth regiment will be upon the side of mercy.' Snelling prevailed, and Ben was brought to this place where he was discharged. To those who may censure me for pardoning Ben, you can state the circumstance of general Wayne's pardoning Antoine Lasselle, who, you know, was not only found fighting with the Indians against us, but actually hid within our lines, and although he was condemned as a spy, he was pardoned by the general. I have yet another *providential* interference in my favor to mention. I had in the campaign, for my own riding, a grey mare and a sorrel horse. They were both fine riding nags, but the mare was uncommonly spirited and active. I generally rode them alternately, day and day about. On the day we got to the town I was on the mare, and as it was our invariable rule to have the horses saddled and bridled through the night, the saddle was kept upon her, and, like the other horses belonging to my family, she was tied to a picket driven into the ground in the rear of my marquee and between that and the baggage wagon. In the night the mare pulled up the picket and got loose. The dragoon centinel awakening my servant George, the latter caught the mare and tied her to the wagon wheel on the back side. When the alarm took place I called for the mare. George being aroused from his sleep and confoundedly frightened, forgot that he had removed her to the other side of the wagon and was unable to find her. In the mean time major Taylor's servant had brought up his horse. The major observed that I had better mount him, and he would get another and follow me. I did so. Poor Owen accompanied me, mounted upon a remarkably white horse. Before we got to the angle which was first attacked, Owen was killed. I at that time supposed that it was a ball which had passed over the heads of the infantry

that had killed him: but I am persuaded that he was killed by one of the two Indians who got within the lines, and that it was extremely probable that they mistook him for me. Taylor joined me in a few minutes after, mounted on my grey mare. I immediately directed him to go and get another. He returned to my quarters, and preferring my sorrel horse to another of his own that was there, mounted him, and we thus continued on each others' horses, till near the close of the action. Being then with both my aids-de-camp, Taylor and Hurst, in the rear of the right flank line, the fire of several Indians near to the line was directed at us. One of their balls killed the horse that Taylor was riding, and another passed through the sleeve of his coat, a third wounded the horse I was riding in the head, and a fourth was very near terminating my earthly career. Now, what a singular combination of circumstances happened to save me. If I had been mounted on my grey mare I should have inevitably been killed, and I should have been on her if she had not broken loose in the night, or if, after being caught she had been tied where the other horses were, or if my servant had recollected where he had tied her. It occurred to none of us that it was dangerous to be on a white animal until after Owen fell, or he would not have been suffered to ride his own white horse, as there were several spare ones belonging to my own family. I have seen a paragraph in one of the papers stating that 'the white horse on which I had ridden the day before the action, was riddled with balls,' this is not the fact; neither colonel Owens' horse, which colonel Wells has since taken home to his widow, or my mare were touched with a ball, and no one was upon the mare during the action but major Taylor, and he only for a minute or two.*"

To those who will take the trouble to examine the circumstances which attended the battle of Tippecanoe, it must be evident that the time and manner of conducting the battle were extremely unfavorable to the Indians. Their only chance of success was upon the first attack; when that failed, they retired for a short time, and reloaded their pieces. They then advanced and made the attack simultaneously, used rattles, and their chargers as whistles. This gave not only an opportunity to prepare for the attack, but as the Indians were the first to deliver their fire, it gave an opportunity to our men to see them more clearly, as they were necessarily very near, on account of the darkness. The buck-shot cartridges made prodigious ha-

* Among the other calumnies industriously circulated by his enemies, it has been said, that General Harrison exchanged horses with major Davies; and his, the General's, being a white one, consequently more conspicuous in the dark, was given to the major, to have him the more exposed to danger. This calumny we have the fullest confidence is completely refuted by the testimony given above.

vock among them. The use of cartridges was also a great advantage on our side, affording a certain load, whereas the enemy being obliged to load with loose powder, frequently lost the greater part in pouring it into the muzzle of their guns. The locks of rifles, particularly those which have double triggers, are much more liable to get out of order than those of muskets. In order to remedy some defect in the lock or flint, which required a light, some of our own men, as well as some of the Indians, exposed themselves to imminent danger. A young man of Spencer's company, to effect some purpose of this kind, in spite of the opposition of his comrades, went up to one of the fires, and making up a light, remained there until he accomplished his object. Although a great number of shots were fired at him, and many of them passed through his clothes, he escaped unhurt. A Winebago chief was not so fortunate—he approached the exterior fire of captain Barton's company, at the rear left angle, where the line had been considerably drawn in, and pushing up the brands to make a light, squatted down to peck his flint, or do something to the lock of his gun. He was, however, immediately fired at from captain Cook's company, which was not more than twenty yards from him, and fell dead into the fire. One of the men asked the captain's permission to go to scalp him; as no attack had been made on that part of the line for some time, he was permitted to go. The Yankee, however, being inexperienced in the business, it took him some time to effect it: he was fired at, and returned to his company, with the scalp in his hand, indeed, but with a ball through his body, which caused his death in a few hours after. In the course of the battle, the Indian was taken off, without being observed by captain Cook, and conveyed to the town, where his body was found and known by its having the scalp off, and his body much burnt. The body had been removed without captain Cook's perceiving it, and is an instance of the care with which the Indians remove the dead bodies of their friends in action.

The following is the official return of the killed and wounded on our side in the battle of Tippecanoe:

Killed—One aid-de-camp, one captain, two subalterns, one sergeant, two corporals, thirty privates.

Wounded, since dead—One major, two captains, twenty-two privates.

Wounded—Two lieutenant-colonels, one adjutant, one surgeon's mate, two captains, three subalterns, nine sergeants, five corporals, one musician, one hundred and two privates.

Total of killed and wounded—188.

Names of officers killed and wounded, as per general return.

General Staff.

Killed—Colonel Abraham Owens, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief.

Field and Staff.

Wounded—Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Bartholomews, commanding Indiana militia infantry; lieutenant-colonel Luke Decker, of do.; major Joseph A. Davies, since dead, commanding a squadron of dragoons; doctor Edward Scull, of the Indiana militia; adjutant James Hunter, of mounted riflemen.

United States infantry, including the late captain Whitney's rifle company.

Wounded—Captain W. C. Baen, acting major, since dead; lieutenant George P. Peters; lieutenant George Gooding; ensign Henry Burchstead.

Colonel Decker's detachment of Indiana militia.

Wounded—Captain Jacob Warwick, since dead.

Major Redman's detachment of Indiana militia.

Wounded—Captain John Norris.

Major Wells' detachment of mounted riflemen.

Wounded—Captain Frederic Guiger.

Captain Spencer's company, including lieut. Berry's detachment of mounted riflemen.

Killed—Captain Spier Spencer; first lieutenant Richard M-Mahan; lieut. Thomas Berry.

NATHANL. F. ADAMS, adjutant of the army.

The whole of the seventh was spent in taking care of the wounded, burying the dead with the honours of war, and fortifying the camp. On the morning of the eighth the whole of the dragoons and mounted riflemen were placed under the command of major Wells, and directed to reconnoitre the town, and see whether the enemy were yet there. They found it deserted, but discovered a great quantity of corn, some small hogs, and a few domestic fowls. The corn was very acceptable to the army, and the pork and fowls were reserved for the wounded. Some dead were found in the town, and a great number partially buried in the gullies adjacent to it. The town appeared to have been abandoned with great precipitancy, as their household utensils were all left, and even a few guns; some of these were new and not divested of the coverings in which they were imported: the powder, too, was of the best kind, English double glazed rifle. The quantity of kettles was immense. After every thing that could be useful to the army was removed, the town was burned. On the morning of the ninth, the troops were put in motion on their return. It required every wagon to carry the wounded, except one, in which the arms of the killed and wounded were carried. The Governor assembled the officers, and told them that it was necessary to destroy all their baggage; he set the example by ordering all his own camp furniture to be knocked to pieces, or thrown into the fire: his injunctions were immediately and cheerfully obeyed, and the whole camp was

soon strewed with broken mess boxes, and their furniture of plates, dishes, bottles, &c.

But after all this, it was with the greatest difficulty that the wagons could be made to contain those who could not ride. When every thing was apparently ready, some one, who was supposed to be able to ride, was found incapable of sitting on the horse, and a new arrangement of the wagons was necessary. It was twelve o'clock on the ninth before the troops could move.

When the troops come to be formed in the open prairie, adjoining the camp, in the same order of march in which they had arrived at the town, two days before, the great loss which had been sustained by all the corps, excepting the dragoons, who had suffered but little, appeared visible. For, independently of the killed and wounded, a considerable number of the men were necessarily taken from the line to attend upon the wounded. There was, indeed, nothing omitted to render their situation as comfortable as possible; the Governor, as long as his stores lasted, caused a large kettle of coffee or chocolate to be every night prepared at his quarters, and distributed amongst them; and this laudable example was immediately followed by colonel Boyd. Great caution had been used in the advance of the troops, but from their being so much encumbered with the wounded, and their numbers so much diminished, a still stricter vigilance was adopted, both on the march, and in the choice of encampments. No enemy, however, appeared; small parties followed the army, for the purpose of taking up and stripping and scalping those that died of their wounds; but they took care to keep at a respectful distance.

Upon their arrival at the block house, which had been erected for the protection of the boats, they were all found safe. In these boats the wounded were embarked, with a proper guard, and sent off to Vincennes. The army pursued its march, by land, to fort Harrison; captain Snelling, with his company of the 4th, were appointed for the garrison of this fortress. The Governor arrived with the army at Vincennes, on the 18th, where they were received with great cordiality, both by the citizens and the members of the legislature, who had just assembled for the purpose of doing business. Separate resolutions of thanks were presented to the Governor, colonel Boyd, and the regular troops, and to colonels Bartholomew and Decker, and the militia. That addressed to the Governor is as follows:

From the Western Sun of December 7th, 1811.

“To His Excellency William Henry Harrison, Governor, and Commander in Chief, in, and over the Indiana Territory.

“When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for a nation to unsheath the sword” in defence of any portion of its citizens—and any individual of society becomes entrusted with the important charge of leading an army of his country into the field to scourge the assailants of its rights—and it is proved by the success of that army, that that individual possesses superior capacity, accompanied by integrity and other qualities of the mind, which adorn the human character in a superlative degree, it has a tendency to draw out the affections of the people, in a way that must be grateful to the soldier, and the man. Such is the light, Sir, in which you have the honor to be viewed by your country, and one which the legislative council, and house of representatives of this territory think you justly entitled to.

“And, Sir, in duly appreciating your services, we are perfectly sensible of the great benefits and important services rendered by the officers and soldiers of the United States infantry under your command. And it is with pleasure we learn that the officers and militiamen of our country acted with a heroism more than could be reasonably calculated upon from men, (such as they generally were) undisciplined, and unaccustomed to war.

“Resolved, That a joint committee attend to the insertion of the foregoing address in the Western Sun for one week.

(Signed,)

“JAMES BEGGS,

“President of the legislative council.

(Signed,)

“GENERAL W. JOHNSTON.

“Speaker of the house of representatives.”

It has been mentioned, in the extract taken from the History of the Western War, that an attempt was made to disparage the

conduct of the militia in the late action; and it had been artfully insinuated to the officers of the 4th regiment, that it would not be difficult to engross the whole honor to themselves. The Governor immediately addressed letters to each of the officers of that regiment, requesting an answer to certain questions, tending to elucidate the subject; they were promptly answered, and the testimony of those who most distinguished themselves in the action, proved that the conduct of the militia deserved the highest applause; that of all the companies in the action, two only had manifested any indecision; that one of these greatly distinguished itself afterwards, and that the other had been placed, by the negligence of the officer commanding the infantry, in a situation which it could not possibly maintain, being exposed to the fire of our own troops, as well as those of the enemy.

This was captain Bigger's company, who was on guard, and of course not with it; the greater part of the company was rallied by adjutant Davies Floyd, and behaved well throughout the remaining part of the action. The captain himself, not being able to find his company, took a musquet and joined captain Scott's, where he did the duty of a soldier until the enemy was driven off.

From the mass of documents, which were published on this occasion, we select the following letter from captain Adams, of the 4th regiment, who was the adjutant-general, and who of course was better enabled to know all the events of the action than the platoon officers.

To His Excellency Wm. H. Harrison, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Indiana Territory.

SIR,

"In answer to the question, which your Excellency hast put to me, 'Do you know, or have you ever heard, that any other companies than those of Bigger and Robb had abandoned their stations in the action?' I must state, that I neither know, nor have heard, of any other companies who had deserted their posts; nor do I conceive, that those companies can justly be considered to have abandoned *their* posts, as Bigger's was certainly attacked in front, flank, and rear; their captain on guard, and themselves overpowered by numbers. Robb's company, in common with the whole of that flank, may also justly be said to have given away before superior numbers. It was rallied and taken to the right flank, where they manfully sustained the repeated attacks of the savages until the close of the action, and suffered severely, as their list of killed and wounded will show, which answers, also, your Excellency's second question, viz: 'Do you not know, or have you sufficient reason to believe, from what you have heard, that Robb's company was rallied and removed to the right flank, where in a post of great danger, it con-

tinued to discharge its duty until the close of the action? In answer to the third question, 'Do you know, or have you ever heard, that any militia officer or soldier was killed or wounded behind, or under wagons, or behind trees, were on or near the line, and where, of course, it was proper for riflemen to be?' I must declare, I neither knew, nor ever heard, that any officer or soldier was wounded or killed behind trees or wagons. Most of those who were wounded, retired to the centre of the camp, which may have led those, who superficially observed things, to suppose that they were there wounded; such people, also, might have mistaken wagoners, men in the contractor's and quartermaster's department, who were not few, whose duty called them about the wagons, for those who had fled from their posts. It must be, indeed, a source of regret to your Excellency, to find people, who are, perhaps, not the most deserving, striving to rend in pieces the laurel wreath, which your little army so gallantly won, merely because they cannot be the exclusive owners. For them should be wove the wreath of discord, labelled with dissension, folly, and madness, on its front; that such may no more disturb where you command is, Sir, the wish of your obedient servant.

"NATH. W. ADAMS,

"Captain 4th regt., adjutant of the army on the expedition."

From this statement, which is corroborated by that of all the other officers, it appears that of ten militia companies, which were in the action, two only were even supposed to have behaved amiss at any time; that one of these amply redeemed its character, and that the other had been broken under circumstances which no troops could have withstood, being without their captain, attacked on every side by the enemy, and exposed even to the fire of our own troops.

The following correspondence on the subject of the battle of Tippecanoe passed between Governor Harrison and the old revolutionary patriot and soldier, general Charles Scott of Kentucky.

"Frankfort, Nov. 27, 1811.

"My dear Harrison,

"It is with sincere pleasure I have heard of your safe arrival at Vincennes with the troops under your command, after the rough play you have been engaged in. You have, so far as I can learn, acquitted yourself like a man, and the men you commanded have really done wonders, considering the circumstances.

"That you would not be wanting on your part was what every one who knew you would naturally expect, and especially one who knew your worth as well as I do. I should before this have answered your two favors from camp but for want of opportunity. My ignorance of the nature and extent of your orders, could alone have produced any hesitation in the line of conduct

I should adopt, as to the supply of volunteers solicited from this state.

“For I had taken up the idea you had a right to call for them officially, or rather that I should have been warranted in ordering them. For you may rest assured, I should be the last to throw cold water on any enterprize you were ordered to execute; for I feel a lively interest in your fame and fortunes. Your first letter alone would have been entirely sufficient, as to any explanation necessary toward me. I have only to regret, you had not more sufficient means to complete the chastisement of a treacherous enemy, and to entirely disappoint the views of our old enemy, who have too plainly urged them on. I should be pleased to be favored by you with as detailed an account of your engagements as your convenience will permit: and I the more wish this, to be enabled to do you justice against the cavils of ignorance or presumption. I am, as I ever shall be, your sincere friend,

CHARLES SCOTT.

“WILLIAM H. HARRISON, Esq.”

Governor Harrison's letter to general, then governor Scott.

“*Vincennes, Dec. 13, 1811.*”

“My dear sir,

“I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 27th ult. by the mail of Wednesday last, and I beg you to accept my sincere thanks for the friendly sentiments which it contains.

“You wish me to give you some account of the late action, that you may be the better enabled to do me justice against the cavils of ignorance and presumption. I would do this with great pleasure, but the legislature of this territory being about to close its session, and having an unusual press of business, I am unable to give you such an account as would be satisfactory: there is, however, the less need of this, as my official account to the government will probably reach you as soon as this letter. It appears to me that from the hints contained in some of your newspapers, that the charge of error in the planning or execution of the late expedition, has been more particularly aimed at the president than myself. I most sincerely thank those gentlemen for placing me in such good company; and it is hardly necessary to inform you that the charge against the administration is as unfounded in this instance as in all the others which have flowed from the same source. The orders of the government evinced as much wisdom as humanity: it was determined to protect its citizens, but if possible to spare the effusion of human blood. This last object was prevented, but by whom? Why, in a great measure by the very persons who are now complaining—because a battle could not be won without loss. At least in this territory the clamour is confined to those who opposed the expedition to the utmost of their power, and by whose exertions in circulating every falsehood that malice and

villany could invent, the militia were prevented from turning out, and instead of a force of from twelve to fifteen hundred men, which I expected to have had, I was obliged to march from fort Harrison with less than eight hundred. My personal enemies here united with the British agents in representing that the expedition was entirely useless, and the prophet as one of the best and most pacific of mortals—a perfect Shaker in principle, who trembled at the thoughts of spilling blood. Every one of his aggressions upon us was denied or palliated, and excused as is the conduct of Great Britain by this same description of people in the Atlantic states. A party sent by the prophet fired upon and wounded one of our centinels upon our own ground. The fact was at first boldly denied—“the man was shot by one of our own people,” and I believe it was once asserted that he shot himself. When the whole circumstance was brought to light, these indefatigable gentry shifted their ground, and asserted that the poor Indian fired in his own defence, and that he was merely gratifying an innocent curiosity in coming up to see what was going on in the camp, and that if he had not shot the sentry, the sentry would have shot him.

“I regret exceedingly that the friends of colonel Daveiss should think it necessary to his fame to suppose a difference of opinion between him and myself, which never existed, that I had rejected advice from him which was never given, and that to give colour to this they listened to stories with regard to the operations of the army which were absolutely without foundation. If the utmost cordiality and friendship did not exist between the colonel and myself from the time of his joining the army till his death, I have been very much deceived. If our military operations were not almost always in unison, those which he expressed (and no man who knew him will accuse him of hypocrisy,) were not his own. The colonel’s mess-mates, major G. R. Floyd and captain Piatt are well acquainted with the entire confidence which subsisted between us: they are acquainted with circumstances which indisputably establish the fact; and others know that I was the object of his eulogy to an extent which it would be indelicate in me to repeat. Colonel Daveiss did indeed advise me to a measure the day before the action, in which he was joined by all the officers around me: whether the advice was good or bad is unimportant to the present discussion, since it was followed to the full extent that it was given.

“It is not necessary to express my opinion of the colonel’s merits at this time, since it will be found in my official letters, and I have no doubt but that will be satisfactory to his friends.

“With regard to my own conduct, my dear sir, it is not in my power to enter into a defence of it, unless I were to know in what particular it has been arraigned: however, I may with safety rely upon the opinions of my army. Believing most sincerely that you do feel that lively interest in my fame and for

tunes which you profess, I am sure you will receive with interest the enclosed declaration, signed by all the field officers of the army* one only excepted, who was absent, and the resolutions of the militia of the country, who served upon the expedition. The testimony of men who fought and suffered by my side ought, I should suppose, to be sufficient.

“An idea seems to prevail in your state that the whole army was completely surprised, and that they were placed in a situation where bravery only could decide the contest, and where there was no opportunity whatever for the exercise of military skill. This was, however, far from being the case:—it is true that the two companies forming the left angle of the rear line (Barton’s and Guiger’s) were attacked before they were formed, and that some of the men were killed coming out of their tents; but it is equally true that all the others were formed before they were fired on, and that these two companies lost but a very few men before they were able to resist. Notwithstanding the darkness, the order of battle (such as had been previously prescribed) was taken by all the troops. The officers were active, the men cool and obedient, and perhaps there never was an action fought, where, for the number of men engaged, there was so many changes of position performed, not in disorder and confusion, but with the strictest military propriety. The companies, both regulars and militia, were extended, contracted, wheeled, marched, and made to file up by word of command. My orders, and they were not a few, were obeyed with promptitude and precision; and if I am not most grossly deceived, all that mutual dependence which ought to exist between a commander and his army was reciprocally felt.

“It has been said that the Indians should have been attacked upon our arrival before their town, on the evening of the sixth. There were two reasons which prevented this: first, that the directions which I received from the government made it necessary that I should endeavour, if possible, to accomplish the object of the expedition (the dispersion of the prophet’s force,) without bloodshed; and secondly, that the success of an attack upon the town by day was very problematical.

“I certainly did not understand my instructions to mean, that I should jeopardize the safety of the troops, by endeavouring to bring about an accommodation without fighting: but if I had commenced an attack upon them after they had sent a chief to inform me, that they were desirous of an accommodation, and that they had three days before sent a deputation to me for that

* The original of this document was not amongst the papers furnished the author, as it was forwarded to governor Scott. It was published with the governor’s letter in the Kentucky papers, and as it bears ample testimony to the correctness of General Harrison’s conduct, it will, if possible, be procured and published in the appendix.

purpose, who can doubt but a much greater clamour would have been raised than exists at present. The cruelty of attacking those *innocent* people would have been portrayed in the strongest colours—the administration would have been represented as murderers, and myself their wretched instrument.

“But ‘the army were exposed to the nightly incursions of the Indians:’—it has been well observed by a writer in the *Argus*, that if ‘nightly incursions’ were really to be so much dreaded by the army, they had no business there. But the author of these objections will be still more surprised when he learns that a nightly incursion was precisely what I wished for, because from such a one only could I hope for a decisive action. If they had attacked us by day, they certainly would have done it upon ground favourable to their mode of fighting. They would have killed, as in general Wayne’s action, a number of our men, and when pressed, they would have escaped with a loss comparatively trifling. In nightly attacks discipline always prevails over disorder—the party which is able the longest to preserve its order must succeed. I had with me 250 regulars, who were highly disciplined, and my militia had been instructed to form in order of battle to receive an enemy in any direction, with facility and precision. But ‘in the immediate neighborhood of the enemy, why were not the troops under arms during the night?’ I answer, that troops can only bear a certain portion of fatigue, and when in the presence of an enemy, it is a matter of calculation with the commander when they should be kept under arms, and when permitted to rest. Upon this occasion I must acknowledge that my calculation was erroneous. In common with the whole army, I did believe that they would not attack us that night: if it was their intention to attack, why had they not done it upon our march, when situations favorable to them might have been found. Indeed, within three miles of the town we passed over ground so broken and disadvantageous to us that I was obliged to change the position of the troops several times in the course of a mile. They had fortified their town with care, and with astonishing labour for them, all indicating that they there meant to sustain the shock. It was the scene of those mysterious rites which were so much venerated, and the prophet had taught his followers to believe that his person and his town were equally inviolable. I expected that they would have met me the next day, to hear my terms, but I did not believe that they would accede to them, and it was my determination to attack and burn the town the following night; it was therefore necessary that the troops should be as much refreshed as possible. But though the men were not made to remain all night under arms, every other precaution was used as if an attack had been certain. In fact, the troops were placed precisely in that situation which is called by military men

lying on their arms. The regular troops lay in their tents, with their accoutrements on, and their arms by their side.—The militia had no tents, they slept with their pouches on, and their guns under them to keep them dry. The order of encampment was the order of battle for a nightly attack; and as every man slept opposite to his post in the line, there was nothing for them to do but to rise and take their post, a few steps in the rear of the fires, and the line was formed in an instant. So little time was required for this operation, that if the guard on the left flank had done their duty as well as the rest of the army, the troops on that flank would have been formed before the Indians came near them. It was my custom, every evening, as soon as the army halted, to examine the ground of the encampment and its environs, and afterwards to call together the field officers of the army, and give them their directions for the night. At those meetings every one was required freely to express his sentiments—every contingency that was likely to happen was discussed. The orders which were proper to be given to them, were repeated by the field officers to the captains. Every one being by these means possessed of my intentions there was no room left for mistake or confusion. The orders given on the night of the 6th were solely directed to a night attack. The officers were directed, in case of such an attack, to parade their men in the order in which they were encamped, and that each corps should maintain itself upon its own ground until other orders should be given. With regulations such as these, and with such a state of discipline as we claim, you must allow, my dear Sir, that we had no reason to dread ‘a night incursion’ more than an attack by day. Indeed it was preferable, because in no other could it have been so completely decisive. In the latter, we might have lost as many men as we did lose, without having killed a third as many of the enemy.

“In my letter to the secretary, it is asserted that the Indians had penetrated to the centre of the encampment; but I believe, however, that not more than two had got within the lines; men were certainly killed near the centre of the camp, but it must have been by the balls fired from without.

“From this letter, and the official despatch to the secretary at war, you will be enabled, my dear general, to form a correct opinion of the battle of Tippecanoe. When an action is over, and we have time to meditate upon the circumstances which attended it, there is no great judgment necessary to discover some error in the conduct of it, something that was done which might have been better done, or something which was omitted, that if done, might have answered a good purpose.”

Frankfort, 30th Dec. 1811.

“My dear Harrison,

“It is with great pleasure I have to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 13th instant, containing a more circumstantial account of the battle of Tippecanoe than I had before received; and this pleasure is increased, because I trust the impression which may have been made on your mind of my having been in anywise unfriendly to the expedition you conducted, has been entirely removed. I received your favor by general Wells, and am more than sorry that it could for a moment find credit, that I had intimated an intention of causing any inconvenience to those brave men, who volunteered from this state to assist in the enterprise. That it was sanctioned by government would at all times be with me a sufficient motive to assist in it as far as I could with propriety; and my friendship for yourself, individually, would have certainly prevented me from interposing any obstacle.

“That you will never need any other defence against the malice and calumny of your enemies on this subject, than the plain and candid narrative you have done me the favor to send me, is I think, apparent to every honest mind. But I think you have not only not deserved censure, but that you have evinced those talents, which from a long acquaintance, I always believed you to possess, of the soldier and general, and I most sincerely trust your country will do justice to their worth.

“That reproach is often dealt out with a liberal hand where praise is due, I have lived long enough in the world to witness; and perhaps in no case is justice less likely to be done, than one which respects the conduct of a commander in battle. For every one conceives himself a perfect judge of what ought to have been done, and rests secure from contradiction, because no one can say with certainty, how it might have resulted.

“That you have done credit to yourself, and rendered, at a moment like this, important service to your country, will be acknowledged by her true friends, and by none with more pleasure than your friend, sincerely,

“CHARLES SCOTT.

“His Excellency, Governor Wm. H. Harrison.”

A faithful narrative, founded on authentic documents, has thus been given of Mr. Harrison's conduct from the day on which he became completely a public character, as Governor of the Territory of Indiana, till the battle of Tippecanoe. We shall conclude this part of the subject with a few reflections.

By what has been said it must appear to every candid and dispassionate reader that the policy pursued by the government of the United States towards the Indians was dictated by the purest principles of morality and good faith, that its wisdom

was only equalled by its humanity, and that it was impossible for that government to have chosen an agent for carrying into effect the object in view, whose principles, and whose conduct could be more in unison with that policy, humane and enlightened as it was, than Governor Harrison.

It must, in fact, be evident to the most fastidious reader, that the negociations and communications of the Governor with the Indians were conducted with patience, forbearance, conciliation, and benevolence, unparalleled in the history of diplomacy under the guidance of any other government, or any other administration of our own government that ever preceded it.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE battle of Tippecanoe had a different character from any one that ever before had been fought with the Indians. A victory had never been obtained over them where the force on both sides was nearly equal, and in no battle that ever before had been fought with them, were there so many killed in proportion to the number engaged. This circumstance, it appears, arises from their peculiar mode of fighting. They never come into close quarters with their enemy, nor expose themselves to his fire where they can possibly avoid it; and as they always fire under cover, and can hide themselves with astonishing dexterity, it becomes difficult, indeed, to take them off in such numbers as those who are governed by European tactics.

In the action with Braddock few or none were killed, and with St. Clair there were not more than eight or ten.

In the action of Tippecanoe they acted with more boldness and resolution than they had ever been known to do on any former occasion. Whether this confidence had been excited by the enthusiastic ardor which had been instilled into them by the

prophet, and their belief that their persons had been rendered invulnerable by the mystic rites and ceremonies which they had practised with him; or from the supposition that the army had been taken by surprise, and that, aided by the darkness, they would have an easy victory, it does not appear. But it is highly probable that all these causes might have combined to give them that confidence with which they commenced the attack, and carried it on during the action. This much, however, is certain, that they discovered more boldness and hardiness than they had ever before shown; and they also suffered more in killed and wounded, by their own acknowledgment, than they had ever before done in any battle with white men.

The number of troops under Governor Harrison was not near so great as he wished and had reason to expect. The reports fabricated and propagated by the Governor's personal enemies, as well as those traitors who were attached to the cause of Britain, with whom it was every day expected there would be a war, prevented the militia turning out in such numbers as they otherwise would have done. These vipers reported that the Indians would attack the settlements in different quarters, while the army would be upon the expedition against the prophet. Those who gave credit to this report would not turn out to serve upon that expedition, when their own concerns were in danger at home; and at home they resolved to stay to protect their wives and children. To others they said, that the expedition was useless and unnecessary, that the Indians were disposed to be quiet, and that it was religion, and not war, they contemplated. The prophet was said to be a SHAKER, and that he dreaded the shedding of human blood; and this was attempted to be confirmed by the chief of the Shakers, who said, that he, the prophet, was under the influence of the same divine spirit by whom he himself was inspired. Without questioning this very probable point, it has only to be stated, that those who believed this could not think themselves in any danger, and they naturally concluded, that there could be no necessity for turning out to fight people who spent all their time in singing and dancing, and performing religious rites and ceremonies.

By these means, that army which the Governor expected would amount to from twelve to fifteen hundred effective men, did not amount to eight hundred, and with this force he had either to disperse the prophet's party, or to suffer the most ruinous and murderous depredations to be carried on with impunity. Fortunately, however, and to the utter disappointment of those good friends to Britain, what he lacked in numbers, was made up in discipline and gallantry; and in the full confidence in the bravery of his men, he took such measures as led to victory over the Indians, and mortification to those by whose intrigues his force was so considerably circumscribed.

The regulars of the 4th regiment were well disciplined, and the militia had been so well drilled by the Governor himself, in all the evolutions necessary in Indian warfare, and were so sincerely attached to his person, as well as the cause in which they were embarked, that it was questionable, indeed, whether there had ever before been a band of more efficient troops brought into the field upon any other occasion. That mutual confidence which ought always to subsist between the commander of an army and the troops commanded, perhaps never had been in a higher degree manifested, than at the battle of Tippecanoe. Wherever his presence was required during the action, there was the Governor to be found. The plan he had laid down previous to the battle was so well understood by his men, that, notwithstanding the enemy was not really expected that night, within less than two minutes after the first fire was heard, every man was at his post, and though one part of the line was not so suddenly formed, from the confusion of the guards at that point, yet the only bad consequence attending that unfortunate circumstance, was one man killed and another wounded; and the subsequent movements and evolutions were performed by the whole troops with that facility and precision, that enabled them to gain even a more decisive victory than if the battle had been fought in open day.

With respect to the motives of the expedition, it is confidently believed that the foregoing statement of well authenticated facts, must acquit the government of the United States of all blame as to the necessity of curbing the growing power of the prophet and his brother; who, if permitted to go on with their schemes would have formed a confederacy so extensive and numerous, as would have been greatly destructive of the interests and safety of the settlers in the western country, if no war had occurred between the United States and England, but still more dangerous on the eve of a war which so soon followed as the ensuing summer. It must not be argued that the probability of a war with England had not entered into the calculation of the administration, or of Governor Harrison, so as to induce any of the measures which they pursued; because it must be as clear as the sun at noon day, that every circumstance remarkable in the conduct of the Indians for many months, nay, for years, could be resolved into the interference of the agents of England. Even so early as the year 1807, the Governor wrote to the secretary at war, that the conduct of the Indians was to him, on the banks of the Wabash, a political thermometer, by which was indicated the feelings and disposition of England towards the United States, better than the information they could draw from the ambassador at the court of St. James. There were very few of the despatches to government from the western country which did not contain some proof of British

agency in all the mischiefs either done or meditated by the Indians against the frontier settlements: and a great many of them manifested the strong probability that the movements of the Indians were instigated by those agents, in direct contemplation of a war with the United States. But whether instigated by the British, or not, it is evident that the Indians were almost daily committing depredations upon the inhabitants of all the territories; and that it was the unanimous opinion of governor Harrison, governor Edwards, general Howard, of Missouri, and general, afterwards governor, Clarke, of the same territory, that it was necessary to break up the prophet's establishment on the Wabash. But still the orders of the government were, that peace was to be preserved, if possible; and in the last letter which Governor Harrison received from the secretary of war, before he left fort Harrison, dated the 17th of September, he is ordered upon his arrival at the town, to offer the same terms which had been so often rejected, *i. e.* to give up those who had committed the depredations upon our citizens and disperse his band. If this did not manifest a spirit of forbearance, we are at a loss to conceive what would be so considered.

On the 2d of December, two principal chiefs of the Kickapoos of the prairie arrived at Vincennes, bearing a flag; they informed the Governor that they came in consequence of a message from the chief of that part of the Kickapoos which had joined the prophet, requiring them to do so, and that the said chief would be there himself in a day or two. The account which they gave of the late confederacy under the prophet, was, that he, with his Shawanoes, was at a small Huron village, about twelve miles from his former residence, on the Vincennes side of the Wabash, where were also about twelve or fifteen Hurons; the Kickapoos were encamped near to the Tippecanoe; the Potawatamies had scattered and gone to the different villages of that tribe; the Winebagoes had all set out on their return to their own country, excepting one chief and some men who remained at their former village. The latter had attended Tecumseh in his tour to the southward, and had only returned to the prophet's town the day before the action. The prophet had sent a message to the Kickapoos of the prairie to request that he might be permitted to return to their town; this was positively refused; and a warning sent to him not to come there. He then sent to request that four of his men might attend the Kickapoo chief to Vincennes—this was also refused. The chiefs said on the whole, that the tribes that had lost warriors in the late action, attributed their misfortunes to the prophet alone—that they constantly reproached him with their misfortunes, and threatened him with death—that they were all desirous of making peace with the United States, and would send deputations to the Governor as soon as they should be assured that they would be

well received. They further stated, that they had been sent by governor Howard and general Clarke, some time before the action, to endeavor to bring off the Kickapoos from the prophet's town—that they had used their best exertions to effect the purpose, but were unsuccessful—that the prophet's followers were fully impressed with a belief that they could beat the Governor's troops with ease—that it had been their intention to attack him at Fort Harrison if he had not gone higher, that Raccoon creek was then fixed on, and finally Pine creek, and that the latter would have been the place, if the usual route had not been abandoned, and a crossing made higher up—that the attack made at fort Harrison on the centinels was intended to shut the door against accommodation—that the Winebagoes had forty-six warriors killed in the action, and the Kickapoos eleven, and ten wounded—they had not heard how many were killed of the Potawatamies and other tribes—that the Potawatamie chief left by the Governor on the battle ground, had died, but that he had faithfully delivered his speech to the tribes, and earnestly advised them to abandon the prophet and submit to the terms offered by the Governor. The Governor could not say how much of the above information could be depended on, but with regard to depositions of the Indians, at that time he had reason to think they were correct, as the most profound tranquillity subsisted on the frontiers: he could hear of no injury being done to the persons or properties of the settlers, though before the expedition, scarcely a fortnight passed without some depredation having been committed.

The report of those chiefs, with respect to the number killed and wounded of the Kickapoo tribe, seemed very improbable; as it was very unlikely that they could have had more killed than wounded; but this they acknowledge, that the Indians never before sustained so severe a defeat since their acquaintance with the white people.

Another deputation from the Kickapoos waited on the Governor, whose report generally agreed with that of those who preceded them; only, that they did not speak so positively of the departure of the Winebagoes, nor did they give so distinct an account of the situation of the prophet and his party. They, however, agreed in saying that there was no probability of hostilities being recommenced on the part of the Indians: and they engaged, that their tribe, in conjunction with the Potawatamies and Miamis, would immediately expel the prophet, and those who adhere to him, from the country. They were told by the Governor that they need not expect a pardon for themselves until it was done.

The Governor concluded, that provided the prophet did continue in a hostile attitude, it would be easy to annihilate his force by expeditions of mounted men; by throwing into fort Har-

ri-son a quantity of corn, an expedition might have been carried on during that winter. As much corn and provisions as would serve them to the fort, might have been carried on their horses from Vincennes, and the supply obtained there, could have enabled them to reach the Indians and return to the fort. Nothing but the risk of losing the corn, by the freezing of the river, prevented the Governor from sending up a few hundred bushels of corn, without waiting for the order of the government. On this consideration he thought it better to await the orders of the president.

The following letter was about this time received from the secretary at war by the Governor. This letter, it will be seen, is fully expressive of the high sense of the importance of the victory entertained by government, and their satisfaction at the manner in which it was obtained.

“ War Department, December 25th, 1811.

“ SIR,

“ By the arrival of major Taylor, on the 16th instant, your Excellency’s despatches of the 18th of November, containing a particular account of the battle of the 7th, were received. The message of the president to congress, herewith enclosed, will convey to your Excellency the high sense entertained by the executive, of the gallantry and good conduct of all the troops engaged in the expedition. And I am instructed, by the president, to communicate to you, Sir, and through you to the officers and men, of the respective corps, his thanks, for the persevering zeal and bravery displayed in the action. The encomium bestowed by your Excellency on the regular troops, appears to have been justly due to the discipline, firmness, and valor with which the action was sustained on their part, and reflects the highest honor on colonel Boyd and his officers.

“ It is presumed that the effects of this defeat will be experienced in a return of the Indians to their former friendly disposition, and in a prevention of future aggressions.

“ The course remaining to be pursued with them will depend, in a great measure, on further indications of their meditated conduct, and is under consideration. In the mean time, your Excellency will continue to communicate every information, and to adopt such measures as exigencies may require.

“ I have the honor to be, your Excellency’s most ob’t. servant.

“ W. EUSTIS.

“ His Excellency William Henry Harrison, Vincennes.”

The following is an extract of the message to congress above referred to:

“To the senate and house of representatives of the United States.”

“I lay before congress two letters received from Governor Harrison of the Indiana territory, reporting the particulars and the issue of the expedition under his command, notice of which was taken in my communication of November 5.

“While it is deeply lamented that so many valuable lives have been lost in the action which took place on the 9th ultimo, congress will see with satisfaction the dauntless spirit and fortitude victoriously displayed by every description of the troops engaged, as well as the collected firmness which distinguished their commander on an occasion requiring the utmost exertion of valor and discipline.

“It may reasonably be expected that the good effects of this critical defeat and dispersion of a combination of savages which appears to have been spreading to a greater extent, will be experienced not only in a cessation of the murders and depredations committed on our frontier, but in the prevention of any hostile incursions otherwise to have been apprehended.

“The families of those brave and patriotic citizens who have fallen in this severe conflict, will doubtless engage the favorable attention of congress.

“JAMES MADISON.

“Washington, December 18, 1811.”

The Owl, a celebrated Miami chief, waited on the Governor to know whether he would receive some Winebagoes and Kickapoos, who, with several of the Wea chiefs, waited at the distance of a day's journey from Vincennes till his return with the Governor's answer. The Governor, anxious to know the determination of the president before he would take any further steps, replied, that he did not wish to see them at that time.

The Owl confirmed the Governor in the opinion that he had entertained, that all the Potawatamies, resident on the Wabash, excepting the chief Winamac, had been in the action at Tippecanoe. He reported that he had seen the warriors from both the villages above the prophet's town, going to join him the day before the battle; and that it was with the greatest difficulty that the young men of his own tribe could be prevented from joining him also. Amongst the Potawatamies were some few that the Governor had cherished particularly. Indeed, the chiefs and warriors of that tribe, residing between the Wabash and Lake Michigan, had participated more largely of the bounty of the United States, dispensed by his hands, than any others. Consequently, their conduct and that of the Miamis, unequivocally proved that their inclinations or their fears had brought them entirely on the side of the prophet, and that it was high time that his establishment should have been broken up.

It was the opinion of the Governor, and in this he was backed by every one who had knowledge of the Indian character, that they should not have been easily admitted into favor. And the course he recommended was, that the Potawatamies, the Miamies, and the Kickapoos, should be made to drive off the prophet and all the strange Indians from the Wabash, and that to prevent them from turning upon the settlements, there should be a respectable force embodied.

All the information at that time received by the Governor agreed in the utter despondency of the prophet's party, and their disinclination to re-commence hostilities. But it was also pretty certain that the Winebagoes had not returned home as was reported by the Kickapoos, and it was not improbable but the arrival of Tecumseh, who was daily expected, would produce different dispositions.

It having been determined by the Governor after the battle of the 7th, to retain the command of the troops, at least while the militia were on foot, till he would have the commands of the government, he continued to do so; but on the militia being disbanded, and no immediate danger to be apprehended, he wrote to the Secretary that he had resigned his command, but with the intention that, on the occurrence of any event to make it necessary, or on the receipt of orders from the Government, to resume it. For his services as commander of the Wabash campaign, the Governor neither asked, nor would receive any compensation.

On the 7th January, 1812, the Governor, in some conversation he had with captain Snelling, the commander at fort Harrison, learnt that the captain had been confidentially informed by a Wea Indian, that the disposition of the Kickapoos and Winebagoes was not by any means such as they wished the Governor to suppose; that many of them still believed in the prophet, who had assured them that his want of success in the late action was caused by an accident of an uncommon kind;* that many of them believed that they would all die as soon as the prophet would be put to death. He further stated, that he had heard them say that if their offers of peace were not accepted soon, and themselves released from their miserable situation, they were determined to make the white people suffer also, by attacking the frontiers with fire and sword.

Shortly after this, the Governor received a long letter from captain Snelling, with a variety of information respecting the Indians, of which little use could be made, from the difficulty of selecting truth from falsehood and inconsistency. At this time the people who had lost their horses by their being stolen by the

* The uncommon accident alluded to was his wife having touched some part of the utensils with which he carried on his incantations.

Indians attached to the prophet, became very clamorous for payment. Of this circumstance the Governor apprised the secretary at war, and recommended the following method of remuneration, viz: That \$500 should be stopped out of the annuity of each of their tribes, to satisfy the claims of the citizens; that half of the Piankishaw and as much of the Kickapoo annuity should be confiscated by the government, in consequence of their having permitted their warriors to join the Prophet and make war upon the United States. As considerably more than half of the Kickapoos and nearly half of the Piankishaws were in the action of Tippecanoe, he recommended that the Potawatamies should also suffer; at the same time he remarked that the tribe was so large that the annuity they had was not sufficient for them.

The following speech or talk, received from the little Turtle, which so feelingly deploras the consequences of the late action, also appears to allude to the gathering storm which broke out in June following. This information the Turtle must have had from some communication, by himself or others, with the British agents. The speech is given as a relic of that extraordinary genius who was fated not long to survive it.

Fort Wayne, 25th January, 1812.

“GOVERNOR HARRISON:

“My friend—I have been requested by my nation to speak to you, and I obey their request with pleasure, because I believe their situation requires all the aid I can afford them.

“When your speech by Mr. Dubois was received by the Miamies, they answered it, and I made known to you their opinion at that time.

“Your letter to William Wells of the 23d November last, has been explained to the Miamies and Eel river tribes of Indians.

“My friend—Although neither of these tribes have had any thing to do with the late unfortunate affair which happened on the Wabash, still they all rejoice to hear you say that if those foolish Indians which were engaged in that action, would return to their several homes and remain quiet, that they would be pardoned, and again received by the President as his children. We believe there is none of them that will be so foolish, as not to accept of this friendly offer; whilst, at the same time, I assure you, that nothing shall be wanting on my part, to prevail on them to accept it.

“All the prophet's followers have left him, (with the exception of two camps of his own tribe.) Tecumseh has just joined him with eight men only. No danger can be apprehended from them at present. Our eyes will be constantly kept on them, and should they attempt to gather strength again, we will do all in our power to prevent it; and at the same time give you immediate information of their intentions.

"We are sorry that that peace and friendship which has so long existed between the red and white people, could not be preserved, without the loss of so many good men as fell on both sides, in the late action on the Wabash; but we are satisfied that it will be the means of making that peace which ought to exist between us, more respected, both by the red and the white people.

"We have been lately told, by different Indians from that quarter, that you wished the Indians from this country to visit you: this they will do with pleasure when you give them information of it in writing.

"My friend—The clouds appear to be rising in a different quarter, which threatens to turn our light into darkness. To prevent this, it may require the united efforts of us all. We hope that none of us will be found to shrink from the storm that threatens to burst on our nations.

"Your friend,

"X MISCHUCAUOCQUAH,
"or LITTLE TURTLE.

"For the Miami and Eel river tribes of Indians.

"Witness,

"Wm. TURNER, *S. Mate U. S. Army.*

"I certify that the above is a true translation.

"W. WELLS."

From some communications which the Governor received from Governors Edwards and Howard, he had no reason to think that a very peaceable disposition prevailed among the Indians in that quarter. He therefore recommended to the government that there should be no relaxation in the providing of any military force that might have been in contemplation.— "There is nothing" says he "so effectual in obliging them to remain quiet as intimidating them. The collection, or the appearance of collection of volunteers or militia, would answer this purpose. It is in vain to threaten them unless they see the danger. I think it probable that the prophet will wait till he hears of the success of Tecumseh in raising the other tribes before he will submit. It is my fixed opinion that if the regular troops here be withdrawn without being replaced by others, that the Indians will recommence hostilities, unless we can prevail upon some of the influential chiefs to set out for Washington before the troops move." These are the words of the Governor in his letter to the secretary at war, in which he also stated that he expected the arrival of some Indian chiefs from the Kickapoos, Winebagoes, and Miamies, from whom, on their arrival, he intended to make a proper selection of deputies to send to Washington City, by desire of the President of the United States, as will appear by the following letter from the secretary at war:

"Sir,

War Department, January 17th, 1812.

"Your Excellency's letter of the 24th of December, with its enclosure, has been received." Accounts have also been received from Mr. Johnson and Mr. Wells, which are contradictory in their nature, and not calculated to produce any useful result. In one thing they agree, namely, that the chiefs had been invited, or permitted, to meet you at Vincennes.

"As it is peculiarly desirable at the present crisis, that measures should be adopted to re-establish the relations of peace and friendship with the Indians, I am instructed by the President to communicate to you his intention to receive, at the seat of government, such of the chiefs, as, in your judgment, it may be expedient to send for that purpose: and that Tecumseh, with his brother the prophet, or either of them, may be among the number. The manner and the terms on which this is to be effected, must depend upon their situation, conduct, and disposition, of which, as it is impossible for the President, from the information before him, to form a satisfactory opinion, your Excellency will judge.

"It may be intimated to them, that the President is justly and highly offended; that he has it in contemplation, to raise a large force in the spring of the year, to drive beyond the great waters, all those who have been or shall be found in arms; that in doing this the innocent may suffer as well as the guilty, as it may not be in the power of his officers to distinguish the one from the other; that they will, in that case, have brought a great calamity upon themselves, which he is desirous they should avoid for their sakes, if it be possible; that he cherishes a sincere regard for his red children, and is willing to receive and to hear such of them as desire it, and are sincere in heart.

"The Winebagoes, Potawatamies, and those of the other tribes who joined, or have been connected with the prophet, must return to their respective tribes. The President will forgive them, provided they remain at home and are peaceable.

"The President, being authorised by law to raise six companies of rangers for the protection of the north-western frontier, will proceed to the appointment of the officers, who will be instructed to enlist their men, and to hold them ready for immediate service. One object in raising this force, is to admit of the removal of the 4th regiment to a scene of greater action, as soon as circumstances and the season will allow.

"Should there, at the time of receiving this letter, be sufficient cause, in your judgment to require a variation or delay of the course herein proposed, you will be pleased to advise this department, and in the mean time, adopt such measures as the public interests may require.

"With sentiments of respect, sir, your Excellency's ob't. sv't.

"W. EUSTIS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOV. W. H. HARRISON, Vincennes." * *

On the 23d February the Governor received by express, a letter from captain Snelling at fort Harrison, informing him of the arrival at that post, of eighty Indians, deputies from all the late hostile tribes, the Shawanese excepted, on their way to Vincennes. The Governor immediately despatched Mr. Baron, the interpreter, to meet them on the frontiers; to learn the number of each particular tribe; to know of the chiefs why they had brought so large a number of their warriors; and to propose to them to send back to fort Harrison all but a few chiefs from each tribe, or that the whole of them should deliver up their arms. This arrangement the Governor found necessary, as he had got private notice from one of the Delawares to be on his guard against them.

About the 1st of March these Indians arrived at Vincennes, and delivered up their arms without the least hesitation. The Kickapoos, Winebagoes, and that part of the Piankishaw tribe which had joined the prophet, had employed the Weas to mediate for them, and a chief of the latter was a principal orator. He said that the whole winter had been occupied in sending messages to the different villages of the Potawatamies, Kickapoos, Miamies, and Delawares, to consult upon the measures which were proper to be taken under the circumstances in which they were placed, and that it was unanimously agreed upon to supplicate their father the President for peace; that this was the ardent wish of all those who had been under the influence of the Prophet; that they acknowledged it was the fault of that bad man that the late great calamity had fallen upon them. The principal Winebago chief who had joined the prophet was present as the representative of his tribe. The Governor informed him of the mischief which had been lately done by his tribe on the Mississippi, and the apprehensions which were entertained of further hostilities from them. He agreed to set out immediately for the residence of his tribe, to inform them that the Americans had buried the tomahawk, and to bring in one or two of their principal men to join the other chiefs on their visit to the President. He promised candidly to explain to them the cause of the late action, in which they had lost so many of their warriors, and the artifices which were practised upon them by the prophet to induce them to engage in it.

The Governor furnished the chief with a horse for the occasion, and also made him some other presents. He was fully impressed with the belief that those Indians were sincere in their professions of friendship and their desire for peace, and that further hostilities were not to be apprehended from them, unless it might be from the Winebagoes, who might think themselves so far removed as to be out of the reach of the United States. However, the chief whom the Governor sent to them

assured him that they would abandon all thoughts of hostilities as soon as he should arrive among them.

Tecumseh had returned from the south at that time, and was highly exasperated at his brother for his precipitancy. He blamed him much for throwing off the mask before their plans were matured. He sent the Governor a speech informing him of his return, and that he was now ready to visit the President. The Governor informed the other Indians that he might go, but not as their leader. They unanimously and vehemently declared that they would never more listen to him. Nothing could appear more humble and submissive than they appeared to be generally, yet the Governor thought that no military arrangement should be suspended on that account, and that the rangers at least, mentioned by the secretary at war, should be put upon duty until the chiefs were on their way to Washington; and he expected to have them assembled at fort Wayne for that purpose in the month of April.

Notwithstanding this apparent sunshine in the affairs of the west, in March, 1812, things soon began to take a very different turn. The deputation which had been contemplated to go off to Washington did not proceed, and Tecumseh and his band began to put their threats in execution. Many depredations were committed on the frontiers of the Illinois and Indiana territories, and part of Ohio: early in April a whole family were murdered on the Embarras river, about five miles from Vincennes. The day after he had the account, the Governor despatched colonel Millar with a detachment of regular troops to the spot, and there he found the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Harrymen, and four small children, whom they buried. The night after the murder had been extremely wet, which rendered it impossible for the detachment of mounted men which were sent in pursuit of the Indians, to discover the route which they had taken.

On the 14th of the same month, April, another family, a few miles from the Ohio, about ten miles below the yellow banks, and seventy-five from Vincennes, was attacked by the Indians. The owner of the house was killed, and one of his sons badly wounded; another son, however, with the assistance of the women of the family, killed one of the three Indians, and drove off the others. These depredations, committed at such distances, appear to have been intended to divide and distract the attention, and thereby to prevent the militia from being embodied, and a more effectual plan could not be devised. The murder committed near the Ohio, where no danger was apprehended, even during the Indian war, so alarmed the people in that quarter that it was impossible to make the militia turn out to march to the assistance or protection of any other place; and the murder of a man upon the drift wood fork of White river had the same effect in all the settlements eastwardly and southwardly of that place.

It would be impossible for words to express the alarm and distress which those murders produced, or to describe the scenes which were exhibited on this melancholy occasion—families abandoning their homes, and flying they knew not whither. Many of them without means of support were to be seen in every direction. Nor was the town of Vincennes by any means calculated to give security to the fugitives. The expected departure of the regular troops, and the revival of the designs of the prophet and his party to surprise the town by a water expedition, caused it to be viewed as a place of greater danger than any other, and the unfortunate fugitives passed through it as expeditiously as possible. It was impossible to defend it by its own militia, and a company could not be procured nearer than the falls of Ohio. The company of rangers which had been raised had for some time been so much employed in detachments that they could not be mustered but with great difficulty. They were, however, mustered on the 28th, and the Governor made such a distribution of them as appeared best calculated to secure the settlements from surprise. He placed them so that the country to the north-west, north, and east of Vincennes, in advance of all the settlements would be reconnoitered daily for nearly one hundred and fifty miles; so that it would be impossible for any large number of Indians to pass them unobserved, and very difficult for even a small party. But there was still a considerable extent of frontier both above and below, through the Delaware country, entirely exposed, nor could the rangers give timely notice of the approach by water, as the Indians could descend the Wabash at that season of the year in their canoes quicker than a horse could travel by land. From all the circumstances which can be collected, it appears that the government of the United States had upon this occasion, and at this period neglected the protection of the western country. From the various communications of the Governor made to the secretary at war, it appears that he was perfectly aware of the necessity of keeping on foot a respectable military force, even from the battle of Tippecanoe up to the period treated of. From his knowledge of the Indian character, he was still apprehensive of danger, nor can it be perceived that at the time when his confidence was greatest in the sincerity of their professions for peace, did he think there ought to have been any relaxation in the military arrangements. What could have produced this palpable supineness on the part of the government it is hard to discover, but it must have been plain to them from the despatches of the governor, that they could not be well warranted in relaxing, but rather that the military force became still more necessary from the progress of things towards a crisis with the British government during the spring of that year.

In order to secure the neutrality of the Delaware tribe, the Governor despatched a special messenger, major Davis Floyd,

who was well acquainted with the chiefs, on a mission to that tribe; his instructions were to endeavor to arrange some plan with the chiefs to prevent them from being forced into the war, which it appeared but too probable the United States were about to engage in with the other tribes. The first and most desirable plan which had occurred to him was that the Delawares should unite with the Miamis and any other of the tribes which had remained faithful, to drive off the prophet and his party from the Wabash, and to declare to the hostile tribes that they would not permit them to make war on this side of that river: but if the disaffection of the Miamis should be so great as to render the plan impracticable, or the strength of the hostile confederacy so formidable as to render them unable to prevent them crossing the Wabash, it would be desirable that they should occupy the country between the White river and the Grouseland treaty, and undertake to prevent any depredations from being committed in that quarter—while the Shawanese of the Auglaize, and the Wyandots of Sandusky should enter into the same engagements for the frontiers of Ohio adjacent to them.

The Governor could not think of any other mode which would effectually preserve their neutrality, but that of removing to their friends on the Mississippi, or joining the Shawanese of the Auglaize; he was also instructed to represent to them in the strongest terms, the anxiety of the government to keep them clear of that ruin and destruction which the folly and wickedness of the other tribes were likely to bring on themselves.

It was to be impressed upon them that their situation would require the utmost caution and circumspection, and that it was particularly necessary that they should explain their intentions with truth, and scrupulously to perform what they promised. That the strength of the United States, particularly the western part, was such that they stood in need of no assistance to crush any combination that the Indians could form; but the situation of the Delawares and Miamis was such, that it was necessary that they should adopt some plans similar to those mentioned; for if the hostile Indians should be permitted to pass through their country, to strike the settlements here in the pursuit of them, our warriors would be unable to distinguish between them and the Delawares, and they would in many instances suffer for the crimes of others: at any rate, those citizens who suffer from war parties which may pass in the direction of the Miami or Delaware towns would become jealous of their fidelity, and might attribute depredations to them of which they might be innocent; and that it was probable also that the hostile tribes might strike the settlements in that direction for the purpose of implicating them, as it was likely that the murder lately committed on the drift-wood settlement was intended to produce that effect.

In reply to the Governor's letters of date 17th and 22d April, he received a letter from the secretary, countermanding an or-

der of date 7th March, for the fourth regiment to march from Vincennes for Detroit, and for colonel Millar to remain at Vincennes, subject to the direction of the Governor, so long as he might conceive the presence of the fourth regiment necessary for the protection of the territory. Before the arrival of this despatch, however, colonel Millar, with the fourth regiment, had taken his departure, and was then far advanced on his march to Cincinnati. Orders were also sent to general Winchester at Lexington, Kentucky, to furnish such assistance as might be considered necessary in the opinion of the Governor.

It appears that the mission of major Floyd had a most salutary effect upon all the tribes with whom he communicated, except the adherents of the prophet and Tecumseh.

A grand council, it seems, was held at Mississinway, and twelve tribes were there represented. They all seemed heartily in favour of peace being made, and continued with the white people, and they all but Tecumseh reprobated the murders and depredations which had been committed on them, particularly since the battle of Tippecanoe, and they as unanimously denied having sanctioned them. Tecumseh's speeches, however, were of a different complexion; he hypocritically professed himself the friend of peace, avowed the attack on his people in his absence as unprovoked, and still continued to harp upon the old string, the impropriety of any of the tribes selling lands to the United States; he carefully kept out of view the foul aggressions committed by his people, and if he admitted that any such had been committed, it was by the Potawatamies, and when retorted on by the latter, who disowned those of their tribe who had by the evil counsels of the prophet committed those enormities, and declared themselves willing to have them put to death, he dexterously evaded the point, and said, that the good advice they gave their brothers was misrepresented, and openly defied any one to say that they had directly or indirectly advised any living creature to make war upon their white brothers: but he carefully evaded touching upon the point of the frequent demands which had been made for the murderers being given up, and the stolen horses restored, and the uniform refusals which had been made to comply with those demands: and in order the better to elude the strong observations made by the other chiefs, he again reverts to the sale of the lands by those who he pretended had no right to sell them.

Upon the whole, it appears evident that Tecumseh was far from having given up his schemes, and that he could not, though willing to disguise that hostility towards the United States, but which broke out from him in his remarks upon the conduct of Governor Harrison, and also upon that of the tribes represented in the council.

It is not difficult to understand what he meant by saying, that if he had been at home no blood would have been shed. His conduct at Vincennes, previous to his going to the southward, proved that his plans were not then matured, and that unless he would find a convenient opportunity to strike a decisive blow, he would not attempt any hostile measure till he could have an extensive and powerful confederation, by which he could act with efficiency. Such he thought he might have had at Vincennes, when by his violent conduct the council was broken up; but when he found that it was yet premature, he changed his tune, and acted the hypocrite, both then and at the subsequent council the following year.

Here follows a sketch of the different Indian speeches delivered at a grand council held at Massassinway, on the Wabash, on the 15th May, 1812, where the following tribes were represented:

Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Potawatamies, Delawares, Miamis, Eel-river Miamis, Weas, Piankishaws, Shawanoes, Kickapoos, and Winebagoes.

The council was opened by the Wyandots, with the following speech:

“Younger brothers, you that reside on the Wabash, listen to what we say; and in order that you may distinctly hear and clearly understand our words, we now open your ears and place your hearts in the same position that it was placed by the Great Spirit when he created you.

“Younger brothers, we are sorry to see your path filled with thorns and briars, and your land covered with blood; our love for you has caused us to come and clean your paths and wipe the blood off your land, and take the weapons that have spilled this blood from you, and put them where you can never reach them again.

“Younger brothers, this is done by the united voice of all your elder brothers, that you now see present who are determined to not be disobeyed. This determination of your elder brothers, to put an entire stop to the effusion of blood, has met with the approbation of our fathers, the British, who have advised all the red people to be quiet and not meddle in quarrels that may take place between the white people.”

Tecumseh, the prophet's brother, replied,

“Elder brothers, we have listened with attention to what you have said to us. We thank the Great Spirit for inclining your hearts to pity us; we now pity ourselves; our hearts are good, they never were bad. Governor Harrison made war on my people in my absence: it was the will of God that he should do so. We hope it will please God that the white people may be

us live in peace; we will not disturb them, neither have we done it, except when they come to our village with the intention of destroying us. We are happy to state to our brothers present, that the unfortunate transaction that took place between the white people and a few of our young men at our village, has been settled between us and Governor Harrison; and I will further state, had I been at home, there would have been no blood shed at that time.

“ We are sorry to find that the same respect has not been paid to the agreement between us and Governor Harrison, by our brothers, the Potawatamies; however, we are not accountable for the conduct of those over whom we have no control; let the chiefs of that nation exert themselves, and cause their warriors to behave themselves, as we have and will continue to do ours.

“ Should the bad acts of our brothers, the Potawatamies, draw on us the ill will of our white brothers, and they should come again and make an unprovoked attack on us at our village, we will die like men, but we will never strike the first blow.”

The Potawatamies spoke.

“ We are glad that it should please the Great Spirit for us to meet to-day, and incline all our hearts for peace.

“ Some of the foolish young men of our tribe, that have for some winters past ceased to listen to the voice of their chiefs, and followed the counsel of the Shawanoe, that pretended to be a prophet, have killed some of our white brothers this spring, at different places. We have believed that they were encouraged in this mischief by this pretended prophet, who, we know, has taken great pains to detach them from their own chiefs and attach them to himself. We have no control over these few vagabonds, and consider them not belonging to our nation; and will be thankful to any people that will put them to death, wherever they are found. As they are bad people, and have learnt to be so from the pretended prophet, and as he has been the cause of setting those people on our white brothers, we hope he will be active in reconciling them. As we all hear him say, his heart is inclined for peace, we hope we may all see this declaration supported by his future conduct, and that all our women and children may lay down to sleep without fear. The future conduct of the Potawatamies will evince the great desire they have to effect this desirable object.”

Tecumseh replied,

“ It is true, we have endeavored to give all our brothers good advice; and if they have not listened to it, we are sorry for it. We defy a living creature to say we ever advised any one, directly or indirectly, to make war on our white brothers. It has

constantly been our misfortune to have our views misrepresented to our white brethren; this has been done by pretended chiefs of the Potawatamies and others, that have been in the habit of selling land to the white people that did not belong to them."

Tecumseh was then called to order by the Delawares, who said,

"We have not met at this place to listen to such words.— The red people have been killing the whites, the just resentment of the latter is raised against the former. Our white brethren are on their feet, their guns in their hands; there is no time for us to tell each other you have done this, and you have done that; if there was, we would tell the prophet that both red and white people had felt the bad effect of his counsels.— Let us all join our hearts and hands together, and proclaim peace through the land of the red people. Let us make our voices be heard and respected, and rely on the justice of our white brethren."

The Miamis spoke as follows:

"We feel happy that we all appear of one mind, that we all appear to be inclined for peace; that we all see that it would be our immediate ruin to go to war with the white people.

"We, the Miamis, have not hurt our white brethren since the treaty of Greenville. We would be glad if all the other nations present could say the same; we will cheerfully join our brethren for peace, but we will not join you for war against the white people.

"We hope our brothers, the Potawatamies, Shawanoes, Kickapoos, and Winebagoes, will keep their warriors in good order, and learn them to pay more respect to their women and children than they have done by going and murdering the innocent white people. The white people are entitled to satisfaction; it is the interest of the Indians to give it to them immediately.— Let us do justice to our white brethren, and expect justice from them; by doing this, we shall insure the future peace and happiness of our men, women, and children."

Then the Kickapoos spoke.

"Elder brothers, we, your younger brothers, have listened to all you have said with attention. It only remains for us to say, that we are glad to hear you say you have pity on our women and children, and wish to stop the effusion of our blood. We have settled our disputes with Governor Harrison, and are sorry the Potawatamies have not acted more like men than they have done, by killing the white people after we had made peace with them.

"We have not two faces, and despise the people that have. The peace we have made with Governor Harrison we will strictly adhere to, and trouble no person and hope none will trouble us."

"The foregoing is a correct translation.

May 24th, 1812.

WILLIAM WELLS."

CHAPTER XXIV.

IN the month of May, 1812, Governor Harrison being deeply impressed with the necessity of providing additional force, for the purpose of curbing the Indians in their depredations and barbarous incursions upon the frontier settlements, exerted himself in procuring to be raised, a corps of mounted volunteers. In this he so far succeeded, as to have the offer of the services of a corps raised at Franklinton, Kentucky, of which he accepted. This gallant corps was chiefly composed of the most respectable men, and officered by some revolutionary veterans, who had distinguished themselves both in that and the war with the Indians in Kentucky. No orders, however, having been received from government as to the employment of this force, the whole ended in their protecting the people in the neighborhood of Vincennes, while planting their corn, for about ten days, when they were dismissed. Thus all appearance of a force capable of punishing their aggressions disappearing, the Indians renewed and carried them on to a very alarming extent.

Notwithstanding the talents and address of the celebrated Tecumseh, it appears he was unable to bring to a head his grand scheme of a general confederation of the Indian tribes on the continent, by which to effect his plan of making the Ohio river the boundary of the United States, and of preventing any further cessions of land without the consent of all the tribes, which would in effect have put an end to the purchase of their lands,

and the extension of our settlements. From his tour to the southward, it does not appear that he derived any immediate assistance: it is certain, however, that his intrigues among the Creeks were the cause of their subsequent hostility: but it seems he had returned from his tour with no additional train of adherents, and the first we hear of his being in arms against the United States, is when leagued with his civilized allies, the British, under the command of his brother in arms and ferocity, the far-famed Proctor, who evinced himself to have been in possession of all the ill qualities of the American savage without a claim to a single one of his virtues.

In the beginning of June, the Governor received a letter from the secretary at war, countermanding an order which had been previously given for colonel Millar, and the 4th regiment, under his command, to march to Dayton, on the way to Detroit, where the regiment was destined to remain; but before this order was received, the regiment had reached Ohio, on their way to Detroit. The place of this regiment was intended to be supplied by some companies of rangers and a part of the regular recruits, which were then raising; colonel William Russell, of the army, who was appointed to command those troops, was about this time arrived at Vincennes.

On the 18th June, this year, congress enacted a law declaring war against the king of Great Britain, and the president's proclamation is dated on the following day. This gave a new character to the affairs of the western country, and a new enemy having to be encountered, greater preparations became necessary: but this was an event that had been some time expected, an order had been given in the spring for one hundred thousand militia to be organized and armed.

Governor Harrison was determined to exert himself to the utmost to put the whole militia of the territory upon the most respectable footing: those of the western parts of the state had already been frequently reviewed and drilled, under his direction; but he had never seen the regiments in the upper counties, bordering on the state of Ohio. As colonel Russel was fully competent to the command of the troops at Vincennes, both from his rank and his qualities as an officer, the Governor left Vincennes on the 19th of June, as well for the purpose of reviewing the militia of the eastern section of the state as to visit his family, who were at that time in Cincinnati. He arrived in that town in the beginning of July, and on the 7th of that month addressed the following letter to the secretary at war disclosing his views and intentions.

Cincinnati, (Ohio,) July 7th, 1812.

“SIR,

“I left Vincennes on the 19th ultimo, for the purpose of reviewing and arming the regiments of militia in the eastern divi-

sion of the territory. With respect to the Indians, nothing worthy of notice had occurred previously to my departure and subsequently to my last communication, excepting the arrival at fort Harrison of thirty Kickapoos, Winebagoes, and Shawanose, who from thence sent me a speech, full of professions of friendship towards the United States, and earnestly desiring me to send them some corn to prevent their families from starving. They informed me also that twenty Potawatamies had set out seventeen days before, to commit murders on the Kaskaskias road. The substance of my answer was, "That their professions of friendship could not be believed sincere, when they admitted that they had suffered a war party to pass their camp (containing seven hundred warriors) with the avowed intention of committing hostilities upon our citizens; and that they could calculate upon no assistance from us until all the murderers of our people were delivered up." I pointed out to colonel Russell a route by which a detachment of rangers might possibly intercept the war party; but I think it highly probable that no such party is out, and that the story is a fabrication of the Indians, who communicated it for the purpose of enhancing their merit with us. There is no doubt of the truth of that part of their speech describing the extreme distress that prevails amongst them from the want of provisions. They have no corn, and their hunting ground being confined to a comparatively small district, and that, too, not the best for game, they are obliged to live on roots and bark. Under these circumstances, it is not probable that they will leave their families to make a stroke in a considerable body; I am, therefore, no longer apprehensive for Vincennes until the roasting-ear season. But it is very probable that a few hundred might be prevailed upon by their British allies to reinforce the army that is said to be collecting to oppose general Hull, if it were not from the apprehension of leaving their families exposed to be captured by an expedition from Vincennes. From this circumstance, I consider the accumulation of a small force at Vincennes, as forming a very useful diversion in favor of general Hull. A company of United States infantry, and another of rangers under captain Penny, are now here, on their way to Vincennes, by order of colonel Russell. In addition to the force which the colonel has under his immediate command, I have directed the colonels commanding the regiments of militia in the vicinity of Vincennes to furnish him with any number of men he may call for. As my family are at this place, and there appears to be no immediate necessity for my being at Vincennes, I shall not return until towards the last of the present month, employing myself in the mean time in assisting to discipline the three regiments of militia which border on this state, the furthest of which is not more than sixty miles from this place. Should you have

any orders for me in that time, I must request them to be sent to the office here; but as it is possible that some event may precipitately recall me to Vincennes, I must ask the favor of having a duplicate sent thither.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

"HON. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*"

A few days after this letter was written, the Governor set out for Indiana, and reviewed the regiments in the counties of Dearborn, Franklin, and Wayne. From this tour he returned to Cincinnati to take leave of his family, and from thence proceed to Vincennes. He there received the following letter from the secretary at war:

"*War Department, July 9th, 1812.*

"SIR,

"By letter from Governor Edwards it appears that the Indians are again collecting. Should the regular troops and rangers under colonel Russell, with the reinforcements ordered to be furnished on your requisition, be inadequate to the protection of the frontier, your Excellency will please to consult with governor Edwards, and to request from the governor of Kentucky, such detachments from the militia of that state, as emergencies may require.

"The Governor of Kentucky will be advised of this instruction to your Excellency, and no doubt can be entertained of his cheerful co-operation.

"Should offensive measures become necessary, the command within the Indiana territory will devolve upon you; and with the consent of governor Edwards, your military command may be extended in the Illinois territory.

"With great respect, &c.

"(Signed)

W. EUSTIS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY WM. H. HARRISON, *Vincennes.*"

On the 6th, an express arrived with a letter to Governor Harrison from governor Scott requesting him to come on immediately to Frankfort, to consult with him upon the disposition of that part of the Kentucky quota of militia which were destined to protect the territories. Previously to his leaving Cincinnati the Governor addressed to the secretary at war the following letter:

"*Cincinnati, 6th August, 1812.*

"SIR,

"I have this day received, by express from governor Scott, the enclosed letter, and I shall immediately obey the summons.

The information received a day or two ago from Detroit is of the most unpleasant nature; the loss of Macinac will be probably followed by the capture of fort Dearborn, and the suspension of offensive measures by Hull's army, will, I fear, give great strength to the British party amongst the Indians. The assemblage of Indians mentioned by governor Edwards, upon the Illinois river is also calculated to excite apprehensions for the safety of the settlements of Kaskaskias or Vincennes. It is, however, my opinion, that it will be the object of the British to draw as many of the Indians as possible towards Malden to cut off the supplies from, and ultimately to capture general Hull's army. To prevent this, even if there should be no real intentions of carrying on offensive operations from Vincennes or Kaskaskias, feints from either or both would be highly useful to keep the Indians at home. I shall do myself the honor to write to you from Frankfort and communicate the result of the interview with governor Scott. The camp equipage, quarter-master stores, rifles, cavalry arms, and equipments, which were ordered to Newport, have not arrived, nor have they been heard of by major Martin. The difficulty of settling drafts for small sums with an account annexed, as has been my practice for the contingent accounts, has induced me to draw on you in favor of the cashier of the Miami exporting company for one hundred dollars, to pay expresses and other expenses of the kind. There is, indeed, so little demand for drafts at this time, that there is a great probability that money will be wanted for the public service in the western country, unless it is sent on from the Atlantic states.

"I have the honor to be, with great respect,

"Sir, your humble servant,

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

"HON. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*"

On the arrival of Governor Harrison at Frankfort, the orders which had been received by governor Scott from the secretary at war, as well as the information recently received from governor Edwards, was submitted to him. From the former it appeared that the Kentucky quota, with the exception of the three regiments which were then about to rendezvous at Georgetown for the purpose of reinforcing general Hull, was made subject to the orders of Governor Harrison. The views and opinions of the latter on the state of affairs at that period, are given in the following letter to the secretary at war, from Lexington.

"Lexington, 10th August, 1812.

"Sir,

"Upon my arrival at Frankfort on Saturday last, I was favored by governor Scott with the perusal of a late communication from governor Edwards, covering a number of documents which

unequivocally prove the existence of a combination amongst the Indian tribes, more formidable than any previous one. And, as the only obstacle to the commencement of offensive operations on their part, (the want of ammunition,) has been removed by the taking of Macinac, I have determined to order four companies of Indiana militia to march from the counties bordering on the Ohio, to Vincennes, and they will soon be followed by a regiment from this state. I have also informed governor Scott that all the remaining part of the quota of this state will be required for active service north-west of the Ohio. Previously to the taking of any other steps, however, I have thought it proper to recur to you for further instructions, and most respectfully to offer you the result of my reflections on the subject of the employment of the disposable force in this quarter of our country. As it appears, from your letter of the 9th ult. that the government had determined on offensive measures against the belligerent Indians, the fact, then, to be considered, is the nature and extent of those measures. Two species of warfare have been used by the United States in their contests with the tribes upon the north-western frontier, viz: rapid and desultory expeditions by mounted men, having for their object, the surprise and destruction of particular villages; or the more tardy, but more effectual, operations of an army composed principally of infantry, penetrating the country of the enemy, and securing the possession by a chain of posts. In the war which was terminated by the peace of Greenville, both of those plans were used, but the former as auxiliary only to the latter, which was regarded as the effectual means for procuring and preserving peace. If, under present circumstances, the government should think proper to rely upon desultory expeditions only, they would naturally be directed against those villages of the enemy which are nearest, and which, of course, would most annoy our settlements. But the direction to be given to an army of the other description, requires more attentive consideration. In the present posture of affairs, it appears to me that one of the two plans which I have the honor to submit, might be adopted with advantage. The first is to establish a chain of posts upon the Illinois river, from the Mississippi to Chicago, and the other, to march immediately a considerable body of troops to fort Wayne. If it were certain that general Hull would be able, even with the reinforcement which is now about to be sent to him, to reduce Malden and retake Macinac there would be no necessity of sending other troops in that direction. But I greatly fear that the capture of Macinac will give such eclat to the British and Indian arms, that the northern tribes will pour down in swarms upon Detroit, oblige general Hull to act entirely upon the defensive, and meet, and perhaps overpower, the convoys and reinforcements which may be sent him. It appears to me.

indeed, highly probable that the large detachment which is now destined for his relief, under colonel Wells, will have to fight its way. I rely greatly upon the valor of those troops, but it is possible that the event may be adverse to us, and if it is, Detroit must fall, and with it every hope of re-establishing our affairs in that quarter until the next year. I am also apprehensive that the provisions which are to be sent with colonel Wells are by no means equal to the supply of the army for any length of time, increased, as it will be, by this detachment. They must then depend upon smaller convoys, which can never reach their destination in safety, if the British and Indians think proper to prevent it. Commanding, as they do, the navigation of the lake, the British can, with the utmost facility, transfer their force from one side of it to the other, meet our detachments, and overpower them, if they are small, whilst performing a laborious and circuitous march through a swampy country, at any point they think proper. To prevent these disasters, or to remedy them, should they occur, a considerable covering army appears to me to be the only alternative; for should any of my apprehensions be realized, it is out of the question to suppose that troops could be collected time enough to render any essential service. There are other considerations which strongly recommend the adoption of this measure. I mean the situation of Chicago, which must be in danger, and if it is not well supplied with provisions, the danger must be imminent. It is possible, sir, that every thing may yet go on well, that no considerable number of Indians may be collected at Malden, and that our detachments and convoys may reach their destination in safety; the reverse, however, appears to me to be the most probable; and I am fully persuaded that the opinions and wishes of the people in the western country, are unanimously in favor of the most vigorous and effectual measures. In this state, particularly, the spirit of the people is arrived to the highest pitch, and the government may rely upon their utmost efforts. To be furnished with arms, and to be allowed to exert their energies to establish our affairs upon the north-western frontier, is earnestly desired by every description of persons. An army going in the proposed direction, particularly if it was sent to fort Wayne, would serve as a considerable check upon the tribes of the Wabash, and those of the west and south of lake Michigan. Supplies could be easily procured in the highly cultivated part of the Ohio between the Miami and Scioto rivers. If the plan here proposed should be adopted, some display of military force, by way of demonstration, would be highly useful, both at Vincennes and in the neighborhood of Cahokia or St. Louis. Indeed, some troops are necessary for the defence of these places and the adjacent settlements.

“The only objection to the scheme of erecting a chain of posts from the Mississippi to the Chicago, arises from the lateness of the season, which would, perhaps, render it impossible to collect the supplies which are necessary for the very large force that this expedition would require. It could not be undertaken with a probability of success with less than 5000 men. Moving in the manner proposed, the Indians would be apprised of the object and there can be no doubt that every effort would be made to defeat it, and as little, that they would be enabled to collect a force at least equal to that which I have stated as the necessary amount for ours. If the advanced season should prevent the plan from being completed, it might, at least, be so far effected as to occupy Pioria, (an important point,) and erect an intermediate post between it and the mouth of the Illinois river. A slight inspection of the map of that country, and reference to the positions of the several tribes, will at once explain the great advantage to be derived from a prosecution of the plan. It would as completely cover our settlements as a chain of posts can cover them; and it would have the effect so highly desirable, of bringing the Indian tribes to a general and decisive action.

“From the enclosed letter from captain Wells, it appears that the prophet had abandoned all idea of remaining upon the Wabash, and that it was his intention to return, after making a stroke at our settlements, to the country of the Winebagoes. As the order of Tecumseh was given, however, under the impression that Malden would shortly fall into our hands, it is highly probable that the procrastination of that event, and the suspension of offensive operations upon the part of general Hull’s army, has inspired other hopes, and given rise to other schemes. If this should be the case, and he remains upon the Wabash, and neither of the other plans which I have recommended is adopted, a second expedition against him might be undertaken from Vincennes, or the driving him off might form a part of the plan to be executed by the army proposed to be collected at fort Wayne. With the opinion I entertain of the situation of affairs at Detroit, I give a decided preference to the fort Wayne expedition. I do think it highly probable that the Indians have been collected in very considerable numbers to relieve their friends at Malden, but I have no further evidence of it, nor, indeed, of the extensive combination which I suppose to exist amongst the Indian tribes, than what is, or will be, before you at the time you receive this.

“Your favor of the 9th inst. I have submitted to governor Scott, Mr. Clay, Mr. Bledsoe, and other conspicuous friends of the administration here, and they have all recommended that I should not put any other part of the troops in motion until I hear from you, excepting the few companies that have been

ordered for the protection of Vincennes. Should the government think proper to authorise the employment of a larger force than the amount of the quota ordered from this state, no fears need be entertained of its not being obtained. I will pledge myself to raise in ten days, two thousand men, for any expedition which may be authorised, wholly independent of the regular militia, or of the quota which has been organized. I am constantly solicited to suffer independent companies to be raised, of both horse and infantry. I should be thankful to be informed of the proportion of cavalry which I may command. It is a description of force to which I am very partial in Indian warfare. If a sufficiency of swords and pistols cannot be procured, I would recommend that some of the dragoon companies be armed with the small rifles now used by the United States rifle corps.

“I have the honor to be, &c.

“WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“THE HON. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*”

We call the particular attention of the reader to this letter, because it so completely prognosticates the events which happened afterwards. The letter was written on the 10th, and on the 15th Chicago was lost.

If the plan of making a covering army to fort Wayne had been adopted in the commencement of the campaign, it would have been the means of keeping the Indians in that quarter from joining the British, given security to the convoys, in their progress to Detroit, and by marching itself in that direction, on the occurrence of any exigency requiring it, prevent the catastrophe which afterwards happened. The opinion here given forms no excuse for the conduct of general Hull; he surrendered before he was hurt, without making the least effort.

We have learnt that the circumstances which produced the above letter are as follow:

Governor Harrison dined in Lexington, Kentucky, with a large party of gentlemen in that town and its vicinity, all of them ardent friends to the war; the conversation turning upon the north-western campaign, and the Governor delivering his sentiments, similar to those contained in the letter, the company were so struck with the justice of his remarks, that he was urged to communicate them to the secretary at war. To this he objected, on the ground that it might be considered as interfering with matters which were foreign to his own duty, which was confined to the defence of the territories; but being assured by Mr. Clay, one of the party, who is always alive to the true interests and honor of his country, that it would be well received by the government, the letter was written.

The detachment, which is mentioned in the above letter, and destined to reinforce general Hull, consisted of all the recruits which had been raised for the regular army in Kentucky, three militia regiments from that state, under the command of colonels Scott, Lewis, and Allen, and a troop of twelve month's volunteer dragoons, under captain W. Garard. These troops were intended to be commanded by colonel Samuel Wells, but as the governor of Kentucky had insisted on sending the brigadier, to whose command the three Kentucky regiments appertained; the whole detachment finally marched under the orders of brigadier-general John Payne.

The following is the letter from captain Wells, mentioned in the Governor's letter to the secretary at war; as it contains a fine specimen of the adroitness of the Indians at deception, we have inserted it.

“ Fort Wayne, July 22, 1812.

“ SIR,

“ I consider it a duty that I owe to my country, and particularly to the inhabitants of Vincennes, to make the following statement to you. On the 17th June, Tecumseh arrived at this place, and said he was on his way to Malden, to receive from the British government twelve horse loads of ammunition, for the use of his people at Tippecanoe. He went on to Malden, and arrived at that place a few days before general Hull with his army arrived at Detroit, and immediately declared that he would join the British against the United States.

“ On the 12th instant, his brother the prophet arrived at this place, with nearly one hundred Winebagoes and Kickapoos, who have ever since been amusing the Indian agent at this place with professions of friendship, and it is now evident that he has completely duped the agent, who had suffered him to take the lead in all his councils with the Indians, giving him ammunition, &c. to support his followers until they can receive a supply from Tecumseh.

“ On the 19th instant an express arrived in the prophet's camp from Tecumseh. In order that it should make the better speed, the express stole a horse from some of the inhabitants of the river Raisin, and rode night and day. The horse gave out within twenty miles of this place. This express was directed by Tecumseh to tell the prophet to unite the Indians immediately, and send their women and children towards the Mississippi, while the warriors should strike a heavy blow at the inhabitants of Vincennes; that he, Tecumseh, if he lived, would join him in the country of the Winebagoes.

“ The prophet found no difficulty in keeping this information to himself and one or two of his confidential followers, and forming a story to suit the palate of the agent here; and on the

20th instant, despatched two confidential Kickapoos to effect the objects Tecumseh had in view; in order that these two Indians might make the better speed, they stole my two riding horses, and have gone to the westward at the rate of one hundred miles in twenty-four hours at least. To keep the agent blind to his movements, the prophet went early in the morning yesterday, and told the agent that two of his *bad* young men were missing, and that he feared they had stole some horses; the agent found no difficulty in swallowing the bait offered him, and applauded the prophet for his honesty in telling of his bad men, as he called them, stealing my horses.

"To keep up appearances, the prophet has this morning despatched two men on *foot*, as he tells the agent, to bring back my horses, &c. And that he and all his party will certainly attend the commissioner of the United States next month at Piqua.

"This he will do, if he finds he cannot raise the western Indians against the United States; but if he finds the western Indians will join him, you may rely on it, he will strike a heavy blow, as Tecumseh says, against the whites in that quarter. You may rely on the correctness of this statement, as I received information relative to the views of Tecumseh, last night, from a quarter that cannot be doubted; the conduct of the agent towards the prophet I have been an eye witness to.

"I send this letter by an Indian to fort Harrison, and hope you will authorize me to pay him twelve dollars. General Hull is now in Sandwich, with his army: I heard from him last night. It is believed that the British will make little or no defence in Malden. The Indians have all, with the exception of Tecumseh and about one hundred, abandoned the British: it is supposed that Malden has surrendered to general Hull before this time. I have the honor to be, Sir, respectfully, your most obedient,
WILLIAM WELLS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR HARRISON.

"P. S. The prophet and his party leave this place to-day for Tippecanoe. I have no reason to believe that he has sent after my horses. He will remain at his village until he knows the intentions of the western Indians; if they wont join him, he will then go and endeavor to save himself by pretensions of peace to the commissioners at Piqua."

From Lexington, the Governor proceeded to Louisville, for the purpose of sending the regiments of the Kentucky quota, which had been ordered to assemble there, to Vincennes, thence the following letter to the secretary at war was written.

"Louisville, Ky. 18th August, 1812.

"SIR,

"The regiment of Kentucky volunteers destined for Vincennes, rendezvoused at this place yesterday. The pressing

engagements of governor Scott, previously to his leaving his office, which takes place in a few days, and the occupation of general Taylor's agent, the pay-master of the district, at the rendezvous of the detachment destined for Detroit, induces the governor to put this regiment entirely under my control, and to leave to me the preparations necessary for the prosecution of their march. Amongst the most difficult of these, is the procuring the means of making them an advance of two month's pay. The first has been gotten over by the offer of the bank here to advance the necessary sum. But as we have no correct information as to the precise amount of the two month's allowance of clothing, it has been determined to pay the men ten dollars apiece only. The paymaster of the regiment is now making the estimate, which will be forwarded by this or the ensuing mail, and the money will be procured by drafts drawn by him and endorsed by me. I have the honor to enclose his bond for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office. He is personally a stranger to me, but is highly spoken of, and either of his three securities are equal to the payment of the penalty of the bond. I have the honor to enclose you an original letter from captain Taylor, the commandant of fort Harrison, which was sent to me by express. A gentleman immediately from Vincennes, informs me that citizens there are under great alarm, and that information received from every quarter corroborates the account of the intended attack. I have sent off one company from the Indiana regiment of militia adjacent to this place, and have agreed to dismiss them in a month, on condition of their furnishing themselves with horses. When the regiment now here reaches Vincennes, it will be amply sufficient for the defence of that settlement. But I fear that colonel Wilcox will not be able to leave Jeffersonville until the 20th inst. I have not been able to procure any tents for the troops, the country being entirely exhausted of materials for making them by furnishing the regiments destined for Detroit. They are also entirely destitute of canteens. All these articles are understood to be on their way from Pittsburg, but they had not arrived at Newport on the 15th inst. I have directed lieutenant Bryson to forward a proper proportion of the equipments and camp equipage as soon as he receives them, and I shall have them escorted to Vincennes by a company of militia, to be left for that purpose. As there was not more powder in the arsenal at Newport than the quantity necessary to supply general Hull's order, I have caused 1000 pounds to be purchased here. In my letter of the 10th inst. I observed that it had been determined, in a consultation with the friends of the administration, that it would be better to suspend the marching of any more of the militia of the Kentucky quota, until your further instructions should be received, or some further indications

of hostility upon the part of the Indians should make it necessary. Upon my return to Frankfort, however, a further consultation with governor Scott took place, and upon a representation being made by one of the colonels in writing, stating that it would be utterly impossible to collect the troops time enough for any offensive operations this fall, unless the order for their assemblage should be soon given, we both united in opinion that it would be necessary, even upon the uncertainty of their being wanted, that a distant day should be appointed for their rendezvous at three different points. The day fixed upon is the 1st of September, and the places designated are Frankfort, Louisville, and Henderson, (Red Banks;) the former for the cavalry and two regiments of infantry, and at each of the others, one regiment of infantry. If none, or a part only, of these troops, should be wanted, they can be disbanded, and the only consequence will be, some disappointment in the men; but if they had not been ordered to assemble, and there should be occasion for their service some time in September, it would have been found almost impossible to get them to any distant scene of action until the season for such operations would have been too far advanced. Should the hopes which have been formed of the favorable effects of the council at Piqua not be realized, the government, at the moment which shall ascertain its failure, will have at its disposal, a formidable force ready to take the field: and the points of rendezvous have been so fixed as to give as great a choice as was possible, as to the direction in which it may be moved. These were my motives, sir, for calling upon governor Scott, under the authority of your letter of the 9th ult. requesting him to call the remaining part of the militia quota of this state to be in readiness to march and rendezvous as above mentioned.

General Winchester has accepted of a troop of twelve month's volunteer dragoons from this state. There are two others of that description that have tendered themselves to me, under captains Trimble and Quarles. Having no authority to accept them, I have turned them over to governor Scott, who will send on their rolls and the names of the officers for commissions. I have assured these gentlemen, however, that they will certainly be employed. They will serve either as dragoons or mounted riflemen.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

"THE HON. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*"

Governor Harrison remained at Jeffersonville, opposite to Louisville, until the regiment was fairly on its march for Vincennes. He then returned to Frankfort, to make arrangements with the governor for the eventual march of the residue of the

Kentucky quota. On his arrival at that place, he found that the most important information had been received from Detroit. What this information was, and the consequences it produced, we think proper to give in the words of "The History of the Late War," because it was written on the spot where the transactions, to which it refers, occurred, and under the immediate inspection of governor Shelby and the others who were parties in them.

"A few days before the actual attack on Detroit by general Brock, an express had been sent by general Hull, to hasten the reinforcement which had been ordered to join him from Kentucky. By this conveyance several of the principal officers of the army had written to their friends in Cincinnati, as well as to the governor of Kentucky, stating their entire want of confidence in their commander, and their apprehensions of some fatal disaster from his miserable arrangements and apparent imbecility and cowardice. These letters also declared it to be the common wish of the army, that Governor Harrison should accompany the expected reinforcements. He was also very popular in Kentucky, and was anxiously desired as their commander by the troops marching from that state to the north-western army. But the authority with which he had been invested by the president, did not entitle him to command any corps, which was not intended for operations in the western territories.

"The question of giving Harrison the command of the detachment on the march from Kentucky for Detroit, presented great difficulties to the mind of governor Scott. The motives to make the appointment were numerous. He had ample testimony of its being the wish of the army at Detroit. The 4th United States regiment in particular, which had acquired so much fame at Tippecanoe, under the command of Harrison, he was assured by an officer of that corps, were eager to see their old commander again placed over them. The same desire was felt by the Kentucky militia; and the citizens echoed their sentiments in every part of the state. To these may be added his own ardent attachment to governor Harrison, and entire confidence in his fitness for the command. The obstacles in the way of the appointment were, that Harrison was not a citizen of Kentucky, the laws of which would not sanction the appointment of any other to an office in the militia, and that a major-general had already been appointed for the detached militia, one only being required and admissible in that corps. Had governor Scott been capable of shrinking from his duty and the responsibility of the occasion, he might have easily evaded this delicate business, as the day on which he was deliberating upon it, was the last but one that he had to remain in office. That he might, however, neither act unadvisedly, nor appear to assume too much, in this situation, he determined to ask the advice

of the governor elect, and such members of congress, and officers of the general and state governments, as could be conveniently collected. At this *caucus*, composed of governor Shelby, the honorable H. Clay, speaker of the house of representatives in congress, the honorable Thomas Todd, judge of the federal circuit court, &c. &c. it was unanimously resolved to recommend to governor Scott, to give Harrison a brevet commission of major-general in the Kentucky militia, and authorize him to take command of the detachment now marching to Detroit; and to reinforce it with another regiment which he had called into service, and an additional body of mounted volunteer riflemen.—The governor conferred the appointment agreeably to their advice, which received the general approbation of the people, and was hailed by the troops at Cincinnati with the most enthusiastic joy.”

Upon receiving his commission and instructions from governor Scott, which are dated on the 25th August, the General set out from Frankfort late in the evening of that day, accompanied by lieutenant-colonel Martin D. Harden of colonel Allen's rifle regiment. By riding all night they reached Cincinnati by eight o'clock on the morning of the 27th. At this place the troops had previously arrived: General Harrison found also here brigadier-general Winchester, who had come on from Lexington, upon hearing of the disaster of Hull's army, to take command of the detachment under general Payne. General Harrison immediately informed general Winchester, of the authority he had received to take command of the Kentucky troops, and requested him to order colonel Wells to receive his orders also. General Harrison also invited general Winchester to accompany him. Several letters passed between them on this subject, which with others tending to elucidate the difference which has taken place since the war, between these two officers, will be noticed in another part of this work. On the 28th and 29th the following letter was addressed to the secretary at war.

“Cincinnati, 28th August, 1812.

“SIR.

“Before this reaches you, a despatch from the governor of Kentucky to yourself, and another from the honorable Mr. Clay to the secretary of state will have arrived at Washington, communicating the circumstance which occasions my having the honor to address you from this place. Being at Frankfort on the 24th inst. making arrangements for the eventual march of the residue of the Kentucky quota to Indiana and Michican territories, an express arrived at that place with despatches for governor Scott, containing information of governor Hull's being shut up in Detroit, and the probability of his being obliged to surrender unless immediately relieved. Upon a consultation

with governor Scott, it was thought advisable, as he was the next day to go out of office, to wait the arrival of his successor, colonel Shelby, and to request the advice and assistance of all the public characters in the state within reach, and expresses were sent to solicit their attendance on the next day. The meeting accordingly took place, consisting of governor Shelby, the former governor, Greenup, the speaker of the house of representatives of the United States, several other members of congress, the judges of the United States and of the supreme court of the state, general Hopkins, the major-general of the Kentucky quota; and it was unanimously recommended to governor Scott to order another detachment of the state quota to follow the one which had marched under general Payne, to request me to take command of the whole, and, for the purpose of removing all difficulty, to give me a commission of major-general by brevet, of Kentucky militia. I could not permit myself to hesitate, when urged by an authority so highly respectable, especially when assured by the large concourse of the citizens from all parts of the state, which had collected on account of the inauguration of the new governor, that it was the unanimous wish of the people of Kentucky that I should do so. Before I left Frankfort governor Shelby urged the propriety of sending one regiment more to Newport than was at first intended; and hearing of the fall of Detroit a few miles from that place, I sent back and recommended still another. My command, then, consists of three regiments of Kentucky troops, colonel Wells's detachment, and a troop of twelve month's volunteers, making an aggregate of about 2100 at this place; and three regiments of infantry, five troops of dragoons, and 500 mounted volunteer riflemen, on their way to join me. Those that first arrive will not, however, be here before the 30th inst. and it will be impossible to get them from here for some days after.

“Until this day, I had some hope that the account of the fall of Detroit was not true; but a letter received a few hours ago from Messrs. Worthington and Meigs to colonel Wells leaves no longer room for doubt. Three persons of the quarter-master department have returned to Piqua, who were in Detroit when it was surrendered. The object of the letter from Messrs. Worthington and Meigs, was to request colonel Wells to hasten his march, and to take the route to Dayton and Piqua, rather than the direct one to Urbana, for the purpose of relieving fort Wayne, which was said to be in danger of an immediate attack. By a gentleman who has this moment arrived from Piqua, the taking of Chicago and the massacre of the garrison, is also put beyond doubt. Poor Wells has also perished, in endeavoring to save capt Heald with his company.

“I shall march to-morrow morning with the troops that I have here, taking the route of Dayton and Piqua. The relief of

fort Wayne will be my first object, and my after operations will be governed by circumstances, until I receive your directions.

“Considering my command as merely provisional, I shall cheerfully conform to any other arrangement which the government may think proper to make. The troops which I have with me, and those which are coming on from Kentucky, are, perhaps, the best materials for forming an army that the world has produced. But no equal number of men was ever collected, who knew so little of military discipline, nor have I any assistance that can give me the least aid, if even there were time for it, but captain Adams of the fourth regiment, who was left here sick, and whom I have appointed deputy adjutant-general, until the pleasure of the President can be known. He is well qualified, and I hope the appointment will be confirmed. You may rely, sir, upon my utmost exertions; but the confusion which exists in every department connected with the army, is such as can only be expected from men who are perfectly new to the business they are engaged in.

“No arms for cavalry have yet arrived at Newport, and I shall be forced to put muskets in the hands of all the dragoons. I have written to the quarter-master at Pittsburg to request him to forward all the supplies of arms, equipments, and quarter-master stores, as soon as possible. I have also requested him to send down a few pieces of artillery, without waiting for your order, and wait your instructions as to a further number. There is but one piece of artillery, an iron four pounder, any where that I can hear of in this country. If it is intended to retake the posts we have lost and reduce Malden this season, the artillery must be sent on as soon as possible. There is no longer a possibility of getting money for drafts in this country. The paymaster, (general Taylor's deputy,) still continues to act, and I have been obliged to agree with the bank here, called the Miami exporting company, that the United States shall be at the expense and risk of sending on the specie for the drafts that are now given for the pay of the troops that are coming on, and for the quarter-master's department. Permit me here to recommend that the monies received here by the receiver of the land office be deposited in the bank of the Miami exporting company. It is now sent to Lexington and the bank here is quite as safe as that of Lexington. I herewith enclose a receipt of the surgeon, and another of the quarter-master of the regiment which is gone to Vincennes, for supplies furnished them. The bonds given by the paymaster and quarter-master were found, after they came into my possession, not to have been witnessed. They were sent on to Vincennes to have the mistake rectified, and will be forwarded to the war office. I write this, sir, under the inconvenience of considerable interruption; when I advance a few days, I will do myself the honor to communicate all the information which I receive, my opinion

of the state of affairs, and submit the result of my reflections as to the course to be pursued.

“ I have the honor to be, &c.

“ WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“ THE HON. W. EUSTIS, Esq, *secretary of war.*”

“ *Cincinnati, 29th August, 1812.*

“ SIR,

“ I did myself the honor to write to you yesterday, and despatched the letter by an express, thinking that he would be able to overtake the mail at Chillicothe. The troops marched this morning for Piqua, I shall follow and overtake them to-morrow. Another letter was received from general Worthington last evening, covering one from captain Rhea, of fort Wayne, stating that a large body of Indians were near the fort and he expected to be attacked that night. I shall lose not a moment in marching to his relief, and think it more than probable that we shall have to encounter all the Indians who assisted at the taking of Detroit, those to whom Chicago was surrendered, and a very large number of others who will be induced, by the fame of their exploits, to join the hostile party.

“ Permit me to recommend that a considerable supply of tents, swords, and pistols, camp kettles, cartridge boxes, rifle flints, and artificer's tools of every description, be forwarded immediately, as well as the artillery and every species of ordinance stores. Medicine, instruments, and hospital stores of every description will also be wanted for the large force which it will require to reinstate our affairs upon the north-western frontier. It is important, also, that some disciplined troops should be sent here: a company or two of artillery, and an experienced engineer will be indispensable.

“ I have caused a travelling force to be prepared, and ammunition wagons are now building. It appeared to me, sir, that it was necessary that some one should undertake the general direction of affairs here, and I have done it. The critical situation of affairs in this country, in my opinion, authorised a departure from the common line of procedure (to wait for orders,) and should it be considered by government to have been improper, I shall hope to be pardoned for the purity of my intentions.

“ You may rely upon it, sir, that the western country was never so agitated by alarm and mortification, as at this time.

“ I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir,

“ Your humble servant,

(Signed,) “ WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“ THE HON. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*”*

* The official letters of the Governor about this time furnish so complete a narrative of the passing events, that it has been thought proper to give them entire. They are taken from two books; one containing his correspondence with

On the 30th, the Governor left Cincinnati, and followed the troops which he overtook about forty miles from that place, on the morning of the 31st.

"To give him an evidence of their esteem and confidence, as he passed from rear to front, they saluted him with three cheers. This reception was gratifying, as it proved that they would cheerfully fight under his command: and such was the ardor of these volunteers, and their confidence in their general, that they would have beaten any equal number of the best British regulars. With the officers of their choice to command them, they would have preferred death on the field of battle to an ignominious retreat or surrender.

"On the first of September they arrived at Dayton; and on the next day as they were marching for Piqua, General Harrison was overtaken by an express, with a communication from the war department, which informed him, that he had been appointed a brigadier-general in the army of the United States, on the 22d of August, and assigned the command of all the forces in the Indiana and Illinois territories, with instructions to consult and co-operate with general Hull, and with governor Howard of the Missouri territory. In answer to this communication he declined accepting the appointment, until he could hear the determination of the government, after the surrender of Detroit, and the character in which he was then acting, had been known at the war department. He also wished to know how far his acceptance would make him subordinate to general Winchester, who was to command the north-western army, in the main design of regaining our lost territory and taking Malden. He gave it as his opinion, that there was a necessity for having one head in the western country to direct all the military movements; and with regard to the selection of a suitable person, he respectfully suggested the advantages which he possessed over Winchester, in his personal influence in the western states, and in his perfect knowledge of the country, in which he had risen from the youngest ensign in the United States' regiment. The importance of possessing the confidence of the militia troops, and the impossibility of obtaining a correct knowledge of the country from the existing maps, were also briefly noticed in his answer.

"On the 3d the troops arrived at Piqua, eighty miles from Cincinnati, and only three from the outside settlements. Piqua is the Indian name for this place, which is called Washington by the people of Ohio. It is a little village, situate on the west bank of the Great Miami. The General having now ascertained, that fort Wayne was invested by the neighboring Indians, detached from this place, colonel Allen's regiment with two

the war department, in the hand writing of the honorable Waller Taylor, who was at that time his aid-de-camp; and the other, the correspondence with the officers of the army, in the hand writing of the lamented captain Hart, who was inspector-general, and killed at the river Raisin.

companies from Lewis and one from Scott's regiments, with instructions to make forced marches for its relief. A regiment of seven hundred mounted men under the command of Colonel Adams had also advanced with the same view as far as Shane's crossing of the St. Mary's. This corps was composed of the citizens of Ohio, of all ages and conditions, who had, unsolicited by the government, volunteered and organized themselves for the protection of the frontiers, and the relief of fort Wayne. Many gentlemen who held important offices in the state, and not a few of the most wealthy and respectable citizens of Cincinnati, were to be found in this regiment. Such indeed was the ardor of the citizens to serve in this way, that every road to the frontiers was crowded with unsolicited volunteers. Their zeal was highly honorable to themselves, but in the end it proved disadvantageous to the cause; for they consumed much of the provisions, which had been accumulated at the outposts by the orders of general Hull, the want of which was afterwards severely felt.

"On the evening of the 4th, General Harrison received further intelligence, that a British and Indian force had left Malden on the 18th of August, to join the Indians already at the siege. Having previously been advised, that general Winchester was ordered by the war department, to take command of the troops destined to reinforce the north-western army, he had intended to resign them to him at Piqua, for which purpose he had written to Winchester to come on to that place; but on learning the critical situation of fort Wayne, he determined not to wait for Winchester, but to retain the command till he had relieved the fort.

"Early next day, the 5th of September, he paraded the remainder of the troops, and delivered them a speech, in which he stated, that fort Wayne was in imminent danger, and that it was absolutely necessary to make forced marches to relieve it. He read several articles of war, prescribing the duty of soldiers, and explained the necessity for such regulations. He then observed, that if there was any person, who would not submit to such regulations, or who was afraid to risk his life in defence of his country, he might return home; as he did not wish to have any person with him who was afraid to fight or unwilling to discharge his duties. One man only said he wished to return: and his friends having obtained leave, as usual, to escort him on his way, he was hoisted on a rail and carried to the Big Miami, in the waters of which they absolved him from the obligations of courage and patriotism, and then gave him leave of absence.

"The troops were detained here till the 6th, for want of *flints*, a very small, yet indispensable article. On that day they marched, leaving the greater part of their clothes and heavy baggage

at Piqua, and overtook colonel Allen's regiment early on the 8th, at St. Mary's river, where an express from the general had overtaken him with orders to halt and build some block houses, for the security of provisions and the protection of the sick. This place is commonly known by the name of Girty's town. The men were here put on half rations; but any one who did not like such fare had leave to remain at the block houses. Major R. M. Johnson arrived on the evening of the same day, with a corps of mounted volunteers, consisting of the companies of captains Arnold and Johnson, and a company from Mason county, under the command of captain Ward. The army was now about two thousand two hundred men strong.

About this time the following letter appeared in the Zanesville Messenger:

S. W. Culbertson to Mr. Chambers, editor of the Zanesville Messenger, 1812.

"MR. CHAMBERS,

"I have just returned from Urbanna, where governor Meigs is at present with about 1000 soldiers. Brigadier-general Harrison is at Piqua with 2000 Kentucky soldiers, and 2000 more in his rear. Harrison's presence appears to inspire every person with courage, and makes even cowards brave. His present conduct evinces a determination to retrieve the injured reputation of our country. He has made a most animated speech to the friendly natives at Piqua, who are numerous and sueing for a continuation of peace. He has promised them protection, at the same time assuring them in terrific language, which struck terror to all hearts, that the name of an Indian foe should not long be known among us—that the American army will no longer be commanded by an *old woman*.

"Governor Meigs's late patriotic conduct and exertions appear to be rewarded only with ingratitude. He has ordered the 2d detachment of militia, which marched from this place under the command of colonel McConnell, to be dismissed, having been called out contrary to his instructions and intentions, which must have been misunderstood. S. W. CULBERTSON."

From Piqua some friendly Indians had been despatched to the entrance of the river Auglaize into the Miami of the Lake, to discover whether any British troops had passed up the latter, in the direction of Fort Wayne. The celebrated Indian chief, captain Logan, was also sent to endeavour to penetrate into fort Wayne. This faithful and gallant chief, who afterwards fell a sacrifice to his attachment to the cause of the United States, gave the most entire satisfaction in the performance of his duty. Equally adroit and daring, he contrived to pass through the hostile Indians, entered the fort, and returned to the General in safety. The information which he brought, that the fort was

closely besieged, and that Mr. F. Johnson, the brother of the agent, had been murdered, as he attempted to pass out of the fort to communicate a knowledge of their situation, determined the General to push on with all the rapidity in his power, consistently with the proper precautions.

On the evening of the 9th, the troops arrived at Shane's crossing, of the St. Mary's, where they joined the Ohio volunteers, under colonel Adams. The General desired those who chose to accompany him to volunteer their services for ten days. The greater part of them did so, but a few thought proper to return. Among those who went on were gentlemen who had filled high offices in the civil and military departments in the state, serving either as privates, or in very low grades. "On the morning of the 10th, some delay took place by repairing broken wagons, and making other necessary arrangements. General Harrison was unremitting in the discharge of his duties, every department underwent his personal inspection; and the temper and condition of every corps in the army were known to him."*

On the 11th, lieutenant Sugget, adjutant of Johnson's battalion was sent in advance, with twenty men, to reconnoitre. Logan and two other Shawanese were sent as guides: the following is a letter from the General to the secretary at war, of this date.

"Head-Quarters, 17 miles from Fort Wayne, }
"September 11th, 1812, 9 o'clock, P. M. }

SIR,
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 30th ultimo, which was brought to me this moment by express.

"The necessary arrangements for the procuring of provisions and ammunition, added to the trouble of establishing an issuing commissary department, in consequence of the failure of the contractor, has prevented me from reaching fort Wayne as soon, by one day, as I expected. I shall, however, reach it to-morrow; but I have every reason to believe it will not be without a severe contest. No information has been received from the fort since the 3d inst. and should the Indians have been assisted by a British detachment, I fear it would not have been able to hold out. A small detachment which I sent to endeavor to penetrate to the fort, has just returned without accomplishing their object, although they defeated a small party of the enemy. You need not fear the issue of the action, which I expect will take place to-morrow. My troops are in high spirits, and will, I am persuaded, do honor to themselves and their country.

"I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed,) "WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.
"HON. WM. EUSTIS, Esq. secretary of war."

* History of the War.

The expectations expressed by the General in the above letter, that he should have to fight his way to the fort, were not realized. The enemy fled before the approach of the troops, and abandoned all their positions around the fort, which they had kept closely blockaded for many days.

It has been mentioned above, from the History of the War, that General Harrison was informed on the march to Piqua, that general Winchester had been ordered by the war department to take command of the detachment of militia and regulars which was first ordered to the relief of general Hull, that he had written to that officer to come on, and that he would deliver the detachment over to him on his arrival. The order from the war department had been issued before it was known at the seat of government that Hull had surrendered, or that General Harrison had taken the command. The order is in the following words:

“Adjutant-General’s Office, 23d August, 1812.

“SIR,

“The detachment ordered to reinforce general Hull having been increased, you will command them in person. You will put a proper officer in charge of the recruiting service at Lexington, with the necessary instructions, and march immediately.

“Upon your arrival, you report to general Hull the senior officer.

“I have the honor to be, with great respect, your ob’t. sv’t.

“A. Y. NICOLL,

“Assistant adjutant-general.

“BRIG. GEN. JAMES WINCHESTER, *Lexington, Ky.*”

A copy of this was enclosed in the following from general Winchester:

“Lexington, 31st August, 1812, 2 o’clock, A. M.

“SIR,

“I herewith send you the copy of a letter this moment received from the assistant adjutant-general. I shall follow the army to-morrow or next day, in order to take the command agreeably to the orders of the secretary of war. It may be perceived that government was not apprised of the surrender of General Hull and his army when the order alluded to was written, and there is no doubt before I reach the army, further orders with relation to its operations will be received. It will be very agreeable to me to be associated with you in command.

“I have the honor to be, with high respect, your ob’t. sv’t.

“J. WINCHESTER,

“Brigadier-general, U. S. Army.

“MAJ. GEN. W. H. HARRISON.”

From this letter it is evident that general Winchester expected that the fall of Hull's army, and the state of the frontiers, would call forth new arrangements from the government. Fort Wayne being relieved, and general Winchester not arriving to take command of the detachment, General Harrison determined to employ the intermediate time in destroying the Indian towns and corn on the Wabash, and at Elk Hart, the latter on the waters of lake Michigan, about fifty miles distant, and the former about thirty.

This service was committed to general Payne with Lewis and Allen's regiments of volunteers, and Garrard's troop of dragoons for the Wabash expedition; and to colonel Wells, with the battalion of regular troops. Scott's* regiment of volunteers, major Richard M. Johnson's battalion of mounted Kentucky volunteers, and about 150 mounted Ohio volunteers, led by general Lytle and Major Dunlap.

The General attended in person the command of general Payne, which, having the shorter distance to perform, returned a day sooner than Wells's detachment. Large quantities of corn were destroyed, which would have afforded subsistence to the Indians in making a second attack upon fort Wayne, or would have enabled them to embody themselves for any other mischief.

“Brigadier-general James Winchester now arrived to take command of the first troops, which had marched from Kentucky to reinforce the north-western army. He too had been a revolutionary officer, and was now advanced in years. He was a

* Colonel John M. Scott, who commanded the 1st regiment of Kentucky volunteers, was born in Pennsylvania, and studied physic in New Jersey, under an uncle. When qualified for the profession, he received the appointment of surgeon's mate, in the regiment then commanded by general Harmer, on the western frontiers. When general Wayne took the command of the western army, Scott was promoted to be surgeon of the 2d United States regiment. It was in this capacity that General Harrison, who was the aid-de-camp of Wayne, first became intimate with him; an attachment of more than *brotherly love* was formed between them. Some time after the peace of Greenville, they both returned from the army. Scott married, and settled in Frankfort, Ky. in the practice of his profession. In both he was very successful. Indeed, there never was a man more universally beloved than Dr. Scott. His uncommon wit, vivacity, and humour made him every where sought for by the young and lively, while his good sense, his professional skill, and his incorruptible honor and integrity procured him the esteem of the wise and good. His extremely chivalrous spirit, and his acquaintance with military duty early pointed him out to the young men about Frankfort, and being first appointed to the command of an independent company, he soon rose to the command of the regiment. Before we proceed to mention the catastrophe of this gentleman's fate, evincing his extreme devotion to his country's cause, we shall relate an instance of a different character, shewing the strength of his friendship no less than the tenderness of his nature. During the whole time that Governor Harrison remained at Vincennes, Dr. Scott resided at Frankfort; the distance is one hundred and seventy miles, and at that time two-thirds of the way was unsettled, and yet this generous friend, upon every occasion of Mrs. Harrison's illness, left his practice, his family, and his business, to administer relief to the wife of his

wealthy citizen of Tennessee, where he had lived many years in a degree of elegant luxury and ease, which was not calculated to season him for a northern campaign in the forest. His arrival produced much uneasiness among the troops; being a regular officer, with whom they were unacquainted, many of the militia seemed disposed not to be commanded by him; and General Harrison with the field officers had to exert all their influence to reconcile the army to the change. The troops had confidently expected, that General Harrison would be confirmed in the command; and by this time he had completely secured the confidence of every soldier in the army. He was affable and courteous in his manners, and indefatigable in his attention to every branch of business. His soldiers seemed to anticipate the wishes of their general: it was only necessary to be known that he wished something done, and all were anxious to risk their lives in its accomplishment. His men would have fought better and suffered more with him, than with any other general in America: and whatever might have been the merits of general Winchester, it was certainly an unfortunate arrangement which transferred the command to him at this moment. It is absolutely necessary that militia soldiers should have great confidence in their general, if they are required either to obey with promptness, or to fight with bravery. The men were at last reconciled to march under Winchester, but with a confident belief, that Harrison would yet be reinstated in the command; and which accordingly was done, as soon as the war department was informed of his appointment in the Kentucky troops, and his popularity in the western country.”*

friend. For some time before the war broke out in 1812, Dr. Scott was in such bad health that it was not supposed he could recover. It was, therefore, not the intention of governor Scott to appoint him to the command of one of the regiments which was to be sent to the relief of Hull. The colonel insisted upon his right, regardless of the consequences, and was accordingly appointed to the command of the 1st regiment of volunteers, to the deep regret of all his friends, who never expected his return. The renewal of old scenes, however, in the army, and the exercise, without a great deal of fatigue, had obviously a good effect upon him, and by the time he reached fort Wayne, he was evidently better. His regiment here, as above stated, was ordered on the command to destroy the Indian villages at Elk Hart. His officers, who were much attached to him, urged him to remain behind on account of the great fatigue he would have to undergo. As he paid no attention to their remonstrances, the general interfered, and assured the colonel that there would be no fighting in that direction, before the return of the troops. The colonel made no answer, but when he was mounting his horse which stood by, he observed, as if to the horse—“As long as I am able to mount you, none but myself shall lead my regiment, either to fight or not to fight.” Upon the return of the troops from the expedition, it was very apparent that the apprehensions of colonel Scott’s friends were well founded. The detachment had undergone great fatigue in a protracted march of nearly three days and nights. The colonel was scarcely able to reach the camp. He continued, however, with the army until it reached fort Defiance, at the mouth of the Auglaize, from which place he was sent to Frankfort in a litter, but died on the second day after his arrival, a victim to his ardent zeal for his country.

* History of the War.

The following general order was issued on this occasion by General Harrison, assigning general Winchester his command, and reserving to himself the other troops in the field:

“Head Quarters, Fort Wayne, 19th Sept. 1812.

“The President of the United States having designated brigadier-general James Winchester to the command of the army originally destined to relieve general Hull, and that officer having arrived at this place, the command is accordingly relinquished to him. Brigadier-general Payne, colonel Wells, and captain Garrard, commanding the several corps composing the army, will accordingly report themselves to general Winchester, and receive his orders.

“If any thing could soften the regret which the General feels at parting with troops which have so entirely won his confidence and affection, it is the circumstance of his committing them to the charge of one of the heroes of our glorious revolution; a man distinguished as well for the services he has rendered his country, as for the possession of every qualification which constitutes the gentleman. The General cannot take leave of this gallant army, which he has commanded with so much satisfaction, without expressing the high sense which he entertains of their conduct. For ten days past, they have performed severe duty with scarcely a sufficiency of food to sustain them, and entirely without some of the articles which constitute the ration: they have done it, too, without a murmur, and with an alacrity which could only have been expected from veteran troops.

“The General requests brigadier-general Payne, and every other officer and soldier of the army, to accept his thanks for the support which they have given him upon every occasion, and for the promptitude and alacrity with which his orders have been obeyed. He has taken care to communicate to the governor of Kentucky, and through him to the people of that state, his opinion of their distinguished merits, and his entire confidence in their perseverance in the path of glory and patriotism.

“The general feels equal pride and pleasure in acknowledging the personal attachment which the army has manifested towards him, and he assures them that their welfare and glory is the first object of his wishes; and as a means of securing both, he most earnestly recommends and entreats the confidence which they have so often expressed in him may be transferred to his worthy successor.

“As Governor and commander in chief of the Indiana territory, the General assumes the command of all the troops in that territory, by virtue of an authority received from the honorable the secretary of war, and as a major-general of the Kentucky quota: he takes the command of all the troops of

that state north of the Ohio, excepting the army of general Winchester."

On the same day the following letter was addressed to general Winchester by General Harrison, communicating a detailed view of the state of the supplies, and offering him any further assistance of men which he might think necessary:

Fort Wayne, 19th September, 1812.

"SIR,

"Having, by my general order of this day, relinquished the command of the army, consisting of the detachment of colonel Well's regiment, under that officer, captain Garrard's troop of dragoons, and the three regiments of Kentucky infantry under general Payne; I have now the honor to inform you, that any other part of the infantry under my command will be made subject to your orders, that you may think necessary to carry the directions you have received from the government into effect. The supplies which have been reported to me, or ordered by me, are as follows: 400,000 rations of beef, and 150,000 of flour, purchased by Mr. John H. Piatt under the authority of general Hull. A part of this flour, and about 50,000 lbs. of beef, has been brought on and consumed by the army. The balance of the flour is either on the way hither or to St. Mary's, where it was directed to be deposited. I also directed Mr. Piatt to purchase and send on to St. Mary's, whiskey, and other component parts of the ration to make the 150,000 lbs. flour complete rations. Mr. Buford, the purchasing commissary in Kentucky, has also been directed to forward to St. Mary's 300,000 complete rations; and major White, the contractor to the 41st degree of latitude, to deposit at St. Mary's 100,000 complete rations, besides the daily issues that may be wanted there; at Piqua, 30,000 rations besides the daily issues; and at Dayton, 50,000 rations besides the daily issues. The means of transportation are hired wagons, which may, with exertion, be procured to any amount; between 3 and 400 pack horses in the hands of Mr. Piatt, and 300 others which Mr. Buford was directed to purchase. All these, sir, are made subject to your orders, together with the provisions above reported.

"I must request you to state to me what force you wish left at St. Mary's; the officer commanding which, will be directed to wait your orders. There is nothing more wanting to the army than a principal commissary to receive and superintend the issues of provisions. That department exhibits nothing at present but confusion. I had designated major Vooshees, of colonel Allen's regiment, to that office; he is, I believe, eminently qualified for it, and he has been in the execution of the duties for some days.

"Any other explanations or assistance which I can give you will be afforded with pleasure.

"I am, very sincerely,

"Your humble servant,

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

"BRIG. GEN. J. WINCHESTER."

Having thus, by his exertions, reconciled the troops to general Winchester,* and given him all the information in his power, General Harrison set out for St. Mary's. It was his intention, at that time, to make a *coup de main* upon Detroit, with a mounted force, by an unfrequented route leading from fort Wayne and crossing the river Raisin above the settlements on that river. On this service he intended to employ a regiment of dragoons which had followed him from Kentucky by his order, under the command of colonel Simrall; the battalion of major Richard M. Johnson; another of Ohio mounted riflemen which had been raised by colonel Samuel Finley, of Chillicothe, and Pogue's regiment of Kentucky infantry, which it was his intention to mount on hired horses. General Harrison arrived at St. Mary's on the 20th. He immediately directed a large convoy to be prepared to meet the detachment of general Winchester at the site of the old fort Defiance, at the mouth of the Auglaize river. On the succeeding day the following letter was addressed to general Winchester:

"St. Mary's, 21st September, 1812.

"SIR,

"Colonel Jennings' regiment is now here. I shall immediately set it to open the road from hence to fort Defiance, and will direct the contractor and commissary to push on their provisions. The secretary of war, in a letter received from him since I saw you, urges me to join you, (supposing that I was then in Kentucky,) with a reinforcement of the troops subject to my orders. As I have declined the appointment tendered me of brigadier, I cannot comply with his request, as the commission which I have is of higher grade than yours. I must, therefore, carry the wishes of the President into effect, so far as to place at your disposal the regiments of Barbee and Jennings, and the quota of this state, which I have heretofore required of governor Meigs. The officers commanding these corps will be directed to report to you, and receive your orders. I shall retain the separate command of the mounted men and Pogue's regiment, and will communicate to you by an express, the particular object at which I shall aim. Be so obliging as to

* In another chapter of this work the *depositions* of some of the most respectable citizens of Kentucky will be introduced to show that it was only the exertions of General H, that could have reconciled them.

send orders to colonels Barbee and Jennings. The former is at Piqua, and the latter I shall place on the road to Defiance, as I have above intimated.

“ I am, very respectfully,
“ Your humble servant,

“ WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

“ BRIG. GEN. JAMES WINCHESTER.”

Expresses were sent to hasten on the wagons, pack horses, and bullocks, which were on their way from the interior of the settlements. Upon their arrival, the whole was placed under the direction of colonel W. Jennings, and the following order given for his directions:

“ *Head Quarters, St. Mary's, 24th September, 1812.*

“ SIR,

“ It has become necessary to open a road from this place to fort Defiance by the way of Tawa town, and to build a block house in the intermediate, as nearly central as a good situation can be had. You will, with your regiment, proceed to this duty immediately. Some of the friendly Indians will be employed as guides, and Mr. William Conner will attend you and act as interpreter. A number of wagons and pack horses will set out from this place to-morrow morning; it will be proper to send two companies to escort them, with directions to open the road only wide enough to allow the wagons to pass, and direct them to proceed with the utmost expedition.

It will be proper, also, that the pack horses should be detached ahead as soon as they arrive within 25 or 30 miles of Defiance, under an escort of thirty men; the remaining part of the regiment will follow the wagons, and open the road, so as to have all the small timber removed, at least to the distance of 30 feet: upon your arrival at the spot upon which you may think proper to erect the block house, you will immediately clear a place, and proceed to build it. It should be of the largest size of such buildings—not less than 25 feet in the bottom story.

“ You will be reinforced or relieved by colonel Poague or colonel Barbee's regiments, if there should be occasion for it before the work is completed. I am, very respectfully, your humble servant.

“ COL. WM. JENNINGS, *commanding 2d regt. Kentucky quota militia.*”

The amount of the supplies forwarded by colonel Jennings is to be found in the following original letter from that officer to General Harrison:

“Tawa Town, September 26, 1812.

“MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON,

“Sir, my highest pride as a soldier is to be obedient to my superiors, and thereby render to my country all that she ought to expect. I may not be a judge of what a regiment in the woods can do, but my opinion clearly is, that more is imposed on me than can be well done. I have now under my cover near 300 bullocks and nearly 200 pack horses, besides a number of wagons. To say nothing about an enemy, I deem it impracticable to take care of the cattle upon a march and have to open the road. I am here in the situation above described, and rest assured that nothing shall be wanting on my part to take care of the public property, and facilitate my movements towards fort Defiance as fast as possible, considering the duties I have to perform on my march.

“I am, dear sir, with sentiments of high respect,

“Your obedient servant,

“WILLIAM JENNINGS,

“*L. C. C. 2d regt. Ky. volunteers.*

“N. B. I refer you to captain Smith of the horse for Indian information. W. J.”

General Harrison had, as yet, received no despatch from the government which was written after the receipt of his letter from Cincinnati, announcing his having taken upon himself the command of the north-western frontier. On the 24th, however, he received from the war-office the following letter, acknowledging the receipt of his letters of the 28th and 29th ultimo, from Cincinnati, and declaring that he had completely anticipated the wishes of the president.

“War Department, September 10, 1812.

“SIR,

“Your letters of August 28th and 29th have been received; you will perceive by my communications of 22d and 28th, that you have anticipated the wishes of the president. In addition to the instructions to Mr. Buford, deputy commissary, and to the assistant deputy quarter-master at Newport, to furnish whatever you may require, the assistant deputy quarter-master at Pittsburg has been directed to forward with all possible expedition arms, ammunition, equipments, tents, and other camp equipage. Arrangements have made for increasing those supplies, and major Stoddard, of the artillery, is now at Pittsburg, to give additional energy to those measures, to prepare artillery, and other necessary munitions for that service, and correspond with the commanding general relative to the same. You must be sensible, that to make carriages, and get up a train of artillery will require time. You will see by the act to establish the quarter-master's department, the officers recognized in that act

are subject to the orders of the commanding general, for all necessary supplies, and every possible facility will be rendered by placing money in the bank of the Miami Exporting company, and at such other convenient points as may be found practicable.

The president is expected to return to this place from Virginia in a few days, when I shall have the honor to communicate to you his further instructions and determinations respecting the command of the forces of the north-western army, which in addition to the regulars, rangers, volunteers, and militia of Kentucky and Ohio, will immediately be reinforced with fifteen hundred militia from Virginia, and fifteen hundred from Pennsylvania, in addition to several companies of mounted volunteers from those states. Very respectfully, I have the honor, &c.

(signed) "W. EUSTIS.
"BRIG. GEN. W. H. HARRISON."

The promise which was made in the above letter, that further communications should be made in a few days on the subject of the command, was soon realized. As soon as the General had made the necessary arrangements for the march of colonel Jennings' regiment, with the convoy of provisions for general Winchester's detachment, he set out the same day, the 4th, for Piqua, to make some arrangements in the commissary's department. He arrived late at night, and was there met by an express from Chillicothe, bearing to him a most important despatch from the secretary at war, announcing his appointment by the president to the command of the whole western department. We think proper to give the letter entire. It is as follows:

"SIR,

"War Department, September 17, 1812.

"The president is pleased to assign to you the command of the north-western army, which in addition to the regular troops and rangers in that quarter, will consist of the volunteers and militia of Kentucky, Ohio, and three thousand from Virginia and Pennsylvania, making your whole force ten thousand men.

"Having provided for the protection of the western frontier, you will retake Detroit, and with a view to the conquest of Upper Canada, you will penetrate that country as far as the force under your command will in your judgment justify.

"Every exertion is making to give you a train of artillery from Pittsburg, to effect which, you must be sensible, requires time. Major Stoddard, the senior officer of artillery at that place, will advise you of his arrangements and progress, and receive your instructions. Captain Gratiol, of the engineers, will report himself to you from Pittsburg; he will receive your orders, and join you with the first piece of artillery which can be prepared, or receive such orders as you may direct. Major Ball, of the second regiment of dragoons will also report himself

and join you immediately. Such staff officers as you may appoint conformably to law, will be approved by the president.

"Copies of all the contracts for supplying provisions, have been transmitted. Mr. Denny, the contractor, at Pittsburgh, is instructed to furnish magazines of provisions at such places as you may direct.

"The deputy quarter-master, at Pittsburgh, will continue to forward stores and munitions of every kind, and will meet your requisitions.

"Colonel Buford, deputy commissary, at Lexington, is furnished with funds, and is subject to your orders. Should an additional purchasing commissary become necessary, you will appoint one, and authorize him to draw and sell bills on this department. It seems advisable to keep the local contractors in requisition as far as they can supply. With these objects in view, you will command such means as may be practicable, exercise your own discretion, and act in all cases according to your own judgment. Very respectfully, &c.

(signed) "W. EUSTIS.

"BRIG. GEN. WM. H. HARRISON,"

The powers here given, it must be confessed, were sufficiently ample. In a letter to governor Shelby, of simultaneous date with the above, the secretary says, "To meet existing contingencies, after consulting the lawful authority vested in the president, it has been determined to vest the command of all the forces on the western and north-western frontier, in an officer whose military character and knowledge of the country appeared to be combined with the public confidence. General Harrison has accordingly been appointed to the chief command, with authority to employ officers, and to draw from the public stores, and every other practicable source, all the means of effectuating the object of his command."

By the same express, a letter was received for general Winchester, to whom the option was given of remaining with General Harrison or joining the army on the Niagara frontier.

Any candid mind reflecting upon the situation of the affairs of the north-western frontier at this period, will admit that the difficulties to be encountered were of no ordinary character, and that a weight of duty rested on the commanding general which required a union of all the qualities of an able commander properly to perform. The command thus bestowed on General Harrison was the most extensive and important that was ever intrusted to any other officer of the U. States, Washington and Green excepted. How they were executed, must be left to the judgment of the reader to determine, from the narrative and documents which we shall furnish. To provide for the safety of the whole northern and western frontier, from the confines of Ohio and Pennsylvania to the territory of Mis-

souri, inclusive; and to prepare for offensive operations against the enemy, separated as they were from our own frontiers by 200 miles of swampy wilderness, at an inclement season of the year presented difficulties which were only to be encountered by uncommon exertion of patience and fortitude.

“But the services which he was required to perform, were, in the opinion of old, experienced, and able officers, the most extensive and arduous, that ever had been required from any military commander in America. The endless number of posts and scattered settlements, which he was obliged to maintain and protect, against numerous and scattered bands of Indians, while he was contending with difficulties almost insurmountable in the main expedition against the enemy at Malden, were sufficient to employ all the time, and talents, and resources of the greatest military genius at the head of a well appointed army. His forces, however, were raw, undisciplined militia, which nothing but *his* address, or Jackson’s energy, could render efficient. Chaos and misconduct reigned in every department, and particularly in that of the supplies, in which the best organization and arrangements were necessary, to meet the inconceivable difficulties which were to be surmounted in that line. He had excellent materials for an army in the Kentucky militia, but he had no time to spend in preparing them for the field—the season for action was drawing to a close—not a moment was to be lost in pushing on the campaign.”*

The information of his appointment was communicated by General Harrison to general Winchester in a letter of which the following is an extract:

“DEAR SIR, “ *Head Quarters, Piqua, September 25, 1812.*

“I arrived here yesterday, for the purpose of making some arrangements in the commissary’s department. After night, an express arrived, with a packet of letters from the office at Chillicothe, directed to me. Upon opening it, and breaking the seals, one after the other, I incautiously broke that of the enclosed letter, which I soon discovered was for you. The same express brought me a letter from the war department, announcing my appointment to the command of the north-western army. Need I add, that it would give me the most heartfelt pleasure if you could determine to remain with us. The secretary informs me, that the army is to be ten thousand strong, artillery is providing at Pittsburgh, an engineer is coming on, a major’s command of cavalry, and every necessary power given.

“I shall necessarily be detained here for some days, expecting to see governor Meigs and general Tupper. I hope at least that you will continue in command until my arrival. I have written to general Payne, but have said nothing about my

* History of the War.

resuming the command, choosing that you should announce it in the manner you thought best."

The difficulties attendant on carrying on an offensive war at such a distance from our settlements, where the supplies were to be transported through a swampy and almost trackless desert, exposed to the constant attempts of an enemy the most active and adroit in the world, in enterprises of this kind, did not escape the penetration of the executive, and it determined to place the whole responsibility of its execution upon the General. This was done in the following letter:

"SIR, "War Department, September 23d, 1812.

"Your letter of the 3d instant has been received. As the difficulty of obtaining supplies, particularly of provisions, through the wilderness, appears to be one of the greatest obstacles with which you will have to contend, which difficulty, it is well known, increases as the season advances, your own judgment, and the information you possess and will acquire on this subject, will enable you to determine how far it may be practicable to advance, and what posts or station it may be expedient to maintain during the winter. You are already apprised of the solicitude of the government that every thing that can be done shall be done towards recovering the ground lost, and extending successful operations into Canada.

"The contractor, commissary, and quarter-master's departments are subject to your orders, and will be further urged to make every effort to comply with your requisitions.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed,)

"W. EUSTIS.

"HIS EXCELLENCY WM. H. HARRISON,

"Commanding N. W. Army."

Before this discretionary letter was received, General Harrison had, upon the receipt of his appointment and orders in that of the 17th, made his arrangements for the campaign. They were communicated to the secretary at war in the following letter:

"Head Quarters, Piqua, 27th September, 1812.

"SIR,

"The final arrangement for the march of the army towards Detroit is as follows: The right column, composed of the Pennsylvania and Virginia troops, are directed to rendezvous at Wooster, a town upon the head waters of Mohegan, John's creek, 35 miles north of Mount Vernon, and 45 west of Canton. and proceed from thence by the Upper Sandusky, to the rapids of the Miami. The middle column consisting of 1200 Ohio militia, will march from Urbanna where they now are, taking general Hull's track to the rapids; and the left column composed of the detachment of regulars under colonel Wells and four Kentucky regiments, will proceed from fort Defiance down the

Miami to the rapids. The mounted force, under an officer whom I shall select for that purpose will take the route mentioned in my former letter, from fort Wayne up the St. Josephs, and across to the waters of the river Raisin. Upon reflection, I am induced to abandon the scheme of attacking Detroit, for should it be successful, as the infantry will not be in readiness to support them, it must necessarily be abandoned, and the inhabitants be more exposed to the depredations of the Indians than they now are. A more useful employment will be, to sweep the western side of the strait and lake, of the Indians who are scattered from Brown's town to the rapids, rioting upon the plunder of the farms which have been abandoned. I expect to have more than 30,000 rations purchased by the commissary at fort Defiance, in the course of the present week, and 200,000 at Urbana, to be taken upon pack horses; both these deposits will be taken at two trips to the rapids. I have directed the contractor White, to deposit 200,000 rations at the second block house, 42 miles beyond Urbana, 200,000 at a block house which is now building between St. Mary's and Defiance, and the like quantity at Wooster. At the latter place, also, Mr. John H. Piatt is about to deposit 300,000 rations, and to procure the means of transportation to Detroit. I have also directed major Denny to send to the same place the 400,000 which he has been directed to purchase at Pittsburg. I am confirmed in the opinion which I before gave, that supplies of provisions can be obtained in this state. I shall take means to ascertain it, and write to major Denny if there should be a necessity for the purchase of 1,980,000 rations. I have despatched an express this day to Pittsburg to direct that the artillery and all the supplies destined for the north-western army should be sent to Georgetown upon the Ohio, and from thence by New Lisbon and Canton to Wooster.

"In consequence of my application to the governor of Kentucky, I have understood that 1600 mounted men have gone from that state to Vincennes. I have directed them to be employed against Tippecanoe and the Piorias, on the Illinois river, with the addition of the rangers and some other companies in the territories; they will form a force of 2400 men.

"Agreeably to the authority given me by your letter of the 17th, I have appointed Mr. John H. Piatt deputy commissary; he is the same person employed by general Hull, and will, I think, make a most excellent officer.

"There is nothing that gives me more apprehension than the destitute condition of many of my men in the article of clothing and blankets. It appears to me that it is impossible that they can act in such a climate as that of Canada without warmer clothing. I have applied to the governor of Kentucky, and have addressed the citizens of that state on the subject myself. Great exertions will, I am persuaded, be made to relieve them; but I

must beg leave to recommend, that some assistance, if possible, may be afforded by the government. I have put in requisition, all the woollens that have been sent out for the Indians, and will have them distributed and accounts kept against the men who receive them, that the price may be deducted from their pay.

“ I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed,) “ WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON;

“ HON. WM. EUSTIS, Esq. *secretary of war.*

“ P. S. I fear that the western country cannot supply shoes and blankets for the troops. Permit me to recommend that a supply of those articles, and, if possible, woollen jackets and overalls, be sent on from Pittsburg to Wooster by land, to be disposed of to the militia in the same manner that the surplus clothing is to the regular troops. It appears to me also proper that the government should furnish watch coats for the militia centinels; from the short period of their service, they cannot purchase those things out of their own pay. I have, therefore, taken upon myself the responsibility of directing them to be procured. I fear, however, that materials cannot be found below Pittsburg. Lieutenant Johnson has orders to furnish 150 from thence. It is fortunate that there are many members of Congress who will be enabled to give testimony that will not be questioned, upon the floor of that body, as to the propriety and necessity of many alterations in the military arrangements. I have no less than seven members, elect, of the next congress under my command, and two of them, Messrs. Johnson and McKee, belong to the present house of representatives.

“ W. H. H.”

The receipt of the discretionary letter did not alter the General's determination, accompanied, as it was, by the expression of “ the strong solicitude to recover the lost ground, and for extending successful operations into Canada.” When the secretary at war had informed Governor Harrison that it was the President's wish that he should repair to the Ohio frontier, he was authorised to designate an officer to take command of the troops which were intended to operate in the direction of the Wabash and Illinois rivers. This duty was accordingly assigned to major-general Hopkins, by a letter from the General written at St. Mary's on the 22d September. On the day after he received his appointment of commander in chief, another letter was addressed to general Hopkins, desiring him, if the force under his orders would justify the attempt, not only to break up the Indian establishments on the Wabash, but those on the Illinois also. From Piqua, also, orders were sent to the commanding officers of the Virginia and Pennsylvania brigades, which were marching to join the north-western army. The utmost efforts were made to procure the supplies necessary for the advance of the army, and to give organization and activity to the quarter-master and commissary departments. There was,

also, another species of supply which was indispensable; to his regret and astonishment, the general had discovered that the greater part of his troops were entirely without woollen clothing, and very nearly without blankets. With a thoughtlessness which is unaccountable, they had left home with their thin cotton or linen summer dress, unprovided with socks or mittens, and with frequently a single blanket or coverlet between two of them. To remedy these defects no time was to be lost; urgent applications were made to the government, and the following address sent into Kentucky and distributed throughout the state:

“ To the people of Kentucky.

“ FELLOW CITIZENS,

“ The executive of your state acting, as it was believed, in unison with your wishes, have conferred on me the command of that part of the state quota of militia, which was destined to relieve Detroit. The general government has confirmed and extended my command to all the troops which have been called into service from the western states. Upon the point of leading these brave men into a rigorous northern climate, I discover that many of them are without blankets, and much the greater part of them totally destitute of every article of winter clothing. It is impracticable to procure the supplies necessary for them from the public stores, and there is no alternative but in your feeling and patriotism. A contribution of articles which will not be felt by you, will enable your soldiers to withstand the keen northern blasts with as much fortitude as they will the assaults of the enemy. Can any patriot sleep easy in his bed of down when he reflects upon the situation of a centinel exposed to the cold of a winter night in Canada, in a linen hunting shirt? Will the amiable fair sex suffer their brave defenders to be mutilated by the frost for the want of the mittens and socks which they can with little exertion procure for them? I trust that I know my fair countrywomen too well not to believe that this appeal to their patriotism and liberality will be effectual.

“ Blankets, overalls, roundabout jackets, shoes, socks, and mittens are the articles most wanted. Colonel Thomas Buford, the deputy commissary-general, will provide for the transportation of the articles, and will pay for the blankets and shoes, if required.”

It is scarcely necessary to observe that this appeal had the desired effect, and that although the winter was far advanced before they were received, a most ample supply of every species of clothing was forwarded by the liberality principally of the citizens of Kentucky.

Having completed his arrangements at Piqua, General Harrison repaired to St. Mary's, and despatched an express to fort

Wayne to direct the corps of Simral and Johnson to return to the latter place. This order was obeyed with promptitude. Colonel Jennings, who had been ordered to cut the road to Defiance and escort the supplies destined to meet general Winchester at that place, had, according to order, proceeded on that duty. He had advanced about thirty miles with the regiment, and having pushed his scouts on to Defiance, they discovered that general Winchester had not arrived, but that the enemy in force were in possession of that point. He accordingly halted his regiment, and commenced building a block-house.

When General Harrison arrived at St. Mary's, he found there some chiefs of the Miami tribe, Stone Eater, (the Turtle's nephew), with a few men of their tribe, accompanied by Langly, a Frenchman. They said that they had come to receive the General's directions, and that all their tribe were ready to follow any course which he should prescribe. Some of them were sent to bring in the other chiefs, and the rest retained as hostages.

The mounted force at St. Mary's now amounted to somewhat upwards of a thousand men. Whilst the General was employed on the 30th September, in organising them for the expedition mentioned in his letter to the secretary at war, of the 27th, and which he had determined to trust to the command of brigadier-general Tupper of the Ohio militia, Mr. quarter-master Thomas D. Carneal and another officer arrived at St. Mary's from general Winchester, with the intelligence "that in his march from fort Wayne to Defiance, he had been greatly impeded by a considerable body of Indians, who were frequently engaged with his advanced guard; and that upon his arrival near Defiance, he had discovered that the Indians were attended by British troops, who had with them some pieces of artillery. Within a few minutes after the arrival of these gentlemen, I received by an express sent by governor Meigs a letter from general Kelso, commanding a detachment of Pennsylvania troops on lake Erie, informing me that on the 16th of September, 2000 Indians, with a detachment of British regulars and militia, had set out from Malden, with two pieces of Artillery, for the purpose of attacking fort Wayne. Having no doubt but that this was the force which was in front of general Winchester, I immediately ordered the two regiments of infantry which were with me, and the whole of the mounted men amounting to about 1000 to divest them of all their baggage, and prepare to go in pursuit of the enemy. We marched six miles that evening, but the following day I left the infantry, and pushed on as rapidly as possible, and reached Defiance on the evening of the 2d, where I found general Winchester encamped, and had the mortification to learn that the enemy had passed that place at least three or four days before. General Winchester met with the Indians the day after his departure from fort Wayne, but he was not able to as-

certain their number or their position. When he arrived within a few miles of fort Defiance, he found the tracks of the enemies' carriages on the south side of the Miami, both going and returning, and upon further examination it was discovered that they had not advanced more than eight or ten miles above fort Defiance. General Winchester kept his troops so well prepared to receive the enemy, that they did not dare to attack him. In the course of the march, he lost an ensign and six men, and one wounded."*

In the march to fort Defiance, the troops suffered much. The second day after the infantry had been left, "the rain continued very heavy all night, the weather was very cold for the season, and as the troops had no tents, their situation was extremely disagreeable. General Harrison and his staff were similarly situated, and his patience and fortitude served as an example to encourage his men."† A description of the *bivouac* of this night will serve for that of many similar ones which were passed by the General and his troops during this campaign, with the exception of the increase of suffering from the severe cold of winter. The troops being on a forced march were not suffered to encamp, as long as there was light enough to march: they were formed as well as possible in an order of encampment, and guards placed out. The ground of the encampment here spoken of was on the side of the Auglaize river, in a flat beech bottom, which was nearly covered by the water from the rain, which fell in torrents during the whole night. The troops were without axes, and their tomahawks could effect nothing with the large green beech trees. Happy were they who could find a dry log in which a fire could be kindled; those who had not this good fortune were obliged to content themselves with passing the night sitting on their saddles, at the roots of the trees, against which they leaned and procured a little sleep. Being separated from the baggage, there were few who had any thing to eat, or spirits to drink. In a situation of this kind, men are peevish and ill-natured, in the venting of which a thousand circumstances continually occur. To prevent ebullitions of this kind, and to produce more pleasant feelings, the General, seated round a small fire, with his staff, wrapped in his cloak, and taking the rain as it fell, directed one of his officers to sing an Irish glee: the humor of this song, and the determination which seemed to exist at *head quarters* to put circumstances at defiance, soon produced cheerfulness and good humour throughout the camp. The General was afterwards joined by a Kentucky officer who sung a glee, beginning with

"Now's the time for mirth and glee,
Sing, and laugh, and dance with me."

* Official letter.

† History of the War.

This became the favourite air, and in all situations of difficulty, whether suffering the peltings of the storm, or traversing the swamps up to the knees in mud and ice, it was resounded in full chorus: the singular contrast between the words of their song, and their actual situation, affording cause of merriment, and a fruitful source of whimsical remark.

"A few pack horses, loaded with flour, arrived at Winchester's camp with General Harrison, which with the intelligence of his confirmation in the command, was very gratifying to the troops. Their sufferings, however, had become so great, as to threaten serious consequences to the service, if they could not speedily be relieved. With a view to allay the uneasiness prevailing among them, on the next day after his arrival, he had all the troops paraded, when colonel Allen and major Hardin addressed them in very affecting terms, and portrayed in a lively manner, the confidence and expectations which this army had excited; and exhorted them to bear their privations with patience and fortitude. General Harrison then addressed them himself as a father would his children. He observed, that his fame and theirs were identified; and then proceeded to flatter their pride as Kentuckians. He affectingly asked them "If you, fellow soldiers, from Kentucky, so famed for patriotism, refuse to bear the hardships incident to war, and to defend the rights of your insulted country, where shall I look for men who will go with me?" He then told them that immense supplies were lying at St. Mary's, to which a direct road was opening, that rations would be forwarded with speed, that in the evening he expected a hundred beeves, with more flour, that the government was doing its best to supply them, and that reinforcements were coming from Virginia and Pennsylvania, which would render the army very powerful. General Harrison was a very eloquent speaker, and on this occasion his speech had a powerful effect on the troops. When it was finished, they rent the air with shouts of applause, and harmony with content again prevailed in the camp."

The following order was issued by general Winchester, announcing the appointment of General Harrison.

"General Orders.

"Camp at Defiance, October 3, 1812.

"I have the honor of announcing to this army the arrival of General Harrison, who is duly authorized by the executive of the federal government, to take the command of the north-western army.

"This officer, enjoying the implicit confidence of the states from whose citizens this army is and will be collected, and possessing himself great military skill and reputation, the general

is confident in the belief that his presence in this army, in the character of its chief, will be hailed with universal approbation.

“ J. WINCHESTER,

“ *Brigadier-general U. States army.*”

General Winchester having determined to remain with the army, under General Harrison, the following letter was addressed to him, defining his duties.

“ *Head Quarters, Fort Defiance, 4th Oct. 1812.*

“ SIR,

“ Being obliged to repair to Wooster, the rendezvous of the right wing of the army, the whole arrangement for the supply and march of the left wing is committed to you. The means and situation of the troops are as follows: There are now at St. Mary's nearly three hundred thousand rations of flour and whiskey, and the greater part of the small component parts, and 15 or 20,000 rations of biscuit and bacon; at Jennings' block-house there were, on the 1st inst. 240 beeves, supposed to average 400lbs. and about 100 packs loaded with flour; 35 or 40 wagons loaded with flour and biscuit were to leave St. Mary's on the 2d instant for the said block-house; and upwards of 200 beeves were ordered on to the former place, (St. Mary's,) from the neighborhood of Hamilton. All these articles above enumerated have been purchased by the deputy commissaries, and are exclusive of the supplies provided by the contractor, who has been instructed to deposit 200,000 complete rations at fort Jennings, which is understood to be the last place upon this route within his contract. He has been further directed to provide for all the troops at and in the rear of that place. Of the three regiments belonging to your command which are in the rear, Pogue's is employed cutting the road from Jennings' block-house to this place, Jennings' is at the block-house, and Barbee's, and a battalion of Ohio troops under major Jenkinson, (which will continue under your command until the arrival of the army at the general rendezvous,) have been ordered back to St. Mary's. The reasons for the latter arrangement were to afford the means of escort to the provisions between St. Mary's and fort Jennings, and to spare the provisions which have been purchased for the use of the army in advance of the district of major White. I have directed the commissary, Mr. Piatt, to procure all the wagons in his power for transporting the provisions from St. Mary's to this place. Major Bodley, the quarter-master for the Kentucky quota, will also remain at St. Mary's with a deputy commissary, to superintend the transportation, and will attend to any orders you may give them. Major Bodley will also attend to the forwarding of the artillery and all the stores of the quarter-master's and ordnance department. He will be instructed to

provide, under your orders, for any deficiencies which may exist. With respect to your movements in advance, I must observe, that it is extremely desirable that you should occupy the rapids of Miami as speedily as possible, for the purpose of securing the corn which is growing there, and which is believed to amount to several hundred acres, an object of no little importance to the future movements of the army. The number of troops which it will be proper to leave in your rear to bring up the provisions, and other necessaries, which you may be unable to take with you, is left to your discretion, and must depend, in a great measure, upon the quantity of them that may be left, the number of trips which it may require to bring them to the rapids, and the size of the escort which you may deem necessary to protect them.

"I will communicate with you frequently, and from St. Mary's will inform you of every thing which I may think material to your operations.

"With great respect and consideration,

"Your humble servant,

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,

"BRIG. GEN. WINCHESTER, *commanding the*
"*left wing of the N. W. Army.*"

Having made these arrangements, General Harrison set out from Defiance and returned to St. Mary's, from whence, passing by Piqua and Urbanna, he proceeded to Franklinton, which was on the line of march designated for the right wing. The following is an extract of his letter to the secretary at war, dated at Franklinton, October 13:

"My presence being absolutely necessary in the rear to make arrangements for supplies for the army, I left Defiance on the 4th inst. having previously directed general Winchester to build a small fort at that place, and general Tupper to proceed with the mounted men to the rapids, if he should think proper (from the information he should there receive) as far as the river Raisin. On my way to St. Mary's, I met an express from fort Wayne, informing me that the Indians were again collecting round that place, and that it had been thought advisable that a troop of dragoons (armed with muskets) which I had sent to bring off a six pounder left there by general Winchester, should not proceed with it until they were reinforced. At St. Mary's I found about 500 mounted riflemen, who had come on to go on the expedition towards Detroit. These were dispatched under a colonel Tremble to fort Wayne, with directions to proceed on to endeavor to surprise the Potawatamie town (called White Pigeon's town,) about 65 miles from fort Wayne. I sent, also, a battalion of Ohio infantry to fort Wayne with a supply

of provisions, and for the purpose of collecting for the garrison a quantity of fuel, which they were unable to get from the distance they have to haul it when there are parties of Indians around them. Before I left St. Mary's for Defiance, some Miamies had arrived, (via. fort Wayne,) with a flag and a message from their chiefs, begging for peace. I had not time to listen to their speech at that time, and upon my return I found here the Owl, Charley, (the Eel river chief,) the Turtle's son, and several others had joined them. They came prepared to palliate or deny the hostility of their tribe, as the one or the other might best suit their purpose; but finding that I was in possession of facts that unequivocally proved it, they then threw themselves upon the mercy of the government, and have agreed to abide the decision of the President, whatever it may be. I have named five chiefs as hostages, whom they are to send in to Piqua, there to be detained until the decision of the President is made. The facts which we can prove upon them are, the assistance given by Chappien, one of their principal war chiefs, in the siege of fort Wayne; one of their warriors participated in the murders committed in Clark county, Indiana, and a scalp taken by him and exhibited in the town of Mississinaway, and a declaration made to the Delawares of their having taken up the tomahawk again; and, I may add, their refusal to attend the council at Piqua, although they were informed that their not attending would be considered as evidence of their having withdrawn from the protection of the United States. There is great reason to believe that the Weas assisted in the late attack upon fort Harrison, and Mr. Johnson thinks that his brother was killed by a Miami. I have no doubt but some of the chiefs have done every thing in their power to prevent the young men from going to war with us, and as little, that the great bulk of the tribe were decidedly hostile. The revolution in their affairs and in their disposition towards us, was very sudden. The declaration of hostility which I have spoken of above, was followed in two days by a message entreating the Delawares in their favor. In the intermediate time an army had appeared at fort Wayne, their villages and provisions destroyed, and their utter extirpation threatened. You are so well acquainted, sir, with all the circumstances connected with the situation of this tribe, that it would be presumption in me to indicate my opinion of the course to be pursued towards them; I will merely observe that they can still do us considerable injury, if they are drawn off and united with the hostile bands which are collecting towards the southern extremity of lake Michigan. From the Miamies I learn that the prophet had abandoned his position upon the Wabash, and had taken one near the head of Tippecanoe river, that the Winebagoes had abandoned him and returned home, disgusted, I suppose, with their late want of success in the

attempt upon fort Harrison.—Having made every arrangement in my power for forwarding on supplies for the army to Defiance, and committed the command of that wing to general Winchester, who agreed to serve under me without the least hesitation, I left St. Mary's for the purpose of making similar arrangements for the right wing."

At Urbanna General Harrison met colonel Morrison, who had been appointed quarter-master to the north-western army; with this officer arrangements were made to procure the means of transportation. On this subject the General, in the letter above quoted, makes the following remark:

"My only fears on the score of provisions arise from the difficulty of getting transportation from the frontiers of the settlements. My experience in the campaign of general Wayne, and the opinions of men conversant in such matters, have determined me to have ox teams; they can live on the food which the forest can furnish for some time, if well salted, whilst our best horse teams require a constant supply of grain. I have, therefore, directed colonel Morrison to purchase 100 ox wagons and teams for the Sandusky route, being convinced that purchasing, in the end, will be more economical than hiring."

In the same letter the general urges his former request for winter clothing for his men, and the necessity of sending him a detachment of artillery. "In an army composed almost exclusively of militia, and operating in a country where rivers are to be crossed in the presence of highly disciplined troops, and posts to be taken, it is all important that the corps of artillery should be respectable for its numbers and knowledge of its duty."*

The general was now constantly occupied in making his arrangements for the advance of his army. It has been seen that the government, by the letter from the secretary at war of the 23d of September, had placed upon him the responsibility of persevering in his efforts to carry on offensive operations during the winter, or to confine himself to the protection of the frontiers. Upon this subject the General, in the above often quoted letter, makes the following remark:

"I am fully sensible of the responsibility vested in me by your letter of the 23d ult. I accepted it with full confidence of being able to effect the wishes of the President, or to show, unequivocally, their impracticability. If the fall should be very dry, I will take Detroit before the winter sets in, but if we should have much rain, it will be necessary to wait at the rapids until the Miami of the Lakes is sufficiently frozen to bear the army and its baggage. A simultaneous movement with the army below will be highly useful, as the enemy will be able for some time to transfer their force from one end of the lake to the other

* Official letter.

by water. I have written to general Van Ransalaer, and shall keep him informed of my movements and prospects.²⁷

The month of October was, however, passing rapidly away. Constant rains had rendered the roads extremely difficult of passage: provisions were taken on with great labour and difficulty, and there was no speedy prospect of the arrival of the artillery and clothing. In a letter to the secretary at war, of the 22d October, after mentioning the exertions which had been made to procure and push on provisions, the General remarks,

"I am not able to fix any period for the advance of the troops to Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot be done upon proper principles, until the frost shall become so severe as to enable us to use the rivers and the margin of the lake for transportation of the baggage and artillery upon the ice. To get them forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in wagons or on pack-horses, which are to carry their own provisions, is absolutely impossible. The enclosed extract of a letter, just received from the commissary Piatt, will give you some idea of the state of the road, and the difficulty of getting provisions even to Defiance: but by that route, or by the margin of the lake, the object of reaching Detroit can be accomplished, if the troops are provided with warm clothing, and the winter such as is common in this climate. It is certain, however, that no species of supplies are calculated upon being found in the Michigan territory. The farms upon the river Raisin, which might have afforded a quantity of forage, are nearly all broken up and destroyed. This article, then, as well as the provisions for the men, is to be taken from this state, a circumstance which must at once put to rest every idea of a land conveyance at this season, since it would at least require two wagons with forage for each one that is loaded with provisions and other articles. I am informed that from eight to ten thousand bushels of corn may be obtained at Cleveland, and a few thousand between that place and Sandusky. My present plan is to occupy Sandusky, and accumulate at that place as much provisions and forage as possible, to be taken thence upon sleds to the river Raisin. At Defiance, fort Jennings, and St. Mary's, boats and sleds are preparing to take advantage of a rise of water, or a fall of snow. General Tupper, with one thousand Ohio militia, is advancing to Mr. Arthur's block-house, forty-four miles from Urbanna, upon Hull's track, to cover the provisions, which the commissary is depositing there, and which by the middle of November will amount to 200,000 rations; he has also directions to prepare sleds for taking it forward. It has been my object to keep as many of the troops as possible within the forty-first degree, to save the provisions purchased by the commissaries, which are intended for the use of the troops, when they shall advance. But notwith-

standing my urgent demands, the contractors have done little or nothing towards the deposits which I have required to be made at M^r Arthur and Jennings's block-house, upon the Auglaize, and at the latter place, the two regiments there are subsisting upon the commissary's stores. ——— has let out his contract for the north-western part of the state at so low a rate that the sub-contractors are unable to furnish the supplies, and one of them at least is as great a scoundrel as the world can produce. Indeed, I am very far from being satisfied with ——— himself. He will, it is said, make 100,000 dollars by the contract from this state, and I am very well persuaded that he had rather see the army starve than that his profits should be lessened five hundred dollars. He merits no indulgence from the government, and he has certainly forfeited the penalty of his bond.

“The troops at fort Defiance proceed to the Miami rapids in a few days. I do not believe, however, that any great advantage would arise from it, until the other columns are ready to support them, and it would be productive of the certain disadvantage of consuming provisions forwarded with immense labour and expense, without essentially contributing to the main design. I know of no arrangement which could be better calculated to protect the frontiers, and support each other, than that which the several corps of the army at present form. Depredations by small parties of Indians may and will be made; but it is impossible that any considerable body can advance against the settlements without being in danger of being intercepted in their retreat. I am persuaded that the Indians have done less mischief upon the frontiers since the declaration of war, than they did in the same length of time preceding it.”

It was the positive determination of the General not to advance with the intention of attacking the enemy, until his preparations were so far matured, as to ascertain the support of his army, not only in the recovery of the territory of Michigan, but in the meditated conquest of the adjacent province of Upper Canada; unless there were some political reasons for urging the immediate re-possession of our lost territory. Upon this subject we find in the above quoted letter, the following extract:

“It was suggested to me, a few days ago, by a member of congress, that the possession of Detroit by the enemy would probably be the most effectual bar to the attainment of peace; if this were really the case, I would undertake to recover it, with a detachment of the army, at any time. A few hundred pack horses with a drove of beeves, (without artillery and heavy baggage) would subsist the 1500 or 2000 men, which I would select for the purpose until the residue of the army could arrive. But having in view offensive operations *from Detroit*, an advance of this sort would be premature, and ultimately disadvantageous.”

The expedition against the Potawatamie towns mentioned in his letter to the secretary of war of the 13th of October, entirely failed. Colonel Allen Trimble, an intelligent and brave officer, who commanded it, reported to the General, that when he arrived at fort Wayne, nearly half his command abandoned him. This defection was produced by some idle stories, in relation to the strength of the enemy, and the difficulties of the expedition, circulated among them by one Ashe, a guide, who had been employed by the General to accompany them. "The officers and soldiers," says colonel Trimble, in his report to the General, "who caused you some trouble at St. Mary's, though apparently reconciled by your address, soon began again to murmur, and anticipate danger and difficulty; they now eagerly embraced the opportunity of sowing discord, dissatisfaction, and mutiny among the men." The circumstance to which the colonel alludes, which took place at St. Mary's, was the refusal of these same men to march, unless they were assured of getting pay for the use of their horses, and indemnification if they should be lost. The general, in an address to them, promised the former, but said that he had no authority to guarantee the latter. He had supposed that they were satisfied, and left them; but upon being informed that they still harped on the subject of pay for their horses, the General again returned to them, and observed that he would "soon settle that matter," mounting the same log from which he had before harangued them, and causing them to be drawn up before him, he thus addressed them: "You want to be assured of receiving pay for your horses, should they be lost; now all those who prefer a worthless poney to the performance of their duty to their country, may march off: I do not want such men."

The whole party consented to serve, but the result shows that the mutineers were determined to seek the first opportunity of abandoning their commander, who gave entire satisfaction to the General by his zeal and officer like conduct.

The mounted force which had attended General Harrison to fort Defiance, had been placed under the orders of brigadier-general Tupper, who was directed to proceed with them to the rapids of the Miami of the lake, to disperse the Indians, who were said to be there consuming the corn of the inhabitants, who had been driven from that place at the commencement of the war. This intention of the commanding general was frustrated by a misunderstanding between general Winchester and general Tupper.

Whilst this detachment was encamped at the mouth of the Auglaize, the whole corps was thrown into confusion by a small party of Indians, who fired on three of our men, on the opposite bank of the Miami, and having killed and scalped one of them, effected their retreat in safety. The misunderstanding between

generals Winchester and Tupper having increased after this affair, and the greater part of Tupper's men refusing to proceed with him to the rapids, he gave up all idea of the expedition to that place, and proceeded by the Ottawa towns to Urbanna, where the men were discharged. "Charges were soon afterwards exhibited against Tupper by general Winchester, for his conduct on this occasion, in consequence of which an arrest was ordered by General Harrison. The Ohio brigade under Tupper, in the mean time, had been advanced to fort M'Arthur on Hull's road, and when the officer went to serve the arrest, the general was gone on an expedition of his own to the rapids—and as there was no officer in his brigade who was qualified to succeed him in the command, it was deemed most prudent by the commander-in-chief to stay the prosecution for the present. A court of enquiry was afterwards demanded by general Tupper at fort Meigs, when no person acquainted with these transactions was there—he was of course honourably acquitted. The failure, however, appears to have been caused, chiefly, by his want of energy and decision, and in some measure by the insubordination of the troops, proceeding from a want of confidence in their general, which will always produce this effect among militia."*

As soon as the surrender of general Hull was known, a considerable body of Ohio militia from the north-eastern parts of the state were embodied, under the command of major-general Wadsworth, an old revolutionary officer, of the state of Connecticut. This force was encamped on the river Huron, a few miles from its discharge into lake Erie. A brigade was directed to be formed out of these troops, for a six month's tour, and placed under the command of brigadier-general Simon Perkins. This officer, with brigadier-general Beall, arrived at Franklinton, on the evening of the 25th of October. From these officers the General received some important information, as well in relation to the nature of the country through which the right wing of his army was to pass, as the amount of supplies which could be expected from the country bordering on lake Erie. In the letter to the secretary of war, of the 27th of September, it will be seen that it was his intention to embody his army at the rapids of the Miami, by three different routes or lines of operation. The one therein designated as the *right*, upon which the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades were to march to *Upper Sandusky*, was found to be too far east for the latter, which, crossing the Ohio at the mouth of the Kenhawa, fell into the great road leading up the valley of Sciota in the vicinity of Chillicothe, and proceeded thence by Franklinton and Delaware to Sandusky. This then became the line of operation and supply for the right wing of the army, and the troops and stores from Pittsburgh^h

* History of the War.

were not of course upon it until they reached Upper Sandusky. Of the three routes of approach to the Miami rapids, (considering the commencement of each at the line of settlements along the boundary established by the treaty of Greenville) that of the centre was the shortest, the left rather the longest, but passing over somewhat better ground, as it avoided the black swamp. All were, however, bad enough, and would have been considered impracticable for the operations of a European army. In most other countries the elevated lands from which arise water courses falling in opposite directions, are generally broken and mountainous; in that which we are describing, the rivers almost universally have their origin in swamps. In passing from the summit level between the waters of Ohio and lake Erie, towards the latter, the best ground for roads is invariably to be found along the margin of the water courses, hence the left route pursued the course of the Auglaize and Miami, and that of the right the Sandusky river, as far as the latter preserved the direction of the rapids. From the point, however, where it becomes necessary to leave the Sandusky river to reach the rapids, an extensive swamp intervened, which, from its dark and frightful appearance, obtained the appellation of the *black swamp*. It commences near to the Auglaize river, and pursuing a course parallel to the Miami, terminates on lake Erie, above the mouth of Portage river. In the month of July preceding, a road had been laid across the swamp, from Lower Sandusky, to the Miami rapids, under the authority of the state of Ohio. General Harrison had been informed that with proper clearing out, it might be made passable for wagons. It appeared, however, that he had been misinformed, for in a letter to the secretary of war of the 26th October, he says, "I now find from general Beall, who was one of the commissioners, that it will not be passable for wagons after the autumnal rains, unless it be causewayed for fifteen miles. This intelligence is extremely embarrassing, and leaves me only a choice of difficulties. There can, however, be no doubt that the swamp may be easily passed after it becomes frozen, but this cannot be calculated on, as general Perkins informs me, before the first of January: there is, however, a possibility of using a branch of the lake from Sandusky to the Miami bay. It is so important that I should correctly understand every thing which relates to the Sandusky route, that I have determined to proceed thither immediately."

Pursuant to the intention here given, the General set out for general Wadsworth's camp, near the mouth of the river Huron, to examine the practicability of turning the black swamp by passing on the shore of the lake. A personal and particular investigation convinced him that no passage could be procured in that direction, and no alternative remained but to cross the black swamp, through which, as yet, no attempt had been made

to open a road. General Perkins' brigade, which had been formed out of the troops under general Wadsworth, was ordered to advance from their position on the river Huron to Lower Sandusky, and to commence the road through the swamp. Having given these directions, the General returned towards the interior, and on the 9th of November, we find him at Delaware, where he met the Virginia brigade under the command of brigadier-general Leftwitch. We must, however, leave him for some time, to notice some important events, which had occurred in a distant part of his command. The command of fort Harrison, on the Wabash, had been intrusted to captain Zachariah Taylor, of the regular army, with a garrison of about fifty men. This fort was attacked on the night of the 4th of September, by a large body of Indians. A part of them had been around the fort for some days, having with them women and children. On the third, they had requested permission to enter the fort, under the pretence of holding a council: this was, however, refused by the captain. Finding that they were not able to effect their object of taking the fort by this stratagem, on the night of the 4th they set fire to one of the block houses, in which the provisions of the garrison were kept. The fire communicating to some barrels of whiskey, raged with such violence that it was impossible to extinguish it, and the Indians having surrounded the fort with their whole force, kept up a constant fire upon every part of the works. The captain, although extremely feeble from the effects of a bilious fever, conducted himself with the utmost gallantry and coolness. He was well seconded by doctor Clark, the surgeon's mate, who was the only other commissioned officer in the fort. The doctor mounted the barracks, adjacent to the burning block-house, and prevented the flames from extending to them, although the Indians were firing volleys of balls to drive him and the men who assisted him from their position. Captain Taylor, in the mean time, was employed in pulling down a small building within the fort, and with the materials constructing a parapet across the opening made by the burning of the block-house.

The Indians attempted frequently to penetrate the fort where the block-house had stood, and to set fire to the fort in other parts, but always were bravely repulsed by the garrison and their gallant commander. At day-break the Indians retreated, and having hovered around the fort some days, and finding no opportunity to effect their purpose, quietly retired.

The provisions of the garrison having been consumed, they were for some time in a starving condition, but were at length relieved by colonel Russell, who on the 13th reached the fort, at the head of some companies of rangers and Indiana militia. The provisions were in several wagons coming on from Vincennes, under an escort of a lieutenant Fairbanks, and thirteen

privates of the regular troops: these were surprised in their encampment, and all killed but two or three. They were, however, soon followed by a large command which reached the fort in safety.

The Indians, exasperated by their failure in this expedition, shortly after attacked the settlement at a place called the Pigeon Roost, on the frontier of Clark county, and murdered twenty-one of the inhabitants, some of them women and children, with circumstances of horrid barbarity.

When General Harrison's suite arrived at Piqua, in the beginning of September, he had requested governor Shelby to send a sufficient force not only to protect the frontiers of Indiana and Illinois territories, but also as the best means of effecting it to carry on offensive operations against their towns. Conformably to this request, a body of volunteer mounted riflemen, to the amount of about 2000 rendezvoused at Vincennes in the latter end of September, and being organized by major-general Hopkins (who, as we have already remarked, had been appointed by General Harrison to command in that quarter of the country,) proceeded on an expedition against the Kickapoo towns on the Illinois river. This corps marched from Vincennes early in October, and proceeding to fort Harrison, crossed the Wabash at that place, and entered the immense prairies which separate the Wabash and Illinois rivers.

After penetrating the country in a northwardly direction for several days, provisions becoming scarce, and the men much dissatisfied with the difficulties of the march, and the uncertainty as to their being in the proper direction to reach their object, a council of war was held, which unanimously recommended a retreat. The general opposed this measure, and the next morning attempted to force them to continue their march; but the column took the contrary route in despite of his orders and remonstrances. No Indians were discovered in this expedition, but our troops were discovered by the Indians, who set fire to the prairie for the purpose of annoying the invaders. General Hopkins, in his official report, says that this fire produced in his camp the most violent storm of wind he had ever seen without a cloud. To prevent injury from the approaching fire, recourse was had to the usual expedient of the prairie hunters in a similar situation, of setting fire to the prairie themselves, and then occupying the ground over which the fire has passed. Much censure was cast on the general by some of his officers; he retorted upon them the charge of having defeated the enterprise by their mutinous conduct. Upon his return to Kentucky, general Hopkins demanded a court of enquiry, which fully acquitted him of all blame.

Having discharged the mounted corps, general Hopkins determined upon conducting an expedition of infantry up the

Wabash, to destroy the villages which had been erected at Tippecanoe and in its vicinity, after the campaign of 1811. The force led by the general on this occasion consisted of three Kentucky regiments, a small company of regular troops under captain Z. Taylor, and about eighty rangers on horseback. They penetrated to Tippecanoe and destroyed about 20 houses at that place, and some other small villages, without seeing an enemy. On the 21st of November, however, a small scouting party were fired on, about seven miles east of Tippecanoe, and one man killed. On the succeeding day about 60 mounted men, under the command of colonels Wilcox and Millar were sent to bring in the dead man. When they approached the place where he had been killed, a single Indian was seen on horse back in the prairie, who, affecting great alarm, fled at full speed. The whole party followed, without any order or arrangement for action, and were led into an ambuscade formed by a large body of Indians placed on either side of the tract they were passing. Eighteen of our men fell on this occasion. Upon the return of the survivors to general Hopkins' camp, he determined to march in pursuit of the Indians, but a snow storm kept him two days in his camp, after which, his efforts to find them were unavailing, and his troops being destitute of clothing suitable to the severe cold which then prevailed, he returned to Vincennes.

An expedition simultaneous to the mounted one under general Hopkins, set out from Cahokia under the orders of governor Edwards and colonel Russell. It consisted of about 4 or 500 United States rangers and Illinois mounted militia. They surprised the Kickpoos' town of Pioria on the Illinois river, and killed and dispersed its inhabitants. This terminated the offensive war in that quarter, and we now return to the operations of the main army.

We left the commanding general at Delaware, just returned from a fruitless search of a passage for his troops and stores across or around the black swamp. At Delaware the Virginia brigade had arrived on the 6th Nov. and he was in daily expectation of hearing of the arrival of the Pennsylvania brigade at Mansfield. From his letter to the secretary of war of the 9th of November, he announces his intention of causing these two corps to form a junction at the Upper Sandusky, at which place he intended to form one of the principal depots of his army. It has been mentioned above that the deputy quarter-master-general, colonel Morrison, had gone into Kentucky from Urbanna, to procure funds for his department, and the means of transportation for the army. The other deputy quarter-master-general, captain Piatt, (for there were two of the same grade and rank in the department,) had remained with the General, and had

used unceasing exertions to procure the supplies which the country afforded, and advance them as fast as possible on the destined route. As the passage of the black swamp was deemed absolutely impracticable, until it should be made firm by the severe frosts of winter, Upper Sandusky was chosen as the first general depot. But even to this place the transportation of provisions was attended with immense difficulty and expense. About the second week in November commenced a fall of rain, which continued for several days, and rendered the roads almost impassable: in adverting to this circumstance, in his letter to the secretary of war, of the ninth November, the General, after describing the bad effect which it would have upon the movements on the right and centre lines, comforts himself with the reflection, that the waters of the Miami of the lake would be so much raised as to become navigable, and that the boats and perogues which he had ordered to be built at St. Mary's, fort Jennings, and fort Winchester, would be enabled to take down a large quantity of provisions, and make up the deficiency occasioned by the increased difficulties of the land transportation. To leave nothing undone to secure the support of his army in their final advance upon the enemy, the General had made attempts to draw some supplies from that part of the country which borders on lake Erie; the contractor at Buffalo was desired to forward 500,000 rations; boats were purchased at Cleveland, and directions given to have them loaded with every thing that could be converted to the use of man or beast. In a letter to the secretary of war, of the 15th November, the General says, "My preparations for the principal object of the campaign are progressing, not however with the rapidity correspondent to my wishes, and I think I may say, to my personal exertions." He then proceeds to give a detailed view of the situation of the supplies on the several routes or lines of operation, and the measures which had been taken to forward them to the Miami rapids. Boats and perogues were provided at St. Mary's and on the Auglaize, to take advantage of a rise of waters in those rivers; and sleds, in the event of a sufficient fall of snow. In the mean time, every effort was made to effect the transportation with wagons. Upon this subject the General, in the letter above quoted, thus expresses himself: "You can have no idea, Sir, of the difficulty with which land transportation is effected north of the fortieth degree of latitude in this region. The country beyond that is almost a continued swamp to the lakes. Where the streams run favourable to your course, a small strip of better ground is generally found; but in crossing from one river to another, the greater part of the way at this season is covered with water. Such is actually the situation of that space between the Sandusky and the Miami rivers, and from the best information I could acquire, whilst I was at Hu-

ron, the road over it must be causewayed at least half the way. On the subject of the expenses of the campaign, the General in the same letter observes, "Colonel Morrison arrived here yesterday; he is very uneasy upon the subject of funds for his department. I fear that the expense of this expedition will greatly exceed the calculations which have been made the grounds for the appropriations of funds for the quarter-master's use. A single fact will at once show the difficulty of the undertaking and the expense which will attend it. We are now purchasing corn here, to be transported to Upper Sandusky. Colonel Morrison believes that it will require two wagons with corn to support their own teams, and one other with flour, to that place and back again. And yet there must be a deposit there of grain for the support of all the horses and oxen of the ordnance, quarter-master's, and commissary's departments, in the advance of the army thence, and which must amount to at least two thousand. The object to be accomplished is, however, considered of great national importance and expense must not be regarded. The government may, however, be perfectly satisfied that every dollar that is appropriated will be faithfully and as economically employed as possible."

It will be seen from this, and the other extracts from the correspondence of the General with the war department, that the government were constantly informed of all the difficulties which opposed the progress of the army, as well as the enormous expense which attended its operations. To show that these difficulties were not exaggerated, we introduce an extract of a letter from major Hardin, one of general Winchester's officers, to governor Shelby, which is contained in M'Affee's History:

"The late rains have rendered the roads desperate. I learn that this route is considered the best of the three, along which provisions are to be conveyed—if so, I am certain that it is morally impossible to provision the army at Detroit by land. Indeed, such is the state of the road, that no wagon can take its own forage from Piqua to the rapids. As for a water carriage, we could have it to the rapids; but while the enemy commands the lake, we are there cut short. I therefore deem it impracticable to penetrate Canada from this quarter at this season—"

"I know that it will be mortifying to Kentucky for this army to return without doing any thing—but it is better to do that than to attempt impossibilities. I wish to God the public mind were informed of our difficulties, and gradually prepared for this course. In my opinion, we should in this quarter disband all but those sufficient for a strong frontier guard, and for convoys, &c. and prepare for the next season."

In an extract of one of the General's letters to the secretary of war, quoted above, it was mentioned that brigadier-general

Tupper, with 1000 Ohio militia, was advancing on the middle route to fort M'Arthur, forty-five miles from Urbanna. This officer having ascertained that a body of Indians and British were at the Miami rapids, determined on attempting to dislodge them. Having formed a detachment consisting of about 700 volunteers, with a six pounder, he commenced his march, and reached the Miami river a little after night on the 13th November. His scouts having been detached across the river to discover the position of the enemy, reported upon their return that the allies were encamped together in close order, and that the Indians were engaged in singing and dancing. The troops were immediately marched to a ford at some distance above, and a disposition made to pass it. Tupper, with about 200 of his men, reached the opposite bank; but the current being extremely swift, and the bottom very uneven, some of the men were washed down, lost their guns, and were with difficulty saved. Recourse was then had to the few horses which were with them, but this, too, was unsuccessful, from their extreme weakness: it was also very cold and the men suffered much. From that circumstance, it was judged best to retrace the part which had effected their passage, and retire to the woods to encamp.

General Tupper had informed general Winchester of his intended enterprise, by an express from fort M'Arthur, and on the morning of the 14th, he despatched another messenger to apprise that officer of his situation, and suggesting the propriety of his sending a reinforcement. He informed him, however, that he would not be able to remain longer than another day without a supply of provisions.

The morning after the unsuccessful attempt to cross the river, Tupper marched his detachment down the river, opposite to the encampment of the enemy, and having his main body covered by the woods, sent his scouts to show themselves on the bank of the river, and endeavour to draw the enemy across; the attempt proving unsuccessful, he displayed his whole force to their view. The British immediately hurried to their boats and made off with the utmost precipitation. The Indians shewed rather more boldness; a detachment of them crossed the river above on horseback, and killed four of our men who had imprudently pursued a drove of hogs to the distance of half a mile from the main body. Tupper's troops being in the woods, some distance from the river (a prairie intervening) a party of Indians, headed by Split Log, a Wyandot chief, attempted to pass the river, but were driven back by major Bently's battalion, with some loss. The piece of artillery with which Tupper had commenced his march, and which would have been of use on this occasion, had been left behind from the badness of the roads.

When Tupper's second express reached general Winchester's camp, he found that a detachment of four hundred men had been

sent out under the command of colonel Lewis, to march to his support; they proceeded, on the morning of the 15th, down the left bank of the river, and in the course of the night ensign Charles S. Todd was sent with a few men by colonel Lewis to apprise Tupper of his approach, to concert the time and manner of forming a junction of the two corps. Todd found Tupper's camp evacuated, and the bodies of two men who had been killed and scalped. Todd returning with this information to colonel Lewis, that officer retreated with his command to Winchester's camp. If this expedition did not produce all the good which might have resulted from it, it was of great service in one particular. The detachment of British and Indians, consisting of about 400 of the latter and 75 of the former, fell back upon the river Raisin, and gave up the idea of removing the corn from the abandoned farms at the rapids, which was the object of their being at that place.

Shortly after this expedition of Tupper's, General Harrison despatched Black Hoof, the principal chief of the Shawnoe tribe, with about twenty of his warriors, to reconnoitre in the direction of the rapids. He was accompanied by captain James Logan, another chief of that tribe.

General Harrison had the utmost confidence in the fidelity of these men, from an intimate acquaintance of many years' standing, or he would not have suffered them to be placed in a situation where they could have intercourse with the hostile Indians. This party, in the vicinity of the rapids, fell in with a superior body of the British Indians, and being hotly pursued, dispersed, the more easily to effect their escape. Black Hoof took the direction of fort M'Arthur; Logan being unable to effect the passage of the river, retreated to the camp of General Winchester, with two warriors of his tribe, captain Johnny and Bright Horn. Many of the officers of general Winchester's camp viewed these men with suspicion, and discredited the account they had given, of the circumstances which brought them there. The written orders of General Harrison which they were instructed to show to any American party they might meet with, were in the possession of Black Hoof. Logan was possessed of a high sense of honour: the suspicions of his being a traitor to the cause which he had espoused, and to his friend General Harrison, stung him deeply, and he resolved to remove them or perish in the attempt.

On the 22d November he left the camp, attended by his two warriors, and again took the direction of the rapids. They had not proceeded above 10 miles when they met a reconnoitring party of the enemy, consisting of a son of Elliot, the British Indian agent, who was a lieutenant in the British service, and five Indians. The meeting of these parties was so sudden, and four of them

being on horseback, that there was no chance for Logan and his warriors to escape. He therefore marched boldly up to them and declared that he was on his way to Malden, to give information to the British general. Among the British Indians was Winemac, a chief whom we have several times mentioned in this work, who was well acquainted with Logan and his attachment to General Harrison. After conversing for some time together, they all set out on the way to Malden, both parties watchfully regarding each other. It was Logan's intention to have gone on until night, and then effect his escape. But in the course of their march, he heard a conversation between Winemac and the officer in the Potawatamie language, which it was supposed he did not understand, and in which the former advised that the Shawonese should be killed. This determined Logan to seize the first opportunity of attacking them, which occurred after they had proceeded about eight miles.

Having previously directed his two followers to be ready and follow his example, he seized the moment when the officer had laid his gun upon his saddle before him, and was reaching up to pull some winter grapes which hung from a small tree; the signal was given, he shot Winemac himself, one of his companions brought down the officer. Both parties then *treed*. Logan's second man kept the enemy at bay, until his friends had reloaded. Several shots from the enemy were ineffectual, but the second fire from Logan's party killed a young Ottawa chief; Logan, however, soon afterwards received a mortal wound—the ball struck him immediately below the breast bone, and taking a downward direction, lodged in the skin near his back bone: at the same time, Bright Horn was also shot through the thigh, and another of the enemy was mortally wounded. When Logan was wounded, he immediately directed his men to retreat. Himself and Bright Horn each seized one of the enemy's horses, and in five hours arrived safe at Winchester's camp, a distance of eighteen or twenty miles. Captain Johnny, after taking the scalp off the Ottawa chief, also arrived safe in camp the next morning. Simultaneously with the retreat of Logan, the remaining two Potawatamies had seized the other two horses, and pushed off in the opposite direction. Logan's wound proved mortal. He bore the extreme agony which he suffered for two days with uncommon magnanimity. Speaking of his late action he laughed; when being asked the cause, he said he was laughing at the contest between captain Johnny and the Ottawa chief for the scalp of the latter. Whilst Logan was endeavouring to mount the horse of the deceased officer, Johnny attempted to scalp the Ottawa, who being not yet dead, made resistance, and seemed unwilling to part with his hair. Johnny, however, seated astride upon his breast, despatched his antagonist, and effected his purpose.

"More firmness and consummate bravery has seldom appeared on the military theatre," says Winchester, in his letter to the commanding general. "He was buried with all the honors due to his rank, and with sorrow as sincerely and generally displayed, as I ever witnessed," says major Hardin, in a letter to governor Shelby. His physiognomy was formed on the best model, and exhibited the strongest marks of courage, intelligence, good humour, and sincerity. It was said by the Indians, that the British had offered one hundred and fifty dollars for his scalp. He had been very serviceable to our cause by acting as a guide and a spy. He had gone with general Hull to Detroit, and with the first Kentucky troops, who marched to the relief of fort Wayne.

"Captain Logan had been taken prisoner by general Logan of Kentucky in the year 1786, when he was a youth. The general on parting with him, had given him his name, which he retained to the end of his life. Before the treaty of Greenville, he had distinguished himself as a warrior, though still very young. His mother was a sister to the celebrated Tecumseh and the Prophet. He stated, that in the summer, preceding his death, he had talked one whole night with Tecumseh, and endeavoured to persuade him to remain at peace, while Tecumseh on the contrary endeavoured to engage him in the war on the side of the British. His wife when she was young, had also been taken prisoner by colonel Hardin in 1789, and had remained in the family till the treaty of Greenville. In the army he had formed an attachment for major Hardin, the son of the colonel, and son-in-law of general Logan, and now requested him, to see that the money due for his services was faithfully paid to his family. He also requested that his family might be removed immediately to Kentucky, and his children educated and brought up in the manner of the white people. He observed that he had killed a great chief, that the hostile Indians knew where his family lived, and that when he was gone, a few base fellows might creep up and destroy them."*

The attention of the commanding General was not exclusively directed to the preparations for the accomplishment of the main objects of the campaign. He did not forget that in his advance upon Malden, he was leaving in his rear a numerous, active, and dangerous enemy, who might harass the frontiers and intercept his convoys. Being sensible that no defensive measures within his power to adopt, could effectually prevent these mischiefs, he determined upon carrying the war into their own country, to break up those of their positions from which their hostile enterprises could with most facility be carried on. This determination he had made as soon as he was apprised, although unof-

* History of the War.

ficially, of the failure of the expedition which had been intrusted to general Hopkins. In his letter to the secretary of war of the 15th of November, speaking on this subject, he says:

"I have received no information from general Hopkins; but there is no doubt of the complete failure of the mounted expedition under his command, and that measures must be immediately taken to prevent the evils which will otherwise flow from it. As soon as the information reached me, I determined to direct an expedition against the Miami towns of Mississiniway. The situation of this town, as it regards one of my lines of operation, even if the hostility of the inhabitants was less equivocal, would render a measure of this kind highly proper; but from the circumstance of general Hopkins' failure, it has become indispensable. Relieved from the fears excited by the late invasion of their country, the Indians from the upper part of the Illinois river, and to the south of lake Michigan, will direct all their efforts against fort Wayne, and the convoys which are to follow the track of the left wing of the army. Mississiniway will be their rendezvous, where they will receive provisions and every assistance they may require for any hostile enterprize. From that place they can by their runners ascertain the period at which every convoy may set out from St. Mary's, and with certainty intercept it previously to its arrival at the Miami rapids; but that place being broken up and the provisions destroyed, there will be nothing to subsist any body of Indians nearer than the Potawatamie towns upon the waters of the St. Joseph's of lake Michigan. The troops destined for the Mississiniway expedition, are the dragoons belonging to my army, with the addition, perhaps, of a single company of mounted volunteers. The dragoons will amount to about 600, but the greater part of them are entirely to be relied upon. The expedition will be commanded by lieutenant colonel Campbell of the 19th regiment. He has not military experience, but is brave, sensible, and judicious, and will be ably seconded by the talents and experience of major Ball. I am confident that you will not hear of any retrograde movement, upon the part of this detachment, until the object upon which they are sent is accomplished."

Lieut. colonel Campbell of the 19th United States regiment, who was appointed to command this detachment, marched from Franklinton on the 25th of November. His command consisted of a regiment of Kentucky militia dragoons, headed by colonel Simrall, a squadron of United States dragoons, under major James V. Ball; Elliott's company of the 19th regiment infantry, a small company of volunteer riflemen from Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, under captain Alexander, and the company of Pittsburg volunteer light infantry under the command of captain James Buller. These were all mounted on horses hired for the purpose; they formed a body of six hundred men. The delay occasion-

ed by the difficulty of procuring horses for the infantry, detained the detachment at Dayton, much longer than was expected; and it was not until the 14th of November that they were enabled to march from that place. Each man carried ten day's provisions for himself, and as much forage as they could with convenience. The weather was extremely cold, and the ground covered with snow. Having arrived at the distance of about twenty miles from the first village, in the evening of the 3d day, colonel Campbell, with the advice of his officers, determined to march all night for the purpose of surprising the enemy. This was in part effected, and would have been more complete, but for an imprudent shout which was given by some of the men as they entered the town. This enabled many of the Indians to escape over the river. Some who remained, made a little resistance, but soon surrendered. Eight warriors were killed, and forty-two prisoners, men, women, and children taken. The place taken was the first of a succession of villages on the river. The dragoons proceeded down the river, and found three other villages abandoned; they were burnt, and the property either destroyed or brought off. Upon the return of the dragoons, it was thought proper to encamp. Indeed the whole detachment having been thirty six-hours on horseback, with very little intermission, were incapable of further exertion without some rest. The encampment was formed on the bank of the Mississiniway, and seems to have been chosen with judgment, and every proper measure taken for defence. The troops were called up and put under arms two hours before day. The centinels reported that they had frequently seen Indians during the night, apparently examining their position; an attack was therefore anticipated. About half an hour before day, whilst the field officers were consulting upon the propriety of marching against the principal village, which was twelve miles lower down, the attack commenced.— Captain Pierce, of the Ohio troops, who commanded the guard opposite to the point attacked, bravely maintained his station until he was killed. This guard being defeated, the enemy attacked the line defended by major Ball's squadron; they were, however, bravely repulsed;—towards daylight, several charges were made from the line, which determined the contest. The enemy left fifteen dead on the ground; many more were, however, taken away or thrown into the river. All the corps composing this detachment behaved well. Captain Trotter, lieutenants Hedges, Basey, and Hickman, were amongst the wounded;—lieutenant Waltz, of captain Markle's company was killed. At the close of the action, eight were found dead, and forty-eight wounded, several of whom died afterwards. As soon after the action as litters could be made to convey the wounded, the detachment commenced their march to return. Colonel Campbell having learned from one of the prisoners that Tecumseh with

600 warriors was on the Wabash at no great distance below him, thought it not prudent to remain long in his position, encumbered with wounded and with prisoners. Many of his men had been frost bitten, and the cold still continued very severe. Prosecuting their march slowly, when they reached the frontiers, nearly one half of the command were unfit for duty, from sickness, frost, and wounds. A messenger having been sent to the commanding General the day after the action, they were met by a reinforcement of ninety men with provisions, for which they began to suffer much.

In the general order which was issued by General Harrison, after the return of the detachment, the officers and men were highly complimented for their good conduct on this occasion.—The following is the concluding paragraph of the order.

“But the character of this gallant detachment, exhibiting as it did, perseverance, fortitude, and bravery, would however be incomplete, if in the midst of victory they had forgotten the feelings of humanity. It is with the sincerest pleasure that the General has heard, that the most punctual obedience was paid to his orders in not only saving all the women and children, but in sparing all the warriors who ceased to resist; and that, even when vigorously attacked by the enemy, the claims of mercy prevailed over every sense of their own danger, and this heroic band respected the lives of their prisoners. Let an account of murdered innocence be opened in the records of heaven against our enemies alone. The American soldier will follow the example of his government, and the sword of the one will not be raised against the fallen and the helpless, nor the gold of the other be paid for the scalps of a massacred enemy.”

The effects of this expedition entirely answered the expectations of the commanding general. It served to confirm the wavering in their determination to accept of the offer which the government had made them to come and reside within the settlements. The Delawares, and some of the Miamis, came in and were settled between Piqua and Wapochounata. The frontiers also enjoyed perfect tranquillity and safety.

As the main object of this work is the vindication of the conduct of General Harrison, the author thinks himself authorised to use the testimony offered by the respectable work written by Mr. M'Affee of Kentucky, as it was composed not only by a person who had a share in the transactions which it relates, but was revised and corrected by a number of the most respectable officers who served in the north-western army. The propriety of this course is more evident as we approach the fatal catastrophe of the river Raisin. The work referred to makes large extracts from the correspondence of the commanding general with the department of war, explaining his views and intentions, interspersing them with a narration, the authenticity of which can

never be overthrown, supported as it is by evidence of the most respectable character, and of those who could have no possible motives for placing the conduct of the commanding general in any other than a true light. Besides the testimony of the Kentucky officers, the author of the History of the Western War had the good fortune to avail himself of a manuscript journal, kept by colonel Wood,* of the corps of engineers, who served throughout the campaign of 1812-13, in the northwestern army. This valuable document was deposited by its author in the library of the academy of Westpoint. General Swift, at that time the superintendant of that institution, furnished it for the use of the above work, at the request of colonel Charles Todd. Upon the completion of the work, it was returned to Westpoint, where it now remains. It will be seen that the author has made frequent quotations from that journal. After giving an account of the Mississiniquia expedition, the History of the Western War proceeds:

“ We must now recur again to the toilsome preparations for the main expedition against Malden, and the inglorious war which our troops were doomed to wage with the elements, which opposed their progress with all the powers and majesty of mud.

“ The troops composing the left wing under Winchester, when the season became severe, were exposed to many and great privations. They had left the greater part of their clothing, in the first instance, at Piqua, when marching to the relief of fort Wayne, and suffered considerably before they received it again. But as the winter came on, an additional supply of winter clothing became necessary. The government had ordered large supplies of this kind—but there was, in this stage of the war, an immense difference between the ordering of supplies and delivering them on the frontiers. Harrison and Shelby had also appealed to the patriotism of the people of Kentucky for voluntary contributions: and a considerable quantity of clothing was in this way collected, under the superintendance of governor Shelby. The ladies of Kentucky were not wanting in such patriotic services as they had it in their power to render. Of the clothing thus collected, however, but very little reached the army before Christmas, and much of it was entirely lost, owing to the misconduct of wagoners and wagon-masters, and the insuperable difficulties of transportation.

“ Soon after fort Winchester was finished, the left wing moved over the river and encamped on the north bank, for the convenience of firewood. The situation being wet and disagreeable, they presently moved down to a second, and then to a third camp, six miles below the Auglaize. About the first of Novem-

* For a biographical account of Colonel Wood, see Appendix.

ber they became extremely sickly. The typhus fever raged with violence, so that three or four would sometimes die in one day. Upwards of 300 were daily on the sick list, and so discouraging was the prospect of advancing, that about the first of December they were ordered to build huts for their accommodation. Many were so entirely destitute of shoes and other clothing, that they must have frozen, if they had been obliged to march any distance. And sometimes the whole army would be for many days entirely without flour.

“All these privations were caused in a great measure by the difficulties of transportation. The roads were bad beyond description: none but those who have actually seen the state of the country, seem ever to have formed a correct estimate of the difficulties to be encountered. The road from Loramie’s block house to the St. Mary’s and thence to Defiance, was one continued swamp, knee deep on the pack horses, and up to the hubs of the wagons. It was found impossible in some instances to get even the empty wagons along, and many were left sticking in the mire and ravines, the wagoners being glad to get off with the horses alive. Sometimes the quarter-master, taking advantage of a temporary freeze, would send off a convoy of provisions, which would be swamped by a thaw before it reached its destination. These natural difficulties were also increased by a great deficiency of funds, and inadequacy of the other resources which were requisite in the quarter-master’s department. The only persons who could be procured to act as pack-horse drivers, were generally the most worthless creatures in society, who took care neither of the horses nor the goods with which they were entrusted. The horses of course were soon broke down, and many of the packs lost. The teams hired to haul, were also commonly valued so high on coming into service, that the owners were willing to drive them to debility and death, with a view to get the price. In addition to this, no bills of lading were used, or accounts kept with the wagoners—of course each one had an opportunity to plunder the public without much risk of detection. We are hence not to wonder, when such were the difficulties and the means of surmounting them, that supplies were not more rapidly accumulated at the various places of deposite.

“The following account will exhibit the difficulties of water transportation. About the first of December, major Bodley, an enterprising officer, who was quarter-master of the Kentucky troops, made an attempt to send near 200 barrels of flour down the St. Mary’s in perogues to the left wing below Defiance. Previous to this time the water had rarely been high enough to venture on a voyage in those small streams. The flour was now shipped in fifteen or twenty perogues and canoes, and placed under the command of captain Jordan and lieuten-

ant Cardwell, with upwards of twenty men. They descended the river and arrived about a week afterwards at Shane's crossing, upwards of one hundred miles by water, but only twenty by land from the place whence they started. The river was so narrow, crooked, full of logs, and trees overhanging the banks, that it was with great difficulty they could make any progress. And now in one freezing night they were completely ice bound. Lieutenant Cardwell waded back through the ice and swamps to fort Barbee with the intelligence of their situation. Major Bodley returned with him to the flour, and offered the men extra wages to cut through the ice and push forwards; but having gained only one mile by two days' labour, the project was abandoned, and a guard left with the flour. A few days before Christmas a temporary thaw took place, which enabled them with much difficulty and suffering to reach within a few miles of fort Wayne, where they were again frozen up. They now abandoned the voyage, and made sleds on which the men hauled the flour to the fort and left it there.

"In the mean time, general Winchester's wing was suffering the greatest privations. Trusting to this attempt to convey supplies by water, the exertions by land were relaxed. From the 10th to the 22d of this month, the camp was without flour, and for some time before, they had only half rations. Poor beef and hickory roots were their whole subsistence. At the same time fevers and other diseases raged in almost every tent, in which the sick were exposed, not only to hunger, but to the inclemency of the season. The necessary vigilance of the general induced him to send out reconnoitring parties very frequently, which still farther exposed the men. Yet they disdained to murmur, or to utter a thought derogatory to the honor of their country. About the first of this month General Harrison had thought his supplies in such a state of forwardness, that he could very soon concentrate his forces at the Rapids; and had instructed general Winchester to proceed to that place as soon as he had provisions for a few weeks on hand—but in the circumstances above described, his condition was very different from that which would authorize him to advance.

"The other divisions of the army had not been pushed out so far as the left wing, and of course had not to encounter such great privations. Their sufferings, however, were sufficiently great, and the difficulties of transportation with them may be understood from the details we have given in relation to the left wing. In the following extracts from a letter addressed to the war department by general Harrison, and dated on the 12th of December, at Delaware, the reader will find some notice of these difficulties, together with a development of the views and plans of the commanding general at this stage of the campaign.

“ Since I had the honor to write on the — every exertion has been made, and every engine put into operation to procure and forward supplies for the army to the advanced posts. The difficulties which have been, and which are still to be encountered in this business are almost insuperable; but they are opposed with unabated firmness and zeal. The greatest obstacle to our success is the want of forage, which for this line we are obliged to bring from the neighborhood of Chillicothe at an immense expense, which can scarcely be conceived.

“ I fear that the expenses of this army will greatly exceed the calculations of the government. The prodigious destruction of horses can only be conceived by those, who have been accustomed to military operations in a wilderness during the winter season. The fine teams which arrived on the 10th instant at Sandusky with the artillery, are entirely worn down; and two trips from M. Arthur's block house, our nearest deposit to the Rapids, will completely destroy a brigade of pack-horses.

“ If there were not some important political reason, urging the recovery of the Michigan territory, and the capture of Malden, as soon as those objects can possibly be effected; and that to accomplish them a few weeks sooner, expense was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say, that if a small proportion of the sums, which will be expended in the quartermaster's department, in the active prosecution of the campaign during the winter, was devoted to obtaining the command of lake Erie, the wishes of the government in their utmost extent, could be accomplished without difficulty in the months of April and May. Malden, Detroit, and Macinaw would fall in rapid succession. On the contrary, all that I can certainly promise to accomplish during the winter, unless the strait should afford us a passage on the ice, is to recover Detroit. I must further observe, that no military man would think of retaining Detroit, Malden being in possession of the enemy, unless his army was at least twice as strong as the disposable force of the enemy. An army advancing to Detroit along a line of operation, passing so near the principal force of the enemy, as to allow them access to it whenever they think proper, must be covered by another army more considerable than the disposable force of the enemy. I mention this circumstance to show, that the attack ought not to be directed against Detroit, *but against Malden*, and that it depends upon the ice affording a safe passage across the strait, whether I shall be able to proceed in this way or not. Detroit is not tenable. Were I to take it without having it in my power to occupy the opposite shore, I should be under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent swamp, to preserve it from the effects of the shot and shells, which the enemy would throw with impunity from the opposite shore.— This result is so obvious to every man who has the least milita-

ry information, that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other part of general Hull's conduct, that he should choose to defend Detroit rather than attack Malden. There is another circumstance, Sir, which will claim attention. Admitting that Malden and Detroit are both taken, Macinaw and St. Josephs will both remain in the hands of the enemy, until we can create a force capable of contending with the vessels, which the British have in lake Michigan, and which they will be enabled to maintain there, as long as the canoe route by Grand river and lake Nississin shall remain open, and for six months after.

“I have conceived it proper, Sir, to lay these statements before you. If it should be asked, why they were not made sooner—I answer, that although I was always sensible, that there were great difficulties to be encountered, in the accomplishment of the wishes of the president, in relation to the recovery of Detroit, and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inexperience of the public agents, and the villany of the contractors. I am still however very far from believing, that the original plan is impracticable. I believe on the contrary, that it can be effected. And as I know that my personal fame is materially interested in its success in the manner first proposed, my feelings are all engaged in opposition to any delay. But I should illy deserve the confidence of the people or the president, if I were capable of being influenced by a private consideration, to withhold from the government any statement, which might throw light upon the operations of an army, the success of which is so important to the character, as well as to the interests of the country. If it should be the determination, to disregard expense, and push on the operations of the army, in the manner that they have been commenced, the president may rely on the exertions of the troops, which I shall employ in the final effort. I shall be much disappointed, if I cannot select three or four thousand men from the army, who will do as much as the same number of men, in a similar state of discipline, ever did. If the plan of acquiring naval superiority upon the lakes, before the attempt is made on Malden or Detroit, should be adopted, I would place fifteen hundred men in cantonments, at the Miami Rapids, (Defiance would be better if the troops had not advanced from thence) retain about one thousand more to be distributed in different garrisons, accumulate provisions at St. Mary's, Tawa Town, Upper Sandusky, Cleveland, and Presque Isle, and employ the dragoons and mounted infantry, in desultory expeditions against the Indians. The villages south of lake Michigan might be struck with effect, by making a deposite of corn and provisions at fort Wayne.

“I am much disappointed in the artillery which has been sent me. There are in all twenty-eight pieces, of which ten are

sixes, and ten twelve pounders—the former are nearly useless. I had five before, and if I had a hundred, I should only take three or four with me. You will perceive by the return of captain Gratiot, which is enclosed, that all the carriages for the howitzers, and eight out of ten for the twelve pounders, are unfit for use.’

“ Before the above letter was received at the war department, Mr. Monroe had become the acting secretary, after the resignation of Dr. Eustis, and had written a long letter to General Harrison on the military affairs of the northwest. That letter was immediately answered by the General, and the correspondence on these subjects was continued through several others, in which the prospects of the campaign, and the proper measures to be pursued, were very comprehensively and ably discussed between the secretary and the General. The result of the whole was, that General Harrison was left to prosecute the campaign in pursuance of his own views; and the government determined to make the most active and vigorous exertions to obtain the command of the lake, which they expected to accomplish early in the spring. Positive instructions were given to the General on two points alone. He was ordered, in the event of entering Canada, to pledge the government to the inhabitants no further than a promise of protection in their lives, liberty, and property. He was also instructed, not to make any transitory acquisitions, or to wrest any of their possessions from the enemy with temporary views only, but to advance prepared to hold all the ground he could gain. He was told that the President was not so anxious to push on the expedition with rapidity, as to be well prepared to render permanent any acquisition that might be made. Some further extracts from this correspondence will be given, after we have detailed some of the movements which took place about this time, as the different corps were advancing towards a concentration for the main expedition.

“ Early in December, a detachment of Perkins’s brigade arrived at Lower Sandusky, and repaired an old stockade which had been erected to protect an Indian store, formerly established at that place by the government. Soon afterwards the whole of the brigade arrived at that post. On the tenth a battalion of Pennsylvanians reached Upper Sandusky with twenty-one pieces of artillery, which had been brought from Pittsburgh by lieutenant Hukill. A regiment of the same troops, and some companies of the Virginia brigade were immediately sent after them by general Harrison to strengthen that important depot; and about the twentieth he arrived himself and established his head quarters at the same place. Whilst there, he received communications from colonel Campbell, informing him of the result of the expedition to Mississinaway, which induced him to return to Chillicothe, to concert with governor Meigs another

expedition to the same place, more effectually to subdue the Indians in that quarter. As he was proceeding again to the frontiers, he received at Franklinton the letter from Mr. secretary Monroe, mentioned above, from which the following is an extract:

“At this distance, and with an imperfect knowledge of the actual state of things, it is impossible for the president to decide, satisfactorily to himself, or with advantage to the public, whether it is practicable for you to accomplish the objects of the expedition in their full extent during the present winter.—No person can be so competent to that decision as yourself; and the President has great confidence in the solidity of the opinion which you may form. He wishes you to weigh maturely this important subject, and take that part which your judgment may dictate. It is expected that you will forthwith form a clear and distinct plan, as to the objects which you may deem attainable, the time within which they may be attained, and the force necessary for the purpose; and that you communicate the same with precision to this department. As soon as you have formed this plan, you will proceed to execute it, without waiting for an answer; and as soon as the government is made acquainted with it, measures will be adopted to give to your operations all the aid in its power.”

“The following are extracts from the answers of General Harrison, which are dated the 4th and 8th of January at Franklinton.

“When I was directed to take the command in the latter end of September, I thought it possible by great exertions to effect the objects of the campaign before the setting in of winter. I distinctly stated, however, to the secretary of war, that there was always a period of rainy weather in this country, in the months of November and December, in which the roads within the settlements were almost impassable, and the swamps which extend northwardly from about the 40th degree of north latitude entirely so; and that this circumstance would render it impossible to advance with the army before that period, without exposing it to inevitable destruction, unless a sufficiency of provisions could be taken on to subsist it until the severe frosts should remove the impediments to transportation.

“The experience of a few days was sufficient to convince me, that the supplies of provisions could not be procured for our autumnal advance; and even if this difficulty was removed, another of equal magnitude existed in the want of artillery. There remained, then, no alternative but to prepare for a winter campaign. But in order to take advantage of every circumstance in our favour, boats and perogues were prepared in considerable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Mary's, in the hope that when the land transportation could not be used, we might

by the means of these rivers, take on large supplies to the Rapids of the Miami. An effort was made also, to procure flour from Presque Isle, by coasting the lake with small boats. These measures were calculated on, as collateral aids only. The more sure one of providing a large number of pack-horses and ox teams was resorted to, and the deputy quarter-master general, colonel Morrison, was instructed accordingly. Considering the Miami Rapids as the first point of destination, provisions were ordered to be accumulated along a concave base, extending from St. Mary's on the left, to the mouth of the Huron, and afterwards Lower Sandusky on the right. From this base, the Rapids could be approached by three routes, or lines of operation, two of which were pretty effectually secured by the posts which were established and the positions taken upon the third. St. Mary's, M^rArthur's block-house, and Upper Sandusky were selected as principal depositories. The troops, excepting those with general Winchester, were kept within the bounds of the local contractors, that they might not consume the provisions procured by the United States' commissaries, and which were intended to form the grand deposit at the Miami Rapids. It was not until late in October that much effect could be given to these arrangements; and for the six following weeks little or nothing could be done from the uncommonly unfavorable state of the weather, which afforded just rain enough to render the roads almost impassable for wagons, and not a sufficiency to raise the waters to a navigable state. Great exertions, however, were made to prepare for the change, which might reasonably be expected. The last twenty days of December were entirely favorable to our views, and were so well employed by colonel Morrison as to afford the most flattering prospect of being able to take on to the Rapids early in this month, a sufficiency of provisions and stores to authorize an advance upon Malden, from the 25th instant to the 10th of February. Our hopes were again a little checked by a general thaw, succeeded by a very deep snow, whilst the ground was in that soft state. It is, however, cold again, and we calculate on being able to use with effect the sleds, a considerable number of which I had caused to be prepared.

“The instructions which I received from Dr. Eustis, with regard to the conduct of the war in this department, amounted to a complete *carte blanche*. The principal objects of the campaign were pointed out, and I was left at liberty to proceed to their full execution during the present winter, or to make arrangements for their accomplishment in the spring, by occupying such posts as might facilitate the intended operations. The wishes of government to recover the ground which had been lost, and to conquer Upper Canada, were, however, expressed in such strong terms, and the funds which were placed at my dis-

posal were declared to be so ample, if not unlimited, that I did not consider myself authorized to adopt the alternative of delay from any other motive than that of the safety of the army. My letters have contained frequent allusions to the monstrous expense which would attend the operations of an army at this season of the year, penetrating to the enemy through an immense forest of one hundred and fifty miles. The silence of the secretary on the subject left me no room to doubt the correctness of the opinion which I had at first formed—that the object in view was considered so important that expense was to be disregarded. I thought it best, however, to come to a full understanding on the subject, and with this view my letter of the 12th ultimo from Delaware was written.

“My plan of operations has been, and now is, to occupy the Miami Rapids, and to deposite there as much provisions as possible, to move from thence with a choice detachment of the army, and with as much provision, artillery, and ammunition as the means of transportation will allow—make a demonstration towards Detroit, and by a sudden passage of the strait upon the ice, an actual investure of Malden.”

“With regard to the amount of force, which such an expedition would require, I have made my calculations, not upon that which the enemy might have at Malden, at the time the enterprise should commence, but upon what they would be able to assemble there time enough to resist us. I know the facility with which troops may be brought at this season, by what is called the back route along the river Thames from the vicinity of Niagara to Detroit and Malden. Had general Smyth's attempts been successful, my plan could have been executed with a much smaller force than I should deem it prudent to employ under present circumstances. I have indeed no doubt, that we should encounter at Malden the very troops which contended with general Van Ransaler on the heights of Queenstown. It is the same thing with regard to the Indians. The British have wisely dismissed the greater part of them to save their provisions, but a whistle will be almost sufficient to collect them again.”

“He next states that if our force appeared weak, it would encourage the timid, the cautious, and wavering among the Indians and Canadians to take the field against us; and that if our means of transportation should not be sufficient to carry all the supplies with us at once, very strong detachments would be required to escort the successive trips—for, he continues, ‘such is the nature of Indian warfare that it is impossible to tell where the storm will fall. It is a rule, therefore, with me, when operating against them, never to make a detachment, neither to the front nor the rear, which is not able to contend with their whole force. From these statements, you will perceive, Sir.

How difficult it would be for me at present to ascertain, with any degree of correctness, the number of men with which I should advance from the Rapids. It was my intention to have assembled there from 4500 to 5000 men, and to be governed by circumstances in forming the detachment with which I should advance. This is still my plan, and it was always my intention to dismiss at that period, all that I deemed superfluous.'

"The nominal amount of the army was ten thousand—but the effective force was much less. 'Notwithstanding the large nominal amount of the army under my command, their sufferings for the want of clothing, and the rigor of the season, reduces the effective number to less than two thirds of the aggregate. You will read with as much pain as I write it, that a fine body of regular troops belonging to the 17th and 19th regiments, under colonel Wells, has been nearly destroyed for the want of clothing. The whole of the effective men upon this frontier does not exceed six thousand three hundred infantry.

"Upon the whole, Sir, my reaching Malden this winter depends upon circumstances which I cannot control—the freezing of the strait in such a manner as to enable me to pass over the troops and artillery.'

"General Winchester is, I hope, now, or will be in a day or two, at the Rapids. Provisions in large quantities are progressing thither. I calculate on being there myself by the 20th instant, with the troops which are intended for the march upon Malden. In the event of occurrences which may induce a suspension of operations beyond the rapids, measures will be taken to make and secure at that place, a deposite of provisions equal to the support of the troops in any enterprize that may be undertaken in the spring. Should our offensive operations be suspended until that time, it is my decided opinion that the most effectual and cheapest plan will be to obtain the command of the lake. This being once effected, every difficulty will be removed. An army of 4000 men landed on the north side of the lake below Malden, will soon reduce that place, retake Detroit, and, with the aid of the fleet, proceed down the lake to co-operate with the army from Niagara.'

"The secretary had written, that 'The destruction of the Queen Charlotte, and of the whole of the naval force of the enemy, frozen up as it is presumed to be in the ice, would be an important attainment. It is one which is recommended to your particular attention.' To which the General replied—'The enterprize against the Queen Charlotte has been long meditated, and shall not escape my attention.'

"In the letter of the 8th he states—'A suspension of the operations of this army for the winter, without having accomplished the principal object for which it was embodied, is an event which has long been looked for, by most of the well in-

formed men who know the character of the country, and recollect that the army of general Wayne, after a whole summer's preparation, was unable to advance more than seventy miles from the Ohio, and that the prudent caution of president Washington had directed it to be placed in winter quarters at the very season that our arrangements were commenced. You do me justice in believing that my exertions have been unremitting, and I am sensible of the commission of one error only, that has injuriously affected our interests; and that is, in retaining too large a force at Defiance. The disadvantages attending it were, however, seen at the period of my committing the management of that wing to general Winchester. Possessing a superior rank in the line of the army to that which was tendered to me, I considered him rather in the light of an associate in command than an inferior. I therefore recommended to him, instead of ordering it, to send back two regiments within the bounds of White's contract. Had this measure been pursued, there would have been at fort Winchester 100,000 rations more than there is at present. The general, who possesses the most inestimable qualities of the head and heart, was deceived as I was, with regard to the period when the army could advance, and he did not think that the reduction of issues would be so important, as it is now ascertained it would have been.'

"Instead of sending back any part of his command, general Winchester was constantly anxious, whenever he had a moderate supply of provisions on hand, to advance further and fix his camp at the rapids. It was to obtain the sanction of General Harrison for such a movement, that major Hardin was despatched to head quarters early in November, when he wrote the letter to governor Shelby, from which an extract has been given in this chapter. On the 12th of that month general Winchester came to a positive determination to move his camp to the rapids at every hazard—but his advance was fortunately arrested by the timely arrival of a despatch from General Harrison. In the letter from which we are making these extracts, the General proceeds—'As the greater part of the expenses of the campaign have already been incurred, I beg leave to assure you, Sir, that trifling difficulties will not oppose the progress of the army to Malden; but at the same time I also promise you, that no measure shall be adopted but when the prospects of success are as clear as they can be in any military operations.'

"On the subject of obtaining the command of the lake, he wrote—'I have no means of estimating correctly the cost of a naval armament, capable of effecting this object, but from my knowledge of the expense of transporting supplies through a swampy wilderness, I do believe that the expense which will be incurred in six weeks in the spring, in an attempt to transport

the provisions for the army along the road leading from the rapids to Detroit, would build and equip the vessels for this purpose.'

"By these copious extracts the reader is made well acquainted with the causes which have so long retarded the march of the army; with its present situation and resources; and with the ulterior plans and prospects of the General for the present campaign. A few days after writing these letters, he arrived again at Upper Sandusky, together with the whole of the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades, making his effective force at that place about 1500 strong. On the 12th the remainder of the artillery also arrived—"large quantities of every necessary supply were constantly arriving, and the general appearance of the camp announced the near approach of that state of preparation requisite to the commencement of active operations."* Parties were sent on to open roads, bridge creeks, and pave the way for the army. Artillery had already been sent towards the Miami; and fine supplies of provisions and stores being on hand, it seemed that time, patience, perseverance, and fortitude alone were necessary to enable the army to remove the numerous obstacles and surmount the various difficulties which nature had opposed to its progress and its future glory. But we must in the next place direct our attention to the movements of the left wing under Winchester, for whose arrival at the rapids the troops at Sandusky were now waiting, as the signal of their advance with all their supplies to the same place.

CHAPTER XXV.

GENERAL HARRISON had expected, on his first arrival at Upper Sandusky, about the 18th of December, to be met there by an express from general Winchester, with information of his advance to the rapids, in conformity with the advice which had previously been given him. As no such information had arrived, he soon afterwards despatched ensign C. S. Todd, division judge advocate of the Kentucky troops, to Winchester's camp, on the Miami below Defiance. Todd was accompanied by two gentlemen of the Michigan territory, and three Wyandot Indians. He proceeded directly across the country, and performed the journey with a degree of secrecy and despatch highly

*Colonel Wood.

honorable to his skill and enterprise, having completely eluded all the scouts of the enemy. He was instructed to communicate to general Winchester the following directions and plans from the commander in chief: 'That as soon as he had accumulated provisions for twenty days, he was authorised to advance to the rapids, where he was to commence the building of huts, to induce the enemy to believe that he was going into winter quarters; that he was to construct sleds for the main expedition against Malden, but to impress it on the minds of his men that they were for transporting provisions from the interior; that the different lines of the army would be concentrated at that place, and a choice detachment from the whole would then be marched rapidly on Malden; that in the mean time he was to occupy the rapids, for the purpose of securing the provisions and stores forwarded from the other wings of the army.'

"The left wing, in the mean time, had received a moderate supply of provisions and clothing on the 22d of December, and were now making active preparations to march. The river being frozen up, which rendered their water craft useless, they were obliged to take their baggage on sleds, many of which had to be hauled by the men. Having provided for the sick, and assigned guards to attend and protect them, the march for the rapids was commenced on the 30th December. At the same time, Mr. Leslie Combs, a young man of intelligence and enterprise, from Kentucky, who had joined the army, as a volunteer, on its march from fort Wayne to fort Defiance, accompanied by Mr. A. Ruddle as a guide, was sent with despatches to inform the commander in chief of this movement, in order that provisions and reinforcements might be forwarded as soon as possible. General Winchester expected to be met by these at the rapids by the 12th of January; this, however, was prevented by an immense fall of snow, which, as Mr. Combs had to traverse, *on foot*, a pathless wilderness of more than 100 miles in extent, retarded him four or five days longer in reaching even the first point of destination, (fort M^cArthur) than would otherwise have been necessary to perform the whole route. The supplies they had already received, and the prospects now before them, afforded some comfort and encouragement to the troops; yet their appearance and their real efficiency were still very unpromising. Their progress was slow from the first, and was much retarded after a few days by the snow.

"While on this march, general Winchester received another despatch from the commander in chief, recommending him to abandon the movement to the rapids, and fall back with the greater part of his force to fort Jennings. This advice was given in consequence of the intelligence received from colonel Campbell at Mississiniway, respecting the force of Tecumseh on the Wabash. General Harrison was apprehensive that if the left

wing advanced so far as the rapids, Tecumseh would be able to attack and destroy all the provisions left on its line of operations in the rear. But as Winchester had already commenced his march, he did not think himself required by this advice to discontinue it and return. Harrison went immediately himself into the settlements of Ohio, to arrange with governor Meigs the means of sending another mounted expedition against the Indians under Tecumseh, at the principal town on the Mississinaway river. Such an expedition, however, was afterwards deemed unnecessary.

“ On the 10th of January general Winchester arrived with his army at the rapids, having previously sent forward a strong detachment of 670 men, under general Payne, to attack a body of Indians which general Harrison had been informed was lying in an old fortification at Swan creek, a few miles farther down the river. The detachment went several miles below the old British fort at the foot of the rapids, and having sent their spies to Swan creek, where they could discover no appearance of Indians, the whole returned again to the position which the army was intended to occupy.

“ On the north bank of the river, above Wayne's battle ground, and directly opposite the point where Hull's road struck the Miami, general Winchester established and fortified his camp, on a handsome eminence of an oval form, covered with timber and surrounded with prairies. On the day of his arrival a recent Indian camp was discovered about half a mile from this position. Captain Williams was immediately despatched, with twenty-five men, to pursue the Indians who had left it. He soon overtook and routed them, having exchanged a few shots, by which some were wounded on both sides.

“ On the 11th of January a despatch was sent to apprise General Harrison of the arrival and situation of the army at the rapids; but it was sent by the persons who were taking in the starved and worn out pack-horses to general Tupper's camp at fort M'Arthur, a place as distant from the rapids as the head quarters of the General, and from which it must then pass through a swampy and pathless wilderness of 40 miles to Upper Sandusky, where it did not arrive before the General had left that place, and was ultimately received by him at the rapids, where it started.

“ The time of the Kentucky troops would expire in February, and General Harrison had requested general Winchester to endeavor to raise a regiment among them to serve six months longer; and at the same time had suggested, that it would be imprudent to employ them on any other condition in the expedition against Malden. General Winchester now advised him, by a letter sent on the 12th to Lower Sandusky, that no reliance

could be placed on retaining any of them in service after their time had expired. This communication was simply a note respecting the above business, and had only this direction upon it, "His excellency, General William H. Harrison." Of course the writer did not intend that it should have a speedy passage, and inform the General of his arrival at the rapids; nor did it answer that purpose, as it was delayed several days on its way to head quarters. On the letter sent by the pack-horse conveyance of 15 miles a day, was the following endorsement in Winchester's own hand writing; "General Tupper will please forward this letter by express.—J. Winchester." From all which it is evident, that he relied on the pack-horse communication alone, to apprise General Harrison that he had reached the rapids, although General Harrison had directed him to communicate the intelligence of that event as quick as practicable.

"The opinions of the generals respecting the Kentucky troops were afterwards changed. The inactivity and sufferings of the army had dissatisfied them with the service at this time; but it soon became evident, that when actively employed they were not inclined to return home: and General Harrison did not hesitate to include them in his selections for the main expedition, firmly relying that they would not abandon the American standard, in the country of their enemy, when their time of service had expired.

"A large store house was now built within the encampment at the rapids, to secure the provisions and baggage. A considerable quantity of corn was also gathered in the fields, and apparatus for pounding and sifting it being made, it supplied the troops with very wholesome bread.

"On the evening of the 13th, two Frenchmen arrived from the river Raisin, with information that the Indians routed by captain Williams had passed that place, and gone on to Malden, with the intelligence of the advance of our army. They stated, that the Indians threatened to kill the inhabitants and burn their town, and begged for protection from the American arms. They were charged with a despatch from Mr. Day, a citizen who was friendly to our cause, and who stated that the British were seizing all suspected persons at the river Raisin, and confining them in Malden prison, and that they were preparing to carry off all the provisions of every description. On the 14th another messenger arrived; and on the evening of the 16th two more came in: they all confirmed the accounts brought by the first express, and solicited protection, as they were afraid that the people would be massacred and the town burnt by the Indians, whenever our army began to advance upon them. They stated the present force of the enemy to be two companies of Canadians, and about 200 Indians, but that more Indians might be expected to assemble.

“The greatest ardour and anxiety now prevailed in the army to advance in force sufficient to defeat the enemy at that place. A council of officers was called by the general, a majority of whom were decidedly in favour of sending on a strong detachment. Colonel Allen supported that side of the question with much ardour. General Winchester agreed to the opinion of the majority, and on the morning of the 17th detached colonel Lewis with 550 men to the river Raisin. A few hours afterwards he was followed by colonel Allen with 110 more, who came up with Lewis late in the evening, where he had encamped at Presque Isle. Early in the morning of the same day, general Winchester prepared a despatch to inform Harrison of this movement. He stated that his principal object was to prevent the flour and grain from being carried off by the enemy; that if he got possession of Frenchtown he intended to hold it; and that, of course, a co-operating reinforcement from the right wing might be necessary. Before the express had started with this letter, information was received from colonel Lewis at Presque Isle, a distance of twenty miles in advance, that there were 400 Indians at the river Raisin, and that colonel Elliott was expected from Malden, with a detachment destined to attack the camp at the rapids. This intelligence was also inserted in the letter to Harrison, which was then despatched by the way of Lower Sandusky.

“Colonel Lewis remained all night at Presque Isle, and in consequence of the information noticed above, which he received by express from the river Raisin, he set out very early in the morning, intending, if possible, to anticipate colonel Elliott at Frenchtown. That village is in the middle between Presque Isle and Malden, the distance from each being eighteen miles. The greater part of his march was on the ice of the Miami bay and the border of lake Erie. When he had arrived within six miles of the town, he was discovered by some Indians, who hastened to give the alarm to the main body of the enemy. Before the detachment left the border of the lake, a halt was called to take some refreshment. Having resumed the march, a piece of timbered land was passed, and as the troops proceeded in the open plain, they were formed in three lines, each corps being in its proper place for the action. The right was commanded by colonel Allen, and was composed of the companies of captains McCracken, Bledsoe, and Matson. The left was commanded by major Graves, and was composed of the companies of captains Hamilton, Williams, and Kelly. The centre consisted of the companies of captains Hightower, Collier, and Sebree, and was commanded by major Madison. The advanced guard consisted of the companies of captains Hickman, Graves, and James, under the command of captain Ballard, acting as major.

“ When they arrived within a quarter of a mile of the village and discovered the enemy in motion, the line of battle was formed, in the expectation of receiving an attack; but it was soon evident that the enemy did not intend fighting in the open field. The detachment then broke off by the right of companies, and marched under the fire of the enemy’s cannon, till they arrived at the river, where the small arms began to play upon them. The line of battle was then formed again, on the bank of the river, and the long roll beat as the signal for a general charge, which was immediately executed with much firmness and intrepidity.

“ The enemy were posted among the houses, and the picketing of the gardens, on the north side of the river. Majors Graves and Madison were ordered to dislodge them, which they effected with great gallantry, advancing at the heads of their battalions under a heavy shower of balls. The enemy routed and retreating from this place, were next met by colonel Allen at some distance on the right, who pursued them about half a mile to the woods. Here they made a stand again, with their howitzers and small arms, covered by some houses and a chain of fences, with a brushy wood full of fallen timber in their rear. Majors Graves and Madison were now ordered with their battalions to possess themselves of the wood on the left, and move rapidly on the main body of the enemy, where they were contending with colonel Allen. These orders were promptly executed; and as soon as they had commenced their fire, colonel Allen also advanced on the enemy; who were soon compelled to retire into the woods, into which they were closely pursued. The contest with Allen’s command now became very warm, as the enemy concentrated all their forces on the right, with the intention of forcing his line. They were, however, kept constantly on the retreat, though slowly, as our men were too much exhausted to rush upon them with rapidity. In this manner they were driven to the distance of two miles, every foot of the way under a continual charge. The action commenced at 3 o’clock, and the pursuit was continued till dark, when the detachment returned in good order, and encamped in the town.

“ In this warmly contested action every officer and soldier did his duty. There was not a solitary instance of delinquency. The troops amply supported “ the double character of Americans and Kentuckians.” It is of course unnecessary to notice the particular merits of individuals, where every man completely filled his sphere of action. Our loss was twelve killed and fifty-five wounded. Among the latter were captains Hickman, Matson, and Ballard. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained. They left fifteen dead on the ground where the action commenced: but the principal slaughter took place in the woods, from which in the night they carried off all their dead. From

the obstinacy with which they contended so long against a force somewhat superior, from the appearances next day in the woods, and from the reports of persons who saw them after the battle, it is believed that their loss was extremely severe. They were commanded by major Reynolds of the British army, who had about 100 British troops in the battle, and about 400 Indians.

“The detachment was now in a place where it could be amply accommodated with all the necessaries of life, and where the wounded could be well lodged and supplied with every thing required by their situation. On the night after the battle, an express was sent to carry intelligence of the success to general Winchester, at whose camp he arrived before daylight; and another was then immediately sent from that place to General Harrison by the way of Lower Sandusky, to apprise him of the event. On the morning after the battle, colonel Lewis determined, with the advice of his officers, to hold the place and await a reinforcement. His first orders from Winchester had been, ‘to attack the enemy, beat them, and take possession of Frenchtown and hold it.’ He was authorized, in a despatch sent after him, however, to exercise some discretion with respect to holding the position.

“As soon as the intelligence of this success was known at the rapids, it produced a complete ferment in camp. All were anxious to proceed to Frenchtown in support of the advanced corps. It was evident that corps was in a critical situation. They were but eighteen miles from Malden, where the British had their whole force: and it was not to be doubted but that an effort would be made by them, to regain the ground they had lost, or to defeat this advance of our army, which at first was inconsiderable, and was now much reduced by the killed and wounded. Preparations were therefore made to reinforce colonel Lewis, and on the evening of the 19th, general Winchester marched himself with 250 men, which was all that could be spared from the post at the rapids. He arrived at the river Raisin in the night on the 20th, and encamped in an open lot of ground on the right of the former detachment. Colonel Lewis had encamped in a place where he was defended by garden pickets, which were sufficiently close and strong to protect his men against an attack of small arms. Colonel Wells commanded the reinforcement, and to him the general named, but did not positively order, a breast-work for the protection of his camp. The general himself established his quarters in a house on the south side of the river, about 300 yards from the lines! On the 21st, a place was selected for the whole detachment to encamp in good order, with a determination to fortify it on the next day.—About sun-set colonel Wells solicited and obtained leave to return to the rapids. Certain information had been received that the British were preparing to make an attack, and

that they would make it with the utmost despatch in their power was a matter of course. Colonel Wells reached the rapids that night, at which place General Harrison had arrived on the 20th, and had made every exertion in his power to hasten the reinforcements.

“ Before we proceed to the tragedy of the twenty-second, we must take a review of the arrangements and exertions which in the mean time had been made in the rear. When general Winchester marched from his camp below Defiance for the rapids, on the 30th of December, he sent an express to advise General Harrison of that movement; but, in consequence of a snow storm, which delayed the bearer, the General did not receive the intelligence at Upper Sandusky before the 11th of January. He then immediately ordered on some droves of hogs, and held the artillery in readiness to march as soon as he should be advised of Winchester's arrival at the rapids. But no further intelligence was received, until the evening of the 16th, when a letter from general Perkins at Lower Sandusky, enclosing one he had received from general Winchester of the 15th, at last informed General Harrison that Winchester had arrived at the rapids, that he meditated some movement against the enemy, and that he wanted Perkins to send him a battalion from Lower Sandusky. This intelligence alarmed General Harrison, and he immediately gave orders for the artillery to advance by the way of Portage river, accompanied by a guard of 300 men, commanded by major Orr. Escorts of provisions were also ordered to follow on the same route; but, owing to the extreme badness of the road, very little progress could be made. Even the lighter pieces of artillery could not be got forward with any degree of expedition. At the same time an express was despatched to the rapids by General Harrison for information, with orders to return and meet him at Lower Sandusky, for which place he set out the next morning himself, and arrived there on the following night. He found that general Perkins had prepared a battalion, with a piece of artillery to be commanded by major Cotgrove; which was ordered to march on the 18th; and the general now determined to follow it himself and have a personal consultation with general Winchester. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, he received the letter in which Winchester informed him of the advance of colonel Lewis to the river Raisin, together with the objects and prospects of the expedition. He immediately ordered the remaining regiment of Perkins' brigade to march to the rapids, and proceeded there himself. On his way he met an express from Winchester, with intelligence of the success of Lewis in the battle of the 18th. On the morning of the 20th he arrived at the rapids, and found that general Winchester had preceded the evening before to the river Raisin, having left general Payne in his camp

with 300 men. Major Cotgrove, with the piece of artillery in his train, was so retarded by a swamp on the road, and other obstacles to his progress, that he had reached no farther than the Miami bay on the night of the 21st. By marching early next morning he arrived within fifteen miles of the river Raisin, before he was met by the fugitives from the massacre.

"When Harrison arrived at the rapids on the 20th, he despatched captain Hart, the inspector-general, to Winchester at Frenchtown, with intelligence of the movements in the rear, and with instructions to the general "to maintain the position at the river Raisin at any rate." On the next day, the 21st, a despatch was received from general Winchester, in which he stated, that if his force was increased to the amount of 1000 or 1200, it would be sufficient to maintain the ground he had gained. On the evening of the same day, the regiment of Perkins' brigade arrived at the rapids, and the remaining Kentuckians under Payne were then ordered to march to general Winchester, which they did the next morning. The corps thus advancing under Cotgrove and Payne would make the force under Winchester considerably stronger than the amount deemed by him sufficient. But they were one day too late.

"On the 22nd, about 10 o'clock, the news of the attack on general Winchester's camp was received at the rapids. General Harrison immediately ordered the regiment of general Perkins' brigade to march with all possible expedition, and proceeded himself after the reinforcement under Payne, which he soon overtook. Some men were presently met who had escaped from the battle, and who stated that Winchester's forces were totally defeated, and that the British and Indians were pursuing them towards the rapids. This report only induced the general to urge on his men with more rapidity; but several other fugitives were soon afterwards met, from whom it was ascertained beyond a doubt, that the defeat was total and irretrievable, and that all resistance had ceased early in the day on the part of the Americans. A council of the general and field officers was then held, by whom it was decided to be imprudent and unnecessary to proceed any farther. Some parties of the most active and enterprising men were now sent forward, to assist and bring in those who might escape, and the rest of the reinforcements then returned to the rapids.

"**BATTLE AND MASSACRE OF RAISIN.** We must now relate the tragical events which occurred on the 22nd and 23rd to the advanced detachment at Frenchtown. Late in the evening, after colonel Wells had left the camp, a Frenchman came to general Winchester from the neighborhood of Malden, with information that a large force of British and Indians, which he supposed to be near 3,000, were about to march from that place shortly af-

ter he left it. This intelligence, however, must have been discredited alike by the officers and men, for no preparations were made by the one, nor apprehensions exhibited by the other. The most fatal security prevailed—many of the troops even wandered about the town till late in the night. Colonel Lewis and major Madison alone seemed to be on the alert—they cautioned their men to be prepared at all times for an attack.

“Guards were placed out this night as usual; but as it was extremely cold, no picket guard was placed on the road, on which the enemy was to be expected. The night passed away without any alarm, and the reveillee began to beat at day-break on the morning of the 22d. A few minutes afterwards, three guns were fired in quick succession by the centinels. The troops were instantly formed, and the British opened a heavy fire on the camp from several pieces of artillery, loaded with bombs, balls, and grape shot, at the distance of 300 yards. This was quickly followed by a charge made by the British regulars, and by a general fire of small arms, and the Indian yell on the right and left. The British had approached in the night with the most profound silence, and stationed their cannon behind a small ravine which ran across the open fields on the right. As soon as the regulars approached within the reach of small arms, a well-directed fire from the pickets round Lewis’s camp soon repulsed them on the left and centre: but on the right the reinforcement which had arrived with Winchester, and which was unprotected by any breastwork, after maintaining the contest a short time, was overpowered and fell back. About this time general Winchester arrived, and ordered the retreating troops to rally behind a fence and second bank of the river, and to incline towards the centre and take refuge behind the pickets. These orders were either not heard or properly understood, and the British continuing to press on the retiring line, whilst a large body of Indians had gained their right flank, the troops were completely thrown into confusion, and retreated in disorder over the river. A detachment, in the mean time, had been sent from the pickets, to reinforce the right wing, which was carried with it in the retreat; and colonels Lewis and Allen both followed it, with a view to assist in rallying the men. Attempts were made to rally them on the south side of the river, behind the houses and pickets of the gardens; but all the efforts of general Winchester, aided by the two colonels, were in vain. The Indians had gained their left flank, and had also taken possession of the woods in their rear. In their confusion and dismay they attempted to pass a long narrow lane, through which the road passes from the village. The Indians were on both sides and shot them down in every direction. A large party, which had gained the wood on the right, were surrounded and massacred without distinction, nearly one hundred men being toma-

hawked within the distance of one hundred yards. The most horrible destruction overwhelmed the fugitives in every direction. Captain Simpson was shot and tomahawked at the edge of the woods near the mouth of the lane. Colonel Allen, though wounded in his thigh, attempted to rally his men several times, entreating them to halt and sell their lives as dear as possible. He had escaped about two miles when at length wearied and exhausted, and disdaining perhaps to survive the defeat, he sat down on a log, determined to meet his fate. An Indian chief, observing him to be an officer of distinction, was anxious to take him prisoner. As soon as he came near the colonel, he threw his gun across his lap, and told him in the Indian language to surrender, and he should be safe. Another savage having at the same time advanced with a hostile appearance, colonel Allen by one stroke with his sword laid him dead at his feet. A third Indian who was near him had then the honour of shooting one of the first and greatest citizens of Kentucky. Captain Mead, of the regular army, who had fought by the side of colonel Daveiss when he fell in the battle of Tippecanoe, was killed where the action commenced. Finding that the situation of the corps was rendered desperate by the approach of the enemy, he gave orders to his men, 'My brave fellows, charge upon them,' and a moment afterwards he was no more.

"A party, with lieutenant Garrett, consisting of fifteen or twenty men, after retreating about a mile and a half, was compelled to surrender, and were then all massacred but the lieutenant himself. Another of about 30 men had escaped nearly three miles, when they were overtaken by the savages, and having surrendered, about one half of them were shot and tomahawked. In short, the greater part of those who were in the retreat fell a sacrifice to the fury of the Indians. The snow was so deep, and the cold so intense, that they were soon exhausted and unable to elude their pursuers. General Winchester and colonel Lewis, with a few more, were captured at a bridge about three quarters of a mile from the village. Their coats being taken from them, they were carried back to the British lines where colonel Proctor commanded.

"The troops within the picketing, under majors Graves and Madison, had with Spartan valor maintained their position, though powerfully assailed by Proctor and his savage allies. The British had posted a six-pounder behind a small house, about 200 yards down the river, which considerably annoyed the camp, till its supplies of ammunition, which were brought in a sleigh, were arrested by killing the horse and his driver. Major Graves, in passing round the lines, was wounded in the knee—he sat down and bound it up himself, observing to his men, 'never mind me, but fight on.' About 10 o'clock, colonel Proctor, finding it useless to sacrifice his men in vain attempts to dislodge this little band

of heroes, withdrew his forces to the woods, intending either to abandon the contest, or to wait the return of the Indians, who had pursued the retreating party. The loss sustained by our men was inconsiderable; and when Proctor withdrew, they employed the leisure it afforded them to take breakfast at their posts.

“As soon as Proctor was informed that general Winchester was taken, he basely determined to take advantage of his situation to procure the surrender of the party in the picketing. He represented to the general that nothing but an immediate surrender would save the Americans from an indiscriminate massacre by the Indians. A flag was then seen advancing from the British lines, carried by major Overton, one of the general’s aids, and accompanied by colonel Proctor himself and several other officers. Having halted at a respectful distance, major Madison, with brigade-major Garrard proceeded to meet them, expecting that the object of the flag was to obtain a cessation of hostilities, for the British to bear off their dead. They were much mortified to find, that major Overton was the bearer of an order from general Winchester, directing the officer commanding the American forces to surrender them prisoners of war. This was the first intimation they had that their general had been taken. Colonel Proctor, with great haughtiness, demanded an immediate surrender, or he would set the town on fire, and the Indians would not be restrained in committing an indiscriminate massacre. Major Madison observed, ‘that it had been customary for the Indians to massacre the wounded and prisoners after a surrender, and that he would not agree to any capitulation, which general Winchester might direct, unless the safety and protection of his men were stipulated.’ Colonel Proctor then said ‘Sir, do you mean to dictate to me?’ ‘No,’ replied Madison, ‘I mean to dictate for myself, and we prefer selling our lives as dear as possible, rather than be massacred in cold blood.’ Proctor then agreed to receive a surrender on the following terms: that all private property should be respected, that sleds should be sent the next morning to remove the sick and wounded to Amherstburg, on the island opposite Malden, that in the mean time they should be protected by a guard, and that the side arms of the officers should be restored to them at Malden.

“Major Madison, after consulting with Garrard, thought it most prudent to capitulate on these terms. Half the original force was already lost; the balance would have to contend with more than three times their number: there was no possible chance of a retreat, nor any hope of a reinforcement to save them: and worst of all, their ammunition was nearly exhausted, not more than one third of a small keg of cartridges being left.

“Before the men had given up their arms, the Indians came among them and began to plunder them. Information being given to major Madison of this conduct, he ordered his men not

to suffer an Indian to come into the lines, and that if they persisted in doing it, or in plundering, to fire upon them and bayonet them. This decided conduct restrained the savages, and none of his men, who were marched with him to Malden, were robbed or injured by the Indians. The inhabitants of the town being much alarmed for the safety of their persons and property, united with general Winchester in soliciting safety and protection from the British.

“Colonel Proctor informed the American officers that his own wounded must be taken to Malden in the first instance; but that early in the morning their wounded should also be removed, and in the mean time that a guard should be left with them. About 12 o'clock the prisoners were marched off; doctors Todd and Bowers of the Kentucky volunteers, were left with the wounded; and major Reynolds with two or three interpreters was all the guard left to protect them.

“Captain Hart, the inspector-general, being among the number of the wounded, expressed much anxiety to be taken with the prisoners; but captain Elliott of the British army, who had been intimately acquainted with him in Kentucky, assured him that he need not be under the least apprehension for his safety, that the Indians would not hurt those who were left, and that upon the honor of a soldier he would send his own cariole for him next morning and have him taken to Malden.

“Soon after the British forces were withdrawn, major Reynolds began to exhibit symptoms of uneasiness, often walking about and looking towards the road leading to the rapids, and no doubt expecting the approach of General Harrison with reinforcements, which would have been a most auspicious event for the wounded. The greater part of the Indians went with the British to Stoney creek, six miles on the road towards Malden, where they were promised a frolic by their employers.—A few stragglers remained, who went from house to house in search of plunder. Some of them remained in town till late in the night; and before day, the interpreters who had been left with them, abandoned the houses in which they lay. Their anticipations were now very gloomy; the whole night indeed was spent with feelings vibrating between hope and despair. Daylight at last appeared, and their hopes began to brighten; but in a very short time they experienced a sad reversal. About sunrise, instead of sleds arriving to convey them to Malden, a large body of Indians, perhaps two hundred in number, came into the town painted black and red. Their chiefs held a council in which they soon determined to kill all the wounded who were unable to march, in revenge for the warriors they had lost in battle. Soon afterwards they began to yell, and to exhibit in their frantic conduct, the most diabolical dispositions.—They began first to plunder the houses of the inhabitants, and

then broke into those where the wounded prisoners were lying, some of whom they abused, and stripped of their clothes and blankets, and then tomahawked them without mercy. Captain Hickman was dragged to the door, where he was tomahawked and then thrown back into the house. This appeared to be the signal for consummating their destruction. The houses of Jean B. Jerome and Gabriel Godfrey, which contained most of the prisoners, were immediately set on fire, and the greater part of the wounded consumed in the conflagration. Many of them who were able to crawl about, endeavoured to get out at the windows; but as fast as they appeared they were tomahawked and pushed back. Some who were not in those houses, were killed and thrown into the flames; while others were tomahawked, inhumanly mangled, and left in the streets and high-ways.

“The few who were judged able to march, were saved and taken off towards Malden; but as often as any of them gave out on the way, they were tomahawked and left lying in the road. Major Woolfolk, secretary to general Winchester, had found an asylum in the house of a French citizen; but he was discovered by the Indians, who placed him on a horse and were carrying him away. They took him by the house of Laselle, a fellow who had been suspected for giving intelligence to the British before the battle, to whom he promised a large sum of money, if he would purchase him from the Indians. Laselle replied that it was out of his power, but that probably his brother would, being willing to sell him, had turned to go there, when another savage shot him through the head. He was then tomahawked and scalped, and left to the hogs for two days, by which he was partly devoured before the inhabitants removed him. The fate of major Graves has never been correctly ascertained. It is believed that he was put into a cariole at the river Raisin, and taken towards Detroit; but whether he was murdered on the way to that place, or reserved for greater sufferings, is not distinctly known.

“The circumstances respecting the fate of captain Hart have been fully ascertained. When the Indians first entered the house, where he lay with captain Hickman, major Graves and others, and before the massacre had commenced, he was carried by doctor Todd into an adjoining house which had been plundered of its contents. An Indian then met them, who knowing the profession of the doctor, enquired why the surgeons were left with the wounded. He was told that it was by the directions of colonel Proctor; and that captain Elliott was a friend to captain Hart, and had promised to send for him that morning. The Indian shook his head and observed, that Proctor and Elliott ‘were damned rascals, or they would have taken care

of them last evening.' He then said, 'you will all be killed—but keep still—the chiefs are in council, and maybe the wounded only will be killed.' Captain Hart offered him a hundred dollars to carry him to Malden; but he replied you are too badly wounded. The savages now began to tomahawk the prisoners; and doctor Todd was tied and carried to Stoney creek, where there was a camp of the wounded British. He informed captain Elliott and the surgeon of what was going on at Frenchtown, and requested them to send back, and endeavor to save some of the wounded. Captain Elliott replied, that it was too late; that those who had been badly wounded were killed before that time; and that all who were still preserved by the Indians were now safe. Doctor Todd spoke of captain Hart in particular, and stated that many, who would be saved in the first instance, being unable to march far, must ultimately be sacrificed, unless means were taken to preserve them. To which Elliott replied, that charity began at home, that his own wounded must first be conveyed, and that if any sleds then remained, he would send them back. Doctor Todd was so anxious to get some person of influence sent back, that he tried to excite the avarice of the surgeon, by informing him that the surgical instruments, which were very valuable, were in the house with the wounded. He soon found that he had now touched the master passion of the British soul. An interpreter was immediately sent back for the instruments; but the conflagration had consumed every thing before he arrived. The conversation of captain Elliott clearly proved, that the British officers had deliberately resolved to abandon the wounded prisoners to an indiscriminate massacre, in direct violation of their solemn engagements at the surrender. If they did not instigate, they at least permitted the horrible scene without regret.

"After doctor Todd had been taken from captain Hart, one of the Indians agreed to carry him to Malden for one hundred dollars. The fellow placed him on a horse, and was going through the commons of the town, when he met with another, who claimed the captain as his prisoner. To settle the dispute they agreed to kill him and divide the remainder of his money and clothes between them. They accordingly dragged him off his horse and despatched him with a war club. When he found that his destruction was inevitable, he submitted with fortitude and composure to his fate.

"Many other instances of the massacre of individuals and small parties might be mentioned. Some who were exhausted by marching, were killed at Brownstown, and several others at the river Rouche. Doctor Bowers was saved by an Ottawa chief, and was a witness to the massacre of four or five at Sandy creek. For several days after the battle, fresh scalps were brought into Malden by the savages. Some of the prisoners,

however, who had been carried off by the Indians were fortunate enough to make their escape: whilst others were doomed to suffer death in the flames, to gratify the revenge of the brutal barbarians. Such indeed were the monstrous acts of barbarity committed on the maimed and defenceless prisoners, that no language can depict them in colours sufficiently dark. And all this was done by the allies of his Britannic majesty, the sovereign of a nation professing to rank high in the civilized world! a nation professing to be christians! a nation that is venerated by the federalists of America, and which claims pre-eminence in every thing that is great, and good, and honorable in human nature! but against which the volumes of history and the records of Heaven contain the longest, blackest catalogues of crimes and barbarities that ever have been perpetrated on this globe. Proctor was, no doubt, peculiarly qualified by nature and education for the perpetration of such deeds as these; but the principles on which the patronage of the British government is administered will always produce an abundant supply of such characters, without the aid of uncommon individual depravity. Under that government there is no road to preferment so sure as that which leads through oppression, perfidy, and blood! For the massacre at the river Raisin, for which any other civilized government would have dismissed, and perhaps have gibbeted the commander, colonel Proctor received the rank of major general in the British army.

“The American army in this affair lost upwards of 290 in killed, massacred, and missing. Only 33 escaped to the rapids. The British took 547 prisoners, and the Indians about 45. The loss of the enemy, as the Americans had no chance to ascertain it, was of course never correctly known by the public. From the best information that could be obtained, it is believed to have been in killed and wounded, between three and four hundred. The Indians suffered greatly, and the 41st regiment was very much cut up. Their whole force in the battle was about 2,000, one half regulars and Canadians, commanded by colonels Proctor and St. George: the other, composed of Indians, commanded by Round-head and Walk-in-the-Water. Tecumseh was not there—he was still on the Wabash, collecting the warriors in that quarter.

“Colonel Proctor arrived at Amherstburg with his prisoners on the 23rd, and crowded them into a small muddy woodyard, where they were exposed all night in a heavy rain, without tents or blankets, and with scarcely fire enough to keep them from freezing, many of them being very indifferently clothed. Such treatment was very severe on men, who at home enjoyed all the comforts and luxuries of life, and whose humanity would have disdained to treat any conquered foe in this manner. Proctor, after he had left the battle ground, never named the guard

nor sleds, which he had promised for the wounded Americans; nor would he pay any attention to the subject, when repeatedly reminded of it by general Winchester and major Madison. Captain Elliott once replied to their solicitations, that 'the Indians were very excellent surgeons.' From the whole tenor of Proctor's conduct, it is evident that he was determined from the first to abandon the wounded to their fate. It is true that he had not the means of transportation for his own and the American wounded at the same time; but it is equally true, that he had it in his power to comply with his promise, made before the surrender, to place a guard over them, which would be able to protect them from the fury of the savages. What a contrast between this base perfidy of the British officers, in exposing their prisoners to massacre, after stipulating to protect them, and the noble humanity of the American tars, in sacrificing their own lives to save their foes who had surrendered unconditionally!

"The prisoners were detained at Amherstburg till the 26th, when they were divided into two parties, the first of which was marched on that day, and the other on the day following. Some who were badly wounded, were left behind with surgeons to attend them. They proceeded up the rivers Detroit and Thames, through the interior of Upper Canada to fort George on the Niagara strait. On this journey they suffered many hardships and indignities from the severity of the weather, the want of provisions, and from the inhumanity of their guards. At fort George they were paroled, and returned home by the way of Erie and Pittsburgh, and thence down the Ohio river. The condition of the parole was, not to bear arms against his majesty or *his allies*, during the present war, until regularly exchanged. When some of the Kentuckians inquired, who were his majesty's allies, they were answered, that 'his majesty's allies were known,' from which it appears, that some of these tools of British baseness were ashamed of the association which their sovereign had formed. General Winchester, colonel Lewis, and major Madison were detained, and sent by Montreal to Quebec, at which place, and at Beaufort in its vicinity, they were confined till the spring of 1814, when a general exchange of prisoners took place and they returned home.

"Ensign I. L. Baker, who had been taken by the Indians on the 22nd, and had witnessed many of their subsequent barbarities, was brought to Detroit and ransomed by an American gentleman at that place before the march of the prisoners. General Winchester directed him to take charge of the wounded, who were left at Sandwich. He continued there until the 15th of February, discharging in a very able and assiduous manner the duties required in that situation. During his stay, he obtained a variety of information concerning the conduct of the allies, which he afterwards reported to general Winchester. He

ascertained that about sixty prisoners had been massacred by the Indians after the day of battle; and that they had probably between thirty and forty prisoners still alive. The prospect of their release, however, was now very gloomy, as Proctor had issued an order, *forbidding individuals to purchase any more of them! while a stipulated price was still paid for all the scalps brought in by the savages!* The dead of the American army were still unburied—left to be devoured by hogs and dogs. When ensign Baker mentioned this subject to the British officers, they still replied that the Indians would not suffer them to be buried. The citizens of Detroit used great exertions to procure provisions for the accommodation of the wounded, and to ransom the prisoners from the Indians. Many young ladies, with the characteristic benevolence of their sex, were very instrumental in this business. The names of many persons were reported on this account by ensign Baker, but among them Augustus B. Woodward, esq. was most preeminently distinguished by his zealous and unwearied exertions for the benefit of the unfortunate Americans. On the part of the British, colonel James Baubee acted with generosity and friendship; and colonel Elliott, with major Muir, was likewise found on the side of humanity in many serviceable acts.

“Colonel Proctor, some time after the defeat, issued a proclamation, by which he required the citizens of Michigan either to take the oath of allegiance to his majesty, or to leave the territory. This measure, together with his violations of the capitulation of general Hull, induced judge Woodward to address him in a letter, in which he complained of the infractions of that capitulation, by the Indians in the British employ; reminded him that he had pledged his honor, before the late battle, to protect the inhabitants; and then informed him of the scandalous scenes of barbarity and devastation which had occurred since the capitulation of the 22nd; and concluded with proposing a convention between him and the citizens, which would tend to secure them for the future in the rights stipulated by general Brock. In reply, colonel Proctor, who had already acted with so much perfidious barbarity, now exhibited another trait in his accomplished character. He had the meanness to deny, that any capitulation had taken place at the river Raisin, and to assert that the Americans had surrendered at discretion! At the same time he called for proofs of the barbarities which had been committed! On the next day the judge sent him the affidavits of such persons as happened to be then in Detroit, who had witnessed the conduct of the Indians, and remonstrated against his purpose of forcing the citizens to swear allegiance to the British government, reminding him that it was contrary to the law of nations, and that ‘in a state of open and declared war, a subject or citizen of one party, cannot transfer his allegiance to the other,

without incurring the penalties of treason, and while nothing can excuse his guilt, so neither are those innocent who lay temptations before him.' A passport was soon afterwards obtained by the judge, who repaired by the way of Niagara to the city of Washington. Many other citizens also abandoned all their property and fled from the sway of the red and white savages.

The following are extracts from the general order, issued by the commander-in-chief of the British forces, concerning the battle of the 22nd—while it avows the employment of the Indians, and sanctions the savage mode of warfare, it will serve as a specimen of the veracity of British official accounts.

“ ‘ His excellency, the commander of the forces, has the highest satisfaction in announcing to the troops under his command, another brilliant action achieved by the gallant division of the army at Detroit under colonel Procter. Information having been received, that an advanced corps of the American army under brigadier general Winchester, amounting to upwards of 1000 (900) strong, had entered and occupied Frenchtown, about thirty-six miles south of Detroit, colonel Procter did not hesitate a moment in anticipating the enemy, by attacking this advanced corps, before it could receive support from the forces on their march under general Harrison. At day break, on the 22nd January, colonel Procter, by a spirited and vigorous attack, completely defeated general Winchester's division, with the loss of between four and five hundred slain (less than 300) for all who attempted to save themselves by flight, were cut off by the *Indian Warriors*. About 400 of the enemy took *refuge in the houses* of the town, and kept up a galling fire from the windows; but finding farther resistance unavailing, they *surrendered themselves at discretion!* On this occasion the gallantry of colonel Procter was most nobly displayed in his *humane* and *unwearied exertions!* *which succeeded in rescuing the vanquished from the revenge of the Indian warriors! ! !* ”

“ ‘ Colonel Procter reports in strong terms the gallantry displayed by *all descriptions* of troops and the able support received from colonel St. George, and from all the officers and men under his command, whose spirited valour and steady discipline is above all praise. The Indian chief Round-Head, with his band of warriors rendered essential service by their bravery and good conduct. It is with regret that colonel Procter reports 24 killed and 158 wounded! ! ! ”

“ ‘ The commander of the forces is pleased to appoint, till farther orders, or until the pleasure of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is known, colonel Vincent of the 49th regiment, and colonel Procter of the 41st regiment, to have the rank of brigadier generals in Upper Canada. ’ ”

“The disgrace of this mass of falsehoods however, is not to be imputed to the commander-in-chief—he merely repeated the story told him by Proctor.

“In this defeat, though the detachment cut off was not large, the American cause sustained a great injury; and on the state of Kentucky the stroke was peculiarly severe. Colonel Wells immediately returned to that state, with all the information that had been collected respecting the battle and massacre.—

“The effect on the feelings of the community was truly deplorable. Almost every family in the state had some friend or intimate acquaintance in the army, for whose fate the most anxious and distressing apprehensions were excited. The accounts given by the fugitives, on which alone the public had to depend, were altogether indefinite, and extremely exaggerated. It was weeks and even months before much information was received, on which a perfect reliance could be placed. The return of the prisoners at last relieved the anxious uncertainty of the greater part of the people; but some were still left in doubt, and for ever must remain in doubt, respecting the fate of their best friends and most intimate connexions. Some idea of the public anxiety and distress may be formed from the facts, that the army thus barbarously destroyed, was composed of the most interesting and respectable citizens of the state; and that from the previous intelligence from it, the highest expectations were formed of its success and glory.

“A disaster so calamitous would necessarily excite much discussion with respect to its causes; and as much blame was thrown upon those, who committed no error, and who were not instrumental in causing the defeat of Winchester, which proved to be the defeat of the campaign, it may not be amiss to vindicate in a cursory manner, the conduct of those, on whom public opinion, or the censure of their enemies, was unjustly severe.—General Harrison was blamed by his enemies, for the advance of the detachment to the river Raisin; for not reinforcing it in time; or finding that impracticable, for not ordering a retreat; besides many other matters of less importance.

“It is evident from the statement of facts already made, that general Harrison is not answerable for the advance of the detachment. It was sent by general Winchester without the knowledge and consent of Harrison; and contrary to his views and plans for the future conduct of the campaign, and to the instructions, communicated with his plans through ensign Todd, before the left wing had marched for the Rapids. If the advance was improper, the blame does not lie upon Harrison; if it was proper, general Winchester is entitled to the credit of having ordered it. The following extract from the journal of colonel Wood, shows the impression made at head quarters by the first intelligence of the advance received at that place.

“ This news for a moment paralyzed the army, or at least the thinking part of it, for no one could imagine that it was possible for him to be guilty of such a hazardous step. General Harrison was astonished at the imprudence and inconsistency of such a measure, which, if carried into execution, could be viewed in no other light than as attended with certain and inevitable destruction to the left wing. Nor was it a difficult matter for any one to foresee and predict the terrible consequences, which were sure to mark the result of a scheme no less rash in its conception than hazardous in its execution.”

“ With respect to reinforcing the detachment, a recurrence to facts equally proves that Harrison is not blameable, as he made every exertion in his power to support it. It was not until the night of the 16th, that he received the information, indirectly through general Perkins, that Winchester had arrived at the rapids. By the same express he was advised, that Winchester *meditated* some unknown movement against the enemy. Alarmed at this information, he immediately made every exertion which the situation of his affairs required. He was then at Upper Sandusky, his principal deposite of provisions and munitions of war, which is sixty miles from the rapids by the way of Portage river, and seventy-six by the way of Lower Sandusky; and about thirty-eight more from the river Raisin. He immediately sent an express direct to the rapids for information; gave orders for a corps of 300 men to advance with the artillery, and escorts to proceed with provisions; and in the morning he proceeded himself to Lower Sandusky, at which place he arrived in the night following, a distance of forty miles, which he travelled in seven hours and a half, over roads requiring such exertion, that the horse of his aid, major Hukill, fell dead on their arrival at the fort. He found there, that general Perkins had prepared to send a battalion to the rapids, in conformity with a request from general Winchester. That battalion was despatched the next morning, the 18th, with a piece of artillery; but the roads were so bad, that it was unable, by its utmost exertions, to reach the river Raisin, a distance of seventy-five miles, before the fatal disaster.

“ General Harrison then determined to proceed to the rapids himself, to learn personally from general Winchester, what were his situation and views. At four o'clock on the morning of the 19th, while he still remained at Lower Sandusky, he received the information, that colonel Lewis had been sent with a detachment to secure the provisions on the river Raisin, and to occupy with the intention of holding the village of Frenchtown. There was then but one regiment and a battalion at Lower Sandusky, and the regiment was immediately put in motion, with orders to make forced marches for the rapids; and General Harrison himself immediately proceeded for the same place. On his

way, he met an express with intelligence of the successful battle, which had been fought on the preceding day. The anxiety of general Harrison to push forward and either prevent or remedy any misfortune which might occur, as soon as he was apprised of the advance to the river Raisin, was manifested by the great personal exertions which he made in this instance.—He started in a sleigh with general Perkins, to overtake the battalion under Cotgrove, attended by a single servant. As the sleigh went very slow, from the roughness of the road, he took the horse of his servant and pushed on alone. Night came upon him in the midst of the swamp, which was so imperfectly frozen that the horse sunk to his belly at every step. He had no resource but to dismount and lead his horse, jumping himself from one sod to another which was solid enough to support him. When almost exhausted, he met one of Cotgrove's men coming back to look for his bayonet, which he said he had left at a place where he had stopped, and for which he would have a dollar stopped from his pay unless he recovered it. The General told him, he would not only pardon him for the loss, but supply him with another, if he would assist him to get his horse through the swamp. By his aid, the general was enabled to reach the camp of the battalion.

“Very early on the morning of the 20th he arrived at the rapids, from which place general Winchester had gone, on the preceding evening, with all his disposable force to the river Raisin. Nothing more could now be done, but wait the arrival of the reinforcements from Lower Sandusky.

“The original force of general Winchester at the rapids, had been about 1300, and all but 300 were now gone in advance. The battalion from Lower Sandusky was hurried on as fast as possible; and as soon as the regiment arrived, 350 strong, on the evening of the 21st, the balance of Winchester's army was ordered to proceed, which they did next morning under general Payne. The force now advancing exceeded by 300, the force deemed sufficient by general Winchester to maintain his position. But whether sufficient or not, it is evident from the preceding statement of facts, that no more could be sent, and that greater exertions could not be made to send it in time. Instead of censure being due to general Harrison, he merits praise for his prudent exertions, from the moment he was apprised of Winchester's arrival at the rapids.

“‘What human means,’ says colonel Wood, ‘within the control of general Harrison, could prevent the anticipated disaster, and save that corps which was already looked upon as lost, as doomed to inevitable destruction? Certainly none—because neither orders to halt, nor troops to succor him, could be received in time, or at least that was the expectation. He was already in motion and General Harrison still at Upper Sandusky, seventy

miles in his rear. The weather was inclement, the snow was deep, and a large portion of the black swamp was yet open.—What could a Turenne or an Eugene have done under such a pressure of embarrassing circumstances, more than Harrison did?

“If it should be asked why detachments from the centre and right wing, were not sent sooner to the rapids, to form a junction with and to strengthen the advance under Winchester, the answer is obvious—The object of the advance to that place was to guard the provisions, artillery, and military stores, to be accumulated there for the main expedition, for which purpose Winchester’s command, as it would daily be strengthened by the arrival of escorts, was amply sufficient; and it was important, that a force unnecessarily large should not be sent there, to consume the accumulating provisions before the main expedition was ready to move.

“After the success of the detachment on the 18th, there were powerful reasons why the position it occupied should not be abandoned. The protection of the French inhabitants was now an imperative duty. The advance to their town had been made at their solicitation; and when the battle had commenced, many of them joined the American forces and fought with great gallantry; and afterwards they attacked and killed the straggling Indians, wherever they met them. Their houses were opened to our men, and they offered to give up the whole of the provisions, which yet remained to them, upon condition that they should not again be abandoned to the fury of the savages, or subjected for what they had done to be immured in the prisons of Malden. The amount of provisions to be secured was believed to be very considerable. The duty of protecting the faithful inhabitants, however, had been so strongly impressed by their conduct, on the minds of general Winchester and his men, that an order to retreat would, perhaps, not have been very promptly obeyed. They proved their fidelity again, by engaging in the battle of the 23d. Whatever firing was done from the windows on that day, according to Proctor, must have been done by the inhabitants. On the other hand, the forwardness of the supplies, and of the other corps in the rear, was such, that in a few days the most ample reinforcements would have arrived, and the main expedition could have moved very early in February.

“From the whole of the facts, which are now before the reader, he will be able to judge for himself, with respect to the causes of the disaster. The advance to the river Raisin was a very important movement; it was made from the best and most urgent motives; but it is questionable whether it was not too hazardous and premature. It was a rule with General Harrison, and undoubtedly a very good one, never in Indian warfare

to send out a detachment, unless indispensably necessary, and then to make it sufficiently strong to contend with the whole force of the enemy. The rule was peculiarly applicable in this instance. Frenchtown was within eighteen miles of Malden, the head quarters of the enemy, while it was more than double that distance from the rapids, and about one hundred miles on an average from the other corps of the American army. The idea of reinforcing an advanced corps at that place, to support it against any speedy movement of the enemy, was hence altogether chimerical. It should have been strong enough in the first instance, or with the reinforcements to be immediately sent after it from the rapids, to maintain its ground, against the whole disposable force of the enemy, for a week at least. And this was probably the case. The greatest error, judging from the information we possess, after the affair is over, does not appear to have been so much the advance of the detachment, as the neglect to fortify the camp. The force actually on the ground, if well posted and well defended by fortifications, and amply supplied with ammunition, could certainly have resisted such an attack as was made, until reinforcements had arrived. On the 21st, general Winchester thus addressed General Harrison: ‘All accounts from Brownstown and Malden agree in stating, that the enemy is preparing to retake this place; if he effects his purpose, he will pay dear for it.—A few pieces of artillery, however, would add to our strength, and give confidence to our friends in this place.’ Though possessed of this information, and lying so near the enemy, that they could march at any time in the evening, and attack him before day next morning, yet he suffered his men to go to rest that night in an open camp, in which they had lain a whole day since his arrival at that place.

“‘Unsuspecting, and elated with this flash of success,’ says colonel Wood, ‘the troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such quarters on the west side of the river, as might please him best; whilst the general, not liking to be amongst a parcel of noisy, dirty freemen, took his quarters on the east side! not the least regard being paid to defence, order, regularity, or system in the posting of the different corps.’ After speaking of the battle and massacre, he proceeds, ‘Thus was there a corps of 1000 men, the elite of the army, totally sacrificed, in the most wanton manner possible; and that too, without the slightest benefit to their country or posterity. With only one third or one fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen or heard the least of an enemy, and with but a very inadequate supply of ammunition; how he ever could have entertained the most distant hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is to me one of the strangest things in the world.—An adept in the art of war is alone authorised to deviate from

the ordinary and established rules, by which that art for a great length of time has been usefully and successfully applied.

“Winchester was destitute of every means of supporting his corps long at the river Raisin, was in the very jaws of the enemy, and beyond the reach of succour. He who fights with such flimsy pretensions to victory, will always be beaten, and eternally ought to be.”

“If Harrison committed an error, it appears to me, that it consisted in allowing too great a latitude of discretion to general Winchester. His responsibility for the conduct of the army, his accurate knowledge of the country, his experience in Indian warfare, and knowledge of the caution it required, all entitled him to control, in the most positive manner, the movements of general Winchester’s command. On the contrary, he had always ‘considered him rather in the light of an associate in command, than an inferior.’ In all the correspondence of Harrison with Winchester, he had treated him with the most respectful confidence, and had recommended, instead of ordering, the measures which he wished him to pursue ; and in his letters to the war department, the same decorous and sensitive respect for the character, and confidence in the opinions of Winchester were constantly preserved and expressed. Had Winchester not inferred from this treatment, that he was at liberty to take the most important steps without obtaining the approbation of general Harrison, the advance to the river Raisin could not have been made prematurely. It has been alleged in justification of Winchester, and in derogation of Harrison, that the communications of the latter had induced the former to believe, that he would be supported in this movement. Some of Harrison’s letters might have raised an expectation, that the supplies and troops of the right wing would have been sufficiently advanced for this purpose. But the last letter from Harrison received on the evening before the detachment marched for the river Raisin, combined with the instructions communicated through ensign Todd, must have left but little room for such an expectation. The letter was dated on the 3rd of January, at Franklinton. The following is an extract:

“The hogs are progressing so fast towards the rapids, that it is necessary the force destined to occupy it should march as soon as possible. If any thing happens to prevent your going on immediately, send an express through the woods to Upper Sandusky, that I may send on two regiments from thence.”

“From this it must have been evident to Winchester, that no troops were approaching from Sandusky ; and from his suggestion that ‘a co-operating force from the right wing might be acceptable’ it is evident, that his calculations on being supported by Harrison, had but little influence in his determinations.”*

* History of the War.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE reader has now before him a correct account of the unfortunate action of the river Raisin, and all the events which led to it: we will for the present dismiss the subject, and defer our own remarks upon it until we conclude the historical part of the work, when we propose to devote a chapter to the examination of the charges which have been brought by general Winchester, as well against the correctness of those statements as the general conduct of the commander-in-chief. We are confident that we possess the means of completely establishing the former, and placing the latter beyond the reach of future censure.

The troops at the rapids, after the defeat of general Winchester, amounted to somewhat less than 900 effective men: this force was composed of the part of the Kentucky regiments which had remained behind after the advance of general Winchester, and the battalion and regiment of general Perkins' brigade of Ohio militia, which had arrived from Sandusky. On the evening of the 22nd, a council of war was assembled by the commanding general, to ask their advice upon the measures to be adopted. It was the unanimous opinion of this council that the troops should fall back for some distance upon Hull's route, to cover the convoys which were advancing in that direction, and which had in charge the whole of the artillery and much of the ammunition intended for the campaign.

The position occupied by the troops at the rapids, *and on the left bank of the river*, could have afforded them a very imperfect protection. As the enemy, by taking the direct route from the mouth of the Miami bay, might intersect Hull's road at any point they might think proper, by a much shorter route than that which led by the rapids. A small party of Indians taking that direction would have it in their power to intercept the convoy which had left Sandusky on the seventeenth of the month, under the command of major Orr, beat it in detail, destroy all the artillery, carriages, and ammunition wagons, and render the artillery useless. The major's command had originally consisted of 300 men, but on account of the extreme badness of the road, the convoy was strung out to the distance of 20 or 25 miles, and his men also divided in small bodies along that whole distance. A knowledge of these circumstances determined the council to advise the commanding general to fall back upon Portage river, a distance of 18 miles, and there wait

until the convoy could be collected, and reinforcements arrive to enable him to again advance. This retrograde movement took place upon the following morning. All the provisions which were at the rapids could not be removed; about thirty barrels of flour and some pork were destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The History of the Western War gives another reason for the change of the position at the rapids: "The position," says that work, "which had been selected, and the camp which had been formed by general Winchester at the rapids, were also very injudicious, and untenable against any formidable force. The position was on the wrong side of the river; for it frequently happens in the winter, that heavy rains suddenly swell the current and break up the ice, so as to render the stream impassable for many days together. This would prevent the convoys from reaching the camp, whilst the enemy might cross on the ice at the mouth of the bay, and destroy them without opposition.

"The attempt to fortify the position had also destroyed all its natural advantages. The camp was a parallelogram with its longest side on the river, corresponding to the form of the hill on which it was placed, the abrupt declivity of which afforded the enemy a better fortification, at point blank shot in the rear, than the breast work of logs by which the lines were protected. The flanks were also at a convenient distance from the ends of the hill to be annoyed by them by the enemy. By reversing the order and making the flank lines the longest, so as to extend quite across the hill, the rear would have been rendered secure, and the flanks would have been at too great a distance to be annoyed from the extremities of the hill."

As events happened, however, this retrograde movement was altogether unnecessary: "We are not to judge the commander of an army by the information respecting the enemy which may be found in the page of the subsequent historian, but by that which at the time was in his possession; and in the present case we may remark, that immediately after experiencing a defeat for the want of a cautious and strict conformity to military principles, it would have been excusable in the officers of the army to have carried that virtue to excess."* Why general Proctor did not pursue his success after the battle of the river Raisin is very difficult to be accounted for. With a force of from 1600 to 2000 strong, well provided with artillery and flushed with victory, did he not think himself a match for General Harrison, with less than 900 men and a single six pounder?

In his approach to the rapids he would have had no bad roads to encounter, as the ice on the lake and river afforded a safe and easy passage to the spot. Of the force at the rapids he could not have been ignorant, nor of the approach of the con-

* History of the War.

vöys from Sandusky. We shall hereafter see that there was at least one other occasion where this officer might have engaged the American general with greatly superior forces, and declined the opportunity. It is very evident also that the Indians discovered no disposition to approach the part of the army which was conducted by the commanding general in person. The result of the battle of Tippecanoe was doubtless the cause of this backwardness.

General Harrison fixed his camp on Portage river, and sent expresses to Tymocty for the troops and artillery. On the 24th, however, it began to rain, and continued to do so until the frost was entirely out of the ground, and the small streams rendered for some days impassable. The progress of the artillery, although it had been taken off the carriages and placed upon sleds, was thus arrested, as well as the Virginia brigade under the command of general Leftwich. On the 30th of January, however, general Leftwich arrived with his brigade, and part of the artillery. The reader will recollect that it had been sent off from Upper Sandusky on the 17th; it thus took fourteen days for a part only, fixed on sleds, to reach Portage river, a distance of 49 miles. The ammunition wagons were nearly all left behind, from being either broken or having worn out their teams. The road for nearly the whole distance was strewn with broken wagons, dead or dying horses and oxen, and with small groups of the militia, who having exhausted their strength in wading through the mud and water, had stopped and kindled fires on the few spots where it was practicable. Those who preserved their health under all their privations, suffered sufficiently, but great numbers were taken ill with colds and pleurisies, who far from having the necessaries suitable to their situation, were often without the shelter and protection which a thin tent could give them. By the arrival of general Leftwich the force at Portage river was increased to about 1800 men, but of these a great many were ill with pleurisies and other disorders of a similar kind: sixty new cases were reported on the morning of the 31st of January. This was not to be wondered at, for the greater part of the encampment was absolutely inundated by the rain which fell on the 24th. Nor was there another spot to be found which would answer better. Captain Wood of the engineers had been sent by the General to search for a better position, but had been unable in a circuit of many miles to discover one. The troops bore their situation with great patience, as their commander set them the example. The General's tent, placed in the centre, happened to be in one of the lowest spots of the encampment; his officers urged him to change it, but he refused to do so, observing that it was necessary that every military man should be contented with the situation which in the course of his duty fell to his lot.

The following description of the hardships endured by the soldiers of the north-western army is taken from a letter written by one of the Petersburg volunteers: "On the second day of our march a courier arrived from General Harrison, ordering the artillery to advance with all possible speed; this was rendered totally impossible by the snow which took place, it being a complete swamp nearly all the way. On the evening of the same day news arrived that General Harrison had retreated to Portage river, 13 miles in the rear of the encampment at the rapids. As many men as could be spared determined to proceed immediately to reinforce him. It is unnecessary to state, that we were among the first who wished to advance. At two o'clock the next morning, our tents were struck, and in half an hour we were on the road. I will candidly confess that on that day I regretted being a soldier. On that day we marched 30 miles under an incessant rain; and I am afraid you will doubt my veracity when I tell you, that in eight miles of the best of the road, it took us over the knees, and often to the middle. The Black Swamp, (four miles from Portage river and four in the extent) would have been considered impassable by all but men determined to surmount every difficulty to accomplish the object of their march. In this swamp you lose sight of *terra firma* altogether—the water was about six inches deep on the ice, which was very rotten, often breaking through to the depth of four or five feet.

"The same night we encamped on very wet ground, but the driest that could be found, the rain still continuing. It was with difficulty we could raise fires; we had no tents, our clothes were wet, no axes, nothing to cook with, and very little to eat. A brigade of pack horses being near us, we procured from them some flour, killed a hog, (there being plenty of *them* along the road;) our bread was baked in the ashes, and our pork we broiled on the coals—a sweeter meal I never partook of. When we went to sleep, it was on two logs laid close to each other, to keep our bodies from the damp ground. Good God! what a pliant being is man in adversity: the loftest spirit that ever inhabited the human breast would have been tamed amid the difficulties that surrounded us."

The army left Portage for the rapids on the 1st of February, leaving at the former place upwards of 80 men ill with pleurisy and other acute diseases. Indeed, almost every man was afflicted with a violent cough: to such a prodigious extent did it prevail that it was scarcely possible to call the roll, from the incessant coughing of several hundred men at the same moment.

Before General Harrison left Portage, he had despatched Dr. M'Keehan, accompanied by two men, under cover of a flag of truce, to ascertain the situation and afford relief to the prisoners who were wounded at Frenchtown. Upon his arrival at the

rapids, the body of one of the men was found; the marks of the tomahawk and scalping knife left no doubt as to his fate. The party had been surprised in their sleep, one man killed, and McKeehan wounded. The doctor, after being robbed, was taken to Malden, insulted and abused by general Proctor, and from Malden sent to Montreal, where he was for thirty days confined to a dungeon. He was at length liberated and suffered to return to the United States.

General Harrison fixed his camp at the foot of the rapids, and on the right bank of the river. "He still entertained a belief that he would be able to execute in the present season the long intended expedition against Malden, and continued to exert himself in preparation. All the troops in the rear were ordered to join him immediately, except some companies which were left in the forts on the Auglaize and St. Marys. He expected he would be able by the 11th or 12th of February to advance towards Malden, if not with heavy artillery sufficient to reduce that place, at least with a force that could scour the whole country, disperse the Indians, destroy all the shipping of the enemy, the greater part of their provisions, and establish a post near Brownstown till the season would permit the advance of the artillery. The Ohio and some of the Kentucky troops soon arrived at the rapids, which rendered his advance 2000 strong. The accession of all the others would scarcely, however, raise his effective force to four thousand men, so greatly were the different corps now reduced from their nominal and original amount.

"The present was the season, in common years, when the most intense frosts prevailed in this country, by which its lakes and swamps were rendered perfectly firm and secure for any kind of conveyance: yet the weather now continued so warm and rainy, that the roads were entirely broken up, and travelling on the ice rendered altogether unsafe. A trial of its strength on the border of the lake was effectually made on the evening of the 9th. Intelligence being received that a party of Indians were driving off the cattle from a small French village, about 14 miles from the rapids, General Harrison prepared a strong detachment, and pursued them that night 26 miles on the ice, with a six pounder in his train. He found the ice so weak in many places, that the horses of several officers who were mounted, broke through it; and in one place the six pounder broke through and was nearly lost. The Indians were not overtaken; and in the morning the detachment returned to camp.

"The 11th of February at last arrived, and still the balance of the troops with the necessary supplies had not been able to reach the rapids: the roads by this time had also become absolutely impassable for any kind of carriage, it being scarcely possible to traverse them with a single horse. Under these circumstances General Harrison was at length constrained, with much

reluctance and mortification, to abandon all thoughts of advancing this season against Malden. And thus terminated, without gaining any decisive advantage over the enemy, a campaign which was prosecuted with incalculable expense to the government and immense labors and hardships on the part of the General and his men. The great difficulties to be encountered in the prosecution of a winter campaign through the swampy wilderness in the north-western parts of Ohio, were doubtless sufficient to defeat all the exertions and perseverance which could reasonably be expected from human nature; yet the indefatigable industry of the General, and the unshaken firmness of his brave compatriots, would probably have surmounted every obstacle, had it not been for the mismanagement and misfortunes of general Winchester in conducting the advance of the left wing. The apparently unimportant error of sending the intelligence of his arrival at the rapids, by the driver of the old pack horses would seem to have been the determining cause of the failure. The roads were then so well frozen, that the artillery and convoys of provisions might have been pushed forward with considerable despatch; but for want of that intelligence at head quarters, some delay was produced by which the critical moment for advancing was lost. It was certainly unfortunate that a winter campaign was ever attempted. When General Harrison was first appointed to the command of the north-western army, the precise season of the year had arrived, which had arrested the progress of the army under general Wayne, in the year '93. Although eighteen months had then been employed in preparation, and in disciplining the troops, the prudent caution of general Washington preferred a postponement of the meditated chastisement of the Indians till another year, to the risk of attempting it at a season, which so greatly multiplies the difficulties at all times presented by the nature of the country, and the peculiar activity of the enemy to be opposed. It was in compliance with *his* instructions, that the American army was cantoned at Greenville, in September, '93, and the auxiliary volunteer force from Kentucky dismissed. The latter had been in part drawn from the most remote counties of Kentucky, and a considerable portion of the whole expense, which would have attended their employment, had already been incurred. To tread in the footsteps of Washington and Wayne could have been dishonorable to no administration and their commander. Why then was a winter campaign attempted? The orders of the government to general Harrison were indeed not positive on this head: but it is impossible that he could hesitate to believe that their wishes and expectations were decidedly in favor of recovering Detroit and taking Malden during the winter. Their letters afford ample evidence that such were their views: and their having ordered 10,000 men to the field, many of whom

were from the Alleghany mountains, whose terms of service would all expire by the end of winter, was an unquestionable evidence of their intentions. The force was much greater than was necessary merely for the defence of the frontiers. After the most mature reflection, the General determined to endeavor to surmount all the difficulties which would oppose the winter campaign. He was fully apprised of their extent, and had even given a decided opinion to the government before his appointment, that in the event of the capture of Hull's army, it would be impracticable to re-establish our affairs in that quarter until the following year. After being invested with the command, he had altered his opinion so far only as to believe, that a season favorable to his operations, combined with some address, and with much labor and expense, might possibly enable him to advance, either before the swamps became impassable in the fall, or in the middle of winter when they were hard frozen; and he believed that the uncommon solicitude of the government and the people, made it necessary to attempt it. The preparations for the advance of the army, however, could not be completed in time for advancing in the fall; and the openness of the winter, with other unfavorable occurrences, defeated him in that season.

“Many persons were impatient at the delay of the north-western army, who did not know, that before it could arrive at Detroit, it had to pass a wilderness of 180 miles, and many who knew that circumstance, did not know that the greater part of that desert was a frightful swamp, and that the best of it would be considered impassable for carriages of any kind, by the people of the Atlantic states. With the knowledge which the General possessed of the country, he could not for a moment have thought of passing, in the latter part of the fall or beginning of winter, the swampy district which crosses every approach to the lake, even if his preparations for the march had been complete. But this was far from being the case. At a time when it was supposed by many, that he might have been in full march upon Malden, some of the pieces of artillery, which were intended to reduce that fortress, had just been forwarded from Washington city, and a part of the timber for the carriages of the latter was still standing in the woods near Pittsburgh. The very unexpected surrender of Hull had thrown all the western arrangements of the government into confusion. Reinforcements had been ordered for *his* army, and during the excitement produced by his surrender, additional reinforcements were ordered into the field, before any arrangements had been made to furnish them with provisions and clothing, and to supply the place of the artillery which was lost in Detroit.

“After the termination of the campaign, the attention of General Harrison was directed to the fortifying of his position at the foot of the rapids; to the distribution of the troops, which

would remain after the discharge of the Ohio and Kentucky corps; and to the accumulation of provisions at his present post for the next campaign.*

As it was the intention to make the camp at the rapids the grand depot of the army, the engineer captain Wood was directed to fortify it upon a plan which he had submitted to the General, and which received his approbation. It was called *camp Meigs*, in honor of the governor of Ohio. From the difficulty of supporting a sufficient body of troops to protect camp Meigs, the General would have preferred that his principal depot should have been much nearer to the frontiers of Ohio, but as the artillery and a very considerable portion of the munitions of war were already there, and could not be taken back, no alternative remained but to make its defences as secure as possible, and to provide a sufficient garrison.

As the term of service for which the Kentucky troops had engaged approached its termination, the remnant of that gallant corps were honourably discharged. Previously to their departure, the brigadier general, (Paync,) and the field officers at the rapids presented an affectionate address to the commanding General, expressive of their highest confidence in his patriotism and military talents. After the departure of these troops, a sufficiency still remained for all the purposes of defensive measures.

The Ohio troops were still to serve some weeks, and the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades would continue until the spring. A sufficient force was assembled at fort Meigs to secure that important point. All the posts in the rear, on the right and left flanks, were garrisoned, and measures taken to accumulate provisions for the ensuing campaign. These employments did not, however, entirely engross the attention of the commanding General: the importance of destroying the enemy's vessels at Malden did not escape him. A detachment was formed for this purpose, consisting of volunteers from all the corps under the command of captain A. Laughran of the 19th U. S. regiment. The combustible materials, and the party which was to use them, were placed under the direction of Mr. Madis, a young Frenchman who had been an officer in the navy of France, and who had joined the American army as a volunteer, and been promoted by General Harrison to the post of conductor of artillery. From the character of the leader of the expedition, the excellent materials of which his command was composed, and the defenceless state which it was afterwards ascertained that the vessels at Malden were in at the time, there is little doubt that the object would have been completely successful, if their progress across the ice of lake Erie had not been stopped by a chasm in the middle of the lake which it was found impossible to cross.

* History of the War.

In the month of February, General Harrison received the appointment of major-general in the army of the United States. He had hitherto acted under the Kentucky commission which he had received when he first took the field. The delay of this appointment had created much uneasiness in the western country, and an intimation having been made that it was the intention of the General to resign at the close of the campaign, meetings were held in various places, and addresses sent as well to the President, requesting him to confer the rank of major-general on General Harrison, as to the latter requesting him to accept it. The citizens of Columbia township, and part of Clermont county, Butler county, and Cincinnati, in Ohio, Brookville, Wayne county, and Palmyra, in Indiana, were particularly zealous on this occasion.*

In the month of February, a change had been made in the war department, general John Armstrong having been appointed to the important office of secretary of that department. This secretary having received the letter of General Harrison of the 11th of February, announcing the suspension of offensive operations, in his reply of the 5th March, declares his conviction of the necessity of that course, and proceeds in that and subsequent letters to mark out the course which was intended to be pursued for the following campaign. The opinions heretofore given by General Harrison in relation to the mode of conducting the war against Upper Canada, were adopted. Captain Perry of the navy was already at Presque Isle, preparing the timber for the construction of those vessels with which he afterwards obtained such imperishable renown. In the letter of the secretary above referred to, General Harrison was informed that the fleet would be ready for service by the middle of May. The land forces, which were to form his command, were also designated; they were to consist of the 17th and 19th regiments, of which at that time but a small part had been raised; the 24th regiment, which was then on its march from Tennessee to join the north-western army, and three regiments of twelve month's men to be raised in Kentucky and Ohio. The post of Cleveland was fixed on as the proper place for building the boats which were intended to convey the troops to the opposite shore of Canada. It was the opinion of the secretary that the recruits which would be engaged for the new regiments could serve to protect the posts until offensive operations should commence. The employment of militia was not to be resorted to but after it was ascertained that the regular troops could not be procured. It will be observed, that the *plan* of the ensuing campaign was precisely the one which had been recommended by General Harrison in the

* For the address from Columbia, and the resolutions of the citizens of Cincinnati, vide Appendix, Note B.

letters heretofore quoted in this work. But the arrangements for the intermediate time were not at all suited to his wishes. Referring to this list of forces *to be* raised, the History of the War says: "With these nominal forces was the General required to maintain the north-western posts, with the provisions and military stores now accumulated in them; and to protect the frontiers against the Indians, and make demonstrations against Malden. Fortunately, General Harrison, before he received these instructions, had called for reinforcements of militia from both Kentucky and Ohio; but the whole number expected would not be sufficient to garrison the different posts completely.

"In answer to these instructions, the General remonstrated against abandoning the use of the militia, and leaving the frontiers in such a defenceless situation. He represented the numerous Indian tribes, residing contiguous to our outposts, who were either hostile, or would soon become so, when not overawed by an American army. As soon as the lake became navigable, the enemy from Malden could also make a descent with the utmost facility on fort Meigs, the important deposite of the artillery and military stores, from which they could not be removed through the swamps, and to which it was necessary to carry, on the high waters in the spring, the immense supplies deposited on the Anglaize and St. Marys. The works at the rapids had been constructed for a force of 2000 men; for the general had thought it necessary to maintain a force at that place, which would be able to contend in the field with all the disposable force of the enemy, in order to prevent him from getting into its rear, and destroying the weaker posts which more immediately protected the frontiers. The government was assured, that the regular force on which they relied, could not be raised in time, even for the intended expedition; and that as large supplies were not prepared, at points where they could be transported by water, the surest plan would be to march a large militia force, which not being delayed and dispirited for the want of supplies, would behave well and effectually accomplish the objects of the campaign. The probability that the force on which the government relied, would be too small to effect its object, was represented as a great obstacle in the way of the recruiting service, which at best was found to be very tedious.

"In the following extract from a letter of General Harrison to governor Shelby, the General expressed himself more explicitly on this subject. 'My sentiments upon the subject of the force necessary for the prosecution of the war, are precisely similar to yours. It will increase your surprise and regret, when I inform you that last night's mail brought me a letter from the secretary of war, in which I am restricted to the employment of the regular troops raised in this state to reinforce the post at the rapids. There are scattered through this state, about 140

recruits of the 19th regiment, and with these I am to supply the place of the two brigades from Pennsylvania and Virginia, whose term of service will now be daily expiring. By a letter from governor Meigs, I am informed, that the secretary of war disapproved the call for militia, which I had made on this state and Kentucky, and was on the point of countermanding the orders. I will just mention one fact, which will show the consequences of such a countermand. There are upon the Auglaize and St. Marys rivers, eight forts which contain within their walls property to the amount of half a million of dollars from actual cost, and worth now to the United States four times that sum. The whole force which would have had charge of all these forts and property, would have amounted to less than 20 invalid soldiers.*"

In the month of February the two brigades of Ohio militia, under the brigadiers Tupper and Perkins, were discharged. These troops had behaved remarkably well, and although they had not had an opportunity to measure their strength with the enemy, they had suffered much from the privations incident to military operations in such a country and in such a season. The General dismissed them with evidence of his approbation. In a letter to the secretary of war, after the defeat of the river Raisin, speaking of Cotgrove's battalion of Perkins' brigade, the General designates them as the "*best in the army.*" We mention this circumstance to show the falsehood of the charge which has been brought against the commanding General, of his being partial to the Kentucky troops to the injury of those from Ohio. With this view, also, we insert below the address to the General from the general and field officers of the two Ohio brigades, upon leaving them at fort Meigs.*

* "*Head Quarters, camp Miami Rapids, Feb. 20, 1813.*

"SIR, The service of the troops under our respective commands, in many cases having expired, and in all being about to close, it becomes necessary that we should shortly retire from the field. Permit us, Sir, (the general and field officers of the two brigades from the state of Ohio,) to address you at a moment in which the eyes of the whole people of the United States are directed towards your movements; at a time the inhabitants of the state of Ohio have every thing to hope from your success, and every thing to dread from unfortunate events, should such attend your operations. The misfortunes attending the capitulation at Detroit, were not confined to the disgrace of that surrender, the loss of service of so considerable a force, the property given up, or territory abandoned; its effects wounded us still deeper—it rendered the soldiery suspicious of the skill and integrity of their commanders, excited jealousy and distrust, which the enemies of our government were spreading through the country, with views most wanton and disgraceful. At such a moment, sir, and under those unpleasant circumstances, you were appointed to the command of the north-western army, to regain the territory so shamefully yielded up, to wipe off the stain from our arms, and to teach our enemy that he who could descend so far below civilized warfare, as to associate with savages, and mark his track with the blood of innocent victims, (sheathing his scalping knife in the hearts of defenceless women and children,) should not find a resting place within the reach of our arms. Great was the undertaking, and

After the Ohio troops were dismissed, there remained in service for the protection of the posts and frontiers a few hundred regulars of the 17th and 19th regiments. The battalion of twelve month's volunteers from Pittsburgh and Greensburgh, Pennsylvania, and Petersburg, Virginia, and the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades of militia. These had been much reduced in point of numbers, from the severe service they had passed through; but as the term for which they had engaged was about expiring, the General viewed his situation with no inconsiderable anxiety. Upon the authority of his original instructions, he had called upon the governors of Ohio and Kentucky for a brigade of infantry from each. The secretary of

numerous the obstacles which opposed your progress; a wilderness of nearly one hundred and fifty miles was to be traversed, which with its swamps and morasses presented difficulties far greater than the Alps. Great as were these obstacles, relying on the willingness of your troops to endure any hardships, to reach the enemy, you rightly judged that they might be surmounted. A few weeks past, every circumstance united to promise you an immediate accomplishment of your designs. Large supplies of provisions, and numerous munitions of war were so far advanced as to be within your control; your troops, with an unbounded reliance on your judgment and skill, were eager to be led up to the enemy, and waited but your order to march; your exertions had been great, and every thing promised the suffering soldier a speedy reward for his toils. At this important moment the unfortunate movement of general Winchester to the river Raisin, with its unhappy consequences, (a movement we believe without your orders or concurrence) broke the successful chain of operations, and presented new and unlooked-for difficulties before you.

"On retiring from service, Sir, we are happy in assuring you of our fullest confidence, and that of our respective commands, in the measures you have taken; they have been cautious, skilful, and guarded, such as would at this time have carried our arms to the walls of Malden, had not the unhappy occurrences at the river Raisin checked your progress, and for a short time thwarted your plans of operation. That you may soon teach the enemy the distinction between an honorable and savage warfare, by planting our standard in the heart of their country, and regain the honor and territory we have lost, and as a just tribute to valour, toils, and suffering, receive the grateful thanks of a generous and free people, is among the first, the warmest wishes of our hearts:

"EDWARD W. TUPPER, *Brigadier General.*

"SIMON PERKINS, *Brigadier General.*

"CHARLES MILLER, *Colonel.*

"JOHN ANDREWS, *Lieutenant Colonel.*

"WILLIAM RAYEN, *Colonel.*

"ROBERT SAFFORD, *Lt. Col. 2d regt. Ohio quota.*

"N. BEASLEY, *Major.*

"JAMES GALLOWAY, *Major.*

"SOLOMON BENTLEY, *Major.*

"GEORGE DARROW, *Major.*

"W. W. COTGREAVE, *Major.*

"JACOB FREDERICK, *Major.*

"His Excellency WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON, *Commander in Chief of the North Western Army.*"

war had not, indeed, countermanded the order for these troops, but he had apprised governor Meigs that he had disapproved it. With the utmost efforts that could be used; it would take a considerable time to bring the portion of them which were intended for fort Meigs, to that place; and it was extremely doubtful whether the militia who were then there, would remain after their term of service had expired. From the experiment he had made with the detachment under captain Langham to burn the vessels at Malden, he was convinced that the enemy could form no enterprise against fort Meigs until the thawing of the ice would allow them to use their vessels; there would certainly then be some weeks of inaction, and he was determined to make use of them to visit the interior, as well for the purpose of urging on the reinforcements for fort Meigs, as to stimulate the exertions of the recruiting officers and those employed in the quartermaster and commissary's departments. Having assigned the command of the fort to brigadier general Leftwich of the Virginia brigade, who was the senior officer, and instructed him to give all the necessary assistance to captain Wood of the engineer corps, to enable that officer to complete the defences, the General proceeded with a small escort of friendly Indians, and accompanied by the officers of his military family, to Franklinton, and thence to Chillicothe, where he arrived on the 16th of March. The General found at Chillicothe about 120 recruits of the 19th regiment; colonel John Miller, the commandant of that regiment, was directed to proceed with them to fort Amanda, on the head waters of the Auglaize, and thence by water to fort Meigs.— The General soon after set out for Cincinnati, for the double purpose of seeing his family, and of hastening on the militia which he expected from Kentucky. During his absence, "his family had suffered, and were still suffering the most unexampled afflictions of disease." An ophthalmia of a most uncommon malignancy had seized upon every individual composing it, by which three of his children had each lost an eye, and much apprehension excited of their becoming entirely blind. The General had the consolation of remaining with them but for a few days. On the 30th of March he received information from fort Meigs that the militia were determined to leave the fort as soon as their term of service should expire; that an unusually warm rain had so far destroyed the ice of lake Erie as to make it navigable in a short time. These letters also conveyed the intelligence that two of our men had been captured near to the fort by a small party of the enemy. As it had always been the opinion of the General that the enemy would make an effort to reduce fort Meigs as soon as the navigation should be opened, he had made every effort to prepare for that event, and had sent expresses to urge on the militia which had been drafted in Kentucky, with as much expedition as possible. The recent infor-

mation made it more than probable, however, that the meditated attack would be made before these troops could reach the Miami rapids. But a single company had as yet reached Newport, the point of rendezvous, where they were to receive their arms, and the whole width of Ohio was to be traversed, over roads, which for the greater part of the way were scarcely passable, before they could reach their point of destination. Add to this, a few hours of fair wind would bring the enemy from Malden to fort Meigs, and the weakened situation of the garrison, of which they would certainly learn from the two prisoners which they had taken. After stating these facts in a letter to the secretary of war, of the 30th of March, the General informs him of his intention to set out on the ensuing day, for fort Meigs, collecting in his progress all the force in his power. The drafts from Ohio under brigadier general Wingate, were by no means complete, and were not more than sufficient for the protection of the frontiers, and for garrisoning the small posts which could not be abandoned without much inconvenience and risk. About 150 of this brigade were, however, employed in building boats on the Auglaize, under the command of colonel Mills. This detachment could be taken from their employment, but when added to the regulars which were marching from Chillicothe, and the troops which would remain at fort Meigs, after the withdrawal of the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades, would form a very feeble garrison for a work so very extensive and important. It was very fortunate, under these embarrassing circumstances, that the commanding General was in a situation where he could adopt measures for hastening the march of the troops which no subordinate officer could have done. Having a number of pack horses in the vicinity of Cincinnati, he directed the company of Kentuckians which had arrived at Newport before his departure from Cincinnati, and two others which arrived on the following day to be mounted on these pack horses and proceed with all possible expedition. The squadron of dragoons, also, under the command of major Ball, which had been cantoned at Lebanon after the Mississiniway expedition, were also ordered on to fort Meigs. It was not exactly the kind of troops suited for the defence of such a fortification, but there was no resource, and by placing muskets in their hands, they would render essential service. General Harrison posted on to fort Amanda on the Auglaize, with the utmost expedition, where, being joined by colonel Miller with the regulars from Chillicothe, he embarked with them and about 150 Ohio militia under colonel Mills. The river was in many places out of its banks, and the navigation at night not a little dangerous; they arrived, however, at fort Defiance without losing any lives, although one or two of the perogues were overset and some arms and baggage lost.—General Harrison was apprehensive that the fort would

be besieged before his arrival, in which case it was his intention to have attacked the batteries in the manner in which it was afterwards directed to be done by colonel Dudley. The practicability of effecting it in that way was suggested to him during his descent of the river at this time. As they approached the fort in the night of the 11th of April, scouts were sent forward to ascertain whether it was invested, and if it was, what was the position of the enemy. The return of them dissipated all anxiety for its safety, and on the morning of the 12th the detachment reached the fort. The arrival of this reinforcement was a matter of great joy to the garrison, particularly as it was led by the commanding General in person. The General found that the Virginia brigade with its general, had entirely gone off.—Of the Pennsylvanians, about 230 remained, who had volunteered their services to remain until the expected reinforcements should arrive.

“ While General Harrison was in the interior, he addressed several letters* to the commanders of the Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades, which were read to those troops, setting forth the exposed situation of the camp, the probability of an attack, and the awful consequences of leaving the camp, almost to the mercy of the enemy. “ Those letters did honor to General Harrison, but they proved of no avail as respects the Virginia troops. They were calculated to rouse the feelings, and excite the energies of him, who had the smallest regard for his country’s welfare; but Leftwich had determined on leaving the camp as soon as possible, and cared not what became of those who remained. Nor did he say or do any thing to get a part of his men to remain a few days. His conduct, during the absence of General Harrison, was highly reprehensible indeed; for instead of completing the unfinished works, he pretended that the men could not be made to work, said they were sickly, that the weather was bad, and what was most vexatious, indeed, permitted them to burn the picketing timber for fuel, instead of getting it from the woods. After General Harrison left camp, not a single thing towards finishing the works was done, until captain Wood returned on the 20th from Sandusky, to which place he had been sent to give directions for its fortification. He had the extreme mortification to find nothing at all done in his absence, except the destruction of the unfinished lines. This was most perplexing to him indeed, as the ultimate responsibility in case of an attack, would in a great measure attach to him, the fortifying of the camp having been solely committed to his charge.” †

After the departure of the brigadiers Leftwich and Crooks, the command of fort Meigs had devolved on major Amos Stod-

* These letters have been mislaid, and, if recovered, shall be given in the Appendix.

† Wood’s Journal.

dard, of the United States corps of artillery. This officer reported to General Harrison that he had been visited by several of the most respectable inhabitants of the banks of the river Raisin, who had informed him that orders had been issued by general Proctor on the 7th of April, for the militia to be embodied for an expedition which was well understood to be directed against fort Meigs. A British officer had also communicated to a French gentleman the plan of attack. The British batteries were, he said, to be placed on the opposite side of the river, from the fort which was to be surrounded by the Indians, and he had no doubt but "a few hours cannonading would *smoke out* the Americans into the hands of the Indians." The hitherto uninterrupted success which had attended the British arms, had greatly increased their natural arrogance. In a letter from colonel C. Myers, acting quarter master general to the British army, to general Proctor, dated at fort George, on the 29th April 1813, and published in Niles' Register, vol. 5th, page 327, is the following paragraph:

"We look with confident hope for the report of your success—and brigadier-general Vincent, (who is here, and by whose directions I am writing to you,) has desired me to impress upon you, what essential aid could be rendered to us by the timely arrival here of *five hundred Indians*; should you have secured Harrison's army, it is the brigadier-general's desire, and in which I most earnestly join, that you forward to us in the king's vessels to Point Abino, that number with as great expedition as possible. In the event of your having captured Harrison's army, you will see the impossibility under existing circumstances of our taking charge of them here, and therefore brigadier-general Vincent requests you will make the best arrangements in your power to dispose of them, either by securing them at one or the other of your own posts, or passing them on parole into the United States by way of Cleveland or other route, as you may find expedient; the latter line of conduct is perhaps the most preferable, on account of the state of your supplies of provisions.

"Sincerely wishing every success, and hoping to send you, and receive from you, good accounts, I have the honor to be, &c.

"CHRISTO. MYERS, Col. Act. Q. M. G.

"Brigadier General Proctor."

The event will show that General Harrison saved both general Vincent and general Proctor the trouble of providing for his army. When General Harrison reached fort Meigs, he found that the squadron of dragoons under major Ball had already arrived, and in a few days after, the three companies of Kentucky militia, commanded by colonel William Johnson, which had been mounted on pack horses at Newport, also reached the fort. This reinforcement enabled the General to dismiss the Pennsylvania militia who had volunteered their services after the expiration of their time. They were discharged with the most flattering evidence of the General's approbation.

Every effort was now made to complete the defences of the fort, and to prepare for the approaching attack. The intervals of guard and fatigue duties were also diligently employed in

practising the troops in military evolutions. Scouts were kept constantly out to discover the approach of the enemy. Information was received from the river Raisin that the preparations of the enemy were still progressing, and that Tecumseh had recently joined them with 600 warriors from the Wabash.

The General was still anxiously looking for the arrival of the residue of the Kentucky brigade under general Clay. The march of this officer had been much impeded by the terrible state of the roads. He had been directed to take the route of the left wing, and to expedite his arrival, to embark his men on board the boats which had been prepared at St. Marys and on the Auglaize. Towards the latter part of April, the reconnoitring parties of the enemy were frequently seen, and on the 23th, the whole force of the enemy were discovered by captain Hamilton of the Ohio militia. The British troops were ascending the Miami with their baggage and artillery on board a brig, several smaller vessels, and a great number of open boats, whilst the Indians were approaching by land. Captain Hamilton immediately returned to the fort, with the intelligence, and was quickly followed by the advance of the Indians. The General being desirous to send an order to general Clay by a confidential person, captain Oliver, the field commissary of the army, offered his services. No one could be better suited to this hazardous enterprise than this gentleman, uniting as he did the qualities of bravery and intelligence. He was accompanied by one white man and one Indian. A detachment of eighty dragoons, under the command of captain Garrard, were ordered to escort them beyond the reach of the Indians who were around the fort.

As soon as captain Oliver was despatched, "the troops in the fort were paraded, and the General addressed them in animated terms on the approaching crisis. His popular eloquence reached the hearts of his brave companions, and was answered with shouts of applause and devotion. Presently the gunboats of the enemy came in view down the river, and approached the site of old fort Miami, on the opposite side from camp Meigs. There the British began to land and mount their guns; and as soon as their ordnance was on shore, their boats were employed to carry the Indians to the south-east side of the river, where they soon completely invested our camp; and nothing but their hideous yells and the firing of musketry was now to be heard.

"The General was indefatigable in his attention to all the operations required by the situation in which he was placed.— On the next morning after the arrival of the enemy he issued a general order from which the following is an extract:

"Can the citizens of a free country who have taken arms to defend its rights, think of submitting to an army composed of mercenary soldiers, reluctant Canadians goaded to the field by the bayonet, and of wretched, naked savages? Can the breast of an American soldier, when he casts his eyes to the opposite

shore, the scene of his country's triumphs over the same foe, be influenced by any other feelings than the hope of glory? Is not this army composed of the same materials with that which fought and conquered under the immortal Wayne? Yes, fellow soldiers, your General sees your countenances beam with the same fire, that he witnessed on that glorious occasion; and although it would be the height of presumption to compare himself to that hero, he boasts of being that hero's pupil. To your posts then, fellow citizens, and remember that the eyes of your country are upon you."*

The enemy adopted the plan in conducting the siege which had been communicated from the river Raisin. Their batteries were erected on the N. W. side of the river, and their main body encamped at old fort Miami, about one and a half mile below. These batteries were commenced in the night of the 28th, and were so far advanced as to afford cover to their men to work on them the following day. The erection of the necessary defences in fort Meigs was intrusted to captain Wood, of the United States engineers, captain Gratiot of that corps, who was the senior officer, being too unwell to be constantly on duty, but occasionally taking charge of a battery. "The enemy's mode of attack being now thoroughly understood, a plan previously arranged and suggested to the General, to counteract such an attack as the one already commenced by the enemy, was adopted and directed to be carried into execution as soon as possible. The whole army was turned out subject to the orders of the engineer, and the General seemed impatient for the new works to be in a state of progression. Scarcely time was allowed the engineer to lay out his works—however he had matured and digested his plan well, and nothing of consequence need occasion much delay."

"The works went on extremely well: never did men behave better on any similar occasion, though some thought the immense trenches commenced entirely unnecessary. . . . Orders had been given for them all to be kept in the trenches through the night, but it was so extremely dark, and the rain poured down in such torrents, that it was thought best to let them retire to their tents. . . . Next day one third only of the army was on duty at a time, and was relieved every three hours. The Indians were getting to be very impudent, and it became necessary for us to keep an eye to them, and occasionally give them a few shells and grape."†

Whilst the British were preparing their batteries, their allies were not idle. The ground being cleared for several hundred yards around the fort, they had no other means of annoying the garrison than by climbing the trees and firing from them. Even at that distance they were enabled to do some mischief: a few men were killed and many wounded by this distant firing.

* History of the War.

† Colonel Wood.

Speaking on this subject, colonel Wood humorously observes—
 “Their ethereal annoyance, however, proved a great stimulus to the militia; for although they did their duty with alacrity and promptitude, yet their motions were much accelerated by it—and let who will make the experiment, it will be invariably found, that the movements of militia will be quickened by a brisk fire of musketry about their ears.”

On the 30th, the enemy's batteries were completed, and their artillery fixed on them, under a very severe fire from the fort, by which they suffered some loss. A number of boats were seen crossing over to the south-west side of the river, laden with British troops, and Indians. The General supposing that it might be their intention to annoy him with their batteries, whilst their real object was to storm the fort, caused the men who were not on duty to have their arms always in readiness for action: “On the morning of the 1st of May,” says colonel Wood, “it was discovered that the British batteries were completed; and about ten o'clock they appeared to be loading, and adjusting their guns on certain objects in the camp. By this time our troops had completed a grand traverse, about twelve feet high, upon a base of twenty feet, 300 yards long, on the most elevated ground through the middle of the camp, calculated to ward off the shot of the enemy's batteries. Orders were given for all the tents in front to be instantly removed into its rear, which was effected in a few minutes—and that beautiful prospect of cannonading and bombarding our lines, which but a moment before had excited the skill and energy of the British engineer, was now entirely fled, and in its place nothing was to be seen but an immense shield of earth, which entirely obscured the whole army. Not a tent nor a single person was to be seen.—Those canvass houses, which had concealed the growth of the traverse from the view of the enemy, were now protected and hid in their turn. The prospect of *smoking us out*, was now at best but very faint. But as neither general Proctor nor his officers were yet convinced of the folly and futility of their laborious preparations, their batteries were opened, and five days were spent in arduous cannonading and bombarding to bring them to this salutary conviction. A tremendous cannonade was kept up all the rest of the day, and shells were thrown till eleven o'clock at night. Very little damage, however, was done in the camp; one or two were killed and three or four wounded—among the latter was major Amos Stoddard of the 1st regiment of artillery—a revolutionary character, and an officer of much merit. He was wounded slightly with a piece of shell, and about ten days afterwards died with the locked jaw.

“The fire of the enemy was returned from the fort with our eighteen pounders with some effect, though but sparingly—for the stock of eighteen pound shot was but small, there being but

360 of that size in the fort when the seige commenced, and about the same number for the twelve pounders. A proper supply of this article had not been sent with the artillery from Pittsburgh. The battery of the enemy supplied us with twelve pound shot; but they had no eighteens, all their large guns being twenty-fours. On the second day they opened their fire again with great fury, and continued it all day, but without any better effect.

“It had been apprehended in camp, that the enemy, finding he could not effect his object by his first plan of attack, would transfer his guns to the other side of the river, and establish batteries upon the center or flanks of the camp. Works calculated to resist him in such an event had, therefore, been undertaken, and were already in a state of forwardness. On the 3d, about 11 o'clock, our expectations were verified. Three pieces and a howitzer were suddenly opened on the camp from the bushes on the left. But they were soon silenced, and compelled to change their position by a few eighteen pound shot from our batteries. They resumed their fire again on the same side, but with no important advantages. On this day, however, they did rather more execution from their fire on every side, than they had done before. On the 4th their fire was again renewed, but with less vehemence and vivacity. Those who were serving their guns appeared to move as if they were executing orders which they disapproved, and making exertions which they knew would fail—and to depress them still more, the troops in camp, when their fire was not very brisk, would show themselves above the intrenchments and give them three cheers, swinging their hats in the air.

“On the first three days, the fire of the enemy way incessant and tremendous; five and eight inch shells and twenty-four pound shot had fallen in showers in the camp. Our batteries at different times had been served with great effect, as was afterwards acknowledged by some of the principal officers of the enemy. But the scarcity of ammunition, and not knowing how long the siege might continue, had compelled us to economise our fire.”* “With a plenty of ammunition, we should have been able to have blown John Bull almost from the Miami. It was extremely diverting to see with what pleasure and delight the Indians would yell, whenever in their opinion considerable damage was done in camp by the bursting of a shell. Their hanging about the camp, and occasionally coming pretty near, kept our lines almost constantly in a blaze of fire; for nothing can please a Kentuckian better than to get a shot at an Indian—and he must be indulged.”†

The following is extracted from a journal of an officer of volunteers, and published in Brown's History of the late War:

* History of the War.

† Colonel Wood.

"Every moment of the General was occupied in directing the works. He addressed the men in the most masterly and eloquent manner on the situation in which the fortune of war had placed them, and of the importance of every man's being vigilant at his post. This address converted every man into a hero: it inspired them with a zeal, courage, and patriotism never surpassed.

"On the 28th the enemy commenced a very brisk fire of small arms: in the evening the Indians were conveyed over the river in boats, and surrounded the garrison in every direction. Several of Colonel Ball's dragoons volunteered to reconnoitre the enemy's camp, but before they had got far from the fort they were fired on by the Indians and compelled to return.

"On the 29th the siege began in earnest, all communication with the other post was cut off. The firing was kept up the whole day. The enemy had progressed so far in the construction of their batteries, that during the night they afforded them sufficient protection to work by day light. A man was this day mortally wounded as he was standing near the General.

"April 30—The besieged kept up a well directed fire against the enemy's batteries and considerably impeded their progress. Boats filled with men were seen to pass to the fort Meigs side of the river; this induced the General to believe that their intention was to draw his attention to their batteries, and to surprise and storm the camp in the rear. Orders were therefore given for one third of the men to be continually on guard, and the remaining two-thirds to sleep with their muskets in their arms, and to be constantly prepared, at a moment's warning, to fly to their posts. These orders were strictly obeyed, and every duty performed with cheerfulness. Notwithstanding the incessant fire of the enemy, the men were obliged to go to the river for water every night; the well not being finished. Several of the men were this day wounded, and the General being continually exposed, had several narrow escapes.—During the night the enemy towed up a gun-boat near the fort, and fired at point blank shot for some time, but without effect. They retired from this position as soon as it was light enough for our gunners to see her.

"The general traverse was now completed, as well as several small ones in various directions. The fire from the garrison was begun with effect. During the day (May 1st) the enemy fired 256 times from their gun batteries. Their twenty-four pound shot passed through the pickets without cutting them down. Our gunners silenced one of their pieces several times. They did not fire so rapidly as the enemy, but with a better aim; eight of the Americans were wounded this day; a bullet struck the seat on which the General was sitting, and a volunteer was at the same time wounded as he stood directly opposite to him.

"On the 2d of May both parties commenced firing very early with bombs and balls, and continued it very briskly all day. Our troops had one killed and ten wounded, besides several others slightly touched with Indian bullets. The enemy fired this day 457 cannon shot.

"The next day commenced with a very brisk and fierce firing of bombs and cannon balls, and continued at intervals all day. They opened two batteries upon the fort, which they had established on this side of the river, within 250 yards of the rear right angle of the camp, one of which was a bomb battery.—An Indian, who had ascended a tree, shot one of our men through the head, and six were killed by the enemy's bombs. They fired 516 times during the day, and forty-seven times during the night.

"It rained very hard on the 4th, which retarded the fire of the besiegers.—A new battery was discovered erected on this side of the river, in the same direction with the others, and traverses were commenced to guard against them. Several were killed and wounded. Lieutenant Gwynn killed a British officer on this side the river with a rifle: 220 shots were fired this day."

The General was under no little apprehensions on account of his magazines, in which was deposited a great quantity of powder. The two houses which contained this article were as widely separated as possible, and as well secured as circumstances would permit. They had, however, attracted the

attention of the enemy, whose red-hot shot, shells, and carcasses were constantly directed to them. As a still further security, a third magazine was formed in the height of the siege. By the constant firing of shot, during the day, and shells at night, and the incessant toil of erecting new works, the officers as well as the men were much exhausted. But they were all in admirable spirits, and full of confidence of final success. The duties of the commanding General were, however, more incessant than that of any other officer. Judging from the course which the enemy ought to have taken, he had little doubt but an attack would be made to take the place by storm as soon as it was ascertained that no breach could be effected by his cannon.

Every precaution was used to prevent surprise, and the most minute directions given to the commanding officers of corps, as to their conduct in the event of an attack of that description. Although the whole of the troops were not sufficient to man the works as they should have been, it was yet necessary to have a small residue or disposable force. The Petersburg and Pittsburgh volunteers were chosen for that purpose, which were reduced to a little upwards of one hundred effective men. These were encamped in the centre near the General's quarters, that they might be in a situation to repair as promptly as possible to any point that should be attacked. Affairs were thus situated on the night of the 4th of May. Nothing as yet had been heard of general Clay, with his brigade of 1200 Kentuckians; but the appearance of Clay himself, or some person to announce his approach, was every moment expected. The night of the 4th was extremely dark: the General still supposing that an attempt to storm the fort would be made, had carefully visited the lines and repeated to all the officers on duty the orders he had before given in relation to that event. As his own marquee was much exposed to the effect of the shells which the enemy each night showered into the fort, and as it was known that he had slept but little, captain Croghan, thinking his quarters more secure, had sent to inform the General that he was on guard, and requested him to take his bed for the night: the General had about midnight availed himself of this offer, when he was awakened by a messenger from the officer of the day, informing him that there were some persons at the gate, who brought information from general Clay. As positive orders had been given never to open the gate after night but when directed by the General in person, he immediately rose and found at the river sally port major Trimble of Kentucky, accompanied by captain Oliver and a few privates. They had descended the river in a skiff, and had left general Clay above the rapids, by whom they were instructed to inform the commanding general that he should arrive at the fort by three or four o'clock in the morning. General Harrison, upon the receipt of this information, determined on

making a vigorous effort, to raise the siege by a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's works, on each side of the river. The attack of the batteries on the left bank was to be committed to a part of general Clay's force, upon the plan which we have before mentioned as that which the commanding General intended to have executed when he descended the river, on the 12th of April, if the fort at that time had been besieged. Captain Hamilton, of the Ohio militia, was immediately despatched, accompanied by a subaltern, to convey the necessary orders to Clay: these were verbal, as the General was apprehensive that he might fall into the hands of the enemy, and had he possessed a written order, they would be made acquainted with the plan of the contemplated attack. Clay was directed to land from six to 800 men on the left bank of the river, about a mile above the fort. This detachment, with Hamilton for their guide, were then to be marched "to the British batteries, carry them, spike the cannon, cut down the carriages, and then return to their boats, and cross over to the fort." The residue of the brigade was to be landed on the right bank of the river, and conducted by the subaltern who went with Hamilton to the fort. As soon as Hamilton was despatched, preparations were made for a sortie against the batteries on the south-east side of the river. It was intended that it should take place at the same time with that which was to be made by general Clay, on the opposite shore. The regular troops under colonel John Miller, and the Pittsburgh, Greensburgh, and Petersburgh volunteers, were assigned for this duty. As all the intended movements depended upon the arrival of Clay, his appearance was anxiously looked for. The eventful 5th of May, however, dawned, and he was not in view. It must be recollected, that the site of fort Meigs is just below the foot of the rapids in the Miami, which are several miles long. The pilot of general Clay informed him that he could not be answerable for conducting the boats in safety through them in the night, and urged his remaining above the rapids until morning. This recommendation was complied with, and it was not until 8 o'clock of the following morning that Hamilton met with Clay, about midway the rapids. The order was then delivered, and the execution of it committed to colonel Dudley, the senior colonel, with about 800 men. A little before nine o'clock, the front boat of general Clay, in which was the general himself, was seen from the garrison, descending the river, near the left shore, and warmly engaged with a party of Indians, who fired on them from the bank of the river. The other five boats, containing the residue of the brigade, after the command of Dudley had been detached, had been separated from each other, and driven ashore by the violence of the wind and current, and did not arrive until some time after the general. They also were fired on by the Indians in their des-

cent. As the Indians appeared to be increasing in that direction, a detachment was ordered out from the fort to cover their landing, consisting of captain Herring's company of regulars, and the battalion of volunteers under major Alexander; colonel Boswell, however, effected his landing without their aid, and as he was by this time exposed to the fire of the British batteries, General Harrison sent an officer to direct him to march his men across the plain which intervenes between the river and the fort, in very open order, to avoid the effect of the enemy's cannon. He thus reached the fort with little loss. These troops were drawn up, together with the detachment which had been ordered out to their assistance, under the west line of the fort. The Indians had by this time accumulated in considerable numbers on this flank, which increased their curiosity so much that approaching within 150 yards of the garrison, under cover of the logs and stumps which covered the ground, they began to annoy the troops so much that it was found necessary to check their presumption. Boswell, Alexander, and Herring were ordered to charge them. This was done with great alacrity in the presence of the commanding General, and although our troops suffered considerably before they could put up their foe from their several coverts, who received the fire of our men as they fled. They were hotly pursued; but the instant when our troops were gaining a most decided advantage, it became necessary to recal them. The commanding General, standing upon the walls of the fort, with a glass in his hand, and anxiously viewing the scene before him, accidentally discovered that a body of British troops were coming from the batteries to the east of the fort, to the assistance of their allies, and that a further advance would enable the British to attack our troops in the rear, whilst they were engaged with the Indians in front. General Harrison immediately directed his aid-de-camp, John-J. Johnson, Esq. to order them to return. Johnson's horse was killed under him before he could communicate this order, and major Graham, another aid-de-camp, was despatched to effect it. It was not without considerable difficulty, however, that the troops could be brought to abandon the pursuit.

This affair was scarcely terminated, when the attention of the General and the whole garrison were drawn to the opposite bank of the river, by the shouts of the brave Kentuckians in charging the enemy's batteries. General Harrison witnessed the complete success of this part of his plan, and every battery taken without any apparent loss. From the prospect of the fort, he saw the poles on which the British flags were erected, prostrated to the ground. Every thing prognosticated a happy termination to this important enterprise. The main body of the enemy were seen indeed to have taken the alarm; their drums were beating to arms, and the troops parading; but their distance

from the batteries was such that they could not have reached them before our troops could have returned to their boats, and been safely embarked. That they should devote a few moments to exultation and triumph upon the ground which they had so bravely won, was to be expected; but these moments passed, they still lingered, and the General saw with feelings of indescribable anguish that the British troops were in full march, whilst not the smallest appearance was observable upon the part of ours, of making a disposition either to retreat or resist the enemy. In fact they neither saw nor heard their drums, their attention being entirely taken up with the novelty of their situation, or skirmishing with a few Indians in the bushes in the rear of the batteries. An attempt was made by the General to call to them across the river, but this proved ineffectual. He then offered a thousand dollars to any one who should swim across the river and apprise captain Dudley of his danger. This was undertaken by an officer. Upon arriving at the beach, he attempted to launch a large perogue which was drawn up there; but before this could be effected, and he, with the assistance of some men, could reach the middle of the river, the enemy had already arrived. Between forty and fifty were killed, and 550 taken prisoners, 150 who were on the extreme left, escaped to their boats and reached the garrison without being followed by the enemy, bringing with them some of their wounded.

The troops destined to attack the batteries on the south-east side of the River had been for some time ready, but the General perceiving that on the first alarm of Dudley's attack, some of the British troops upon that side had been sent for, and at the moment of the surrender of Dudley's corps were actually crossing over, he waited until they had reached the opposite shore, before they were ordered to march. This detachment was commanded by Colonel John Miller, of the 19th United States regiment, and consisted of about 250 of the 17th and 19th Regiments, 100 twelve month volunteers, and captain Sebree's company of Kentucky militia. They were drawn up in a ravine under the east curtain of the fort, out of reach of the enemy's fire; but to approach the batteries it was necessary, after having ascended from the ravine, to pass a plain of 200 yards in width, in the woods beyond, which were the batteries protected by a company of British grenadiers, and another of light infantry, upwards of 200 strong. These troops were flanked on the right by two or three companies of Canadian militia, and on the left by a large body of Indians under Tecumseh. After passing along the ranks and encouraging the men to do their duty,* the General placed himself upon the

* When the General had finished his exhortation, which besides encouragement contained some threats against those who should be remiss, an Irishman

battery of the right rear angle, to witness the contest. The troops advanced with loaded, but trailed arms. They had scarcely reached the summit of the hill, when they received the fire of the British Infantry. It did them little harm; but the Indians being placed in position, and taking sight or aim, did great execution. They had not advanced more than fifty yards on the plain before it became necessary to halt and close the ranks. This was done with as much order by word of command from the officers, as if they had been on parade. The charge was then made and the enemy fled with so much precipitation, that, although many were killed, none were taken. The General from his position on the battery, seeing the direction that a part of them had taken, despatched Major Todd with the reserve of about fifty regulars, who quickly returned with two officers and forty-three non-commissioned officers and privates. In this action the volunteers and militia suffered less than the regulars, because from their position, the latter were much sooner unmasked by the hill, and received the first fire of all the enemy.

It was impossible that troops could have behaved better than they did upon this sortie. Some further particulars respecting it will be found in an extract from the commanding General's official letter, and the general order, extracts from which we shall give hereafter. Shortly after the troops returned from this sortie, a boat was seen putting off from the British side, bearing an officer with a flag of truce. Upon his landing at the beach, and being met by major Hukill, General Harrison's aid-de-camp, he said that he wished to see General Harrison, and that his object was to demand a surrender of the fort: Hukill told him, if that were his only business, he might spare himself the trouble, but that he would report what he had said to his General. General Harrison being anxious to ascertain the situation of the Kentuckians who had been taken by the enemy, directed him to be blindfolded, and brought into the fort. The demand for the surrender of the fort was treated as an insult.* The pro-

in the ranks called out to him, "Never mind, General, we're the boys that can do it." A laugh along the whole line was produced by this speech. And with this feeling they commenced their march up the hill of the ravine, from which so many were doomed never to return.

* We copy the following account of this interview from Niles' Register, vol 4, p. 260:

* "We are authorised to state, (says a Cincinnati paper) by an officer of General Harrison's staff, that the paragraph which appeared in the late Chillicothe Fredonian, relative to the answer which was given by the General to the demand of his surrender to general Proctor, is not correct. The answer there attributed to the General was made by a soldier of our army, who, being upon the bank of the river with some others, a British soldier called to them and observed "that they had better hang out the white flag and surrender." The American answered; "general Hull has not yet arrived; until he comes you may save yourselves the trouble of asking for a surrender." The conversation which took place between General Harrison and major Chambers, of

positions of the General for an exchange of prisoners, and the release of the Kentuckians was acceded to. Several flags were exchanged upon this subject, and the enemy ceased to notice the garrison, and as cannon shot had become very scarce in our batteries, there was no more firing on either side until it was discovered that the enemy were removing their cannon, when it was again renewed on the part of the garrison. The extracts from General Harrison's official letters to the secretary of war, which we give below, will be found to contain many interesting particulars.*

the British army, who was sent by general Proctor to demand the surrender, was as nearly as can be recollected, as follows.

Major Chambers.—General Proctor has directed me to demand the surrender of this post. He wishes to spare the effusion of blood.

General Harrison.—The demand under present circumstances, is a most extraordinary one. As general Proctor did not send me a summons to surrender on his first arrival, I had supposed that he believed me determined to do my duty. His present message indicates an opinion of me that I am at a loss to account for.

Major Chambers.—General Proctor could never think of saying any thing to wound your feelings, sir. The character of General Harrison, as an officer, is well known. General Proctor's force is very respectable, and there is with him a larger body of Indians than has ever before been embodied.

General Harrison.—I believe I have a very correct idea of general Proctor's force; it is not such as to create the least apprehension for the result of the contest, whatever shape he may be pleased hereafter to give to it. Assure the general, however, that he will never have this post *surrendered* to him upon any terms. Should it fall into his hands, it will be in a manner calculated to do him more honor, and to give him larger claims upon the gratitude of his government, than any capitulation could possibly do."

* "HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP MEIGS, 9th May, 1813.

"SIR—I have the honor to inform you, that the enemy having been several days making preparations for raising the siege of this post, accomplished this day the removal of their artillery from the opposite bank, and about twelve o'clock left their encampment below, were soon embarked and out of sight. I have the honor to enclose you an agreement entered into between general Proctor and myself for the discharge of the prisoners of the Kentucky militia in his possession, and for the exchange of the officers and men of the regular troops which were respectively possessed by us. My anxiety to get the Kentucky troops released as early as possible induced me to agree to the dismissal of all the prisoners I had, although there was not as many of ours in general Proctor's possession. The surplusage is to be accounted for, and an equal number of ours released from their parole, whenever the government may think proper to direct it.

"The two actions on this side of the river on the 5th were infinitely more important and more honorable to our arms, than I had at first conceived. In the sortie made upon the left flank, captain Nearing's company of the 19th regiment, a detachment of twelve months' volunteers under major Alexander, and three companies of Kentucky militia under colonel Boswell, defeated at least double the number of Indians and British militia.

The sortie on the right was still more glorious; the British batteries in that direction were defended by the grenadier and light infantry companies of the 41st regiment, amounting to 200 effectives and two companies of militia, flanked by a host of Indians. The detachment sent to attack this consisted of all the men off duty belonging to the companies of Croghan and Bradford of the 17th regiment, Langham, Elliott's, (late Graham's,) and Nearing's of the 19th, about 80 of major Alexander's volunteers, and a single company of Kentucky militia under captain Sebree, amounting in the whole to not more than

In a subsequent letter, dated at Sandusky, on the 12th of May, the General says, "From the account given by these men," (two British deserters) "my opinion is confirmed of the great superiority of the enemy who were defeated in the two sallies made on the 5th instant. That led by colonel Miller did not exceed 350 men, and it is very certain that they defeated 200 British regulars, 150 militia, and four or five hundred Indians. That American regulars, (although they were raw recruits) and such men as compose the Pittsburgh and Petersburg volunteers, should behave well, is not to be wondered at—but that a company of militia should maintain its ground against four times its number, as did captain Sebree's of the Kentucky, is truly astonishing. These brave fellows were at length, however, entirely surrounded by Indians, and would have been entirely cut off, but for the gallantry of lieutenant Gwynne of the 19th regiment, who, with part of captain Elliott's company, charged the enemy and released the Kentuckians. I enclose you a list of the killed and wounded during the whole siege. It is considerably larger than I had supposed it would be when I last wrote to you—but it is satisfactory to know that they did not bleed uselessly, but in the course of successful exertions. The return does not embrace those who fell on the north-west side of the Miami."

The total amount of killed and wounded in the foregoing action was as follows: killed, 81; wounded, 189.—Total killed and wounded, 270.

Sixty-four of the above were killed in the sorties, and 124 wounded; the remainder 81, killed and wounded within the fortified camp.

In the general order which was published on the 9th, the General mentions with the highest approbation the conduct of the troops in general, and gives them his thanks, as he does the following officers by name, viz: Wood and Gratiot, of the engineers; captains Cushing and Hall, of the artillery; colonel Miller and major Todd, of the 19th infantry; major Ball, of the United States dragoons; colonel Mills, and majors Lodwick and Ritzer, of the Ohio militia; major Johnson of the Kentucky militia; captains Croghan, Bradford, Langham, Elliott, and Nearing; lieutenants Campbell, Gwyn, Kercheval, Lee, and Rees; ensigns Ship, Hawkins, Harrison, Mitchel, and Stockton, of the United States infantry: to brigadier general Clay, colonel Boswell, and major Fletcher, and the captains Dudley, Simmons,

340. Yet the event of the action was not a moment doubtful, and had not the British troops been covered in their retreat by their allies, the whole of them would have been taken.

"It is not possible for troops to behave better than ours did throughout—all the officers exerted themselves to execute my orders, and the enemy, who had a full view of our operations from the opposite shore, declared that they had never seen so much work performed in so short a time."

and Metcalf, of Clay's brigade. Adjutant Brown, Mr. Peters, conductor of artillery, and to serjeants Timberlake, Henderson, James, and Meldrum, and Mr. Lion, principal artificer: to the Petersburg and Pittsburgh volunteers, captain Sebree and his company of Kentucky militia; also to major Hukill, acting inspector general; lieutenant O'Fallon, acting deputy adjutant general, and to his aids-de-camp, major Graham and John J. Johnson, Esq.

Upon the subject of colonel Dudley's misfortune, the author of the History of the War in the West, thus expresses himself: "The defeat of colonel Dudley very naturally became the subject of much speculation in Kentucky; and a considerable diversity of opinion existed, respecting the causes of the disaster and the actors concerned in it. The subject, however, appears very plain. Those who were in the defeat, commonly attributed it, very justly, to their own imprudence and zeal, which were not properly controlled, and directed by the orders and example of their leader. There was nothing difficult or hazardous in the enterprise—the whole misfortune resulted from the imprudent manner of its execution. The batteries were easily taken, and the retreat was perfectly secure; but the detachment wanted a head to direct and restrain its Kentucky impetuosity to its proper object."

The following judicious observations are made in M'Afee's History: "It was fortunate for the American cause, that the enterprise of general Proctor against fort Meigs was delayed so long. Had he been ready to sail as soon as the lake became navigable, and so timed his movements as to arrive at the fort during the first week in April, immediately after the last militia of the winter campaign were discharged, and before General Harrison arrived with reinforcements, he must have succeeded against that post. The garrison was then left very weak, being considerably less than 500 effectives. The works, too, were then very incomplete, and entirely too large for that number, as the fortified camp included seven or eight acres of ground. The place was still with propriety denominated *camp Meigs*, more frequently than it was styled a fort. Its capture would have been a most serious loss, as it contained nearly all the artillery and military stores of the north-western army, beside a large amount of provisions. General Harrison repeatedly in the winter had pressed on the attention of the government, the necessity of preparing a force to take the place of the militia then in service; but instead of doing this, we have seen that the new secretary, at the critical moment when the last of those troops were disbanded, restricted General Harrison to the use of regulars, which were still to be levied in a country, where it is almost impossible to raise a regiment of regulars through the whole year. Without the aid of the Ohio and Kentucky militia,

which the General called into service without the authority, and contrary to the views of the war department, it is highly probable that the important post at the rapids would have been lost."

In the message of the President of the United States, to congress, at their subsequent session, he says, "the issue of the late siege of fort Meigs, leaves us nothing to regret but a single act of inconsiderate valor."

On the 12th of May General Harrison proceeded to Lower Sandusky, where he found governor Meigs with a large body of militia, and learned that a still larger force was following on.— On the arrival of the General at Franklinton, on the 16th, the following general order was issued:

"Head Quarters, Franklinton, May 16th, 1813.

"The commanding General has observed with the warmest gratitude, the astonishing exertions, which have been made by his excellency governor Meigs, and the generals and other militia officers of this state, in collecting and equipping a body of troops for the relief of camp Meigs. But the efforts of these men would have been unavailing, had they not been seconded by the patriotic ardor of every description of citizens, which has induced them to leave their homes, at a most critical season of the year, regardless of every consideration, but that of rendering service to their country. The General found the road from Lower Sandusky to this place, literally covered with men, and amongst them many who had shared in the toils and dangers of the revolutionary war, and on whom, of course, there existed no legal claims for military services.— The General has every reason to believe, that similar efforts have been made in Kentucky. He offers to all those brave men from both states, his sincere acknowledgments; and is happy to inform them, that there is at present no necessity for their longer continuance in the field. The enemy has fled with precipitation from camp Meigs, and that is in a much better situation to resist an attack, than when the last siege was commenced.

"By order of the General,

"R. GRAHAM, *Aid.*"

"This order excited considerable murmurs in the state of Ohio. The volunteers had marched under the expectation of being led immediately against the enemy; and they reflected on General Harrison and the government for being too tardy in their movements. Those who understood the situation of the country, and the difficulty of supplying a large army through a swampy wilderness of 140 miles in extent, were, however, satisfied that nothing better could be done. There being a necessity in the first instance for obtaining the command of the lake, for which the greatest exertions were making, it would have been extravagant folly to retain so large a mounted force in service at fort Meigs, or to have led them through the wilderness against the enemy."^{*}

The season of the year had now arrived when the troops destined to act against the enemy, should have been ready to take the field. A very small portion had as yet been inlisted. The presence of the General being not necessary at this time on the frontiers, he repaired to the interior to stimulate the exertions of the officers who were employed in the recruiting service, and to

* History of the War.

embody and organize such of those as had been raised. He accordingly proceeded by the way of Chillicothe to Cincinnati, whence he could disseminate his orders with most facility, over the immense extent of territory, which was assigned to raise recruits for his army. The greater part of the companies of the 24th regiment which was raised in Tennessee having been filled, they were ordered on. They arrived at Cincinnati shortly after the General reached that place, and were immediately sent on to Franklinton. Having completed his arrangements in the interior, the General again set out for the frontiers. On his arrival at Franklinton, he held a council with the chiefs of the Delaware, Shawanese, Wyandot, and Seneca tribes. "He informed them that circumstances had come to his knowledge, which induced him to suspect the fidelity of some of the tribes, who seemed disposed to join the enemy in case they succeeded in capturing fort Meigs—that a crisis had arrived, which required all the tribes who remained neutral, and who were willing to engage in the war, to take a decided stand either for or against us—that the President wanted no false friends—that the proposal of general Proctor to exchange the Kentucky militia for the tribes in our friendship, indicated that he had received some hint of their willingness to take up the tomahawk against us—and that to give the United States a proof of their good disposition, they must either remove with their families into the interior, or the warriors must accompany him in the ensuing campaign, and fight for the United States. To the latter condition the chiefs and warriors unanimously agreed; and said they had long been anxious for an invitation to fight for the Americans. TARHE, the oldest Indian in the western country, who represented all the tribes, professed in their name the most indissoluble friendship for the United States. General Harrison then told them he would let them know, when they would be wanted in the service—'but you must conform to our mode of warfare. You are not to kill defenceless prisoners, old men, women, or children.' He added that by their conduct he would be able to tell, whether the British could restrain their Indians from such horrible cruelty. For if the Indians fighting with him would forbear such conduct, it would prove, that the British could also restrain theirs if they wished to do it. He humorously told them he had been informed, that general Proctor had promised to deliver him into the hands of Tecumseh,* if he succeeded against fort Meigs, to be treated as that warrior might think proper. 'Now if I can succeed in taking Proctor, you shall

* There is no doubt that when Proctor made the arrangement for the attack on fort Meigs with Tecumseh, the latter insisted, and the former agreed that General Harrison, and all who fought at Tippecanoe, should be given up to the Indians to be burned. Major Ball of the dragoons ascertained this fact from prisoners, deserters, and Indians, all of whom agreed to its truth.

have him for your prisoner, provided you will agree to treat him as a *squaw*, and only put petticoats upon him; for he must be a coward who would kill a defenceless prisoner.'"^{*}

Whilst the General was at Franklinton, he received intelligence from general Clay, that the enemy were again preparing to invest fort Meigs with a very large force. The 24th regiment had left Franklinton some days before. The General immediately set out, and having overtaken this regiment below Upper Sandusky, believing the danger to be very pressing, caused three hundred of the stoutest and most active men to be selected for the purpose of making a forced march to fort Meigs. These troops, stimulated by the presence and exhortations of the General, and by the example of colonel Anderson, lieutenant colonel Gaines, and the other officers, performed a most rapid march across the Black swamp, which was in a state the most difficult to be passed, either by man or beast; the mud being partly dried, but not so as to bear the weight of a man. It was with much difficulty that their legs could be drawn out, sinking as they did almost every step nearly to the knees. The General left the troops within a few miles of the fort, where he arrived on the evening of the 23th, and colonel Anderson, with his command, a few hours after.

At fort Meigs, General Harrison found colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted volunteers, which he had despatched from Cincinnati, to scour the frontiers in the direction of forts Wayne and Defiance. This service they had performed to the satisfaction of the General. As there appeared to be no enemy about the fort, the General despatched colonel Johnson with a detachment of his regiment to the river Raisin, to procure intelligence. The colonel returned with two of the French citizens, from whom the General received such information as convinced him that no immediate attempt would be made by the enemy.— These men corroborated the information that colonel Johnson had received from the other citizens at the river Raisin, that the enemy were not yet prepared for the contemplated attack upon our posts; but that a war party of about 100 Indians had passed the river Raisin in canoes, and had directed their course towards Lower Sandusky. As there was no longer any necessity for the General's remaining at fort Meigs, he set out from that place on the 1st of July, escorted by a company of colonel Johnson's regiment, commanded by captain McAfee. The swamp was exceedingly bad. The horses of the escort being much worn down were scarcely able to get through it. Those of the General and his staff being stronger, outtravelled the escort so much, that upon his arrival at Sandusky, but a few of the men were with him. On this occasion the General had one of those providential escapes, of which there were so many in-

stances in the course of this war. The Indians, of whose departure from Malden colonel Johnson had received intelligence, after having, on the preceding day, killed at a farm house near Sandusky, three men, a woman, and two children, had formed an ambuscade on the fort Meigs road, about three miles from Sandusky. Having waited all day and no person appearing, it was broken up, some short time before the General passed. They were heard by some of his party to fire off their guns as is their custom when they are overtaken by rain; and are not afraid of being discovered. The coming on of this slight rain, in all probability, saved the General and the officers who were with him from destruction. The commanding General had ordered the squadron of dragoons under colonel Ball to meet him at Sandusky—they accordingly arrived on the 2nd—and the General immediately set out with them for Cleveland. To that place the secretary of war had some time before dispatched major Jessup* to superintend the building of the boats which were to convey the army across the lake—as a number of them were now finished, and as Cleveland was also a deposite for provisions, and situated immediately on the margin of the lake, and of course subject to an attack by water as long as the enemy possessed the superiority on the lakes, it became necessary to attend to its security. For this purpose colonel Ball with his squadron was left in command, and orders were given to sink the boats as fast as they were finished in the deep water of the Cayahoga river. Orders were also given to erect a small fort at the mouth of the river. Having made these arrangements the General set out on his return to Lower Sandusky, in the vicinity of which it was his intention to assemble the army which was to be employed in the ensuing campaign. The middle of July had now arrived, and it was still not in his power to determine what number of regular troops he could calculate upon obtaining, and as that had been made by the war department, the criterion for determining whether any, or if any what number of militia were to be called into service, he was still unable to make the requisitions upon the respective states. We have before mentioned the arrival of colonel Johnson's regiment of volunteers on the frontiers. The General had directed the colonel to repair to the mouth of the river Huron, on lake Erie as a convenient situation for recruiting the horses, and one also from which they could conveniently repair to any point of our line which the enemy should attack. Whilst the General was at Cleveland, however, he had received instructions from the war department to order this regiment to repair to Kaskaskia to protect that frontier from the incursions of the Indians.

* The present quarter master general of the army, who so greatly distinguished himself on the Niagara frontier in the war.

This order was immediately obeyed, although extremely against the wishes of the regiment, and it had already marched on its destined service.

After the departure of Johnson's regiment, there remained with the commanding General no disposable force whatever; but in a few days after, some companies of the 26th and 29th regiments arrived at Lower Sandusky. The main body of the last mentioned regiment was also approaching under its commander colonel Paul. The returns made about the middle of February of the amount of the regular troops in the north-western army, including those on the march to join it, as well as the garrisons, was about 2000. Whilst the General was at Cleveland, he had despatched an officer of his staff to confer with commodore Perry, at Presque Isle, and to ascertain when it was probable the flotilla would be ready to sail. The information brought by this officer, captain Richardson, determined the General to commence the embodying of his troops with as much expedition as possible. On the 20th July, the long expected orders from the secretary of war arrived, authorising him to call out the militia. The General immediately despatched his aid-de-camp, major Trimble, with a letter to the governor of Kentucky. The call on the governor of Ohio was delayed in consequence of the greater facility with which the militia of that state might join the army, and it was not as yet known how many would be wanted to complete the number which had been fixed on as the maximum to be employed in the invasion of Canada. By major Trimble orders were also sent to accelerate the march of the 28th regiment, which had been raised in Kentucky. We must now turn our attention to the important events growing out of the second attempt of general Proctor upon our line of posts.

On the 20th of July, the boats of the enemy appeared ascending the Miami to fort Meigs, and on the following morning a non-commissioned officer's guard of ten men was surprised, and seven of them killed or captured by the Indians. In the night of the 20th, captain M'Cune of the Ohio militia, was despatched by general Clay to inform the commander in chief of the arrival of the enemy before fort Meigs. The information reached the General at Lower Sandusky. Out of the troops which were with him the General immediately strengthened the garrison of the fort, (Stephenson) to 160 men, and committed its defence to major Croghan. With the residue of his force, amounting to 140 regulars, he took post at the old Seneca town, on the Sandusky river, nine miles above fort Stephenson. This position was chosen as the most convenient to assemble the troops, which were coming from the interior, and from which succours could be sent to fort Meigs, fort Stephenson, or Cleveland, and from which also he could defend Upper Sandusky, should the enemy make any

attempts to destroy the great magazine of provisions which had been accumulated at that place. Captain M'Cune was ordered to return to fort Meigs, and inform general Clay that in the event of the enemy's opening their batteries against the fort, that every effort would be made to relieve it: in the mean time that he must be particularly cautious to guard against surprise. General Harrison was shortly after joined by brigadier generals M'Arthur and Cass, and by colonel Paul, with the 27th regiment, upwards of 300 strong. Colonel Ball also joined him with the squadron of dragoons from Cleveland. It was the intention of the General, should the enemy lay regular siege to fort Meigs, to select 400 men from the troops which were with him, and by an old and unfrequented route to approach the fort so as to reach it a little before day, and at any hazard to break through the lines of the enemy. By captain M'Cune, who had again been sent out to him, the General was informed that about 800 Indians had passed up the Miami, in view of the fort, with the design as was supposed to attack fort Winchester. The General believed that the real object of the enemy was to draw his attention to that quarter, to cover their design upon Upper Sandusky, Lower Sandusky, or Cleveland. A reconnoitring party was therefore constantly kept out, in the direction of the first of these places as well as on the margin of the lake. Captain M'Cune was ordered to return to fort Meigs on the night of the 25th, to inform general Clay of the situation and intentions of the commanding General. This gallant veteran arrived near the fort next morning at day break, after encountering many Indian camps, and putting spurs to his horse as soon as he reached the opening of the fort, was fortunate enough to enter it without injury. His arrival no doubt saved this important post, for on the evening of that day a heavy firing of small arms, (musketry and rifles,) was heard on the Sandusky road, intermingled with Indian yells and shouts, the whole indicating a severe battle between a body of Indians and one of our troops. The whole garrison immediately flew to arms, in the almost unanimous belief that General Harrison, coming to their relief, was attacked by the enemy. The officers even of the highest grades were of that opinion, and some of them insisted on being suffered to march out to the relief of their friends. General Clay, although unable to account for the firing, yet as captain M'Cune had left Seneca but the night before, and brought no intelligence of its being the intention of General Harrison until there should appear farther necessity for it, either to come on with, or send any troops to fort Meigs, he could not believe that the General could so soon have altered his intention. This information in a great measure satisfied the officers, but not the men, who were extremely indignant at being prevented from going to share the dangers of their commander in chief, and their brother soldiers. A smart shower

of rain, however, soon put an end, as well to this battle, as to their apprehensions. It proved to be the well conceived stratagem of an Indian chief, to draw out the garrison, or a part of it, whose return was to have been intercepted by a body of Indians, whilst the British troops were to rush upon and carry the fort. There can be but little doubt but the plan would have succeeded, in whole or in part, but for the opportune arrival of captain M'Cune. The allies remained but one day after this well devised stratagem before fort Meigs. On the 23th the British embarked their troops and stores, and proceeded down the Miami.

"The force which Proctor and Tecumseh brought against us in this instance, has since been ascertained to have been about 5000 strong. A greater number of Indians were collected by them for this expedition, than ever were assembled in one body on any other occasion during the whole war.

"Having raised the siege of camp Meigs, the British sailed round into Sandusky bay, whilst a competent number of their savage allies marched across through the swamps of Portage river, to co-operate in a combined attack on Lower Sandusky, expecting no doubt that General Harrison's attention would be chiefly directed to forts Winchester and Meigs. The General, however, had calculated on their taking this course, and had been careful to keep patrols down the bay, opposite the mouth of Portage, where he supposed their forces would debark.

"Several days before the British had invested fort Meigs, General Harrison with major Croghan and some other officers, had examined the heights which surround fort Stephenson; and as the hill on the opposite or south-east side of the river was found to be the most commanding eminence, the General had some thoughts of removing the fort to that place, and major Croghan declared his readiness to undertake the work. But the General did not authorize him to do it, as he believed that if the enemy intended to invade our territory again, they would do it before the removal could be completed. It was then finally concluded that the fort which was calculated for a garrison of only 200 men, could not be defended against the heavy artillery of the enemy; and that if the British should approach it by water, which would cause a presumption that they had brought their heavy artillery, the fort must be abandoned and burnt, provided a retreat could be effected with safety. In the orders left with major Croghan it was stated—'Should the British troops approach you in force with cannon, and you can discover them in time to effect a retreat, you will do so immediately, destroying all the public stores.'

"'You must be aware, that the attempt to retreat in the face of an Indian force would be vain. Against such an enemy your garrison would be safe, however great the number.'

“ On the evening of the 29th, General Harrison received intelligence by express from general Clay, that the enemy had abandoned the siege of fort Meigs; and as the Indians on that day had swarmed in the woods round his camp, he entertained no doubt but that an immediate attack was intended either on Sandusky or Seneca. He therefore immediately called a council of war, consisting of Mr Arthur, Cass, Ball, Paul, Wood, Hukill, Holmes, and Graham, who were unanimously of the opinion, that fort Stephenson was untenable against heavy artillery, and that, as the enemy could bring with facility any quantity of battering cannon against it, by which it must inevitably fall, and as it was an unimportant post, containing nothing the loss of which would be felt by us, that the garrison should therefore not be reinforced, but withdrawn and the place destroyed. In pursuance of this decision the General immediately despatched the order to major Croghan, directing him immediately to abandon fort Stephenson, to set it on fire and repair with his command to head quarters—cross the river and come up on the opposite side, and if he should find it impracticable to reach the General’s quarters, to take the road to Huron and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and despatch. This order was sent by Mr. Conner and two Indians, who lost their way in the dark, and did not reach fort Stephenson till eleven o’clock the next day. When major Croghan received it, he was of opinion that he could not then retreat with safety, as the Indians were hovering round the fort in considerable force. He called a council of his officers, a majority of whom coincided with him in opinion that a retreat would be unsafe, and that the post could be maintained against the enemy, at least till further instructions could be received from head quarters. The major therefore immediately returned the following answer: ‘ Sir, I have just received yours of yesterday, 10 o’clock, P. M. ordering me to destroy this place and make good my retreat, which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to maintain this place, and by heavens we can.’ In writing this note, major Croghan had a view to the probability of its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on that account made use of stronger language than would otherwise have been consistent with propriety. It reached the General on the same day, who did not fully understand the circumstances and motives under which it had been dictated. The following order was therefore immediately prepared, and sent with colonel Wells in the morning, escorted by colonel Ball with his corps of dragoons.

‘ July 30, 1813.

‘ Sir, The General has just received your letter of this date, informing him that you had thought proper to disobey the order issued from this office, and delivered to you this morning. It appears that the information which dictated the order was incorrect; and as you did not receive it in the night, as was expected, it might have been proper that you should have reported the circum-

stance and your situation, before you proceeded to its execution. This might have been passed over, but I am directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver, that he has made his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition to the orders of his General, can no longer be entrusted with a separate command. Colonel Wells is sent to relieve you. You will deliver the command to him, and repair with colonel Ball's squadron to this place. By command, &c.

A. H. HOLMES, *Asst. Adjutant General.*

"The squadron of dragoons on this trip met with a party of Indians near Lower Sandusky, and killed eleven out of twelve. The Indians had formed an ambush, and fired on the advanced guard consisting of a sergeant and five privates. Upon seeing the squadron approach they fled, but were pursued and soon overtaken by the front squad of captain Hopkins' troop. The greater part of them were cut down by colonel Ball and captain Hopkins with his subalterns, whose horses being the fleetest overtook them first. The loss on our part was two privates wounded and two horses killed.

"Colonel Wells being left in the command of fort Stephenson, major Croghan returned with the squadron to head quarters. He there explained his motives for writing such a note, which were deemed satisfactory; and having remained all night with the General, who treated him politely, he was permitted to return to his command in the morning, with written orders similar to those he had received before.

"A reconnoitring party which had been sent from head quarters to the shore of the lake, about 20 miles distant from fort Stephenson, discovered the approach of the enemy by water on the evening of the 31st of July. They returned by the fort after 12 o'clock the next day, and had passed it but a few hours, when the enemy made their appearance before it. The Indians showed themselves first on the hill over the river, and were saluted by a six pounder, the only piece of artillery in the fort, which soon caused them to retire. In half an hour the British gun boats came in sight, and the Indian forces displayed themselves in every direction, with a view to intercept the garrison, should a retreat be attempted. The six pounder was fired a few times at the gun boats, which was returned by the artillery of the enemy. A landing of their troops with a five and a half inch howitzer was effected about a mile below the fort; and major Chambers accompanied by Dickson was despatched towards the fort with a flag, and was met on the part of major Croghan by ensign Shipp of the 17th regiment. After the usual ceremonies major Chambers observed to ensign Shipp, that he was instructed by general Proctor to demand the surrender of the fort, as he was anxious to spare the effusion of human blood, which he could not do, should he be under the necessity of reducing it, by the powerful force of artillery, regulars, and Indians under his command. Shipp replied, that the commandant of the fort and its garrison were determined to defend it to the last extre-

mity; that no force however great could induce them to surrender, as they were resolved to maintain their post, or to bury themselves in its ruins. Dickson then said, that their immense body of Indians could not be restrained from murdering the whole garrison in case of success, of which we have no doubt, rejoined Chambers, as we are amply prepared. Dickson then proceeded to remark, that it was a great pity so fine a young man should fall into the hands of the savages—sir, for God's sake surrender, and prevent the dreadful massacre that will be caused by your resistance. Mr. Shipp replied that when the fort was taken, there would be none to massacre. It will not be given up while a man is able to resist. An Indian at this moment came out of an adjoining ravine, and advancing to the ensign, took hold of his sword, and attempted to wrest it from him. Dickson interfered, and having restrained the Indian, affected great anxiety to get him safe into the fort.

“The enemy now opened their fire from their six pounders in the gun boats and the howitzer on shore, which they continued through the night with but little intermission and with very little effect. The forces of the enemy consisted of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians commanded by Dickson, the whole being commanded by general Proctor in person. Tecumseh was stationed on the road to fort Meigs with a body of 2000 Indians, expecting to intercept a reinforcement on that route.

“Major Croghan through the evening occasionally fired his six pounder, at the same time changing its place occasionally to induce a belief that he had more than one piece. As it produced very little execution on the enemy, and he was desirous of saving his ammunition, he soon discontinued his fire. The enemy had directed their fire against the north-western angle of the fort, which induced the commander to believe that an attempt to storm his works would be made at that point. In the night captain Hunter was directed to remove the six pounder to a block house, from which it would rake that angle. By great industry and personal exertion captain Hunter soon accomplished this object in secrecy. The embrasure was masked, and the piece loaded with a half charge of powder, and double charge of slugs and grape shot. Early in the morning of the 2nd, the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer and three six pounders, which they had landed in the night, and planted in a point of woods about 250 yards from the fort. In the evening, about 4 o'clock, they concentrated the fire of all their guns on the north-west angle, which convinced major Croghan that they would endeavour to make a breach and storm the works at that point; he therefore immediately had that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour and sand, which were so effectual that the picketing in that place sustained no material injury. Sergeant Weaver with five or six gentlemen of the Petersburg

volunteers and Pittsburgh blues, who happened to be in the fort, was entrusted with the management of the six pounder.

“Late in the evening, when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the fort, the enemy proceeded to make the assault. Two feints were made towards the southern angle, where captain Hunter’s lines were formed; and at the same time a column of 350 men was discovered advancing through the smoke, within twenty paces of the north-western angle. A heavy galling fire of musketry was now opened upon them from the fort, which threw them into some confusion. Colonel Short who headed the principal column soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the brink of the ditch. After a momentary pause he leaped into the ditch, calling to his men to follow him, and in a few minutes it was full. The masked port hole was now opened, and the six pounder, at the distance of 30 feet, poured such destruction among them that but few who had entered the ditch were fortunate enough to escape. A precipitate and confused retreat was the immediate consequence, although some of the officers attempted to rally their men. The other column, which was led by colonel Warburton and major Chambers, was also routed in confusion by a destructive fire from the line commanded by captain Hunter. The whole of them fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the reach of our fire arms. During the assault, which lasted half an hour, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left colonel Short, a lieutenant, and twenty-five privates dead in the ditch; and the total number of prisoners taken was twenty-six, most of them badly wounded. Major Muir was knocked down in the ditch, and lay among the dead, till the darkness of the night enabled him to escape in safety. The loss of the garrison was one killed, and seven slightly wounded. The total loss of the enemy could not be less than 150 killed and wounded.

“When night came on, which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were in a desperate situation. Complete relief could not be brought to them by either side with any degree of safety. Major Croghan, however, relieved them as much as possible—he contrived to convey them water over the picketing in buckets, and a ditch was opened under the pickets, through which those who were able and willing, were encouraged to crawl into the fort. All who were able, preferred, of course, to follow their defeated comrades, and many others were carried from the vicinity of the fort by the Indians, particularly their own killed and wounded; and in the night about 3 o’clock, the whole British and Indian force commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their precipitation that they left a sail boat containing some clothing and a considerable quantity of military stores: and on the next day seventy stand

of arms and some braces of pistols were picked up round the fort. Their hurry and confusion were caused by the apprehension of an attack from General Harrison, of whose position and force they had probably received an exaggerated account.

“It was the intention of General Harrison, should the enemy succeed against fort Stephenson; or should they endeavor to turn his left and fall on Upper Sandusky, to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for the protection of that place. But he discovered by the firing on the evening of the 1st, that the enemy had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression on the fort; and he knew that an attempt to storm it without making a breach could be successfully repelled by the garrison; he therefore determined to wait for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers under colonel Rennick, being the advance of 700 who were approaching by the way of Upper Sandusky, and then to march against the enemy and raise the siege, if their force was not still too great for his. On the 2nd he sent several scouts to ascertain their situation and force; but the woods were so infested with Indians, that none of them could proceed sufficiently near the fort to make the necessary discoveries. In the night the messenger arrived at head quarters with intelligence that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 8 o'clock major Croghan had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that they were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to the commander in chief with this information. The General now determined to wait no longer for the reinforcements, and immediately set out with the dragoons, with which he reached the fort early in the morning, having ordered generals M. Arthur and Cass, who had arrived at Seneca several days before, to follow him with all the disposable infantry at that place, and which, at this time was about 700 men, after the numerous sick, and the force necessary to maintain the position, were left behind. Finding that the enemy had fled entirely from the fort so as not to be reached by him, and learning that Tecumseh was somewhere in the direction of fort Meigs with 2000 warriors, he immediately ordered the infantry to fall back to Seneca, lest Tecumseh should make an attack on that place, or intercept the small reinforcements advancing from Ohio.

“In his official report of this affair, General Harrison observes that, ‘It will not be among the least of general Proctor’s mortifications, that he has been baffled by a youth, who has just passed his twenty-first year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, general George R. Clarke.’

“Captain Hunter of the seventeenth regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great propriety: and never was there a set of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz. lieutenants Johnson and Baylor of the seventeenth, Meeks of the seventh, and ensigns Shipp and Duncan of the seventeenth.

"Lieutenant Anderson of the twenty-fourth was also noticed for his good conduct. Being without a command he solicited major Croghan for a musket and a post to fight at, which he did with the greatest bravery.

"Too much praise," says major Croghan, "cannot be bestowed on the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates under my command for their gallantry and good conduct during the siege."

"The brevet rank of lieutenant colonel was immediately conferred on major Croghan by the President of the United States, for his gallant conduct on this occasion. The ladies of Chillicothe also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied by a suitable address."*

The conduct of the gallant Croghan and his garrison received from ever quarter the plaudits of their countrymen. This was what they most richly deserved. There was, however, some jealous spirits who took it into their heads to be dissatisfied with the course pursued by the commanding General. The order which was given to colonel Croghan to evacuate and destroy the garrison previously to the attack, was loudly condemned, as well as the decision of the council of war, to fall back with the troops then at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these measures, it has been seen, were determined on by the unanimous advice of the council of war. It is not to be presumed that such men as composed that board, would have given advice which was in any way derogatory to the honour of the American arms. Every individual amongst them either had, before or afterwards, distinguished himself by acts of daring courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be much acquainted with military matters, but the subject appears to us so plain as only to require a small portion of common sense, perfectly to comprehend it. At the time that the determination was made to withdraw the garrison from Sandusky, it must be recollected that the General had only with him at Seneca about 400 infantry and 130 or 140 dragoons. The enemy, as he was informed by general Clay in the letter brought by captain McCune, amounted to at least 5,000. With such a disparity of force, would it have been proper to have risked an action to preserve the post of Lower Sandusky, which of itself was of little or no importance, and which, the garrison being withdrawn, contained nothing of any value? The posts of fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of the utmost importance; the former was amply provided with the means of defence, and was in no danger; but the latter, weak in its defences, and with a feeble garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of flour and other provisions, the sole resource of the army for the ensuing campaign, was to be preserved at any risk. The position at Seneca was not in the

* History of the War.

direct line from fort Meigs to Upper Sandusky. The enemy by taking the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison, as several hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed of their movement, even if it had been discovered the moment it had been commenced, a circumstance not very likely to happen. It, therefore, became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position better adapted to that purpose should be assumed. There was another and most important reason for this movement: twelve miles in the rear of Seneca, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or open country commences. The infantry which the commander in chief had with him were raw recruits; on the contrary, the squadron of dragoons were well disciplined, and had seen much service. In the country about Seneca, this important corps could have been of little service: in the open country to the rear, they would have defeated five times their number of Indians.— It was for these reasons that it was determined by the council of war, to change the position of the troops at Seneca. If this movement did take place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower Sandusky was obvious. The place was extremely weak, and in a bad position. It was not intended originally for a fort. Before the war, it was used as the United States' Indian factory, and had a small stockade around it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken Indians. It was, moreover, commanded by a hill within point blank shot on the opposite side of the river. To those who suppose that General Harrison should have advanced upon the enemy, the moment he discovered that Sandusky was attacked, we must, in the language of the General and field officers who were present on the occasion, "leave then to correct their opinions in the school of experience." General Harrison had been reinforced a day or two before the siege of Sandusky, by the 23th regiment, raised in Kentucky. After having received this corps, he could not have marched more than 300 effective men without risking his stores, and, what was of still more consequence, 150 sick at Seneca, to be taken by the smallest party of Indians. The scouts of the army brought information that the Indians were very numerous in the direction of fort Meigs. The General conjectured that a large portion of the Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the defenceless camp at Seneca, should he advance. The information he received from the British prisoners confirmed this opinion; a body of 2000 being there under the command of Tecumseh. At the moment of which we are speaking, the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching. Now, under these circumstances, does any reasonable man believe that General Harrison should have advanced with his 800 raw recruits, against a force in front which he knew to be so much superior in numbers, and with the probability of having one equally large hanging on

his flank? What would have been thought of his abilities as a general, even if he had been successful against general Proctor, (of which with his small force there was little probability) if in his absence Tecumseh with his 2000 warriors had rushed upon camp Seneca, destroyed his stores, tomahawked his sick soldiers, and pursuing his route towards Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio volunteers, scattered as they were in small bodies, and finally ending his career with the destruction of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of which all his hopes of future success depended? In all human probability this would have been the result, had General Harrison advanced to the relief of fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly better to risk for a while, the defence of that fort to the talents and valor of Croghan, and the gallant spirits who were with him, than to jeopardise the whole prospects of the campaign. We have introduced two documents which we have taken from the Liberty Hall newspaper, published at Cincinnati on the 14th of September, 1813. The first will show that all the general and field officers of the army approbated the course pursued by the commander in chief. Amongst those were many who would bear a comparison with any others of the army, for all the qualities which constitute the accomplished officer. The second document is a statement going to the same point, from the hero of fort Stephenson himself. It will also serve to correct an erroneous opinion which many have, and which some still entertain, that the defence of the fort was made in opposition to the opinion and instructions of General Harrison, or that the orders were changed upon colonel Croghan's "representations of his ability to maintain the post."

"Lower Seneca Town, August 29, 1813.

"The undersigned, being the general, field, and staff officers, with that portion of the north-western army under the immediate command of General Harrison, have observed with regret and surprise, that charges, as improper in the form, as in the substance, have been made against the conduct of General Harrison during the recent investment of Lower Sandusky. At another time, and under ordinary circumstances, we should deem it improper and unnecessary thus publicly to give any opinion respecting the movements of the army. But public confidence in the commanding General is essential to the success of the campaign, and causelessly to withdraw or to withhold that confidence, is more than individual injustice; it becomes a serious injury to the service. A part of the force, of which the American army consists, will derive its greatest strength and efficacy from a confidence in the commanding General, and from those moral causes which accompany and give energy to public opinion. A very erroneous idea respecting the number of the troops then at the disposal of the General, has doubtless been the primary cause of those unfortunate and unfounded impressions. A sense of duty forbids us from giving a detailed view of our strength at that time. In that respect, we have fortunately experienced a very favorable change. But we refer the public to the General's official report to the secretary of war, of major Croghan's successful defence of Lower Sandusky. In that will be found a statement of our whole disposable force; and he who believes that with such a force, and under the circumstances which then occurred, General Harrison ought to have advanced upon the enemy, must be left to correct his opinion in the school of experience.

"On a review of the course then adopted, we are decidedly of the opinion, that it was such as was dictated by military wisdom, and by a due regard to our own circumstances and to the situation of the enemy. The reasons for this opinion it is evidently improper now to give, but we hold ourselves ready at a future period, and when other circumstances shall have intervened, to satisfy every man of its correctness who is anxious to investigate and willing to receive the truth. And with a ready acquiescence, beyond the mere claims of military duty, we are prepared to obey a General, whose measures meet our most deliberate approbation, and merit that of his country.

LEWIS CASS, <i>Brig. Gen. U. S. A.</i>	GEORGE TODD, <i>Maj. 19 R. U. S. I.</i>
SAMUEL WELLS, <i>Col. 17 R. U. S. I.</i>	WILLIAM TRIGG, <i>Maj. 28 R. U. S. I.</i>
THOS. D. OWINGS, <i>Col. 28 R. U. S. I.</i>	JAMES SMILEY, <i>Maj. 28 R. U. S. I.</i>
GEORGE PAWLL, <i>Col. 17 R. U. S. I.</i>	RD. GRAHAM, <i>Maj. 17 R. U. S. I.</i>
J. C. BARTLETT, <i>Col. Q. M. G.</i>	GEO. CROGHAN, <i>Maj. 17 R. U. S. I.</i>
JAMES V. BALL, <i>Lieut. Col.</i>	L. HUKILL, <i>Maj. & Ass. Insp. Gen.</i>
ROBERT MORRISON, <i>Lieut. Col.</i>	E. D. WOOD, <i>Maj. Engineers.</i>

"Lower Sandusky, August 27, 1813.

"I have with much regret seen in some of the public prints, such misrepresentations respecting my refusal to evacuate this post, as are calculated not only to injure me in the estimation of military men, but also to excite unfavorable impressions as to the propriety of General Harrison's conduct relative to this affair.

"His character as a military man is too well established to need my approbation or support. But his public services entitle him at least to common justice, this affair does not furnish cause of reproach. If public opinion has been lately misled respecting his late conduct, it will require but a moment's cool, dispassionate reflection, to convince them of its propriety. The measures recently adopted by him, so far from deserving censure, are the clearest proofs of his keen penetration, and able Generalship. It is true that I did not proceed immediately to execute his order to evacuate this post; but this disobedience was not, as some would wish to believe, the result of a fixed determination to maintain the post contrary to his most positive orders, as will appear from the following detail, which is given to explain my conduct.

"About 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30th ultimo, a letter from the Adjutant General's office, dated Seneca Town, July 29, 1813, was handed me by Mr. Conner, ordering me to abandon this post, burn it, and retreat that night to head-quarters. On the reception of the order I called a council of officers, in which it was determined not to abandon the place, at least until the further pleasure of the General should be known, as it was thought an attempt to retreat in the open day, in the face of a superior force of the enemy would be more hazardous than to remain in the fort, under all its disadvantages. I therefore wrote a letter to the General, couched in such terms as I thought were calculated to deceive the enemy should it fall into his hands, which I thought more than probable—as well as to inform the General, should it be so fortunate as to reach him, that I would wait to hear from him, before I should proceed to execute his order. This letter, contrary to my expectations was received by the General, who, not knowing what reasons urged me to write in a tone so decisive, concluded very rationally that the manner of it was demonstrative of the most positive determination to disobey his order under any circumstances. I was therefore suspended from the command of the fort, and ordered to Head Quarters. But on explaining to the General my reason for not executing his orders, and my object in using the style I had done, he was so perfectly satisfied with the explanation, that I was immediately reinstated in the command.

"It will be recollected that the order above alluded to, was written on the night previous to my receiving it—had it been delivered to me, as was intended, that night, I should have obeyed it without hesitation; its not reaching me in time, was the only reason which induced me to consult my officers on the propriety of waiting the General's further orders.

"It has been stated, also, that 'upon my representations of my ability to maintain the post, the General altered his determination to abandon it.' This is in-

correct. No such representation was ever made. And the last order I received from the General, was precisely the same as that first given, viz. "That if I discovered the approach of a large British force by water, (presuming that they would bring heavy artillery,) time enough to effect a retreat, I was to do so; but if I could not retreat with safety, to defend the post to the last extremity."

"A day or two before the enemy appeared before fort Meigs, the General had reconnoitred the surrounding ground, and being informed that the hill on the opposite side of Sandusky completely commanded the fort, I offered to undertake, with the troops under my command, to remove it to that side.—The General, upon reflection, thought it best not to attempt it, as he believed that if the enemy again appeared on this side of the lake, it would be before the work could be finished.

"It is useless to disguise the fact, that this fort is commanded by the points of high ground around it; a single stroke of the eye made this clear to me the first time I had occasion to examine the neighborhood, with a view of discovering the relative strength and weakness of the place.

"It would be insincere to say that I am not flattered by the many handsome things which have been said about the defence which was made by the troops under my command; but I desire no plaudits which are bestowed upon me, at the expense of General Harrison.

"I have at all times enjoyed his confidence so far as my rank in the army entitled me to it. And on proper occasions received his marked attention. I have felt the warmest attachment for him as a man, and my confidence in him as an *able commander* remains unshaken. I feel every assurance that he will at all times do me ample justice; and nothing could give me more pain than to see his enemies seize upon this occasion to deal out their unfriendly feelings and acrimonious dislike—and as long as he continues (as in my humble opinion he has hitherto done) to make the wisest arrangements and most judicious disposition, which the forces under his command will justify, I shall not hesitate to unite with the army in bestowing upon him that confidence which he so richly merits, and which has on no occasion been withheld. Your friend,

"GEORGE CROGHAN,

"*Maj. 17th Infantry, Commanding Lower Sandusky.*"

"This second invasion of Ohio, like the former, brought the patriotism of that state into action. As soon as governor Meigs received certain information, that the enemy had entered his territories, he issued his orders in which he called on the militia to rise *en masse* and repel the invaders. The division lately commanded by general M-Arthur literally obeyed the call. Every man prepared himself to march against the enemy: and through the state generally the greatest military ardor and activity prevailed. It was supposed that at least ten thousand men were under arms and marching to the frontiers. The enemy, however, did not wait for their arrival. The foremost corps of mounted volunteers was not able to reach head quarters, before general Proctor had rendered their services unnecessary by his precipitate flight from Lower Sandusky. It then became necessary, as in the former case, to disband them again, without having an opportunity to fight; which again produced much discontent and chagrin among them. Many of them were even highly exasperated against the general, for not retaining and employing them efficiently against the enemy.

"They had volunteered not only with the expectation of being opposed to the invaders of their state, but also of being em-

ployed in the main expedition against Upper Canada, which it was now evident would soon be carried into execution. When a considerable number of them had arrived at Upper Sandusky, and the retreat of the enemy was known, governor Meigs addressed a letter to General Harrison respecting the course to be pursued with them. The General immediately repaired to that place for the purpose of explaining his situation and views to the Governor, and reconciling the volunteers to the measures he would be obliged to adopt. After a personal interview with the governor, he committed his explanation to writing, on the 6th of August, which he addressed to that officer as follows:

"Your excellency's letter of the 4th instant was handed to me yesterday morning by colonel Brush. The exertions which you have made, and the promptitude with which your orders have been obeyed, to assemble the militia to repel the late invasion, is truly astonishing and reflects the highest honor on the state. Believing that in a personal interview I could best explain to you the intentions of the government and my own views, I determined to come to this place to see you. I now have the honor to repeat to you in this way, the result of my determination on the employment of the militia, and most of the facts on which my determination is founded. It has been the intention of government to form the army destined for operations on Lake Erie, exclusively of regular troops, if they could be raised. The number was limited to 7,000. The deficiency of regulars was to be made up from the militia. From all the information I at present possess, I am convinced there will be a great deficiency in the contemplated number of troops, even after the militia now in service, and whose time of service will not expire immediately, have been added to the regulars. I have, therefore, called on the governor of Kentucky for 2,000 effective men, with those there will still be a deficiency of about 1,300. Your excellency has stated to me, that the men who have turned out on this occasion, have done it with the expectation of being effectually employed, and that should they be sent home, there is no prospect of getting them to turn out hereafter should it be necessary. To employ them all is impossible. With my utmost exertions the embarkation cannot be effected in less than fifteen or eighteen days, should I even determine to substitute them for the regular troops which are expected. To keep so large a force in the field, even for a short period, would consume the means which are provided for the support of the campaign, and which are only provided for the number above stated. Under these circumstances, I would recommend a middle course to your excellency, viz. to dismiss all the militia but two regiments of ten companies, each of one hundred men, and the usual proportion of field, platoon, and non-commissioned officers, &c. that the corps be encamped at or near this place, until it is ascertained whether their services will be wanted. A short time will determine the question. Permit me to request your excellency to give your countenance and support to the exertions which general M'Arthur will make to fill the 26th regiment of twelve months troops. It appears that the venerable governor of Kentucky is about to take command of the troops of that state. Could your excellency think proper to follow his example, I need not tell you how highly grateful it would be, dear sir, to your friend,

"W. H. HARRISON."

In pursuance of this letter, two thousand men, with the proper number of officers, were selected by governor Meigs, and the remaining part of the volunteers returned to their respective homes. The governor remained at Upper Sandusky with the selected corps, and General Harrison returned to camp Seneca to complete his arrangements for the meditated invasion of Canada. It was certainly the intention of the commanding Gene-

ral to employ the troops at Upper Sandusky in the active service of the campaign, unless the number of regular troops should greatly exceed his expectations, and this design is fully and clearly expressed in the above quoted letter. Great was his surprise and mortification, therefore, to learn some days after, that these troops had been engaged for a service of forty days only. Governor Meigs had been made acquainted with all the instructions of the government to the commanding General, in relation to the means proposed as well as the manner of conducting the campaign. He knew that the attack upon the enemy's posts was to be made by water with boats which were then preparing at Cleveland, and under the protection of a fleet which was not yet ready to sail from the port in which it had been built; that half the time at least for which these men were retained would be spent before the movement in advance could be made; and could he expect that any prudent commander should attempt to invade an enemy's country with troops who would be relieved from their obligations of service in twenty days? Besides, the authority given to the commanding General by the government was to call out militia for a six months', not for a forty days' tour.

As soon as the General received the information above referred to, he wrote to the governor, and requested if the militia were to be retained for a period of service so limited, that they might be immediately discharged, as they would be of no use to him, and were consuming provisions which were necessary for the ulterior operations of the campaign. This letter was communicated to the officers, in whose breasts it raised a storm of anger and indignation against the commanding General: they assembled and passed resolutions of a very violent character: there is no doubt that the most of them soon repented of a measure which was not only unjust towards General Harrison, but which might have proved extremely detrimental to the public service, by impairing the confidence of the army in their commander, at the critical moment when he was about to lead them against the enemy. It is much to be regretted that governor Meigs, whose conduct hitherto had been so highly exemplary and patriotic, had not taken measures to prevent this hasty and ill-advised ebullition of passion and resentment. He knew the orders which the commanding General had received from the government, and that the time of movement depended upon contingencies which he could not controul—such as the completion of the fleet and the boats, the arrival of the distant troops, and the success of the former against the fleet of the enemy. The event proved that the General was right in not receiving those troops for the service of the campaign, as their term of service would actually have expired before they could have embarked from our shore.

We have before mentioned that General Harrison had despatched his aid-de-camp major Trimble with a letter to the go-

vernor of Kentucky, requesting him to call out a body of militia to be employed in the campaign. The following is the letter referred to:

"MR DEAR SIR—I have this moment received a letter from the secretary of war, in which he authorises me to call from the neighboring states, such number of militia as I may deem requisite for the ensuing operations against Upper Canada. It was originally intended that the army should consist of regular troops only; but it is now ascertained that the contemplated number cannot be raised. It is indeed late—very late—to call out militia; but still it will be better to do this, than to enter upon operations on which so much depends with inadequate forces. I am not uninformed, as to the difficulties your excellency may have to encounter to organize another detachment of militia. I believe, however, it will not be impossible for you to re-animate your patriotic fellow citizens, and once more to bring a portion of them into the field.—What that portion will be, your own judgment must determine. I have sent major Trimble, my aid de-camp, to inform you of many circumstances which I have not time, nor indeed would I like to commit to paper. Send me as many good men as you can conveniently collect, or as you may deem proper to call out—not less than 400, nor more than 2000. The period has arrived when with a little exertion, the task assigned to this section of the Union may be finished and complete tranquillity restored to our frontiers.

"To make this last effort why not, my dear sir, come in person? You would not object to a command, that would be nominal only: I have such confidence in your wisdom, that you in fact should "be the guiding head and I the hand." The situation you would be placed in would not be without its parallel. Scipio the conqueror of Carthage did not disdain to act as the lieutenant of his younger and less experienced brother Lucius: I refer you to major Trimble who is instructed to communicate many particulars to you."

Orders were at the same time despatched to all the recruiting districts, directing the recruits to be marched to head quarters with all possible expedition. A constant communication was kept up between General Harrison and commodore Perry, and the arrival of the latter off Sandusky with his fleet, was to be communicated to the General by signal. Whilst the General was watching the result of these orders and arrangements at Seneca, he was actively engaged in disciplining the troops which were with him, and making other preparations.—The friendly Indians of the Delaware, Shawanese, and Seneca tribes had been invited to join him. A number had accepted the invitation, and had reached Seneca before the arrival of the Kentucky troops.

All the chiefs, and no doubt the greater part of the warriors were favorable to the American cause; but before their departure from their towns, a wretch had insinuated himself amongst them, with the intention of assassinating the commanding General. He belonged to the Shawanoese tribe, and bore the name of Blue Jacket,* and had formerly resided at the town of Wapockonata; he had, however, been absent for a considerable time, and had returned but a few days before the warriors of that town set out to join the American army. He informed the chiefs that he had been hunting on the Wabash, and at his re-

* Not the celebrated Blue Jacket, who signed the treaty of Greenville with general Wayne.

quest, he was suffered to join the party which were about to march to Seneca. Upon their arrival at M'Arthur's block house, they halted and encamped for the purpose of receiving provisions from the deputy Indian agent, colonel M'Pherson, who resided there. Before their arrival at that place, Blue Jacket had communicated to a friend of his, (a Shawanese warrior) his intention to kill the American General, and requested his assistance: this his friend declined, and endeavored to dissuade him from attempting it, assuring him that it could not be done without the certain sacrifice of his own life, as he had been at the American camp, and knew that there was always a guard round the General's quarters, who were on duty day and night. Blue Jacket replied, that he was determined to execute his intention at any risk, "that he would kill the General if he was sure that his guards would cut him in pieces not bigger than his thumb nail." No people on earth are more faithful in keeping secrets than the Indian, but each warrior has a friend from whom he will conceal nothing: luckily for General Harrison, the friend of this confidant of Blue Jacket's was a young Delaware chief named Beaver, who was also bound to the General by the ties of friendship. He was the son of a Delaware war chief of the same name, who had with others been put to death by his own tribe, on the charge of practising sorcery, as mentioned in a former part of this work. General Harrison had been upon terms of friendship with the father, and had patronized his orphan boy, at that time ten or twelve years of age. He had now arrived to manhood, and was considered among the most promising warriors of his tribe: to this young chief the friend of Blue Jacket revealed the fatal secret. The Beaver was placed by this communication in an embarrassing situation, for should he disclose what he had heard, he betrayed his friend, than which nothing could be more repugnant to the feelings and principles of an Indian warrior. Should he not disclose it, consequences equally or even more to be deprecated were likely to ensue. The assassination of a friend, the friend of his father, whose life he was bound to defend, or whose death to revenge by the same principle of fidelity and honour which forbid the disclosure. Whilst he was yet hesitating, Blue Jacket came up to the Delaware camp, somewhat intoxicated, vociferating vengeance upon colonel M'Pherson who had just turned him out of his house, and whom he declared he would put to death for the insult he had received. The sight of the traitor aroused the indignation and resentment of the Beaver to the highest pitch. He seized his tomahawk, and advancing towards the culprit, "You must be a great warrior," said he, "you will not only kill this white man for serving you as you deserve, but you will also murder our father, the American chief, and bring disgrace and mischief upon us all; but you shall do neither, I will serve you as I would a mad

dog." A furious blow from the tomahawk of the Beaver stretched the unfortunate Blue Jacket at his feet, and a second terminated his existence; "There," said he to some Shawanoes who were present, "take him to the camp of his tribe, and tell them who has done the deed." The Shawanoes were far from resenting it; they applauded the conduct of the Beaver, and rejoiced at their happy escape from the ignominy which the accomplishment of Blue Jacket's design would have brought upon them. At the great treaty which was held at Greenville in 1815, general Cass, one of the commissioners, related the whole of the transaction to the assembled chiefs, and after thanking the Beaver, in the name of the United States, for having saved the life of their general, he caused a handsome present to be made him out of the goods which had been sent for the purposes of the treaty. It is impossible to say what was the motive of Blue Jacket to attempt the life of General Harrison: he was not one of the Tippecanoe Shawanoes, and therefore could have no personal resentment against the General. There is little doubt but that he came from Malden when he arrived at Wapockonata, and that he came for the express purpose of attempting the life of the General; but whether he was instigated to it by any other person or persons, or had conceived the idea himself, has never been ascertained. Upon the arrival of the chiefs at Seneca, the principal war chief of the Shawanoes requested permission to sleep at the door of the General's marquee, and this he did every night until the embarkation of the troops. This man, who had fought with great bravery on our side in the several sorties from fort Meigs was called *captain Tommy*: he was a great favourite of the officers, particularly the General and commodore Perry, the latter of whom was accustomed to call him the General's Mamaluke.

About the 18th of August, commodore Perry arrived with his fleet off the mouth of Sandusky bay. General Harrison immediately went on board to consult as to their future operations. It was agreed that the commodore should forthwith go in search of the enemy, and endeavour if possible to bring them to action before he should be encumbered with the army. But as his fleet was still deficient in men, the General agreed to furnish him with 150, to be selected from the whole army. This was done, and the commodore immediately proceeded to Malden, before which he displayed his fleet for several days. Finding the enemy determined not to come out, he returned to harbour at Put-in bay, which was the only one on our side of the lake. On the 10th of September, however, he was gratified by the appearance of his adversary, and on the same day was fought that brilliant action which has shed imperishable lustre upon the nation and the heroes who achieved it. This glorious event opened the way to the conquest of Upper Ca-

nada, nor was the commanding General loth to profit by this fortunate circumstance. Perry had become satisfied in the previous interview of the great solicitude of General Harrison to be enabled to carry the war into the enemy's country, and being sensible of his impatience on this subject, lost no time in communicating to him the result of the contest. Accordingly, the General received at camp Seneca on the 12th of September the following note from the commodore:

"United States brig Niagara, off the Western Sister, Sep. 10, 1813, 4, P. M.
 "Dear General, we have met the enemy and they are ours—two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and a sloop. Yours with great respect and esteem,
 "OLIVER HAZARD PERRY."

In the mean time, however, the General had taken measures to be advised of the result of a cannonading heard on the 10th in the direction of Malden, by a detachment of troops coming from fort Meigs. With that view he despatched major Hukill, assistant inspector general, and captain Todd of the 28th infantry, on the evening of the 11th, to Lower Sandusky, where they were directed to embark with 18 men in an open boat, for the purpose of proceeding towards Put-in bay. Adverse winds, however, detained them under great privations on Cumberland island, and they did not reach the commodore until the evening of the 14th, just as he was under way for the mouth of Portage with the prisoners; to which point the General had previously removed on the 12th and 13th. It was a most interesting circumstance that governor Shelby should arrive at head quarters at the precise moment of the commodore's debarking with his prisoners; it was a presage of the singular harmony and good fortune that attended our cause throughout the whole campaign. The governor reached head quarters on the 14th, and his troops, amounting to about 3,500, under major general Henry, arrived on the 15th and 16th. He had previously received at Upper Sandusky a letter from General Harrison with respect to his future movements.

General Harrison, after leaving the necessary troops to attend to the sick at camp Seneca, marched to the mouth of Portage river with Cass's brigade, composed of a part of the 29th regiment, under colonel Paull, and of the 28th under colonel Owings. General McArthur received orders at fort Meigs on the 16th September to embark the artillery, military stores, and provisions at that place and march the troops across the country to head quarters, having already reduced the fort to a small picketed post in the upper corner of the works. The remaining Kentuckians under general Clay embarked also for head quarters. The mounted regiment under colonel Johnson, also at fort Meigs, was directed to encamp under the guns of the fort and await further orders, but were on the 25th directed to ad-

vance to the river Raisin, as the army would land near Malden on the next day. About 260 Wyandot, Shawanee, and Seneca Indians, under their chiefs, Lewis, Blackboof, and Snake, joined the commander in chief at Seneca. The military stores and provisions from the posts on the Sandusky river were transported across the isthmus of less than two miles in width between the Sandusky and Portage rivers, and along which the Kentucky troops erected a strong fence of fallen timber, for the purpose of enclosing the horses.

The commander in chief embarked on the 20th September with the brigades of M^rArthur and Cass for Put-in bay, and on the two succeeding days all the Kentucky troops arrived. The army remained on Bass island on the 24th, and embarked for the Middle Sister on the 25th. These islands afforded great convenience to the passage of the lake, as the men were thus enabled to avoid sea sickness, and to secure their baggage against any ordinary storm. General Harrison sailed with commodore Perry on the 25th to reconnoitre off Malden, and to select a point for debarkation. The enemy had destroyed the block-house on Bare point below Malden, but the view of the fort was obstructed by the island in the river above. In the mean time, governor Shelby despatched an express to colonel Johnson at Brownstown, with intelligence of the position and movements of the main army. General Harrison returned late in the evening, after fixing on the proper point for landing the troops on the next day. The following general order was now issued, prescribing the order of debarkation, of march, and of battle:

“As it is the intention of the general to land the army on the enemy's coast, the following will be the order of debarkation, of march, and of battle. The right wing of the army will be composed of the Kentucky volunteers under command of his excellency governor Shelby, acting as major general—the left wing, of the light corps of lieutenant colonel Ball, and the brigades of generals M^rArthur and Cass. This arrangement is made with a view to the localities of the ground, on which the troops will have to act, and the composition of the enemy's force, and is calculated in marching up the lake or strait, to place the regular troops in the open ground on the lake, where it is probable they will be opposed by British regulars, and the Kentucky volunteers in the woods, which probably will be occupied by the enemy's militia and Indians. When the signal is given for putting to shore, the corps of lieutenant colonel Ball will precede the left wing, and the regiment of volunteer riflemen under colonel Simrall the right wing. These corps will land with the utmost celerity consistent with the preservation of good order, and as soon as landed will seize the most favourable position for annoying the enemy, and covering the debarkation of the troops of the line. General Cass's brigade will follow lieutenant colonel Ball's corps, and general Calmes' the regiment of colonel Simrall. The other regiments will follow and form in succession after those which precede them, the right wing with its left in front, displaying to the right, and the left wing with its right in front displaying to the left. The brigades of generals King, Allen, and Caldwell will form successively to the right of general Calmes. The brigades of generals M^rArthur and Chiles will form the reserve, under the immediate command of general M^rArthur. The General will command in person the brigades of Cass and Calmes, assisted by major-general Henry. His excellency governor Shelby will have the immediate command of the three brigades on the right, assisted by major general Desha. As soon as the troops disembark,

the boats are to be immediately sent back to the fleet. It will be observed, that the order of landing here prescribed is somewhat that of direct *echelon*, displayed into line upon the advanced corps of the right and left wings. It is the intention of the General, however, that all the troops which are provided with boats should land in as quick succession as possible, and the general officers commanding towards the extremities of the line are authorised to deviate from this arrangement, to counteract any movement of the enemy, by landing any parts of their commands previous to the forming of the corps which are herein directed to precede them. The corps of lieutenant colonel Ball, and the volunteer regiment of colonel Simrall, will maintain the position they occupy on landing, until the troops of the line are formed to support them; they will then retire through the intervals of the line, or to the flanks, and form in the rear of the line. A detachment of artillery with a six pounder, four pounder, and howitzer, will land with the advanced light corps. The rest of the artillery will be held in reserve and landed at such points as major Wood may direct. The point of landing for the reserve under brigadier general M'Arthur cannot now be designated. It will be made to support any part of the line which may require aid, or be formed on the flanks as circumstances may require. The arrangements for landing the troops will be made entirely under the direction of an officer of the navy, whom commodore Perry has been so obliging as to furnish for that purpose. The debarkation of the troops will be covered by the cannon of the vessels. The troops being landed and the enemy driven off, or not opposing the landing, the army will change its front to the left, and form in order of battle in the following manner. The two brigades of regular troops, and two of the volunteers, to be formed in two lines at right angles to the shore of the lake. The brigades of generals M'Arthur and Calmes to form the front line, and those of Cass and Chiles the second line, the regular troops still on the left, and that flank resting on the lake shore. The distance between the two lines will be three hundred yards. The remaining three volunteer brigades will be drawn up in a single line of two ranks, at right angles to the lines in front, its head on the right of the front line, forming a crotchet *en potence* with that line, and extending beyond the second line. The corps of lieutenant colonel Ball will form the advance of the left wing at the same distance of 300 yards, and colonel Simrall's regiment that of the right wing at the same distance. Some light pieces of artillery will be placed in the road leading up the lake, and at such other points as major Wood may direct. When the order is given for marching, the first and second lines will advance by files from the heads of companies, or in other words those two lines will form two columns marching by their flanks by companies at entire distances. The three brigades on the right flank will be faced on the left and marched forwards, the head of this column still forming *en potence* with the front line. It is probable that the two brigades of the front line will extend from the lakes some distance into the woods on the right flank, and it is desirable that it should be so; but should it be otherwise, and the crotchet or angle be at any time in the open ground, governor Shelby will immediately extend the front line to the right by adding to it as many companies of the leading brigade of the flank column as will bring the angle, and consequently the left column itself completely within the woods. It is to be presumed that the enemy will make their attack upon the army on its march, that their regular troops will form their right upon the lake, their militia occupy the ground between their regulars and the woods, and that the Indians will make a flank attack from the woods. The formation herein prescribed is intended to resist an arrangement of this kind. Should the General's conjecture on this subject prove correct, as it must be evident that the right of the enemy cannot be turned, as on that wing the best of his troops will be placed, it will be proper to refuse him our left, and direct our principal effort to uncover the left flank of his regulars, by driving off the militia. In the event here supposed, it will therefore be proper to bring up a part, or the whole, of general Cass's brigade to assist the charge to be made by general Calmes, or that the former should change positions with the brigade of volunteers in the second line. Should the General think it safe to order the whole of Cass's brigade to assist the charge made by general Calmes, or that the former should change positions with the volunteers in the se-

card line, or should the General think it safe to order the whole of Cass's brigade to the right, without replacing it with another, general Cass will march it to the right, formed in oblique *echellons* of companies. It will be the business of general M'Arthur, in the event of his wing being refused, to watch the motions of the enemy, and with the assistance of the artillery, prevent his front line at least from intercepting the progress of our right. Should the enemy's militia be defeated, the brigade of ours in advance will immediately wheel upon the flank of the British regulars, and general M'Arthur will then advance and attack them in front. In the mean time his excellency governor Shelby can use the brigade in reserve of the second line, to extend the flank line from its front or left, or to reinforce any weak part of the line. In all cases where troops in advance are obliged to retire through those which are advancing to support them, it will be done by companies in files, which will retire through the intervals of the advancing line, and immediately form in the rear. The light troops will be particularly governed by this direction. The disposition of the troops in the right flank, is such as the commanding general thinks best calculated to resist an attack from the Indians, which is only to be expected from that quarter. His excellency governor Shelby will, however, use his discretion in making any alteration which his experience and judgment may dictate.

"Lieutenant colonel Ball, colonel Simrall, and the officers commanding on the flank line, are to send out small detachments in advance of the two former corps, and to the flank of the latter. Should they discover the enemy in force, immediate notice will be sent to the lines. The General commanding on the spot will immediately order the signal for forming in order of battle, which is the beat, *to arms*. All signals will be immediately repeated by all the drums of the line. The signal for the whole to halt is, *the retreat*. Drums will be distributed along the line at the heads of companies, and taps occasionally be given to regulate their march. Lieutenant colonels Ball and Simrall are to keep the General constantly informed of the discoveries made by the advanced parties, and when it shall become necessary for their corps to retire, they will form on the flank, or in the rear of generals M'Arthur and Calmes' brigades, and receive the orders of their brigadiers respectively.

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON."

"Such were the directions given for the debarkation, the marching, and fighting of the troops; in which we find all that lucid minuteness so necessary in the orders given to an army composed *emphatically* of raw troops, and whose officers in general were but little superior in the knowledge of tactics to the men they commanded. After this perspicuous development, however, of the operations to be performed, the debarkation was subsequently effected with surprising celerity and good order, not indeed under the opposition of a hostile force, but in the momentary expectation of an attack."^{*}

The whole army embarked from the Middle Sister for the Canada shore on the 27th, and presented in its *denouement* one of the finest occasions for the pencil of the artist, and the interest of the scene was not a little awakened by the momentary expectation of the opening of the enemy's fire from the shore. No opposition, however, was made to the landing of our troops, and commodore Perry frequently expressed his admiration of the promptness and discipline displayed on the occasion. Just at the moment of debarkation, the General issued along the line of boats the following laconic and impressive order:

* History of the War.

"Head-Quarters, on board the Ariel, September 27, 1815.

"The General intreats his brave troops to remember that they are the sons of sires whose fame is immortal: That they are to fight for the rights of their insulted country, whilst their opponents combat for the unjust pretensions of a master.

"Kentuckians! remember the river Raisin; but remember it only whilst the victory is suspended. The revenge of a soldier cannot be gratified upon a fallen enemy. By command, **ROBERT BUTLER, A. Adjutant General.**"

In an hour after landing, the troops entered Amherstburg, and the American flag was hoisted. The following is the General's official letter from Amherstburg:

"Head-Quarters, Amherstburg, September 27, 1813.

"Sir, I have the honour to inform you that I landed the army under my command about three miles below this place at 3 o'clock this evening, without opposition, and took possession of the town in an hour after. General Proctor has retreated to Sandwich with his regular troops and Indians, having previously burned the fort, navy-yard, barracks, and public store-houses—the two latter were very extensive, covering several acres of ground. I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking him, as he has upwards of one thousand horses, and we have not one in the army. I shall think myself fortunate to be able to collect a sufficiency to mount the general officers. It is supposed here that general Proctor intends to establish himself upon the river French, forty miles from Malden. I have the honour to be, &c.
"W. H. HARRISON."

The army left Malden on the 28th, and entered Sandwich on the 29th, and general M'Arthur's brigade crossed over and took possession of Detroit. On the same evening General Harrison issued his proclamation for re-establishing the civil government of the territory, and the order previously issued by Proctor, declaring martial law on the Canada side, was continued in force.

Colonel Johnson arrived with his regiment at Detroit, on the 30th September, and joined the main army at Sandwich on the evening of the 1st of October. The General had awaited this event to commence the pursuit of Proctor, which was accordingly done on the following morning. It may not be improper, however, to explain in this place a transaction which occurred before the army left Sandwich, and which has been entirely misrepresented by some of the enemies of General Harrison.

The day after the General's arrival at Sandwich, he had procured through a secret channel a manuscript map of Upper Canada which had been recently made under the authority of the British government. From this map he learnt that the road upon which Proctor was retreating approached as near as twelve miles to lake Erie, at a place called port Talbot, and that the intermediate ground was quite practicable for an army. The idea at once occurred to him that by passing down lake Erie to this point, he could intercept Proctor's retreat. He immediately communicated this information to commodore Perry and asked his opinion. The commodore dissuaded him from attempting it, upon the ground of the uncertainty of the navigation of

the lake at that season: observing, that the passage to port Talbot might be accomplished in two days, but that it might take ten or twelve. General Harrison immediately abandoned the idea of taking the port Talbot route, and determined upon the pursuit up the Thames. He thought, however, that it was proper that the question should be submitted to a council of war, as he knew that in the event of the pursuit by land not proving successful, he would be censured for not having taken the other route. The council of war was accordingly held in the morning of the 1st of October, and it was unanimously determined to take the land route. As the circumstances of calling a council of war to determine upon the route by which the army would be most likely to overtake the enemy gave occasion to some of the enemies of General Harrison to impute to him a disposition to abandon the pursuit at Sandwich, we think proper to publish the following documents in support of the statement here given:

Frankfort, April 21, 1816.

"Dear General, your letter of the 15th instant has been duly received, in which you stated that a charge has been made against you, 'that you were forced to pursue Proctor from my remonstrances,' and that I had said to you, upon that occasion 'that it was immaterial what direction you took, that I was resolved to pursue the enemy up the Thames;' and you request me to give you a statement of facts in relation to the council of war held at Sandwich.

"I will in the first place freely declare that no such language ever passed from me to you, and that I entertained throughout the campaign too high an opinion of your military talents to doubt for a moment your capacity to conduct the army to the best advantage. It is well recollected that the army arrived at Sandwich in the afternoon of the 29th of September, and that the next day was extremely wet. I was at your quarters in the evening of that day; we had a conversation relative to the pursuit of the enemy, and you requested me to see you early the next morning. I waited on you just after day-break, found you up, apparently waiting for me; you led me into a small private room, and on the way observed, 'We must not be heard.' You were as anxious to pursue Proctor as I was, but might not have been entirely satisfied as to the route. You observed that there were two ways by which he might be overtaken: one was down the lake by water, to some post or point, of the name of which I am now not positive, thence to march across by land twelve miles to the road leading up the Thames, and intercept him. The other way, by land, up the strait, and up the Thames. I felt satisfied by a pursuit on land that he could be overhauled, and expressed that opinion with the reasons on which it was founded, and we readily agreed in sentiment; but you observed as there were two routes by which he might be overtaken, to determine the one most proper was a measure of great responsibility, that you would take the opinion of the general officers as to the most practicable one, and you requested me to collect them in one hour at your quarters. I assembled them accordingly, to whom you stated your determination to pursue Proctor, and your object in calling them together; and after explaining the two routes by which he might be overtaken, you observed, 'that the governor thinks, and so do I, that the pursuit by land up the Thames will be most effectual.' The general officers were in favour of a pursuit by land; and in the course of that day, Colonel Johnson with his mounted regiment was able to cross over from the Detroit side to join in the chase. He might, however, have been ordered the day before during the rain to cross over with his regiment, but of this I have not a distinct recollection. The army I know was on its march by sunrise on the morning of the 2nd of October, and continued the pursuit (often in a run) until the evening of the 5th, when the enemy was overtaken. During the whole of

this long and arduous pursuit, no man could make greater exertions or use more vigilance than you did to overtake Proctor, whilst the skill and promptitude with which you arranged the troops for battle, and the distinguished zeal and bravery you evinced during its continuance, merited and received my highest approbation.

"In short, sir, from the time I joined you to the moment of our separation, I believe that no commander ever did or could make greater exertions than you did to effect the great objects of the campaign. I admired your plans, and thought them executed with great energy; particularly your order of battle, and arrangements for landing on the Canada shore were calculated to inspire every officer and man with a confidence that we could not be defeated by any thing like our own number.

"Until after I had served the campaign of 1813, I was not aware of the difficulties which you had to encounter as commander of the north-western army. I have since often said, and still do believe, that the duties assigned to you on that occasion were more arduous and difficult to accomplish than any I had ever known confided to any commander; and with respect to the zeal and fidelity with which you executed that high and important trust, there are thousands in Kentucky, as well as myself, who believed it could not have been committed to better hands.

"With sentiments of the most sincere regard and esteem, I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, ISAAC SHELBY.

"Major General William Henry Harrison."

— "Newport, August 18, 1817.

"My DEAR SIR,

"I have received your letter of the 11th ult. in which you request me to reply to the following questions, viz. first, 'Whether the statements made by governor Shelby in his letter to you of the 21st April, 1816, be substantially correct?' to which I reply in the affirmative. Secondly, 'Whether you did ever, either in the council held at Sandwich or in private conversation with me, evince any thing like an indisposition to pursue the British army by one of the two routes which were under consideration?' to which I answer in the negative. In a conversation which I held with you the morning prior to the assembling of the general council at Sandwich, you appeared particularly desirous of attempting to cut off the retreat of the British army by the route from port Talbot. To your arguments in favour of this measure I opposed our limited means of transportation, and the great difficulty and uncertainty of the lake navigation at that season of the year. These obstacles appeared to induce you to have recourse to the measure which was afterwards adopted.

"Although I have little or no pretensions to military knowledge as relates to an army, still I may be allowed to bear testimony to your zeal and activity in the pursuit of the British army under general Proctor, and to say, the prompt change made by you in the order of battle on discovering the position of the enemy always has appeared to me to have evinced a high degree of military talent. I concur most sincerely with the venerable governor Shelby in his general approbation of your conduct (as far as it came under my observation) in that campaign. With great regard, I am, my dear sir, your friend,

"O. H. PERRY.

"Major General W. H. Harrison."

— *Extract of a letter from Governor Cass to General Harrison, dated Detroit, August 31, 1817.*

"Upon the subject of the council which was held at Sandwich I cannot speak with precision; I think that for some cause I do not now recollect, I was not present at its deliberations. But I do recollect that at all the interviews I had with you, you were ardent and zealous for the pursuit of Proctor, nor did I ever hear that a doubt had been expressed by you upon that subject till long after the events themselves had passed away. In the letter from governor Shelby to you which has been published, the governor has stated so correctly and distinctly the propositions which were made for the pursuit of Proctor, that there is the less necessity for me to enter into a detail of them. The main body

of the enemy's army had left Amherstburg some days before we landed, and were understood to be upon the river French. If conducted with common prudence, it was my opinion then, and it is my opinion yet, that they might have moved with such celerity as to have rendered it impracticable for us to have overtaken them. A deep indentation of the lake some distance below Malden would have brought us within a few miles of the road upon which Proctor retreated, and considerably advanced of the position where we overtook him. The propriety of pursuing him along the road he had taken, or of endeavoring to intercept him by the other route was the subject of conversation on our first arrival at Sandwich. But whenever I conversed with you, the latter route was mentioned as one which deserved examination rather than one upon which any decided opinion had been formed. Upon a consideration of its uncertainty at that season of the year, it was soon abandoned. I was with you frequently, and conversed with you freely during our continuance at Sandwich, and I am confident you never hesitated in your determination to pursue Proctor. So far as my feeble testimony can aid in removing erroneous impressions, which have injured you, it is given with pleasure. From the time I joined the army under your command, its operations were conducted with as much celerity as possible, and so far as respects yourself, its fiscal concerns, I am confident, were managed with the most scrupulous integrity."

We have now before us the certificate of major general Henry, and the *depositions* of colonel Charles Todd, the honourable John Speed Smith, and John Chambers, Esq. of Kentucky, the former one of the regular aids-de-camp, and the two latter volunteer aids to General Harrison. These documents all go to the establishment of the facts mentioned in the above letters, but we deem it altogether unnecessary to insert them to support the assertions of a Shelby, a Perry, or a Cass. No American will hesitate to believe any statement made by them. We shall therefore only insert the concluding paragraphs from the *depositions* of colonel Todd and major Chambers:

Extract from the deposition of Colonel Todd.

"During the whole period that I had the pleasure to be associated with General Harrison, with various opportunities of observing his conduct and appreciating his motives, I do most unequivocally declare my conviction, that the unremitted zeal, the unshaken firmness, the spotless integrity, and the consummate ability with which he conducted the north-western army to complete victory amidst innumerable difficulties, (correctly estimated by those only who participated in them) secured my entire approbation, and give him just claims to the eternal gratitude of his country.

C. S. TODD."

Extract from the deposition of Major Chambers.

"During the whole pursuit, and indeed from the time I first joined General Harrison, he evinced in his whole conversation and conduct the most ardent disposition to push the campaign into the enemy's country, and to meet general Proctor in the field, at the same time that he evidenced a devotion to his duties which I have never seen equalled in any station. JOHN CHAMBERS."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE army commenced its march from Sandwich in pursuit of the enemy on the 2nd of October, and on the evening of the 5th General Harrison had the satisfaction to address a short letter to the secretary at war, informing him "that by the blessing of Providence the army under his command had obtained a complete victory over the combined Indian and British forces under the command of general Proctor." This was the precursor of another letter written from Detroit on the 9th, containing a more detailed account as well of the action as of the whole expedition.

"Head quarters, Detroit, 9th October, 1813.

"Sir.—In my letter from Sandwich of the 30th ultimo, I did myself the honor to inform you, that I was preparing to pursue the enemy the following day. From various causes, however, I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the 2nd instant, and then to take with me only about one hundred and forty of the regular troops, Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of governor Shelby's volunteers as were fit for a rapid march, the whole amounting to about three thousand five hundred men. To general M'Arthur (with about 700 effectives) the protection of this place and the sick was committed.—General Cass's brigade, and the corps of lieutenant colonel Ball were left at Sandwich, with orders to follow me as soon as the men received their knapsacks and blankets, which had been left on an island in lake Erie.

"The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no disadvantage to us. General Proctor had posted himself at Dalson's on the right bank of the Thames, (or Trench) fifty-six miles from this place, where I was informed he intended to fortify and wait to receive me. He must have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him, or that he had secured my continuance here, by the reports that were circulated that the Indians would attack and destroy this place upon the advance of the army; as he neglected to commence the rearing up the bridges until the night of the 2nd instant. On that night our army reached the river, which is twenty-five miles from Sandwich, and is one of four streams crossing our route, over all of which are bridges, and being deep and muddy, are unfordable for a considerable distance into the country—the bridge here was found entire, and in the morning I proceeded with Johnson's regiment to save, if possible, the others. At the second bridge over a branch of the river Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a lieutenant of dragoons and eleven privates, who had been sent by general Proctor to destroy them. From the prisoners I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain information of our advance. The bridge having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's farm, four miles below Dalson's.

"The river Thames, along the banks of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen, after the passage of the bar at its mouth, over which there is six and a half feet water.

"The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats, protected by three gun-boats, which commodore Perry had furnished for that purpose, as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames itself, or the mouths of its tributary streams; the banks being low and the country generally open (prairies) as high as Dalson's, these vessels were well calculated for that purpose. Above Dalson's, however, the character of the river and adjacent coun-

try is considerably changed.—The former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody. The commodore and myself, therefore, agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of one hundred and fifty infantry, and I determined to trust to fortune and the bravery of my troops to effect the passage of the river. Below a place called Chatham and four miles above Dalson's is the third unfordable branch of the Thames; the bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as that at M^rGregor's Mills, one mile above—several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of battle, and brought up our two six pounders to cover the party that were ordered to repair the bridge—a few shot from those pieces soon drove off the Indians and enabled us, in two hours, to repair the bridge and cross the troops.—Colonel Johnson's mounted regiment being upon the right of the army, had seized the remains of the bridge at the mills under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our loss upon this occasion, was two killed and three or four wounded, that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house near the bridge, containing a very considerable number of muskets, had been set on fire—but it was extinguished by our troops and the arms saved. At the first farm above the bridge, we found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, loaded with arms and ordnance stores, and learned that they were a few miles ahead of us, still on the right bank of the river with the great body of the Indians. At Bowles' farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels, and a large distillery filled with ordnance and other valuable stores to an immense amount, in flames—it was impossible to put out the fire—two twenty-four pounders with their carriages were taken and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes. The army was put in motion early in the morning of the 5th, I pushed on in advance with the mounted regiment, and requested governor Shelby to follow as expeditiously as possible with the infantry; the governor's zeal, and that of his men, enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and, by nine o'clock, we were at Arnold's mills, having taken in the course of the morning, two gun-boats and several batteaux loaded with provisions and ammunition.

“A rapid at the river at Arnold's mills affords the only fording to be met with for a considerable distance, but upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately, taken two or three boats and some Indian canoes, on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a foot man behind each, the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'clock. Eight miles from the crossing we passed a farm where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before under the command of colonel Waburton. The detachment with general Proctor had arrived the day before at the Moravian towns, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to accelerate their march for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy's wagoners being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position and order of battle, to determine that which it was proper for me to adopt.

“I have the honor, herewith, to enclose you my general order, of the 27th ultimo, prescribing the order of march and of battle when the whole army should act together. But as the number and description of the troops had been essentially changed, since the issuing of the order, it became necessary to make a corresponding alteration in their disposition. From the place where our army was last halted, to the Moravian towns, a distance of about three and one half miles, the road passes through a beech forest without any clearing, and for the first two miles near to the bank of the river. At from two to three hundred yards from the river a swamp extends parallel to it, throughout the whole distance. The intermediate ground is dry, and although the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of underbrush.—Across this strip of land, its left *appayed* upon the river, supported by artillery placed in the road, their right in the swamp covered by the whole of their Indian force, the British troops were drawn up.

"The troops at my disposal consisted of about 130 regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry, under his excellency governor Shelby, averaging less than 500 men, and colonel Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making in the whole an aggregate something above 3000. No disposition of an army, opposed to an Indian force, can be safe unless it is secured on the flanks and in the rear. I had, therefore, no difficulty in arranging the infantry conformably to my general order of battle. General Trotter's brigade of 500 men, formed the front line, his right upon the road and his left upon the swamp. General King's brigade as a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's and Chiles's brigade as a corps of reserve in the rear of it. These three brigades formed the command of major-general Henry; the whole of general Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were formed *en potence* upon the left of Trotter.

"Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed colonel Johnson's regiment, which was still in front, to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy, and, upon the advance of the infantry, to take ground to the left and forming upon that flank to endeavor to turn the right of the Indians. A moment's reflection, however, convinced me that from the thickness of the woods and swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do any thing on horseback, and there was no time to dismount them and place their horses in security; I, therefore, determined to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British lines at once by a charge of the mounted infantry: the measure was not sanctioned by any thing that I had seen or heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded too that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it. Conformably to this idea, I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column, with its right at the distance of fifty yards from the road, (that it might be in some measure protected by the trees from the artillery) its left upon the swamp, and to charge at full speed as soon as the enemy delivered their fire. The few regular troops of the 27th regiment under their colonel (Paul) occupied, in column of sections of four, the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery, and some ten or twelve friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The *crotchet* formed by the front line, and general Desha's division was an important point. At that place, the venerable governor of Kentucky was posted, who at the age of sixty-six preserves all the vigor of youth, the ardent zeal which distinguished him in the revolutionary war, and the undaunted bravery which he manifested at King's mountain. With my aids-de camp, the acting assistant adjutant general, captain Butler, my gallant friend commodore Perry, who did me the honor to serve as my volunteer aid-de-camp, and brigadier general Cass, who having no command, tendered me his assistance, I placed myself at the head of the front line of infantry, to direct the movements of the cavalry, and give them the necessary support. The army had moved on in this order but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line, and were ordered to charge; the horses in the front of the column recoiled from the fire; another was given by the enemy, and our column at length getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute, the contest in front was over; the British officers seeing no hopes of reducing their disordered ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon them and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only of our troops were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however, the contest was more severe with the Indians. Colonel Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect. The Indians still further to the right advanced and fell in with our front line of infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and for a moment made an impression upon it. His excellency governor Shelby, however, brought up a regiment to its support, and the enemy receiving a severe fire in front, and a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear, retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.

* I can give no satisfactory information of the number of Indians that were in the action, but they must have been considerably upwards of one thousand.— From the documents in my possession, (general Proctor's official letters, all of which were taken,) and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians kept in pay by the British were much more numerous than has been generally supposed. In a letter to general de Rottenburg of the 27th instant, general Proctor speaks of having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany him. Of these it is certain that 50 or 60 Wyandot warriors abandoned him. A British officer of high rank assured one of my aids-de-camp, that on the day of our landing, general Proctor had at his disposal upwards of three thousand Indian warriors, but asserted that the greatest part had left him previous to the action.

"The number of our troops was certainly greater than that of the enemy, but when it is recollected that they had chosen a position that effectually secured their flanks, which it was impossible for us to turn, and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery.

"In communicating to the president through you, Sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers who served under my command, I am at a loss how to mention that of governor Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of mine can reach his merit. The governor of an independent state, greatly my superior in years, in experience, and in military character, he placed himself under my command, and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity, than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders. The major-generals Henry and Desha, and the brigadiers Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles, and Trotter, all of the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity. Of governor Shelby's staff, his adjutant-general colonel M'Dowell, and his quarter-master general colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aids-de-camp, general Adair and majors Barry and Crittenden. The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my adjutant-general colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwich. His duties were, however, ably performed by the acting assistant adjutant general, captain Butler. My aids-de-camp, lieutenant O'Fallon and captain Todd, of the line, and my volunteer aids, John Speed Smith and John Chambers, Esq. have rendered me the most important service from the opening of the campaign. I have already stated that general Cass and commodore Perry assisted me in forming the troops for action. The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the appearance of the brave commodore cheered and animated every breast.

"It would be useless, Sir, after stating the circumstances of the action, to pass encomiums upon colonel Johnson and his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more firmness. The colonel's numerous wounds prove that he was in the post of danger. Lieutenant-colonel James Johnson and the majors Payne and Thomson were equally active, though more fortunate. Major Wood, of the engineers, already distinguished by his conduct at fort Meigs, attended the army with two six pounders. Having no use for them in the action, he joined in the pursuit of the enemy, and with major Payne of the mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made many prisoners.

"I left the army before an official return of the prisoners, or that of the killed and wounded was made out. It was however ascertained that the former amounts to six hundred and one regulars, including twenty-five officers. Our loss is seven killed and twenty-two wounded, five of which have since died. Of the British troops 12 were killed and 22 wounded. The Indians suffered most—33 of them having been found upon the ground, besides those killed on the retreat. On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two iron twenty-four pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, and can be easily procured. Of the brass pieces three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull. The number of small arms taken by us and destroyed by the enemy must amount to upwards of 5000; most of them had been ours and taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the river Raisin, and colonel Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retain no other military

trophy of their victories than the standard of the 4th regiment. They were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.

"You have been informed, Sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in action; it gives me great pleasure to inform you, that they merit also the approbation of their country for their conduct, in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness. The infantry were entirely without tents, and for several days the whole army subsisted on fresh beef without bread or salt. I have the honour to be, &c. WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

"P. S. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by forty dragoons and a number of mounted Indians.

"General James Armstrong, Secretary of War."

In this letter General Harrison has admitted that the amount of his forces was somewhat greater than that of the enemy. From the examination, however, of the documents which were taken with the British army, it was ascertained that their force was much greater than the General had supposed, and in a letter to the secretary of war, dated at Detroit two days after the above was written, he says, "upon submitting my official letter to governor Shelby, he has convinced me that I have greatly overrated our force in the action of the 5th of October, and that it fell short of 2500 of every description." The militia infantry were all under the immediate command of governor Shelby,* who of course knew better than the commanding General the number which he led into action. The author of the History of the War in the West makes the whole number on the American side 2500. The same author, after having examined all the documents which were taken with the British army, says, "The British part of that force appears to have been about 845 strong. Its loss in killed, wounded, and captured was 645; and the adjutant general of the British forces soon afterwards officially acknowledged, that 204 of those who escaped had assembled at Ancaster on the 17th of October. This calculation is also confirmed by the official return of the troops at Malden, on the 10th of September, which made them 944 in number—affording an excess of 100 above our estimate, to meet the losses experienced on the retreat before the battle. As for the amount of their Indian force, when it is shown by their own official papers captured with the army, that 14,000 rations were issued daily to the Indians before the retreat, and that the greater part of them accompanied Proctor up the Thames, it is certainly a reasonable calculation to estimate them at 15, 18, or even 20 hundred warriors in the battle. The whole force of the allies must hence have been at least considerably above 2000."

Speaking of the result of the action, the same writer observes, "Our important and glorious victory it is evident was princi-

* Colonel Johnson's regiment did not form a part of governor Shelby's command; it had been called into service some time before the governor took the field, and was on a different footing from the troops which were led in person by the veteran hero.

fully achieved by the novel expedient of charging through the British lines with mounted infantry." "It is really a novel thing," says colonel Wood, "that raw militia, stuck upon horses, with muskets in their hands instead of sabres, should be able to pierce British lines with such complete effect, as did Johnson's men in the affair upon the Thames; and perhaps the only circumstance which could justify that deviation from the long established rules of the art military, is the complete success of the result. Great generals are authorised to step aside occasionally—especially when they know that their errors will not be noticed by the adversary."

The following remarks on the battle of the Moravian towns are from the pen of an officer of General Harrison's staff, distinguished alike for his military services and those which he has since rendered his country in a civil capacity.

The battle of the Thames is generally regarded as exhibiting a novel experiment in the art of war, to be justified only by the complete success which attended it. But to the examination of a military man, the formation of the troops presents one of the finest specimens of the application of the new principles of tactics which were first introduced by the king of Prussia, and since improved and enlarged by the generals who were formed in the course of the French revolution: the same principles enabled the great Frederick to triumph at Prague, and gave to Napoleon the splendid victories of Jena, Wagram, and Moskwa. The great secret of the principles alluded to is that of "*concentration*," or of bringing the large mass of an army to act on a single point of the enemy's lines. There are several ways of accomplishing this object; the most common is that of *refusing one wing* to the enemy, and *reinforcing the other* with a large detachment drawn from that which is refused. The point of the enemy's lines selected for the attack is of course that which is considered the weakest, either from his inferior troops being there, or from some defect in the position.

Let us now apply these principles to the formation of the American troops upon the Thames. When General Harrison came up with the British army, it consisted, as is now clearly ascertained, (from documents obtained from Canada) of at least 1500 Indians and eight or nine hundred British troops. His own army consisted of not more than 2700, of whom 120 were regulars, 30 were Indians, and the remainder were *militia infantry and mounted volunteers*, armed with muskets and rifles. From the character which the northern Indians had acquired for bravery and skill in woods fighting, by their defeats of Braddock, Harmor, and St. Clair; and by the difficulty of ultimately subduing them with the immense preparations which had been made under the direction of general Wayne, (whose army was opposed at the rapids of the Miami by only 1300 Indians) it

must have excited some fears had it been known in the United States on the 5th of October, 1813, that 1500 of these savages, led by Tecumseh, and assisted by a veteran body of British troops, amply furnished with artillery and in a position chosen by themselves, were about to be engaged by not more than an equal number of raw militia. In this situation, notwithstanding the known characteristic bravery of the backwoodsmen, it would have been universally believed that success must depend upon the superior skill with which the American troops were arranged for the battle. That this was the case is very evident from an attention to the circumstances. Of the hostile army, the Indians posted in a horrid swamp, and extending in it to an unknown distance, formed the right wing; the British troops drawn up between the swamp and an unfordable river, the left wing. Whatever might have been the case in other situations, here it is evident that the British wing was the weakest part of the position. It was therefore at once determined by the General, to "refuse his left to the Indians, and attack the British with his right reinforced with all the disposable force of his left." Since it was impossible to out wing the enemy, the lines of the right were therefore increased from two to three, but presenting a front not more extensive than that of the British infantry. The refused wing was thrown back in a line at right angles to the other troops, presenting a front parallel to the swamp. The regular troops formed a detachment designed to seize the enemy's artillery, and the few friendly Indians were directed to attack his flank from their position under the bank. There was great difficulty in disposing of the mounted infantry to advantage. Whilst the above arrangements were making, they were in front of the British troops, and as they could not operate on the left flank of the enemy on account of the river, they were directed, when the infantry should advance, to penetrate the swamp and endeavour to turn the right of the Indians. This then was the arrangement for battle, and following the ordinary military principles, it must be considered as combining the features which would promise success, if the disparity in point of discipline were not so decidedly in favour of the British troops; a circumstance of the utmost importance, when from the narrowness of the ground between the river and the swamp, the fronts of the contending troops must be the same. But what could be done? To multiply the lines? it had been done as far as it could be useful. But this measure did not afford absolute security. A compact body of British troops might be conceived able to break a line of raw militia, and a rout once begun with irregular troops would be very difficult to stop. The General had revolved this circumstance in his mind, and had provided against it as far as was in his power. One of the best disciplined regiments was on the right of the front brigade, and led by two officers in whom

he had great confidence, Gano and Bodley, both formed under general Wayne, and who united the qualities which form a consummate officer.

Nothing remained but to watch the course of events, and take advantage of any of those mistakes it was possible the enemy might commit. One had already been committed. The American infantry were upon the point of being put in motion, when *major Wood*, who had been sent to ascertain the precise situation of the enemy, returned and informed the General that the British troops were in two lines, and being unable to occupy the whole space between the swamp and the river in *close order*, had accomplished it by *opening their files*. The intelligence was received by the General with joy. "It is a blunder," said he, "that they shall repent: we must alter our disposition; instead of sending Johnson to the swamp, he shall charge the British lines. Although without sabres, and armed with muskets and rifles, he will break through them. I will have the infantry near to take advantage of their confusion and complete their discomfiture." The arrangement was made and a bloodless victory was the consequence, and has there ever been one obtained where the merit was more fairly to be divided between the General and his troops, the latter bravely executed what the former had happily planned. From the foregoing it will be seen that the first disposition of the troops upon the Thames was made in strict conformity with the modern military principles, and that the deviation was made, as colonel Wood observes, "from that latitude which is allowed to men of genius."

The army remained on the field of battle during the whole of the 6th, to take care of the wounded, to bury the dead, and to collect and provide for the transportation of the stores taken from the enemy. In addition to the artillery already mentioned, upwards of 5000 stand of arms were captured, or destroyed by the enemy on their retreat. General Harrison having left the immediate command of the army with governor Shelby, set out on the morning of the 7th, accompanied by commodore Perry and his aids-de-camp, for Detroit, at which place he arrived on the succeeding day. It was his intention to have immediately despatched a body of troops for the reduction of Macinaw. The vessels and the troops were designated for that purpose, and they only waited for the arrival of provisions and stores, for which the schooners Chippewa and Ohio had been sent to Cleveland and Bass island. These vessels had arrived off Malden on the 12th, but a severe storm from the westward had driven them to the lower end of the lake where they were stranded. The stores which these vessels contained were indispensable to the Macinaw expedition. The loss of them made it necessary to postpone, until the ensuing year, the reduction of that post, as commodore Perry was unwilling to risk the vessels on the upper lakes, unless the

expedition could depart immediately. As this was now impossible, it was abandoned upon the unanimous opinion of a council of war, composed of the superior officers of the army and navy. Upon the certain defeat of their allies, the Indian tribes sent in to the commanding General to ask for peace. A part of them had applied to general M^rArthur for a suspension of arms previously to the return of General Harrison from the Thames. A general armistice was now granted to them, and the subject of their final disposition referred to the government.

The troops having all arrived at Sandwich on the 10th, they were crossed over, and the Kentucky volunteers discharged, and with their veteran commander returned to receive the testimonials of gratitude from their fellow-citizens, to which they were so justly entitled.

As the north-western frontier now reposed in peace, and the advanced state of the season would not permit of an expedition to the upper lakes, General Harrison determined to take a part of his force to the Niagara frontier, to assist the operations which were going on in that quarter. General Cass was left with his brigade to protect the territory of Michigan and the conquered province, and it was vested in the latter with all the powers which had been exercised by the British governor, civil and military. The troops at the disposal of the commanding General, after Cass's brigade was detached, consisted of M^rArthur's brigade, the light battalion, under colonel Ball, and a part of the regiment of United States riflemen, under colonel Thomas Smith; as the means of transport, however, would not allow him to take the whole of these corps, he embarked with about 1500, accompanied by commodore Perry, and arrived at Erie on the 22nd, and at Buffalo on the 24th October. This movement of General Harrison formed no part of the plan of the campaign which had been assigned to him to execute, and having received no orders from the war office of a later date than the month of July, he was entirely ignorant of the intentions of the government, in relation to the army he commanded, after it should have accomplished the re-occupation of the Michigan territory, and the conquest of the uppermost Canada. The General knew, indeed, that a despatch had been sent to him by the secretary of war, from Sacket's Harbor, but it had not reached him, having, with its unfortunate bearer, captain Brown, (a brother of general Brown) been buried in the abyss of the Niagara river. From Buffalo General Harrison despatched his adjutant general, colonel Gaines, to communicate his arrival to the secretary, and proceeded himself with the troops to Newark, when he assumed the command of the troops at that place and fort George, then under the direction of general M^rClure, of the New-York militia. Shortly after the arrival of General Harrison at Newark, he received a letter from the secretary of war from Sacket's Harbor, covering it.

copy of the despatch which had been lost with captain Brown. In this letter the General was directed, after having secured Malden, to pass down the lakes and throw himself upon the flank or rear of the British forces, which was at that time opposed to the American troops in the vicinity of fort George. It appears, therefore, that General Harrison in descending the lake had in a second important instance anticipated the directions of the government. In the letter enclosing the one above mentioned, the secretary intimates a wish that General Harrison would drive the British army out of the peninsula which was then on the head of lake Ontario, under the command of general Vincent. This task was gladly undertaken by the General. Expresses were sent into the adjacent state of New York to procure volunteers, whilst every exertion was made to prepare some field artillery and ammunition from the refuse mass of those articles which had been left at fort Niagara by the main army under general Wilkinson. Those preparations were in great forwardness; the volunteers were collecting in considerable numbers, and the expedition to Burlington heights would have shortly set out, when another letter was received from the secretary, directing the General to send the regular troops at Newark for the protection of Sacket's harbor. This order the General did not think it proper to disobey, and, soon after, the fleet arrived under the orders of commodore Chauncey, to receive them, and in which they were accordingly embarked.

Before General Harrison left Newark, a correspondence had taken place between the British general, Vincent, and himself, on the subject of the employment of the Indians by the belligerent parties. We have not room for the insertion of these interesting documents: there is, however, the less necessity for their publication now, as they are to be found in all the periodical works of the day, as well as in a collection of military and naval letters recently published by Mr. Branham.

General Harrison accompanied the troops to Sacket's Harbor, and leaving them under the command of colonel T. Smith proceeded by the way of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, to Washington city. The news of the victory on the Thames had preceded him; it was received with great rejoicing by the people, which in several of the principal towns was manifested by brilliant illuminations. In Philadelphia a single individual, Mr. Jacob Koch, expended 1500 dollars in illuminating his house, and in the transparent paintings which were prepared for the occasion. Nor were they less attentive to the General on his passage to Washington. He was every where received with distinguished respect: in New York and Philadelphia he was entertained with splendid public dinners, and in Baltimore he was obliged to decline an invitation of the same kind, from his anxiety to reach Washington. In this city he remained but a

few days. Information from Detroit announcing an intention upon the part of the enemy to retake or destroy the captured vessels which had been laid up in the harbor of Put-in bay induced the President to urge his departure to Ohio, as well to provide for resisting any attempts of the enemy as to superintend the filling up of the regiments which were intended to be raised in the western states. General Harrison arrived at Cincinnati on the 9th of January. A committee of the citizens waited on him, with an invitation to a public dinner. The General was obliged to decline that honour, on account of the severe indisposition of his father-in-law, Judge Symmes, who died a few weeks afterwards. As soon as he reached Cincinnati, the General assumed by general order, the command of the eighth military district, which he had originally commanded. As there were no active military operations going on in any quarter at this period, the General was contented with his situation, as it permitted him to remain for some time with his family, from which he had been long separated. He expected, however, and we may add, that it was the general expectation of the nation that he would upon the approach of spring be called to a more important command. But whatever might have been the expectations and wishes of others upon this subject, it is certain that the secretary of war had determined that they should not be realized. The course of conduct which he thought proper to adopt towards General Harrison was such as obliged him to leave the service, or to continue in it under circumstances at once degrading to himself, and to the profession whose rights he was bound to maintain. The interference with his rights as commanding officer of the district, by the secretary, brought from the General a spirited remonstrance which concludes with the following words; "Apart from the considerations of duty to my country, I have no inducement to remain in the army, and if the prerogatives of my rank and station as the commander of a district be taken from me, being fully convinced that I can render no important service, I should much rather be permitted to retire to private life."

To the gallant officer who furnished us with the remarks on the battle of the Thames, we are indebted for the following facts and observations relative to General Harrison's resignation:

"The letter of the secretary of war, of the third of November, gave strong indications that so far as the arrangement could be controlled by his efforts, General Harrison would not be permitted to participate in any of the important or glorious operations of the approaching campaign. A major-general who was in the prime of life, who had fought with reputation under Wayne, who had signalized his name and character in the memorable and well-contested events at Tippecanoe and fort Meigs, and who had by a bloodless victory on the Thames, achieved by the suggestions of his masterly genius, given peace

to a widely extended frontier, restored an important territory to our government, and acquired possession of the greater portion of Upper Canada, was thus directed to remain in a district at no one point of which was there more than a regiment stationed. The letter of the secretary of the 14th May, 1814, enclosing the plan of campaign as submitted to the President on the 30th April, fully authorizes the inference that General Harrison would not be assigned any command in the active operations of the approaching campaign. All of the troops, excepting garrisons for Detroit and Malden, were to be held in readiness to move down the lake to Buffalo, and general McArthur was designated for the command of those corps, including the 17th, 19th, 24th, and 26th regiments of regulars. This arrangement of all the disposable force in the north-west was made after the receipt of General Harrison's letter of the 13th February, in which he expresses his views and feelings consequent upon the interference of the secretary in withdrawing general Howard from his command. In the mean time, the secretary had ventured on the very indelicate and outrageous proceeding of not only designating a subordinate officer for a particular service within the district, but of transmitting the order directly to him to take a certain portion of the troops without consulting the commanding officer of the immediate post or of the district. His order of the 25th of April, to major Holmes was not less insulting to the commanding General than it was conducive to every species of insubordination. The command of the Major-general was not even nominal, if a secretary at the distance of 1000 miles were permitted thus to interfere in the internal concerns of his district. This course was evidently intended as a source of mortification to General Harrison, when contrasted with the unlimited powers confided to him in the campaigns of 1812-13. On the receipt, therefore, of the notification from the war department of the order of the 25th April, General Harrison instantly addressed a letter of resignation to the secretary, and a notification of it to the President. As soon as governor Shelby heard of the resignation of General Harrison, he lost no time in addressing the President in his usual forcible terms to prevent his acceptance of it, but unfortunately for the public interests, the President was on a visit to Virginia, to which place the letters from General Harrison and governor Shelby were forwarded, and that of the latter was not received until after *Armstrong*, *without the previous consent of the President*, had assumed upon himself the high prerogative of accepting the resignation. The President expressed his great regret that the letter of governor Shelby had not been received earlier, as in that case the valuable services of General Harrison would have been preserved to the nation in the ensuing campaign."

If General Harrison could have sacrificed his sense of duty to pecuniary considerations, he might have retained his commission and remained in his district, enjoying with his family the emoluments of the high rank which he held in the army; but he disdained to hold a nominal command, or to receive pay for services which he did not perform.



Sequel of the fate of Tecumseh, and his brother the Prophet.

TECUMSEH and the Prophet joined the British as soon as the war was declared. The former was not in the battle of the river Raisin. He was at that time employed in raising the Indians of the Wabash to conduct to Malden. When colonel Campbell was at Mississinaway, Tecumseh was at no great distance with several hundred warriors. He was at the siege of fort Meigs, and on the eventful 5th of May commanded the Indian force which co-operated with the British on the south-east side of the river. When forced to cross the river, he arrived at the British camp at the moment when the Potawatamies and other lake Indians were murdering Dudley's men. It is said that Tecumseh interfered and saved several of them. He was at the second attempt on fort Meigs, in July, but did not go with Proctor to the siege of Sandusky. Whilst the attack was making on that place by the British and the Indians from the lakes, Tecumseh went with all his force, said to be 2000, to reconnoitre the situation of General Harrison. For some cause which never has been explained, he made no attempt on the position at Seneca. The probability is that his warriors were unwilling to engage in the undertaking. At the time that commodore Perry made the first display of his fleet before Malden, there were with the British Indians some emissaries of the Crane, (the Wyandot chief who adhered to the United States,) and who had been sent at the suggestion of General Harrison to endeavor to bring off those of their tribe who under Walk-in-the-Water had taken the part of the British. These men were in conversation with Tecumseh when the American fleet came in sight. Tecumseh appeared much rejoiced at their appearance, and assured the American Wyandots that the British fleet would soon destroy them. The many thousand Indians who were on the island (Bois Blanc) hastened to the shore to witness the conflict; but no motion or preparation was visible in the harbour of Malden. Tecumseh launched his canoe, apparently much mortified, and hastily paddled over to the British fortress. Upon his return he made known to the Indians "that the big canoes of their great father were not yet ready, but that the destruction of the Americans must be delayed for a few days."

When Proctor began to prepare for the retreat from Malden, Tecumseh, suspecting what was going forward, demanded an

audience, and in the name of all the Indians delivered a speech.* "If Proctor had followed the advice of Tecumseh," says the historian of the Western War, "and fought the American force before he retreated, the result must have been more glorious at least, if not entirely favourable to the British arms."

When Proctor had reached Dalson's farm in his retreat, he returned with Tecumseh and a small guard to examine the ground at a place called Chatham, where a large unfordable creek falls into the Thames. Having thoroughly examined the place, it was approved, of, and Proctor told Tecumseh as they rode in the same gig, that upon that spot they would either defeat General Harrison or there lay their bones. Tecumseh seemed much pleased at this determination, and said, that "it was a good place, and when he should look at the two streams, they would remind him of the Wabash and the Tippecanoe."† This is the place where the skirmish took place as mentioned in General Harrison's official letter, and it is represented as uniting all the advantages which are desirable for an army constituted like that of the British, of regulars and Indian warriors: their front would have been covered by a deep unfordable stream, their right flank by the river Thames, and their left by a swamp; there was, moreover, a sufficiency of open ground for the British regulars to be formed on. But general Proctor did not comply with his engagements with Tecumseh; he continued his retreat, and left the chief with 1000 or 1200 Indians to defend the pass. Tecumseh made a judicious disposition of his force, but whatever may have been the cause, it is certain that his warriors did not on this occasion sustain the reputation of north-western Indians. It is probable that the recollection of Tippecanoe did not produce the same feelings in their minds as in that of their gallant leader. If they had manifested their accustomed bravery, the American army could not have forced the passage without a very heavy loss. After this unsuccessful effort, Tecumseh speedily joined general Proctor, and it is not unlikely that upon his remonstrances another place was fixed upon on which to conquer or "lay their bones." If this was the case, Tecumseh fulfilled his part of the stipulation: In the battle of the Moravian towns he commanded the right wing of the allied army, and was himself posted on the left of that wing, the only part of it which was engaged with the American troops. Disdaining to fly, he fell, and the grave in which he was deposited by his countrymen after the return of the American army is still to be seen. There is a possibility that this distinguished chieftain fell by a pistol shot from the hand of colonel Johnson; he was certainly killed

* For this speech see Appendix, No. 9.

† This anecdote is given on the authority of the British sergeant, who commanded the escort of Proctor and Tecumseh, and who heard the conversation as it was interpreted.

in that part of the line where the colonel was himself wounded. It is probable that Tecumseh imagined that Proctor intended to retreat, for a British officer who was a prisoner told a gentleman of this city, that just before the action commenced, Tecumseh rode up to Proctor and told him that the British wing was not far enough up to be in a line with his. The British government have granted a pension to his widow and family. It is understood that they now reside in the vicinity of Malden, where also lives, supported in like manner by a British pension, the celebrated Prophet, possessing, however, no longer any influence or consequence amongst the Indians.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

IN a previous part of this work we have promised to enter into a short examination of the controversy between General Harrison and General Winchester. We have paid some attention to this subject, have read with care the first attack of general Winchester, with the documents attached to it, printed in a pamphlet form—the reply of General Harrison in several successive numbers in the National Intelligencer, and a second series of numbers by general Winchester in the same paper. We acknowledge ourself the friend of General Harrison, but are not therefore the enemy of general Winchester; we are the friend of justice, but are nevertheless free to declare that we have never in the whole course of our experience witnessed a more unprovoked, unnecessary, and unsupported attack made upon an individual than that of general Winchester upon General Harrison. We sincerely believe that with the aid of the documents we shall now produce, and the narrative of the events which has been given in another part of this work, that every unprejudiced mind will come to the same conclusion. Our own comments shall be therefore very brief. To the reader who may desire perfectly to understand the nature of the dispute between General Harrison and general Winchester, we recommend an attentive perusal of the narrative in the foregoing part of this work, as he will then easily comprehend the observations and documents which follow.

The charges which have been made or *insinuated*, either by general Winchester or his witnesses, (for the three principal of the latter seem, in their zeal to convict General Harrison of some error, to forget the character in which they appear) shall be stated and answered in order. The first, made by a certain Samuel G. Hopkins in a letter to general Winchester, is, that “he, (General Harrison) intrigued at Frankfort to obtain the command of the detachment of Kentucky militia, going to the

relief of general Hull, and with labouring to execute a plan for the destruction of general Winchester's military fame; that he (Hopkins) being at Frankfort at the time, and in the General's confidence, gathered this from declarations made to him by the General." Now we request the reader to turn to page 283 of this work, and see who composed the Governor's council when he was advised to give the command of the detachment of Kentucky militia to General Harrison, and what chance there was for an intrigue with such men as are there named, every one of whom, excepting governor Scott and Mr. Clay, were strangers to General Harrison. We will now introduce to the reader Samuel G. Hopkins himself to bear testimony against Samuel G. Hopkins. The following letter was written by him to the General in the winter of 1813, and no doubt since forgotten. It was published by the General in 1819.

"Upper Sandusky, Feb. 24 1813.

"DEAR GENERAL: I had hoped to have had the pleasure of waiting on you in person before I again return to the interior. It seems the malice of some mischievous and unprincipled person has represented to you that I had so far acted the hypocrite and poltroon, as to have spoken disrespectfully of and attempted to injure you, after your departure from Kentucky. To colonel Campbell, whose friendship for me induced him to communicate this intelligence, I promptly and unequivocally declared its utter destitution of truth, and solicited him on his return from the expedition to Mississinaway, to make known this denial to you. At the period you received the appointment of major-general of the Kentucky quota of militia from general Scott, (an appointment to which my father had been regularly commissioned some time before) I confess my feelings were severely stung. I thought the measure calculated not only to inflict a tacit censure, but an egregious outrage upon the reputation and sensibility of him whom it was my duty most to venerate.

"It is probable, and I hope it is the fact, that being ignorant of the train of circumstances that led to this event, I may have looked upon it improperly; but it is certain I still think it sufficient to dissolve all the ties of friendship hitherto existing between general Scott, the gentleman who advised it, and my father. Delicacy enjoined that I should be silent as related to every person concerned, and I ever most solemnly I was strictly so: common prudence, General, required that I should particularly seal my lips as it regarded you, for it is known to all, who know me, how ardently and sincerely I had been your advocate in every situation of life in which I have been placed. I was so from principle, and consequently claim no obligation from you for any thing of this kind. *Apart too from this consideration, I here assure you that I had discovered nothing in your conduct to merit either my censure or resentment, and, so help me God, you never had either.* It is due to truth and my feelings that I should request you to acquaint me with the name of the person who has so unjustly and insidiously assailed me. If consistent with your situation towards him, I trust I shall be gratified in this particular.

"A court of enquiry on the conduct of my father will, I am informed, be held in Frankfort on the fourth Monday of March next. With your permission I will request major Ball for a furlough to attend there at that time. The major will judge of the propriety or impropriety of granting the application at the period at which it will be solicited. It is the first indulgence of the kind I have ever sought, and you will at once appreciate the feelings which dictate it in this instance. A line from you (directed to Lebanon) as soon as your convenience may permit, will be most thankfully received. Pardon the trouble I am giving you: and the confusion with which I am surrounded must plead my apology for the imperfect manner in which I have addressed you. I have the honour to be, most respectfully, your friend and servant, S. G. HOPKINS."

General Winchester charges General Harrison with endeavouring to deprive him of the command of the North-western army, and with procuring an address from the officers to the President of the United States. These are serious charges indeed; and if after a minute investigation we could conceive that there was the most remote probability of their truth, we would never have taken on us to advocate the cause of General Harrison—but on the contrary we have the utmost confidence that the documents we shall introduce will prove to every candid mind that to support these charges recourse has been had to an entire perversion of facts and circumstances, and also,

First, that general Winchester never was either in possession of, or entitled to, the command of the North-western army.

Secondly, That General Harrison had no hand in procuring the address complained of—that it emanated from corps over which general Winchester had no controul, and that so far from countenancing any attempt at limiting his legal authority, it was by his (Gen. Harrison's) exertions alone that general Winchester could establish himself in the command which had been assigned him. The following short narrative of facts, however, it is proper should precede the introduction of the documents.

When General Harrison arrived in Kentucky in August, 1812, three regiments of the Kentucky quota had been detached, which, with a body of regular troops under colonel Wells, were about to march under the command of general Payne to the relief of general Hull. The residue of the quota had been placed by order of the President at the disposal of Governor Harrison for the protection of the territory of Indiana. When the news of Hull's surrender arrived, the governor of Kentucky, upon the advice of a number of gentlemen whom he consulted, appointed Governor Harrison with the rank of Major General, to command this detachment. The General overtook these troops at Cincinnati, and assumed the command. At this place he found general Winchester, whom he invited to accompany him, which invitation he declined, upon the ground, that as he (General Harrison) had come on, there was no necessity for his going farther. General Winchester then returned to Lexington, and General Harrison proceeded with the troops to Piqua, on the road to fort Wayne.

Previously to General Harrison's leaving Kentucky, it had been agreed on between the governor and him that three additional regiments of infantry and one of dragoons of the Kentucky quota should be called out and marched toward the Ohio frontier—that colonel Richard M. Johnson should raise a corps of mounted riflemen for the same destination. Of these four regiments the three first had been put under the orders of

General Harrison by the President, and the latter by the governor of Kentucky.

Before General Harrison reached Piqua, he received a letter from general Winchester, inclosing an order from the war office for him, Winchester, to take command of the detachment which was going to the relief of Hull. This order was dated 23d August, before it was known that Hull had surrendered, or that General Harrison had taken the command of the detachment. General Harrison, however, immediately wrote to Winchester, desiring that he might come on and take command of the detachment mentioned in the order, but offering also, as fort Wayne was besieged by the enemy, and it was necessary to proceed to its relief without delay, to give to Winchester a similar number of troops which belonged to his (Harrison's) command, and which were coming on from Kentucky.

General Winchester declined the exchange, but acceded to the propriety of Harrison's proceeding with the advance troops to the relief of the fort. This was done, and after employing them in some further service, Winchester arrived at fort Wayne to take the command. The troops at first manifested some disposition to mutiny, but by the exertions of General Harrison they were reconciled to the command of general Winchester, and he, Harrison, issued a general order, specifying the command turned over to Winchester, and that retained by himself. General Winchester made not the least objection to the arrangement, and the two generals parted on the most amicable terms.

General Harrison then set out for St. Mary's, whence he promised to send provisions to Winchester at Defiance. On his arrival he found two of his infantry regiments, Jennings' and Pogue's, at that place, and learnt that the other, Barbee's, was at Piqua.

On his way to St. Mary's, General Harrison received a letter from the secretary of war, (supposing him still in Kentucky) requesting him to join Winchester.

As Harrison had declined the commission of brigadier in the service which had been offered him (see page 291) by the government, and was then acting under the Kentucky commission, and not choosing to interfere with Winchester's command, he wrote to that officer, offering to put under his control, as he had before done at fort Wayne, two out of the three regiments of infantry which belonged to his own proper command. (See pages 295, 296.)

Immediately on the arrival of General Harrison at St. Mary's, he assembled a considerable convoy of provisions and despatched them under the guard of colonel Jennings' rifle regiment by the direct road to Defiance. (See page 297.)

At St. Mary's the same attachment was felt to the General, and the same desire to serve under his command that had been

expressed at fort Wayne. It, however, produced no other result than a respectful address from the officers to the President, praying him to appoint Harrison to the supreme command; and it is this address which is taken as the ground-work of Winchester's complaint against him. General Harrison admits in his answer to general Winchester, which was published in the National Intelligencer, that he knew that such an address had been prepared, but it will be seen by the following documents that he had no agency in producing it. He was not unwilling that it should be forwarded as evidence of the attachment and confidence of *his* officers, although he must have been perfectly convinced that it would arrive too late to be of any service, for at the very moment that it was prepared, and before it could have left the camp, the letter of the secretary of war of the 10th September arrived, approving his having taken the command of the troops, (see pages 298-9) and informing him, that in a few days definite directions respecting the command of the army would be forwarded; and on the evening of the same day, the 24th, the letter of the 17th constituting him commander in chief of all the forces on the north-western frontier was received.

The letter of governor Shelby is inserted to show that the regiments of Jennings, Poague and Barbee, whose officers signed the address to the President, did not belong to the command which had been assigned to general Winchester.

December 13, 1817.

Dear General: Your favor of the 5th ult. has been duly received; in answer to the questions you have stated to me, I have to observe, that I do not know what was the extent of general Winchester's command, having seen nothing official, that I now recollect, on the subject; but I have always believed that it consisted of the detachment, destined to relieve General Hull, from this state, and which was composed of the three regiments of Kentucky detached militia, commanded by colonels Lewis, Allen, and Scott, with captain Garrard's troop of cavalry, and the 17th regiment of U. States' infantry. The residue of the Kentucky detached militia was placed at your disposal as governor of the Indiana Territory; of which residue was the regiment of cavalry commanded by colonel Simrall, and those of the infantry, commanded by colonels Jennings, Poague, and Barbee. These last four regiments were called into service upon your requisition, and ordered to the state of Ohio, in August, 1812. *They formed a distinct corps from those destined to reinforce General Hull, as before mentioned, and the officers commanding them, viz: Simrall, Jennings, Poague, and Barbee, could not, in my opinion, have divested themselves of your control in any other way than by an order from the President of the United States, or by an act of your own.* The executive of Kentucky had no power upon them after they had passed the limits of the state.

You are at liberty to make what use you please of this statement: and that you may finally obtain that reward from your country which your incessant labors and toils so justly entitle you to, while commander of the North-western Army, is the sincere wish of, my dear sir, your truly affectionate friend and humble servant,
ISAAC SHELBY.

Major Gen Wm. H. HARRISON.

INDIANA, SEPT. 16, 1818.

Dear Sir: In compliance with your request, I will proceed to state your conduct as it relates to General Winchester, and other matters of the north-western army, as far as my recollection serves me, in the first campaigns in 1812 and

1813. I was with you, as your aid-de camp, when general Winchester arrived at Fort Wayne to take the command of the detachment which had been sent to the relief of Gen. Hull. The troops of the detachment, both officers and men, expressed the utmost disapprobation of the circumstance, and were on the point of breaking out, as I supposed, in open mutiny. You immediately took every means in your power to reconcile them to General Winchester. You assembled the officers, and, after addressing them on the subject, prevailed upon them to exert themselves to satisfy the men. You also issued a general order, which was well calculated to effect that object, and finally succeeded. I believe your influence could only have produced that result. I accompanied you from Fort Wayne to St. Mary's, to meet the three regiments of Kentucky infantry commanded by colonels Jennings, Barbee, and Poague. Which regiments did not belong to general Winchester's command, but which you had reserved to yourself in the order by which you transferred the command of the first detachment to General Winchester. I believed myself, at that time, and have always since believed, that I was in your confidence, and I do positively assert, that nothing ever came to my knowledge which had the remotest appearance of an intrigue to suspend general Winchester from his command. The officers of the regiments above mentioned did indeed sign a recommendation to the President of the United States to appoint you to the command of the army, which was drawn up by the Hon. Samuel M'Kee, a member of congress from Kentucky. I can also state, with confidence, that no man could have made greater exertion than you did to push forward provisions for the support of General Winchester's detachment; and, I am satisfied, but for these exertions provisions could not have been sent on either so soon, or in such quantities. I do further state, that I was with you when you received information of general Winchester's design to advance to the river Raisin, and I am convinced, from my knowledge of your military documents, to all which I had access, and most of which I copied, that you had no knowledge of the intended advance of Winchester until you were informed of it by an express from general Perkins, who was then stationed at Lower Sandusky. The express arrived in the night of the 16th of January, and early next morning you set out, with some of your staff, from Upper to Lower Sandusky. Having on the 16th resigned my situation in the army, previously to your receiving the information from general Perkins above alluded to, when you set out for Lower Sandusky, I left the army and returned home.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

Gen. W. H. Harrison.

WALLER TAYLOR.

State of Kentucky, Franklin county.
 Samuel Shannon, late chaplain to the 1st regiment of Kentucky detached militia, under the command of colonel John M. Scott, states, on oath, that he was, in the year 1812, at the commencement of the war, and has been ever since, a regular ordained minister of the Presbyterian church, in the state of Kentucky: that in the month of July or August, 1812, he was commissioned chaplain to the said regiment by the then governor Charles Scott, and marched with the first detachment of the Kentucky quota, destined to reinforce general Hull; that the regiment proceeded on to Fiqua, where they were overtaken by General Harrison, who assumed the command of the detachment; that the troops, who were generally raw and inexperienced, were highly delighted and much elated at the idea of being commanded by General Harrison, whom they esteemed as an able and experienced officer; that information was then received that fort Wayne was besieged and likely to be taken; that General Harrison addressed the troops, and proposed to advance by forced marches to the relief of fort Wayne: which met the approbation of all the troops. The army advanced accordingly and relieved fort Wayne; and detachments were then sent to different points to destroy some of the neighbouring Indian towns, which being accomplished, on their return general Winchester had arrived with instructions from the general government to take command of the detachment destined for the relief of Detroit, &c. The troops having formed a strong attachment for General Harrison, expressed great regret at his yielding the command, and evinced an unwillingness to be commanded by general Winchester, or any other regular officer; that General Harrison took great

pains to reconcile the troops to general Winchester, by conversing with officers and soldiers, and by his general order; and indeed such were the prejudices entertained by the troops against general Winchester, and such their confidence in General Harrison that he is well convinced, and believes it was the general impression at that time, *that General Harrison's influence and exertions could alone have reconciled the troops to general Winchester.* On the march from fort Wayne to fort Defiance, and whilst there, the troops were much dissatisfied with general Winchester, and relied entirely on their own officers, and the hope and expectation that General Harrison would return to them. And soon after their arrival at fort Defiance, some of the troops were on the eve of mutiny, which was prevented by the arrival and address of General Harrison; that the exertions of General Harrison to remove the objections against general Winchester, as well at fort Wayne as at fort Defiance, were, as he believes, ardent and sincere. He further states, that he was an officer under General Washington during a great part of the revolutionary war: and he has thought and frequently said, that the zeal, activity, and military talents of General Harrison resembled General Washington's more than any other officer he had ever known.

SAMUEL SHANNON.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Franklin county, ss.

Personally appeared, this day, before the subscriber, one of the Justices of the peace for said county, the Rev. Samuel Shannon, who made oath to the above statement, as witness my hand this 31st October, 1817, at Frankfort, Ky.
C. S. TODD, J. P. F. C.

Franklin county, Ky. 2d Nov. 1817.

John Arnold, late a major of Kentucky mounted volunteers, states, that he was a captain in major Richard M. Johnson's mounted troops, and was at fort Wayne in September, 1812, at the time General Harrison, conformably to what he understood were the orders of the President of the United States, relinquished the command of the detachment originally destined to relieve general Hull, to general Winchester. He well recollects the dissatisfaction that pervaded all ranks at General Harrison's relinquishing the command, and the uneasiness which prevailed at the idea of being under general Winchester, or indeed any regular officer—more especially one with whom, or with whose character they were unacquainted. He was not present at the time General Harrison addressed the troops on that occasion, but he well recollects, the general conversation and impression was, that he had made great and sincere exertions to remove the objections which the troops had to general Winchester; and, judging from the spirit then existing in camp, he is well satisfied that *General Harrison's influence and persuasion could alone have reconciled a great portion of the troops to the command of general Winchester;* that he was at St. Mary's in the latter part of said month, and is well acquainted with General Harrison's exertions to forward supplies to general Winchester at Defiance, and that every thing appeared to have been done that could have been effected—colonel Jennings' regiment, and a large number of beavers, and a quantity of flour, having been immediately forwarded. But general Winchester had not arrived at Defiance, and when his battalion (about the 5th of October) proceeded, under General Harrison, to Defiance, colonel Jennings had encamped about half way between St. Mary's and Defiance; and upon the arrival of General Harrison at Defiance, he states that the troops were much dissatisfied with their situation, as well from a scarcity of provisions as a want of confidence in general Winchester; that he believes the exertions General Harrison at all times made to reconcile the troops to their situation under general Winchester were ardent and sincere; that while at St. Mary's he neither knew nor heard of any conduct on the part of General Harrison, which had the least appearance of an intrigue to supersede general Winchester in his command, although he has no doubt that it was the wish of every officer and soldier at St. Mary's that General Harrison should be the commander in chief. He further adds, that from his knowledge of General Harrison's services in the campaign led by general Wayne, as well as in the operations carried on by him in the north-west, during the late war, he then, and does now, entertain the highest confidence in his patriotism, his integrity, and his eminent military talents. JOHN ARNOLD.

Franklin county, *sc.*:

Personally appeared before the subscriber, one of the justices of the peace for said county, major John Arnold, who made oath to the preceding statement, as witness my hand, this 3d November, 1817. CHAS. S. TODD, J. P.

November 10, 1817.

Sir: In answer to your request I can state, that I know, of my own knowledge, that the army at fort Wyne was very much dissatisfied when General Harrison was about to surrender the command to general Winchester, and that *General Harrison did use his exertions and influence to reconcile the men, without which it is my opinion the army would not have submitted to it.* The men were much displeas'd at the change, and spoke to me about it. I let them know it would be better to wait and hear what General Harrison would say to it, and not to think of any measures that would throw the army into confusion; and I can truly say it was my opinion General Harrison was the means of the men's going on as they did with general Winchester. I could state much of the conversation that passed in camp, fort Wayne, and Defiance; but think it unimportant. From your friend

JAMES SUGGET,

Late Chaplain and Adj. to colonel Johnson's corps.

GEN. WM. H. HARRISON.

I served in the campaigns of 1812, 13, in the North-western army as Quarter Master General of the Kentucky quota. I joined the advance, under General Harrison, 25 miles from Fort Wayne, about the 20th of September, 1812, in company with captain Thomas Eastland, who claimed the post of Quarter Master of the Kentucky quota, which I considered myself entitled to, under an appointment and commission from governor Scott, subsequent to, and superseding that of Eastland. We agreed that the difference between us should be decided by General Harrison. It was determined in my favor, and from that time Eastland became the deadly enemy of General Harrison, which has been evinced by his subsequent conduct, by his letters to general Winchester, which contain charges against General Harrison so unwarranted and unfounded that he should blush at having made them. General Harrison is charged with having intrigued with the troops, at St. Mary's, so obtain the command from general Winchester. I was present the whole time, and do solemnly declare it my opinion, that the charge is destitute of a shadow of foundation. To my knowledge, the troops, with which the intrigue is said to have been attempted, were ordered into service on the application of General Harrison, did not form a part of general Winchester's command; and were never under his orders until they were so placed by General Harrison. The sentiment of attachment to General Harrison was, however, as strong amongst those troops, both officers and men, as with those of general Winchester's particular command, and considerable apprehension was entertained by them that general Winchester, being the senior officer of the regular army in the Western country, might be appointed to the command of the North Western army; an event which was much dreaded and deprecated, as well on account of his age, as from his supposed want of experience in Indian warfare.

General Harrison, on the contrary, possessed the entire confidence of the western people, from his knowledge of the country, from the experience he had acquired of Indian warfare, while acting in general Wayne's army, and from the result of the battle of Tippecanoe, for which he had, at the previous session of the Kentucky legislature, been highly complimented by the joint resolution of both houses. A single fact will place the popularity of General Harrison with the people of Kentucky, in its proper light. He was not, nor ever had been, a citizen of the state; and yet, although not in strict accordance with the constitution, but in supposed violation of the rights of every general officer there in commission, he was appointed by the governor to command the Kentucky troops in the field, with the approbation and acquiescence of the citizens in general; at least, if a contrary sentiment did exist with any individuals, they took care to keep it to themselves. When General Harrison took command of the Kentucky troops, under governor Scott's commission, he was received with the strongest marks of attachment and enthusiasm, both

by the officers and men. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that any intrigue was necessary to procure a declaration of their sentiments to the President in his favor. I had, perhaps, as large a share in procuring the signatures to the address as any other person, and solemnly declare that I never heard of any objection being made to it, and did conceive that the officers who have since blamed the measure, appeared at that time as ardent in the recommendation of General Harrison as any others; and I do believe, they are mistaken in supposing that General Harrison had any personal agency in the affair. The address alluded to was drawn up by the honourable Samuel McKee, then a volunteer in the corps.

With respect to General Harrison's forwarding provisions to general Winchester, I had, from my station, a better opportunity of knowing his conduct than almost any other person, and most solemnly declare that, in my opinion, no one could have used greater exertions than he did. The events indeed, prove it. He arrived at St. Mary's on the 21st of September, 1812, and on the next day a very large convoy sat out, under the escort of colonel Jennings' regiment. That general Winchester did not receive it in time, was owing to the slow progress he had made to Defiance, and the enemy occupying that fort, which obliged colonel Jennings to halt and fortify his camp on the Auglaize. To impute to General Harrison the sufferings of the left wing of the army, when he was on the right wing, and did not interfere with the left, and when general Winchester had the entire command of the staff officers, and all the resources of the left line, is ridiculous. General Harrison, at fort Defiance, and in my presence, informed general Winchester, that "the quarter masters, contractors, and commissaries were all under his orders, and if they did not supply him well, he must hang them." But it was, in a great degree, the fault of general Winchester himself that his troops were not well supplied. He detained fresh teams at Defiance, forty or fifty at a time, until many of the horses were literally starved, and some of the best teams not able to bring in the empty wagons; and I have the documents in my possession to prove it. From my own observation, from what I have heard, and from all the circumstances which took place during the campaign, I have no hesitation in declaring it my fixed opinion that no general living could, under the same circumstances, have done more than was effected by General Harrison. His industry, zeal, and perseverance were unparalleled. No commanding general ever had more difficulties to encounter. The troops were brought together from a distance, at different periods, and under various circumstances; some new recruits, some drafted militia, and some volunteers; the whole raw, undisciplined, and unexperienced; many of them poorly officered, and badly provided with clothing and military stores. The country through which he had to pass is the worst, in wet weather, that ever was known. I have seen the roads so deep that the axletrees of the wagons would drag on the ground for rods together. The swamps and small streams were frequently impassable. I have known wagons to be a month going from Cincinnati to St. Mary's, (105 miles,) and two weeks from Loramies to St. Mary's, (12 miles,) and in one instance I recollect two wagons being loaded with forage, at Piqua, and when they arrived at St. Mary's, (30 miles) the teams had eat all the forage but six bushels. I was intimate with General Harrison, and believe possessed his confidence, and do not recollect ever to have heard him to express an unfavorable or unfriendly opinion of general Winchester, until after the defeat at Raisin, and I do know, that the first and greatest object of General Harrison was to have the whole troops well supplied with provisions and stores, and to concentrate the army at the Rapids, as soon as practicable, and believe that every effort was made to effect it; but *he could not war against the elements, nor do impossibilities.* Several officers became dissatisfied and inimical to General Harrison, in consequence of being left at the rear posts. Some of those who have given statements against him were at first his friends, but became his enemies from this and other causes.

THOMAS BODLEY.*

Lexington, Ky. Oct. 24, 1819.

* It has been asserted by general Winchester that general Rodley is brother-in-law to General Harrison; if this was done for the purpose of weakening his testimony, the object was not obtained, as it is well known that no relationship exists between these two gentlemen.—*Ed.*

It is, we conceive, unnecessary to add any thing to the testimony above adduced to show the propriety of General Harrison's conduct, as well in relation to the public service, as to general Winchester himself.

The next charge we shall notice is that contained in a letter from a certain Thomas Eastland to general Winchester, in which, besides reiterating the charges which have been noticed above, he has the audacity to charge the General with having designedly kept back the supply of provisions for the troops commanded by general Winchester. This production of Eastland bears upon the face of it so much rancour and malevolence as must in the opinion of every impartial person totally disqualify him from being a witness in this case, even if he had testified to facts which *had happened under his own observation*: but what will be thought of Mr. Eastland when we shall show that the events he relates as if he were present when they happened, not only did not happen, but that he was not present when they were said to have occurred, and that after that period he was the warm eulogist of General Harrison: what will be thought of general Winchester to have palmed upon the public as legitimate testimony the declaration of a man whom *he knew* could not have been acquainted but from hearsay with the facts which he pretends to relate, as if he were present when they took place, and whom he knew also to be the bitter enemy of the person against whom his testimony was directed. Was it fair, was it honourable for an officer of high rank to attempt to destroy by such means the reputation of a brother officer, his commander, who had ever treated him with the greatest attention and respect. And yet it is upon the declarations of this *major* Eastland that general Winchester principally relies to support his accusations against general Harrison. In one of the numbers of general Winchester's last series, he calls Eastland's letter to him a "precious document;" General Bodley in his statement says, that the charges made by Eastland are "so unwarranted and unfounded that he should blush at having made them."

The deposition of major Arnold, and the statements of the Hon. Waller Taylor, the Rev. Mr. Suggett, and general Bodley, which are given above, who are all of the highest standing in society, and who were *eye-witnesses* to the scenes which occurred at St. Mary's from the 20th to the 24th of September, will at least weigh in the opinion of the public, whatever they may do in that of general Winchester, against the declarations of Mr. Eastland who was at fifty miles distance.

General Bodley's statement explains at length the cause of Eastland's hostility to General Harrison. We now introduce an original letter of Eastland's to General Harrison, dated on the 3d of October. It will be perceived that it was written ten or twelve days after the period in which (according to his *other*

statement) the General's conduct was so reprehensible. It proves the correctness of Bodley's statement, and also that on that day Mr. Eastland was well acquainted with General Harrison's "impartiality and determination to do justice," that he would "cherish rather than wound the honor of a soldier," and that he (Eastland) was "confident he would" act from "motives of purity and justice."

Camp, nigh Defiance, Oct. 24, 1812.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRISON,

Dear Sir: I had the honour of reporting myself to you on the morning of the 20th of September as quarter master general to the detachment of Kentucky militia, and received your verbal order to proceed on to fort Wayne, and report myself to general Winchester, there to do duty with the detachment under his command. I accordingly hastened on to join the detachment, agreeably to your order, and on my arrival at the fort, reported myself to general Winchester; the general was at that time very much engaged, and did not give me any orders. The next morning I waited on him, when he informed me that he had received a letter from major Bodley, after I had left his quarters the over night, informing him that the major contended for the appointment which I held. The general seemed not to be disposed to settle the business between major Bodley and myself at that time, but told me to come on to this place, and that here the matter would be settled. The thing is not yet decided, and being informed that you have again resumed the command of the army, it becomes my duty to appeal to you for a decision between major Bodley and myself.

I have already shown to you my commission, also my orders from governor Shelby, authorising me to come on and join the detachment from Kentucky; my commission is dated 6th of June last; major Bodley's the 8th of August. Seniority has ever been respected and attended to in the armies of every country. On this long established and just principle, I claim the right of acting in the duties of my appointment, and from *your known impartiality and determination to do justice*, I have no hesitation in appealing to you for a decision between major Bodley and myself. When I accepted of my appointment, it was with a view to serve my country. I ask you, General Harrison, whether you will prevent me or not. *I am mistaken in you, Sir, if you would wound the honor of a soldier; rather would you cherish him.* I ask you for justice in the camp; I have never know it denied. I have much at stake on your decision, my own honor and that of my children; take this from me, and you deprive me of all I hold dear in life. My not having the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with you prevents me from saying to you many things which my feelings suggest to me. I have enemies who are intimate with you, but you are not to be influenced by malevolent representations. I have no apprehension on that score, *as I am confident you will act from motives of purity and justice.*

I have been much mortified from the unpleasant and uncertain situation I have been in since I joined the detachment. Will you do me the honor of giving my business a speedy determination, and inform me of the result as early as convenient.

I have the honor of being, very respectfully, your Excellency's most obedient and very humble servant,
THOMAS EASTLAND.

It is rather unfortunate that general Winchester's principal witnesses, Hopkins and Eastland, should thus have furnished the means of refuting their own testimony.

We shall consider the two charges of "unnecessary delay in the prosecution of the campaign in the autumn and winter of 1812—13," and "not making effectual provision for the support of the wing commanded by general Winchester," together.

In addition to the testimony of general Bodley and others, which has already been given in relation to these two points, we now request the attention of the reader to the following answers of colonel James Morrison, the quarter-master general of the north-western army, to certain questions proposed by General Harrison to him, shortly after the first attack of general Winchester upon the former.

Lexington, October, 1818.

Dear Sir: In reply to the queries, which you have addressed to me, relative to the situation and occurrences of the north-western army, under your command, in the autumn and winter of 1812—13, I send you the following statements. Having documents in my possession, to which I have recurred, I cannot be mistaken in the dates I have mentioned. In matters where data of this kind would not enable me to be positive, I have written according to the best of my recollection.

Query 1st. "At what time did you arrive?" &c.*

Answer. My first interview with you, after receiving the appointment of quarter-master, was at Urbana, on the 10th of October, 1812; where you gave me an order to provide stores, &c. for 10,000 men, operating in a wilderness, and almost destitute of every thing necessary for offensive operations, particularly in that climate, and for a winter campaign. I hastened back to Kentucky, borrowed money from the banks on my own responsibility, procured such stores as the country afforded, including some clothes for the militia and volunteers, and purchased and hired wagons and teams for the use of the army, and to transport the stores to the advanced posts. The clothing was voluntarily contributed by the citizens of Kentucky for the troops from that state. On the 14th of November I rejoined you at Franklinton.

Query 2nd. "What was the situation of the army?" &c.

Answer. The army under your command, principally composed of militia and volunteers from Kentucky and Ohio, who had been marched in haste to cover an extensive frontier, left open and unprotected by the surrender of general Hull, was nearly destitute, as above remarked, of all the means, which an invading army should possess. The contractor had failed, and was unable to furnish the troops with provisions, or to make deposits at the advanced posts, in conformity with the requisitions you had made upon him. Other arrangements became necessary; and before provisions could be procured, and means to transport them, in addition to the munitions of war, forage, &c. the month of December had passed. It may not be irrelevant here to remark, that from the nature of the country, it being flat and abounding in swamps; from the frequent and heavy rains that fell in November and December, together with the alternate freezings and thawings which were experienced; it was soon discovered, that wagons, the usual means of transport, would not answer the purpose. Recourse was had to pack-horses, which could be procured in sufficient numbers only in Kentucky: and even this mode of transport was found incompetent to effect the object until some time in January.

Query 3d. "Taking into view the nature of the country," &c.

Answer. I have no hesitation in saying, that previous to the month of January, and indeed before the 10th or 12th of that month, the necessary preparations to justify an advance on the army, were not made. I am altogether confident in this assertion; for I have documents in my possession, which show that the clothing, munitions of war, quarter-master stores, &c. were not generally sent from Pittsburgh, till late in December, and even in January and February. No competent commander, under these circumstances, would have advanced against the enemy, as he must have exposed himself to a failure in the objects of the campaign.

Query 4th. "What is your opinion of the general arrangements?" &c.

* As the letter of General Harrison to colonel Morrison, containing the queries, was not among the documents, they could not be given at length, but the intelligent reader can readily conceive the queries by the tendency of the answers.

Answer. The positions selected for protecting the frontier settlements were universally admitted to be judicious: and as a proof that they were so, it is remarkable, that during the autumn and winter of 1812—13, on a frontier of great extent, there was scarcely an instance of the inhabitants being molested by the enemy. The general arrangements for concentrating the troops at the Rapids of the Miami, as soon as stores and provisions could be procured to justify an advance, were such in my opinion as evinced a correct knowledge of the country and character of the enemy, and great military talents on your part.

Query 5th. "Was there any thing omitted?" &c.

Answer. Your exertions as commanding general, to give life and energy to every department of the army, were uniform and incessant. In my department, I received from you, at all times, and on all occasions, the most prompt, efficient, and cordial support.

Query 6th. "What was the state of our preparations?" &c.

Answer. The plans and arrangements indispensable to an advance on the enemy, were so far consummated, at the period of general Winchester's defeat, as to authorize a general movement. I have a perfect recollection of your calling on me as quarter-master, a short time previous to that disaster, to know whether I possessed the means, and would promise to supply the army with provisions on their march upon the enemy. On receiving an affirmative answer, you hastened to the head of the centre line, and marched for the rapids, where I understood you expected to meet general Winchester, and where a deposite of provisions, &c. was commenced when the defeat took place.

Query 7th. "Did you consider yourself in my confidence?" &c.

Answer. I had every reason to believe I possessed your confidence; and I never heard from you, nor did I ever believe, or have any reason to suppose, that general Winchester with the left wing, or any other portion of the army, would advance beyond the Rapids, before your arrival, and the concentration of the whole army at that place.

Query 8th. "Was the period when the advance," &c.

Answer. From my situation at Franklinton, on the right wing or line of the army, I am not able to respond very fully to this inquiry. General Winchester, in a letter to me, complained of his want of transport, and the difficulties experienced in supplying the troops at fort Defiance with provisions. As general Bodley was the acting quarter-master in that line, I referred general Winchester to him; and at the same time took the liberty of suggesting the expediency of marching back to St. Mary's a portion of his army, until an ample supply of provisions could be deposited at the advanced posts, which he then occupied. The general, as appears from his answer to me, deemed a retrograde movement of any portion of his troops, improper and un military. The quarter-master, general Bodley, who had the charge of that line, can give you more correct information on this subject, than it is in my power to communicate.

If it were necessary to be more particular, in answering your queries, I could give you a detail of facts and circumstances within my knowledge, which would amply support the statements and opinions I have given, and impart to them a degree of cogency, which no general statements and expressions of opinion alone can possess. But I presume, that what I have said will be sufficient for your purpose; to be more minute, would swell this communication to an inconvenient size, and consume more time in examination of documents, and recollection of occurrences, than my affairs at present will allow me conveniently to employ in this way.

I hereby certify, that amongst the papers of the late colonel James Morrison of Lexington, Kentucky, decd. was the foregoing statement and answers, occupying five pages and part of a sixth, (fools cap paper) and was contained in an envelope, labelled in the hand writing of said Morrison, as follows—"October, 1818 J. Morrison's statements and answers to queries by General Harrison."

ROBERT SCOTT.*

Lexington, Kentucky, Feb. 23, 1824.

* Mr. Scott is the nephew of colonel Morrison, and has the settlement of his business.

We consider it scarcely necessary to say any thing of the character and standing of the distinguished citizen who has in the preceding document so completely vindicated General Harrison from all blame in relation to the delay which general Winchester has imputed to him in prosecuting the campaign of 1812-3. Colonel Morrison is well known throughout the continent no less for his services in the revolutionary and last war, as for all the qualities which constitute the gentleman, the patriot, and the Christian. After the capture of Hull, at the urgent request of the President he abandoned his widely extended private business to accept of the appointment of quarter-master general to the north-western army. On him then devolved the important task of transporting the supplies of the army; he was therefore better qualified from his situation as well as his talents to form a correct judgment of the conduct and character of the commanding General than any other person, and it will be observed that on both he has bestowed the most unqualified approbation. With regard to the deficiency of provisions in general Winchester's wing of the army, it will be seen in the statement made by general Bodley, who was then quarter-master of that wing, that he expressly attributes the failure to Winchester himself, and he states the facts upon which this assertion is founded. General Bodley further states, that when General Harrison left Winchester in the command of the left wing, he committed to him the responsibility of getting forward his own supplies, that he had a distinct staff organized for that purpose, and if we are not to consider the last observation of Harrison to Winchester on this subject as a jest, he was vested with more ample powers, for Bodley states, that Winchester was told "to hang his quarter-masters and commissaries if there was any deficiency in their departments." The distance which the personal command of Harrison was from that of Winchester made it absolutely necessary that the latter should have the control of his own staff. But there is no difficulty in discovering the wide difference in the management of the two commands: General Harrison, after the example of Wayne, kept the body of his troops back, whilst he pushed forward his supplies in front until he was ready to make his principal movement, and an abundant supply was the consequence. Winchester, on the contrary, in opposition to the advice of General Harrison and colonel Morrison, retained the bulk of his command at the head of his line, where the utmost exertions could scarcely keep them from starving: No provisions could therefore be accumulated.

We have now only to notice the disaster of the river Raisin, so far as any agency which General Harrison may be supposed to have had in producing it. We shall be very concise upon this head, because although the professed object of Winchester's publications was to correct the misrepresentations of M^r. Affee's History of the War in the Western country, the fidelity of the re-

lation given in that work as to every material fact, remains unshaken, and indeed for the most part unassailed. If we cannot give general Winchester credit for great military talents we will acknowledge our admiration of the singular art and address with which he has managed what he calls his defence. The public were desirous of being informed of the cause of the disaster of the river Raisin, but with wonderful ingenuity this subject is kept in a great measure out of sight. When we look for some testimony, some order or letter from General Harrison authorizing the movement to the river Raisin, or promising to support it, the "*precious document*" of Eastland is again, and again and again introduced to our notice. But we cannot describe the course pursued by general Winchester and that which he ought to have pursued better than by giving it in the words of General Harrison in his reply to Winchester:

"General Winchester stood indeed before his country and the world under circumstances of a very awful character. A large wing of an army committed to his command had been destroyed; the hopes of a campaign blasted; hundreds of brave men had perished, not indeed ingloriously, but without any corresponding benefit to the cause for which they suffered. The widow, the orphan, and the bereaved mother, could not comfort themselves with the reflection, that the husband, the father, and the son, had fallen in the arms of victory, and that *their* immediate loss had contributed to the safety and prosperity of their country. It was a contest in which the talents of the subordinate officers could effect nothing, and where valour was only useful to shew how American soldiers could die. If general Winchester could clear himself of any blame in this affair, justice to his own character, to those who appointed him, and a regard to truth itself, required that he should do it. His countrymen were prepared to listen to him with indulgence; to pardon the errors of his head; to give him credit for his good intentions, and as far as possible to throw the mantle of oblivion over the agency which he might have had in producing the great national calamity at the river Raisin. Such would have been the result of a candid and ingenuous exposure of the events which led to his defeat. And if, in the prosecution of a just and necessary inquiry, the character of another had suffered, upon the great principle of self-defence, he would have been acquitted in the eyes of heaven and earth. This was the course which the public had a right to expect, from his age and station in society, and which seemed to be promised by his introductory address.

"In that number of his publications his professed object is to correct the misrepresentations with regard to his conduct, contained in a history of the late war, then recently published in Kentucky. But, in the prosecution of his labor, he appears to have forgotten his original design, or to have supposed that his purpose would be best answered by pointing out another victim to be sacrificed upon the altar of public opinion. Much the greater part of his address consists of an attack, of unexampled malignity, upon his commander, which, if true, has no possible relation to the disaster of Raisin. I repeat, that no other unfavourable impression existed in the public mind against general Winchester's conduct in the north-western army, than from the agency he was supposed to have in producing that defeat. The facts, known to every body, were, that a detachment of the army under his immediate command, had been pushed forward beyond the reach of support, and that it had been destroyed. The circumstance to be inquired into was, upon whom the blame of this movement was to rest. Was it made in pursuance of an order from the commanding general? or by general Winchester himself, upon his own responsibility, and in opposition to the views of the commander? Having been made in either way, did the commanding general use the proper exertions to withdraw or reinforce the detachment? And lastly, what was the conduct of

general Winchester himself, in relation to the action? Were his measures marked by prudence and ability? Was his order of battle a good one, and his position such as an able officer would have chosen? And, was the battle lost by an overwhelming force of the enemy, or other causes which he could not counteract? These inquiries being answered favourably to general Winchester, his fame would have been reinstated; his countrymen would have admitted that he deserved success, although he could not command it; and his future life might have been passed in tranquillity, uninterrupted by those bitter reflections which must now oppress him. And if, in some moment of disease or ennuï, the bloody ghost of one of his murdered officers (no longer considered as the victims of his contumacy, his negligence, or his incapacity) should sit before his fancy, he might say, with more truth than Macbeth,

“Thou canst not say I did it:

“Never shake thy gory locks at me.”

“But instead of devoting himself to these inquiries, of his embodied appeal much the greater part is a personal attack upon me; whilst the statement in the history, which was the professed object in calling him out, remains unshaken; and, as far as relates to any material point, uncontradicted.

A total absence of all proof upon the part of Winchester that the movement upon the river Raisin was authorized by General Harrison ought to exculpate the latter from all blame for that disaster. It is not a little remarkable that Winchester should no where communicate to the public what the orders were which he received from General Harrison in relation to the occupancy of the rapids. The reason is obvious: if he had, the whole of the plan to throw the blame upon Harrison would have been defeated: we shall supply his defect. The intentions of the commanding General in relation to the advance of the left wing to the rapids were communicated to Winchester through colonel Charles S. Todd, at that time division judge advocate to the Kentucky troops, and since our *chargé des Affaires* to the republic of Colombia, who left the head quarters at Upper Sandusky about the 20th of December for that purpose. The order was to the following effect:

“As soon as he had accumulated provisions for twenty days, he was authorized to advance to the Rapids, where he was to commence the building of huts, to induce the enemy to believe that he was going into winter quarters—that he was to construct sleds for the main expedition against Malden, but to impress it on the minds of his men that they were for transporting provisions from the interior—that the different lines of the army would be concentrated at that place, and a choice detachment from the whole would then be marched rapidly on Malden—that in the mean time he was to occupy the Rapids, for the purpose of securing the provisions and stores forwarded from the other wings of the army.”

This was the last order received by general Winchester upon the subject of the intended operations beyond the rapids; but why should we resort to any other when we have the testimony of Winchester himself that the movement to the river Raisin originated with him. We have now before us the the original letter of general Perkins mentioned in page 348, inclosing one from general Winchester of the 15th January, five days after his arrival at the rapids, of which the following is an extract: “I ar-

rived here on the 10th instant, and since my arrival received a communication from the river Raisin, which strongly points to the propriety of this army advancing to that place with as little delay as possible; to enable me to go on, and leave this place sufficiently strong, a co-operating force of a battalion of infantry will be necessary, and if you have it a troop of horse." In one of Winchester's numbers he has asserted that whilst at the rapids "he had cast many an anxious look across the river, in the hope of seeing the promised reinforcements." It is difficult to understand what was the general's intention in making this remark: if he meant to convey the idea that the commanding General had promised to reinforce him upon his arrival at the rapids, for any movement upon the enemy, we can pronounce with certainty, from having all the correspondence before us, that no such promise was ever made. The plan from first to last was that the several corps of the army should unite at the rapids, but agreeably to the plan which he had pursued from the commencement, General Harrison intended to have had at that place only a sufficient force to secure it from any attempt of the enemy, until every thing was prepared for a general movement upon Malden. There were two strong reasons for this course: first, the smaller the force the less would be the consumption of provisions, and the greater the accumulation for the main operations in advance. Secondly, a great show of force at the head of the line would expose to the enemy his intention of attacking them, and put them on their guard. At the distance of fifty miles from the enemy, with a brigade at Lower Sandusky, (within thirty miles) a large body at Upper Sandusky, which would be immediately moved nearer to the rapids, the General had no fears of an attack on that place. In the very last letter which Winchester could have received from him, before the period when he was "looking for the reinforcements," General Harrison says, "But, my dear sir, I fear that you take with you too large a force; there is no danger of an attack either on your way or at the rapids." It is unnecessary, we think, to add any thing to the documents and statements which we have given above and in the foregoing narrative of the campaign, to show that the advance of the troops to the river Raisin was unauthorized by General Harrison, that general Winchester is alone responsible for it, and that but for that unfortunate measure the campaign would have terminated advantageously for the country and gloriously for those who were concerned in it. Colonel Morrison says expressly that the state of preparation had at that time, and not before, reached the point which would have authorized the general advance, and had it not been for the precipitancy of general Winchester, there can be no doubt that a force well supplied and adequate to the object would have been ready to march from the rapids by the last of January. We do not, however, blame general Winchester so much for his advance

to the river Raisin as for his conduct after he had arrived there, and his neglecting to inform the commanding General by express of his arrival at the rapids and of his intended advance. Had he done this when he first reached the latter place, and the measure been approved by the General, there would have been time enough to have reinforced him with the whole of Perkins' brigade from Lower Sandusky, and even with some of the light corps from Upper Sandusky. But he chose to send the letter from the rapids announcing his arrival not only by the old worn out pack horses of the army, unable as they were to travel more than 12 or 15 miles per day, but to send it to general Tupper's camp to be forwarded thence. The defence which Winchester has set up in answer to this charge as made in M'Affee's History, is not less singular than the act itself. He says that it was done because "he did not know whether General Harrison was at Lower or Upper Sandusky, or at Franklinton:" that is, he sent it 80 miles upon a road where he knew the General was not, to forward thence, rather than on the route where he knew the General was, and where, according to his own account, he might be found at the distance of thirty miles, to Lower Sandusky, or sixty-seven miles at Upper Sandusky: but why did he not send the despatch by express? He had with him 100 men, who would have taken it to Sandusky in two days, and by taking horse at Lower Sandusky in a day and a night: had this been done all the mischief would have been prevented. As it was, the General never received the despatch until after the disaster had happened. Enough has been said in the narrative extracted from the History of the War to show the impropriety, if not impracticability, of withdrawing the troops from the river Raisin after General Harrison arrived at the rapids. To show how generally the opinion prevailed amongst the officers at the river Raisin, of the injury which the citizens would sustain if they were abandoned by the troops, we insert the following letter from captain Hart, the inspector general of the army:

My dear Sir: Colonel Wells will give you the news we have received. The importance of holding this post I know you have fully weighed. In the event of its loss, the people having taken an active part against the British, will be subjected to utter ruin—perhaps scalped.

The officers here are truly desirous of seeing you here, if it were even for a day. Many things ought to be done, which you only know how to do properly. Such, however, is the opinion they entertain of you.

With great respect, yours,

NATHANIEL G. S. HART.

I know the hand-writing of captain Nathaniel G. S. Hart perfectly. The above is the copy of a letter entirely in his own hand-writing.

T. T. CRITTENDEN.

Cincinnati, August 16, 1824.

Having determined not to withdraw the troops, it will be seen by our narrative, that every exertion that could possibly be

made was made to reinforce them. Upon this subject the gallant and distinguished colonel Wood pays General Harrison the following high compliment: "What could a Turenne or an Eugene have done under such a pressure of embarrassing circumstances, more than Harrison did." Having made these exertions, knowing that a reinforcement superior to what Winchester himself had deemed sufficient, was far advanced on its way, and its arrival in time confidently expected, the weather being fine, and the supplies pouring in, the General wrote to the secretary of war that the condition of the army was prosperous and the prospects flattering. These prospects and expectations were blasted; and by whom? by the commanding general? No. But by general Winchester himself. For it is as certain, that if he was to blame in having gone to the river Raisin, he was still more blameable for having, when there, neglected all the duties of a general. The troops which he brought with him were suffered to encamp in a most unfavourable position. He took up his quarters at a house three fourths of a mile in the rear of his troops. He was informed the night before the action that the enemy were preparing to attack him, and yet not a single step was taken by him to prepare for their reception. In answer to a sarcastic remark of general Winchester upon the appellation of *Hero of Tippecanoe*, which had been bestowed on General Harrison by a resolution of the Kentucky legislature, the following just retort is made by General Harrison in his answer in the National Intelligencer.

"I can inform general Winchester how he might have heard of the *Hero of Frenchtown*, without bringing a blush on his cheek, or a mournful reflection in his bosom. If, instead of going to sleep at colonel Navarre's three fourths of a mile from his encampment, he had tented or bivouacked with his gallant troops; if he had placed the right wing of his command in a position which would have given them even a tolerable chance for victory, *they* would have borne him triumphantly through the conflict. The valour of American soldiery would have covered his previous blunders. (as it has probably my own,) and a grateful people, proud of the glory of their troops, would have given him his full share of the reward. But alas! we never hear of the Hero of Raisin, but when it is used to point a sarcasm, or in a mournful elegy, the requiem of the departed warriors."

To conclude this most painful part of our task, we must repeat, that the attack made by general Winchester on General Harrison was entirely unnecessary and unwarranted by any part of Harrison's conduct to him, and that to give his charges even the colouring of truth, he has resorted to most unjustifiable means. The three persons to whom he applied to support his charges he knew were the bitter enemies of the General, and he has suffered one of them to impose upon the public by relating events as if he were present when they happened, when he knew that was not the fact.

The following extract from colonel Morrison's letter to General Harrison enclosing the statement which we have given above is

inserted as an appropriate answer to that part of Winchester's publication where he speaks of his expectations that General Harrison would not answer him, but affect to treat his strictures with contempt:

Lexington, October 19th, 1818.

"I conclude this hasty letter by expressing my regret, that you ever gave a pledge to answer general Winchester's attack. If your military character could be effected by the barkings of a few enemies (who wish to lessen their burthens by throwing a portion of the load of degradation which their want of military acquirements has brought on them, or more particularly on him, general Winchester,) then indeed have you served an ungrateful country. But the proud satisfaction you possess of having received the plaudits of your country, and the thanks of congress, ought, in my opinion, to have placed you on an elevation in your own estimation, beyond the attacks or shafts of calumny. I am, dear Sir, sincerely, your friend,

JAMES MORRISON."

"The above is truly extracted from a letter signed by the late colonel James Morrison, and directed to General Harrison. L. WHITEMAN."

CHAPTER XXIX.

HAVING left the army, as we have stated above, General Harrison became a citizen of Ohio. In the summer of 1814, the government seeing that the Indians would not remain neutral, and that unless they were suffered to fight on the side of the United States, they would inevitably take part with their enemies, determined to offer them the alternative of becoming their allies or of joining the enemy. Commissioners were accordingly appointed for the purpose—these were, General Harrison, general Cass, and governor Shelby, but the latter not accepting the appointment in consequence of its being considered incompatible with his situation as governor of Kentucky, general Adair was appointed in his stead, but that gentleman not arriving in time, the treaty was concluded at Greenville, the old head quarters of general Wayne, by Generals Harrison and Cass.

In the succeeding year, 1815, after the peace with Great Britain, it became necessary, conformably to the treaty of Ghent, to offer to the several tribes who had taken part with the enemy a restoration of the possessions which they had held previously to the war. General Harrison was put at the head of this commission also, and general M'Arthur and the honourable John Graham associated with him. By them a treaty was made at Detroit in August of that year.

In the fall of 1816, the Hon. John M'Lean having resigned his seat as member of the house of representatives of the United States, General Harrison was elected to serve for the unexpired time of Mr. M'Lean, and also for the succeeding two years. At this election, although opposed by five respectable citizens, the number of votes given to him exceeded by more than a thousand those given for all his competitors added together.

Some complaints having been made by one of the contractors to the army of the incorrectness of his conduct towards him, and insinuations of partiality towards another staff officer, General Harrison determined to seek an investigation by the house of representatives. Many of his friends in congress remonstrated against this step as unnecessary. He persisted, however, in procuring a resolution to be passed, referring the subject to a committee. Seven highly respectable members were appointed, and after a strict examination of a number of witnesses, colonel R. M. Johnson as chairman made the following report:

“ House of Representatives, January 23, 1817.

“ The select committee of the house of representatives, to whom was referred the letter and documents from the acting secretary of war on the subject of General Harrison's letter, ask leave to report—That they have investigated the facts involved in this inquiry, by the examination of documents and a great number of most respectable witnesses, personally acquainted with the transactions from which the inquiry originated. And the committee are unanimously of opinion, that General Harrison stands above suspicion, as to his having had any pecuniary or improper connection with the officers of the commissariat for the supply of the army; that he did not wantonly or improperly interfere with the rights of contractors, and that he was, in his measures, governed by a proper zeal and devotion to the public interest.

“ The committee beg leave to be discharged from the further consideration of the subject; and, as the papers refer in part to the conduct and transactions of the contractors of the north-western army, where accounts are unsettled, and only incidentally involved in this inquiry, that the papers be transmitted to the department of war.

“ After the report was read, Mr. Hulbert said, that, having the honor to be one of the committee who made the report which was then before the House, he felt it his duty to make a few remarks upon it.

“ The committee, he said, considered the subject an important one. It was interesting to the public, and highly and especially so to General Harrison. The character of that gentleman had been impeached. They, therefore, determined to make the investigation as full and thorough as should be in their power. With such views and sentiments they entered upon the inquiry. They had notified a gentleman who had made charges in writing against the General, and requested his attendance upon the committee, and he had more than once attended. They had read and considered all the documents and papers which they could obtain, and which they thought calculated to throw light on the inquiry, and had examined many respectable witnesses, and the investigation had resulted in a firm belief, and an unanimous opinion of the committee, that the insinuations and complaints which had been made against General Harrison, and which were the foundation of his application to Congress, were unmerited, groundless, and unjust.

“ Mr. Hulbert said it gave him pleasure to make these declarations. He considered himself doing an act of justice to an injured individual. He said he must acknowledge, that he had entertained impressions very unfavorable to the General. The complaints, which had been made against him, had spread far and wide. The bane and antidote had not gone together. He rejoiced that this inquiry had been made, and he had no hesitation in saying, that, so far as the report of the committee should defend, before the public, the conduct and character of General Harrison, it would promote the cause of truth and justice.

“ Mr. Hulbert said that the General had been charged with unjust and oppressive conduct in relation to the contractors in the army under his command. He said he was entirely satisfied that the General had interfered only in those cases, where he thought his duty to the public imperiously required it. In saying this, he meant to cast no imputation upon the contractors; he spoke only of what he believed to be the motives of General Harrison.

"The most serious accusation against the General was, that while he was commander in chief in the west, regardless of his country's good, he was in the habit of managing the public concerns with a view to his own private interest and emolument. Mr. Hulbert said he could not refrain from pronouncing this a false and cruel accusation. He was confident that directly the reverse was true. There was the most satisfactory evidence, that the General, in the exercise of his official duties, in his devotion to the public interest, had neglected his private concerns to his material detriment and injury. In a word, said Mr. Hulbert, I feel myself authorized to say, that every member of the committee is fully satisfied, that the conduct of General Harrison in relation to the subject matter of this inquiry, has been that of a brave, honest, and honorable man; that, instead of deserving censure, he merits the thanks and applause of his country."

The calumnies so entirely refuted by this investigation, and that which we have mentioned above in relation to his unwillingness to pursue the British army had produced a serious injury to General Harrison. They had caused the rejection of a resolution introduced into the senate of the United States for giving him the gold medal and the thanks of Congress. The statements made by the venerable Shelby and other distinguished officers having completely silenced the last of these calumnies, in the succeeding session, the resolution which had been laid over in the senate was again called up, unanimously passed by that body, and received the sanction of the house of representatives, with a single dissenting voice.

Amongst the political objects which had induced General Harrison to wish for a seat in congress, there were two on which he felt a more than usual degree of interest. These were the adoption of an efficient militia system and the relief of those (or the representatives of those) who had suffered in the two wars waged for the liberty and independence of their country. This subject had been recommended by every successive president to almost every successive congress, but from the great difficulty of fixing on a proper system, or some other cause, nothing efficient had been done, and the militia remained in the same, or if possible a worse situation than when the government went into operation. As it was known to be a subject to which General Harrison had turned much of his attention, he was put at the head of the committee to whom it was referred. A bill was accordingly reported providing for a new classification and organization of the militia, together with a report explanatory of the principles of the bill and recommending an ultra plan for the creation of an efficient militia. This being what was called the short session of congress, terminating on the 3d of March, and there being much important business before the house which was necessary to be acted upon, the militia subject was again postponed to the next session. At that session, General Harrison again as chairman of the militia committee, presented a bill and report, the latter discussing at large those points, 1st, that a government constituted like ours should rely upon its militia for its defence rather than upon a standing army. 2d, that the militia should be disciplined, and thirdly, that a state of discipline adequate to

the object can only be obtained by the adoption of a system of military instruction combined with the ordinary education of the youth. We lament that we cannot find room for the whole report, but must content ourselves with the two following extracts:

"In searching for landmarks, to guide us to our object, it will be in vain that we direct our attention to the modern nations of Europe: from them we can borrow nothing to aid our purpose: governments formed upon artificial distinctions in society, which estimate their security by the inability of their subjects to resist oppression, can furnish a free people with no guides in organizing a system of defence which shall be purely national. We are, however, not without resources.

"The ancient republics, from which we have drawn many of the choicest maxims upon which to found our civil institutions, will furnish also a most perfect model for our system of national defence. The whole secret of their military glory, the foundation of that wonderful combination of military skill and exalted valour which enabled the petty republic of Athens to resist the mighty torrent of Persian invasion; which formed the walls of Sparta, and conducted the Roman legions (influenced indeed by unhallowed motives) to the conquest of the world, will be found in the military education of their youth. The victories of Marathon and Plataea, of Cynocephale and Pydna, were the practical results of the exercises of the campus martius and gymnasia. It is on a foundation of this kind only that an energetic national militia can be established."

"The organization of a system, thus extensive in its operations, must necessarily be a work of some time and difficulty. The want of statistical information will prevent the committee from submitting to the house, at this time, more than the outline of this plan. It is embraced in the following propositions:

1. "As important advantages of the military part of the education of the youth, will accrue to the community, and not to the individuals who acquire it, it is proper that the whole expense of the establishment should be borne by the public treasury.

"That to comport with the equality, which is the basis of our constitution, the organization of the establishment should be such as to extend, without exception, to every individual of the proper age.

"That to secure this, the contemplated military instruction should not be given in distinct schools, established for that purpose, but that it should form a branch of education in every school within the United States.

"That a corps of the military instructors should be formed to teach gymnastic and elementary parts of education in every school in the United States, whilst the more scientific part of the art of war shall be communicated by professors of tactics to be established in all the higher seminaries.

"The committee are fully aware that the establishment of an institution, which from its nature is calculated to produce an important change in the manners and habits of the nation, will be received with caution and distrust by a people jealous of their liberties, and who boast of a government which executes its powers with the least possible sacrifice of individual rights. An encroachment upon individual rights forms no part of their system. It is not a conscription which withdraws, from an anxious parent, a son for whose morals he fears more than for his life. It is not a Persian or Turkish mandate to educate the youth within the purlieu of a corrupt court, but a system as purely republican in practice as in principle.

"The means are furnished by the government, and the American youth are called upon to qualify themselves under the immediate inspection of their parents, or of tutors chosen by their parents for the sacred task of defending the liberties of their country."

The aversion of congress even to discuss a militia bill or system has been manifest at every session from the presidency of Washington to the present moment. The bill reported by General Harrison, as well as the project for the military education of the youth, was approved by many of the leading members of congress, but

yet there seemed to be a general indisposition to take them up. Towards the close of the session only was General Harrison by the greatest perseverance enabled to bring his bill to a discussion before a committee of the whole. There is no report of his speech on that occasion, but Mr. Williams of North Carolina, some time after, speaking upon another subject said that "the gentleman from Ohio had depicted the dangers of a standing army to a government like ours in a strain of eloquence which had been rarely witnessed in that house." All the exertions, however, of General Harrison availed nothing. This great national question was made to give way to an investigation relative to the conduct of the bank of the United States, the debate upon which occupying thirteen days, the militia subject was again postponed to the succeeding session. At that session it was again taken up, and again made to give way to other business, which was considered more immediately interesting, and although committees have been raised for the purpose at every succeeding session, no law has ever been passed on the subject. It is probable that if General Harrison had remained in congress he would have been enabled to have procured the adoption of his system, as it had received the approbation of many of the most distinguished members, but as it was *his* plan no one has since undertaken to urge its passage, upon the ground, probably, that if even successful, the greatest share of the honour would be given to its original author.

General Harrison was more successful in the other objects which he had so much at heart. He had the satisfaction to see his efforts joined to those of the veteran governor Bloomfield, (who being the chairman of the committee on pensions, reported the bill) and several other members, prevail in at length rescuing the aged heroes of the revolution from the poverty and misery under which they had so long suffered. The pensions for many of those who had been grievously wounded in the last war were also by his exertions increased, and the bill for extending the pensions to the widows and orphans of those who had fallen in the late war, and which he introduced into the house of representatives under very unfavorable circumstances, was passed through that body after a very vigorous contest. The speech he delivered on that occasion has been published in most of the newspapers, and is now before us: we regret much that our limits will not permit its insertion here, but we cannot in justice pass it by without observing that it is a speech replete with the sound policy of a patriot, and the humanity of a philanthropist, and that it is equally honorable to the head and the heart of him who delivered it.

On the question for acknowledging the independence of the South American Republics, at this period, General Harrison warmly supported that measure.

In the fall of 1819 General Harrison was elected to the senate of the state of Ohio for two years, and took his seat accord-

ingly, and though for that time there was little but the routine of legislative business to occupy the attention of the members, he continued to pursue and act upon those truly republican principles which have distinguished him from early life.*

We cannot in justice to General Harrison close this narrative without giving a few out of the many documents in our possession to show the estimation in which he was held by many of the most distinguished individuals in our country: and first the following extract from a letter of the gallant and lamented Perry in December, 1813, will show at once the warmth of his friendship for Harrison, and his high opinion of his talents as a commander:

"You know what has been my opinion as to the future commander in chief of the army. I do not pride myself a little, I assure you, on seeing my predictions so near being verified; yes, my dear friend, I expect soon to hail you as the chief who is to redeem the honor of our arms in the north."

The sentiments expressed in the letter from which the above is quoted reminds us of a circumstance mentioned by the Hon. J. S. Smith, and John Chambers, Esq. in their depositions relative to the campaign of 1813, in which it will be recollected that these gentlemen served together with Perry as volunteer aids-de-camp to General Harrison. We mention this only as another evidence of the friendship of Perry for Harrison, and the great interest he took for his safety. These gentlemen state that Perry expressed to them, and afterwards to Harrison himself, his disapprobation of the commanding general exposing his person so much as he did at the attack made by the Indians on the advance of the army at Chatham, and afterwards in the action on the Thames. General Harrison defended his conduct by observing that "with undisciplined troops, and particularly with volunteers, it was necessary the General should set the example."²

In the debate in the house of representatives in February, 1814, on the loan bill, Mr. Cheves of South Carolina thus expresses himself, "The victory of Harrison was such as would have secured to a Roman general, in the best days of the republic, the honours of a triumph. He put an end to the war in the uppermost Canada."[†]

The influence which General Harrison possessed over the minds of the militia and volunteers who served under him, and the zeal with which they performed their duty under the severest deprivations, whilst the same men were ready to mutiny under other commanders, has often been spoken of. Upon being asked how he managed to procure that control over them, he answered, "By treating them with affection and kindness, by always recollecting that they were my fellow citizens whose feelings I was bound to respect, and on every occasion to share the hardships which they were obliged to undergo. By these means, whenever it became necessary to act with rigour to-

* During this period of his service in the Senate, General Harrison was elected by the people one of the electors of President and Vice President, and gave his vote for James Monroe and Daniel D. Tompkins.

† See Supplement to Fifth Volume Niles' Register, page 116.

wards them, they were convinced that it proceeded from a sense of duty, and not from an arbitrary disposition, or to show my authority over them."

The following is an extract of a letter from general M'Arthur of this state, to General Harrison, dated Albany, February 22, 1814: "You, Sir, stand the highest with the militia of this state of any general in service, and I am confident that no man can fight them to so great an advantage, and I think their extreme solicitude may be the means of calling you to this frontier."

The following remarks and anecdotes are taken from the Port Folio of 1815, and are given upon the authority of an officer who had served with General Harrison:

"It was General Harrison's constant practice to address his troops, personally, believing it to be more effectual than the common mode of general orders. He never omitted an opportunity of setting his troops the example of cheerfully submitting to those numerous and severe privations, incident to the carrying on of military operations, in an almost trackless desert, and in the most inclement seasons.

"During the campaign on the Wabash, the troops were put upon a half a pound of bread per day. This quantity only was allowed to officers of every rank, and rigidly conformed to in the General's own family. The allowance for dinner was uniformly divided between the company, and not an atom more was permitted. In the severe winter campaign of 1812—13, he slept under a thinner tent than any other person, whether officer or soldier: and it was the general observation of the officers, that his accommodations might generally be known by their being the worst in the army. Upon the expedition up the Thames all his baggage was contained in a valise, while his bedding consisted of a single blanket, fastened over his saddle, and even this he gave to colonel Evans, a British officer, who was wounded. His subsistence was exactly that of a common soldier.

"On the night, after the action upon the Thames, thirty-five British officers supped with him upon fresh beef roasted before the fire, without either sak or bread, and without ardent spirits of any kind. Whether upon the march, or in the camp, the whole army was regularly under arms at day break. Upon no occasion did he fail to be out himself, however severe the weather, and was generally the first officer on horseback of the whole army. Indeed, he made it a point on every occasion, to set an example of fortitude and patience to his men, and share with them every hardship, difficulty, and danger."

Thus have we brought to a conclusion our Historical Narrative, which we presume to hope will be received by a generous and impartial public as a redemption of that pledge which we offered in the outset—to give a faithful and authentic detail of important historical facts, which might otherwise have been lost to the world; and also to place the character and conduct of a distinguished and virtuous citizen in their proper light.

We cannot, however, lay down the pen without expressing our gratitude to those gentlemen who have so kindly lent their aid in furnishing many of the most important of the documents on which the work is founded. That no defects may be discovered in our work, we have not the vanity to suppose; but this we do confidently assert, that we have not wilfully deviated from the course prescribed to us by truth and candour, as it was from the commencement our firm determination to

"Nothing extenuate, nor ought set down in malice."

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NOTE I. Page 81.

THIS pre-eminence had frequently been arrogated to themselves by the Shawanoese, but had never been admitted by the other tribes of Indians. At the convention of chiefs in 1803, at fort Wayne, an old chief of this tribe stood up and harangued the meeting at great length on this subject. He said that "the Master of life," (by which title the Indians designate the Supreme Being) "who was himself an Indian, made the Shawanoese before any other of the human race, and that they sprang from his brain; that he gave them all the knowledge which he himself possessed; that he placed them upon the great island, and that all the other red people were descended from the Shawanoese:—that after he had made the Shawanoese he made the French and English out of his breast, and the Dutch out of his feet; and for your long-knives kind," said he, addressing himself to the governor, "he made them out of his hands. All these inferior races of men he made white, and placed them beyond the stinking lake," meaning the Atlantic Ocean.

"The Shawanoese for many ages continued to be masters of the continent, using the knowledge which they had received from the Great Spirit, in such a manner as to be pleasing to him, and to secure their own happiness. In a great length of time, however, they became corrupt, and the Master of life told them that he would take away from them the knowledge which they possessed, and give it to the white people, to be restored when by a return to good principles they would deserve it. Many years after that, they saw something white approaching their shores; at first they took it for a great bird, but they soon found it to be a monstrous canoe, filled with the very people who had got the knowledge which belonged to the Shawanoese. After these white people landed, they were not content with having the knowledge which belonged to the Shawanoese, but they usurped their lands also: they pretended indeed to have purchased these lands; but the very goods which they gave for them was more the property of the Indians than the white people: because the knowledge which enabled them to manufacture these goods actually belonged to the Shawanoese: but those things will soon have an end—the Master of life is about to restore to the Shawanoese both their knowledge and their rights, and he will trample the long knives under his feet."

This man, it appears, belonged to a party of the Shawanoese that were devoted to the British, and in all probability had been sent to fort Wayne in order to prevent the treaty being concluded.

NOTE II. Page 82.

Buckongehelas was a Delaware Indian, who rose to be head of his tribe from being a private warrior. Till after the victory of general Wayne, on the 20th August, 1794, this man had been the devoted partizan of the British, and a mortal foe to the United States. He was indeed the most distinguished warrior in the Indian confederacy, and as it was the British interest which had in-

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placed the Indians to commence, as well as to continue the war, Buckongehelas relied upon their support and protection. This support had been given, so far as relates to provisions, arms, and ammunition; and in the action above alluded to, there were two companies of British militia from Detroit on the side of the Indians; but the gates of fort Mimms being shut against the retreating and wounded Indians, after the battle, opened the eyes of Buckongehelas, and he determined upon an immediate peace with the United States and never to trust the British more. He assembled his tribe and embarked them in canoes, with the design of proceeding up the river, and of sending a flag of truce to fort Wayne. Upon approaching the British fort, he was requested to land, and he did so: "What have you to say to me?" said he, addressing the officer of the day; it was replied, that the commanding officer wished to speak with him: "Then he may come here," was the reply: "He will not do that," said the officer, "and you will not be suffered to pass the fort if you do not comply," "What shall prevent me?" said the intrepid chief: "These," said the officer, pointing to the cannon of the fort: "I fear not your cannon," replied the chief, "after suffering the Americans to defile your spring, without daring to fire on them, you cannot expect to frighten Buckongehelas," and he ordered the canoes to push off, and passed the fort.

He never after would, like the other chiefs, visit the British, or receive presents from them. He died shortly after the treaty of 1804, and on his death bed, he earnestly recommended to his tribe, to rely upon the friendship of the United States, and never to listen to the advice of the British, who had been the cause of all their misfortunes. This man possessed all the qualifications of a hero; no christian knight was ever more scrupulous in performing all his engagements than the renowned Buckongehelas.

At a treaty held at fort McIntosh, on the Ohio, in the year 1785, Buckongehelas, then the chief warrior, was present. After the Sachems or peace chiefs, had addressed the commissioners of the United States, who were George Rogers Clark, Arthur Lee, and Richard Butler, whom he did not deign to notice, approaching general Clark and taking him by the hand, he thus addressed him; "I thank the Great Spirit for having this day brought together two such great warriors as Buckongehelas and general Clark."

NOTE III. Page 85.

Meshecunnaqua, or the Little Turtle, was the son of a Miami chief, by a Mohecan woman. As the Indian maxim, with regard to descents, is precisely that of the civil law in relation to slaves, that the condition of the woman adheres to the offspring, he was not a chief by birth, but his great natural talents raised him to distinction. He was in the two actions with the detachments of general Harmer's army near the Miami towns, (afterwards fort Wayne) and he and Buckongehelas planned and commanded in the great action, which resulted in the defeat of general St. Clair, in 1791.† He was also in the action at fort Recovery, the same spot where general St. Clair had been defeated, in which a detachment of the American army, under the command of major M'Mahon, was defeated. A furious onset was made upon the fort, but the Indians were repulsed with great loss. It was said to be the plan of the Turtle to attack our army at Greenville, on the fourth of July, when it was supposed they would be feasting. He was also in the decisive action of the 26th of August following: There was no principal commander of the Indians present on that occasion; each tribe fought under its own chief. At the general treaty of Greenville, the following year, the Turtle took a decided part against the giving up of the large tract of country which general Wayne required on the part of the United States. This circumstance, however, was not unfavourable to the at-

* This was spoken metaphorically to express the contempt and insult with which the garrison had been treated by the Americans, for their treachery towards the Indians who had been their allies.

† He commanded a body of Indians, which in the year 1792 made a furious attack on a detachment of Kentucky volunteers, under the command of general, now governor Adair, under the walls of fort St. Clair, and after a severe contest the Indians were repulsed with great loss.

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tainment of the object, as it was evident that there was a violent jealousy of the Turtle, on the part of the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatamies, and that they invariably opposed every thing which he advocated. And as they and their friends constituted the majority of the council, the Turtle was always in the minority. The superiority of his mind, however, was conspicuous not only in the council, but in his measures and deportment in the society of white people. The chiefs were all invited in their turns, to the General's table; on these occasions the others were still savages. Many of them, however, appeared much at their ease, and enjoyed the good things of the General's table with great satisfaction. The drinking, however, was the most pleasing part of the entertainment, so much so, that the White Pigeon, a Potawatamie chief, could not refrain from expressing his gratitude to the Great Spirit for this, as he conceived, the best gift to man. Upon being asked for a toast by general Wayne, he rose and said "I will give you the Great Spirit, and I am much obliged to him for putting so much sense into that man's head who first made rum."

After the peace was concluded, the Turtle settled upon the Eel river, about 20 miles from fort Wayne, where the government erected for him a comfortable house. He frequently visited the seat of government both at Philadelphia and Washington. Observing his taste for civilized life, the Indian agents were desired by the government to furnish him with every reasonable accommodations for his decent subsistence, supposing that the example might prove beneficial in their exertions to civilize the other Indians.

These indulgences, however, entirely destroyed the Turtle's influence with the Indians, who in general viewed him with jealousy and hatred. He was perfectly sensible of this, and made several attempts to regain his popularity, in taking a real or apparent part in opposition to the interests of the United States. His intrigues for this purpose, however, were never carried to any injurious length, and in the sequel he generally gave his aid to the accomplishment of the wishes of the government.

But what distinguished the Turtle from all the other Indians was his ardent desire to be informed of all that relates to our institutions, and he seemed to possess a mind capable to understanding, and valuing the advantages of civilized life, in a degree far superior to any other Indian.

In the frequent visits which he made to the seat of government, he examined every thing he saw with an inquisitive eye, and never failed to embrace every opportunity to acquire information by inquiring of those with whom he could take that liberty.

Upon his return from Philadelphia, in 1797, he staid several days with governor Harrison, at that time a captain in the army, and commander at fort Washington. He told the captain that he had seen many things, which he wished to have explained, but said he was afraid of giving offence by asking too many questions. "My friend here," said he, meaning captain Wells, the interpreter, "being about as ignorant as myself, could give me but little satisfaction." He then desired the captain to inform him how our government was formed, and what particular powers and duties were exercised by the two houses of Congress, by the President, the Secretaries, &c. Being satisfied on this subject, he told the captain he had become acquainted with a great warrior while in Philadelphia, in whose fate he was much interested, and whose history he wished to learn. This was no other than the immortal Kosciusko: he had arrived at Philadelphia a short time before, and hearing that a celebrated Indian chief was in the city, he sent for him. They were mutually pleased with each other, and the Turtle's visits were often repeated. When he went to take his final leave of the wounded patriot, the latter presented the Turtle with an elegant pair of pistols, and an elegant robe made of the sea-otter's skin, worth several hundred dollars.

The Turtle told the captain that he wished very much to know in what wars his friend had received those grievous wounds which had rendered him so crippled and infirm. The captain showed him upon a map of Europe the situation of Poland, and explained to him the usurpations of its territory by the neighbouring powers—the exertions of Kosciusko to free his country from this foreign yoke—his first successes and final defeat and captivity. Whilst the captain was describing the last unsuccessful battle of Kosciusko, the Turtle

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seemed scarcely able to contain himself; at the conclusion he traversed the room with great agitation, and violently flourished the pipe tomahawk, with which he had been smoking, and exclaimed "Let that woman take care of herself," meaning the empress Catharine; "this may yet be a dangerous man."

The captain explained to the Turtle some anecdotes respecting the empress and her favourites, one of whom had been the king of Poland, who had at first been by her elevated to the throne, and afterwards driven from it. He was much astonished to find, that men, and particularly warriors, would submit to be governed by a woman; but when he better understood the character of the lady, he said that perhaps if his friend Kosciusko had been a portly, handsome man, he might have better succeeded with her majesty of all the Russias, and might by means of a love intrigue have obtained that independence for his country, to which his skill and valour in the field had been found unequal.

The Turtle was fond of joking, and was possessed of considerable talent for repartee. In the year 1797 he lodged in a house in Philadelphia, in which was an Irish gentleman of considerable wit, who became much attached to the Turtle, and frequently amused himself by drawing out his wit by good humoured jests. The Turtle and this gentleman were at that time both sitting for their portraits, (the former by order of the President of the United States, the picture to be hung up in the war office,) to the celebrated Stewart. The two meeting one morning in the painter's room, the Turtle appeared to be rather more thoughtful than usual; the Irishman rallied him upon it, and affected to construe it into an acknowledgment of his superiority in the jocular contest. "He mistakes," said the Turtle to the interpreter, "I was just thinking of proposing to this man, to paint us both on one board, and there I would stand face to face with him, and blackguard him to all eternity."

The Turtle died in the spring of 1813, just before the declaration of war against Great Britain. He had been long affected with a disorder which the army surgeon of fort Wayne pronounced to be gout. Had he lived, there can be no doubt but he would have taken a decided part in favour of the United States, but it is probable that he would have been assassinated by the hostile Indians.

NOTE IV. Page 110.

Mr. Jefferson, in one of the interviews with the Osage chiefs, expressed his surprise at the hostility entertained against that nation by the other tribes of Indians, and requested an explanation of the cause, when he was informed by one of them by the following simile:

"You, father," said he, "have a fine house and beautiful gardens and plantations around it, and you live comfortably and happily in your house; there are a great many of your people who have not these good things, and they wish much to have them. So our nation has a fine country, with plenty of game, and every thing delightful for Indians, and those nations who have not so fine a country, want to get our's, and they know they can get it no other way than by fighting for it, and therefore they are continually picking quarrels with us."

Note V. Page 153.

"William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander-in-chief of the territory of Indiana, to the Shawanese chief and the Indians assembled at Tippecanoe:

"Notwithstanding the improper language which you have used towards me, I will endeavour to open your eyes to your true interests. Notwithstanding what bad white men have told you, I am not your personal enemy. You ought to know this from the manner in which I received and treated you on your visit to this place.

"Although I must say that you are an enemy to the seventeen fires, and that you have used the greatest exertions with other tribes to lead them astray. In this you have been in some measure successful, as I am told they are ready to raise the tomahawk against their father; yet their father, notwithstanding his anger at their folly, is full of goodness, and is always ready to receive into his arms those of his children who are willing to repent, acknowledge their fault, and ask for his forgiveness.

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"There is yet but little harm done, which may be easily repaired. The chain of friendship, which united the whites with the Indians, may be renewed, and be as strong as ever. A great deal of that work depends on you—the destiny of those who are under your directions depends upon the choice you may make of the two roads which are before you. The one is large, open, and pleasant, and leads to peace, security, and happiness;—the other, on the contrary, is narrow and crooked, and leads to misery and ruin. Don't deceive yourselves; do not believe that all the nations of Indians united are able to resist the force of the 17 fires. I know your warriors are brave, but ours are not less so; but what can a few brave warriors do against the innumerable warriors of the 17 fires. Our blue coats are more numerous than you can count. Our hunters are like the leaves of the forests, or the grains of sand on the Wabash.

"Do not think that the red coats can protect you; they are not able to protect themselves. They do not think of going to war with us. If they did, you would in a few moons see our flag wave over all the forts of Canada.

"What reason have you to complain of the 17 fires—have they taken any thing from you—have they ever violated the treaties made with the red men? You say that they purchased lands from them who had no right to sell them: Shew that this is true, and the land will be instantly restored. Shew us the rightful owners of those lands which have been purchased—let them present themselves. The ears of your father will be opened to your complaints, and if the lands have been purchased of them who did not own them they will be restored to the rightful owners. I have full power to arrange this business, but if you would rather carry your complaints before your great father the President, you shall be indulged. I will immediately take the means to send you with those chiefs which you may choose, to the city where your father lives. Every thing necessary shall be prepared for your journey, and means taken for your safe return."

NOTE VI. Page 185.

A few years before, the same chief had visited Vincennes, attended by some young men. The Kickapoos were at that time receiving their annuity, and their party consisted of about 150 warriors. The Potawatamies coming to the place where the goods were to be delivered, and addressing the governor, "My father," said he, "it is now twelve moons since these people, the Kickapoos, killed my brother; I have never revenged it, but they have promised to cover up his blood, but they have not done it. I wish you to tell them, my father, to pay me for my brother, or some of them will lose their hair before they go from this."

The governor accordingly advised the chief of the Kickapoos to satisfy the Potawatamy. On the following day the latter again called upon the governor, and said, "See there, my father," showing three blankets and some other articles, "see what these people have offered me for my brother, but my brother was not a hog that I should take three blankets for him," and he declared his intention of killing some of them unless they would satisfy him in the way he proposed. The governor upon enquiry, finding that the goods of the Kickapoos were all distributed, directed, on account of the United States, a small addition to be made to what he had received.

The Kickapoos set out on their return home, and in a day or two after, the Deaf Chief followed them. Previously to his departure, however, he solicited from the governor a small keg of whiskey, declaring his intention to take it with him, and not to drink it in the settlement. His request was granted; he pursued the Kickapoos up the Wabash; finding them encamped on the bank of the river, he landed, took the keg in one hand, and his gun in the other, passed along the tents of the Kickapoos, selected a young warrior as the victim of his revenge, and understanding that an old woman who was present was his mother, gave her the whiskey; here, said he, take this that you may be enabled to cry for your son, whom I am about to kill, immediately shot him down, and with his own warriors raised the war whoop, and returned leisurely to his canoe. The Kickapoos are accounted the bravest of the Indians, yet they suffered him to depart. The presenting of the whiskey

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to the mother of the young warrior who was killed, proceeded from what he supposed a principle of humanity. The Indians think it a great disgrace for a warrior to shed tears on any account, unless he be drunk; it is then attributed to the whiskey, and no disgrace is attached to it. It is not absolutely forbidden for a woman to cry when sober, but it is nevertheless considered much more decorous to do so when intoxicated.

NOTE VII. Page 330.

Eleazar D. Wood was born in Massachusetts in the town of Lunenburg, on the 22nd January, 1785, but removed with his parents to Plattsburgh, New-York, at an early period of his life. Active and persevering, and of such a penetrating mind, with a cheerful, sociable disposition, he became a favorite with his acquaintances, and accumulated many friends, and made few enemies indeed. Having a strong thirst for knowledge, as well as an ardent desire for distinction, he entered the military academy at West Point in 1805. He obtained a second lieutenant's commission, and became attached to the corps of engineers, and was employed in the construction and repair of fortifications. In the autumn of 1812 he had orders to repair to the head quarters of General Harrison, then in command of the North western army.

The following remarks upon the character of this respectable gentleman and brave soldier are from the pen of his brother in arms, the gallant Col. C. S. Todd, of Kentucky, in a letter to General Harrison, dated 24th May, 1824, and now deposited with the rest of the documents which have been made the ground work of this history. It is much regretted that the work has accumulated so much as to preclude the further enlargement of this sketch; it is therefore entirely confined to the letter of the colonel, who has expressed himself in the following words.

“ May 28, 1824.

“ Dear Sir: I send some materials, collected in 1815—16, for a biography of Colonel Wood. They relate chiefly to his early life, and the official notices of his conduct in the late war. These, however, afford a very imperfect idea of his merits as a man or as an officer. He was as distinguished for his social dispositions as for gallantry in the field. Of this no man evinced more conspicuous proofs in the war. He was signalized in six general actions, in the last of which he fell, a generous victim to his confidence in the New-York regiment of 1000 militia, with which he most gallantly carried the British batteries on the 17th September, 1814. If he had commanded regular troops he would have been brought off the field as Ripley and Trimble were, with much severer wounds. He was bayoneted by the British while in the act of tendering his sword, and met the fate extended to Mercer. The British general paid him a high compliment on learning that he had been killed. ‘I rejoice,’ says he, ‘because now there may be some chance of capturing the American army.’

“ Wood was distinguished at fort Meigs for his pleasant temper and cool conduct in time of danger. On one occasion, while at breakfast with Croghan and O’Fallon, a bomb, by bursting near them, having covered the table with dirt, he remarked with great sang froid after quickly removing it, ‘let us make haste and finish our meal before another shot disturb us.’

“ You mention with great propriety in one of your letters to the secretary of war that Wood’s genius best fitted him to the command of a partizan corps, and general Brown has done himself great credit by giving the chief merit to Wood and McRee of saving his army.

“ On the night of the 25 July, at Lundy’s Lane, Wood was approached by a British sergeant, and accosted as general Drummond. He promptly encouraged the delusion. The sergeant, while giving Colonel Wood important information as to the posture of the British troops, was ordered to come nearer, as he (Col. Wood personifying Drummond) was rather deaf, by which means he captured the sergeant in a manner showing his presence of mind, and generosity, and obtained very desirable intelligence for general Brown. In the affair of the Thames he very chivalrously saved my life by cutting down a British sergeant, who had (treacherously after capture) endeavoured to shoot me.

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"I have been credibly informed that Wood planned the sortie on the 17th September at fort Erie, and mentioned at the time to general Brown that he took the project from your sortie at fort Meigs.

"I beg that you will preserve these materials, and believe me truly yours,

"GEN. W. H. HARRISON."

"C. S. TODD.

NOTE VIII. Page 374.

Columbia Township, Hamilton county, O. Jan. 16, 1813.

GEN. W. H. HARRISON,

Dear Sir: The anxiety of your fellow citizens has been excited, (and we hope you will pardon our intruding a few lines on you, which were drawn up in haste at a large meeting of the citizens of Hamilton and Clermont counties, for the particulars of which we refer you to the Liberty Hall,) to find you intend to retire from the command of our army at the expiration of the present campaign.

With deep regret do we contemplate the discontent that will prevail in the army, by your withdrawing from a station which your presence seems indispensably necessary for a continuance of that discipline and harmony, and implicit confidence, which we feel confident no other commander which government may please to appoint will ensure. We have therefore been constrained to address you in this way, as a manifestation of our ardent wishes for you to continue the command until we shall by petition obtain a commission for you which shall place you at the head of the north-western army during the present war.

When we reflect on your past life, the honourable stations you have filled with unremitting zeal and fidelity, the general satisfaction which has prevailed wherever your authority has extended, your known attachment to liberty and the honour and good weal of your country, we anticipated a favourable answer from you, that you will devote a few more days or years in the service of your country. You, Sir, are aware of the necessity of a beloved commander in an army, the great advantage of soldiers obeying for love above that of fear: the presence of a beloved general animating his men by good example, adds fresh vigour to the war-worn soldier, warms their hearts, and arms them with undaunted courage, and they will perform to admiration—such scenes you, Sir, have experienced, and they will ever be held in grateful remembrance by your friends and your country. By order of the meeting,

JOHN ARMSTRONG, *Chairman.*

DAVID M'GAUGHEY, *Secretary.*

TOWN MEETING.

At a very large and respectable meeting of the citizens of Cincinnati and its vicinity, at the court-house, on Saturday evening, for the purpose of consultation on the critical situation and safety of our country, Gen. John S. Gano was appointed chairman, and George P. Torrence esq. secretary. On motion, Jacob Burnet, esq., C. A. Brown, esq., Capt. R. Fosdick, N. Longworth, esq., and Daniel Reeder, esq., were appointed a committee to report suitable resolutions. The committee retired for half an hour, and reported the following, which were unanimously adopted.

1. *Resolved*, That this meeting have heard the details of the distressing conflict at the river Raisin with the most poignant grief, but they do not for a moment despair; having the fullest reliance on the abilities and will of the nation to repair and avenge the loss, and that we will hold ourselves in readiness to repair to the standard of our country when our services shall be necessary.

2. *Resolved*, That this meeting have the highest confidence in the military talents, experience, and patriotism of General William Henry Harrison, and should view his retiring from the army at this time as a national disaster that ought to be deprecated by every friend to the prosperity of the United States.

3. *Resolved*, That the great disaster at the river Raisin has not in the least degree diminished our confidence in the abilities, vigilance, and activity of General Harrison, but has rather served to strengthen and confirm it; because it appears that the movement to that exposed position was made without his

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orders; and his prompt and vigorous efforts to succour the detachment immediately after he had been informed of its situation, evinces the correctness of his judgment, his knowledge of the ability of the enemy, and his anxious solicitude for the safety of his troops, and the honour of the American arms.

4. *Resolved*, As the sense of this meeting, that General Harrison has a just claim to a higher and more permanent rank in the army than has yet been conferred on him by his country, and that in our opinion the public service would be greatly advanced by placing him in the situation for which his talents so eminently qualify him; and that he is the man of all others most likely to unite the confidence of the western people.

NOTE IX. Page 438.

"Father, listen to your children! You have them now all before you.

"The war before this, our British father gave the hatchet to his red children, when our old chiefs were alive. They are now dead. In the war our father was thrown on his back by the Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge; and we are afraid that our father will do so again at this time.

"Summer before last, when I came forward with my red brethren, and was ready to take up the hatchet in favour of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurry, that he had not yet determined to fight the Americans.

"*Listen!* When war was declared, our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk and told us that he was then ready to strike the Americans; that he wanted our assistance; and that he would certainly get us our lands back, which the Americans had taken from us.

"*Listen!* You told us, at that time, to bring forward our families to this place, and we did so; and you promised to take care of them, and they should want for nothing, while the men would go and fight the enemy; that we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's garrisons; that we knew nothing about them, and that our father would attend to that part of the business. You also told your red children that you would take good care of your garrison here, which made our hearts glad.

"*Listen!* When we were last at the Rapids it is true we gave you little assistance. It is hard to fight people who live like groundhogs.

"*Father, listen!* Our fleet has gone out; we know they have fought; we have heard the great guns; but we know nothing of what has happened to our father with one arm.* Our ships have gone one way, and we are much astonished to see our father tying up every thing and preparing to run away the other, without letting his red children know what his intentions are. You always told us to remain here, and take care of our lands; it made our hearts glad to hear that was your wish. Our great father, the king, is the head, and you represent him. You always told us you would never draw your foot off British ground; but now, father, we see you are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our father's conduct to a fat dog, that carries its tail upon its back, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off.

"*Father, listen!* The Americans have not yet defeated us by land; neither are we sure that they have done so by water; we therefore wish to remain here, and fight our enemy, should they make their appearance. If they defeat us, we will then retreat with our father.

"At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans certainly defeated us; and when we returned to our father's fort at that place the gates were shut against us. We were afraid that it would now be the case; but instead of that, we now see our British father preparing to march out of his garrison.

"*Father!* You have got the arms and ammunition which our great father sent for his red-children. If you have an idea of going away, give them to us, and you may go and welcome for us. Our lives are in the hands of the Great Spirit. We are determined to defend our lands, and if it be his will, we wish to leave our bones upon them."

* Commodore Barclay.

